ts kI f

August 1969 LTC No. 66

The Land Tenure Center310 King HallUniversity of WisconsinMadison, Wisconsin 53706

THE DECISIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE

IN THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

WESTON H. AGOR

The author wishes to acknowledge fellowship support from the FulbrightCommittee and the Midwest Universities Consortium for field research in1962-63 and 1967-68, respectively. The Land Tenure Center, while itprovided no support for field research, did provide the author with partialsupport at different points in his graduate study in Madison. LTC isissuing this report because of its interest to those concerned with economicdevelopment. Weston Agor is assistant professor at Wisconsin State Univer-s i ty-Oshkosh.

All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions expressed inthis paper are the author's and not necessarily those of the Land Tenure Center.

ERRATUM

On page 6, this paragraph should follow the first paragraph onthat page, immediately preceding Section II, "Decisional Function."

The principal data sources on which this paper is basedare: in-the-field interviews (forty-three of the forty-fiveSenate universe),] ex-senator (who was also a former Ministerof Finance), twenty Senate staff members, I ex-Senate staffmember, 2 Chamber staff members, officials In the Executiveand the political parties: a detailed analysis of documents,committee reports, floor debates, and the work of other scholars;and extensive empirical observation of the operation of theChilean Congress. In this study, political parties will beabbreviated thusly: National (PN), Radical (PR), Christian-Democrat (PDC), Vanguard of the People (VNP), National Democrat(PADENA), Socialist (PS), Communist (PC), and Independents (I).

Ank-

THE DECISIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE IN

THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

by Weston H. Agor

I. Introduction

Chile is a highly centralized unitary, quasi-presidential political

system. The President has a fixed six-year term, and members of the

Cabinet are chosen by and responsible to him, although Congress has the

constitutional right to impeach ministers. If the President selects a

congressman for a Cabinet post (usually a deputy and rarely a senator),

the congressman must give up his congressional seat. The Congress is

bicameral--the Senate currently numbering forty-five members and the

Silvert prefers to describe the Chilean political system as"semi" (K. H. Silvert, Chile: Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt,Rinehdrt and Winston, 1965), p. 93) or "neo-parliamentary" (Silvert,

The Conflict Society--Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (rev.ed.) (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966), p. 27).Federico G. Gil uses the term "restricted parliamentary"--see his Poli-tical System of Chile (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). p. 89. Theycontend that in a fully presidential system, cabinet ministers are theservants only of the President. In Chile, Congress may impeach ministersand are "answerable" before Congress for their actions. It seems moreaccurate to describe the system as "quasi-presidential" in view ofthe way the system actually works. First, the President has a fixedsix-year term) which cannot be cut short by a vote of confidence.Co-igtes5 has the constitutional perogative to impeach the President undert ttbln lImited circumstances, but it has not been exercised in modern

tties. Secondly, although Congress also has the constitutional right tocIpeach inftsters, the Chilean scholar, Carlos Andrade Geywitz, notes

that such proceedings have seldom passed both houses. Finally it iscustomary for ministers to explain their actions to Congress, andeven participate in debates on key legislation. But, this is notunlike the American system, where cabinet members appear before hearingsof well-publicized congressional standing committees.

2Chamber of Deputies one hundred and forty-seven. The military has

traditionally abstained from active participation in politics, "acting

as a veto group only in so far as their own interests are concerned." 3

A proportional representation system is used for congressional elections

in an effort to assure faithful representation of all shades of political

opinion.

Although it is debatable how "faithful" representation is, the

electoral process has enabled Congress (especially the Senate) to serve

as an effective opposition site. Robert Dix has characterized Chile

(as well as Costa Rica and Uruguay) as follows, "The opposition role

is substantially (though not definitively) legitimized. The presidency

has been won two or more times by the opposition during the 25-year

period; the opposition wins over a third of the votes of the legislative

seats in most elections; there have been no or only very brief (e.g.,

Costa Rica, 1948-49) periods of non-constitutional rule." 5

2 The respective membership increased to 50 and 150 as of the 1960

congressional elections.

3 Silvert (1966), op. cit., p. 23.

The degree to which the system "faithfully" represents all shadesof opinion has most recently been examined in German Urzua Valenzuela,Los partidos politicos chilenos: las fuerzas pol(ticas (Santiago:Editorial Jurtdica de Chile, 1968), pp. 128-29, 148, 165, & 175; and inCarlos Ahdrade Geywitz, Elementos de derecho constitucional chileno(Sdfitiago: Editorial Juridica de Chile, 1963), pp. 313-324.

~Robett H. Dix, "ppositions and Development in Latin America,"

P& dL&0Uered at the 196.7 Annual Meeting of the American Politicalt~ti~e Association, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967

(Cpright- 1967, -A-PSA), p. 21+.. . ...- II

"The result has been one of the most stable multi-party systems16

in Latin America, one that "hassuccessfully evolved from an aristo-

cratic oligarchic democracy into one in which the masses play the

leading role."'7 Indeed, Flanigan and Fogelman's index of democratization

for the period 1900-1950 places Chile fifth behind Canada, England, the

United States and Switzerland: Chile is not only placed ahead of the

important European nations of France, Italy and Germany, but also ahead

of the Philippines and Brazil, states with Latin cultural origins.8

"Chile is the only Latin American country where political forces

are clearly and distinctly aligned, as in many European countries, into

three great blocs: the Right, the Center, and the Left.' '9 In the period

of approximately one hundred years during which the multi-party system

6 Silvert (1966), op. cit., p. 27.

Charles 0. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle forDemocracy in Latin America (New York: Macmillan, 1961). p. 6. For aChilean interpretation of this evolution, see: Julio Heise Gonzales,150 a'nos de evolucikn institucional (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello,

8 William rianigan and Edwin Fogleman, "Patterns of PoliticalDevelolffnetit arid Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis," Paperdelivered it the 1..967 Annual Meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociationf PIck-Congress Hotelz Chica o, September 5-9- 1967 (Copy-right 1967, APSA), Figurer This index updated to 1968 would notalter this placement.

An index of democratization is of course normative. The authordoes-rwl wish to imply in its use that political democracy--especially"t' Okdeied aftet the United States--necessarily equates with politicalde~~~iii#t (1 ,'W11 and capacity to cope with and to generate

foiitH atf a f g1 Faio t +on toward whichever values seem appropriate inUle pt~uiLItf eotlte~t"), However, it is one means (among others) byhiih vQI1id g l inay be achieved, and it is the system which has been

adopted with appropriate Chileanization in this country. Therefore,when speaking of Chile, it is correct to make this equation.

has functioned in Chile, the number of parties in existence has varied

widely, reaching a maximum of thirty-six in 1953. Recently, five

major parties have dominated the political field, ranging from Right to

Left as follows: National, Radical, Christian-Democrat, Socialist,

and Communist. Ideologically, the Chilean political scale leans to

the Left, with important factions in the two largest parties (Christian-

Democrat and Radical) tending toward detentes with the Socialist and

Communist parties.

