Fixing the Spy Machine

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FIXING THE SPY

MACHINE



his page intentionally left blank



FIXING THE SPY

M CHINE

Preparing American Intelligence

for the Twenty-First Century

Arthur S. Hulnick

Foreword by Richard R.

Valcourt

W e s t p o r t , C o n n e c t i c u t

London

R G R



Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hulnick , Ar thur , 1935-

Fixing the spy machine : preparing American inte l l igence for the

twenty-f i rs t cen tury / A rth ur S. Hu lnick ; forew ord by Richard R. Valcourt

p .

cm.

Includes bibl iographical references and index.

ISBN 0-275-96652-6 (a lk.

paper).—ISBN

0 -275-96653^ (pbk . :

a lk. paper)

1.

Intell igence service—United State s. I. Title.

JK468.I6H85 1999

327.1273—dc21 99-37523

Bri t ish Library Cataloguing in Publ icat ion Data is avai lable .

Co py righ t © 1999 by Art hu r S. Hulnick

All r ights reserved. No port ion of this book may be

reproduced , by any process or t echnique , wi thout the

express wri t ten consent of the publ isher .

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-37523

ISBN: 0-275-96652-6

0-275-96653-i

(pbk.)

First published in 1999

Praeger Publ ishers , 88 Post Road West , Westport , CT 06881

An impr in t of Greenwood Publ i sh ing Group, Inc .

w w w . p r a e g e r . c o m

Printed in the Uni ted States of America

The paper used in this book complies wi th the

Permanent Paper S tandard i s sued by the Na t iona l

Informat ion Standards Organizat ion (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4

http://www.praeger.com/

http://www.praeger.com/



The Centra l Inte l l igence Agency (CIA) asked the author to inc lude the

fol lowing s ta tement in this book:

CIA's Publications Review Board has reviewed the manuscript for this

book to assist the author in eliminating classified information and poses

no security objection to its publication. This review, however, should not

be co nstrued as official release of information , confirmation of its accuracy,

or an endorsement of the author's views.

In fac t , the CIA's review was helpful and cer ta inly not onerous. No

other inte l l igence service seems to be as wil l ing as the CIA to permit i ts

former officers to write about intell igence matters.



For Eileen, Sandra and Larisa



Contents

Foreword by Richa rd R. Valco ur t xi

Acknowledg

ments

xvii

Acronyms xix

1 Is the Spy M ach ine Broken? 1

2 Stealing the Secrets 23

3 Puzz les an d M yste r ies 43

4 Secre t O pe ra t io ns 63

5 Ca tch ing the En em y ' s Spies 87

6 S top ping the Bad Gu ys 105

7 M an ag ing an d Co ntrol l ing Secre t Inte l ligence 129

8 Sp yi ng for Profit 151

9 Secret Intell igen ce an d the Pub lic 173

10 Fixing the Spy M achin e 191

Bibliography

209

Index 217



Foreword

Proposa ls to re form the U.S . in te l l igence communi ty a re no t new. Con

gress and outs ide inves t iga tors have pe rs i s ten t ly urged tha t a l te ra t ions

be made in the s t ruc ture of the Centra l Inte l l igence Agency s ince i ts

inception in 1947 and to those of i ts sister agencies in the various years

thereafter . Efforts at reform tend to run in cycles, increasing in intensity

in the af termath of the fa i lure of a par t icular ly unpopular cover t ac t ion,

or when an in te l l igence ana lys is has proven embar rass ing ly inaccura te .

Internal reform effor ts a re genera l ly more incrementa l than the broad-

scale suggest ions offered by external forces . The bureaucracy apprecia tes

i ts ow n accom pl ishm ents an d na tura l ly pro tec ts i ts m em bers , a s m ight be

ant ic ip ated in an y funct ioning orga niza t io n, pub l ic or pr iv a te . Even schol

ars are loa the to ha ve the ir pre su m ab ly c lose ly-reasoned, informed assess

m ents cha l lenged . But in te rna l com m enta ry i s o ften m ore as tu te than tha t

offered by outs iders . Int imate knowledge of re levant inte l lec tual and or

ganiza t ional processes takes a s ignif icant amount of t ime and effor t , and

those who have cha l lenged any government agency ' s pe r formance of ten

sof ten the ir c r i t ic isms when given access to the decis ionmakers and the ir

ra t iona le , o r upo n pe rso na l pa r t ic ipa t ion in an agen cy ' s r ank s .

Arthur S . Hulnick, a ve teran of more than thir ty-f ive years in the in

te l l igence community , has had the benef i t of learning the business f rom

the ground up. Star t ing with his service in the U.S. Air Force and sub

sequent rec ru i tment by the CIA, Mr . Huln ick se rved in bo th the ana ly t

ica l and c landest ine branches of the Agency. Subsequently , he became

an editor of the President's Daily Brief an d Co ord inato r of A cade m ic Af

fairs in the CIA's Office of Public Affairs. He also served as Chairman

of the Direc tor o f Cent ra l In te l l igence ' s Management Advisory Group .

As an Agency spokesman, Mr . Huln ick embarked upon an ex tens ive



xii Foreword

speaking tour of U.S. col leges and universi t ies , wr i t ing and speaking

about the CIA and i ts role in the inte l l igence community . Expla ining the

wor ld of in te l l igence to genera l ly skept ica l audiences , he won numerous

fr iends by advocat ing grea ter Agency openness and easier access to i ts

noncr i t ica l documents , so as to a l low a deeper publ ic unders tanding of

the real work of intell igence officers. Yet, to date, the CIA remains sub

stant ia l ly unable to adequate ly expla in i tse lf to the public .

Late in his Agency career , Mr. Hulnick became a CIA officer-in-

residence a t Boston Universi ty , teaching about the inte l l igence profession

and i ts role in the pol icymaking process . Subsequent to his re t i rement

f rom the Agency, he remained with the universi ty , lec tur ing in i ts de

par tment of internat ional re la t ions. In conjunct ion with his teaching, Mr.

Hulnick has par t ic ipa ted consis tent ly in the ac t ivi t ies of the Inte l l igence

Studies Sect ion of the Internat ional Studies Associa t ion and has long

been a member of the edi tor ia l board of the International Journal of Intel

ligence and Counterlntelligence.

Over more than a dozen yea rs , Mr . Huln ick ' s a r t ic le s , r ev iews , and

c omme nta r i e s in nume r ous pub l i c a t ions ha ve a dd r e s se d a n a s so r tme n t

of vexingly diff icult intell igence issues, some of which are revisited in

Fixing the Spy Machine. In the pages of the International Journal of Intelli

gence and Counterlntelligence and e lsewhere , he has wr i t ten , na tura l ly ,

abo ut the Agen cy ' s o ften co nt rovers ial and co nten t ious re la tionsh ip w i th

acad emi a ,

indica t ing tha t i t should be a symbiosis not a psychosis ; deal t

with the dif f icul ty of obta ining information about inte l l igence and ad

vocat ing grea ter openness to fac i l i ta te scholar ly research and grea ter

publ ic un de rs ta nd ing and apprec ia t ion ; d iscussed the une asy re la t ion

s h i p

be tween in te l l igence and pr iva te indus t ry ; wondered about the

effec t iveness of contemporary counter lnte l l igence ef for ts while examin

ing the cause an d effects of the Ald rich A m es case; differentiated be

tw ee n intell igenc e officers an d police officers, ind icatin g tha t spie s are

not cops ; quest ioned the future of cover t ac t ion; and examined the pos

sibili t ies for intell igence cooperation in the post-Cold War era. On the

Agency ' s in te rna l opera t ions , Mr . Huln ick has s tud ied techniques for

managing the CIA ' s ana lys is p rocess and specula ted on methods for de

termining U.S. in te l l igence pol icy. He has reviewed books deal ing with

the federa l government ' s long-s tanding re l iance , da t ing to Pres ident

George Washington 's days, on var ious forms of inte l l igence , mil i ta ry and

poli t ica l , and on the del ica te ba lance tha t must be mainta ined by the

American inte l l igence community in a world essent ia l ly host i le to i ts

opera t ions .

Fixing the Spy Machine is Mr. Hulnick ' s f i rs t book. Taking his previous

w ri t ing s severa l s teps fur ther , th is vol um e is a scholar ly , ye t easi ly un de r

s tand able t rea t ise on num ero us reorgan iza t ion propo sa ls f rom leg isla tors

an d specia l com m ission s in the past severa l years . Rather tha n dw ell in g a t



Foreword xii i

leng th on the intense cr i tic isms of the pa st qua r ter ce ntury , da t ing back to

the upheavals of the ear ly 1970s when the Seymour Hersh ar t ic les in The

New York Times and the Se lec t Sena te and House Commit tees conduc ted

hear ings tha t brought the inte l l igence community to i ts f igura t ive knees,

Mr. Hulnick looks a t more recent reorganiza t ion effor ts and appl ies them

to the con tem po rary CIA an d i ts s is ter agencies . For instance , he notes th a t

a major impediment to ach iev ing a more benef ic ia l r e la t ionsh ip be tween

in te l l igence producers and consumers i s the

d ec i s i o n mak er s '

preference

for top secre t inform ation ra ther tha n m ater ia l col lec ted m ainly f rom

op en sources . H e dep lore s the re la t ive lack of apprec ia t ion for the w or k of

inte l l igence analysts and the f requent downplaying of the ir contr ibut ion

to overa l l po l icymaking in government .

Mr. Hulnick a lso quest ions the f inancia l ba lance of intercept inte l l i

gence, noting the diff iculty of determining the effectiveness of this very

exp ensiv e process . Tech nolog y can go only so far , or as he pu ts it , Spy

cam eras a re no t m uc h use w i tho ut the spy . M uch is r eque s ted from the

inte l l igence community , but , as Mr. Hulnick points out , in te l l igence can ' t

predic t the future , i t can offer only a weighted judgment about the l ike ly

course of events .

Ar thur Huln ick ' s a ssessment of the wide d isc repancy in power be

tween the t i tu lar head of the inte l l igence community , the direc tor of cen

tral intell igence, and its actual head, the secretary of defense, is

no tewor thy . Most media a t ten t ion focuses on the DCI because of his

s ta tutory posi t ion as both coordinator of the overa l l in te l l igence appa

ra tus and direc tor of the Centra l Inte l l igence Agency. But the DCI con

trols l i t t le more than 10 percent of the inte l l igence budget ; most of the

remainder is under the jur isdic t ion of the defense secre tary through his

direc t l ine of supervis ion over the Defense Inte l l igence Agency, the Na

t ional Secur i ty Agency, the National Reconnaissance Off ice , the National

I ma ge r y a nd Ma pp ing Age nc y , a nd the ne w Me a su r e me n t s a nd S igna

tures Intell igence Office. Smaller pieces of the intell igence budget are

he ld by the Federa l Bureau of Inves t iga t ion , the Depar tment of Com

merce , the S ta te Depar tment ( th rough i t s Bureau of Informat ion and Re

sea rch) , and the Treasury Depar tment . This huge budge ta ry imba lance

is the foundat ion for considerable bureaucra t ic s t ruggle within the inte l

l igence communi ty and confus ion in the ou ts ide wor ld among those un

famil iar with the internal f inancia l and organiza t ional s t ruggles .

In te l ligence is no w p ar t o f the corpora te wo r ld . Ma ny na t ion s encou rage

cons ide rab le co l labora t ion be tw een the i r in te l ligence app ara tu ses a nd the

bu sine ss an d co rpo ra te sec tors . The Un ited Sta tes ha s so far ref ra ined f rom

deve loping such a symbios is , be l iev ing in the separa t ion of government

an d th e pr iv a te sec tor , a t least in these ma tters . Fur th erm ore , m os t inte l l i

gence profess iona ls cons ide r them se lves publ ic se rvants , w ork ing o n

b e

half of the gen era l welfare of the nat ion a nd n ot as pa id sno op s for p r iva te



xiv Foreword

com pan ies . A nd , as M r. Hu lnick p oin ts out , U.S. f irms hav e no t bee n o ver-

eag er to get hel p from the CIA. The A m eric an ec on om y is relatively free of

na t iona l ly sponsored corpora t ions , and the in tens ive compet i t ion among

com panie s mak es each of them w ary of ind iv idua l a ss is tance from a gov

ernment uni t . A s ignif icant number of former inte l l igence professionals

ha ve joined f i rms specia l iz ing in pol i tica l r isk analysis an d bu sine ss inte l

l igence , but prac t i t ioners in those f i rms rea l ize tha t pr iva te espionage is

thef t , and those caught par t ic ipa t ing in s tea l ing business secre ts of ten in

cu r a crim inal l iabili ty.

In the espio nag e bu sine ss , the sp ies ( agents ) a re genera l ly fore ign

nat ionals working in the ir home country on behalf of the United Sta tes

or an oth er intell igence service. Th e CIA pe rso nn el are called case offi

cers. Th eir job is to recruit , train , task , an d debrief the ag en ts an d

send the col lec ted information back to CIA headquar ters in Virginia . The

case officer 's job is diff icult , for he/she must carefully evaluate any po

tent ia l agent les t the United Sta tes ' s presence in a country be jeopardized

or compromised. The officer 's own life is occasionally at stake, as is that

of the prospect ive recrui t . Mr. Hulnick points out tha t human agents are

of ten more valuable than sophis t ica ted and expensive technologica l de

v ices because a pe rson can communica te and in te rpre t in ways no ma

chine can.

