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FINANCE AND TAXATION

Rutledge v Chandler

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants sought review of a decision from

a trial court order that enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic

Beverages and Tobacco from collecting taxes, imposed pursuant to Fla.

Stat. ch. 83-349, § 17, against appellees' inventory of alcoholicbeverages. The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified this

matter for direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court as requiring

immediate resolution.

OVERVIEW: After a trial court concluded that Fla. Stat. ch. 83-349, §

17, which imposed a "floor tax" against appellees' retail inventories of alcoholic beverages, was an unconstitutional ad valorem tax, under Fla.

Const. art. VII, § 1(a), and permanently enjoined appellant Division of 

Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting the taxes, theappellate court certified appellants' challenge to the trial court's order.The court reversed the trial court's order. The court ruled that § 17 was

not a property tax because it was not levied on value assessed byassessors and that it also affirmatively satisfied the criteria for an

excise tax. The court noted that § 17 tax was imposed againstappellees' retail inventory as it existed on the effective date of a state-

wide increase in the alcoholic beverage tax, and that the § 17 tax wasintended, among other things, to ensure that all alcoholic beverages

sold by retailers after the effective date bore the same tax rate. Assuch, the court concluded, the tax was not on inventory, but on aprivilege as measured by appellees' inventory, and was therefore not

an unconstitutional ad valorem tax.

OUTCOME: The court reversed an order that permanently enjoined

appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting

taxes that were imposed against appellees' inventory of alcoholicbeverages. The taxes imposed by the statute at issue were not

impermissible ad valorem taxes on appellees' inventory, but were taxeson appellees' privilege to sell alcohol, measured by their inventory. Thetax was thus a constitutionally imposed excise tax.

 direct v indirect tax...it looks like an ad valorem tax; but ad valoremis a tax on the value so there would need to have been an appraiser

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that went out there

 All taxes, other than polls, are either direct or indirect propertytaxes. A direct tax is one that is imposed directly upon property,

according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a property taxor an ad valorem tax. An indirect tax is a tax upon some right orprivilege, or corporate franchise, and is most often called an

excise or occupational tax. An excise and a property tax, when

the two approach each other, ordinarily may be distinguished bythe respective methods adopted for laying them and fixing theiramounts. 

 If a tax is imposed directly by the legislature withoutassessment, and its sum is measured by the amount of business

done, income previously received, or by the extent to which a

taxable privilege may have been enjoyed or exercised by the

taxpayer, irrespective of the nature or value of such taxpayer'sassets or his investments in business, it is to be regarded as an

excise tax. But if the tax is computed upon the valuation of theproperty, and assessed by assessors, either where it is situatedor at the owner's domicile, although privileges may be included

in the valuation, it is considered a property tax. 

Bd of Pub Instruction v Treasurer

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant county school board, havingbrought a declaratory judgment against appellee state officials, soughtreversal of the order of a Brevard County (Florida) trial court declaring

Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) to be constitutional.

OVERVIEW: Appellant county school board filed suit against appelleesstate treasurer, state board of education and education commissioner,and junior college board of trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment

that Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) (1967) were

unconstitutional. Appellant contended that it had the exclusive power

to set local school taxes and to regulate the free educational system inthe county, and that in consequence, junior colleges either should be

controlled by it or should not be permitted to receive local fundingunder the provisions of chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7). The trial

court found the statutes constitutional. On appeal, the court affirmed.The court held that when a local district which promoted theestablishment of a junior college later withdraw that funding, the state

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could likewise withdraw state support for the local school district

pursuant to the challenged statutes. The court determined that juniorcolleges were part of the public school system authorized by Fla. Const.

art. IX.

OUTCOME: The trial court's order that declared statutes regarding

 junior college funding to be constitutional was affirmed. The state

constitution's provisions dealing with the state's free educationalsystem permitted the state to require local governments to help fund

 junior colleges within their localities.

 Facts:

 a community college system that isn't governed by the state; butstate law requires that it be supported by funds created by ad

valorem taxes but constitution divies up to allow diff municipal bodies to create

*** but argument is that counties don't control the community collges,but are being forced to give up some funds to support these statethings

Fla. Const. art. IX, § 1 recognizes that there are three areas of publiceducation (1) a uniform system of free public schools, (2) institutions

of higher learning and (3) other public education programs

Fla. Const. art. IX, § 3 authorizes long terms for any appointive board

dealing with education, and that provision clearly contemplates thatboards may be established by law to function in the operation of thevarious phases of the state school program subject, of course, to thecontrol of free public schools by the local boards Fla. Const. art. IX, § 4(b), in addition to authorizing local schoolboards to operate, control and supervise the free public schools

within their districts, also requires that they determine the rate of school district taxes within the constitutional limits - however, someof the taxes so levied by the local school district can properly be used

for local school purposes other than the support of the free publicschools when so provided by law (see following note) Fla. Const. art. VII, § 9 places a limit of 10 mills on taxes for allschool purposes. "All school purposes" is certainly broader than the

phrase "free public schools" used in Fla. Const. art. IX. This impliesthat while the local school board must determine the rate of all school

district taxes, some of the taxes so levied by the local school district

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can properly be used for local school purposes other than the support

of the free public schools when so provided by law.

Fla. Const. art. VII, § 8 provides that state funds may beappropriated to the several counties, school districts, municipalities or

special districts upon such conditions as may be provided by general

law

Subject to the power of the legislature to establish a uniform system of 

free public schools, the control of the free public schools in each districtis vested in the local school board. This does not prohibit the legislature

from placing upon the local school districts the duty to render financialsupport to junior colleges which are not under the control of the local

school boards but which have been established at their request. Thus,statutes providing for local support of junior colleges which aren't

under the control of the local board of public instruction but which havebeen established at board's request are constitutional and valid.