Chile also appears to be characterized by a Congress which exercises

real influence in the political system. For example, Robert Scott notes

that although the legislatures in most of the countries of Latin America

only go through the formal steps of lawmaking while their acts are

frequently dictated by presidents, in Chile, "The center of power has

virtually been transferred from the president to the legislature . . ,,lO

Numerous other American, Chilean. and Cuban scholars have presented

specific examples of Congress' decisional voice, and selected statements

from President Frei's 1968 Message to Congress provide still further11

evidence.

Although these scholars would agree that Congress and particularly

the Senate exercise important influence in the decision-making process,

they probably also would contend that vis a vis one another, the

txha6-x U in hit is e important role insofar as policy initiation is

,~~ .Sot "Legislatures and Legislation,"iHrl E.tDavfs (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: RonaldPress, 1958), p. 331.

11 Cuarto mensadie del presidente de la Republica de Chile don Eduardo

F rei Montalva al inau urar el er~odo de sesiones ordinarias del Con rsNacional, 21 de mayo de 1968 (Santiago: Departamento de Publicacionesde Ia Presidencia de la Republica de Chile), pp. 52, 74, 76-78.

5

concerned. They would base this contention on the President's considerable

"formal" powers as outlined in the Constitution. For example, the

President may classify certain legislation urgent, thereby setting a time

12limit in which Congress "must" pass the bill. He also has "exclusive"

areas of initiative, for example, in proposing the annual budget, and

Congress is supposedly "limited" to reducing the requested expenditures13

of funds. Congress may also grant extraordinary powers to the Executive

in emergency situations, and he has wide veto powers (e.g., item. additive).14

However, there has been little systematic emprirical analysis to probe the

degree to which Congress' influence is in fact restricted by these formal

Executive prerogatives.

Objectives

The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the Chilean

Senate does exercise real influence. Specifically, it will show that

despite the President's extraordinary urgency powers, the Senate exercises

considerable lawmaking initiative, and can delay, modify, and defeat

legislation generated by the Executive. It also will consider the

Senate's role in overseeing the bureaucracy, granting patronage, articu-

lating interests, and resolving conflicts. Finally, it will try to

explain the bases of the Senate's rather extraordinary powers. For

FdJ o am~ see Manuel Matus Benavente, Desniveles entreuUstkJesyrepuestos realizados (Santiago: Editorial

1"Constitucic~n poll'tica de la republica de Chile" in Manual delSenado (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S. A., 1966).

comparative purposes, the discussion adopts the decisional function

outline used by Robert Packenham in a recent survey of world legislatures

as follows: (1) lawmaking (initiation); (2) lawmaking (modify and delay);

(3) administrative oversight andpatronage; and (4) interest articulation

and conflict resolution. 15

II. Decisional Function

I.Lawmaking (initiation)

A close examination of the Executive's urgency powers and the

budgetary process indicates that Congress exercises far more initiative

than scholars have previously suggested. First let us consider the

President's urgency powers. Since bills classified "urgent" by the

President have priority on Congressional calendars, and "must" be

discussed and dispatched within a specified time limit, analysts often

conclude that Congress has little opportunity to present its own legis-

lation. But it has not been sufficiently stressed that Congress is free

to accept or reject the President's legislation. Since the Executive

normally lacks a sufficient majority in one of the two chambers to pass

the bill (usually the Senate), congressmen use this lever to initiate

numerous unrelated bills (in the form of amendments) on its coattails.

The President frequently agrees to "tolerate" many of them rather than

have his proposed bill rejected within the required time limit.16

15 Robert A. Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development,"in Lloyd Musoif and Allan Kornberg (eds.), Legislatures and DevelopmentPerspectives (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming).

16Jorge A. Tapia Valdes, La tecnica legislativa (Santiago:

Editorial Jur~dica de Chile, 1960), pp. 41 and 43-45.

A recent example was the 1968 Salary Readjustment Bill which

President Frei tagged "as important as the annual budget. ''17 Before

final clearance by the Senate, it was the subject of more than 2,000

attempted amendments--often new bills not related to the law in question. 8

Two senators and an important staff member observe:

These miscellaneous laws have the advantage of acceleratingpassage--it is the only way some bills would get passed. Thereare many bills, perhaps that shouldn't get passed, but they gottacked on important legislation. The presidents of standingcommittees have the power to rule unconstitutional or extraneousto the material of the bill such amendments, but they oftendon't or can't use this power depending on the situation.

The congressman must add on items of importance to him--it is the only way to get them passed, and the Executive hasto accept some of this. Presidents of standing committees doalso--there is a certain amount of tolerance.

This process of amendments is worse than ever before, butit is a way of putting pressure on the President as well asgetting your own bills through.

As far as the annual budget is concerned, although Congress is

"restricted" by the Constitution from directly increasing the annual

budget, indirtl it is able to circumvent this restriction by passing

laws during the year that entail permanent expenses which must be

included in the annual budget according to Article 44J Section 4 of the

17 Cuatro mensaje . . . OP_.cit p. 76.

18 Indicaciones formuladas a] proyecto de ley que.reajuste las

reutna.iones.de los empleados y obreros de los sectores p'Ibli co y.ydo ...ara el ano 1968 boletfn no. 23.519-senado ND; based on

stahdfng c mmlttee reports, debates, interviews, and observations duringthis pe~lod. For an excellent service, see the photo-copies of allteW [paper accounts: "Cambios ministeriales," Boleti'n de informacic~n_general no. 37 (OlS), May 9, 1968.

19Constitution. Although Congress is not supposed to pass laws during

the year which signify new expenses without simultaneously indicating the

source of financing, it escapes this shackle by simply indicating that

20the source of funds is a future annual budget. Congress may also

decrease variable budget expenses during the fiscal year. This power,

when it chooses to exercise it, permits Congress to bargain with the

Executive.21

There is also abundant evidence that Congress influences the

formulation of Executive legislation prior to actual presentation.

Cabinet ministers may "try out" several alternative proposals on party

congressmen, not only for their personal reaction. but to solicit their

response as to what they sense Congress (especially the Senate opposition)

will accept. Or, the President and his Cabinet may directly approach

Congressional leaders for their views on a particular bill. One Government

(PDC) senator discusses these exchanges, "Sure, a minister may call the

presidents of the respective parties /who are often senators_/, and have

them over for an informal dinner one night .... " The President

himself indicates his frequent communication with Congress when urging

constitutional reforms, "I can say that Senators and Deputies of the most

distinct political viewpoints, in private conversations, have told me of

19 El proceso presupuestario fiscal chileno (Santiago: Instituto

de Economra, Universidad de Chile, 1958) p. 41.

2Arnaldo Gorziglia Balbi, Facultades presupuestarias legis-

lativas (Santiago: Imprenta Lazcano, 1960), p. 124+.

21El proceso presupestario . . ., op.. cit., p. 1+0.

9

their conviction that this situation /salary adjustment and unfinanced122

social security system-/ cannot continue and should be solved soon ... "

A tangible example of such activity involved the 1968 Salary

Readjustment Bill. After Sergio Molina, Minister of Finance, resigned

over the Senate's opposition to his proposal in January, 1968, Raul Saez23 -

replaced him. Saez began to explore possible alternative approaches

with the leadership of opposition parties. Victor Garcia, president of

the National Party, declared after talking with Saez, "The Minister . .

has pointed out the need to discuss the general aspects of the project

before it is sent to Congress . . . Saez called us to know our opinion,

and not to impose his point of view ... .24 Saez himself was quoted

as saying, "I think that if they have rejected the previous bill, they

have proposals to make. I hope to hear them and see what can be done ...

