FO B5 Public Hearing 5-18-04 3 of 3 Fdr- Tab 12- FSC Questions for Emergency Response Hearing...

8/14/2019 FO B5 Public Hearing 5-18-04 3 of 3 Fdr- Tab 12- FSC Questions for Emergency Response Hearing Witnesses 773

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PANEL ONE (Alan Reiss; Joseph Morris)Questions fo r Alan Reiss,

1) Helicopter Evacuations: The Port Au thority claims that helicopter evacuationswere no t part of the WTC's fire safety plan. However, in 1993, at least 12 peoplewere evacuated by helicopter from the roof of the South Tower after an NYPDhelicopter landed on a small helipad on the tower's roof. At least 1 person wasalso rescue d from the roof of the North Tower (which did not contain a helipad)by a helicopter rappel mission. W hat was the Port A uthority's and/or Firedepartmen t's reason fo r deciding subsequently not to include procedures fo rhelicopter evacuations in the evacuation plan? W ere gene ral helicopterevacuations and/or specific helicopter rescues ruled out or merely discouraged?In either case, why weren't tenantsmany of whom were aware of rooftoprescues in 1993 and of the fact that the roof of the south tow er contained ahelipadinformed of this policy during fire drills, beyond standard fire drillannouncement that implied that tenants would be instructed to go down in anactual emergency? In other words, given that tenants, especially on high floors,had reason to believe that rooftop rescues were a viable, if not preferred option, incase they became trapped above a fire, why weren't they instructed never toevacuate up?2) If there was no rooftop evacuation plan, what was the plan for rescuing peopletrapped above a non-localized fire?3) Despite that the WTC's design was technically exempt from city codes, did thePort Authority feel a responsibility to follow code requirements? [hi what ways todid the WTC's design comply, exceed or fail to meet code? m a y be coveredm or e specifically in other questions]

4) The Port Authority has stated that roof access was severely restricted because ofstructural an d radiation hazards on the towers' tw o roofs, as well as securityconcerns. Please elaborate on these hazards. Who had access to the roof? [ I f th ePort Authority a t tem pted to comply -with city code regulations, - w h y weren 'ttenants notified that roof doors w ere locked in accordance with regulations'?] OnSeptember 11 th, there was a order given to the 22nd floor security commandstation for all build ing's locks to be released, (which co uld not be carried outbecause of damage to the building's systems); did this include doors leading tothe roof? W as this standard operating procedure for em ergen cies which called formass evacuations from the towers?5) Former WTC employees with whom we have spoken have indicated that theygenerally felt "kept in dark" by the Port Authority about going s-on in thebuildings. For example, one former employee claimed that, on one occasion, hercompany was not notified that a fire had occurred on another floor of the tower inwhich their office was located. This engen dered a distrust on the part of sometenants of the Port Authority, which was running their building. Based on theamount of information the Port Authority itself acknowledge was given (or notgiven) to civilians du ring fire drills, it appears to be true civilians w ere not highly