The CIA's Clandest ine Service case off icers must of ten do business

w i th e v il pe op le , i nd iv idua l s w i th w ho m the y wo u ld se ldom o the r wise

associa te . Such re la t ionships are a negat ive , ye t essent ia l , par t of the in

te l l igence /esp ionage bus iness . The CIA is aware tha t r e la t ionsh ips wi th

evi l pe op le involve cons ide rab le dange r , r angin g from ident i ty d isc lo

sure to to r ture or even dea th . The wor ldwide reputa t ion of the Uni ted

Sta tes is a lso a t s take . In m y ar tic le Co ntrol l ing U.S. H ired H a n d s

(International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence,

Vol. 2, No. 2,

Su m m er 1988, p p . 163-178), I po inte d ou t tha t these un de sirab le typ es

frequently control the legi t imate agencies of government in the ir home

lands and hold the i r na t ions ' sea ts in the Uni ted Na t ions whi le pa r t ic i

pat ing extensively in internat ional diplomatic c irc les . Therefore , both

diplomats and inte l l igence off icers are compelled to interac t with them.

Given genera l ly accepted U.S. pol i t ica l , socia l , and e thica l mores , these

re la t ionsh ips must become more d isc re te over t ime .

The question is often raised as to whether secret ( covert ) action is

necessa ry and wh e the r the Clan des t ine Serv ice should be separa ted f rom

the CIA and, perhaps, a t tached to the mil i ta ry. This debate , in termit

tent ly waged for over f ive decades, has been consis tent ly resolved in

favor of the Agency 's re tent ion of both paramil i ta ry and cover t funct ions.

Cover t ac t ion is not s t r ic t ly an inte l l igence matter , according to the au

thor , w h o sug ges ts tha t the re la t ionsh ip be tw een the opera t ions d i rec tors

and the analyt ica l branch be c loser , par t icular ly among the top people .



Foreword xv

Mr . Huln ick a lso recommends the es tab l i shment of a Cover t Ac t ion

C o

ord ina t ion Cente r and tha t any opera t ion under taken have a rea l i s t ic

chance of success and be considered reasonable by the public should i t

be disc losed premature ly or resul t in fa i lure .

The au thor sugges ts an enhanced rec ru i tment e f for t among the bes t

and br igh tes t co l lege and unive rs i ty gradua tes a s the bes t me thod of

developing highly qual i f ied and motivated inte l l igence off icers a t a l l lev

els and in all directorates—from analysts, to case officers, to administra

t ive pe rson ne l . H e advo ca tes a pa r t ia l r e tu rn to the o ld school ne tw ork ,

whereby sympathe t ic co l lege professors encourage the i r mos t p romis ing

students to consider an inte l l igence career .

Inte l l igence courses , now being offered a t more than one hundred U.S.

inst i tut ions of higher learning, a re rout ine ly over-subscr ibed. Not every

one taking these classes is a suitable candidate for an intell igence career ,

bu t severa l among them might show enough ta len t to be cons ide red . The

Agency a lso faces the chal lenge of developing a be t ter system of t ra ining

and re ta ining these new off icers af ter recrui tment so tha t they can func

t ion as a permanent cadre of professionals for two or three decades,

thereby const i tut ing both exper ienced s taf f and inst i tut ional memory.

The widespread be l ie f tha t the in te l l igence communi ty no longer has

a pr imary funct ion a decade af ter the col lapse of the Sovie t Union and

i ts empire is easi ly dispel led. In July 1999 Russia ' s then-pr ime minis ter ,

Sergei V.

Stepash in ,

a former direc tor of tha t country ' s secur i ty appara

tu s ,

told rep or te rs a t the N ation al Press Clu b in W ash ing ton tha t [a]s

long as states exist , there will always be special services, intell igence

com m un i t ie s . But, accord ing to The New York Times, he ad de d tha t such

ungentlemanly pursu i t s should no t s tand in the way of

' p a r t n e r l i k e '

re

la t ions be tw een the tw o cou ntr ie s (July 28, 1999, p . A8) .

The cont inui ty of inte l l igence agencies be ing vir tua l ly guaranteed, Ar

thu r S . H uln ic k ' s Fixing the Spy Machine is no t m ere ly a va luab le add i t ion

to the l i te ra ture on inte l l igence . I t is a bluepr int for improving the inte l

l igence community of the United Sta tes , not by dramatica l ly taking i t

a pa r t a nd bu i ld ing a ne w, bu t by a c knowle dg ing i t s a c c ompl i shme n t s

over a ha lf -century, incorpora t ing bet ter in ternal and external commu

nica t ion, ba lancing investment costs and ant ic ipated resul ts , and f ine-

tuning every member agency 's components for grea ter ef f ic iency and

accuracy. Given his four decades of exper ience as a professional inte l l i

gence officer and scholar , Mr. Hulnick's instructions, akin to those of a

master mechanic or technic ian, should be fol lowed as direc ted.

Richard R. Valcourt

Editor-in-Chief

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence



Acknowledgments

As usual in works of this sor t , I owe a debt of gra t i tude to many people

who he lped me and encouraged me in wr i t ing th is book . Spec ia l thanks

go to Deborah and Richard Valcour t of New York City because i t was

over a lovely dinner a t one of Richard ' s favor i te Manhat tan restaurants

tha t the two of them f irs t k indled the idea of wri t ing this book, pushed

me to come up with a plan for i t and even a t i t le . Thanks a lso to Richard

for f ind ing a publ i she r and prepar ing the foreword . As managing ed i tor

and later editor- in-chief of the International Journal of Intelligence and

Counterlntelligence, Richard has publ i shed a number of my a r t ic le s , thus

lay ing the groundwork for th is book .

My wife Ei leen and my daughte r Sandra were he lpfu l in provid ing

pa t ien t bu t cons is ten t suppor t whenever my en thus iasm for the pro jec t

waned , bu t i t was my younger daughte r Lar isa who gave me spec i f ic

he lp in ed i t ing the or ig ina l manuscr ip t , ques t ion ing my occas iona l ly

vague wr i t ing , and provid ing use fu l sugges t ions over the two years i t

took to get th is book done.

My graduate assis tant dur ing the las t year of the projec t , Lisa Sasson,

he lp ed m e track do w n som e of the source m ate r ia l s I nee de d an d he lp ed

m e p u t the bib l iog raph y toge ther . I w as able to obta in other useful da ta

from the electronic notes sent out by the Association of Former Intell i

gence Off icers (AFIO), an organiza t ion of which I am an ac t ive member .

I am gra teful to the folks a t Greenwood Publishing for deciding to

publish the book, especia l ly Dr . Heather Ruland Sta ines , the his tory ed

i tor , who f i rs t took an interest in the manuscr ipt , and the others , some

of w h om I do n ' t kn ow , w h o prep ared the copy and read ied the book for

pr in t ing , inc lud ing Nico le Cournoyer and Br idge t Aus t iguy-Presche l .

My former col leagues a t the Centra l Inte l l igence Agency have helped



xv i i i Acknowl edgm ents

me over the years in s taying current on the world and profess

ion of

intell igence. Thanks go to the Center for the Study of Intell igence, which

has taken over the job of providing unclassif ied mater ia ls to me and

hundreds of o the r academics who teach or wr i te about in te l l igence mat

ters, an d to the Public Affairs Staff w hi ch sen ds out useful info rm ation

to those of us who are now or who were CIA Off icers- in-Residence on

col lege campuses around the country. I am especia l ly gra teful to the

Publica t ions Review Board a t the CIA for the ir prompt review of this

work and the other ar t ic les I have wri t ten. They have never been arbi

t rary or capr ic ious in asking for the very few revis ions and dele t ions

they have requested over the years .

Final ly , I w ish to tha nk m y col leagues in the De pa r tm en t of Interna

t ional Rela t ions a t Boston Universi ty who welcomed me when I f i rs t

a r r ived on ca m pu s in 1989 , de fende d m e aga ins t the skept ic s w ho w on

dere d about the pro pr ie ty of hav ing a CIA agen t in the c lass room , an d

quest ioned the val idi ty of inte l l igence as an academic subjec t . The pop

ular i ty of the courses and the spreading interest in s tudying the arcane

world of intell igence seem to have silenced the crit ics.



Acronyms

AFIO

ANSIR

ASIS

C A

CFI

CI

CIA

CMS

C N C

C N N

C O M I N T

CTC

DCI

DDI

DEA

DGI

DGSE

DI

DIA

DMI

DNI

D O

D O D

Association of Former Intel l igence Officers

FBI secur i ty aw areness ne tw ork

American Society for Indust r ial Secur i ty

cover t act ion

Commit tee on Foreign Intel l igence

counter lntel l igence; also compet i t ive intel l igence

Central Intel l igence Agency

Communi ty Management S taf f

Counter Narcot i cs Center

Cab l e News Ne t wor k

communicat ions in te l l igence

Counter Ter ror i sm Center

director of central intel l igence

deputy di rector for intel l igence

Dr ug Enforcement A dm inis t r a t ion

Cuban intel l igence service

French intel l igence service

Directorate of Intel l igence

Defense Intel l igence Agency

director of mili tary intel l igence

director of national intel l igence

Directorate of Operat ions

Depar tment of Defense



xx Acr onyms

ELINT

FBI

FBIS

FOIA

G O C

GRU

HPSCI

H U M I N T

IC

IG

INR

IOB

KGB

MAS I NT

MI-5

MI-6

NACIC

NFIB

NI C

NIE

NIMA

NIO

NPIC

N R O

NS A

N T M

OSINT

OSS

PCI

PDB

PFIAB

P H O T I N T

R&A

SCIP

SIGINT

SIS

electronic intel l igence

Federal Bureau of Inves t igat ion

Foreign Broadcas t Informat ion Service

Freedom of Informat ion Act

global organized cr ime

Soviet-Russian mili tary intel l igence service

House Permanent Selec t Commit tee on In te l l igence

human in te l l igence

Inte l l igence Communi ty

inspector general

Bureau of Intel l igence and Research (State Dept.)

Intel l igence Overs ight Board

Soviet intel l igence service

measurements and s ignatures in te l l igence

Brit ish internal securi ty service

Brit ish secret intel l igence service

Nat ional Counter ln te l l igence Center

Nat ional Foreign Intel l igence Board

Nat ional Intel l igence Counci l

Nat ional Intel l igence Est imate

Na t i ona l I mager y and Mapp i ng Agency

national intelligence officer

Nat ional Photographic Intel l igence Center

Nat ional Reconnaissance Off ice

Nat ional Secur i ty Agency

Nat ional Technical Means

open source intel l igence

Office of Strategic Services

I t a l i an communis t par ty

President's Daily Brief

Pres ident ' s Foreign Intel l igence Advisory Board

photographic in te l l igence

research and analys is

Society of Competi t ive Intel l igence Professionals

signals intel l igence

Secret Intel l igence Service (MI-6)



Acronyms xxi

SSCI Senate Select Co m m it tee on Intel ligence

SVR Ru ssian intel l igenc e service

UN Uni t ed Na t i ons

W M D we apo ns of mas s des t r uc ti on



CHAPTER 1

Is the Spy Machine Broken?

America ' s in te l l igence system is a t a crossroads. As we approach the

twenty- fi r st cen tury , m an y qu es t ions a re be ing ra ised abou t a sys tem tha t

is now more than f if ty years old. The roots of this system lie in the

conf lagra t ions of W orld W ar II . The system 's fou nd ing fa thers in c lu ded

such lum inar ies as W ild Bill D on ov an, the co m m an de r of the Office

of Strategic Services (OSS), and J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal

Bu reau of Inves t iga t ion (FBI). A m erican inte l l igence ran g up m an y vic

tor ies in World War I I . I t captured German and Japanese spies , ran

agents in to occupied Europe and Asia , b roke enemy codes , and ca r r ied

out spectacular fea ts of aer ia l reconnaissance . Dur ing the Cold War

American inte l l igence repeatedly forecast , with considerable accuracy,

the plans and intent ions of the Sovie t Union and i ts associa ted s ta tes

wh i le repea te d ly thw ar t in g the opera t ion s of i ts m a in ene m y, the So

vie t KGB inte l l igence appara tus .

To da y Am erica ' s in te l ligence system is , by any m ea su re , the largest

an d m ost expen s ive in te l ligence burea ucrac y in the W este rn world—per

haps the largest anywhere on the planet . But i t ' s in ser ious t rouble . De

spi te myriad successes over the past ha lf century as America ' s f i rs t l ine

of de fense in shoot ing wars and Cold War conf ronta t ions , many obse rv

ers of American inte l l igence bel ieve the system is ser iously f lawed and

tha t Am er ica ' s Spy M ach ine nee ds a ma jor overh aul .

These days people who th ink a t a l l about Amer ican in te l l igence re

member i ts fa i lures ra ther than i ts vic tor ies . S tar t ing with Pear l Harbor

and the invas ion of South Korea by the Nor th , up to modern t imes and

Saddam Husse in ' s a t tack on Kuwai t , Amer ican in te l l igence does no t

seem to do what i t was designed for : prevent ing surpr ise . Cover t ac t ion

failures also remain in memory, from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion to



2 Fixing the Spy M achine

the a t tempted over throw of Sa lvador Al lende in Chi le . And who could

forget the debacle of Aldr ich Ames, the Sovie t mole inside CIA head

quar te r s?

For many years the CIA ran a f i lm for newly hired employees tha t

pointed out tha t while the CIA's fa i lures of ten became known, i ts suc

cesses had to remain hidden. At the t ime this was not a big issue for

those of us who to i led ins ide the CIA because we unders tood tha t by

hiding our vic tor ies , we s tood a very good chance of repeat ing them. I f

our adversar ies knew that our s is ter agency, the National Secur i ty

Agency (NSA), was reading the ir codes, they would change them. I f the

ene m y kn ew th a t w e had rec ru i ted a gents ins ide the ir wa l l s , they m ight

f ind them and execute them or turn them against us . I f they could te l l

ho w g ood o u r pho to r e c onna i ssa nc e wa s , t he y migh t h ide the ve r y w e a p

ons or ac t ivi t ies we were capable of see ing. We never thought about the

drawback of hiding success .

I s F a i l u r e I n e v i t a b l e ?