Fla. Const. art. VII, § 1 prohibits state ad valorem taxes. Ad valoremtaxes levied by school districts for support of junior colleges are local

taxes levied for local purposes. Thus, even ad valorem taxes levied bycounty board of public instruction for support of junior colleges whicharen't under the control of the local county board but which have been

established at board's request are "local taxes" levied for localpurposes, rather than prohibited state ad valorem taxes.

 Legislature may not circumvent prohibition against state ad

valorem taxation by any scheme or device which requireslocal ad valorem taxes and then channels proceeds into

essentially state functions which are not also local functions 

State v City of Port Orange - Impact Fees

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant state sought review of the

decision of the Circuit Court for Volusia County (Florida), which found

appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance valid.

OVERVIEW: Appellee city enacted a transportation ordinance requiringits citizens to pay a fee based on their usage of appellee's roads.

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Appellant state contended that the ordinance was not valid because it

was a tax, and as such, it had to be authorized by general law. Thetrial court held that the ordinance was valid because it imposed a user

fee on appellee's residence, rather than a tax. On appeal, the supremecourt reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the ordinanceimposed a tax on appellee's residents that was not authorized by

general law. The supreme court determined that the fee was a tax

because it was a mandatory charge imposed on all residents. Moreover,the supreme court determined that the ordinance did not impose a

user's fee because a user's fee was paid voluntarily. The supreme court

concluded that if a resident did not pay the fee imposed by thetransportation ordinance, a lien would be placed on the resident's

property. The supreme court further concluded that residents had nochoice but to pay the fee.

OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision

because appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance imposed atax on appellee city's residents that was not authorized by general law.The supreme court held that the ordinance did not impose a valid

user's fee because residents were required to pay the fee or have a lienplaced on their properties. 

 Facts:

 city wanted citizens to pay a fee based on use of roads - tax ct saidit was ok b/c it's like a user fee

 Sup ct of FL said it's a tax, not a user fee - held that transportationutility fees used to finance bonds were unauthorized tax, rather than a

valid user fee something about voluntariness

 user fee for a road would be a toll - b/c there's a meaningfulconnection b/w actual use *** driving on the road is pretty voluntary

 constitution draws a line b/w taxes and fees - two kinds; user fee andimpact fee

 impact fee - Contractors and Builders Assoc v Dunedin (talked

about in this case) this case is a nice discussion on tax user fees and impact fees,

Rutledge is a nice discussion on ad valorem tax

Canaveral Port Auth v Dept of Rev

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner port authority and respondentrevenue department moved for rehearing and clarification of the

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decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Brevard County (Florida),

holding that petitioner's fee-simple interest in property was notimmune from ad valorem taxation.

OVERVIEW: The county in which petitioner port authority was locatedassessed ad valorem taxes against petitioner pursuant to Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 196.199(4) on the fee interest of real property owned by

petitioner and leased to private entities engaged in nongovernmentalactivities. Petitioner filed suit challenging the assessment. Immunity

from ad valorem taxation, which was necessary for the proper

functioning of state government, was to be kept within narrow bounds,and not extended to exempting of commercial establishments operated

for profit on property leased from the government. Therefore, feeinterest in petitioner's property was not exempt from ad valorem

taxation because the property was leased to a nongovernmental entityfor a nongovernmental use.

OUTCOME: Decision holding that petitioner's fee-simple interest inproperty was not immune from ad valorem taxation was affirmed,

where the property was leased to a nongovernmental entity fornongovernmental use. 

o  def of states Facts:

  so states are immune, but what's a state?

FL Dep of Rev v Gainesville

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, the Florida Department of Revenue, challenged the judgment of the District Court of Appeal(Florida), which affirmed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of appellee city. The city had brought suit seeking a declaration

that the portions of Fla. Stat. ch. 97-197, imposing the tax obligationon its telecommunications facilities, were unconstitutional under Fla.Const. art. VII, § 3(a).

OVERVIEW: The city became involved in the business of providing

telecommunication services. The trial court granted summary judgmentin favor of the city and declared §§ 2 and 3 of Fla. Stat. ch. 97 - 197

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facially unconstitutional. The lower court affirmed, holding that the

property in question was being used by the city for a municipal purposeand that the legislature's attempt to condition the provision of those

municipal services on the payment of an amount equal to any advalorem tax liability was in direct conflict with Fla. Const. art. VII, §3(a). The court, upon reviewing the applicable statutes and the

meaning being various terms such as municipal purpose, held that

providing telecommunications services did not, as a matter of law,always serve municipal or public purposes and, therefore, ad valorem

taxation of a municipality's telecommunications facilities was not

facially unconstitutional. The court agreed that telecommunicationsservices were essential services but that, in providing those services, a

municipality did not as a matter of law engage in an activity essentialto the welfare of the community.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision of the lower court that

held that the statutory provisions imposing ad valorem taxation ontelecommunications facilities were facially unconstitutional.

 what's a public purpose?

Strand v Escambia County

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:Appellant intervenor challenged a final judgment validating a proposed bond issue from the Circuit Court of 

the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, Florida. Appelleeswere Escambia County, Florida, etc., et al.