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informed about circumstances an d decisions relating to their safety. Did the PortAuthority have a reason for keeping certain info rm ation from civilians?6) From interviews with civilians who evacuated the towe rs on Septembe r 11th, aswell as communications from those who were not able to, it appears that thedeviations in stairwells A and C, which contained transfe r hallway s on their upperan d lower boundaries, and within which "smoke doors," we re located created agreat deal of confusion on the morning of September 11 th , causing some evacueesto believe that stairways had ende d at an artificial point, and d elaying and/orimpeding descent. Did sim ilar problem s occur during the 1993 evacuation as faras the Port Authority kn ows? If so, why weren't efforts made to inform civiliansabout these deviations d uring fire drills? W hy weren't civilians brought intostairwells? W hy weren't full or at least partial evacuation drills held? Were an yof these m easures contemplated?7) Evacuees on Septembe r 11 th also encoun tered what they perceived to be lockeddoors. The Port A uthority has told us that doors leading from floors into thestairwells were n ever kept locked an d that "re-entry doors" (by which peoplecould exit stairwell back onto floors) were located at least every four flights(except for in one area near the lobby where m arble walls bounded the stairway).Can you explain then why some evacuees were unable to open do ors leading fromfloors into the stairwells and others were unable to o pen "smo ke doors" in transferhalls, causing them to have to re-ascend stairs and sw itch to other staircases on ahigher floor? Was this due to the fact that the plane's impact caused doors to jamand/or to be blocked by debris? To the best of your knowledge, did this occur onlower floors, where these instances were also cited, as well as near the im pactzone?8) The Po rt Authority claim s that two o f the build ings three stairwells m et coderequirements for width and that the third (stairwell B) was actually six incheswider. Despite m inim um com pliance, did the Po rt Authority contem plate at thet ime of the towers' construction, making staircases wider to accommodate thelarge nu m ber of people expected to occupy space in the towers (approx 25,000each) who would have to use the stairways in the event an evacuation w asrequired?9) Did the Port Authori ty m ake an effort to coordinate with tenant-com panies whichhad developed their own evacuation plans so that civilians would not be givenconflicting advice?10) W hat equipm ent was given to civilian fire wardens, if any, other than flashlights,whistles (and hats)? Given the serious duties which fire warde ns are called on toperform, did the PA contem plate providing them with an y type of protective gearor other equipment such as walkie-talkies (as some companies provided fo r theiremployess)?11) There is a lot of confusion surrounding the public address instructions given tooccupants of the So uth Tower after the No rth Tower was hit. The Port Authorityhas recen tly told us that standard procedure was for deputy fire safety directors,who manned the public address from the lobby of their respective towers, to make"advisory" announcements to tenants when a "notable" event occurred, "to helpreduce anxiety." Initial PA instructions did appear to confo rm in part to this SOP,


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to the extent that they did advise south tower tenants that the incident hadoccurred in the other building. How ever, was the portion of the announcem entwhich advised tenants to remain in the building and, if evacuating, return to theiroffices and/or floors, in keeping with the SOP for advisory announcements or didit exceed the mandate of the intended instruction? Assu ming this instruction wasno t part of any SOP, yo u have told us that the reason for it may have been thedangers presented by falling victim s and debris on the street. If that is the case,based on your know ledge of the relevant parties, do you believe that the DFSDmade this decision on his own, based on observations from his vantage point, ordo you believe others were instrumental in m aking this decision? Is there anyreason to believe that the possibility of a secondary attack on the street inanticipation of the m ob that a two-tower evacuation would produce, might havebeen another reason to advise (W e have been told that a Port A uthority officer orsecurity guard stated on television shortly after the event that she was somehowresponsible for making this decision, though w e know of no female person in thattype of position of comm and; do you have inform ation on who this person is,what her function on September 11th might have been, as she would be the onlyliving person to have know ledge about this decision); 2nd Announcement: Itappears that, at some point, we believe ve ry close to the time the South Towerwas struck, a further instruction was announced over the public address systemadvising tenants that they could begin an orderly evacuation if conditionswarranted on their floors. We have been told that the fire department officials inthe north tower lobby advised the overall FSD to have the South Tower evacuatedshortly before this time, but this com mun ication does not appear in recordedtranscripts of the Security channel. The commanding officer of the PAPD alsoissued a complex-wide evacuation order at approxim ately this time, how ever,FSD's did not have access to the police radio channels. Do you have any reasonto believe that the DFSD became aware of either of these instruction by any othermeans? If not, what, to your knowled ge, was the reason for the shift ormodification in advice? Given that these two orders had been announced,whether or not the DFSD was aware of them, it appears that a full evacuation ofthe South Tower was planned to commence at approximately the time thebuilding was hit. What would have been the procedure for such an evacuation?12) W e understand that the public address system, despite its enhancements since1993, may have failed to function as a result of the enorm ity of the plane'simpact. Because this fact had not been ascertained that morning, we assume thatthe fire safety directors in the lobbies of the two tow ers proceeded to transmitinstructions over the PA system after the respective buildings were struck? To thebest of your knowledge, what instructions were given? Did any buildingpersonnel receive information from the NYP D or any other source about thefeasibility of helicopter rescues? If so, was there an attempt to transmit thisinformation over the PA system?13) The Port Authority has told us that Incident Com man d training was given to firesafety staff and security mana gers; please describe what staff was trained inincident com ma nd, when training began, a nd what was nature of training.