As Amer ican in te l l igence fa i lu res became known, they caused se r ious

problems. Fai lure is inevi table in inte l l igence . I t is not a lways possible

to forecast the future , or measure a hidden weapons system, or s top a

de term ine d ter ror is t , or f ind a m ole , an un de rcov er spy inside the in

te l l igence sys tem. Human judgment somet imes resu l t s in fau l ty ana lys is ,

poor decis ions, or bad pol icy. In inte l l igence opera t ions, where an ad

versary is working in secre t to discredi t the inte l l igence system, as

happened in the Cold War , the enemy may c ircula te fa lse s tor ies , or

dis information, to those qui te wil l ing to be l ieve tha t the ir own inte l l i

gence agencies are f lawed.

The result of all this is that the American people, to the extent that

they pa y a t ten t ion to such th ings , an d even those wh o a re c lose obse rvers

of American inte l l igence , in the media , in academe, and in government ,

may have a faulty perception of the successes and failures of the intel

l igence sys tem. This does no t mean tha t the Amer ican people a re op

posed to having good inte l l igence . All i t takes is a bombing in Saudi

Arabia or Oklahoma City to provoke an outcry for more inte l l igence . As

Genera l Vernon Wal te r s once sa id , when the Amer ican people fee l

th rea tened , they want in te l l igence to work for them. He added tha t they

soon lose interest when the threa t is over .

1

Misunderstanding of inte l l igence is fur ther complica ted by the growth

of a great body of l i terature, f i lms, and television over the past f if ty years

devoted to spy f ic t ion and esp ionage drama . People th ink they know

about the CIA because they 've seen James Bond movies or r ead Tom

Clancy nove ls . In one absurd inc ident , s tudents a t a p rominent eas te rn



Is the Spy Machine Broken? 3

col lege repor tedly protested the appearance of a CIA recrui ter a f ter they

had seen a f ic t ional movie por traying CIA involvement in the assassi

nat ion of a U.S. president .

E x a m i n i n g t h e S y s t e m

How can we examine a system that is cloaked in secrecy? In fact, i t is

not so diff icult . For the careful observer, America 's intell igence system

is the most open in the world. This was not a lways the case . In i ts ear ly

years the system fol lowed the Br i t ish s tyle and t r ied to keep everything

sec re t . Malco lm Mugger idge , the Br i t i sh au thor and wi t , who se rved in

British intell igence in World War II , once observed that secrecy in intel

l igence was akin to vestments in church, c rea t ing an aura tha t is neces

sary for the process . In America ' s f ree socie ty , however , mainta ining

secrecy was not so easy. After a series of revelations in the press about

the evils of A m eric an intell igence, a ho st of tell a ll bo ok s by form er

inte l l igence off icers , and the subsequent development of congressional

oversight by legis la tors who had for years avoided c lose scrut iny of in

te l ligence , m an y of the ac t ivi t ies of the inte ll igence system b eca m e public .

This new openness was re inforced when Admira l S tansf ie ld Turner

dec ided tha t the Amer ican publ ic was paying la rge sums for the CIA

and Amer ican in te l l igence and tha t they had a r igh t to know more about

where the ir money was going. Despi te the objec t ions of some old- t imers

in the Agency, Turner set up the Public Affairs Office, held press con

ferences, released previously classif ied material , and after leaving the

CIA wrote h is own book about in te l l igence .

2

His successors have been

equa l ly op en . Despi te hav ing been n ur tur ed in the OSS t rad i t ion , the la te

Wil l iam Casey became a wil l ing public speaker , and Bob Gates , d irec tor

of central intell igence (DCI) under President George Bush, himself a for

mer DCI, wrote a book about his exper iences as well .

3

C ou p le d w i th

press s tor ies , growing academic interest in inte l l igence , and the open

l i te ra ture about i t , we now have the oppor tuni ty to learn a grea t deal .

In fact , s tu dy ing A m erican inte l ligence is a form of intell igence in itself.

Just as the clever intell igence analyst pieces together small bits of data

f rom a var ie ty of sources , f rom agents , f rom space photos , and f rom a

var ie ty of open sources , so can we examine the Spy Machine . Admit

tedly, i t he lps tha t the author spent thir ty-f ive years inside the system

as a military intelligence officer and as a CIA official. As with all intel

l igence professionals , however , the author is sworn to keep the secre ts

he lea rned dur ing h is se rv ice and i s r equi red to submit h is manuscr ip ts ,

inc luding this one , for review by the CIA. That a reader has access to

this book at all suggests that the CIA had no objection to i ts publication,

a l though the Agency may not l ike what i t says. This is ye t another rea-




Is I t Broken?

Now we can begin to ana lyze the ques t ion posed a t the beginning of

this chapter . I s the Spy Machine broken? As in most exerc ises of this

nature , the answer is a mixed one . In some respects , American inte l l i

gence is without peer in the world; in others, i t is less successful. I t is

no t nea r ly as incompeten t a s some charge , bu t the re a re many a reas

w he re repa i r seem s app rop r ia te . A l tho ugh ce r tain ly no t the ev il sec re t

go ver nm ent tha t i ts de t rac tors fea r, i t has taken on some ope ra t ions

where i t should probably have sa id an empha t ic no . P robably much

larger than i t needs to be , the Spy Machine is cer ta inly a confusing con

g lomera te of agenc ies s t rung toge the r th rough weak t ie s and in some

cases weak leadersh ip . I t has , over t ime , been pene t ra ted by the enemy,

though not as of ten as one might expect . I ts successes outweigh i ts fa i l

ures , but i ts mistakes have been cost ly .

What is in te l l igence anyway? We need to def ine inte l l igence i f we are

going to examine i t , and we have many def ini t ions f rom which to choose .

Some say tha t in te l l igence is information about a na t ion ' s adversar ies ,

enemies, or competi tors or about threa ts to na t ional secur i ty . Others ar

gue that intell igence is information designed to assist policy officials in

formula t ing s tra tegies or reaching decis ions. Both posi t ions are correc t .

Inte l l igence is a lso the business of s topping others f rom stea l ing nat ional

secre ts , p lans, or pol ic ies; f rom penetra t ing the government; and f rom

carrying out te r ror ism. I t can inc lude ant i -subversive ac t ivi ty , a l though

the United States has rarely suffered from real internal subversion; or i t

can be used to combat narcot ics f lows and organized cr ime. Final ly , in

te l l igence can inc lude secre t opera t ions designed to carry out na t ional

pol icy by sur rep t i t ious methods , o r in modern te rms cover t ac t ion .

Intell igence can also be studied in terms of functions. These activit ies

can be divided in a var ie ty of ways. There is s t ra tegic inte l l igence tha t

opera tes a t the na t iona l leve l to suppor t the pres ident and h is pol icy

makers, and there is tactical intell igence for military operations. Intell i

gence inc ludes col lec t ion opera t ions for ga ther ing information, research

and analysis to make sense out of the gathered data , counter lnte l l igence

to s top o the rs f rom doing to you wha t you a re do ing to them, cover t

ac t ion, and inte l l igence management and control . All these funct ions wil l

f igure in our examinat ion.

T h e I n t e l l i g e n c e P r o c e s s

We begin with the genera l na ture of the inte l l igence process . In a lmost

all schools that teach about intell igence to practitioners—in the mil i ta ry




or the

CIA—the

con cept of the inte l ligence cycle is w ide ly s tu died .

7

This

cycle begins with requirements f rom policy off ic ia ls , which leads in turn

to collection, analysis, circulation of reports, and decision making. This

is not a par t icular ly accura te or useful explanat ion of the process gen

era l ly , but s ince i t is so widely taught , i t cannot very well be ignored.

The concept nonetheless gives a dis tor ted pic ture of how inte l l igence

real ly works.

First , policy officials rarely provide intell igence requirements for col

lection of data. Their questions, to the extent that they ask them at all ,

a re far too genera l to guide the gather ing of information. Usual ly re

quirements for col lec t ion come f rom within the system, s ince inte l l igence

professionals know best what information they are missing. Pol icy off i

c ia ls might give some sense of pr ior i t ies , but again, they rare ly do so.

This forces intell igence collectors to rely on their own reading of what 's

going on a t the top. In the mil i ta ry, th is process is a bi t more order ly .

Mil i ta ry commanders do provide guidance for tac t ica l col lec tors , es-

pcially at the combat level.

Second, col lec tors cannot a lways af ford to wait for guidance in ga th

e r ing da ta . Somet imes they have to an t ic ipa te wha t wi l l be needed and

grab inform ation as they can get i t. This is especia lly t rue in deal in g w ith

human sources or in some forms of technica l col lec t ion.

Third, analysts cannot a lways wait for da ta to be col lec ted in order to

deal with a fas t-breaking issue or problem. Usual ly analysts have bui l t

a la rge database and can deal with most subjec ts using incrementa l bi ts

of new data as they get them.

The circulation of reports to co n s u mers —d ec i s i o n mak er s , mil i ta ry

commanders , pol icy s taf fers , or in te l l igence users—is ha r d ly a s a u to

matic as the intell igence cycle depicts. In fact, getting intell igence to those

who need i t is a major problem for inte l l igence managers . Ensur ing tha t

the r ight people receive the information they need or should have , in a

useful format an d on a t imely basis , is the end ga m e in inte l ligence ,

and when i t is p layed poor ly , the ent i re system suffers . History te l ls us

that intell igence failure can often occur at this point in the intell igence

process .

Last , we know from surveys, in terviews, and exper ience tha t decis ions

are rare ly made on the basis of inte l l igence a lone . Although inte l l igence

may be a crucial part of policy formulation, or in carrying out policy, i t

is rare ly decis ive on i ts own. Where this has happened, i t has usual ly

been in t ime of war, such as at the Battle of Midway in World War II in

the Pacif ic , when Admira l Chester

Nimitz

trusted his inte l l igence ana

lysts , who had broken the Japanese code, to te l l h im where to f ight the

Japanese carrier fleet.



8 Fixing the Spy Machine

Fidel Castro ' s endless speeches, and we could interpre t China ' s ac t ivi t ies

f rom s ta tements by the New China News Agency .

Open source intell igence is hardly the stuff of spy movies. Yet some

in te l l igence ve te rans in Washington have been push ing the sys tem to

p lace even more re l iance on open sources . The In te l l igence Communi ty

has responded by appoin t ing an open source coord ina tor ; bu t unfor tu

na te ly , when budge t cu ts have had to be made , such open source or

ganizations as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which

has been t ransla t ing and publishing media repor ts for more than f i f ty

years , take the brunt of the reduct ions. FBIS is a component of the CIA,

and in sp i te o f some an t ipa thy toward the CIA on many co l lege cam

puses , academics have we lcomed the i r t r ans la t ions and subsc r ibed to

FBIS publica t ions for many years .

O pe n sources may m ake u p as m uc h as 80 pe rcent of the da tabase on

any given subjec t or country, though in deal ing with a c losed socie ty

such as in North Korea , i t may be much less . One of the problems in

volved in using open sources is tha t they are unclassified—not secret—

an d th us the analysis der ive d f rom such sources is no t su pp os ed to be

secre t e i ther . When an analyst combines open source information with

secret sources, the resulting analysis may be classif ied at the level of the

most sensi t ive source .

Policy officials are rarely interested in unclassif ied analysis. They see

i t as no bet ter than the New York Times. W he n the analysis ha s Secre t

or To p Secre t s ta m pe d on i t, ho w eve r , i t has a cachet. O nly c leared

people can have such information, so pol icy off ic ia ls are more interested

in paying attention to i t . Thus, the clever analyst soon learns that if he

or she wants the a t tent ion of the pol icy community , i t is important to

find secret material to use in drawing the analysis, even if the bulk of

the information comes f rom open sources .

T e c h n i c a l S e n s o r s

Technical col lec t ion, using sophis t ica ted e lec tronic sensors , provides

an increasing amount of information in inte l l igence . Although the tech

n iques da te back to be fore Wor ld War I , modern sys tems have become

increasingly sophis t ica ted in design and capabi l i ty . Breaking of codes

and c iphers is an ancient prac t ice ; indeed, the f i rs t codes may have been

used by Alexander the Grea t .

9

Evidence of code breaking can be found

in the American Revolut ion and in our Civi l War , and s imilar prac t ices

were used a t the same t ime in Europe. In World War I the Br i t ish suc

cess fu l ly broke German c iphers , lead ing to the famous Zimmermann

Telegram incident in which a German offer of an a l l iance with Mexico



Is

the

Spy M achine Broken? 9

was intercepted and deciphered by Bri t ish inte l l igence , he lping in par t

to push Amer ica ' s en t ry in to the war .

1 0

In World War I I a combined group of Br i t ish , French, and Polish in

te l l igence off icers managed to decipher t ransmissions f rom the suppos

ed ly unbreakable Enigma sys tem. The Germans never found out tha t

the ir t ransmissions were being read by the ir enemies. At the same t ime

U.S.

Navy code-breakers de r ived ways to read Japanese d ip lomat ic and

mil i ta ry communicat ions t raf f ic . To protec t these inte l l igence successes ,

specia l handling was required for a l l those with access to the deciphered

m ate r ia l , and spec ia l Top Secret co m pa r tm en ts w ere c rea ted to l imi t

dis tr ibut ion of the repor ts . This is the system that American inte l l igence

still uses.

When NSA, the National Secur i ty Agency, was establ ished in the 1950s

to centra l ize communicat ion and s ignals inte l l igence taken f rom inter

cepted fore ign t ransmissions, i t was c loaked in secrecy. Later , insiders

c la imed tha t NS A real ly s tood for N o Such A gen cy or N eve r Say

A ny th ing . Even no w , w he n i ts m iss ion an d ac tiv it ie s an d even the lo

cation of i ts facili t ies are relatively well known, NSA remains the most

secre t ive of a l l America ' s in te l l igence services . Nonetheless , NSA has es

tab l i shed a smal l museum to he ra ld i t s explo i t s and has begun to ad

ver t ise i ts locat ion and even to se l l souvenirs .