OVERVIEW: The intervenor raised three issues: (A) whether thecircuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for

continuance, (B) whether the circuit court's final judgment was

supported by competent, substantial evidence, and (C) whether thebonds required a referendum pursuant to art. VII, § 12, Fla. Const. On

the first issue, given the adequacy of the notice provided and thecircuit court's accommodation, the circuit court did not abuse itsdiscretion. With regard to the second issue, the intervenor argued that

the circuit court's adoption of the County's proposed final judgmentwas an improper delegation of authority. This contention was withoutmerit because the intervenor was afforded a meaningful opportunity to

review the County's proposed final judgment, make objections, and

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make his own proposals. Next, the court stated that the findings in the

Ordinance and Resolution were not shown to have been clearlyerroneous. Finally, the third issue was controlled by the court's decision

in Penn, in which the court previously affirmed the Circuit Court'svalidation of bonds issued under a similar tax ordinance and resolutionand issuance structure.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the final judgment of validation of theEscambia County Circuit Court.

 Facts:

o  Ct said what was critical was constitutionality of the bonds

 bonds were going to create a trust fund non ad valorum revenue available?

 

Jackson-Shaw

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On appeal from a federal district court, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified twoquestions. It asked the present court to determine whether an aviation

authority had become a joint owner with a private entity or whether ithad given, lent, or used its credit to aid a private entity in violation of 

Art. VII, § 10, Fla. Const. 

OVERVIEW: The agreement was for a private commercialdevelopment company's long-term use of vacant land owned by the

authority. The court held that the agreement did not violate the

constitutional prohibition against joint ownership. Although an option toground lease required the authority to construct a road extension, ithad already been planned and budgeted, so the authority was not

using public funds to create a prohibited joint ownership. The authority

was also obligated to provide land for wetlands mitigation, but thisprovision did not make the parties to the agreement joint owners.

Furthermore, the agreement did not meet all of the elements of thetest for a joint venture. Next, the authority was not impermissiblypledging its credit to aid the company. The constitutional prohibition

contemplated not just the use of public funds but the imposition of anew financial liability and a direct or indirect obligation to pay a debt of 

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a third party. Under this standard, the authority had not given, lent, or

used its credit to aid the company. Thus, the transaction needed toonly serve a public purpose, which was fulfilled to the extent that the

revenue might ultimately provide tax relief.

OUTCOME: The court answered the certified questions in the negative

and returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit.

Gallant v Stephen

CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant taxpayer sought review of thedecision of the Pinellas County Circuit Court (Florida) upholding theconstitutionality of Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) in an action brought

by appellant against appellee county board members to block thecreation of municipal service taxing units.

OVERVIEW: Appellee county board members adopted a resolutionunder Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) creating a municipal service

taxing unit spanning the unincorporated area of the county to fund the

services provided to that area. Appellant taxpayer and property ownerin this area, sued appellees challenging the newly imposed tax underFla. Const. art. VII, § 9. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of 

chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r). The court affirmed the trial court's order. Infinding ch. 125.01(1)(q), ( r) constitutional, the court relied on the

language of art. VII, § 9, which provided for the imposition of taxes bya county in order to provide municipal services separate and apart fromthe requirement that other types of taxes be approved by a

referendum. The court also relied on the legislative intent that ch.125.01(1)(q), (r) was to ensure that individuals living in the

unincorporated area of the county also receive municipal services.Moreover, the court found that the tax did not violate Fla. Const. art.VII, § 2 because the tax was applied in a uniform rate within the

unincorporated area.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court order's declaring the lawauthorizing a county to furnish municipal services funded by ad

valorem taxes in an unincorporated area without a referendumconstitutional because the legislative intent was to provide such

services, and the state constitution contemplated the imposition of 

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such taxes without a referendum.

Fl Dept of Rev v Howard

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant Florida Department of Revenue

sought review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District(Florida), which declared that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) violated

the mandate of Fla. Const. art. VII, § 4.

OVERVIEW: The appellate court had ruled that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 

(2001) was unconstitutional because it interfered with a property

appraiser's discretion to determine just value, and it favored tangiblepersonal property owners who had received a reduced assessment

from an administrative value adjustment board (VAB) in a previous taxyear. The supreme court disagreed. Chapter 193.016 required anappraiser to consider the results of an appeal before VAB in the year

prior in determining the current just value of tangible personal

property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.011 (2001) set out eight factors that wereto be considered in valuing property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001)

merely provided a ninth factor for consideration. It did not arbitrarily

create a class of property for favored tax treatment. Further, ch.193.016 did not require an appraiser to follow the VAB's assessment, it

only required an appraiser to "consider" it. The statute's secondsentence, which required an appraiser to justify his or her reasons for adecision to depart from a VAB assessment, simply regulated the

procedural, not substantive, method of assessment where there had

been a successful appeal to a VAB.

OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision

and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with thesupreme court's decision

Capital City Country Club

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) affirmed the judgmentthat Fla. Stat. Ann. § 196.199(4) (1991) did not exempt petitioner, a private lessee of cityproperty on a lease entered into before 1976, from paying real estate taxes and that petitioner'spayment of tangible tax on the lease did not cause the value of the lease to be excluded from the

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value of the property, and certified these questions to the court.

OVERVIEW: Petitioner entered into a 99-year lease in 1956 to lease city-owned land for the useas a private golf course. The lease required petitioner to pay all ad valorem taxes. Petitioner paidintangible tax on the lease, and sued for an exemption from real estate taxes under  Fla. Stat.