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14) The stairwellswhich were to function as em ergency escape routesbecameconsumed with smoke, apparently because of inadequacies relating to fireproofing(drywall (sheetrock) was blow n off by explosion). [W as this in accordance withNYC building code?] Why was drywall used as fireproof coating? [Why wasfireproofing not "up to code", Corbett]15 ) On September 11 th 2001, the Port A uthority had transferred control of the WTC toSilverstein Properties pursuant to a lease contract [on ?]; some WTC employeeswere on a "transition team" to remain employed by Silverstein Properties, otherswere not intended to be retained. W hat were the responsibilities of both groups asof the morn ing of September 11 th, and what was the responsibility of the PAversus Silverstein (this question needs work. . . )16) Summary of family/other questions re this topic: Please describe any warningsthe Port Autho rity migh t have received in the years or mon ths prior to September11 th pertain ing to threats against the W TC or terrorist threats in gene ral? Fromwhom were these warnings obtained? W ith whom , if anyone, did the PA sharethe information of these warnings? Did the PA take an y measures to increasesecurity in response to this information? (according to Glenn Corbett sources haveindicated that there was a "sense of heigh tened security procedures") (accordingto un identified questioner, PA installed blast-proof windows and fireproof doorson some floors during the summer of 2001why were these measures taken?)17) Outside questions about elevators: [Why were the elevators equipped w ith doorrestrictors and locking roof hatch system which trapped hundreds of victims,many of who were only inches from the lobby floor, but could not escape due tothe door restrictor/hatch lock?]Glen Corbett; What risk assessment an d testingwas done on the "hatch latch" locking m echanisms fitted to the elevators in theTwin Towers. W hat was known about their performance in fires and electricaloutages in large population, high-rise or super high-rise office blocks before thedecision to buy an d fit them] un identified questioner; [Reliable sources h averevealed that the elevator maintenance contract was cut by 75% in the five yearrun-up to the long-term leasing of the Twin Towers in July 2001. Is this true?Please assess the impact of this on the reliability an d safety of elevator b m eans ofthe comparison of incident reports, order for and fitting of spare parts,maintenance logs, and service records]unidentified questioner18) [The Port Authority of NY/NJ owns an d operates Newark International Airport.They also owned and operated the W TC. Please explain the failure of the PortAuthority to coordinate and act on the information about the second plane headingfor the South Tower when they had this information available to hem by their ow nAir Traffic Control Center. They had eleven minu tes of notice that the plane wasbearing down on Tower Two and yet, they told people that the building was safeand secure.]Glenn Corbett; [The Com man d Center in the Twin Towers hadspecial comm unication facilities for rapid an d urgen t contact with air trafficcontrol at the region's major airports. Please describe these an d give examples oftheir function. How did this commu nication system work w hen comm ercialaircraft were known to be off course on September 11 th? What message wererelayed? What action taken?]unidentified questioner


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19) [What particular security / ev acuation criticisms did Rick Rescorla, head ofsecurity at M organ Stanley, level at the Port Authority? [when?] Please releaseall correspondence between M r. Rescorla, Morgan Stanley, and the Port Authorityon this subject and explain why his specifically suggested changes andenhancements were not acted on?]unidentified questioner20)


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PANEL ONE (Alan Reiss; Joseph M orris)Questions fo r Joseph M orris,

1) W hen you assumed comm and of the PA PD shortly after September 11th, whatchanges did you make with respect to training, SOPs, etc in light of lessonslearned on September 111 ?2) What SOPs were in place as of September 11 th to guide officers in differentcommands to respond to a ma jor incident? Have these SOPs beenmodified/updated as a result of the confu sion experienced on September 11 th.3) To what extent are the PAPD's SOPs/training coordinated with that of securityofficials an d fire safety staff? Has any effort been m ade to provide access topolice radio channels to PA security and/or fire safety staff?4) Please describe relationship the PAPD shares with the FDNY and the NY PD; howhas this changed as a result of lessons learned on September 11 th? What arecurrent SOP's for responding to a terrorist attack or other major incident at a PortAuthority-controlled site?

5) To the best of your know ledge, what training did the PA PD receive prior toSeptember 11 th to respond to possible terrorist events at the WTC? Didtraining/drills change/increase as a result of the 1993 bombing? What changeswere made to the structure/practices of the PAPD as a result of the September 11 thattacks?6) The Port Authority has told us that, after the 1993 bombing, the PAPD conducteddrills (in incident comm and?) with civilian W TC employees; under yourcommand, did these drills continue?