Communicat ions inte l l igence , or COMINT, and i ts re la ted disc ipl ine

of electronic intell igence (ELINT) rarely come in for crit icism. Yet, Amer

icans were dis turbed af ter the Vie tnam War to discover tha t NSA re

sources had been used to ga the r in format ion about Amer ican c i t izens

involved in ant i -war protests in viola t ion of regula t ions establ ished to

prevent such abuse . Since those revela t ions there has been no fur ther

evidence of misuse of the intercept system, but there are those who s t i l l

fear the possibili ty that their civil r ights might be violated by such a

system.

It is diff icult to measure the util i ty of intercept intell igence. In the au

thor ' s exper ience inte l l igence der ived f rom intercepts tends to be f rag

menta ry and of l imi ted use . None the less , o the rs cons ide r such sys tems

to be valuable . Because COMINT and ELINT require sa te l l i tes for much

of the intercept work, the process has turned out to be very expensive .

Also,

because so much of such intell igence is sti l l considered Top Secret

and i s t igh t ly compar tmented , f ew outs ide obse rvers can te l l much

about i ts effectiveness. In fact, former CIA director Admiral Turner tr ied

to wri te about i t in his book Secrecy and Democracy, b ut hi s unclassif ied

draf t w as a l legedly re turn ed s tam ped Top Secre t. H e pro tes ted to no

avail.




P h o t o I n t e l l i g e n c e

The same pro tec t ions were g iven to Amer ican photo reconna issance

in it s ea r ly po s t -W or ld W ar II day s . Ac tua l ly , ph oto reconna issance da tes

back to the Am er ican Civ il W ar w he n in t rep id in te l ligencers lugge d

heavy pla te cameras onto hot a ir ba l loons to capture photos of the en

e my .

1 1

Both s ides used bal loons, but not unt i l the invent ion of the a ir

plane did photo observat ion rea l ly became pract ica l . In World War I ,

hand-he ld cameras were soon rep laced by photo appara tus spec i f ica l ly

designed to be mounted in the f l imsy a ircraf t of those days, and by

World War I I the business of taking photos f rom high a l t i tude and in

te rpre t ing them had become qui te advanced . The photos were used for

target ing, bomb damage assessment , and other forms of inte l l igence

ga the r ing . Al though no one was paying much a t ten t ion , photos taken

over Auschwitz revealed c lear evidence of Nazi death camps.

1 2

When the Cold War began and Sovie t -cont ro l led te r r i to ry became

c losed to the West , a t tempts were made to take photos f rom the pe r iph

e ry of the I ron Cur ta in us ing conver ted bombers . Many p lanes re turned

from such missions full of bullet holes, and some did not return at all .

In order to learn about Communist mil i ta ry capabi l i ty , a be t ter system

was needed, and so the high-flying U-2 was built , a joint project of the

U.S.

Air Force , the CIA, and Lockheed. I t was enormously successful .

Flying at over 70,000 feet, the U-2 was immune at f irst to Soviet attempts

to br ing i t down. Eventua l ly the Sovie ts managed to br ing down Franc is

Gary Powers , and the explo i t s o f the U-2 became known. Never the less ,

the U-2 remained a very ef fec t ive weapon in the American inte l l igence

arsenal, and more than forty years after i t f irst f lew, i t is st i l l gathering

intell igence for America and its all ies.

The follow-on aircraft , the SR-71, ironica lly ca l led Ox car t w h en i t

was f irst built , was an even more capable airplane. I t could f ly at Mach

3, three t imes the speed of sound, fas t enough to outrun enemy missi les .

I t could f ly higher than the U-2, though with more l imited range. I t was

too expensive to opera te , however , and was eventual ly taken out of ser

vice des pit e spo rad ic efforts to kee p it f lying. W he n on e SR-71 w as sen t

to Dulles Airpor t f rom Los Angeles to become par t of a planned a ir

museum, i t made the t r ip in s ix ty-e igh t minutes .

Today photo recona issance has changed . A grea t dea l o f emphas is has

shif ted f rom supersonic a ircraf t to unmanned a ircraf t , some no larger

than model a irplanes. They are re la t ive ly inexpensive , a re expendable ,

and can s tay over ta rgets for more than twenty-four hours in some cases .

They are f lexible and can be targeted by f ie ld commanders ra ther than

by a r e mote he a dqua r t e r s in Wa sh ing ton .

The o the r g rea t change in overhead photography came wi th the de -




Recrui t ing a secre t agent to penetra te the enemy's defenses is what many

pe op le think abo ut w h en the term inte l l igence is use d, an d c lear ly ,

espionage has been a s ignif icant fac tor in American his tory. George

Washington ran spy r ings against the Br i t ish , Thomas Jefferson under

s tood the va lue of sp ies , James Madison employed them, and James

Knox Polk defended against e f for ts by the Congress to reveal the ir iden

tities.

13

Spies were used by both s ides in the American Civi l War , and in

World War I I , espionage ac t ivi ty was incorpora ted in the OSS. Many of

the or iginal m em be rs of the CIA, fou nd ed in 1947, learned the ir espio

n a g e tradecraft, as spy techniques are ca l led, in the OSS and re turned

to the bus iness when the Agency was c rea ted .

Espion age , som et imes ca lled HU M INT for hu m an in te ll igence, i s

sti l l a controversial subject. Despite i ts role in the history of the United

Sta tes , there are those who take the posi t ion, much l ike the Br i t ish in the

nineteenth century, tha t obta ining inte l l igence by c landest ine methods is

abhorrent . Modern cr i t ics have argued tha t espionage is a waste of t ime.

This view was taken by ja i led Sovie t spy Aldr ich Ames to just i fy his

wil l ingness to s tea l information f rom the CIA. Former Sta te Depar tment

chief of the Bureau of Intell igence and Research Roger Hilsman has said

that he thought foreign service officers were quite capable of collecting

the mater ia l tha t the CIA's Clandest ine Service normally gathers , and

George Kennan, the archi tec t of America ' s s t ra tegy dur ing the Cold War ,

has said that clandestine intell igence collection is overrated.

1 4

The Depar tment of Defense (DOD) , however , th inks human in te l l i

gence is an important par t of i ts da ta col lec t ion system and has estab

l ished the Defense HUMINT Service to carry out espionage for DOD.

Effor ts to l ink the DOD system with the CIA's Direc tora te of Opera t ions

in ear ly 1996 came to nothing, despi te the recommendations of the s tudy

panels . Actual ly , the DOD espionage net and the CIA's Clandest ine Ser

vice are after different targets. Defense is l ikely to use the system to

obtain tactical military information, whereas the CIA will target polit ical

and economic data . This issue is wor thy of fur ther discussion la ter in

this work.

P u z z l e s a n d M y s t e r i e s

Espionage is the stuff of spy novels. Intell igence analysis is something

quite dif ferent . I f you consider tha t the unknowns in the world are made

up of secre ts , puzzles , and myster ies , then inte l l igence ought to have a

way to get at them. Intell igence collection operations ought to be able to

unearth—or steal—the

secrets. Intell igence analysis ought to be able to

solve the puzzles and perhaps even divine the myster ies . Inte l l igence



Is

the

Spy

Machine Broken?

13

analysis is the most fasc inat ing and yet the least understood or recog

nized par t of the inte l l igence process .

Inte l l igence col lec t ion systems produce what might be thought of as

ra w da ta . The in format ion has no t been eva lua ted or com pare d to in

te l l igence a l ready on hand . When an ana lys t eva lua tes the raw mate r ia l

and synthes izes judgments f rom it—either to solve the puzzle or to un

de r s t a nd the mystery—then w e ha ve w ha t som e call f inished inte ll i

gence . Others might ca l l the resul t an inte l l igence product . We can

understand this a bi t be t ter by looking a t the dif ferent types of products

intell igence creates.

One major role of any inte l l igence service is to warn pol icymakers of

im pe nd ing c ri si s. W arnin g in tel ligence sho uld a ler t

decisionmakers

early

enough so tha t they can take ac t ion to s top or prevent the cr is is or a t

least prepare themselves to react to i t . In order to be able to warn of

cr is is , m ost inte ll igence services these da ys m ain ta in twe nty-fo ur-ho ur-

a-day cr is is or opera t ions centers , where a l l incoming mater ia l is re

v iewed and eva lua ted to make sure tha t no ac t iv i ty tha t might be

potent ia l ly threa tening is missed.

The warning analyst is looking for anomalies or devia t ions f rom the

no rm , som et imes us in g ind ica to rs such as changes in com m unica t ions

pat terns or increases in mil i ta ry movements to te l l tha t something is up.

For exa m ple , it is qui te co m m on to be able to de tec t a m il i ta ry ov er th row

of a government when normal commerc ia l o r governmenta l b roadcas ts

swi tch f rom the i r r egula r p rogramming to the p lay ing of mi l i ta ry march

music . Today warning inte l l igence analysis is a ided and abet ted by the

prol i fera t ion of a l l -day news services such as CNN, and most opera t ions

centers in the United Sta tes probably watch CNN for ear ly warning.

C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e

A second product is the dai ly repor t , a her i tage f rom mil i ta ry inte l l i

gence ; for many yea rs mi l i ta ry commanders have expec ted to rece ive ,

f irst thing in the morning, an intell igence briefing to begin their day.

President Truman was an ear ly and eager rec ipient of an inte l l igence

br ief designed just for the White House , and the prac t ice of issuing a

dai ly br ief has become a s taple of CIA inte l l igence product ion. The same

may be said for the other U.S. intell igence agencies as well , each with

i ts ow n l is t of sub scr ibers . W ith the gro w th of secure on- l ine co m pu ter

system s, the dai ly br ief has becom e avai lable e lec tronica lly da y and nigh t

and thus can be upda ted a t a moment ' s no t ice . This p rocess i s usua l ly

referred to as current intell igence, and it takes up a good part of the

work of inte l l igence analysts .




Inevi tably, current inte l l igence products are cr i t ic ized because they are

wri t ten by exper ts for non-experts—senior policy officials who are gen-

era l is ts ra ther than specia l is ts . Consumers of inte l l igence who are area

or functional specialists usually f ind daily reports lacking in specif icity

or de ta i l and complain tha t the repor ts do not he lp them. Genera l is ts ,

however , f ind them a good , qu ick upda te to supplement wha t they lea rn

from the m ed ia. In fact, be cau se of the eff iciency of electronic d istr i bu tio n

of raw inte l l igence repor ts to pol icy users , who receive them at about

the same time as intell igence analysts, policy specialists f ind few sur

pr i ses in the resu l t ing da i ly in te l ligence pro du c ts . The va lue ad de d by

inte l l igence exper ts in the dai ly br iefs is in the judgments the analysts

reach, unta inted by pol icy considera t ions or pol i t ica l pressure .

Inte l l igence analysts crea te a da tabase out of raw inte l l igence by wri t

ing s tud ies , m em ora nd a , and o the r re sea rch pro du c ts . Some of these m ay

be circulated to interested users, others kept on the shelf until a need for

them ar ises . When analysts share the ir research with other inte l l igence

exper ts , they not only educate the ir col leagues but a lso crea te ne tworks

for shar ing knowledge and ideas . Unfor tunate ly , for many years inte l

l igence analysts were pressed to send their research to policy officials,

whether i t was wanted or not . The resul t ing glut of ra ther lengthy in

te l l igence research papers on pol icy desks led to a cheapening of the

produc t , and much of the mate r ia l went unread . Former DCI Bob Ga tes

of ten noted tha t when he was direc tor of inte l l igence analysis , h is uni t

tu r ne d ou t mor e tha n 5,000 repor ts and papers a year . He never sa id

w h o w a n t e d t h e m .

We know f rom in te rv iews , consumer surveys , and in formal d iscus

sions that policy officials really want intell igence delivered only when

they need it , and in a form they can use: a printed or electronic report,

a video, or a br ief ing. Inte l l igence producers thought tha t as long as they

were put t ing out an inte l l igence research paper , they might as well ship

i t to anyone who might conceivably have use for i t . Modern desktop

publishing techniques and e lec tronic l inks make i t much easier to de l iver

just- in-time intell igence only to those who really need it .

A final category of product is the most controversial . These are fore

casts of the future, usually referred to as intell igence estimates. They

became a specia l ca tegory of inte l l igence analysis in World War I I when

OSS chief W il liam D on ov an crea ted a bo ard of wise m en to w ri te

est im ates for s t ra tegic pla nn ing . H e du bb ed the bo ard his College of

Card ina ls .

1 5

Later , in the CIA, this became the Board of National Esti

mates , and under DCI Bil l Colby the est imates funct ion was taken up by

the newly crea ted National Inte l l igence Counci l .

The controversy surrounding inte l l igence est imates involves the fac t

that intell igence analysts cannot really predict the future. The British,

who developed a s imilar system of es t imates , be l ieved tha t smar t people




given good da ta could do so . Exper ience , however , shows tha t the bes t

tha t can be expected is to give pol icymakers insights into the future or

we ighted judgments about the l ike ly course of events . In o the r words ,

inte l l igence can t ry to solve the puzzles or unear th the myster ies , but i t

can make no guaran tees . This p roblem is s t i l l no t we l l unders tood by

those who wonder why we spend b i l l ions on in te l l igence i f we cannot

forecast the future. The entire issue of intell igence analysis was tackled

by the va r ious re form s tud ies and i s wor th cons ide rab le d iscuss ion .

C o u n t e r i n t

el l igence

The business of counter inte l l igence (CI) is as old as intell igenc e collec

t ion. I t makes sense tha t i f one country is spying on another , the target

country wil l want to s top i ts secre ts f rom being s tolen. This process is

ca l led counterespionage, one of severa l ca tegor ies of ac t ivi ty tha t might

be considered par t of counter inte l l igence . Most countr ies in the modern

era have counter inte l l igence and secur i ty services , and many of them

have a t least some form of pol ice power . This is the case with America ' s

domest ic CI and secur i ty service , the Federa l Bureau of Invest iga t ion. Of

course , the FBI is pr imar i ly focused on f ight ing cr ime, but counter ing

fore ign espionage has a lways been par t of i ts mandate .