 Ann. § 196.199(4) (1991), or to have the value of the lease excluded from the value of the land

for real estate tax purposes. The trial court entered judgment against petitioner, and theappellate court affirmed the judgment and certified the question of the exemption and theexclusion. The court held that because § 196.199(4) (1991) did not expressly exempt leasesentered into before 1976 from taxation, and because Fla. Const. art. VII, § 3(a) exempted cityowned property from taxation only if it were being used for a public purpose, petitioner was notexempt from paying real estate taxes. Because the intangible tax on the lease and the realestate tax were two separate taxes on different types of property, there was no double taxationand the value of the lease could not be excluded from the value of the land for real estate for taxpurposes. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision.

OUTCOME: The court approved the decision affirming the denial of a real estate tax exemptionor reduction to petitioner because the state constitution did not give petitioner, a private lessee of 

city land on a lease entered into before 1976, an exemption, thus the statute could not giveexemptions to pre-1976 lessees, and because the value of the lease did not affect the value of the real estate and could not be excluded for tax valuations

Volusia County v State

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, challenged a judgment from the circuit court (Florida), where appellant's complaint for validation of capital improvement bonds was denied. Appellant claimed that it would pledge allunused revenue from regulatory fees.

OVERVIEW: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida,challenged a judgment from the circuit court, which denied the complaint of the County of Volusia for validation of capital improvement bonds in the amount of $ 40,000,000, pledgingunused revenues from regulatory fees and user charges to pay for the bonds. The FloridaSupreme Court affirmed the order denying validation. The pledge of all available funds had morethan a mere incidental effect on the exercise of ad valorem taxing power. It required areferendum under the Fla. Const. art. VII, § 12. The pledge of all available revenues, together with a promise to maintain the programs, would have had a substantial impact on the futureexercise of ad valorem taxing power. The taxpayers of Volusia County had to have anopportunity to vote on the bond issue.

OUTCOME: The state supreme court affirmed the circuit court's denial of appellant county's

complaint to validate capital improvement bonds because the pledge of funds, offered byappellant, required a referendum under the state constitution

Donovan v Okaloosa County

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee county filed a bond validation complaint pursuant to Ch.75, Fla. Stat. (2008) seeking a determination of its authority to incur bonded debt relating to a

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beach restoration project. Appellant owners of property subject to the related assessmentsintervened, filing an answer and counterclaims. The Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County(Florida) issued an order validating the bonds. The property owners appealed.

OVERVIEW: The owners argued, among other things, that, in adopting the AssessmentResolution, the county failed to comply with its Municipal Service Benefit Unit (MSBU)

Ordinance, and as a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to validate the bonds. The appellatecourt found, however, that the county fulfilled the § 75.03, Fla. Stat. condition when it adoptedthe bond resolution, authorizing issuance of bonds to finance the underlying project. With thiscondition satisfied, the county was authorized to file the complaint. As all the requirements of theinitial assessment resolution were fulfilled before the hearing, a separate hearing was notneeded for consideration of the initial resolution and both the initial and final resolutions could beadopted jointly. Further, the requirements of the MSBU Ordinance were met. The MSBUOrdinance did not require a separate hearing to adopt first an initial and then a final assessmentresolution. The property subject to the assessment derived a "special benefit" and theassessment was properly apportioned among the specially benefitting properties. Even if theparamount public purpose test applied, the project met that standard.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed

GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAWS

Village of North Palm

  advanced via the 

 PLs are arguing equal protection - which supports Gillen's theory that

that's the ***  commission did not have jx if the pop is over 100k..? 

 if municipality doesn't exercise jx, the commission gets jx..?  argument is that it doesn't treat all public utilities the same?  public utilities commission is going to set rates that aren't in the bestinterest of ppl who use the services...so trying to undo the jx of the

railroads over these utilities  ct holds that there isn't a prob - railroad have ability to regulate utilities

within their powers  1964 case still trying to tack on idea that state commission is too far

removed from the ***  ct says no, there is a rational difference 

 also provided a distinction bw laws that function universally vs laws thatfunction uniformly - law isn't necessarily discriminatory.. 

 question is whether the.....is predicated on a fair, rational and reasonable

classification  so equal protection is idea that law should treat all similarly situated ppl

the same way...this here, discussing distinction bw gen and speciallaws...discussion becomes whether ******** are differently situated inlight of purpose of the law (which is to provide regulation of public

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utilities) ct finds it is reasonable - so much so that it takes judicial notice of it 

Gulfstream Park Racing

  25 mile radius only 3 tracks could be run 

 argued that it was unconstitutional - b/c it only applied to one area of FL  see beginning of prob of ppl going to legislature and trying to get specialdeals - passing laws as general laws that aren't truly general 

 he likes this one b/c requires you to look at operation of law to see that itisn't a general law 

 Statute prohibiting thoroughbred permitholders from engaging inintertrack wagering in any area of the state where there were three or

more horse race permitholders within 25 miles of each other applied toprecisely one 25-mile area in state, and there was no reasonable

possibility that it would ever apply to another area of state, and thusstatute was unconstitutional as a special law enacted in the guise of a

general law and without compliance with the specific requirements for the

enactment of special laws  if there is no reas possibility that other ppl can enter the class - *** 

  just like w appropriations bill, it is masquerading as a general law  ct will take into account how it actually operates 

 meaningful analysis of face of statute as well as (gillen finds it similar todormant commerce clause scrutiny) 

 description of class generally means its a general law bc all are situated

similarly...but have to look at how statute is actually operated - if it ismade so that only narrow **** 

Ocala BreedersCASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff gaming center filed a complaint for declaratory judgmentagainst defendant breeders and defendant Florida Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, asking thetrial court to declare Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615(9) unconstitutional. After the trial court declared thestatute unconstitutional, the breeders and the division appealed to the Florida First District Courtof Appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. The breeders appealed.