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004N ew School University in New York CityPANEL TW O (Former NYPD/FDNY Commissioners & OEM Director)Questions for Bernard B. Kerik, former Com missioner, New Y ork Police Department(NYPD)1. During the summer of 2001, the U .S. Intelligence Community was at a heightened state ofalert, based p rima rily on an increase in terrorist "chatter." Did either the IntelligenceCommunity or FBI officials inform yo u about the increased threat level at the time? If so,what actions were you w ere asked to take or did you take in response to the heightenedthreat? Prior to 9/11 were you ever briefed on the possibility of terrorists flying planes intobuildings?2. Prior to 9/11, to what extent did you have to rely on the FB I to understand the threat that alQaeda and other terrorist groups posed to New Yo rk? How com plete a picture did you haveat the time of the threat posed by al Qaeda, and w hat were the greatest obstacles to increasingyour understanding? To what extent was the FBI sharing intelligence with the NYPD? How

did NYPD share relevant information with the FBI?3. Please describe your perspective on the relationship of the NYPD and FDNY prior to 9/11?Are critics' descriptions o f a "dysfunctional relationship" fair? Did the NYPD and FDNYconduct joint drills and tabletop exercises in order to prepare fo r possible terrorist attacks?4. To what extent were the NYPD's efforts at the W TC complex on the morning of 9/11coordinated with other New York City agencies, especially the FDNY, an d with the PAPD?5. Please describe your perspective on OEM and what their role was in (i) helping the NYPDprepare to respond to po tential terrorist attacks and (ii) in an actual terrorist incident.6. Prior to 9/11, to your knowledge did anyone in the NY PD ever question locating OEM at theW TC complex (on 9/11 O EM as headquartered on the 23rd floor of WTC 7)? Did the forcedevacuation of OEM on 9/11 impact NYPD operations at the W TC com plex, either prior to orafter the second tower collapse?7. Prior to 9/11 what was the NYPD 's relationship with the Port Authority Police Department?Did the NYPD and PAP D ever conduct joint drills or tabletop exercises in order to prepare torespond to possible terrorist attacks?8. In the days after September 11 , 2001, there was great concern in the FBI and in the

Intelligence Community that al Qaeda was also planning a series of follow-on attacks. Towhat extent were you apprised of the concern regard ing possible add itional attacks, an d whatrole did you play in efforts to prevent possible additional attacks? How w ell coordinated wasthis effort between the state, local an d federal law enforcement communities?9. Counterterrorism experts frequently mention the importance that the state an d local lawenforcement officers ca n play in prevention efforts, particularly given their familiarity withthe commun ities in which they ar e working. Prior to 9/11, what steps did the NYPD take toensure that the officers who were "out on the beat" were focusing on counterterrorism an d

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Commission's eleventhpublic hearing on "Emergency Response "M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York Cityknew how to spot suspicious behavior? How w as inform ation collected by the NY PD sharedwith the FBI and other federal entities? Was all potentially relevant counterterrorisminformation collected by the NY PD shared with the federal governmen t? Prior to 9/11 pleasedescribe the level of information you received from federal intelligence agencies with respectto the general threat of militant Islamic terrorism? Were you ever br iefed on Osama BinLaden and A l Qaeda specifically?

10. Based on our staff statement, one could conclude that the NYPD was well prepared for 9/11and its response that day, which included the mo bilizatio n of thousands of officers, was wellcoordinated. To w hat do you attribute this?11. On the morning of September 11th, many calls to 9-1-1 failed and m any were prematurelyterminated? Did the police department have a plan in place for the 9-1-1 system to deal withstrains caused by large-scale disasters (backup operators, other backup capabilities)?12. Early in the morning of September 11th, the NYPD aviation unit determined that, due to

immense smoke and heat conditions surrounding the roofs of both towers, full-scaleevacuations would not be possible from the roof of either tow er and specific rescueoperations would be unlikely unless conditions drastically changed. However, civiliansinboth towers, apparently unaware of this determination, ascended to the roof with the hope ofbeing rescued. Was any attempt made to comm unicate this information either to the FDNYor the Port Authority w ho might have been able to advise civilians from the lobbies of thetowers? Was any attempt m ade to communicate th e information to 9-1-1 operators at policeheadquarters to advise civilians who called? (A num ber of civilians specifically addressedthe issue of whether to go to the roof, or "up") Why was this information no t transmitted tothose in a position to give ad vice?13. Some 9-1-1 callers from within the towers requested specific information to help them makepotentially life-savin g decisions, such as whether they were above or below the fire in theirbuilding. We have not seen any cases where 9-1-1 operators had this inform ation. Weunderstand that the 9-1-1 system was de aling with an unpreceden ted leve l of chaos.However, what was the normal procedure, if any, fo r 9-1-1 operators to receive information

