Footnotes: Herwig Hofmann, 'A Hierarchy of Norms …...(1)I am grateful to Dirk Bornemann, Dorothee...

This annex is part of the study "Joseph H.H. Weiler, Certain Rectangular Problems of European Integration"

Footnotes: Herwig Hofmann, 'A Hierarchy of Norms for the EC-Treaty'

(1)I am grateful to Dirk Bornemann, Dorothee Fischer-Appelt and Annette Elisabeth Töller for their most valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Responsibility for errors is entirely my own.

According to the Declaration (No. 16) to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union (1992 O.J. (C 191) 101), the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to be convened in 1996 will "examine to what extent it might be possible to review the classification of Community acts with a view to establishing an appropriate hierarchy between the different categories of act."

(2) Le champ d'application de la codécision - rapport de la Commission au titre de l'Article 189 b paragraphes du Traité, July 2, 1996, SEC(96)1225/4.

(3) See e.g.: Claude Blumann, Le parlement européen et la comitologie: une complication pour la Conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, 32 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (RTDE) 1, 17 et. seq. (1996).

(4) See e.g.: Paul Craig, Democracy and Rulemaking Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment, 1996 W.G. Hart Legal Workshop working paper.

(5) Bull. EC 6-1990, I.35.; Bull. EC 10-1990, I.4.

(6) For a review of the discussions on the IGC see: Jim Cloos et al., Le Traité de Maastricht 369-373 (1994); Enrico Martial, Italy and the European Political Union 146 (Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, 1992)

(7) The Italian delegation's proposals are published as Annex 4, Typology of Community acts (Italian Delegation), to Doc. 9233/2/90; also published in: Maastricht in der Analyse 223 (Wener Weidenfeld ed., 1994); The Italian proposals have been repeated in regard to the 1996 IGC at various occasions e.g. by the Italian Foreign Secretary of the time, Susanna Agnelli, in her speach of May 23, 1995 at the Italian Parliament and the "Position of the Italian Government on the Intergovernmental Conference for the Revision of the Treaties", March 18, 1996.

(8) The 1984-draft Treaty distinguishes between constitutional laws (amendments of the Treaty are subject of the procedure described in Art. 84), ordinary laws and regulations concerning the modalities of the application of the laws (Art. 34). Each group of norms has its own decision making procedures and institutional responsibilities. The draft Treaty though also provided for a classical threefold division of powers with the EP and the Council as bicameral legislator (Art.36) and the Commission as executive (Art. 40). See: Francesco Capotorti et al., Le Traité d'Union Européenne 130 (1985); Francesco Capotorti et al., Der Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Union 127 (1986).

(9) Second Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the constitutional basis of European Union, 12 November 1990, Rapporteur: Mr. Emilio Colombo, EP Doc. A3-0301/90; Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conferences in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union, 22 November 1990, O.J. 1990 (No. C 324) 219, 233; Resolution on the enhancement of democratic legitimacy in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, EP Doc. B3-0551/91, O.J. 1991 (No. C 129) 134, 135; Resolution on the nature of Community acts, EP Doc. A3-0085/91, O.J. 1991 (No. C 129) 136 - 138.

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(10) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 117 - 119 and 121 - 123.

(11) 1992 O.J. (C 191) 101.

(12) Discussion outlined in the: Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21), 35; EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the relationships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, March 15, 1995, PE 211.103/ rev.

For the literature: Europa: Der unmögliche Status quo 106 et. seq. (Club von Florenz ed., 1996); Alan Dashwood, Democracy, Accountability and Transparancy 92 et. seq. (Alan Dashwood ed., Reviewing Maastricht Isssues for the 1996 IGC, 1996); Siegfried Magiera, Zur Reform der Normenhierarchie im Recht der Europäischen Union, 18 Integration 197 (1995); Antonio Tizzano, La hiérarchie des normes communautaires, 1995 Revue du marché commun de l'Unique Européenne (RMC) 219, 228.

(13) Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective (Gerd Winter ed., 1996).

(14) Le champ d'application de la codécision - rapport de la Commission au titre de l'Article 189 b paragraphes du Traité, July 2, 1996, SEC(96)1225/4.

(15) European Parliament, Committee on Instituional Affairs, Report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - implementation and development of the Union, May 17, 1995, EP Doc. A4-0102/95/Part I.A, No. 29 - 34; Commission Européenne, Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Traité sur l'Union Européenne, May 10, 1995, 23; Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Traité sur l'Union Européenne, March 14, 1995, SN 1821/95, 9-10;

from the literature: Claude Blumann, Le parlement européen et la comitologie: une complication pour la Conférence intergouvernementale de 1996, 32 RTDE 1, 17 et. seq. (1996); Justus Lipsius, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, ELR 235, 262 - 265 (1995); Jean-Dominique Nuttens, La «comitologie» et la conférence intergouvernementale, 1996 RMC 314 et. seq.; Jean Claude Piris, Après Maastricht, les institutions communautaires sont-elles plus efficaces, plus démocratiques et plus transparentes?, 30 RTDE 1, 12-20, 28 (1994); Massimo Silvestro, Modifications des procédures législatives à la suite du Traité sur l'Union Européenne et renforcement des procédures de contrôle politique et administratif, 1995 RMC 169, 171- 172.

(16) See e.g.: Blumann (1996), supra note , at 20 et seq.

(17) Definition of the terminology: Roland Bieber and Bettina Kahil, "Organic Law" in the European Union (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(18) Hans Smit, Peter Herzog eds., The Law of the European Economic Community, Volume 5, 5-579.

(19) An example is the simplified Treaty amendment procedure of Art. 165 (4) and 166 (3) ECT, in which the Council may increase the number of judges and advocates general at the ECJ. Similar provisions are enshrined in Art.138 (3) ECT for a uniform procedure for direct universal suffrage for elections to the EP and in Art. 201 regarding the own resources of the Community.

(20) Art. 31 (1) EP 1994 Draft Constitution of the European Union states that organic laws regulate



"in particular the composition, the tasks or activities of the institutions and organs of the Union"; see also: Art. 34 (2), 38 EP draft Treaty on European Union; commented in: Capotorti et al., supra note , at Art. 34, 38.

(21) The proposals including the category of organic laws usually contain a list of matters deemed important enough to be decided by the more complicated decisional process than for simple legislation (e.g. Art. 38 of the 1984 EP draft Treaty Establishing the Europen Union). The 1984 EP Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union lists e.g. the organisation and the functional process of the Union's institutions, (Art. 14 (2) Parliament, Art. 18 parliamentary right of investigation, Art. 26 Commission, Art. 30 (3), 42 and 43 Court of Justice and legal control of the Union), of its authorities (Art. 33 (1), (2) The Court of Auditors and alike), questions of monetary policy (Art. 52 (3)) or the decision about the location of organisations (Art. 85 ) as well as inner-Community decision making proceedures for Treaty amendments (Art. 7 (3)) and all the cases of competence similar to todays Art. 235 ECT (Art 12 (2)).

(22) Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle v. Köster, 1970 E.C.R 1161.

(23) Case 6/71, Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1971 E.C.R. 823, 841; Case 34/78, Yoshida Nederland BV v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Friesland 1979 E.C.R. 115; Case 114/78,Yoshida GmbH v. Industrie- und Handelskammer Kassel, 1979 E.C.R. 151; Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Capotorti delivered on 13 December 1978, 1979 E.C.R. 137, 140; for a precise summary see: Hans Smit, Peter Herzog eds., The Law of the European Economic Community, Volume 5, 5-579 - 5-580.

(24) Case 38/70, Deutsche Tradax GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1971 E.C.R. 145, 154.

(25) Case 25/70, Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E.C.R 1161; Case 23/75, Rey Soda v. Cassa Caonguaglio Zucchero, 1975 E.C.R. 1279; Case 16/88, Commission v. Council, 1989 E.C.R. 3457; Case C-240/90, Federal Republik of Germany v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, 5423; see also: Magiera, supra note , at 200.

(26) Council Decision of 13 July, 1987 on the definition of the modalities of the implementation power conferred upon the Commission, 1987 O.J. (No. L 197) 33; Modus Vivendi between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementation measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 189 b of the EC Treaty of Janurary 18, 1995, 1995 O.J. (No. C 43) 40; see also: Koen Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community, 28 C.M.L.Rev. 11, 17 (1991).

(27) Magiera, supra note , at 200 et. seq.

(28)The Italian delegation's declarartion on the Typology of Community acts published as Annex 4, Typology of Community acts (Italian Delegation), to Doc. 9233/2/90; also published in: Maastricht in der Analyse, 223 (Werner Weidenfeld ed., 1994).

(29) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122.

(30) Kieran St. Clair Bradley, The European Court and the Legal Basis of Community Legislation, 13 E.L.R. 379-402 (1988); Markus Heintzen, Hierarchisierungsprozesse innerhalb des Primärrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 29 Europarecht (EuR) 35 - 49 (1994).

Whether there are formal or subject-matter related exemptions to the rule of formal equivalence



between primary Treaty law has been element of recent discussions, see e.g.: Roland Bieber, Les limites matérielles et formelles à la révision des traités, 1993 RMC 343-350; José Luis da Cruz Vilaça, Nuno Piçarra, Ya-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités instituant les communautés européennes?, 29 Cahiers de droit européen (CDE) 3-37 (1993).

(31) Bengt Beutler et al., Die Europäische Union 204 (4. Auflage, 1993).

(32) Case C-300/89 (Titanium-Dioxide) Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-2867, para. 22 - 25; Case 68/86, United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 855, para. 14 - 22; Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, papra. 12 - 23; Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v. Council, 1979 E.C.R. 2161; Case 83/78, Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 1978 E.C.R. 2347.

(33) Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, para. 11.

(34) Case 187/93, Parliament v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-2857, para. 17 - 29; Case C-70/88, (Chernobyl I ) Parliament v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-4529 para. 9; Case C-300/89 (Titanium-Dioxide) Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-2867, para. 10; Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493, para. 11, 12.

(35) Case 5/73, Balkan - Import - Export v. Hauptzollamt Berlin Packhof, 1973 E.C.R. 1091.

(36) For an exact list of 22 different procedures (which do not contain the possibility of combinations of several procedures): Jean Claude Piris, Après Maastricht, les institutions communautaires sont-elles plus efficaces, plus démocratiques et plus transparentes?, 30 RTDE 1, 20 , Footnote 96 (1994).