Th e foun de r of the FBI, J. Ed ga r H oo ve r, tr ied to kee p th e FBI in th e

forefront of American inte l l igence ac t ivi ty , and he fought long and hard

against the growth of the OSS in World War I I and the crea t ion of the

CIA in the pos t -war pe r iod . Through much of the Cold War , the re was

re la t ive ly l i t t le coopera t ion or even communicat ion between the FBI and

the CIA. Af te r Hoover ' s dea th , these ba r r ie r s began to break down. As

the emphas is on counte r ing te r ror i sm has grown in the Uni ted S ta tes ,

more and more e f for t s have been made to br ing the two agenc ies in to a

c loser working re la t ionship. In the af termath of the Aldr ich Ames spy

case, the alleged failure of the CIA to give information to the FBI moved

the Clinton adminis tra t ion to de ta i l FBI agents to the CIA to help direc t

some CI activity.

F o r e i g n S p i e s

Penetra t ion of an inte l l igence organiza t ion by fore ign spies is a lmost

inevi table , and i t is qui te remarkable tha t American inte l l igence has so

rare ly fa llen vic t im to a m ole . No neth eless , w h en it ha s ha pp en ed , i t

has caused enormous anguish bo th ins ide and outs ide the agenc ies con

cerned. I t is easy to forget that foreign intell igence organizations, some

fr iendly, some not so f r iendly, a re working assiduously to ge t someone




inside. More often, hostile intell igence services are able to turn an agem

in to a do ub le an d feed false inform ation to the service tha t ha s bee n

fooled . Today such ac t iv i ty has spread beyond government and has be

come par t of the murky world of business inte l l igence and industr ia l

e sp ionage .

Inte l l igence services have to work di l igent ly to protec t themselves

against penetra t ions, moles , and double agents . In some countr ies , where

respect for h u m an an d civil r ights is no t strong , a variety of tactics—phone

taps , survei l lance , or s t rong-armed interrogation—might be used against

those suspected of working for the other side. In Western democracies,

and especially in the United States, such draconian methods are carefully

controlled. Thus, intell igence services in democracies have a double bur

den: They must protect themselves against hostile intell igence agencies

and at the same time respect the r ights of their own citizens.

The United Sta tes has rare ly had a ser ious problem with internal sub

versio n des pi te the hyster ia of the var iou s Red scares tha t occurred

af ter both world wars . In many countr ies , inc luding America ' s c lose

ne ighbor , Canada , in te rna l subvers ion has been an impor tan t ta rge t fo r

CI and security services.

16

CI techniques have been used to combat the

growing threa t of te r ror ism, to work against narcot ics f lows, and increas

ingly to deal with global crime. Efforts to strengthen CI resources in the

United Sta tes , usual ly in demand af ter a te r ror is t inc ident or a spy case ,

tend to be offset by fears of abuse. This was i l lustrated dramatically in

the su m m er of 1996 w he n the Clinto n adm inis tra t io n, in the af terma th

of the TWA Flight 800 crash, asked Congress for emergency legis la t ion

to fight te r ror ism . Civi l l iber tar ians pr otes ted pla ns to br oa de n FBI ph on e

taps and specia l in terest groups quickly ra l l ied to f ight chemical markers

in gun powde r .

C o v e r t A c t i o n

Secre t ope ra t ion s, ca l led cover t ac t ion in the Un ited Sta tes an d ac

t ive m ea su res in Russia , a re not inte l ligence opera t ion s in the s t ric t

sense . They are not designed to gather or analyze information. Rather ,

they are used to carry out the foreign and security policy of the state

us ing c landes t ine methods . They inc lude va r ious forms of psychologica l

w arfare , inc lud ing dec ept io n an d dis informa tion, the use of age nts of

inf luence for pol i tica l or econom ic op era t io ns, su pp or t for guerr i l las or

ir regular mil i ta ry forces , and in some countr ies assassinat ion, te r ror ism,

or sabotage . Despi te a long his tory of such cover t ac t ivi ty by the United

States, the subject is one of continuing controversy.

George Washington 's use of cover t ac t ion to combat the Br i t ish is wel l

documented , and the o the r Founding Fa the rs , inc lud ing Je f fe r son and



Is

the

Spy M achine Broken? 17

Madison, were not opposed to such ac t ivi ty . In fac t , running secre t op

era t ions out of the White House became a t radi t ion in the United Sta tes ,

involv ing many pres idents up th rough Teddy Rooseve l t . The Iran-

Contra affair and the involvement of White House officials in both the

events and subsequent coverup would no t have seemed s t range to

n ine teen th-century pres idents .

Dur ing the Cold War the Amer ican CIA and the Sovie t KGB both

carr ied out cover t ac t ion to suppor t the ir respect ive governments . The

United Sta tes sa id tha t i t was forced to use such dir ty t r icks because the

other s ide was so good a t them. Thus, the CIA gained a reputa t ion as a

sec ret gov ernm ent , a l legedly over thro w ing reg imes it d id no t l ike , a s

sassinat ing leaders i t opposed, and suppor t ing evi l forces . The reputa t ion

was ha rd ly dese rved . When Sena tor F rank Church c la imed tha t the CIA

w as a rogu e e leph ant run nin g am ok, h is hea r ing s in to the subjec t

proved tha t he was wrong . None the less , the reputa t ion of the CIA in

regard to such ac t ivi ty never recovered. There are s t i l l those who bel ieve

that th e CIA is in leagu e w ith th e devi l , or a t least is do ing b usin ess w ith

the devi l ' s associa tes .

I t is not surpr is ing tha t quest ions about cover t ac t ion were ra ised in

the var ious s tudies on American inte l l igence . Yet , none of them sug

gested tha t the United Sta tes should give up on cover t ac t ion as a po

tent ia l tool against the bad guys. The s tudies re i tera ted tha t cover t ac t ion

may prove use fu l when mi l i ta ry ac t ion i s too s t rong and where d ip lo

m acy seem s ineffec tive. Co ver t ac t ion is a third opt i on for pol icy m ak

ers.

1 7

Most inte l l igence watchers agree tha t cover t ac t ion needs to be

careful ly control led, and so the United Sta tes has the most s t r ingent re

s tr ic t ions on cover t ac t ion of any nat ion. No president has ever sa id tha t

he would be opposed to the use of cover t ac t ion, and a l l modern presi

dents have author ized i ts use a t some point in the ir tenure .

M a n a g i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e

Control l ing and managing inte l l igence is hardly the subjec t of spy f ic

t ion. Yet , the var ious s tudies under taken dur ing 1995-96 focused a grea t

dea l o f a t ten t ion on management and cont ro l i s sues , and th is was t rue

as well of the s tudies of the inte l l igence system carr ied out in previous

adminis t ra t ions . Whereas management and cont ro l i s sues a re of l i t t l e

interest to the genera l publ ic , they are the very l i feblood of Washington

bu rea ucr a ts . Turf issues , as they are called—who controls what func

tions—are

c r i t ica l in Washington because they mean power , pe r sonne l ,

and resources and thus rank and impor tance .

Budget matters are equal ly cr i t ica l to the Bel tway insider . Money is

power in Washington , and th is i s t rue in most a reas of government , no t




just in intell igence. But in intell igence, turf and budget issues are more

diff icult to see because of the secrecy that surrounds so much of the

intell igence business. In fact, a great deal of discussion in the recent sur

vey panels was devoted just to the quest ion of whether or not to make

public the tota l amount of money spent on inte l l igence each year , as i f

no one in Washington knew wha t the number was . Thanks to leaks to

the press , a common pol icy too l in Washington , the budge ted amount

spent on inte l l igence has been genera l knowledge for years . The break

down of the

budget—how

much of the pie each agency

receives—was

also leaked, and so it is relatively easy to calculate the percentage break

down for fu ture budge ts .

The In te l l igence Communi ty a rgues , by the way, tha t the number i s

sti l l secret because it has never been officially confirmed. Can some

thing be secre t i f everyone knows i t? The problem of secrecy, keeping

secre ts , and who can determine what should be secre t is in i tse lf a sub

jec t wor th examinat ion. One enterpr is ing repor ter t r ied to f ind out not

long ago the date of America ' s oldest secre t and found one in the Pen

tago n (cal led the Five-s ided Pu zzle Palace by some) tha t da ted back

to World War I .

18

A ppa ren t ly no one ha d ever bo th e red to dec lass i fy

the document , which re la ted to the sh ipment of Amer ican t roops to

Europe .

T h e D C I

A great deal of controversy surrounds the role of the DCI, the direc tor

of centra l in te l l igence . Although this person is supposed to be the co

ordinator of a l l American inte l l igence ac t ivi ty and the inte l l igence ad

visor to the president, the DCI really has control only over the CIA, a

signif icant but small par t of the overa l l in te l l igence bureaucracy. When

the posi t ion of DCI was crea ted in 1946, there was no CIA; but when

the Agency was establ ished in 1947, the DCI became i ts leader .

Most of America ' s in te l l igence resources belong to the Depar tment of

Defense , and most of the money spent on inte l l igence is control led by

the Pentagon. Smaller in te l l igence uni ts exis t in other depar tments , in

c lu din g the Sta te D ep ar tm en t , Trea sury, and E nergy and Just ice , bu t they

are sm all po ta to es co m pa red to DOD . The FBI, or a t least i ts in te ll i

gence com pon ents , a re pa r t o f the In te ll igence Co m m un i ty , the conglom

era te inte l l igence establ ishment , a l though J . Edgar Hoover fought to keep

the FBI independent of any outs ide inter ference .

As one might expect in Washington, the role of the DCI, the extent of

the

DCI's

control , the resources , and the budget issues a l l rece ived se

r ious a t tent ion in the var ious inte l l igence s tudies . These issues are worth




out becoming targets and to protec t the ir contac ts and ac t ivi t ies . Some

mainta in this cover even in the United Sta tes , and this means tha t the ir

t ies to the CIA have to be protec ted. Obviously, they cannot have insur

ance or tax forms or bank accounts tha t ident ify them as CIA employees.

This forces the creation of yet another layer of bureaucracy.

Over the years , as America ' s in te l l igence agencies have grown, they

ha ve becom e inc reas ing ly bureaucra t ic . Several of them occupy bui ld ings

spread a round Washington and i t s suburbs , and they a lways seem to

outs tr ip the ir resources . Dur ing the Reagan adminis tra t ion, for example ,

the CIA was able to double the s ize of i ts headquar ters , only to f ind tha t

i t could not shoehorn in a l l i ts employees when the bui lding was f in

ished. The formerly Top Secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

created a rea l s t ink when i t was revealed tha t i ts new headquar ters had

been built in secret and that i t was four t imes as large as the agency that

was to go in it.

American inte l l igence agencies have t radi t ional ly hired the ir new em

ployees by seeking the best and the br ightest f rom the nat ion ' s top uni

vers i t ies and col leges. They no longer recrui t in the t radi t ional sense ,

ho we ver , bu t m ere ly inv i te g rad ua tes to apply . In the goo d o ld da ys

spot te r s on campus were ab le to seek ou t good s tudents and convince

them to apply . This means tha t some gradua tes who might have been

effective intell igence officers have never been tapped. Further, the system

tends to t ry to br ing new people in a t the lowest level and a l low them

to advance through the ranks. I t is far less successful a t br inging in peo

p le a t middle grades , even though they might have acqui red sk i l l s the

system could use .

One s tudy took par t icular a im a t the t ra ining American inte l l igence

professionals rece ive in prepara t ion for the ir work. Each agency tends to

run i t s own t ra in ing programs, in i t s own s ty le , emphas iz ing i t s own

values . The resul t is an inte l l igence system in which values and cul ture

dif fer remarkably. Within disc ipl ines , t ra ining var ies as well . Thus, CIA

off icers enter ing the Clandest ine Service , as the Opera t ions Direc tora te

is known, receive much dif ferent prepara t ion than those who go into

analysis or adminis tra t ion. The resul t has been the crea t ion of a f ra ternal

a tmosphere among those who t ra in toge the r , and th is has c rea ted prob

lems over the long run, s ince those who do not be long to the f ra terni ty

are rarely allowed access to i ts activit ies.

Over the las t few years i t has become qui te c lear tha t an ar rogance has

developed within the Clandest ine Service . Act ivi t ies tha t should have

been repor ted to managers or pol icy off ic ia ls were withheld because they

w ere dee m ed to hav e no need to kn ow . In te res t ing ly , the m i l ita ry takes

an ent i re ly dif ferent approach to t ra ining i ts in te l l igence people with

w ha t ap pe ar to be far be t ter resul ts , bu t the CIA has s teadfast ly refused

to adopt such techniques .




5.

IC 21: The Intelligence Com munity in the 21st C entury, Staff S tudy, Permanent

Select Commit tee on Intel l igence, House of Representat ives , 104th Congress

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1996) .

6. See

In from the

Cold:

The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force o

Intelligence (New Y ork: Tw ent ieth C en tury Fu nd , 1996); Cou nci l on Foreign Re

lat ions ,

Making

Intelligence

Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence

(1996); an d G ary

Schmit t and Abe Shulsky, The Future of U.S. Intelligence: Report Prepared for the

Working Group on Intelligence Reform (W ashington, DC: Co nsor t ium for the S tudy

of Intelligence, 1996.

7. Amos Jordan, Wi l l i am Taylor , and Michael Mazar , American National Se

curity

(Balt imore: Johns Hopkins Universi ty Press, 1989), p. 147.

8. Perry U nd ere s t im ated Terror is t Thre at in Sau di

A r a b i a / '

Star Tribune, 10

July 1996, p. 3A.