from the scene (from either aviation units or other officers on the ground)? How did this failon September 11 th? Were an y efforts made by 9-1-1 operators to attempt to obtaininformation specifically requested by callers in distress?

Questions for Thomas Von Essen, former Com missioner, Fire Department of New York(FDNY)1. Please describe the training given to FDN Y dispatch operators. On September 11 th, mostcallers who sought advice from 911 were told the standard procedure for high-riseoperations, which m ay have been detrim ental in some cases. W hile SOP's may reflect thebest advice fo r general categories of emergencies, it must have been contemplated indesigning an emergency system, that extraordinary circumstances could arise where SOPsdid not apply an d could actually translate to harmful advice. In the case of a major disaster,operators might not be able to receive information from commanders at the scene of an

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Com mission's eleventh public he aring on "E mergen cy Respon se"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York Cityincident. Did any FDNY operators and/or supervisors possess th e backgroun d, skills ortraining to give discretionary advice to callers in extraordinary situations? If not, has theFDNY revised its training (of some, if not all, operators) to permit them to functioneffectively on such future occasions?

2. FDN Y dispatch operators were also not able to provide specific information requested bycallers? Again, unpredictable circumstances of the day impeded th e flow of informationbetween FDN Y incident comm and and dispatch. However, were any efforts made bydispatch operators to obtain inform ation spe cifically requested by callers, such as where thefire was in relation to them , when c allers indicate that the answer may be of life-and-deathproportions? What changes have been m ade to correct the shortcomings w hich ruptured theflow information on September 11 from occurring in the future?3. Given the historical and cultural resistance to the Incident Command System (ICS) and to aunified comm and structure, exactly how do you see the city's new Citywide IncidentManagement System (CIMS) working? Be specific.

a. Is CIMS just "window dressing" or a "cosmetic fix" to an entrenched organizationalrivalry between the fire and police departments? How might CIMS unintentionallyinstitutionalize the "battle of the badges" between the NYPD and FDNY?b. Discuss the duplication of services between the FDNY and NYPD. Does CIMSeliminate any or all of this duplication?

4. What is the reason for the police department and the fire department not being able to talk onthe same radio frequenc ies on 9/11?

Questions fo r Richard Sheirer, former Director, New York City Office of EmergencyManagement (OEM)1. How did the loss of the O EM Comm and Center impact the response on 9/11?2. Have you seen a Mass C asualty Disaster Plan as part of New York State's emergencyoperations plan (EOF)? If not, why haven't you seen it? If yes, how has New York Citytrained and exe rcised the state's Mass Casualty Disaster Plan?3. Please specify as to how (i) OEM would assist other city agencies in preparing for

potential terrorist attacks and (ii) what OEM's role would be in responding to an actualterrorist attack?4. Please describe pre-9/11 terrorism drills in which both th e NYPD an d FDNYparticipated? Did the PAPD participate in any of these drills?5. How well prepared did you think the FDNY was to respond to majo r incidents prior to9/11?


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York City

6. Please give us your perspective on the "battle of the badges" between NYPD an d FDNY?Could this be improved? How?7. Please give specific pre 9/11 examples of OEM's role in coordinating the City's responseto major incidents (e.g., Millennium and West Nile)8. To your knowledge, why was OEM headquarters located at the WTC complex? Did youor anyone else express any concern about its location there prior to 9/11?9. Did OEM have a back-up site as of 9/11 ?10. What was OEM's plan of action after WTC 1 was hit at 8:46 a.m.? How did it changeafter WTC 2 was hit? How did it further change after the south tower collapsed? Howdid it change after the south tower collapsed?11. It appears that the NYPD , FDN Y, and P APD were operating independently of each other