(37) Informative is the "Rapport sur le fonctionnnement du traité sur l'Union Européenne" of the Commission of Mai 10, 1995 in which it states that: "La ventilation des différents procédures selon les domaines d'action ne répond à aucune logique apparente: - ainsi, trois domaines aussi importants que la politique agricole, celle des transports et le marché intérieur, sont respectivement soumis aux trois procédures de consultation simple, de coopération et de codécision; - des domaines étroitement liés comme les transports et les résaux sont en partie soumis à des procédures différentes (coopération et codécision); - à l'intérieur d'une même politique, il arrive que plusieurs procédures coexsistent; les cas les plus évidents étant l'environnement, la récherche et la cohésion économique et sociale."

(38) For a criticism of the 'de minimis' rule: Kieran St: Clair Bradley, L'arret dioxyde de titiane un jugement de salomon?, 28 C.D.E. 609, 615 (1992).

(39) Case C-300/89, (Titanium-Dioxide) Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. I-2867, para. 17 - 24.

For an overall view of the ECJ's decisional practice, see: Beutler et al. supra note 31, at 205; Siegfried Breier, Das Schickasl der Titandioxidrichtlinie, 1993 EuZW, 315 - 318; Bradley (1988), supra note , at 379 -402; Bradley (1992), supra note , at 612 et.seq.; Astrid Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Umweltschutz und Verwirklichung des Binnenmarktes - "Harmonisierung" der Rechtsgrundlagen?, 47 Juristen Zeitung (JZ) 564, 566-568 (1992); Thomas Schröer, Mehr Demokratie statt umweltpolitischer Subsidiarität?, 26 EuR 356 (1991); Dimitris Triantafyllou, Vom Vertrags- zum Gesetzesvorbehalt: Beitrag zum positiven Rechtmäßigkeitsprinzip in der EG 61 - 66 (1996).

(40) Case 187/93, (Regulation on shipments of waste) Parliament v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-2857, No. 17 - 29; Case C-271/94, (Edicom) Parliament v. Council, 1996 EuZW 416 L; Case C-360/93, Parliament v. Council, 1996 EuZW 403.

(41) Bradley (1992), supra note , at 629; Triantafyllou, supra note , at 66.

(42) E.g. the Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty



establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122.

(43) Meinhard Hilf, Die Richtline der EG - ohne Richtung, ohne Linie?, 28 EuR 1- 22 (1993); Thijmen Koopmans, Regulations, directives measures 691, 692 (Ole Due, Markus Lutter & Jürgen Schwarze eds., Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, Band I, 1995).

(44) For the scope of private law approximation see: P.C. Müller-Graff, Private law unification by means other than codification 22 (A.S. Hartkamp et.al. eds., Towards a European Civil Code, 1994); for the practice of ECJ case law e.g.: Case 247/85, Commission v. Belgium, 1987 E.C.R. 3029.

(45) Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich et al. v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. I-5357, para. 17-21; Case C-208/90, Emmott, 1991 E.C.R. I-4269, para. 20-24; Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken v. Handelsonderneming Moormann BV, 1988 E.C.R. 4689, para. 21-24; Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, para. 25 - 30; Case 148/78, Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, para. 20 - 23.

(46) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 35.

(47) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122; Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, EP Resolution of 14 February 1984, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33.

(48) EP Draft Constitution of the European Union, Art. 31 (4), 1994 O.J. (No. C 61) 155, 162; EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts of April 18, 1991, Art 189, 1991 O.J. (No. C 129) 136, 138; Second Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the constitutional basis of European Union, November 12, 1990, EP Doc. A3-301/90, No. 43; Hilf (1993), supra note , at 19; Magiera, supra note , at 206.

(49) Many signes seem to point at the fact that even if the Treaty amendments as result of the current IGC might reduce the overall number of decisional procedures, the case-by-case approach will not be relinquished. The Commission in its report on the scope of the codecision procedure which will be the basis of further debate advises to maintain a sort of case-by-case definition of the appropriate decisional procedure for the single subject matter by setting up a catalogue of matters. see: SEC(96)1225/4 Commission Européenne, July 2, 1996, Le champ d'application de la codécision - rapport de la Commission au titre de l'article 189 B paragraphes du traité.

(50) Bieber (1993)¸ supra note , at 343-350; M. Luisa Fernandez Estel, Constitutional Values and Principles in the Community Legal Order, 2 Maastricht Journal 129-144 (1995); da Cruz Vilaça & Piçarra,supra note , at 3-37. According to Bieber "le noyau 'dur' de ce droit commun est constitué par deux valeurs fondamentales, il s'agit: - d'une part, dans la terminologie de l'article F du traité de Maastricht: 'des traditions constitutionnelles communes aux Etats membres en tant que principes généraux du droit communautaire' et d'autre part: - de l'identité de 'l'union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples de l'Europe 'Ce noyau dur constitue la limite matériel des futures réformes des traités."; according to Da Cruz Vilaça & Piçarra at 33, "Les objectifs fondamentaux qui découlent du traité, pour essentiel, les articles 2 et 3, d'un côté, et l'article 164, de l'autre, fonctionneraient commes des limites matérielles implicites à sa [the EC Treaty's] révision."

Oposing this sort of distinction: Markus Heintzen, Hierarchisierungsprozesse innerhalb des Primärrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1994 EuR 35-49; Yves Petit, Art. N T.U.E, note 24 (Vlad Constantinesco & Robert Kovar & Denys Simon eds., Traité sur l' Union Européenne, 1995).

(51) For the vast literature to this subject see e.g.: Armin von Bogdandy & Wolfgang Nettersheim,



Die Europäische Union: Ein einheitlicher Verband mit einheitlicher Rechtsordnung? 31 EuR 3-26 (1996); Deidre Curtin, The Shaping of a European Constitution and the 1996 IGC: «Flexiblity» as a Key Paradigm?, 50 Aussenwirtschaft 237 (1995); Renaud Dehousse, Europe after Maastricht: an ever closer union? 13, 14 (1994); Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Aspects of European Constitutionalism, 21 E.L.R. 32 (1996); Meinhard Hilf, Eine Verfassung für die Europäische Union: Zum Entwurf des Institutionellen Ausschusses des Europäischen Parlaments, 17 Integration 68 (1994); Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, How can the European Union be Constitutionalized? The European Parliament's 1994 Proposal for a «Constitution for the European Union», 50 Aussenwirtschaft 171, 185-187 (1995); Martin Seidel, Basic Aspects of a European Constitution, 50 Aussenwirtschaft 221 (1995); Werner Weidenfeld ed., Reform der Europäischen Union, 38-45 (1995).

(52) In the context of the following chapter when the "hierarchy suggestions" are addressed, this term will refer to the core of the suggestions outlined above in part B which all the existing proposals have in common. Such are basically the suggestions to introduce a division between legislative and implementary matters and to submit the legislative matters to the codesion procedure.

(53) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21); see also in general on future reform agendas: Club von Florenz, supra note , at 21 et. seq.

(54) Petersmann, supra note , at 180-184; Silvestro, supra note , at 172; In general: Roland Bieber, Europäische Gesetzgebung nach dem Vertrag von Maastricht, 9 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung (ZfG) 297, 315 (1994).

(55) EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the relationships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, March 15, 1995, PE 211.103/ rev., page 2.

(56) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 121.

(57) Bieber (1994), supra note , at 315; Petersmann, supra note , at 201.

(58) EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the relationships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, March 15, 1995, PE 211.103/ rev., 2.

(59) EP Resolution on the enhancement of democratic legitimacy in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, EP Doc. B3-0551/91, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 134.

(60) Seccond Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the constitutional basis of European Union Rapporteur: Emilio Colombo, EP Doc. A3-0301/90, Nov. 12 1990, page 16; Justus Lipsius, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, 1995 E.L.R. 235, 256; Petersmann, supra note , at 201; Silvestro,supra note , at 170.

(61) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 121; :Speach by Jaques Delors at the EP on April 17, 1991, Hearings of the EP 17.4.91 Nr. 3-404/ 138.

(62) Hilf (1994), supra note , at 69; Petersmann (1995), supra note , at 174.

(63) Annette Elisabeth Töller, Europapolitik im Bundestag, 33 (1995).

(64) Joined Cases 281, 283-285, 287/85, Germany and others v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R 3203; T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law 110 (1994).



(65) Thomas Bruha, Das Demokratisierungsdilemma der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 19 (Beiträge und Berichte des Instituts für Politikwissenschaften der Hochschule St. Gallen, Band 134/1989); Beate Wieland, Verfassungspolitische Probleme der "Staatswerdung Europas" 429-459 (Rudolf Wildenmann ed., Staatswerdung Europas?, 1991).

(66)Weidenfeld (1994), supra note , at 28.

(67)J.H.H.Weiler et. al., European Democracy and Its Critique -- Five Uneasy Pieces, (EUI Working papers No. 95/11) 3.

(68)J.H.H.Weiler et. al. (1995), supra note , at 3.

(69)Christian Kirchner & Andreas Schwarze, Legitimationsprobleme in einer Europäischen Verfassung, 1995 Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 183, 188.

(70) Michael Zürn, Über den Staat und die Demokratie in der Europäischen Union, 11 (Michael Zürn & Ulrich Preuß, Probleme einer Verfassung für Europa, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 3/95), citing: Andrew Moravcsik, Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation, Harvard University Working Paper Series # 52, Cambridge, Mass.

(71)Zürn, supra note , at 19, 20.

(72) In general: Gráinne de Búrca, The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 The Modern Law Review 349 (1996); Birgit Suski, Das Europäische Parlament: Volksvertretung ohne Volk und Macht? (1996).

(73) J.H.H. Weiler, Europäisches Parlament, europäische Integration, Demokratie und Legitimität 80 - 82 (Otto Schmuck & Wolfgang Wessels eds., Das Europäische Parlament im dynamischen Integrationsprozess: auf der Suche nach einem zeitgemäßen Leitbild, 1989).

(74)Rainer Lepsius, Nationalstaat oder Nationalitätenstaat als Modell für die Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 19, 29 (Rudolf Wildenmann ed., Staatswerdung Europas?, 1991).

(75)Weiler et al. (1995), supra note , at 6.

(76)Weiler et al. (1995), supra note , at 6.

(77) Bruha, supra note , at 15; Weiler (1989), supra note , at 78 - 80; Beate Wieland, Ein Markt - Zwölf Regierungen? Zur Organisation der Macht in der europäischen Verfassung 118 (1992).