OVERVIEW: The breeders owned a permanent thoroughbred horse racing/sales facility andconducted horse sales. The breeders applied for and received a license to conduct intertrackwagering pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 550.61(8) (Supp. 1990), an earlier version of  Fla. Stat. ch.

550.615(9), containing the same licensure criteria. The trial court found the statutory provisionscreated an impenetrable barrier to all intertrack wagering applicants except the breeders. TheFlorida Supreme Court agreed. The statute was unconstitutional as a special law enacted under the guise of a general law in violation of  Fla. Const. art. III, § 10. Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615 wasenacted to increase revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by providing protection tothoroughbred horse breeders from the state policy against off-track betting, but no rationalrelationship existed between this purpose and the detailed licensure criteria in the disputedstatute. Curiously, the breeders were the only business entity that had ever obtained a

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nonwagering thoroughbred racing permit. Fla. Stat. ch. 550.615 violated the equal protectionrights of other potential licensees.

OUTCOME: The supreme court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 

 wanted a permit in order to run tracks

 only ppl who could get permits were the breeders b/c of how ppl qualifiedfor it 

 theoretically other ppl could get the permit for this kind of gambling, butthey have a tiebreaker provision that says - length of time applicant has

****  Statute governing intertrack wagering license application was

unconstitutional as a special law enacted under guise of a general law, asstatutory provisions in tandem created impenetrable barrier to all

intertrack wagering applicants except currently licensed wagering facility;under “tiebreaker provision,” current wagering facility would always

prevail against another applicant because criteria essentially describedcurrent wagering facility 

 Statute governing intertrack wagering license violated potential licensees’ right to equal protection of the law, where statute was enacted to increase

revenues at pari-mutuel wagering facilities by providing protection tothoroughbred horse breeders from state policy against off-track betting,but no rational relationship existed between this purpose and detailed

licensure criteria in statute  found no rational basis bw licensing requirements and general purpose of 

the statute  example of open class; general 

 also shows adding of equal protection analysis - once you have argsabouat gen vs special law, you're gonna make them under equal

protection  fed law - rational basis = legit interest; very deferential review; any

rational basis bw means chosen and the legit public purpose of the statute 

o  this one has gen vs special problem 

o  then what are the purposes of the statte 

Schrader v FL Keys Aqueduct CASE SUMMARY 

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority (FKAA) filed a complaintunder Fla. Stat. ch. 75 in the Circuit Court in and for Monroe County, Florida, seeking validationof its sewer revenue bonds and a judgment that its service area was wholly within the FloridaKeys area of critical state concern and that 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, § 4 was a general lawapplicable in that area. The circuit court granted this relief; appellant citizen sought review.

OVERVIEW: Under the authority of 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, § 4, the FKAA and a city enactedconnection ordinances which included package plants within their scope and required mandatoryconnections within 30 days of receipt of notification that a publicly-owned or investor-owned

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sewage system was available. The citizen argued in the circuit court that as § 4 pertained only tolocal governments within the Florida Keys area of critical state concern, it was a special lawunconstitutionally passed as a general law in violation of  Fla. Const. art. III, § 10, and that theconnection ordinances were unenforceable because their provisions regarding package plantswere based solely on the authority granted by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 395, § 4. The circuit court heldthat § 4 was properly enacted as a general law and that the connection ordinances were valid

and binding. The supreme court agreed. Though § 4 affected a limited geographic area of thestate, its primary purpose was one of statewide importance and impact, and that purpose wasrationally related to the designation of the Florida Keys as an area of critical state concern;therefore, it was a valid general law.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

 FL Keys Aqueduct Auth

 law allowed those that were already there to connect to public utilitysewage treatment plans, but didn't include those from package system 

 later on passed law that reqd FKAA

 so law that applies to one part of the state that gives authority thatrequires this *** authority to *** 

 b/c so specifically related to that specific area - specific law and notgeneral law 

 this is a local law  Art 3, Section 10 - special laws 

 Art 10, Section 12 g - defines special law to include local law  special law b/c it has an intended localized impact 

 this case gives you exception for areas of critical state concern...all boilsdown to is that

 whether this law that gives FKAA special power to require ppl auth to domandatory hookups... 

 a special law is not universal...  it operates uniformally.... 

 are all package *** uniformly ...  A “local law” is one relating to, or designed to operate only in, a

specifically indicated part of the state, or one that purports to operatewithin classified territory when classification is not permissible or the

classification adopted is illegal 

 A “general law” operates universally throughout the state, or uniformlyupon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within

permissible classifications by population of counties or otherwise, or is alaw relating to a state function or instrumentality 

 If particular physical conditions exist in only a portion of the state,enactments with reference thereto nonetheless may be general laws; so

long as a law materially affects the people of the state, it need not haveuniversal application to be a general law.

 held that primary purpose of state statute, authorizing local governments

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of single county designated as being an “area of critical state concern” topass waste water laws more restrictive than those provided for undergeneral law, was to protect natural state resource, the nearshore waters

of state’s keys, and thus statute related to a state function such that itconstituted a general law rather than a special law.

 if it looks like a population act, but pop is determined by a fixed point intime - that won't be **** - b/c no ppl will be able to enter that class 

 looks at purpose of statute and det if there are legit reasons for treatingthis area differently 

o  primary purpose of statute is to address tourism and impact of statuteis in keeping w that purpose - FL keys uniquely impacts that purpose 

o  area of critical state concern 

 idea that an act targets on one locality - FL keys - would tend to look likea special law...schrader gives us test that it isn't special law b/c there isn't

other area that looks like this - and it is area of critical state concern..and

statute impact is to address that area of crit state concern   barbri ? H2 sub a ? where they cite Schrader   concern is that they are passing special laws treated as general laws schrader is ex of something that looks like special law that is not - as long as you can ID state

concern and illustrate that impacts area of state concern ? (whereas other cases are ones

that look like general law that arent)

RJR Tobacco v HallCASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee personal representative obtained a $ 15.75 million

 judgment against appellant tobacco company. The tobacco company appealed and obtained astay of the judgment by posting a $ 5 million bond pursuant to § 569.23(3), Fla. Stat. The CircuitCourt for Alachua County (Florida) denied the personal representative's motion to determine thesufficiency of the bond. The personal representative sought review of that order.