in m ost cases that day at the WTC . The units of these agencies which were climbingtowards the impact zo ne in mos t cases did not coordinate their efforts. What steps wasOEM taking that m orning to address this?12. Despite the fact that both the NYP D and FDNY had protocols for FDNY personnel to beplaced in NYP D helicopters during major incidents, this did not happen on 9/11. W hywas this? Did you make any efforts to address this?13. Prior to the evacuation of OEM that morning, was OEM, with all of its large screentelevisions and ability to monitor so many radio frequencies, conveying any informationto incident managers who were struggling w ith limited situational awareness?14. In the initial hour after the north was hit, you were in the north tower lobby. Wh y didyou select this as your basis of operations?15 . W hat impact did the evacuation have of OEM at 9:30 a.m. have on OEM operations? Doyou it believed it impacted public safety prior to the collapse of the tow ers?16. With your background in dispatch, please give us your perspective on the fact that 9-1-1operators and FDNY dispatch in man y cases, advised civilians in the towers to remainwhere they were, andwait for first responders, instead of trying to evacuate themselves -regardless of whether they were above or below the impact zone? Indeed, these operators

had no idea what the impact floors were.17. What recomm endations do you have fo r improving protocols fo r 9-1-1 operators an dFDNY dispatch fielding 9-1-1 calls in a major emergency?


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Commission's eleventhpublic hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York CityPANEL THREE (Current NYPD/FDNY Commissioners & OEM Director)Questions for Raymond W . Kelly, Commissioner, New York Police Department (NYPD)1. Since the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD has greatly enhanced its Intelligence Division and its

resources on the New York Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Why did the NYPD decideto take these actions? How do you define the different roles of the Intelligence Division andthe JTTFs? To what extent does the NYPD still have to rely on the FBI to understand thethreat that al Qaeda an d other terrorist groups po se to New York? How would youcharacterize the state of intelligence sharing between the FBI an d the NYPD? Whatproblems still remain in this area? How does the NYPD and the FBI ensure that informationdoes not get "stovepiped" as new counterterrorism entities are created?2. The NYP D now has its own counterterrorism program independent of the FBI and theJTTFs, which includes its own operational, su rveillance, and analytic capabilities. Why isthis program necessary? Is it a model that other state and local law enforcem ent agencies

should emulate, or is the situation in New York C ity so exceptional, that only New York C ityrequires this type of capacity?3. How has the creation of the Department of Homeland Security made a difference, if any, inthe efforts of New York City to prevent terrorist attacks? DH S has the responsibility forprotecting the nation's critical infrastructure. What progress has DHS made in this mission?What role do you see state an d local law enforcement playing in critical infrastructureprotection? What can DHS do to be most helpful to the City of New York?4. Counterterrorism experts frequently mention the importance that the state an d local lawenforcement officers can play in prevention efforts, particularly g iven their familiarity with

the communities in which they are working. What steps has the NYPD taken since 9/11 toimprove the ability of its officers who are out on the streets to play a role in counterterrorismprevention? How is information collected by the NYPD shared with the FBI, DHS, andother federal entities? Is all potentially relevant counterterrorism inform ation collected bythe NY PD shared with the federal government?5. Different command systems, or the lack of a common, clearly understood system, historicallyhave created confusion among response agencies and personnel at an incident scene. Manyemergency professionals believe that failure to utilize the Incident Command System (ICS)results in loss of command an d control an d leads to coordination failures during an incident.This past Friday (May 14), it was announced that New York City ha s adopted the Citywide

Incident Managem ent System (CIMS), a formal management structure designed to betterorganize the City's response to emergencies and comply w ith state and federal mandates.a. Why has it taken over 2 !/z years since 9/11, and over 8 years since Gov. Pataki'sExecutive Order No. 26, dated March 5 , 1996 an d entitled "Establishing aManagement System for Em ergency Response," for New Y ork C ity to finally movetowards utilizing ICS?


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York Cityb. Many people whom we have interviewed have stated that the NYPD and you inparticular have been opposed to NY C ado pting ICS. Is that the case? [tap da ncinganswer likely here]c. If you are opposed to, or at least have questions about it, please explain yourconcerns w ith it.d. Besides the arrival of the 9/11 Com mission in New York C ity this week, how did thefact that federal funding will be contingent (as of O ct. 1, 2004) upon the adoption andregular use of ICS force the city's decision regarding CIMS?