(78) Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would be Polity 40 (1970); Oskar Niedermayer, Bevölkerungsorientierung gegenüber dem politischen System der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 323 (Rudolf Wildenmann ed., Staatswerdung Europas? 1991).

(79) According to Zürn there are basically three factors of interdependence which constitute collective identity: One is the interdependence of the effects of decisions, so to say, the borders within which the decisions can influence reality. The second factor is whether this interdependence of effects is respected and taken into account in society. This entails a certain subjective, strategic approach. Collective identity though only comes to existence with the third factor - the emergence of common social interests which relate to the real problem boundaries which could be called the interdependence of interest (Zürn, supra note , at 17,18).

(80)Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Integration und Demokratie 55 (Markus Jachtenfuchs & Beate Kohler-Koch, Europäische Integration, 1996); Weidenfeld, supra note , at 38; Weiler et. al. (1995), supra



note , at 9.

(81)Kielmansegg, supra note , at 55: "Warum gibt es keine belastbare kollektive Identiät der Europäer als Europäer? Die Antwort lautet: Es sind Kommunikations-, Erfahrungs- und Erinnerungsgemeinschaften, in denen kollektive Identität sich herausbildet, sich stabilisiert, tradiert wird. Europa, auch das engere Westeuropa, ist keine Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, kaum eine Erinnerungsgemeinschaft und nur sehr begrenzt eine Erfahrungsgemeinschaft".

(82)Decision of the German Constitutional Court of October 12, 1993; BVerfGE 89, 115, No. 40-44.

(83)Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale Law Yournal 2403, 2472 (1991); Zürn, supra note , at 18.

(84) From this point of view, Weiler noted that one could even argue that: "At its starkest, this critical view claims that in terms of social legitimacy no difference exists between a decision of the Council of Ministers and a decision of the EP. To the electorate, both chambers present themselves as legislative composed of Member State's representatives" (Weiler (1991), supra note , at 2473).

(85) Weiler (1991), supra note , at 2473; Wieland, supra note , at 136; Zürn, supra note , at 29.

(86) Beate Kohler-Koch, Die Gestaltungsmacht organisierter Interessen 193, 214 et.seq. (Beate Kohler-Koch & Markus Jachtenfuchs, Europäische Integration, 1996).

(87) See above at page 18.

(88) Piris, supra note , at 20 - 26.

(89) Bruha, supra note , at 15.

(90) Roland Bieber, Democratization of the European Community through the European Parliament, 46 Aussenwirtschaft 391, 403 (1991).

(91) Bieber (1991), supra note , at 403.

(92) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) para 78 - 80.

(93) Kielmansegg, supra note , at 51.

(94) This approach is openly declared to be the basis of the British EU policy, see e.g. The U.K. Government's White Paper on the IGC "A Partnership of Nations" issued on March 12, 1996, according to which: "Above all, we [the British Government] shall be guided by a cool assessment of the British interest. Common European decision-making, as opposed to cooperation, can only be justified where it brings benefits for the British security, prosperity and quality of life which are so significant that they justify some loss of unfetted national control over the decision-making in the area concerned, or where common action enables nation states to exercise joint control which is not open to them individually".

(95) Ulrich K. Preuß, Chancen und Grenzen einer Verfassungsgebung für Europa 60 et. seq. (Michael Zürn & Ulrich Preuß, Probleme einer Verfassung für Europa, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 3/95).

(96) From the aspect of efficiency, the negotiations at the IGC preceding the Treaty of Maastricht had, as Cloos et al. report, found that "un système où l'application d'une procédure aussi lourde à des actes même d'importance secondaire conduirait à l'asphyxie législative. Il fallait, en d'autre termes,



limiter le champ d'application d'une éventuelle codécision à des actes vraiment importants. C'est dans ce contexte que s'engageait la réflexion sur la hiérarchie des normes ou la typologie des actes." (Cloos et al., supra note , at 369).

(97) When majority voting would be increased this would mainly effect the matters which currently are decided by the assent procedure (avis conforme) to which mostly the Council has to decide unanimously (e.g. Art. 8 a (2) EC - Treaty, exercise of the citizens' right to move and reside; Art. 106 (5) EC - Treaty, amendment of the ESCB's statutes; Art. 138 (3) ECT, uniform procedures for elections).

Of course the argument that it would be simplistic to assume that strengthening efficiency within the EU is above all connected with eliminating the unanimity vote in the Council Piris (supra note , at 27), is justified, but it would nevertheless have considerable effect.

(98)Bruha, supra note , at 23; Hans Peter Ipsen, Zur Executivrechtsetzung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 425-441(Peter Badura & Rupert Scholz, Wege und Verfahren des Verfassungslebens, 1993), at 427 - 430; Wieland (1992), supra note , at 136.

(99)1993 O.J. (C 329) 132-142.

(100)Report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - implementation and development of the Union, 12 May 1995, EP Doc A4-0102/95/PART I.A; Rapport sur le fonctionnement du traité sur l'Union Européenne, 14 March 1995, SN 1821/95, 13.

(101)Commission Européenne, Rapport sur le fonctionnement du traité sur l'Union Européenne, 10 May 1995, 19.

(102) Sophie Boyron, Maastricht and the Codecision procedure: A sucess story, 45 I.C.L.Q. 293-318 (1996).

(103)Arved Deringer, Europäisches Parlament und Maastrichturteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 245, 253 (Ole Due et al. eds., Festschrift für Ulrich Everling, 1995).

(104)Ipsen (1993), supra note , at 428.

(105)Eberhard Grabitz et al., Direktwahl und Demokratisierung - Eine Funktionenbilanz des Europäischen Parlaments nach der ersten Wahlperiode (1988).

(106)Grabitz et al., supra note , at 659, 660.

(107)Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 121.

(108)Tizzano, supra note , at 226.


(110) Müller-Graff, supra note , at 22.

(111) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 2, 23; From the literature see e.g.: Hilf (1993),supra note , at 69; Petersmann,supra note , at 174.

(112)Clauia Wilming, Institutionelle Konsequenzen einer Erweiterung der Europäischen Union: Eine



ökonomische Analyse der Entscheidungsverfahren im Ministerrat 47, 197 (1995).

(113)Kielmansegg , supra note , at 70.

(114) Ipsen (1993), supra note , at 434, 435.

(115) On the discussions within the IGC in the run-up to the Treaty of Maastricht: Cloos et al., supra note , at 370, 371.

(116) Hans Peter Ipsen, Zur Tragfähigkeit der Verfassungsprinzipien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 9, 23 (Jürgen Schawarze & Roland Bieber eds., Eine Verfassung für Europa, 1984); Ipsen (1993), supra note , at 430 - 435.

(117)Case C-70/88, (Chernobyl I) Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. I-2041, para. 21; see also e.g.: Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle v. Köster, 1970 E.C.R 1161; Case 138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333; Joined Cases 188-190/ 80, French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2545.

(118) Club von Florenz, supra note , at 66 et. seq.

(119)Roland Bieber, The Settlement of Institutional Conflicts on the Basis of Art. 4 of the EEC Treaty, 21 C.M.L.Rev. 505, 519 (1984).

(120)Hellen Wallace, Die Dynamik des EU-Institutionengefüges 141, 143 et. seq. (Markus Jachtenfuchs & Beate Kohler-Koch eds., Europäische Integration, 1996): The citations are an excerpt from the original text in English language on file with the editor.

(121)Koen Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community, 28 C.M.L.Rev. 11, 12 (1991).

(122) See on the distinction also: Massimo La Torre, Democracy and Tensions Representation, Majority Principle and Fundamental Rights, EUI Working Paper Law No. 95/5, 25 et. seq.

(123) Koen Lenaerts (1991), supra note , at 14.

(124)Joined Cases 188-190/ 80, French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2545.

(125)Alan Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers, 21 ELR 113, 127 (1996).

(126)Lenaerts (1991), supra note , at 15: which "are important in terms of policy but limited as to their number".

(127) Antonio Tizzano, The Instruments of Community Law and the Hierarchy of Norms 207, 216 (Jan A. Winter et. al. eds., Reforming the Treaty on European Union, 1996) explanes the problem as follows: „Another objection raised is that in the Community system there is no distinction between legislative and executive power. But this observation is partly unfounded, since, albeit in a very singular way, there is such a distinction between the role of the Council and the EP and that of the Commission; to some extent, it is not conclusive, since in State systems the two functions are not necessarily assigned exclusively to one specific authority, in the sense that executive acts are also adopted by legislative bodies and vice versa. But, above all, when it comes down to it the remark is question-begging, in so far as, if the division between the legislative and the executive is not clearly defined in the Community system, this is partly because the Community system makes no clear distinction between legislative and executive acts: such a distinction can be created precisely by



defining a hierarchy between acts".

(128)Ipsen (1993), supra note , at 438-441.

(129)Rainer Pitschas, Europäische Integration als Netzwerkkoordination komplexer Staatsaufgaben, 5 Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 503, 504 (1994); Preuß, supra note , at 60.

(130) Armin von Bogdandy, Supranationale Union als neuer Herrschaftstypus: Entstaatlichung und Vergemeinschaftung in staatstheoretischer Perspektive, 16 INTEGRATION 210, 217 (1993).

(131) Ipsen (1993), supra note , at 435; British Government's White Paper on the IGC "A Partnership of Nations" issued on March 12, 1996, pages 4, 5.

(132)Bieber (1991), supra note , at 391, 395.

(133)Case 138/79, Roquette Frères v. Council, 1980 E.C.R 3333, para. 33.


(135)To which Art. 8 b (1) ECT gives every citizen of the Union the right to vote when living in another Member State within certain restrictions.

(136)Weiler et. al. (1995), supra note , at 21.

(137) Piris, supra note , at 14.

(138) Cloos et al., supra note ,at 370, 371.

(139) EP-Reports on the functioning of the TEU with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - implementation and development of the Union, Committee on Institutional Affairs, Rapporteur: Mr. David Martin, Part I B 2; PE 212.450/fin./Part I. B 2, annotation No. 18.

(140) Lipsius,supra note , at 263.

(141) E.g.: EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Report on the functionning of the TEU, Rapporteurs: J.L. Bourlanges, D..Martin, Doc A4-0102/95/ Part IA, No. 29; Art. 31 (1), Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 156; Art. 84, EP 1984 Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union; The discussion in the pre-Maastricht phase: The Italian delegation's proposals are published as Annex 4, Typology of Community acts (Italian Delegation), to Doc. 9233/2/90; also published in: Wener Weidenfeld (ed.), Maastricht in der Analyse, 223 (1994); and the Commission's proposal on the IGC in the run up to Maastricht dated October 21, 1990, Bull. EC Supp 2/91, 121.