OVERVIEW: Under  Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(1), the bond required for a stay would have beenabout $ 17.6 million. The personal representative argued that § 569.23(3) was anunconstitutional special law under   Art. III, § 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. because it applied only to thefive tobacco companies that signed an underlying settlement agreement in the Engle progenycases. However, the appellate court found that the statute was not limited to judgments enteredfor Engle plaintiffs; it applied in any civil case against a settlement agreement signatory broughtby or on behalf of a member of a decertified class action. It was not unreasonable to expect thatthe settlement agreement signatories, which included the nation's four largest tobaccocompanies, may have been the subject of other class actions that ended up being decertified.

Thus, it was not a special law. Further, Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(a) recognized that general law andthe rule itself may have provided different requirements for obtaining a stay, and § 569.23(3) fellwithin the "except as provided by general law" clause of  Rule 9.310(a). The statute did notviolate the separation of powers mandate in  Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. 

OUTCOME: The trial court's order denying the personal representative's motion to determine thesufficiency of the bond was affirmed. A question of great public importance was certified to theSupreme Court of Florida.

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 Hall was pers rep of companies  agreement bw FL and tobacco companies for billions of dollars - FL

became dependent on it 

 class action - decertified to individual groups  FL amended the bonding reqmts to put a cap on it  litigation by states against tobacco companies...settlement

agreements...some companies settled w FL - the class action wasdecertified 

 the generally applicable bonding reqmt would force tobacco companies toput up so much money as security that they wouldnt be able to make

their payments to FL 

 idea is that they are going to exempt those 5 companies from generalbonding reqmts in order to protect the money

 this is a Schrader case- ability of 5 companies to make their payments isa critical state concern - so this statute that treats these 5 companies

differently from other companies wrt bonding reqmts - it is a general law  Statute limiting the bond payment required for stay of judgment pending

appeal for cigarette manufacturers which signed Florida SettlementAgreement (FSA), was not “special law,” subject to constitutional

provision prohibiting special laws pertaining to grant of privilege to aprivate corporation; settlement agreement was important state revenuestream, and although statute was designed to apply to certain class action

plaintiffs, it was likely in the future that other cases would be subject tothe statute 

 they say theoretically its an open class - but they focus not on thedefending class, but the PL class, which is burdened -

 2 ways to get to okay land - one is if its open class...other is if **** o  *** who's the beneficiary of the statute - **** 

o  here though, ct flips that around o  argument is that its a specific law.... 

o  gillen thinks its plainly a schrader case 

o  it's not universality, its uniformly...have to look at whats the difference 

o  no question that this is right - only 5 signatories whose revenue streamimplicates *** 

o  they ask on top whether its an open class, but gillen doesn't think youhave to answer that quesiton - if you satisfy schrader, you don't have to

det whether its an open class...but he thinks lower cts are confused -why barbri says "compare" - but open class where *****LISTEN **** 

o  open class vs class that looks closed 

o  schrader thing 

Barndollar v Sunset

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have to have reas notice

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants challenged a decision from the Circuit Court of theTwentieth Judicial Circuit for Charlotte County (Florida), granting defendant corporation summary

 judgment on the grounds that the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act, Fla.

Stat. ch. 79-490, was unconstitutional.

OVERVIEW: The legislature enacted the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act(Act), Fla. Stat. ch. 79-490, which dealt with the creation of a historic and conservation district. Aspecial government entity would be established after approval by a majority vote in areferendum. Appellee corporation owned real property within the proposed district and sought toenjoin the referendum. The trial court granted appellee summary judgment and held that that the

 Act was unconstitutional because of the method the act was to be submitted for voter approval.On appeal, the court affirmed the order finding the pre-enactment notice was legally inadequatebecause it was clearly inadequate to apprise interested persons of the scope and purpose of theproposed regulatory scheme. The court ruled that the provision allowed nonresident propertyowners to vote which violated Fla. Const. art. III, § 10. The court found the provision was not

severable, and thus, the entire Act was void because the valid and void parts of the chapter weremutually connected with and dependent upon each other and severability was not compatiblewith the legislative intent.

OUTCOME: Summary judgment in favor of appellee corporation was affirmed on the groundsthat the Gasparilla Island Historic and Conservation District Act (Act) was unconstitutionalbecause the provision permitting nonresident property owners to vote violated the FloridaConstitution, the provision was not severable, and thus, the entire Act was void

Lawnwood Medical

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant corporation brought an action seeking to have the St.Lucie County Hospital Governance Law (HGL), ch. 2003-372, Laws of Fla., declaredconstitutional. Appellee president of the corporation's medical staff opposed the petition. Bothparties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court held that the HGL violated  Art. III, §11(a)(12), Fla. Const. The Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed. The corporationappealed.

OVERVIEW: The intermediate appellate court found, inter alia, that the HGL altered many of therights and obligations specified in the contract between the corporation's medical staff and itsboard of trustees, constituting an impermissible privilege. The appellate court found, amongother things, that the HGL provided the hospital with a complete override of medical staff bylaws.