6. FDNY chiefs in key positions on 9/11 have stated that they wo uld have b een able to ma kemore informed decisions that day had they ha d access to all information which they NYPDhad. One fire chief described N Y C ' s response on 9/11 as being encumbered by what he calls"situational awareness stove piping" in which critical inform ation which would improv eincident com manders' situational awareness was not shared between agencies. For example,fire chiefs on the ground lacked access to the perspective on the tow ers afforded to NYPDaviation pilots. Since Septem ber 11, this has been addressed, but we are concerned it has notbeen addressed adequately. For example in February 2003 a barge exploded at a fuel loadingdock in Staten Island. Following protocols developed in response to 9/11, a FDNY battalionchief rushed to the NYPD's aviation field, in order to board an NYPD helicopter which wasspecially equipped with FDN Y radio capability. How ever, when this chief arrived, he wasadvised that the NYPD helicopter already had taken off, and he was forced to board a NassauCounty helicopter which lacked the FDNY radio capability. In addition, even as late as2004, FDNY chiefs looking to establish real-time video feeds from helicopters have reportedthat they have had more success working with news media helicopters than with the NYPD.W hy is this still an issue? [tap dance answer]7. Some critics have noted that there is some redundancy between the NY PD 's ESU teams andthe FDNY's rescue teams in that they both perform rescue missions of civilians. Some ofthese critics question whether this redundancy is a misalloc ation of the police departm ent'sfinite resources. For example, several months ago, a pedestrian was pinned by a car whichhad jumped the curve a few blocks from Perm Station. A n FDNY company promptlyresponded and attempted to rescue the civilian. How ever, an NY PD ESU team which hadbeen at Penn Station also came running to the scene, according to FDNY personnel. W as it agood allocation of the city's resources to have the NYPD ESU team cease performing thefunctions they had been to respond to an incident already being handled by the FDNY?[response likely to be that NYPD at the scene need to evaluate to what extent an

incident is a criminal incident]8. Do you believe that handling chem ical spills is a law enforcem ent function? Please addresswhat many people see as the duplication of services between the NYPD an d FDNY. Is therea point where a healthy redun dancy in response capabilities can becom e detrimental toresponding efficiently an d effectively to emergencies?9. Please describe the training given to 9-1 -1 operators.


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York City

10 . What impact, if any, does a military reserve call-up have on the NYPD ? Have reserve andNational Guard deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq significantly affected NYPDmanpower?

Questions fo r Nicholas Scoppetta, Com missioner, Fire Departm ent of New York (FDNY)1. You state that the CISMS (Citywide Incident M anagem ent System), "is an important step inaddressing issues of command and control at major emergencies." In the example of anexplosion, the CISM S Unified Com mand M atrix indicates that the FDNY and NYPD are the"primary agencies," but who is the incident comm ander - who is in charge? Are bothagencies in charge? If so, how does that provide for a clear line of command, control, andcoordination?2. What has the FDNY done since 9/11 to upgrade the Critical Incident Dispatch System

(CIDS)?3. Does the FDNY have co mplete radio com munications capabilities within al l high-rises andsubways of New York City? Are these communications capabilities interoperable with othercity and state agen cies? Can the FDNY and NYPD talk to each other?

a. In terms of emergency responder access to priority communications, how critical isCellular Priority Access Service (CPAS )?b. Access to such dedicated bandw idth is closely guarded by the telecommunicationsindustry and the FCC. Is it your understanding that C PAS would require either

Con gressional legislation or a change in FCC regulations?a. Is similar access needed to landline telephon es as well?

4. How important is it for the FDNY to have sustained multiyear funding as it relates toemergency respond er assistance grants? Do you currently have this type of funding?5. What impact, if any, does a military reserve call-up have on the FDNY? Have reserve andNational Guard deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq significantly affected FDNYmanpower?

Questions for Joseph F. Bruno, Director, New York City Office of Emergency Management(OEM)1. Prior to May 14, why has there been so much reluctance within various city agencies to theadoption of an incident com mand system protocol in New York City?2. Would it be correct to state that the NYC's Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS)treats al l chem ical spills as terrorist attacks until proven otherwise?