For the literature: Gerd Winter, Reforming the sources and categories of EC legal Acts 13, 28 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(142) Hilf (1994), supra note , at70.

(143) Art. 31 (1) subpara. 2, EP Draft Constitution of the European Union, Resolution of 10 February 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 155, 162.

(144) Roland Bieber, Das Verfassungsrecht von Verfassungsorganen, 81 et. seq., 257 et. seq. (1992).



(145) This procedure is presently e.g. applied to the rules for the definition of certain standard comitology procedures (Art. 145 third indent ECT), the recourses of the Union (Art. 201 ECT) and Art K.9 TEU (the application of Art. 100 c ECT to certain matters of the field of justice and home affairs).

(146) E.g.: Council Decision of 24 June 1988 on the system of the Communitie's own recources, 1988 O.J. (L 185) 24.

(147) Decision and Act of 10 September 1976 Concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1; Winter, supra note , at 16, 29.

(148) Advocate General Frederico Mancini, Case 204/86, Greece v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5323, 5349; Jörg Monar, Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomeon and its new Dynamics after Maastricht, 1994 C.M.L.Rev. 693; Francis Snyder, Interinstitutional agreements: forms and constitutional limitations 453 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(149) For a more detailed description see e.g.: Dmitri Georges Lavroff, Le droit constitutionnel de la Ve République 629 (1995).

(150)See the overview by: Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 444-447.

(151)Luis María Díez-Picazo, Sources and categories of legal acts - Spain 185, 193 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(152)Art. 52 (3) and Art. 12 (2), 1984 EP Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union; Art. 9 (Attainment of objectives) EP 1994 Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 165.

(153) Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 451.

(154)Tizzano, supra note , at 226.

(155) Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 449.

(156)Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 425, 449.

(157)Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 451.

(158)Díez-Picazo, supra note , at 195.

(159)See above at part B of this paper, page 9 et.seq.

(160) Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 425; See e.g. the difficulties of keeping apart the different forms of action in the currently exisiting comparable situation when the Council is authorized to issue acts of legislative nature and also issue implementing acts it executes itself: Case 119/77, Nippon Seiko v. Council and Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1303, 1331, para. 24.

(161) Petersmann, supra note , at 195; Seidel, supra note , at 233.

(162)Bieber & Kahil, supra note ,at 449.

(163)Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 449.

(164)Díez-Picazo, supra note , at 193.



(165)Winter, supra note , at 29 with e.g. the examples of: Art. 138 ECT and Art. K 9 TEU, Art. 201 ECT.

(166) E.g.: Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 449, 460.

(167) E.g.: Case 21-24/72, International Fruit Company, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1229.

(168) Smit & Herzog, Vol. 6, 228.07 [b], 6-248 (Hans Smit & Peter Herzog eds., The Law of the European Community, Vol. 6, 1995).

(169) The former dispute whether international agreements (as soon as they are self executing) are in compliance with the 'monistic theory' applicable within the Union's legal order in their genuine nature as norms of public international law and hence do not need to be transferred into the Community's legal system, or whether Art. 228 (2) ECT in the sense of the 'dualistic theory' serves as a duplicator, has in the light of the ECJ decisions has become academic. In any case the result is that international agreements which are directly applicable vis à vis the Union's citizens hold a position between the primary law and secondary law in the hierarchic system. It is therefore no longer relevant for the definition of the hierarchic position of international agreements in the Community's hierarchic order (Christian Tomuschat, Art. 228, Rdnr. 51 (Hans von der Groeben, Jochen Thiesing, Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EWG Vertrag, Band 4., Vierte Auflage, 1991); Christoph Vedder, Art. 228, Rdnr. 45, 46 (Eberhard Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf, Kommentar zur Europäischen Union, Band 1, 1995)).

(170)EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the realtionships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, 15 March 1995, PE 211.103/rev., 2.

(171)Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonière de Belgique v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-1956 E.C.R. 245, 258.

(172)Triantafyllou, supra note , at 75.

(173)E.g.: In both the French and in German Constitutional law there is the distinction between 'loi formelle' and 'loi matérielle', or 'formelles Gesetz' and 'materielles Gesetz'.

(174)Michel Miaille, Les sources et catégories des actes juridiques - La France 141, 151 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996); Triantafyllou, supra note , at 77.

(175) E.g.: Stephen Weatherill & Paul Beaumont, EC Law 115 (1993).

(176)Joined Cases 16 and 17/62, Conféderation nationale des fruits et légumes and Others v. Council, 1962 E.C.R. 471, 478.

(177)Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Lagrange, Joined Cases 16 and 17/62, 1962 E.C.R. 481, 485.

(178) Müller-Graff, supra note , at 19, 22; Koopmans, supra note , at 696.

(179)Permanent judgements of the ECJ: Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53 at No. 25; For a more detail see: Hilf (1993), supra note , at 8-16.

(180)Triantafyllou, supra note , at 86.

(181)An important execption is of course Art. 34 of the French Constitution of 1958 with its



substantive definition of the matters to be counted to the category of "lois".

(182)See a comparative overview at: Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective (1996).

(183)Non-paper of the Luxembourg presidency of 17 April 1991, CONF-UP 1800/1/91, REV 1 (d) R/LIMITE. (also published in: Werner Weidenfeld ed., Maastricht in der Analyse, 1994)

(184)Lipsius, supra note , at 263.

(185) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122 .

(186)See: Art. 76 GG, Art. 42 French Constitution; For the definition: Triantafyllou, supra note , at 95.

(187) For the discussion on conditions of parliamentary representation see above at page 20 et. seq.

(188)Piris, supra note , at 28.

(189)Ib Martin Jarvad, Sources and Categories of legal acts - Denmark 95, 104 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996); Richard Macrory, Sources and Categories of legal acts - Britain 69, 72 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(190) Art. 189 (1), EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts, 18 April 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 129/138).

(191) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European EconomicCommunity with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122: "(...) the sole purpose of a law would be to determine principles and general guidelines and the basic elements of the matter to be dealt with. (...) there would therefore be a double (cumulative) criterion for defining matters to be dealt with by a law: the 'basic elements' in all cases plus sufficiently detailed rules in case of those provisions affecting the rights and obligations of those subject to the law; by contrast, all measures, even those of general and permanent effect, covered by the notion of implementation would not be covered by a law. "; Art. 189 (1) Non-paper of the Luxembourg presidency of 17 April 1991, CONF-UP 1800/1/91, REV 1 (d) R/LIMITE.

(192) Art. 189 of the Non-Paper of the Luxemburg Presidency of April 17, 1991, CONF-UP 1800/1/91, Rev 1 (d) R/LIMITE.

(193) Most recently expressed in the British Government's White Paper on the IGC 1996, March 12, 1996 "A Partnership of Nations", 3.

(194)Deidre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 C.M.L.Rev. 17, 41 (1993).

(195) Case 240/90, Germany v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, 5384, 5417-5419; Magiera, supra note , at 203.

(196) This occurs not only to Art. 145 and 155 EC Treaty, but also to the other Treaty provisions which use the term.



(197) Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Berodt & Co., 1970 ECR 1161, 1170; Koen Lenaerts, Regulating the regulatory process: "delegation of powers" in the European Community, 18 E.L.Rev. 23, 27 (1994).

(198) Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E.C.R. 1161, 1170 para 6.

(199) Hans Smit & Peter Herzog, The Law of the European Community, Vol. 6, Art. 155 , 5-191 (1995).

(200) Case 23/75, Rey Soda v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, 1975 E.C.R. 1279, 1300, 1301, para. 10, 14; see also: Case 121/83 Zuckerfabrik Franken v. Hauptzollamt Würzburg, 1984 E.C.R. 2039, 2058.

(201) Joined Cases 133 to 136/85, RAU/BALM, 1987 E.C.R. 2289, para 31.

(202) Case 46/86, Romkes v. Officier van Justitie, 1987 E.C.R. 2685, para. 16; Case C-417/93, Parliament v. Council, 1995 E.C.R. I-1185, 1219, para. 30; Case C-156/93, Parliament v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I - 2019, 2047, para. 18.; Case C-303/94, Parliament v. Council, EuZW 1996, 590, 591.

(203) Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383, 5384, 5434 et. seq.

(204) Case 22/88, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. Minister van Landbow en Visserij, 1989 E.C.R. 2049, 2076.

(205) Case 291/86, Central-Import Münster GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Münster, 1988 E.C.R. 3679, 3706.

(206) Case 9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1954-1956 E.C.R. 133.

(207) Bieber (1984), supra note , at 505-523; Bradley (1992), supra note , at 698.

(208) See: Art. 34, Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33: "As far as possible, they [the laws] shall restrict themselves to determining the fundamental principles governing common action and entrust the responsible authorities (...) with setting out in detail the procedures for their implementation.";

Art. 189 (1) Resolution on the nature of Community acts, EP-Documennt A3-0085/91, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 136, 138: "(...) the legislative organ of the Community shall (...) adopt framework laws and laws which must lay down the basic principles, general guidelines and essential elements of the measures to be taken for their implementation";

Art. 31 Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 156, 162: "Laws may take the form of framework laws when they are confined to a definition of the general principles of the matter".

(209) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122; Art. 189 (1) Non-paper of the Luxembourg presidency of 17 April 1991, CONF-UP 1800/1/91, REV 1 (d) R/LIMITE.

(210) Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E.C.R. 1161.

(211) See the Courts definition in: Case 22/88, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v.



Minister van Landbow en Visserij, 1989 E.C.R. 2049, 2080.


(213) E.g.: Wolfgang Däubler, Europäische Grundrechtsakte 86 (Werner Weidenfeld ed., Wie Europan verfasst sein soll - Materialien zur politischen Union, 1991); Meinhard Hilf, Grundrechte für eine Europäische Verfassung 65 (Werner Weidenfeld ed., Wie Europan verfasst sein soll - Materialien zur politischen Union, 1991).

(214) 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51.

(215) Art. 25, Third Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the Intergovernmental Conferences in the context of the Parliament's strategy for European Union, 31 October 1990, EP Doc. A3-0270/90.

(216) 1994 O.J. (C 61) 155.

(217) Art. 26, EP Resolution adopting the Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms of 12 April 1989; Art. 25, EP Resolution on the strategy concerning the IGC on the European Union of October 31, 1990; Title VIII, No. 22, EP 1994 Draft Constitution.