2. Lawmaking (modification or delay)

The Senate also appears able to modify or delay the President's

legislation. First of all, Article 138 of the Senate Reglamento (internal

rules and procedures) prohibits the Senate or a standing committee from

26considering at the same time two or more urgency bills. This provision

22 Catrmensae . , op. cit. p. 77.

231"Jue ui " El Mercurio, February 16, 1968, p. 1.

"IPosjtlvo primer contacto de Saez con dirigentes pol'ticos,"

i~~utli~l de Ia empresa privada destacan dos nuevos ministros,"

t1 Me*~eu~lo, February 24, 1968, p. 1.

2"Reglamento del senado," in Manual del senado, op. cit., p. 158.

10

obviously enables them to draw out the time period in which they consider

Executive-inspired urgency legislation. Secondly, the President's

"urgency" prerogative is considerably weakend if he lacks a majority

in either chamber. They will simply reject the proposed bill in the

required time limit. Faced with this alternative, the President will

either: (a) withdraw and re-submit the bill several times (starting the

urgency period over again from the beginning each time); (b) attempt

to reach a compromise solution with the opposition; or (c) simply give

Congress more time to consider it. He may even discard the bill altogether.27

Two examples which illustrate this process are the Bill on Public

Housing Developments and the 1968 University Reform Law. The Public

Housing Development Bill was sent to the Senate standing committees of

Public Works and Finance on September 7, 1965 (See Table 1). After more

than three months in committee, the President decided to ask for urgency

classification of the Bill, thereby requiring passage within thirty days.

It became clear to the President two weeks later that the committees would

report out the Bill within the required time limit. but not in the form

desired. Therefore, on January 12, 1966, the Executive retired and

immediately presented the same Bill again, thereby starting the time limit

all over from the beginning. By mid-July, this procedure had been

repeated four times, and over ten months had elapsed since original

submission to the Senate.

In the case of the University Reform Law, the President arrived

at a compromise solution with the Senate opposition which allowed for

27 Andrade Geywitz, o i. p. 439.

II

Table 1. Senate Action Delay of the Public Housing Development BillDeclared Urgent by the President

Date Session

9/7/65 43a Bill sent to Senate Committee ofPublic Works and Finance.

11/3/65 27a Included in list of bills to beconsidered.

12/22/65 46a Presents Executive urgency request.Classified simple urgency.

1/4/66 52a Agree to give committees extra weekto review bill.

1/12/66 57a Executive retires urgency and presentsBill again. Classified simple urgencyagain.

1/25/66 67a Executive retires urgency again.

5/31/66 la Executive presents urgency againfor third time. Classified simpleurgency.

7/7/66 3a Time limit of until 7/15 is given tocommittee of Public Works to reportout the Bill.

7/15/66 7a Executive for the fourth time retiresurgency.

Source: Senate Office of Information 1967 File.

12

rapid dispatch of the Bill (sixty days), but also provided more time

for committee study than a simple urgency classification would have.

Hence, in May 1968, the representatives of the PC, PDCI PR, and PS

(comites) issued this public statement:

The respresentatives declare that the project containsmatters of great importance which require study and carefullegislation . ... The periods for a petition of urgency areinsufficient to make such a study .... In view of this,we have asked the Minister of Education . . . to ask the Pre-sident to retire the urgency . . . and we indicated that aperiod of sixty days was a prudent and legitimate period tostudy the initiative, obtain all the relevant data, 2d hearthe opinions of the authorities of the universities.

Except by special Senate agreement or Executive urgency (and

we have seen how effective this is in fact), a standing committee does

not normally have a fixed period in which it must report out a bill. 29

Matters pending in Senate standing committees as of May, 1968, filled

a sixty-page booklet. 30 Should the originating chamber reject a law,

31it may not be introduced again for another year. On paper, the

President's veto powers appear substantial (e.g., item, additive).

But since the Executive normally lacks a majority to pass his legislation

in both houses, he is often forced to make informal bargains with the

opposition on how he will exercise his veto power once the bill leaves

Congress. Furthermore, Congress may also overrule a Presidential veto

by two-thirds vote of both houses, and the President may not use his

28Declaracin de los comit s Comunista, Demcrata CristianoRadical y Social ista del senado en relacion con el estudio del proyectogue legisla sobre las universidades (ND).

29.Tapia Valdes, op i. p. 28.

30 Senado-asuntos pendientes en comisiones al 21 de mayo de 1968

(Santiago: instituto Geografico Militar, 1968).

3Adela Ramos Pazos, La funcion legislativa (Concepcion: Univer-

sidad de Concepcion, memoria de prueba, 1965), p. 32.

13

additive veto (add totally new pieces of legislation) on matters of

constitutional reform, as he can with a normal bill. 32

Table 2 illustrates the Senate's capacity to delay the dispatch

of five additional key pieces of legislation during President Frei's

Administration. Note that standing committees of the Chilean Senate

often are the central arena in the process. For example, of the total

eighty-seven days required to pass the Bill entitled "The Creation of

a Committee to Adjust National Defense Pensions," eighty-five days

(98 percent) were spent in committee. Frequently, it is there that bills

are carefully studied, and most compromises pounded out. '"ithout public

tribunes, official versions and so on, there is more calm; it is much

easier to produce a climate which leads to agreement on different points

of view. There is less passion, and more give and take when an idea has

merit.

Delay should not necessarily be considered negative in effect.

There is considerable evidence that the Senate improves the laws it

modifies or delays, a process which reflects a serious and professional

standing committee analysis comparable to the United States Senate.34

Those who regard Senate delays or modifications as undue harassment of

a Government which currently leans to the Left should not forget that

the Senate has acted no differently when the President has represented

the Right0 Examine these excerpts from Senate debates for example:

Andrade G~eywitz, ogp. c it., P. 650. See also, Alejandro SilvaBascu?an, Tratado de derecho constitutional, tomo Ill (Santiago: EditorialJurfdica, 1963), p. 4+93.

Andrade Geywitz, op. cit., p. 446.

3Tapia Valdes, op i. p. 31; Guillermo Bruna Contreras,

Esauod rfso parlamentaria (Santiago: Universidad Catolica deChile, memoria de pru ..., 1963), p. 8 ...

Table 2. Senate-Time Taken to Pass Five Key Administration Bills

Total Time in Senate (Days)

Total Time inCommittee and

Title of Bill Time in Committee Time on Floor on the Floor

Days % Days % Days

1. Creation of a Committeeto Adjust NationalDefense Pensions 98 (85) 2 (2) 100 (87)

2. Creation of New Min i s t y

of Housing andUrbanization 97 (131) 3 (4) 100 (135)

3. Exemption of Propertyfrom Tax if Valued LessThan E-5,,0086 (101) 4 (17) 100 (118)

4. Rules to StimulateExports 84 (84) 16 (16) 100 (100)

5. Creation of a Directorof National Boundariesand Frontiers 49 (97) 51 (98) 100 (195)

Source: Senate Office of Information 1967 File.