9. Jock Haswel l , Spies and Spymasters (London: Tham es & H ud son , 1977).

10 . Bar ba r a Tuchman ,

The Zimmermann Telegram

(New York: Ballentine Books,

1966).

11.

Edwin Fishel , The Secret War for the Un ion (New York: Houghton Miff l in,

1996).

12 .

Photo s of Au schw i tz Exterminat ion Uni t

Produced/'

New York Times, 24

Feb ruary 1979; the autho r had the op po r tun i ty to see an d hear Mr. Brug ioni ' s

presentat ion on the subject .

13.

Stephen F . Knot t ,

Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American

Presidency (New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996).

14.

George F .

K e n n a n ,

Spy and

C o u n t e r s p y / ' New York Times,

18 May 1997,

p .

E17.

15.

Nathan Mi l l er ,

Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence

(New York: Paragon House, 1989) , p. 279.

16 .

John Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service (Toronto:

Doubleday Canada , 1980) .

17 .

Theodore Shackley , The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsur-

gency

(Pleasantvil le, NY: Reader 's Digest , 1981).

18. Jonathan Landay , P rying Ope n T o p Secret ' U.S. Safe , Christian Science

Monitor, 27 November 1998, p. 3.



CHAPTER 2

Stealing the Secrets

Espionage means the ga the r ing of in format ion th rough c landes t ine sur

vei l lance or observat ion, or through the use of spies to s tea l information.

In ancient days c landest ine observat ion meant c l imbing a hi l l or a t ree

to view the enemy without be ing seen. I f one needed to get c loser , a spy

might be sent under the cover of a disguise or through subterfuge , but

th is p roved to be much more dangerous than surve i l lance . I f the spy

were discovered, the enemy might be a ler ted to take ac t ion or hide the

very in format ion the spy was sen t to ob ta in . Modern technology has

changed the way people spy on each o the r , bu t the bas ic no t ions remain

the same as Sun Tzu descr ibed them almost 2 ,500 years ago.

1

We no longer have to f ind a mounta in for secre t reconnaissance; we

can use a sa te l l i te , or we can f ly a long-range unmanned photo a ircraf t

over the targets we seek. We can pick up e lec tronic communicat ions or

s ignals in the sam e wa y th a t each s ide intercep ted the s ignals of the o ther

dur ing America ' s Civi l War . Of course , in the nineteenth century the

s igna ls were made by so ld ie r s us ing hand-he ld f lags . Today sp ies might

use f iber-opt ic cables to send the ir s ignals , using high- tech encrypt ion

devices . Interest ingly, as more and more countr ies develop the abi l i ty to

intercept s ignals and communicat ion, they are a lso developing the abi l i ty

to protec t the ir t ransmissions f rom their adversar ies . Inte l l igence services

are cont inual ly t rying to s tay one s tep ahead.

Governments do no t usua l ly pro tes t e lec t ron ic and communica t ions

intercepts . Recent ly the Japanese government did ra ise the issue when i t

was a l leged tha t the Uni ted S ta tes was in te rcep t ing Japanese communi

ca t ions to ga in an advantage in t rade negotia t ions. As one might expect ,

the Uni ted S ta tes den ied the charge , even though the U.S . government

prob ably h as the capabi li ty to do jus t w ha t the Japanese sug ges ted . M ost




governments seem to understand tha t i f they fa i l to protec t the ir com

munica t ions , they may ve ry we l l be in te rcep ted . They do not p ro tes t

overhead photography e i the r , a l though they might t ry to h ide the i r ac

tivit ies. The Soviets tr ied, for a while, to hide their latest developments

in sub m arin es f rom U.S. ph ot o sa te ll i tes bu t la ter gav e u p w he n they

real ized tha t there was no way to take the subs out for sea t r ia ls without

leaving the covered sheds they had bui l t for the vesse ls .

N a t i o n a l T e c h n i c a l M e a n s

During the last stages of the Cold War, the use of satell i tes for pho

tography and e lec t ron ic in te rcep ts became enshr ined in a rms cont ro l

treaties. The satell i tes were referred to as National Technical Means

(NTM), and i t seems l ike ly tha t none of the t rea t ies would have been

ra t i f ied without an agreement on NTM, s ince both s ides could use the

satell i tes to monitor and verify that the other was following the rules.

T h u s ,

the gather ing of inte l l igence by technica l sensors has become gen

erally accepted, though it is st i l l considered a form of spying. I t is , how

ever, far less intrusive—and far less dangerous—than the use of human

agents to ga ther information.

I t is tempting to think tha t technica l sensors , whether for imagery or

for intercepts , can replace the secre t agent . When he was DCI, Admira l

Stansf ie ld Turner got the notion—probably based in par t on advice f rom

people who knew even le ss about in te l l igence than the admiral—that

technica l sensors could do what the spies could do, only bet ter and more

safe ly . The DCI was very much taken with this not ion and decided tha t

a combinat ion of sharply focused inte l l igence requirements and capable

sa te l l i tes would be the wave of the inte l l igence future . He establ ished a

complex , expens ive , and ra the r la rge bureaucracy to handle the requi re

ments . He put h is money in the wrong p lace .

We have spent bi l l ions on sa te l l i tes but we haven ' t ye t spent the nec

essary funds to deal with the enormous amounts of da ta the sa te l l i tes

gather . Thus, we can col lec t far more information than we can process .

This became obvious dur ing the Cold War when congress iona l p robers

learned tha t a Sovie t br igade had been resident in Cuba for many years

and wondered why the Inte l l igence Community had fa i led to f ind i t . As

i t turned out , a search of da ta tha t had never been processed revealed

tha t we could hav e kn ow n abo ut the br iga de f rom i ts ea r lie st a s s ignm ent

to the island, but because policy officials expressed li t t le interest , the

imagery was no t ana lyzed and no repor ts were wr i t ten .

In anothe r example of p roblems wi th process ing , ana lys ts d iscovered

that they could not review imagery fast enough to re target the photo

satell i tes from one p as s ove r Ea rth to the next. Typ ically, i t tak es ab ou t




know-how, bu t i t s wingspan was so huge tha t on ly pa r t o f the p lane

could f i t inside the museum.

S p a c e R e c o n n a i s s a n c e

Early efforts at space reconnaissance were kept secret as well . In fact,

the same system that was used to protec t SIGINT was repl ica ted a t f i rs t

to pro tec t space ph oto grap hy . In add i t ion , a cover s to ry w as c rea ted

to expla in the launches as weather sa te l l i tes or mil i ta ry tes t ing.

4

N o n e

theless , the press were quick to fer re t out what was going on, and l i t

era ture on space imagery made c lear tha t the United Sta tes was in the

lead in this area of intell igence collection. Although the Soviets were f irst

in to space wi th Sputn ik , the i r b reak through was soon over taken by

American technica l sophis t ica t ion.

Both sides relied, for a while, on satell i tes that could take pictures in

space on f i lm and re turn the exposed mater ia l back to Ear th via capsules

that separa ted f rom the parent vehic le . This provided excel lent images,

but the pic tures were two or three weeks old by the t ime the f i lm cap

sules w ere recovered. In the 1970s the Un ited States dev elo ped a near-

rea l- t im e ph oto capabi l i ty f rom spac e tha t use d digi ta l im age ry to

re turn pic tures a lmost instant ly and with remarkable c lar i ty . At f i rs t the

KH-11,

as the near-real- t ime satell i te was called, was protected by str ict

security controls, but when a low-level CIA officer decided to steal the

manua l tha t expla ined the KH-11's operation and sell i t to the Soviets,

the s t r ic t controls proved worthless .

Later , imagery f rom the sa te l l i te was re leased to the press to suppor t

va r ious Whi te House pos i t ions , and so the en t i re imagery methodology

has become qui te we l l known. In th is case the government recognized

that secrecy was no longer necessary. The CIA has public ized i ts ear ly

achievements in space reconnaissance , and l i te ra ture on space recon

naissance has become readi ly avai lable . The government refuses only to

re lease the deta i ls of the po tent ia l reso lut io n of the im agery , tha t is ,

how small an object can be identif ied in the picture. Suffice i t to say, in

the author ' s exper ience the resolut ion can be safe ly descr ibed as unbe-

l ieveably good.

Benef i t s a nd Co st s o f Ima g ery

Mainta in ing bo th the space-based imagery capabi l i ty and the new

techniques in ae r ia l r econna issance us ing manned or unmanned a i rc ra f t

has many poten t ia l benef i t s . In addi t ion to the s tandard usage in spying

on one 's enemies or in monitor ing t rea t ies , overhead imagery can be



Stealing the Secrets 29

used to locate narcot ics crops, assess na tura l disasters , and detec t pol

lut ion. I t is , never theless , an expensive business . Launching and main

taining the satell i tes is just one aspect of aerial operations. Sophisticated

ground s ta t ions a re needed to re t r ieve the imagery , and photo ana lys ts

requi re advanced machinery to ana lyze the resu l tan t in te l l igence . Re

mote ly pi loted vehic les , in contrast , a re less expensive , but they require

target ing and guidance , and the analyt ic cost is much the same as in

space imagery . Main ta in ing th is capabi l i ty repor ted ly ea ts up about a s

much as SIGINT in the inte l l igence budget , and there is l i t t le pressure

to reduce this because the benef i ts a re grea t and the payoff is obvious.

The same cannot be sa id for the bureaucracy tha t control led the im

agery systems. Unlike NSA, which centra l ized the control of SIGINT

soon af ter i t was establ ished, control of imagery was f ragmented and the

opera t ions decent ra l ized . Some cont ro l were main ta ined by the DCI , bu t

the Depar tment of Defense owned most of the asse ts . A super-secre t

agency, the National Reconnaissance Off ice (NRO) was crea ted under

the Dep ar tm ent of Defense to m ana ge the overhead sys tem s, bu t ana lys is

w as han dle d in a jo in t CIA-mi l i ta ry organiza t ion , and re qui re m ents w ere

put together in ye t another uni t .

I t was quite clear , r ight from the start , that the different intell igence

agencies could not each launch the ir own imagery sa te l l i tes and tha t they

would have to sha re . This forced the In te l l igence Communi ty to work

more c lose ly toge the r and eventua l ly to e s tab l i sh management sys tems

to regula te the sha r ing . Much of the management was kept wi th in the

National Reconnaissance Off ice , whose very exis tence was considered to

be secre t , a l though many knew of i t . This secrecy broke down, in par t ,

because the press p icked up much of the in format ion about the NRO,

and i t fe l l apar t complete ly when enterpr is ing s leuths on Capitol Hil l

d iscovered tha t the NRO was bu i ld ing new headquar te r s ou t nea r Dul les

Airpor t in Virginia tha t exceeded i ts needs, according to press s tor ies ,

by some 300 pe rcent . Coupled wi th repor ts tha t the NRO management

had v io la ted budge t ru les by squi r re l ing away ex t ra money f rom pre

vious a l locat ions, the resul t ing scandal forced the adminis tra t ion ' s hand.

A N e w A g e n c y

The National Reconnaissance Off ice has not been broken up. Rather ,

a ne w ove r a r c h ing ima ge r y ope r a t ions a nd ma na ge me n t a ge nc y ha s

been crea ted to take over much of the work of imagery inte l l igence . This

un i t , t he Na t iona l I ma g e r y a nd M a pp ing A ge nc y (NI MA) , ha s sub sum e d

the Cent ra l Imagery Off ice tha t managed requi rements , the Na t iona l

Photograpic Inte l l igence Center (NPIC) , the Defense Mapping Agency,

an d som e smal le r un i t s r e la ted to imag ery . The ne w orga niza t ion be longs




to the Depar tment of Defense and, l ike NPIC, is repor tedly s taf fed by

a combination of military officers, DOD civilians, and CIA officers. Of

course , th is means the crea t ion of ye t another suppor t bureacracy, but i t

shouldn ' t be too big, s ince most of the people wil l be long to the ir parent

organiza t ions and NIMA wil l not need a la rge cadre of i ts own per

sonnel .

Another idea for saving money is to pr iva t ize the launching of imagery

satell i tes and the collection of images. I t is already possible to purchase

imagery f rom French, Russian, and some American sa te l l i tes , a l though

the resolut ion of the images is probably too large for inte l l igence pur

pose s .

Such imagery might be useful , however , for analyzing natura l

disasters , narcot ics product ion, or problems of pol lut ion. The Brown

Commiss ion sugges ted tha t we t ry to a r range coopera t ion wi th our a l l ie s

to share the cost b u rd en of bu i ld ing a nd la un chin g sa te ll i tes , bu t th ere

is a lways a re luctance in inte l l igence to become too dependent on others ,

even i f they are supposed to be our f r iends. In any event , the business

of imagery, once classif ied as t ightly as intercept intell igence, has become

so open that little secrecy is left.

E s p i o n a g e

Secrecy, however , remains essent ia l in deal ing with secre t agents , the

tradi t ional form of espionage. Espionage has a lso become an accepted

par t of internat ional behavior , even though most countr ies have s tr ic t

laws against such ac t ivi ty . I f a spy is caught , i t usual ly means death for

the spy and disgrace , i f not something worse , for the spy 's masters .

Throughout the Cold War the United Sta tes and i ts a l l ies , and the

Sovie ts and the ir a l l ies , p laced resident diplomats and a t taches on each

othe r ' s te r r i to ry , unders tanding tha t they would be ga the r ing in forma

t ion. Their t ravel might be restr ic ted or other l imita t ions placed on them,

but they were never conf ined to the ir embassies . They were supposed to

ga the r in format ion openly and not involve themse lves in c landes t ine in

tell igence collection. If they were to do so and were caught in the act,

they would be declared in viola t ion of the ir diplomatic pr ivi lege and

sent home as persona non grata, P N G - e d .