(218) Macrory, supra note , at 69 - 94; see also the comparable situation in Denmark: Jarvad, supra note , at 95 - 126.

(219) William Wade & Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law 874 (1994).

(220) Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law 158 (1995).

(221) Barnett, supra note , at 382; Wade & Forsyth, supra note , at 864: "Among these [examples for wide delegated powers] none would be more remarkable than the provsision of the European Communities Act 1972, which gives power to make Orders in Council and regulations for giving effect to Community law which are to prevail over all Acts of Parliament, whether past or future, subject only to safeguards against certain aspects such as increased taxation, retrospective operation, delegated legislation or excessive penalties".

(222) David Kinley, The European Convention on Human Rights: Compliance without Incorporation 33 (1993).

(223) Macrory, supra note , at 83.

(224) Kinley, supra note , at 34 cites a survey according to which "fewer than 17% of the Statutory Instruments laid before Parliament are subject to the affirmative procedure".

(225) Macrory, supra note , at 85.

(226) The leading case occured in 1921 at which it had to be decided whether the delegation of the general power to impose controls impliedly included the power to tax. The House of Lords rejected this by stating that express words in the enabling statute were necessary to empower a public authority to raise taxes from the subject (Attourney General v. Wilts. United Dairies Ltd. [1921] 38 TLR 781, [1922] 127 LT 822). Another example occured in more recent case law. It was decided that a provision of the British Prison Rules of 1964 was ultra vires which authorised excessive interference with a prisioner's correspondence to his solicitor. The court cited Lord Wilberforce who had in an earlier case expressed his view that the prisonor's right to unimpeded access to court was a "basic" and "constitutional right" and that there was no provision in the country's Prison Act of 1952



which allowed to "interfere with this right or to hinder its exercise". In the view of Lord Bridge of Harwich "a citizen's right to unimpeded acess [to court] could only be taken away by express enactment". Consequently, as long as there was no express enabling provision in primary legislation, Government was not entiteled to restrict the prisonor's basic right by secondary legislation (Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Leech (No. 2) [1993] 3 WLR 1125 at 1134 et seq.) On an abstract and more doctrinal level, one might therefore say that in British law the regulation of an infringement to a right which can be quallified "basic" or "constitutional" ought to be element of a parliamentary statute to the extent that the delegating legislation has to encompass the express (and not merely an implicit) authorization to infringe this right.

(227) Among this list of matters reserved for parliamentary law in Art. 34 are the definition of rules concerning civil rights and fundamental gurantees accorded to the citizens for the exercise of their public liberties, the definition of nationality, the definition of punishments and criminal law, the basis for the assesment of taxes and the electoral regime. Furthermore under Art.34 Parliament may lay down the "principes fondamentaux" of the organisation of the national defence, the autonomy of regional bodies, as well as education-, civil-, commercial-, labour-, and social security law.

(228) Art. 3 (elections), Art. 47 (state finance), Art. 53 (international treaties), Art. 64 (magistrates), Art. 66 (detention), Art. 68 (criminal law and penalties), Art. 72 (territorial subdivisions), Art. 74 (overseas territories) of the French Constitution of 1958.

(229) Compétences par nature e.g. arise in cases in which the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 requires a law to deal with certain matters. Such are for example the declaration's Art. 7 - 9 (prosecution and criminal law) and Art. 10, 11 (restrictions to the the freedom of opinion and of speach).

(230) Marcel Prélot & Jean Boulouis, institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel 624 (1987).

(231) Art. 56 - 63 French Constitution of 1958.

(232) Kinley, supra note , at 109.

(233) Miaille, supra note , at 155, 156.

(234) Art. 70 - 75 and 76 - 78 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG).

(235) For an overview: Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Der Rechtsstaat 987-1043 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band I, 1987).

(236) According to which - in the hierarchy of norms - the law stands above all forms of executive action, see: Fritz Ossenbühl, Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes 316 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band III, 1988).

(237) According to which a law, in order to be constitutional, has to reach a certain degree of precision allowing the citizen to be able to comply with the law and the courts to be able to supervise the respect of the laws limits, see: Ulrich M. Gassner, Gesetzgebung und Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz, 1996 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung 37 - 56.

(238) Joseph Isensee, Grundvoraussetzungen und Verfassungserwartungen an die Grundrechtsausübung 420 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band V, Allgemeine Grundrechtslehren, 1992); Uwe Kischel,Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United States and German Law, 46 Administrative Law Review 213, 246 (1995).



(239) Michael Kloepfer, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes im Wandel, 39 JZ 685, 689 (1984).

(240) Kischel, supra note , at 231.

(241) BVerfGE 47, 46 (78); BVerfGE 49, 89 (126, 127).

(242) The term "infringement" is used as translation for the term "Eingriff" - an expression which mirrors a broad understanding of fundamental rights and is applied to any public action touching and regulating fundamental rights related matters of the affected.

(243) Two cases may illustrate this:

In the decision of 21 December 1977, BVerfGE 47, 79, 81-82, the Constitutional Court had to decide about public school's curriculum in sexual education. Sexual education is a matter affecting several conflicting rights such as the parent's rights to educate their children (Art. 6 (2) GG) and the right of children to develop their personality (Art. 2 (1) GG) as well as the duty of the state to provide for education (Art. 7 (1) GG). The question wheather sexual education was taught in public schools was judged to be of such relevance for the exercise of the conflicting rights that the matter was essential. It therefore had to be element of the legislator's decision. It was not to be left to the school authorities to decide.

In the decision of Oct. 20 1981, BVerfGE 58, 257, 268-276, the Constitutional Court decided about whether the legislature must determine under which circumstances a school student must repeat a class or can be expelled from a certain type of school. The Court differentiated: The expulsion from school was judged to be essential, as it touches upon the right of the student to freely choose a profession as it usually excludes him from certain job related education possibilites (Art. 12 I GG). On the other hand, requiring a student to repeat a class was not held to be essential even though the student's right of free development of his personality ( Art. 2 (1) GG) was affected since it only had the effect of prolonging the student's education for a year.

(244) In practice the gradual approach has been shown in the school cases cited above. The requirement to repeat a class was seen as an infringement of much lower intensity than the expulsion from school. Consequently the expulsion needed a higher degree of statute regulation. Another example is criminal law. In the field of criminal law the requirements are particularily strict. The primary rules of conduct as well as the penalty range, must be foreseeable from the statute itself, and may not be element of an administrative regulation. (BVerfG decision of July 3, 1962, BVerfGE 14, 174, 185-187).

(245) BVerfGE 49, 89 (127).

(246) See e.g. the school-dismissal-case, BVerfG decision of Oct. 20 1981, BVerfGE 58, 257; Kischel, supra note , at 234; Hans D. Jarass, Art. 20 Rdnr. 39 (Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pierroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3. Auflage, 1995).

(247) Ossenbühl, supra note , at 344;

An example for this approach is the decision of the Constitutional Court in the "Kalkar" decision, a case which dealt with the question whether the administration's approval for the construction of an atomic power plant was lawful or not. The Court held that the normative basic decision of whether or not the peaceful use of atomic energy in Germany was essential and therefore to be taken by the legislator. Also the relevant procedural aspects which led to the adminstration's permission to grant new power plants have to be decided in the statute. The single case decision though has to be taken by the executive and it thereby may have a certain scope of measurement to judge technical detail. (decision, August 8, 1978, BVerfGE 49, 89, 126-130) Also the relative character of the gradual



approach is clearly visible. As the matter was highly complex, and it could be expected that facts were going to change quickly, a fewer degree of specification within the law was required, and a wider field of discretion could be given to the administration. Nevertheless parliament had to provide for rules of procedure (decision August 8, 1978, BVerfGE 49, 89, 133).

(248) This limitation has been expressively formulated in BVerfGE 68, 1, Headnote 1a) " Extension of the Bundestag's particapatory powers in national policy formation (...) would constitute interference in central areas of decision of the executive and run counter to the structure of the distribution of power, responsibliltiy and control laid down in the Basic Law." (translation: Decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Vol 1/II Internat. Law and Law of the European Communities, Karlsruhe 1992) The case was brought up by the plaintiff with the argument under the "Wesentlichkeitstheorie" essential matters had to be decided in parliament. The matter of complaint was the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in Germany which the plaintiff judged to be an essential matter which was submitted to the prerogative of parliament. The Constitutional Court decided that one of the limits of the parliamentary rights were the constitutional rights of the other institutions.

(249) Hans D. Jarass, Art. 19 Rdnr. 1 (Hans D. Jarass & Bodo Pierroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3. Auflage 1995).

(250) For an overall view of the German cases concerning nondelegatability see: David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 125 - 134 (1994).

(251) "Dabei müssen Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der erteilten Ermächtigung im Gesetze bestimmt werden"

(252) BVerfGE 80, 1, 21; BVerGE 68, 319, 333 (Translation of the formula: Kischel, supra note , at 233).

(253) BVerfGE 2, 307, 334; BVerfGE 20, 257, 269-270.

(254) BVerfGE 58, 257, 277.

(255) BVerfGE 68, 319, 333; BVerfGE 62, 203, 209 et.seq.

(256) Lipsius, supra note , at 263.

(257) See e.g. the Commission's opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 123 footnote 1.

(258) See: Art. 80 GG.

(259) See: e.g.: MEP Bourlanges Eur. Parl. Deb. Nr. 3-404/135 (17. April 1991).

(260) From the range of official statements see e.g.: Art. 25 of the EP Motion for a resolution in the Third Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs EP Doc. A3-0270/90; Titel VIII No.22, EP-1994 draft Constitution of the European Union O.J. 28.2.94 No. C 61/155; Commission's opinion 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122.

(261) See e.g.: Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E.C.R. 1161: "Without distorting the Community structure and the interinstitutional balance, the Management Committee machinery enables the Council to delegate to the Commission an implementing power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the decision itself if necessary".

(262) Lenaerts (1991), supra note , at 10 et. seq.; Triantafyllou, supra note , at 226.



(263) An aspect which in the German discussion appears under the term of "funktionsgerechte Organstruktur" see: Hans Herbert v. Arnim, Zur "Wesentlichkeitstheorie" des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 102 DVBl 1242 (1987); Wilfried Bernhardt, Verfassungsprinzipien - Verfassungsgerichtsfunktionen - Verfassungsprozeßrecht im EWG-Vertrag 100 (1987); Kischel, supra note , at 245; Otto Küster, Das Gewaltenteilungsproblem im modernen Staat, 75 AöR 397 et seq. (1949); Ossenbühl, supra note , at No. 49.