15

Altamirano (PS): No other President had his initiativesapproved in block . ... The Government says that all of itspredecessors were given extraordinary faculties. This is a halftruth ... During the last administration of Mr. Ibanez he wasnot given faculties to restructure either the Central Bank or theControllor General's Office. And, if I remember correctly, SenatorEnriquez, who is also President of the PR, demanded substantialmodifications of the faculties asked by former President JorgeAlessandri .

Aguirre Doolan (PR): For example, faculties to legislateover social security and the petroleum industry were not given.

35

3. Administrative Oversight and Patronage

Effective legislative scrutiny of administrative performance must

be based in part on the capacity to obtain necessary information (particu-

larly executive agency documents), and an adequate staff to seek out and

analyze these data.

Passage of Article Five of Law 13.609 in 1959 gave the Senate

both the authority and staff to more energetically perform this function.36

First of all, the Office of Information of the Senate (OIS) was created.

Composed of economists, political scientists/public administrators,

lawyers, translators, and a newspaperman, OIS conducts for senators

valuable studies on the performance of administrative agencies.

Secondly, Law 13.609--tested and upheld in several legal cases over a

period of eight years--requires all administrative agencies to forward

whatever information or data OIS deems necessary to complete these studies.

In a 1968 test case, OIS sought to evaluate the progress of

Chiie It agrariarn reform from 1964 to 1968. OIS asked the Agrarian

35Diario de sesiones del senado, ... legislatura extraordinaria,Sesion 87a OP. cit., p. 430 6

36"Disposiciones legales y labor que desarrolla la oficina de

informaciones del senado," Boletin de informacion general No. 18,Santiago, OIS, May 31, 1967.

16

Reform Corporation (CORA) to submit the balances of agriculture settle-

ments (asentamientos) for this purpose. After some resistance by CORA,

the Controller General ruled on July 6, 1968, that the information must

be provided as in the past, and it subsequently was. 3 7

In some nations, legislative control of administrative performance

is frequently weakened because opposition senators cannot get access

to executive documents they need. In Chile, this problem apparently

does not occur for the Senate. OIS conducts studies for all senators

in a non-partisan manner, an operation which, in effect, is an insti-

tutionalized guarantee of information for the opposition. An analysis

of OIS consultas (studies or consultations) for the period 1967-March,

1968 (see Table 3) reveals that 91 percent (three hundred and twenty-

nine) of the total three hundred and sixty-three consultations were

in answer to requests made by opposition senators.

Subject matter standing committee hearings and floor debates

are also used by the Senate to review administrative activity. For

example, interviews and extensive personal observation show that ministries

regularly appear before Senate committees to explain both policy stands

and bureaucratic performance. On the floor, senators often call attention

to administrative bottlenecks by taking advantage of the hora de incidentes

(hour of incidental matters). During this period, senators can bring

up or debate whatever matters they deem to be in the public interest.

37 or a more detailed account, see the author's "Senate vs.CORA--An Attempt to Evaluate Chile's Agrarian Reform to Date," Inter-American Economic Affairs (Autumn 1968), and a shorter version in LandTenure Center Newsletter Number 27 (Madison: University of Wisconsin,March-August, 1968), pp. 1-7.

Table 3. Senate Office of Information Consultations 1967-68 Ordinary Sessions

PC PS PADENA PDC I PR PN Total

% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)

1967 (109) (89) (1) (28) (14) (30) (14) (285)

1968 (32) (19) (1) (6) (2) (17) (1) (78)

Total 39 (141) 30 (108) 1 (2) 9 (34) 4 (16) 1.3 (47) 4 (15) i00 (363)

Note: Coverage does not1968 data only until March 31,

include consultations to1968.

committee secretaries or other personnel.

Source: Senate Office of Information Consultations.

18

In particular instances, committee hearings and floor debates

may lead Congress to request that the Controller General conduct an

audit of an administrative program to determine whether funds have been

spent as Congress intended. Or, a committee might travel to an agrarian

reform settlement, for example, to verify the information the Agrarian

Reform Corporation provided. The Chamber may also set up special

investigating committees to explore a particular matter. Furthermore,

if the evidence warrants such action, the Chamber can and sometimes does

start impeachment proceedings of a minister. If the measure passes the

Chamber, the Senate must make the final decision. As Table 4 indicates,

the Senate usually votes not to impeach, but if sufficiently provoked

or justified, it will vote otherwise, as happened on several occasions

during the Iba'nez administration (1952-58). The same is true of local

officials (mayors, for example). Finally, the Senate may also seek to

alter Administration policies (or their implementation) by refusing to

approve military advancements, diplomatic appointments, and presidential

travels abroad as occurred on two occasions in 1967 and 1968.38

As noted earlier, the Senate exercises some control over financial

resources, and therefore has an instrument--patronage--to exert influence.

Friends and constituents regularly approach senators for political

appointments or other special favors. Reviewing his mail, one senator

cited a typical group of solicitations. "Here is a woman who wants me

to get her a naval pension because her husband died recently. Another

3The Senate refused to allow Frei to travel to the United

States in 1967, and also rejected a diplomatic appointment to Peru in 1968.

19

Table 4. Accusations Against Ministers of State Congress--1926 to 1966

Year Total Chamber SenateNo. Approved Approveda

1926-27 1 01931 9 6 11935 2 01936 2 01938 2 01939 21940 3 2 11944 1 01945 1 11946 1 01947 1 01948 1 01951 1 01952 1 01954 1 01955 1 1 01956 1 01957 3 2 l1958 1 01959 1 01960 4- 01962 1 01963 2 01966 2 0

Total 49 13 (27%) 4 (8%)

aZero is used for the Senate to indicate that it does not needto totlsder the case if the Chamber itself rejects the charges.

Source: Senate Office of Information 1967 File.

20

is a man who wants me to get him a job as an elevator operator." Tapia

Valdes points out that 55.2 percent of the laws passed by Congress be-

tween 1938 and 1958 were over particular matters such as pensions, jobs,

or retirement benefits (asuntos de gracia) in response to these re-

quests.39

4. Interest Articulation and Conflict Resolution

Congress not only articulates interests, but resolves conflicts,

in part by initiating or modifying legislation in response to demands

made upon it. This takes place on three levels--particular groups, pro-

vincial (agrupacion), and national.

Pressure groups have a long history in Chile (e.g., the National

Society of Agriculture was formed in 1838) and unlike Brazil, there is

close contact between them and Congress. Menges writes:

Chile's business associations have the usual types of for-mal access to the legislature. They may testify on bills beforeappropriate committees, and they submit documentation statingtheir views on legislation under discussion. Each of the majorpeak organizations keeps a close watch over the legislativecalendar and informs potentially interested members of develop-ments. The peak organizations also very often serve as middle-men in transmitting the views of member associations and individualcompanies to the Congress. ...

Following the pattern of American business group activity,however, it seems that the really important contact with the le-gislature involves informal relations with individual congress-men .... In the case of controversial legislation, businessassociation leaders present their views and perhaps ven coor-dinate strategy with sympathetic congressmen .. 0.

3 9 lapia Valdes, op. cit., p. 47.