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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response "M ay 18-19, 2004N ew School University in New York City

3. How has the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) made a difference, ifany, in the efforts of New York City to prevent terrorist attacks? DHS has the responsibilityfor protecting th e nation's critical infrastructure . W hat progr ess has DHS made in thismission? W hat role do you see OEM playing in critical infrastructure protection? What ca nDHS do to be most helpful to the City of New York?

4. Wh at interaction does OEM have with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)or other Department of Homeland Security offices or agencies? What type of training,funding or guidance do they provide yo u? Is it adequate?5. Will OEM be the lead agenc y to design an d implement a CISMS (Citywide IncidentManagement System) training program to ensure that New York City first responders knowan d perform their roles and responsibilities under this new system?6. Have you seen a Mass Casualty Disaster Plan as part of New York State's emergency

operations plan (EOF)? If not, why haven't yo u seen it? If yes, how has New York Citytrained an d exercised th e state's Mass Casualty Disaster Plan?7. Of the 3 m ain activities of an OEM - field operations, planning, and manning a commandcenter - howwould youprioritize these activities?


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response "M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York CityQuestions fo r Rudolph W . Giuliani, former May or1. As the U.S . Attorney in New York, you were integrally involved in the war on drugsan d in the federal government 's efforts to combat the Mafia in New York. Whatsimilarities an d differences are there between those efforts and the war on terrorism?2. Prior to 9/11 please describe the level of information you received from federalintelligence agencies - particularly theFBI - with respect to thegeneral threat ofmilitant Islamic terrorism? Were you ever briefed on Osama Bin Laden and AlQaeda specifically? Prior to 9/11 to what extent would the F BI warn you of specificterrorist threats to New York City? W ould you be given the underlying d ata fromwhich the FBI determined that there was a threat, or would you simply be advised ofthe FBI's conclusion that there was a threat? Were you ever briefed prior to 9/11about the po ssibility of terrorists flying planes into buildings? The JTTF existedwhile you were mayor; how much did that improve your and the policecommissioner's understanding of the threat militant Islam posed toNYC? [expect

answer to say that he never received specific al Qaeda briefings, and when hewas advised by FBI of terrorist threat against NYC, he and his policecommissioner would only be given the conclusion, not the underlying data onwhich th e conclusion w as based]

3. In your opinion w hat is the proper level of intelligence information sharing betweenthe FBI and a large city's police force? [expect forceful answer here supportingthe local police force] Have the appropriate intelligence sharing protocols beenestablished?4. We commend you for having the foresight to create the Office of Emergency

Management (OEM) in 1996. We understand that one of your primary purposes increating it was to better prepare the city's ability to respond to major emergencies in acoordinated manner. W e further understand, as you indicate in your book, that on9/11 it was very reasonable for theNYPD's overall command post - which would becoordinating the NY PD 's response throughout the city and thus needed hardtelephone lines - would not beplaced at the FDN Y overall command post. However,on 9/11, despite OEM's existence, FDNY, NYPD an d Port Authority personnelresponding into th e twin towers were not coordinated, perhaps in part because theylacked one overall co mmand post. W as this incident simply to o large, complex, an dunfolding too rapidly for a more strategic coordination of those agencies responding?5. What did you view as OEM's role in preparing the city for major emergencies and inresponding to actual emergencies?6. To your knowledge, why was OEM headquarters located at the W TC complex? Didyou or anyone else express any concern about its location there prior to 9/11?


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Commission's eleventh public hearing on "Emergency Response"M ay 18-19, 2004New School University in New York City1. Do you think New Y ork City should have a Com missioner of Public Safety withdirect authority over the NYPD and the FDNY?8. Please describe your perspective on the difficulty a governmental chief executivefaces in receiving countless briefings an d having to prioritize the issues raised in allof these briefings.9. Director Mueller had made significant efforts since 9/11 to transform the FBI and toimprove its ability to prevent terrorist attacks. Do you believe that the FBI is on theright track? Can the FBI make th e transformation necessary to become an effectivecounterterrorism agency? If not, what other alternatives are there, and of these, whichis the best alternative, in your opinion?10. Please advise on how you think local governm ents and the federal governm ent shouldapproach illegal imm igration?

FO B5 Public Hearing 5-18-04 3 of 3 Fdr- Tab 12- FSC Questions for Emergency Response Hearing...

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Transcript of FO B5 Public Hearing 5-18-04 3 of 3 Fdr- Tab 12- FSC Questions for Emergency Response Hearing...