(264) Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 22 et seq., 71 et seq. (1977).

(265) Dworkin, supra note , at 24 et seq.

(266) Dworkin, supra note , at 26.

(267) E.g.: Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte 71 et seq. (1985) in regard to fundamental rights; Gassner, supra note , at 56 concerning the German " Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz"; Theodor Schilling, Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle, or: Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/95 applying this distinction for analysing the impact of the principle of subidiarity in EC law.

(268) Alexy, supra note , at 75; Gassner, supra note , at 56: both speaking of an "Optimierungsgebot".

(269) See the suggestion made by: Lipsius, supra note , at 263.

(270) E.g. Art. 48 (3) d ECT (the Commission's power to issue implementing regulations to regulate on the conditions for foreign workers to remain in the state of their last employment) and Art. 90 (3) ECT (the Commission's competence to address decisions and directives to MS to ensure the application of competition rules to public undertakings).

Currently, "there is no basis in the Treaty provision governing the institutions for the view that, by virtue of the very principles which govern the division of powers and responsiblities between the Community institutions, all original lawmaking power is vested in the Council, whilst the Commission has only powers of surveillance and implementation. It follows that the limits of the powers conferred on the Commission by a specific provision of the Treaty are to be inferred not from a general principle, but from interpretation of the particular wording of the provision in question, analysed in the light of its purpose and its place in the scheme of the Treaty." (Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2545).

(271) Dashwood (1996), supra note , at 86.

(272) Bourlanges and Delors, Eur. Parl. Deb. Nr. 3-404/135 (17. April 1991).

(273) This problem is well known in the French constitutional life due to the combination of Art. 34 and 21 of the Constitution of 1958, see: Francis Hamon & Michel Troper, Droit Constitutionnel 589 (21.ed. 1988).

(274) Resolution on the nature of Community acts, O.J. No C 129/136, 20.5.91, EP-Documennt A3-0085/91.

(275) See e.g.explicitly: MEP Bourlanges, Eur. Parl. Deb. Nr. 3-404/135 (17. April 1991) in the discussion on the draft of the: Resolution on the nature of Community acts, O.J. No C 129/136, 20.5.91, EP-Documennt A3-0085/91.



(276) Case 22/88, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. Minister van Landbow en Visserij, 1989 E.C.R. 2049, 2076; Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5383.

(277) Case 22/88, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. Minister van Landbow en Visserij, 1989 E.C.R. 2049, 2076.

(278) Jan Kalbheim & Gerd Winter, Delegation requirements for rule-making by the Commission 583, 599 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(279) EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the relationships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, March 15, 1995, PE 211.103/ rev.

(280) The German version of the Report of the EP Committee on Institutional Affairs of March 15, 1995 reads: "Jede Rechtsnorm, die von dieser Möglichkeit [of delegation] Gebrauch macht, muß Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der Delegation hinreichend bestimmbar festlegen". Art. 80 (1) second sentence GG: "Dabei müssen Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der erteilten Ermächtigung im Gesetze bestimmt werden".

See also earlier suggestions from the EP to refer to the wording of the German GG: MEP Bourlanges Eur. Parl. Deb. Nr. 3-404/135 (17. April 1991).

(281) BVerfGE 80, 1, 21; BVerGE 68, 319, 333; BVerfGE 55, 207, 226.

(282) Theodor Maunz, Art. 80, Rdnr. 1-13 (Theodor Maunz et al. eds. Grundgesetz Kommentar Band III, 1994); Fritz Ossenbühl, Rechtsverordnung, Rdnr. 14-20 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band III, 1988).

(283) In general to the distinction between principles and rules in legal theory: Dworkin, supra note , at 21, 71 et.seq.; on the nature of principles being optimizing orders (Optimierungsgebote): Alexy, supra note , at 75; Gassner, supra note , at 56.

(284) See e.g.: Fritz Ossenbühl, Rechtsverordnungen Rdnr. 14 et. seq. (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band III, § 64, pages 387-424, 1987).

(285) E.g.: 1994 EP Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 155.

(286) As mentioned above see also: Commission's opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp 2/91, 122, arguing for the legislature to rule "provisions creating new obligations and liabilities to be borne by private individuals or buisiness and determining the gurantees the latter should enjoy in any MS should be laid down by a law".

(287) In France the definition of matters which are relevant to the exercise of individual rights of the citizens is one of the points which Art. 34 submitts to the realm of the law. Additionally, all matters which the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 requires a law to deal with are element of the parliament's so called 'compétence par nature'. In Germany, the Grundgesetz holds a catalogue of rights and freedoms which are by definition only restrictable by a law. In connection with the Bundesverfassungsgericht's theory of the essentials, this prerogative of parliament goes even further as to all decisions related to the use of fundamental rights - even those which are by definition unrestrictable have to be element of a law. Comparable concepts can be found in Italian (Luciano Monaco, Italien 363-435, in: Eberhard Grabitz ed., Grundrechte in Europa und USA, 1986; Guido Astuti, Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte in Italien, 8 EuGRZ 77-84 (1981)) and Austrian constitutional law (Robert Walter & Heinz Mayer, Grundriß des österreichischen



Bundesverfassungsrechts 6. Auflage 430 et.seq. (1988); Kurt Heller, Outline of Austrian Constitutional Law 32 et. seq. (1989)).

(288) E.g.: Art. 2 (2) c; Art. 5 (1); Art. 8 (2); Art. 9 (2); Art. 10 (2); Art. 11 (2) of the European Convention of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of November 4, 1950.

The definition of a law in the sense of the Convention is immanent to Art. 8 (2) of the European Convention, according to which public authority should not interfer with rights acknowledged in Art. 8 (1) unless such is in accordance with a law. The law in this sense is the previously fixed, abstract and general rule. Case 136/79, National Panasonic v. Commission, 1980 E.C.J. 2033, 2057, para. 19; explicitly recognised as general principle of EC law: Joined Cases 45/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission, 1989 E.C.J. 2859, 2934, para. 19.

(289) Hilf (1991), supra note , at 70; Petersmann, supra note , at 185.

(290) Commission's opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp 2/91, 122.

(291) Leo Tindemans, The European Union, Bull. EC Supp 2/76, 29.

(292) Lenarts (1991), supra note , at 14 refering to the necessity on the Community level due to the extension of the Community's substantive powers.

(293) Joseph Isensee, Grundrechtsvoraussetzungen und Verfassungserwartungen an die Grundrechtsausübung, Rdnr. 124 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band V, 1992).

(294) E.g. in German legal theory described with the term of "Praktische Konkordanz".

(295) Konrad Hesse, Bedeutung der Grundrechte 139, 146, Rdn. 25, 42-48 (Ernst Benda et al. eds., Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts, 2.ed., 1994); Peter von Wilmowsky, EG-Freiheiten und Vertragsrecht, 51 JZ 590, 596 (1996).

(296) Commission's opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp 2/91, 122.

(297) Title VIII, No. 22 EP 1994 Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 165, according to Art. 31 of the EP Draft Constitution the law is an instrument which always has to be decided under parliamentary participation; Art.26, EP 12 April 1989 Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms, 1989 O.J. (C 120) 51.

(298) The discussion to remedies to this situation is vivid. See e.g.: ECJ-Opinion 2/94 of March 28, 1996, 17 Human Rights Law Journal 58 (1996) and 1996 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 197 et seq.; J.H.H. Weiler, European Citizenship and Human Rights 57-86 (Jan A. Winter et. al. eds., Reforming the Treaty on European Union, 1996)

(299) Other references from the TEU are Art. J.1. (2) fifth indent on the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Article K.2 (1) from the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. For a more complete list of references see: Opinion 2/94 of March 28, 1996, 1996 EuGRZ 197; see also: Giorgio Gaja, The Protection of Human Rights under the Maastricht Treaty 549-560 (Diedre Curtin & Ton Heukels eds., Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers Volume II, 1994).

(300) Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491.

(301) Case C-260/89, ERT, 1991 E.C.R. I-2925, 2963.



(302) C.G. Rodriguez Iglesias, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1 The Columbia Journal of European Law 169, 174 et seq. (1996).

(303) Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 507, para. 13; Hans-Werner Rengeling, Grundrechtsschutz in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 13 (1993).

(304) This argument shall of course not be misinterpreted in the sense of an opposition to the possible adoption of a Community Catalogue of Rights or an Accession to the ECHR. It equally does not intend to underplay the role other catalogues, especially the Declaration of Human Rights of the European Parliament, could have in delimiting fundamental rights related matters. The argument instead intends to point at the fact, that cataglogues exist which are widely accepted and which - even though they are not officially part of Community law - can be applied as yardstick for the definition of fundamental rights related issues.

(305) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122; Lipsius, supra note , at 263 et. seq.; Tizzano, supra note , at 227.



(308) This is an aspect the "Club von Florenz" (Club von Florenz, Europa: der unmögliche Status quo 111 (1996)) does not take into consideration when suggesting that it could be left to the ECJ as mediator to decide which matters are essential and which are not. Without a set of predictable principles this would lead to a high degree of legal uncertainty and many delays in the legislative procedures due to litigation.

(309) The ESCB defines and implements the monetary policy of the Community, conducts the foreign exchange operations and holds and manages the official foreign currency reserves of the MS and supervises the national credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. (Art. 105 a, 109 ECT).

(310) Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Wettbewerbspolitik im Binnenmarkt, 39 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 793 - 797 (1993); Peter Bartodziej, Reform der EG-Wettbewerbsaufsicht und Gemeinschaftsrecht 217-331 (1994).

(311) Hans Smit & Peter E. Herzog eds., 228.05., 6-243 (Hans Smit & Peter E. Herzog eds., The Law of the European Economic Community, Vol. 6, 1995); Chrisitian Tomuschat, Abkommen der Gemeinschaft Art. 228 Rdn. 19 (Groeben et al. eds., Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Band vier, 4. Auflage, 1991).

(312) For some general considerations: Triantafyllou, supra note , at 233 et. seq.; In an abstract manner: Gordon Tullock, On the Desirable Degree of Detail in the Law, 2 European Journanl of Law and Economics 199-209 (1995).


(314) For the implications of the distinction between rules and principles in regard to the principle of subsidiarity see: Schilling, supra note .

(315) Schilling, supra note , at IV; Girolamo Strozzi, Le principe de subsidiarité dans la perspective de l'intégration européenne: une énigme et beacoup d'attentes, 30 RTDE 374, 380 et seq. (1994).