4 Constantine C. Menges, "Public Policy and Organized Businessin Chile: A Preliminary Analysis," Journal of International Affairs,Vol. 20, No. 2 (1966), p. 354.

21

Menges also notes that parliamentary groups of some of the

major political parties may effectively make policy on some or all

issues in Chile, just as MacKenzie found in England. If this is the

case, "Contact of business association leaders and prominent indivi-

dual congressmen would be tantamount to contact with a party organi-

zation rather than a free agent. ' 4 1

But if the business community has its linkage to Congress, so

does the Left. There are at present six PS and five PC senators among

the total of forty-five senators (not counting independents or small

parties tied to the Left). One PC senator was a former director of the

party paper, El Siglo; two others were former union directors, and all

view their role as representing the worker and marginal groups. Just

as the Right attempts to chair the standing committees of Finance or

Economy and Commerce, the Left shows interest in Labor and Social Legis-

lation, or Public Health. Colonization of the presidencies of different

committees and linkages to individual congressmen insure access to com-

peting interests, "permitting a balance of forces, more facts, and reso-

lution with greater clarity.I 4 2

Before 1925, senators were elected by provinces. President

Alessandri Palma attempted to make the Senate less provincial and more

41

T2apia V~ld~s, op. cit., p. 41. For a description of the place

b1f this struicture in conflict management, see Malcolm E. Jewell and Samueltt~ItSoti he Legislative Process in the United States (New York:

Random House1- 966), p. II.

22

national in outlook, but was forced to accept a compromise solution

whereby senators are now elected by a group of provinces (arupacion)

directly by the people. As in the United States, senators maintain

frequent contact with their agrupaci-n and have on occasion voted

against their party in preference to regional interests. "Pork" com-

mittees like Public Works and Government are popular among senators,

because they control funds for roads and water which directly involve

the electoral interests of each congressman.

Many senators find regional election and representation a use-

ful mechanism for reconciling conflict between societal and regional

interests. One senator argues" in my view, /it/ is the escape

valve (valvula de escape) which preserves our system. With our uni-

tary system which tends toward control from Santiago, and at the same

time, regions with such diverse characteristics and needs, direct repre-

sentation by agrupacion is necessary." Yet many senators do not share

this view; they find "errand boy" tasks distasteful, concern for re-

election degrading, and prefer to see the Senate as representing the

"national interest," at times as a brake (freno) on the Chamber. They

contend that the objective of partial election of senators is to encour-

age a national versus regional view on issues, and certain senators

would favor disallowing re-election for this purpose. Some of this

latter group of senators find re-election difficult, and others gravi-

tate to "safe" districts. But some are re-elected consistently because

they so admirably perform this reconciliatory role. Therein lies the

importance of the form which the Senate interest articulation and

23

conflict resolution functions take. It is the meshing of each level--

group, region, and nation--which aids national integration and political

system persistence. One senator sums it up nicely:

On the one hand is the problem of national disintegration* . . Each region tries to obtain privileges, principally ontaxes........This tendency is seen primarily in the frontierzones, and at times, one hears talk of total separation. Somesee a national senator a response to this problem. On theother hand, there is the question of centralism /in capitaland geographically/--a trend considered adverse to our develop-ment. If you create a national senator, this process would beaccentuated. The conclusion has always been that the existingsystem is the best overall solution to both problems.

II1. Basis for Decisional Influence

Several factors help explain the Senate's considerable influence

in the political system. The first is the long historical development

4+3of the institution. At first (1812), the Senate was little more than

a legitimating body, with its members selected by the Executive. But

by 1818, disagreements began to arise between the two powers when Presi-

dent O'Higgins violated the formal constitution, and the President decided

to dissolve the body in 1822.

After several subsequent changes, a Senate was set up under the

Constitution of 1833 which was to last until 1874. The first seeds of

increasing decisional power were planted here, when member selection was

"formaiiy"' shifted from the President to provincial assemblies, and later,

i 1874, to the public. Although the objective of the 1833 Constitution

3Luis E. Williamson Jordan, La evolucion del senado en Chile(Santiago: Imprenta General Diaz, 1937), p. 21.

24

was "to establish a strong Executive independent of the pressure and,4k

tyranny of Parliament," Manuel Antonio Tocornal returned from Euro-

pean travels in 1848 with a new concept of Congress' role. His ideas

subsequently led to even greater influence for Congress with a corres-

ponding decrease in the relative importance of its legitimizing role.

This movement culminated in the "revolution of 1891" with the estab-

lishment of a parliamentary regime which was to last until 1925.

On balance, despite all of the bad effects generally attri-

buted to this parliamentary period, it should also be recognized that,

"It facilitated the development of new social groups: the middle

class and the proletariat. Also, it made possible the organization

of popular political parties: Workers Socialist and Communist ..

In this manner, the Parliamentary period was a magnificent civic

school for the Chilean people .... Functionally and institu-

tionally, presidential veto power was modified, the need for Senate ap-

proval of diplomatic appointments established, and ethical guidelines

for member activities outside Congress defined.

The evolutionary trend toward greater congressional influence

proved difficult to reverse or overcome in 1924, when attempts were

44"Version oficial de la conferencia dictada por S. E. el Iresi-dente de Ia Republica, Arturo Alessandri Palma, en el Salon de Honor, de]a Universidad de Chile, el dia viernes, 3 de Julio, 1925," which appearsth Actas oficiales de las sesiones celebradas por Ia comision y subcomi-_slones ~enca'rgadasdel estudio del .. rojecto de nueva constituiJ " l tica

.... ----.--. ... ,..;,-........ .... ,-_ _.d Republica (Santiago: Imprenta Univers'itaria, 1925), p. 98!.

5Heise Gonzalez, o p. cit., pp. 3l-82.

25

made to re-establish presidential pre-eminence. Many of President

Alessandri Palma's proposals for stronger Executive power (for exam-

ple, the right to dissolve Congress) were rejected by the Constitu-

tional Committee which helped write the Constitution of 1925 (many

members of which were congressmen).46 Some congressional members

of the Committee (Radical, Conservative, Communist parties) actually

presented simultaneously to the public an alternative plan, which

called for substantially less change than the reform actually adopted.4 7

Even after its passage, effective reduction of Congress' decisional

role was limited by the number of congressmen who continued to serve

in 1926 versus 1924, carrying with them parliamentary traditions

and habits which reinforced decisional role persistence. Twenty-seven

(60 percent) of the forty-five senators elected in 1926 were members of

Congress in 1924, and this carry over represents a clear linkage to

the Senate's influence today. 4 8

We have already touched on a second variable which gives Congress

such a strong voice in lawmaking--the presence of an opposition majority

46"Sesiones de la subcomisio*n de reformas constitucionales,"Actas oficiales . A . , op. cit., pp. 382-88; see p. 5 of this docu-

ment for list of members of the first session of La Comision Consul-tiva., which added members later also.

147"Fruadiidne-ormula disidente," Actas oficiales . op. cit pp.

644-46.

4jose Guillermo Guerra, La Constitucin de 1925 (Santiago:ktabi.cimientos Graficos Balcells7f199,especially pages 192-94.