Moreover, Ch. 2003-372, § 5, at 448, Laws of Fla. granted the corporation's board of trustees theright and power to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws, something it could not do beforeenactment of the HGL. The HGL altered the framework for governing, and the medical staff'simportant role in it pursuant to the bylaws, in a manner favorable to the board, and essentiallygave the board plenary power to take independent action in these areas. These facets of theHGL granted the corporation a "right" and placed it in an advantageous position, one that it didnot possess before the law was enacted. The HGL granted the corporation rights, benefits, or advantages and thus, a "privilege" in contravention of   Art. III, § 11(a)(12), Fla. Const. Theunconstitutional provisions were not severable.

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 OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

Pinellas County Planning Council

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, the Pinellas County Planning Council, challenged aPinellas County Circuit Court (Florida) decision for appellee property owners, which held that thespecial act, 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-594, which established appellant, violated Fla. Const. art. III,§ 11(a)(1) because it affected the jurisdiction or duties of the Board of County Commissioners.

 Appellant argued that the law was constitutional.

OVERVIEW: Appellant, the Pinellas County Planning Council, established a countywide landuse plan which affected appellee property owners. Appellees brought an action which claimedthat the special act which created appellant, 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-594, violated Fla. Const. art.III, § 11(a)(1) because it affected the jurisdiction or duties of the Board of CountyCommissioners. The trial court held that the special act was unconstitutional. Appellant

challenged that decision. The court reversed the trial court and held that the act wasconstitutional. The court noted that other special acts have created similar local authorities in thestate. The court found that this act, like the others, created an authority which served a usefuland valid county function. The court reasoned that the constitutional limitation appellee allegedunder art. III, § 11(a)(1), was merely incidental to the act's main objective. The court reversed thetrial court's decision and remanded the matter.

OUTCOME: The court reversed the trial court decision, which held that the special act thatcreated appellant, Pinellas County Planning Commission, was unconstitutional. The courtrejected appellee property owners' argument that the act violated the Florida Constitution byinfringing upon the responsibilities of the Board of County Commissioners and remanded thematter to the trial court.

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT

Pomponio

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners sought review of judgment which granted rent payments tothe court registry under a recreational lease provision under  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 718.401(4) (1977), inrespondent condominium association's favor.

OVERVIEW: Petitioners, condominium developer and lessors, sought review of decision whichrequired the payment of rent into a court registry during pendency of litigation under  Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 718.401(4), in respondent condominium association's favor. Petitioners claimed the provisionimpermissibly interfered with contractual rights. The court reversed the decision below, inpetitioners' favor, concluding the provision impermissibly impaired contract rights when it was notthe least restrictive means possible to achieve the police power interest in requiring a unit owner'sdeposit to protect from lessors' foreclosure for non-payment of rent during litigation. The court

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noted no documentation of the underlying premise of massive condominium foreclosure threat wasshown. The court explained it began its analysis of reasonableness of a contract impairmentthrough application of two accepted principles: he who pays too late, pays less and virtually nodegree of contract impairment was tolerable in Florida. The court determined the rent depositprovision's effect, absent contractual consent, unreasonably impaired significant contract rights toreceive bargained for rent.

OUTCOME: The court reversed judgment requiring petitioners' deposit of rent in a court registryduring pendency of litigation with respondent condominium association because the rent depositstatute unreasonably impaired significant contractual rights to receive bargained for rent when themeans wielded to achieve state police power goals was not the least restrictive possible.

Chiles v United Faculty of FL

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, governor and state, sought review from the judgment of the Circuit Court in and for Leon County (Florida), which issued a judgment for appellees, unionsrepresenting public employees, in their action against appellants after appellants eliminated pay

raises agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement.

OVERVIEW: Appellees were unions representing public employees and were unable to resolve acollective bargaining process for pay and benefits. Appellants, governor and state, authorized araise for the employees and the unions ratified the raise. Appellants eliminated the raises in order to meet a revenue shortfall. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision issuing judgment for appellees. Appellants' elimination of the raises was an impermissible impairment of contract andviolated Fla. Const. art. I, §§ 6, 10. Appellants and appellees agreed on a fully enforceable contractbecause appellants accepted and funded the agreement. Appellants were parties to that contract.

 Appellants failed to show that they had no alternative means of preserving the contract with thepublic employees and, thus, had no authority to breach the contract. The savings clauses in thecontract were not an escape hatch for appellants but were included only to preserve the contact in

the event of partial invalidity.

OUTCOME: The court affirmed the circuit court's decision for appellees, unions representing publicemployees, and found that appellants, governor and state, violated the Florida constitution whenthey eliminated raises for the public employees after appellants had agreed to and funded theraises because appellants failed to show they had no alternative means of funding the raises.

Florida v FL PBA

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Appeal, First District

(Florida) for appellees, declaring a proviso in a state appropriations bill unconstitutional after appellants enacted legislation altering the leave policy for appellees' career service employees.

OVERVIEW: Appellants enacted legislation that altered the leave policy for appellees' career service employees. Appellees claimed that appellants' actions abridged their right to collectivelybargain, which was guaranteed by the state constitution. The trial court granted summary judgmentfor appellees. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision declaring Fla. Const. § 9.3 (A)5 of the 1988 Appropriations Act unconstitutional. The court stated that where the legislatureprovides enough money to implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change

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the benefit, the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit will be enforced. Where thelegislature does not appropriate enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, thenthe conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if contradictory to the negotiatedagreement.