Both sides also sent intelligence officers who were career officers of

the ir respect ive c landest ine services . For the United Sta tes , th is meant

members of the operations directorate of the CIA; for the KGB, officers

from the First Chief Directorate. Other countries, East and West, sent

s imi la r people , a l l o f whom were supposed to manage the bus iness of

c landest ine inte l l igence col lec t ion, opera t ing f rom sta t ions in the host

country. Their job was not to spy but , ra ther , to recrui t o thers to do the

spy ing for them . The sp ies w ere the age nts of the spy m aste r s— case




officers in A m eric an term ino log y. Th e case officers w er e to recru it the

spies , g ive them their ass ignments , teach them how to avoid detec t ion,

and t ransla te the information they gathered into usable inte l l igence re

por ts .

The li terature on the actual activity of case officers is derived mostly

from outs ide observers . CIA c landest ine service career is ts have wri t ten

only rare ly for publ ica t ion, and the ir counterpar ts in other services have

been equal ly re luctant to go public , a l though such works are s tar t ing to

appear in pr in t .

5

A great deal of mater ia l about espionage and t radecraf t ,

the term used to descr ibe spy behavior , emerged f rom the capture of

Aldr ich Ames and the subsequent books about h is case .

6

We can learn

about espionage f rom a careful reading of open l i te ra ture , and we can

even f ind information in spy f iction, although most of i t is far from re

alistic . Retired officers have from time to t ime spoken about their expe

r iences a t meet ings of re t i red inte l l igence personnel , and the recent spate

of re form l i te ra ture has added to our knowledge .

M a n a g i n g E s p i o n a g e O p e r a t i o n s

In the world of c landest ine opera t ions, there is a remarkable s imilar i ty

in the ways in which such ac t iv i ty i s handled , whe the r we a re speaking

of the CIA, the old KGB, or the Israeli Mossad. The general nature of

espionage is thus well known, a l though specif ic cases remain secre t .

Above all else, intell igence services want to protect the identit ies of the

spies and the spymasters and the targets on which they spy. Spy cases

usual ly come to l ight only when an agent is caught or there is a leak of

information. As in so much of the inte l l igence business , success is care

ful ly hidden in hopes tha t i t can be repeated.

How do intell igence officers recruit and train agents to spy for them?

Aind

how are the case off icers and the agents equipped to carry out such

poten t ia l ly dangerous and sens i t ive miss ions? Le t ' s beg in wi th the case

off icers themselves . In the United Sta tes , members of the CIA's Direc

tora te of Opera t ions (DO)—sometimes referred to as the Cla nd est in e Ser

vice—join

the agency af ter a r igorous hir ing process . They are chosen

because they have l ived and worked abroad , they a l ready speak a t leas t

one fore ign language f luent ly and have demonstra ted the capaci ty to

learn others , and they display the kind of personal i ty tha t wil l enable

them to rec ru i t and handle c landes t ine agents .

7

Psychologica l tes t ing and

tough in te rv iews weed out those who do not have the pe rsona l i ty for

such unusual work. By the t ime they reach the end of the se lec t ion pro

cess , the appl ican ts have passed th rough a medica l te s t , a po lygraph

exam, and a thorough background check .

Typically the new Clandestine Service officers are between the ages of




twenty- f ive and th i r ty , have a gradua te degree , and show some mi l i ta ry

or business exper ience; they do not come r ight out of col lege or graduate

school . In spi te of the Agency 's cont inuing effor t to a t t rac t more minor

it ies and women into the ranks of the Clandestine Service, case officers

are sti l l mostly white males. At one time case officer trainees tended to

come f rom eastern col lege backgrounds, especia l ly f rom the Ivy League,

but tha t changed some years ago .

W o m e n i n C l a n d e s t i n e O p e r a t i o n s

Recently a group of women within the Clandest ine Service sued the

CIA in a c lass ac t ion c la iming tha t there had been systematic discr imi

nat ion against females in the Direc tora te of Opera t ions and tha t women

had ne i the r rece ived the same good ass ignments nor promot ions as the i r

male counte rpa r t s .

8

In the end, the agency had to admit tha t the c la ims

were t rue and the re had indeed been d isc r imina t ion . P romises were

made tha t such in jus t ices would no t cont inue and tha t women would

receive equal t rea tment with the men in the Direc tora te of Opera t ions.

This ought to be the case, since there are very few jobs that men can

per form tha t w om en cannot . There m ay be som e ass ignm ents in the Mid

dle East, for example, that would be diff icult for women to take on be

cause of the restr ictions of Muslim religious laws, but in other areas

women might under some c i rcumstances be even more e f fec t ive than

the i r ma le counte rpa r t s . The Agency contends tha t the inequa l i t ie s a s

socia ted with women in the Direc tora te of Opera t ions have been cor

rec ted, but we may not know for sure unt i l there is another lawsuit .

Once admit ted to the Agency, the potent ia l case off icers undergo a t

least on e year of train ing , m uc h of i t a t the Fa rm , the CIA 's train ing

facility near

Wi l l i amsburg ,

Virginia. The site is supposed to be secret,

but the locat ion and mission of the place is widely known. The t ra inees

learn the rudiments of inte l l igence and the specif ics of managing c lan

des t ine opera t ions abroad .

9

They undergo some phys ica l t r a in ing as we l l

as weapons handl ing and o the r sk i l l s t r a in ing tha t they may have to

teach to future agents.

If they are successful and do well in training, the trainees may be

assigned to language school or they may be sent abroad to acquire f ie ld

knowledge while they perfec t the ir language ski l ls . I f they remain in the

Clandes t ine Serv ice , where agent rec ru i t ing and handl ing i s done , the

potential case officers will spend most of their t ime overseas. In most

cases i t takes severa l years of overseas work to become complete ly pro

ficient as a case officer . An assignment to headquarters is not seen as

produc t ive because i t involves suppor t fo r overseas opera t ions , paper

work , and bureaucracy and because promot ions a re most ly won abroad .




A n I s o l a t e d C a r e e r

Because of the arcane skills needed to be a case officer and because of

the extensive training for the job, Clandestine Service officers tend to

stay within the Service throughout most of the ir careers . They win no

points for serving outs ide the Direc tora te of Opera t ions in what are

ca lled ro ta t iona l a ss ig nm ents , a l tho ugh such ass ign m ents m ay be

broadening and may give off icers exposure to other par ts of the Agency.

M em bers of the Clandes t ine Serv ice w or ry tha t the ir cover ma y be b low n

if they work with open employees, thus jeopardiz ing the ir e f fec t iveness

overseas . They prefer to socia l ize with others under cover so tha t they

don ' t have to wor ry about say ing the wrong th ing to the wrong pe rson .

The resul t of th is has been the growth of a Clandest ine Service tha t is

isola ted f rom the rest of the CIA and the Inte l l igence Community .

Recent problems tha t have surfaced within the Direc tora te of Opera

t ions indica te tha t i ts members have been re luctant to repor t the ir ac t iv

i t ie s to the i r ambassadors abroad or to sen ior Agency managers ou ts ide

the Direc tora te of Opera t ions a t home.

1 0

This a r rogance has deve loped

because of the isola ted nature of the Direc tora te of Opera t ions, the in

sularity of i ts case officers, and the almost fanatic zeal to protect clan

dest ine opera t ions f rom prying eyes. This a t t i tude has led to er rors in

judgment on the pa r t o f case

officers—mistakes

the DO senior managers

shou ld ha ve p r e ve n te d . The se ma na ge r s , howe ve r , c a me up th r ough the

sam e system as thos e they sup ervise , be lo ng to the f ra terni ty , so to spe ak,

and seem protec t ive of the ir brothers (and occasional ly the ir s is ters) .

Pe rh aps so m e a rrogance i s just if ied a m on g those w h o han dle c landes

t ine opera t ions. I t takes a specia l ta lent and a par t icular personal i ty to

do this work. Not everyone is able to f ind potent ia l sources of infor

mation and convince the sources to become secre t agents . This job re

quires fac i l i ty in fore ign language, the abi l i ty to understand personal i ty

well enough to detec t vulnerabi l i t ies and motivat ion, and the conf idence

to m ake the rec ru i t ing p i tch . I t a l so m ean s hav ing to dea l w i th peop le

who a re somet imes unpleasan t , coa rse , o r vena l ; who have ca r r ied ou t

cr iminal ac ts or viola ted human r ights ; or who might be ter ror is ts .

D e a l i n g w i t h E v i l P e o p l e

The Ame r ic a n pe op le ma y be some wha t sque a mish a bou t the ne e d to

work with evi l people , but Clandest ine Service off icers have to deal with

them anyway. This caused someth ing of a fuss when a New Je rsey con

gressman a l leged tha t the CIA had two Gua temalan co lone ls on the p a y

rol l as sources , and tha t these colonels had been involved in the mur-



34 Fixing

the

Spy Machine

der of two American c i t izens. The subsequent invest iga t ion revealed tha t

Agency managers had fa i led to in form the ambassador about the

sources , and this led to a revis ion of the rules about whom to recrui t as

c landest ine agents .

I f we are going to be successful in working against enemies and ad

versaries, against terrorists and criminals, intell igence officers are going

to have to do bus iness wi th people they don ' t l ike and whom they

wouldn ' t inv i te home to d inner . They need to ge t a t people who have

or can obta in the information they want , even i f the contac ts are un

savory. Inte l l igence managers should not encourage i l legal ac t ivi ty or

condone ac t ivi ty they f ind reprehensible , but i f they are going to be suc

cessful in gathering intell igence, they' l l just have to accept the negative

aspects of c landest ine opera t ions. Clandest ine Service managers wil l

have to ba lance the demands for information against the dangers of deal

ing with evi l people .

Why do people , evi l or not , become spies? Sometimes i t ' s for the

money , a l though most agents a re no t pa id pr ince ly sums. An agent who

rece ives too much money and spends i t on h igh-pr iced goods immedi

a te ly draws a t tent ion to

himself.

This was one of the grea t mistakes the

Sovie ts made in handl ing the Ames case : Ames spent too much money

on cars and high l iving, leading to his eventual discovery. Agents may

work for ideologica l reasons against a regime or people they don ' t l ike ,

or they may help establ ish a government or suppor t a fac t ion they prefer .

And sometimes they become agents for the thr i l l or exci tement of the

wor k .

In f ic t ional accounts of spying, agents are sometimes coerced or black

mailed into c landest ine work af ter they have been caught in a sex scandal

or in black market t ransact ions. This was a technique ac tual ly used by

the Sovie ts and the ir a l l ies . Dur ing the Cold War i t was not unusual for

foreigners in Moscow to be offered an exchange of rubles for dollars at

a very a t t rac t ive ra te , only to be ambushed by pol ice or the KGB once

the m on ey cha nged ha nd s . The KGB w ou ld then offer to over look the

c r im e if the v ic tim wo uld b ecom e a source . Al th oug h such b lackmai l

may be an easy way to t rap someone into becoming a spy, the infor

mation the spy then col lec ts may be suspect . The agent may be gener

a t ing information just to keep his handler off his back. In some cases the

b lackmai l v ic t ims went to the po l ice when they re turned f rom Moscow,

r e por t e d wha t ha d ha ppe ne d , a nd we r e the n tu r ne d a ga ins t t he KGB by

the FBI.

C o n t r o l l i n g A g e n t s

Whatever the method, once the agent has been recrui ted, the case of

f icer has to establish a contract with the agent so that the rules of the




relationship are clear . The case officer wants to control the agent, set up

an agreement on pay , and in o the r ways ensure tha t the agent does wha t

the case officer wants. This system ensures that the case officer is in

charge .

After the agent is under control, the case officer has to provide training

and establ ish rules of

tradecraft—the

common te rm for c landes t ine prac

tices—to mask the re la t ionship between case off icer and agent and pro

tec t the agent against the possibi l i ty of discovery by counter inte l l igence

or security services. The case officer has to give the agent some means

of communicat ion, e i ther a radio tha t cannot be easi ly intercepted or

pe rha ps the t r ad i t iona l dea d dr op , a h id ing p lace w he re m essages can

be exchanged. During the Cold War the Sovie ts were fond of using old

soda cans lef t on the s ide of the road as places to hide messages, and in

one case an American case off icer was caught put t ing a message into a

hol low rock bui l t fo r the pu rpo se .

After the communicat ions and secur i ty systems are in place , the case

off icer and agent can get down to the ac tual business of espionage. The

case off icer might t ra in the agent to use t iny cameras to photograph

documents or o the r ta rge ts , p rovide equipment to h ide papers , o r g ive

the agent min ia ture recorders to cap ture conversa t ions . In many cases

the agent is sent to f ind out par t icular information and is direc ted to

repor t back to the case off icer a t an agreed t ime. Meetings between case

officer an d age nt usu al ly take place in a safe ho us e , of ten an ap ar tm en t

tha t i s known to be secure , where the two can en te r and leave wi thout

being not iced and where they can speak without fear of be ing inter

cepted.

A g e n t R e p o r t i n g

I f the agent is performing proper ly , he or she obta ins the inte l l igence

sought by the case officer and reports back. The case officer then has to

turn the conversa t ion or the documents into a useful repor t . The repor t

has to capture faithfully what the agent has said, not what the case officer

wishes he or she had sa id , but usual ly a provis ion is made for the case

off icer or others to provide comments on the agent repor t . This repor t is

sent to users to fulf i l l an establ ished requirement , but th is does not qui te

com ple te the repor t ing process . Each agent has to be eva lua ted over t im e

to see if he or she is actually providing useful and reliable intell igence.

In some cases agents turn out to te l l more than they know or to become

pa pe r fac tories , age nts w h o fabr ica te inform ation. In the w ors t s i tua

t ion, the case officer m ay discover tha t the agen t is a do ub le , som eon e

control led by a host i le inte l l igence service and who is ac tual ly working

for the other side, feeding false information to the case officer . I t may be




necessary to te rminate the agent . In spy f ic t ion, th is has an ominous r ing

and means death to the agent . In rea l i ty , however , the agent has to be

terminated with l i t t le fuss , cer ta inly no violence , and in such a way tha t

the agent does not te l l a l l about working for the Americans. This may

mean a f inal payoff of some kind or putting the agent on ice, tell ing the

agent to wait for a s ignal to resume opera t ions. Of course , the s ignal may

never come.