26

in one of the two chambers. The traditional existence of such a major-

ity is in turn a product of several factors: (1) Congress is elected

in a different year than the President; (2) the Senate is only partially

renovated and in such a way that it is difficult to win a majority;

(3) the President himself rarely wins more than a plurality (Frei is an

exception) and may not run for another term; (4) even when a President

obtains a majority, many voters give their support only to prevent a

less desirable candidate from being elected. Under these circumstances,

the next congressional election is viewed as a more accurate reflection

of the President's "real" support.4 9

Public opinion also appears to provide a third base in support

of Congress' demands for a powerful voice in the policy process. In

January 1965, Eduardo Hamuy asked a random sample of Santiago residents

(just after Frei's presidential election and before the March 1965 con-

gressional election, a time when the President's support was probably

at its apex), "Returning to the subject of the actual Government, let us

suppose that Frei cannot govern because Congress obstructs his work.

Would you be in favor of dissolving Congress so that the Government could

complete its program, or would you be in favor of waiting until the par-

liamentary elections of 1969 in order to obtain a favorable Congress?"

Table 5 indicates that although 67.1 percent of the sample recog-

nized that a conflict existed between the President and Congress, and 73

4 9For example, President Frei obtained a majority of the popular

votes in the 1961+ presidential election, but many voters supported himonly in preference to Socialist candidate Salvador Allende.

-lw

27

Table 5. Santiago Survey SamplePresident Frei vs. Congress

January 1965

Number Percent

I. Dissolve Congress

2. Wait until 1969 elections

3. President renounce

4. Plebiscite

5. Unite, combine w/o parties

6, Pressure Congress

7. Other or in error

8. Not known, not answer

205

250

36.8o

44.9

18 3.2

1.3

.7

16 2.9

57 I0.2

Total 557 100.0%

Source: These data were generously provided by Eduardo Hamuyfrom his January 1965 print-out sheets, question 6Y, Universidad deChile, Facultad de ciencias Economicas-Centro de Estudias Socio-Economico'sstudy.

28

Table 6. Senate Members Background1965-69 Vs. 1933-37

Profession/Activity 1933-37 Senate 1965-69 SenateN % N

Lawyer 21 46.8 21 46.3Doctor 2 4.6 2 4.4Bus inessman 4 9.0 3 6.8Civil engineer - - 2 4.5Newspaperman - - 1 2.2Worker 3 6.6 2 4.5Chemical engineer - - 1 2.2Accountant - - 2 4.5Engineer 2 4.4 - -

Agronomy engineer - - 1 2.2Professor - - 2 4.5Agriculturist (6 13.2) 2 4.5Ex-mil itary (2 4.4) - -

Writer - - 1 2.2Industrialist 1 2.2 3 6.8

Wi nemaker (T2 4.4) - -

Architect - - 2.2Ex-pol iceman 1 2.2 - -

No data 1 2.2 1 2.2

Total 45 100.0 45 100.0

(slight rounding to equal 100.0%)

Source: Senate Office of Information 1966 File.

29

percent felt the President was correct versus 12 percent for Congress

(based on other questions in the survey), only 36.8 percent favored

dissolving Congress as the solution; 4+4.9 percent preferred to wait

until the 1969 Congressional elections, and only ],3 .percent favored

a plebiscite. Even when social class is controlled, the variation in

attitudes is relatively similar. One may conclude that although the

vast majority in this sample supported the President over this conflict,

and at this point in time, the majority was not prepared to undercut

Congress' constitutionally guaranteed decision-making role by opting

for dissolution or a plebiscite.

The public's reluctance to support dissolution may be due, in

part, to Congress' demonstrated capacity to change. One measure is the

career background of the Senate membership in 1965 versus 1933 (see

Table 6). In 1933, ten (22 percent) of the senators were ex-military

men or rural representatives. But in 1965, this representation had

dropped to two (4.5 percent,) in response to greater urbanization, re-

duction of corrupt electoral practices, and civilian predominance in

political life. Correspondingly, career backgrounds of senators to-

taled fifteen different types in 1965 versus eleven in 1933, represen-

ting a wider spectrum and reflecting Chile's economic and political

development during this period.

Polsby has argued that a political system is better able to

utherltatively make decisions if it is institutionalized. 5 0 Hence, an

50 Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. Houseof Representatives," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. l,p. 14k.

30

organizational package of member stability, and informal norms of Cham-

ber-Senate apprenticeship provide the Chilean Senate with a fourth base

of influence. Table 7 shows that of forty-five present members, thirty-

one have served previously in the Chamber (eighteen of twenty-five in

1961, thirteen of twenty in 1965 or after). Of those originally elected

in 1961 and 1965, thirty-five (78 percent) were Deputies before, and

only three senators have renounced to accept other positions (President,

Ambassadors to the United States and Argentina). This pattern has

existed for more than thirty-five years (see Table 8).

Not only do a high percentage of the 1968 Senators have previous

Chamber experience, but they also frequently represent the same district

repeatedly while in the Chamber. Their Chamber district often forms a

part of their agrupacion (group of provinces) once in the Senate, and

they generally continue to represent it there. This pattern is similar

to the United States system. Thirty-four of the thirty-five senators

who previously served in the Chamber represented the same district all

during their period there. For twenty-six (74 percent), their Chamber

district formed a part of the same agrupacion they represented once in

the Senate. The most typical Chamber-Senate career (see Table 9) totals

nineteen years (nine in the Chamber and ten in the Senate), and a mean

for the total 1968 Senate sample is seventeen years (see Table 10).

This Chamber apprenticeship and district stability enables the senator

to acquire knowledge, ski lls, and local contacts necessary for an influ-

ential legislative career.

The Senate's capacity for a lawmaking role is further enhanced

by the support of a highly competent staff (see Table l l), which compares

31

Table 7. 1968 Senators with Prior Servicein the Chamber of Deputies

Term PC PS PADENA PDC VNP I PR PN TotalI

1961-69 3 2 - 1 1 6 4 18

1965-73 2 1 - 7 - - 3 - 13

Total 5 3 - 8 1 1 9 4 31

Source:ject Fi les.

Compiled from Library of Congress Biographical Date Pro-

Table 8. Institutionalization of Congress

Chamber Senate

Year Total No. NFC = AOPD Year Total No. NFCa AOPb

% (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N) % (N)

1930-32 100 141 33 47 4 5 1933-37 100 27 41 11 4 11933-37 100 145 25 36 3 4c 1933-41 100 27 71 19 7 21937-41 100 156 46 71 5 8 1937-45 100 28 71 20 7 21941-45 100 150 46 69 2 3 1941-49 100 22 68 15 - -1945-49 100 150 6o 90 1 1 1945-53 100 29 83 24 3 1 d

1949-53 100 152 51 77 1 Ic 1949-57 100 23 74 17 4 1 d1953-57 100 147 39 58 1 1 1953-61 100 25 60 15 - -

1957-61 100 147 54 79 - - 1957-65 100 21 72 15 5 1d

1961-65 100 148 59 88 - - 1961-69 100 25 84 21 - -

aNFC stands for number former congressmen.

bAOP stands for accept other post.

c Became senator in mid-term.

dBecame President of Chile,

Note- Different numbers correspond to changeand to deaths, etc., which cause other by-elections.