OUTCOME: The court's decision declaring a proviso in the state appropriations bill unconstitutional

was reversed because appellants had the right to impose conditions on the use of funds so long asthey appropriated enough money, even if it was contradictory to the negotiated agreement withappellees. 

Scott v Williams

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants, Florida's Governor and others, acting as the State Boardof Administration of Florida, and others, appealed a circuit court judgment to the First District Courtof Appeal, which certified that the appeal, which dealt with the constitutionality of provisions of ch.2011-68, Laws of Fla., presented issues of great public importance that required immediateresolution by the supreme court.

OVERVIEW: Ch. 2011-68, Laws of Fla., enacted Senate Bill 2100, which as of July 1, 2011,converted the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from noncontributory by employees tocontributory, required all current FRS members to contribute 3% of their salaries to the retirementsystem, and eliminated the retirement cost-of-living adjustment for creditable service after theeffective date of the act. Ch. 2011-68, §§ 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 17, 24, 26, 29, 32, 33, 39, and 40, Laws of Fla. were facially constitutional. There was no violation of  Fla. Const. art. I, § 10. The preservationof rights statute, § 121.011(3)(d), Fla. Stat., was not intended to bind future legislatures fromprospectively altering benefits for future service performed by all members of the FRS. Theprospective changes made by ch. 2011-68 were made within the authority of the legislature anddid not impair any statutorily created contract rights. As no contract was breached, there was nounconstitutional taking under   Art. X, § 6, Fla. Const. Finally, nothing on the face of ch. 2011-68's

"Plan Amendment" removed the subject of retirement from the collective bargaining process. Thus,there was no violation of   Art. I, § 6, Fla. Const. 

OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed

EMINENT DOMAIN / TAKINGS

St John's River Management v Koontz

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified a question to be of great public importance, asking whether  U.S. Const. amend. V and  Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. recognized an exactions taking where there was no compelled dedication of any interest in realproperty to public use and the alleged exaction was a non-land-use monetary condition for permit

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approval, which never occurred and no permit was ever issued.

OVERVIEW: A landowner requested permits from the water management district to developcommercial property. When the permits were denied, he brought an inverse condemnation claimasserting an improper exaction by the district. The trial court held that the district had effected ataking of the property. Pursuant to § 373.617(3), Fla. Stat. (2002), the district issued the permits,

and the trial court subsequently awarded the landowner a sum for a temporary taking of theproperty. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. However, the intermediate court erroneouslyapplied the Nollan/Dolan exactions test because the district did not condition approval of thepermits on the landowner dedicating any portion of his interest in the property in any way to publicuse. Further, the landowner never expended any funds towards the performance of offsitemitigation, and nothing was ever taken from him. U.S. Const. amend. V and  Art. X, § 6(a), Fla.Const. did not recognize an exactions taking where there was no compelled dedication of anyinterest in property to public use and the alleged exaction was a non-land-use monetary conditionfor permit approval, which never occurred and no permit was issued.

OUTCOME: The court rephrased the certified question, answered the rephrased question in thenegative, and quashed the decision under review

Keshbro, Inc. v Miami

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In separate cases, petitioner motel and respondent apartment suedrespondent first city and petitioner second city for inverse condemnation. The trial courts grantedsummary judgment to the motel and apartment, and the cities appealed. The Third District Court of 

 Appeal (Florida) reversed the first trial court's judgment; the Second District Court of Appeal(Florida) affirmed the second court's judgment. The motel and the second city appealed.

OVERVIEW: The cities ordered a motel and an apartment to close temporarily under the cities'nuisance ordinances, due to illegal activities occurring there. The motel and apartment sued thecities for compensation for losses caused by the closures, and both were granted summary

 judgment. The first intermediate appellate court reversed; the second affirmed. The motel and thesecond city appealed, and the cases were consolidated, The instant court held that, as thetemporary closures rendered the properties economically idle, the cases were to be analyzedunder Lucas. Lucas's "nuisance exception", under which a regulation that eliminated the value of property was not a taking if the purpose of the regulation was to control a public nuisance, appliedto the motel but not to the apartment. The motel was the scene of numerous drug- and prostitution-related arrests, and the first city acted reasonably in ordering its temporary closure. Nocompensation was due the motel. But there was no such record of illegal activity at the apartment,and so closing it for one year was not specifically tailored to abate the drug nuisance, making itsclosure a compensable taking.

OUTCOME: The judgments were approved.

Stop the Beach Renourishment (focus on section "IV")

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner nonprofit corporation, the members of which were owners

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of beach-front property, brought an action against respondents, local governments and a stateagency, alleging that the governments' beach restoration projects approved by the state wereunconstitutional takings of the owners' property. The corporation challenged the judgment of theFlorida Supreme Court which held that no takings occurred. A writ of certiorari was granted.

OVERVIEW: The projects involved placing sand along beaches seaward from the mean high-

water line, which was the boundary between the state's submerged land and the owners'properties. The corporation contended that the state's ownership of the new dry land to seawarddeprived the owners of their rights to accretion and a water boundary, and that the state court'sdecision was a taking of the owners' properties. While their was no consensus concerning whether a judicial decision could effect a taking, or whether it was even necessary to address the issue, theU.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that there was no taking of the owners' property rights.Since the change in the mean high-water line resulted from a relatively sudden avulsion, rather than a gradual accretion, the newly exposed land remained property of the state and the previousmean high-water line remained the boundary between the properties of the state and the owners.Thus, prior to the state court's decision the owners had no rights to future accretions and to contactwith the water superior to the state's right to fill in its submerged land, and any further seawardaccretion became property of the state.

OUTCOME: The judgment holding that no takings occurred was affirmed