(316) Armin von Bogdandy & Martin Nettersheim, Art. 3 b EGV Rdn. 27 (Eberhard Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf eds., Kommentar zur Europäischen Union, 1995); Vlad Constantinesco, Article 3 B C.E. 112 (Vlad Constantinesco et. al. eds., Traité sur l'Union Européenne, 1995) this opinion is e.g. opposed by: Peter E Herzog & Crandall Melvin, Art. 3 B, § 3b.04, 1-70 (Hans Smit & Peter Herzog, The Law of the European Community, Vol. 1, 1995).

(317) Armin von Bogdandy & Martin Nettersheim, Art. 3 b EGV Rdn. 27 (Eberhard Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf eds., Kommentar zur Europäischen Union, Band 1, 1995); Peter E Herzog & Crandall Melvin, Art. 3 B, § 3b.04, 1-70 (Hans Smit & Peter Herzog, The Law of the European Community, Vol. 1, 1995).

(318) E.g.: Case 44/79, Lieselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3744, para. 13 et.seq.

(319) Joined Cases 133 to 136/85, RAU/BALM, 1987 E.C.R. 2289, para. 31; on the ECJ' s approach in general see above at page 49.

(320) Further examples for matters of such kind can be found in the subject areas to which specialised agencies have been founded or are in the discussion. Among those are e.g. the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products in London, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction in Lisbon, the European Enviromental Agency in Copenhagen and the European Training Foundation in Torino - to name just a few of the agencies which started work in this decade.

(321) See e.g.: Christian Tomuschat, Normenpublizität und Normenklarheit in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 461 (Wilhelm G. Grewe et.al. eds., Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit und nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Hans Kutscher, 1981)

(322) Council resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of Community legislation, 1993 O.J. (C 166) 1.

(323) BVerfGE 7, 282 (303); BVerfGE 14, 174 (185); BVerfGE 25, 44 (55) see also: Gassner, supra note , at 37, 56; on the nature of the pinciple as optimizing command: Alexy, supra note , at 75 et. seq.

(324) Making the Law, The Report of The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process (1993), The Hansard Society conducted a survey on possible reform of the British legislative procedures the results of which were presented in this report.

(325) Making the Law, The Report of The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process 56 (1993).

(326) See the case law since: Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 661, para. 63/67; see also: Jürgen Schwarze, The Procedural Guarantees in the Recent Case-law of the European Court of Justice 487 et.seq. (Deidre Curtin & Ton Heukels eds., Institutional Dynamics of European Integration Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. II, 1994)

(327) See above at the description of the German approach at page 57.

(328) Hartmut A. Grams, Komitologie im Gesetzgebungsprozeß der Europäischen Union und die Einbeziehung des Europäischen Parlaments, 78 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 112, 126 (1995); Triantafyllou, supra note , at 235.

(329) For a general overview and profund criticism see: Hans Herbert v. Arnim, Zur "Wesentlichkeitstheorie" des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 102 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1242



(1987); Michael Kloepfer, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes im Wandel 39 JZ 685 (1984); Fritz Ossenbühl, Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes 334 et.seq. (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band III, § 62, pages 315-349, 1988).

(330) Gassner, supra note , at 52.

(331) Making the Law, The Report of The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process 66, note 267 (1993): "we recommend that the main provisions of statute law should be set out in Acts of Parliament, but that most detail should be left to delegated legislation, provided that much more satisfactory procedures are adoppted by Parliament for scrutiny of delegated legislation (...)".

(332) See the ongoning discussion in this respect e.g.: Carol Harlow, Codification of EC Administrative Procedures? Fitting the Foot to the Shoe or the Shoe to the Foot, EUI Jean Monnet Chair Papers 27/1995; Jürgen Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (1988); Jürgen Schwarze ed., Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht im Werden (1982).

(333) Case 25/70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle v. Köster, 1970 E.C.R., 1161, para. 9; Case 30/70, Scheer v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle Getreide, 1970 E.C.R. 1197, para. 18.

(334)See e.g.: Blumann (1996), supra note , at 1-23; Claude Blumann, Comitologie (Ami Barav & Christian Philip eds., Dictionaire Juridique des Communautés européennes, 188 - 198, 1993); Bradley (1992), supra note , at 693-721; Josef Falke & Gerd Winter, Management and regulatory committees in executive rule-making 541-581 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996); Grams, supra note , at 112-131; Nuttens,supra note , at 314-327.

(335) Council Decision 87/373/EEC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred upon the Commission, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33 - the so called comitology decision.

(336) See e.g.: Case 302/87 Parliament v Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5615; Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Compétences d'exécution conférées à la Comission - la nouvelle décision-cadre du Conseil, 1988 RMC 232; Meinhard Hilf, Das Klagerecht des Europäischen Parlaments im Organstreit, 25 EuR 272 (1990); Werner Meng, Die Neuregelung der EG-Verwaltungsausschüsse 1988 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 208; Charles Reich, Le Parlement européen et la «comitologie», 1990 RMC 319.

(337) See: EP resolution on questions of comitology relating to the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 20) 176 and the unerlying report of the Committee of Institutional Affairs EP Doc. A3-0147/93; Legislative resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the common position established by the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, 1994 O.J. (C 44) 93; EP Bericht über die Antwort der Kommission auf das Ersuchen des Parlaments um Informationen über die Tätigkeit der Komitologie-Ausschüsse im Jahr 1994, No. EP Doc. A4-0189/95.

(338) Modus vivendi between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, 1995 O.J. (C 43) 40.

(339) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 35.

(340) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 118, 123; the proposed new Art. 189 b (1) (iii) reads: "in that event [of the rejection of the Commission's implementative regualtion]



the Commission may either adopt a new regulation, which shall be subject to the substitution procedure, or submit a proposal for a regualtion; in the latter case the procedure laid down in Art. 189a shall apply."

(341) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122; Magiera, supra note , at 203. agreeing to the premise but with a different suggestion: Lipsius, supra note , at 264.

(342) Commission Européenne, Rapport sur le fonctionnement du Traité sur l'Union Européenne, May 10, 1995, page 22; Statement of the President of the Commission Jaques Santer Agence Europe, October 28, 1995: "Il faut alors regarder plus positivement le système de la «comitologie» (...). Ce système mérite sans doute d'être rendu plus simple et plus transparent; mais rien ne peut le remplacer pour que les administrations nationales qui connaissent le terrain, soient impliquées suffisamment en amont."

(343) Blumann (1996), supra note , at 21.

(344) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 35; EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Report on the functionning of the Treaty of the European Union with view to the 1996 IGC - implementation and development of the Union, Rapporteurs Mr. Jean-Louis Bourlanges and Mr David Martin, EP Doc A4-0102/95 Part I.B, No. 56: "Secondly, he [the Rapporteur] comes out for a reduction in the number of Comitology procedures and also their simplification. (...) Your Rapporteur proposes a system which would allow considerable freedom for the Commission, while ensuring that Council and Parliament are fully informed, and are both able to reject a proposed Commission implementing measure"; See also: Blumann (1996), supra note , at 21et.seq.; Falke & Winter, supra note , at 578 et seq.

(345) For the procedure see: Modus vivendi between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, 1995 O.J. (C 43) 40. From the literature: Alan Dashwood, Democracy, Accountability and Transparancy 92 et. seq. (Alan Dashwood ed., Reviewing Maastricht Isssues for the 1996 IGC, 1996); Grams, supra note , at 129; Lipsius, supra note , at 264.

(346) Dashwood (1996), supra note , at 93.

(347) Falke & Winter, supra note , at 579.

(348) The disitinction in the Commission's draft for an interinstitutional agreement between the EP the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, Bull. EU 4-1994, 1.7.1.

(349) Winter, supra note , at 42, 43.

(350) Nuttens, supra note , at 327.


(352) See the list and the description of the procedure at: Macroy, supra note , at 84.

(353) SEC(96)1225/4 Le champ d'application de la codécision - rapport de la Commission au titre de l'Article 189 b paragraphes du Traité, July 2, 1996.

(354) SEC(96)1225/4 Le champ d'application de la codécision - rapport de la Commission au titre de l'Article 189 b paragraphes du Traité, July 2, 1996, at page 9.



(355) Winter, supra note , at 28, 32-35; Gerd Winter, Institutionelle Strukturen der Europäischen Union, 46 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 173 (1993).

(356)Winter, supra note , at 33 - 35.

(357)Winter, supra note , at 32.

(358) Art. 31 (1) subpara. 3, Draft Constitution of the European Union, Resolution of 10 February 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 155, 162.; Art. 38, Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, Resolution of 14 February 1984, 1984 O.J. (C 77) 33, 41.

(359) See e.g.: Italian delegation's proposals published as Annex 4, Typology of Community acts (Italian Delegation), to Doc. 9233/2/90; also published in: Wener Weidenfeld ed., Maastricht in der Analyse 223 (1994); Commission's proposal on the IGC in the run up to Maastricht dated October 21, 1990, Bull. EC Supp 2/91, 121; Resolution on the nature of Community acts, EP Doc. A3-0085/91, O.J. 1991 (No. C 129) 136 - 138.

(360) See: the discussion outlined in the Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 35; Magiera, supra note , at 205; Tizzano, supra note , at 227.

(361) Thomas von der Vring, Legal acts in the budgetary process of the European Union 467, 483-486 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996).

(362) E.g.: Art. 40 (1) EP Draft Constitution of the European Union, 10 February 1994; Winter, supra note , at 36.

(363)Magiera, supra note , at 204.

(364) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122 .

(365)Winter, supra note , at 53, 54.

(366)EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 136, 138.

(367)EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 138; for a similar definition see: Art. 31 (4) EP Draft Constitution of the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 163.


(369)Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 121.

(370) Koopmans, supra note , at 693.

(371) For more precise information and examples: Thomas Adams & Gerd Winter, Framework elements in regulations (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996) 507.

(372) From the vast amount of literature to this subject see e.g.: Hilf (1993), supra note , at 8 - 16.



(373) Koopmans, supra note , at 695.

(374) Hilf (1993), supra note , at 3; Koopmans, supra note , at 695; Müller-Graff, supra note , at 22.

(375) E.g. the Commission's incentive of March 1996 to launch a reform initiative called SLIM (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market), COM(96) 204.

(376) On the problem in general: Hilf (1993), supra note , at 8; Joseph .H.H Weiler, The White Paper and the Application of Community Law (Roland Bieber et. al. eds., 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission's Internal Market Studies, 1988) 337 - 358.