in numbers of members over time,

Source: Compiled from data in Guillermo Bruna Contreras, Estatuto de ]a profesionparlamentaria (Santiago: Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1963, memoria de prueba), pp. 19-25. w

N3

33

Table 9. Typical Congressional Career1968 Senate

Chamber SenateTotal

Name Prov. Yrs. Agrup. Yrs. Years

NationalParl1. Bulnes IOa 8 5a 16 242. Curti 17a 8 7a 16 24

Radical Party3. Bossay 6a 10 3a 16 264. Mirandaa 4a 16 2a 8 245. Duran 21a 12 8a 16 286. Juliet la 20 6a 8 287. Enriquez 17a 12 7a 8 20

Independent8. Sepu Iveda 23a 12 9a 8 209. Von Mbhlenbrock 24a 8 9a 8 1610Natl. Vang. People10. Castro 9a 8 5a 8 16

Christian-Democrats11. Reyes 7a 16 4a 8 2412. Palma 22a 8 2a 8 1613. Musalem 7a 12 4a 8 2014. Fuentealbaa 4a 8 8a 8 1615. Gumucio 7a 8 4a 8 1616. Pablo 17a 4 7a 8 12

Socialist Party17. Rodrfguez 7a 4 9a 16 2018. Altamirano 22a 4 4a 8 1219. S. CorbaIanb 17a 8 5a 6 14

Communist Party20. Teitelboim 6a 4 4a 8 1221. Campusano 7a 4 2a 8 12

Career Total 9 10 19

aAlso president or secretary-general of his party.

bDied in 1967 and replaced by wife in off-year election.

Table 10. Length of Congressional CareerSenate--1 953-65a

Year PN PR MNI AGL UNI I PDC PADENA VNP PS PC Total

1953No. 9 4 2 4 1 - - 1 - 4 25Yrs. 25 15 8 9 8 - - 13 16 17

1957No. 8 5 3 - - 1 - - 3 - 20Yrs. 18 28 12 - - 15 - 9

1961No. 6 6 - - 3 2 - 1 4 3 25Yrs. 22 22 - 15 14 - 16 20 14 19

1965No. - 3 - - - 1 1 1 - 2 2 20Yrs. - 24 - - - 16 15 8 - 10 12 15

aBy year of election.

bMean career for 1961-65 is 17.

Note: Abbreviations not noted elsewhere are:MNI--National Movement for IbanezAGL--Agrarian LaborUNI--Independent National Union

4:-

35

Table 11. Senate Staff Not Including PersonalSecretaries of Senators

1967

Position Men Women Tota l

Personnel of Sec. of Senate 23 23

Office of Information 6 3 9

Editing Personnel 19 2 21

Treasurer 2 2

Edecan I I

Auxiliary Services 1 5 6

Service Aids 56 56

Dining Room 14 14

Other Positions 2 6 8

Contracted Personnel 3 2 5

Building 28 4 32

Chefs 2 2

Total 157 23 17.

CHAMBER 166 24 190

POSITIONS VACANT 26 1 27

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 28 28 56

HEALTH SERVICES 9 6 15

Source: Senate Office of Information 1967 File.

36

favorably with the staff available to the American Congress. 5 1 Sena-

tors Gonzalez Madariaga (PR) and Castro (VNP) give testimony to their

reliance on the Senate staff:

The Senate knows how much we value the collaboration ofall the staff of the Senate, because they are our greatestallies in the legislative action that Congress achieves.Practically nothing can be done without the aid of all thepersonnel of the Secretary . . . their collaboration throughtheir experience, which has been acquired over a long periodof work, at times, leads us to a common solution...*52

We have always maintained that it is the staff of Con-gress . . . to a great extent that carries on the democratictradition . . . they are the ones who show the way to thoseDeputies and Senators who arrive for the first time to Con-gress . . . on their stability and good judgment depends toa great extent the efficiency and capacity to work of Con-gress. 53

Except for personal secretaries, the Senate staff is filled through

competitive public examinations. Advancement is based on demonstrated

ability and a long period of apprenticeship (escalafon).54 Two of the

51Numerically, the Senate staff is modest by American stan-dards. But when appropriate adjustments are made for the fact thatChile has only nine million people versus two hundred million, andthat legislation is not so complex as in the more highly industri-alized U.S. system, the proportionate impact of each staff member maybe equal to or even greater than that of a staff member in the U.S.Senate.

52Diario de sesiones del senado, leg. extro., Sesion 12a,November 2, 1960, p. 643.

Diario de sesiones del senado. leg. extro., Sesion 22a,December 6, 1961, p. 1009.

5hTapia Valds, op.t pp. 32-3.

37

most important components of the Senate staff are the standing com-

mittee secretaries, and the Office of Information (OIS). Standing

committee secretaries are an important driving force in a system

where the principal work is done in committees. They are the ones

who really study the laws, and help inform the senators of their

contents. They generally serve on the same committee for years, ac-

quiring a high level of expertise and specialization in their com-

mittee's subject matter. One senator exclaims, "The secretaries

are extremely important. They are highly efficient, and are the pro-

duct of many years of experience in the Senate . . . they are the

tradition of the Senate. I ask my friends--that is how we regard

them--for their opinion on a project. That doesn't bother me at

all. After all, many were in the same law classes, and we have

been friends for years ... i

A typical career is that of Jorge A. Tapia Valdes, secretary

of Constitution, LegislatJon, and Justice. Graduating in law in 1960,

and author of the book, La tecnica legislativa, Tapia began in the

Senate in 1954. After more than twelve years of apprenticeship, he

became the secretary of his committee. 5 5 Similarly, Rafael Eyza-

guirre Echeverria received his law degree in 1947, became a secretary

of Constitution, Legislation, and Justice after eighteen years in

1962, and presently is working on the Special Committe on Constitu-

tion~al Reform. Eyzaguirre is also a professor of constitutional

5 5 Diccionario biografico de Chile--decima tercera ed. (Santia:Empresa Per iodisticaChite, 1967), p. 1533.

38

law at the University of Chile.56

The secretaries and their aids are supplemented by the

OIS. Also chosen by competitive examination, OIS carries out val-

uable in-depth studies for senators and secretaries of standing

committees in a totally non-partisan manner, as well as publishing

numerous bulletins of information for the public media57 (see Table

12).The Senate staff demonstrates a high degree of adaptabil-

ity to the periodic increase and decrease of demands made on it.

As a rule, secretaries and their aids work only on one or two stan-

ding committees. But, some committees work more than others, and

some hardly at all. Therefore, in times of stress (e.g., 1968

Salary Readjustment Bill), or in the absence of a secretary, a tem-

porary shift of secretaries or aids will take place to augment the

capacity of a committee (e.g., Finance). Work hours follow a simi-

lar cycle, increasing in response to demands made on the system.

Standing committees can and do call on experts for testimony and

assessment. Senators also have a personal staff, but it is modest

by United States standards (the size varies by senator). This gap

is overcome in part by calling on party experts to help keep them

informed on important bills. 58

56 Ibid.1 p. 484.5 7 "Disposiciones legales y labor . . .," op. cit.t

5 8 See Chapter I I for a discussion of the relationship be-

tween senators and their respective national party leadership.