(377) See: Second Interim Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the constitutional basis of European Union, Rapporteur: Emilio Colombo, EP Doc. A3-0301/90; Giorgio Gaya et al., Instruments for Legal Integration in the European Community - A Review 134, 135 (Mauro Cappelletti et. al. eds., Integration Through Law, Book 2 Political Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process, 1986); Hilf (1993), supra note , at 20-22; Thomas Adam & Gerd Winter, Framework elements in regulations 518 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996); EP 1994 Draft Constitution of the European Union, Art. 31(4) second sentence, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 163: "A law may contain provisions applicable in the event of failure by Member States to act on the implementation of framework laws".

(378) Hilf (1994), supra note , at 74; Hilf (1993), supra note , at 20.

(379) EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Working Document on the categories of legal act of the European Union and the relationships between them, Rapporteur: Willi Rothley, March 15, 1995, PE 211.103/ rev.; see also: Magiera, supra note, at 206.

(380) Monar, supra note , at 693, 694; Charles Reich, La mise en œuvre du Traité sur l'Union Européenne par les accords interinstitutionnels, 1994 RMC 81 - 85.

(381) Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 on Fundamental Rights, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1; Joint Declaration of 11 June 1986 on Racism and Xenophobia, 1986 O.J. (C 158) 1; Interinstitutional Declaration of 17 November 1993 on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity, 1993 O.J. (C 329) 133.

(382) See e.g.: Modus Vivendi between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementation measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 189 b of the EC Treaty of Janurary 18, 1995, 1995 O.J. (No. C 43) 40; based on Commission's proposals which again was shaped according to the EP suggestions laid down in the ONP dispute: EP resolution on questions of comitology relating to the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 20) 176 and the underlying Report of the Committee of Institutional Affairs EP Doc. A3-0147/93; Legislative resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the common position established by the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, 1994 O.J. (C 44) 93; EP Bericht über die Antwort der Kommission auf das Ersuchen des Parlaments um Informationen über die Tätigkeit der Komitologie-Ausschüsse im Jahr 1994, No. EP Doc. A4-0189/95

(383)The first group has a legal basis in e.g. Art. 138 c ECT (the exercise of the EP's right of inquiry), Art.162 ECT (methods of cooperation between Council and Commission) or Art. 203 (9) ECT (maximum rate for non-obligationary expenditure in the budgetary procedure).

(384)Monar, supra note , at 697.



(385) Bieber (1984), supra note , at 520; Advocate General Frederico Mancini, Case 204/86, Greec Republic v. Council of the European Communities, 1988 E.C.R. 5323, 5349.

(386) Francis Snyder, Interinstitutional agreements: forms and constitutional limitations 453, 461 (Gerd Winter ed., Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective, 1996); Winter, supra note , at 61.

(387) Monar, supra note , at 699.

(388)Advocate General Frederico Mancini, Case 204/86, Greec Republic v. Council of the European Communities, 1988 E.C.R. 5323, 5349.


(390)Bieber & Kahil, supra note , at 448; Winter, supra note , at 62.

(391) Lenaerts (1994), supra note , at 27.

(392) The importance of not directly binding forms of law such as internal guidelines, circulars or "Verwaltungsvorschriften", the use of soft law and the application of non-regulative instruments more in the sense of persuasive instruments are of course of practical relevance. Their evaluation in the horizon of this paper thus would exeed the possible limits; for an overview of the most relevant questions, see: Winter, supra note , at 54 et. seq.


(394) The situation has been titled as "executive federalism" or "Vollzugsföderalismus". Not only are the areas of legislative competence divided between the national and the Community's governments, competencies are also split in respect to implementation. When the legislative power lies with the Community the MS usually hold the executive power in a given area (Jochen Frowein, Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland 586-587 (Mauro Cappelletti et. al. eds., Integration through Law, Vol I, Book 1, 573-600, 1986); Lenaerts (1994), supra note , at 28).

(395) The brief overview of some of the most central questions of the structure of the level of implementing measures can of course be not at all conclusive. Many questions will be left open which would require careful evaluation. Elements of interest would for example be the future role of the agencies within the third hierarchic level or matters such as the role of professional standardisation activities. Also the role of the non legal binding activity (Commission's guidelines, the use of soft law, and other "persuasive instruments") and its relation to the hierarchy of acts would be of interest in this respect (see: Winter, supra note , at 54 et. seq.). Addressing these matters would go beyond the possiblities of a paper of this size.

(396) EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts A3-0085/91, April 18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 137; see also: Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, at 122; Magiera, supra note , at 206; Tizzano, supra note , at 227 (who wishes to see the Council involved in implementary measures only for a transitionary period).

(397) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, at 122.

(398) See the overview at: Schmitt von Sydow, Art. 155, No 51 et.seq. (Groeben et al. eds., EWG-Vertrag Kommentar, Band 3, 4. Aufl., 1991); Kalbheim & Winter, supra note , at 586.

(399) E.g.: Reinhold Kraushaar, Zur Kompetenz der Kommission der EWG zum Erlaß von Verordungen, 12 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 726, 729 (1959).



(400) Case 23/75, Rey Soda v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, 1975 E.C.R. 1279, 1302.

(401) Claude Blumann, La pouvoir exécutif de la commission à la lumière de l'Acte unique européen, 1988 RTDE 23, at 26; Helmut Schmitt von Sydow, Art. 155 Rdnr. 52 (Groeben et. al. eds., Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Band 3, Vierte Auflage, 1991).

(402) Concerning the Single European Act: H.-J. Glaesner, Die Einheitliche Europäische Akte, 21 EuR 119, 146 (1986); Concerning the Treaty of Maastricht: Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122: "In the absense of a specific reference to implementation on the national level, implementation would be a matter for the Community's institutions, an approach which is close to the arrangemet for regulations at present. Executive powers could be vested in the Commission by theTreaty, in the case of both regulatory measures and administrative provisions. A law could not depart from this general rule"; suggestions in this direction also exist for the 1996 IGC: Tizzano, supra note , at 227.

(403) Glaesner, supra note , at 146.

(404) See e.g.: EP Directorate General for Research, Draft Study of the System of Community Commitology, October 1995, PE 165.571 at page 23.

(405) The possibility of control would have been equally difficult before Court as well as by alternative control mechanisms: Other, theoretically possible mechanisms for keeping the Commission accountable such as i.e. the control of the Commission via supervision by regulatory committees (Kalbheim & Winter, supra note , at 586) could equally turn out to be little effective with the Commission's right to issue executive regulations for any given law. Regulatory committees usually are composed of experts and are therefore capable of controlling the Commission in fairly narrowly defined issues. It thus would be difficult to create regulatory committees which were capable of controlling the Commission in the whole range of possible implementing measures to all of the Community's laws. They would most likely not be able to control the Commission in the exercise of such broad powers adequately.

(406)EP Committee on Institutional Affairs, Report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmetal Conference - implementation and development of the Union, Rapporteur Mr. David Martin, EP Doc. A4-0102/95/PART I.B, No. 18.

(407)In contrary to the prposal issued by the Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122.

(408) E.g.: exercised in the scope of Art. 113 ECT.

(409) See: Council Decision of 13 July, 1987 on the definition of the modalities of the implementation power conferred upon the Commission, 1987 O.J. (No. L 197) 33.

(410) Commission opinion of 21 October 1990, Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 122: "Executive powers would be vested in the Commission by the Treaty, in the case of both regulatory measures and administrative provisions. A law could not depart from this general rule. This confirms the principle already recognised in Art. 145, third indent of the EEC Treaty, doing away with the option now open to the Council of reserving the right to exercise implementing powers itself in 'specific cases', in other words, with no clear or verifiable limit (...)".

(411) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21) 35

(412) Tizzano, supra note , at 225.



(413) EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts A3-0085/91, April 18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 136.

(414) EP 1994 Draft Constitution of the European Union Art. 34 (2) second sentence: "The Council may be made responsible by law for regulatory power in specific areas." 1994 O.J. (C 61) 163; Dashwood (1996), supra note , at 89; Lenaerts (1994), supra note , at 33; Winter, supra note , at 42.

(415) Winter, supra note , at 41.

(416) Case C-303/94, Parliament v. Council, of 18 June 1996, 1996 EuZW, 590 concerning the Council Directive 94/43 EEC, 1994 O.J. (L 227) 31; Comment by: Johann Schoo, Vom Strahlenschutz zum Pflanzenschutz - Nichtigkeitsklagen des Europäischen Parlaments, 1996 EuZW 581-583.


(418) Case 119/77, Nippon Seiko v. Council and Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1303, at 1331, paragraph 24 ; see also: Case 46/86, Romkes v. Officier van Justitie, 1987 E.C.R. 2671, at 2685-2686 paragraph 16.

(419) According to Art. 112 (1) second sentence ECT "on a proposal from the Commission, the Council shall (...) by qualified majority (...) issue any directives" needed for legislative purpose in the field of common commercial policy. These are implemented according to Art. 113 (2) and (4) ECT upon Commission proposals and a Council decision taken by qualified majority.

(420) Dashwood (1996), supra note , at 89; Falke & Winter, supra note , at 580 et. seq.; Winter, supra note , at 47.


(422) Report from the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernment Conference, SN 520/1/95 REV 1 (REFLEX 21), 35.

(423) See above at page 20; see also: EP Resolution on the nature of Community acts A3-0085/91, April 18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 129) 137, H.-I.

(424) See e.g.: Blumann (1996), supra note , at 1-23; Blumann (1993), supra note , at 188 - 198; Bradley (1992), supra note , at 693-721; Falke & Winter, supra note , at 541-581; Grams, supra note , at 112-131; Nuttens, supra note , at 314-327.

(425) Thus, these two reductions of the Council's powers are fairly minor in comparison with the Commission's hierarchy suggestions dating from the preparatory phase of the Treaty of Maastricht, which are after all very much the basis of the current debate. According to the Commission's suggestions the Council would have not only been deprived of its entire executive powers, also its competencies in the legislative field would have been reduced due to the definition of the sole purpose of a law "to determine principles and general guidelines and the basic elements of a matter to be dealt with" (Commission opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for amendment of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with view to political union, Bulletin of the EC Supp. 2/91, 122).

Footnotes to Herwig Hofmann, 'A Hierarchy of Norms for the EC-Treaty'



This annex is part of the study "Joseph H.H. Weiler, Certain Rectangular Problems of European Integration"



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