Table 12. Senate-Office of Information Work for Period 1964-68

Type of Work 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967-68 1968Ext.a Reg.a

1. ConsultationsSent out 740 1,017 1,o049 967 621 318Reports received 158 288 356 316 204 126

2. Commun i cat ionsSent out 116 342 302 307 211 126Received 165 125 26-1 2+4 271 166

3. Bulletins PublishedPress information 29 13 6 - 1 6Parliamentary information 40 52 45 57 65 40Translations 34 29 34 65 71 17Economic reports 10 17 22 28 23 11General information 2 - 1 20 12 4

Statistical information 3 4 4 3 2 l

4. Documents Loaded 375 525 461 355 252 232

5. Communications Sent 1,885 2,311 1,834 1,572 1,273 974

6. Communications Received 1,983 NA 2,217 1,835 1,040 593Messages 217 NA 201 270 223 76From Chamber 1,165 NA 390 731 217 176From Ministries 433 NA 954 536 414 239From Controller et. al. 26 NA 136 113 94 63Requests of concern 81 NA 74 48 11 18Other contacts 61 NA 462 137 81 21

aRegular and extraordinaryoverlap with 1967).

sessions. For idea of trend, combine last two (some wJ

Source: Senate Office of Information (Compiled from Annual Work Reports).

40

The existence of member stability, staff support, and norms

which encourage work and specialization contrasts sharply with most

other Latin American legislatures. For example, Payne's data on the

Colombian Congress show that member stability is low. 59 Regular

members can be and are replaced by alternates, and only twenty-five

percent return for a consecutive term (versus seventy-eight percent

for the Chilean Senate). Absenteeism is high. Committees seldom

meet., and closed door sessions are rare (normal for Chilean Senate).

Columbian legislators are virtually without research or technical

assistance, and have no personal offices or secretaries (Chilean

senators do).

A senator's personal ties (economic and kinship) and past

experience should not be underestimated as a fifth source of law-

making influence. Although the practice has been the subject of

frequent debate, it is still quite legal for a congressman to be a

director of a private company or bank as long as it does not have a

contract directly with the state.6 0 If a congressman is at the same

time a director in an important private company or bank, a potentially

5 9See Chapter XI of James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict inColombia (New Haven and London- Yale University Press, 1968).

6o See Guillermo Guerra, P. cit., pp. 188-96, for his viewsin 1924 and 1929; and Ada I. Manriquez G., El Senado en Chile (San-tia: Editorial Universitaria S.A., 1965), p. 176, for a 1965 posi-tion. The PDC has, as part of their constitutional reform project(passed the Chamber and is still in committee in the Senate), takena position against the continuation of this linkage--if it ever passes,some of their own members will have to order their personal affairs.

41

powerful linkage between public and private careers is created which

may be useful in initiating or modifying proposed legislation. Further-

more, if a congressman has acquired through service in the Executive

Branch, knowledge of the ins and outs of a ministry, personal loyalties,

or expertise, a similar base is created.

A study of the directors and top ten stockholders of the top two

hundred sociedades anonimas, top twenty-five insurance companies, and

all domestic banks at the end of 1966, shows clearly that career overlap

exists.6 1 First, it is necessary to make clear the importance of the

group studied. For example, the top ten stockholders of the top one

hundred and ninety-three sociedades anonimas (seven are foreign), or

3/10 of one percent of all sociedades anonimas stockholders, own 62.3

percent of all sociedades anonimas value (valor patrimonial). Of the

total number of directors of the top one hundred and ninety-three, 28

percent are also stockholders in these companies, which represents a per-

sonal ownership of 6.4 percent of the value of all sociedades annimas.

If a person is a director or director-stockholder in one of these top

193 companies, he is a potentially influential individual in the economic

community. If he is also horizontally linked to institutions such as the

top insurance companies and banks, this potential is still greater. It

is multiplied if one is also such in more than one of the t group. Add

to this the position of congressman at the same time, and an immense

potential for incluence is created. It is multiplied still further if

6 1Forthcoming. Raw data were provided by the Superintendencia

de Cmpanas de Seguros, Sociedades Anonlimas y Bolsas de Comercio, andby the Superintendencia del Bancos for their most recent complete files.1967 should be available shortly.

42

the congressman also happens to sit regularly on one of the two most

important standing committees in either house (for example, Finance).

Examination of relevant data (see Table 13) indicates that

twenty percent (nine) of all senators in 1966 were directors or di-

rector-stockholders in the top group mentioned above. If we add to

this participation in any one of the sociedades anc#nimas, insurance

companies, or banks existing at the end of 1966, the number increases

to twenty-seven percent (twelve). The respective percentages and

numbers for the Chamber are seven-tenths of one percent (one) and five

percent (seven). At least two secretaries of Senate standing com-

mittees are also directors or director-stockholders in several com-

panies--one in the same company as a senator. In one case, two sen-

ators of opposing political parties (ideologically) are directors on

62the same company.

IV. Conclusion

It is evident from this discussion that the Senate exercises

a significant level of influence in the Chilean political system. We

have shown that the Senate: (1) initiates its own bills, increases

and decreases the annual budget, helps to shape Executive public poli-

cy proposals, and delays, alters, or defeats Executive legislation--

despite the President's extraordinary urgency power; (2) aggressively

scrutinizes Administration policy and bureaucratic performance through

2For possible implications of these ties, see Ricardo LagosE., La concentracion del poder economico--su teoria realidad chilenaed. 5 (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1965), pp. 168 ff.

Table 13. 1966 Senators and Deputies Who Are Also Directors or Director-Stockholdersin Top Group of 193/25/All or All Groupa by Party

Top Group All Group

PC PS PDC PR PN Total (%) PC PS PDC PR PN Total (/)

Senators - 1 - 3 5 9 (20) - 2 - 5 5 12 (27)

Deputies . . . . 1 1 (.7) - - 4 2 1 7 (5)

Total - 1 - 3 6 10 (6) - 2 4 7 6 19 (10)

aNot including congressmen who were only stockholders or formerly associated asabove during their terms.

Independent Senators are grouped with party that supports them in elections.

Source: Compiled from raw data provided by the Superintendencia de Compa'isdSeguros, Sociedades Anonimas y Bolsas de Comercio and by the Superintendencia de Bancos.

44

the application of 01S prerogatives (Article Five of Law 13.609)

and reliance on its staff studies, use of standing committee sources

of information and control, floor debates and Chamber committee in-

vestigations; (3) performs a patronage function by passing asuntos

de gracia; and (4) articulates interests and resolves conflict

through member representation or participation on key standing com-

mittees, and by meshing of group, regional and national interests.

We have suggested that the Senate's decisional role is

based on: (1) its long evolutionary historical development which

included a period of parliamentary government (1891-1925); (2) the

presence of an opposition majority in one of the two congressional

chambers (usually the Senate), which in turn results from off-year

election of senators versus the President, and from partial renova-

tion; (3) public support for a democratic system which includes a

Congress independent of the Executive; (4) an organizational package

of member stability, and informal norms of Chamber-Senate apprentice-

ship and "hardwork" in standing committees comparable to the United

States Senate; and (5) possibly personal links (economic and kinship)

of Congressmen.