T h e V a l u e o f H U M I N T

After the ar rest of Aldr ich Ames in 1994 and his subsequent publ ic

comments tha t e sp ionage was a was te of t ime and tha t Amer icans

weren ' t ve ry good a t i t anyway, the re was some d iscuss ion in the press

and on Capi to l Hi l l about the va lue and u t i l i ty of HUMINT. How much

does human in te l l igence co l lec t ion add to our knowledge? Cons ide r ing

the dangers inheren t in e sp ionage opera t ions , should we cont inue to do

i t? Were Roger Hi lsman and George Kennan cor rec t when they c la imed

that the CIA should get out of the espionage business?

Al though in te l l igence de r ived f rom c landes t ine sources may make up

only 10 or 20 percent of the inputs to intell igence analysis, agent reports

can provide insights tha t a re t ruly valuable . Tradi t ional ly suppor ters of

HUMINT a rgue tha t agent r epor ts can he lp us lea rn about the a t t i tudes

and intent ions of our adversar ies . Agents can br ing us mater ia l tha t can

not be obta ined by technica l sensors or developed by diplomats . I t seems

foolish to give up the possibili ty of learning inside information from a

well-placed source . I f we agree tha t we should cont inue to use c landes

t ine sources as a way of learning about our adversar ies , what changes

should be made to improve the sys tem?

B e t te r R e c r u i t i n g M e t h o d s

I t seems c lear tha t the t radi t ional method of recrui t ing Clandest ine

Service off icers by put t ing ads in newspapers or sending recrui ters to

college job fairs is not good enough. The Agency rarely hires off icers for

the Clandest ine Service r ight out of col lege anyway, and i t cannot re ly

on the possibi l i ty tha t the more seasoned people i t rea l ly wants wil l see

the newspaper ads . Too many people wi th the necessa ry ta len t may be

missed by what is essent ia l ly a passive system. We know a grea t deal

about recrui t ing agents , so why are we re luctant to be a bi t more ag

gressive about f inding the kinds of ta lented people the system needs?

In the ear ly days contac ts a t col leges and universi t ies , some of whom

h ad serv ed in the OSS, w er e enlisted to find the r igh t ca nd ida tes for the



38 Fixing the Sp y M ach ine

seas , especia l ly management and l ia ison funct ions. To f i t in to the oper

a t ions grou p , the t r ansfe rees w ou ld hav e to be g iven addi t iona l t r a in ing ,

but much of i t could be done on the job.

Al though the CIA has no t sa id much about wha t i t i s do ing in regard

to changes in the Clandes t ine Serv ice , agency managers have repor ted ly

begun to put analysts together with opera t ions off icers , e i ther in centers

or in geograp hica l ly or iente d offices . Th at is , analy sts and op era t io ns

people who work on Lat in America , for example , a re s i t t ing in the same

place in the agency instead of in totally isolated offices. The same is true

for ana lys ts and opera t ions people who work on te r ror i sm, counte rna r -

cot ics , and counter inte l l igence . This wil l cer ta inly break down the t ra

di t ional barr iers be tween analysts and opera t ions off icers .

Only time will tell if i t will break down the fraternal mentality of the

opera t ion s d i rec tora te . Pe rh aps agency m ana gers wi l l r ea lize tha t p eop le

who s i t together and work together may be able to do each other ' s job.

When tha t happens , the insu la r i ty of the c landes t ine opera tors i s bound

to diminish. Some cr i t ics of the Agency argue tha t plac ing analysts and

DO officers together will allow the operators to influence the analysis to

su pp or t op era t ion s. This cr i tic ism su gge sts tha t DO officers are intereste d

only in the cases they run and not in the information that is collected,

and tha t ana lys ts a re weak minded and incapable of de tec t ing a t tempts

to inf luence them. Neither charge is correc t . In the author ' s exper ience ,

both col lec tors and analysts are af ter the best information, a l though they

use different methods of getting it .

M i l i t a r y H U M I N T

What about the problem of mil i ta ry HUMINT? Should mil i ta ry off icers

be seconded to the CIA to gather information cr i t ica l to mil i ta ry opera

t ions? Or should the Depar tment of Defense run i ts own c landest ine

col lec t ion opera t ions a imed a t the targets i t th inks important? The issue

rem ains unreso lve d , and the re a re goo d a rgu m ents to be m ad e on both

sides. The author once served in a military collection unit in the U.S. Air

Force , and the compar ison be tween i t and the CIA ' s opera t ions were

str iking. Nonetheless , there are good reasons to have the mil i ta ry run i ts

own effor t to ga ther tac t ica l mil i ta ry data f rom human sources .

The CIA's focus is on strategic issues, and it does not collect tactical

military information. I t is a civilian organization focused on polit ical and

economic issues , and i ts in terest in mil i ta ry problems a ims a t s t ra tegic

issues of interest to high- level users . I t does not have the resources to go

after information of interest to the battlef ield commander, nor should it .

What the CIA can do, and is doing bet ter a l l the t ime, is to provide the

information it does collect and analyze to military users. But the specif ic




and de ta i led in format ion f igh t ing men and women need should be ga th

ered using mil i ta ry inte l l igence resources .

Some information wil l be gathered by mil i ta ry a t taches. They can re

c ru i t and handle agents ; bu t s ince they a re d ip lomats , they have to be

careful about ge t t ing caught . Usual ly , mil i ta ry a t taches are expected to

coordinate the ir ac t ivi t ies with the CIA chief of s ta t ion to make sure tha t

there are no conf l ic ts in the ir respect ive opera t ions. Another way to han

dle tactical targets is to assign a military collections officer to the CIA

sta t ion and a l low the off icer to opera te under s ta t ion guidance , but

against mil i ta ry sources .

The mil i ta ry has t radi t ional ly opera ted i ts own col lec t ion uni ts , but

the ir opera t ions are usual ly fa ir ly vis ible and the ir t radecraf t has been

poor , even with CIA tra ining. In one case of which the author is aware ,

a military case officer was seen driving an official army car—with a r m y

ma r k ings on the

sides—to

an agent mee t ing , ha rd ly good c landes t ine

practice. Stand-alone units are costly to operate and diff icult to hide.

Plac ing a mil i ta ry HUMINT off icer under cover inside a CIA sta t ion

might prove cost-effective but means that the CIA officers have to get

over having a non-CIA officer in their midst. An effective station chief,

however , should be ab le to make the a r rangement work .

A S e p a r a t e A g e n c y ?

One idea tha t surfaced in the course of the var ious reform studies on

c landes t ine opera t ion s , an idea tha t w as espo use d by Adm ira l Bobby Ray

I n m a n ,

the respected former DCI and direc tor of NSA, was to establ ish

a Clandest ine Service agency, outs ide the CIA, just for secre t opera

tions.

1 1

This hardly seems feasible. To maintain the cover of the officers

in such an agency would be nea r ly

impossible—unless

the who le ope r

a t ion was se t up as a propr ie tary, or business , opera t ion, and then the

officers would all have to be put under non-official cover. This would

mean tha t the i r s ta t ions abroad would have no access to d ip lomat ic or

official circles, and thus protecting the officers abroad would be a night

mare . A s tand-a lone agency would be cut off f rom analyt ic uni ts as well .

I f anything, there should be a c loser working re la t ionship between col

lec tors and analysts , not complete separa t ion.

There seems l i t t le quest ion tha t the United Sta tes is going to cont inue

to run c landest ine opera t ions abroad, and not only for ga ther ing posi t ive

fore ign inte l l igence but a lso against t radi t ional counter inte l l igence tar

gets and for cover t ac t ion opera t ions. These problems wil l be discussed

later; for no w , suffice i t to say that if the U nit ed States is go ing to em plo y

sec re t agents , then the agent handle r s ought to be g iven the bes t equip

ment , the best cover , and the most ef fec t ive communicat ions systems as




poss ib le . Also , the Amer ican people ought to unders tand tha t th is can

be a nasty business and tha t those who engage in i t wil l rece ive l i t t le

recognition for their work. Clandestine Service officers should not be

sad dled w i th gu i l t fo r w ha t they do ; r a the r , they should be g iven s up po r t

for what can be a dangerous way to serve the country.

T h e V a l u e o f O p e n S o u r c e s

We should not leave the discussion of s tea l ing secre ts without some

recognit ion of the importance of open sources . Nei ther glamorous nor

adventurous , open sources a re none the less the bas ic bu i ld ing b lock for

secret intell igence. Why, then, is open source collection being cut back

when i t is a re la t ive ly inexpensive par t of the budget?

A key element in the collection of open sources is the Foreign Broad

cast Information Service, the unit that translates foreign media. FBIS is

one of the oldest components of the inte l l igence system, dat ing back to

World War I I when i t was a uni t of the Sta te Depar tment . When the CIA

w as crea ted, FBIS bec am e par t of tha t organ iza t ion. I t m ain ta in ed s ta

t ions a round the wor ld to p ick up rad io broadcas ts and had a team of

local na t ive-speaking t ransla tors to provide the l inguis t ics . I t produced

transla t ions by cable and in pr inted books; unclassif ied, the books could

be obta in ed by su bscr ipt ion. FBIS pub lica t ions w ere avai lable in m an y

college l ibrar ies as an important source of information for those who

could not obta in or could not read the fore ign media in the or iginal

language .

Of course , in the modern world of e lec tronics , many fore ign newspa

pers and magazines are avai lable on the Internet ; but for those who can

not read the language, they are of l i t t le use . Analysts who cannot handle

the or iginals wil l be dependent on news services to provide the infor

mat ion , bu t some impor tan t de ta i l s o r nuances may be missed . Fore ign

broadcasts are an equal ly important source of information, but who can

spend hours t ry ing to f ind the t r ansmiss ions , r ecord them, and then

transla te them? Anyone who has l is tened to one of Fidel Castro ' s s ix-

hour ora t ions , even wi th f luen t Spanish , unders tands the problem. In

contrast , a t ransla t ion can easi ly be skimmed for the key points .

A t one time FBIS h ad an an alys is uni t of its ow n to carry ou t a pro ces s

known as content analysis . This was a way of divining the rea l meanings

in the ob tuse pronouncements made by some wor ld leaders , e spec ia l ly

those who ru led in the Communis t wor ld . With the end of the Cold War

that uni t was broken up in the mistaken bel ief tha t i ts services were no

longer needed . These days when leaders l ike Saddam Husse in or F ide l

Castro speak, analysts in other par ts of the Inte l l igence Community are

left to f igure out what they really mean.




E a r l y W a r n i n g

FBIS perf orm ed ano ther v a luab le service as pa r t of the inte l ligence

com m un i ty ' s ea r ly war n in g sys tem. It w as the FBIS rad io team s tha t

through careful monitor ing of fore ign broadcasts of ten picked up the f i rs t

s igns tha t someth ing was happening . Now the in te l l igence sys tem has

to re ly on the Cable N ew s Ne t w ork (CN N) . FBIS w as an d rem ains a

cost-effective intelligence collector, but it is not likely to remain so if the

cuts in pe rsonne l and resources cont inue .

During the Cold War i t was considered cost-ef fec t ive for U.S. embas

s ies and miss ions abroad to ga the r open source documents , usua l ly

ne wspa pe r s a nd ma ga z ine s , a nd se nd the m ba c k to Wa sh ing ton . Whe n

cos t was no problem, ana lys ts could orde r the impor tan t news maga

z ines or papers f rom the country they were fol lowing, assuming they

were able to read them in the or iginal language. I f they could not , FBIS

could usual ly be re l ied on to provide a t ransla t ion through i ts Joint

Publications Research Service.

Today an enormous number of open source da tabases a re ava i lab le

e lec tronica l ly , and the CIA is proud of programs i t has se t up to tap

these mater ia ls . We have no way of measur ing the ef fec t iveness of these

new inputs in the inte l l igence world, but i f univers i ty research is any

indica tor , then these databases are t ruly a gold mine of information.

These programs to take advantage of open sources ind ica te tha t Agency

managers rea l ize tha t i f American inte l l igence is rea l ly intent on main

ta ining our inte l l igence system as an a l l -source establ ishment , then we

must not lose the capabi l i ty to obta in and analyze open sources . These

sources make up the grea t major i ty of the inputs in many areas , and they

do not cost much to gather .

In fact, what is really special about our intell igence system is that i t

does gather a l l sources for the analysts to s tudy. Although the inte l l i

gence collection system gives us the way to steal the secrets, intell igence

ana lys is enables us to unders tand the puzz les and d iv ine the myste r ie s .

That is the subjec t to which we now turn.

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1963).

2.

The classic work on revealing the inside story on NSA is James Bamford,

The

Puzzle

Palace

(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1984); an update appeared in

series in No Such Agency: America's Fortress of Spies, Baltimore Sun, 3-1

December 1995.

3.

The CIA has published the official story of the U-2 in Gregory W. Bedlow




and Don ald E. W elzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974 (Washington,

D C :

Central Intel l igence Agency, 1998).

4.

Jeffrey Richelson, Keyhole: America's Secret Eyes in Space (New York: H arpe r

& Row, 1990).

5.

See, for example Tom Gill igan, CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency (Guil-

ford, CT: Foreign Intel l igence Press, 1991); Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All

Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997). A work of fiction by a senior DO officer is

also useful: Milt Bearden, The Black Tulip (New York: Random House, 1998) .

6. The most informat ive books on the Ames case are David Wise, Nightmover:

How Aldrich A mes Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million

(New York: Harper

Coll ins, 1995); and Pete Earley, Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Am es

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1997).

7.

These character is t ics are l i s ted in the CIA's recrui t ing ads and brochures .

8. R. Jeffrey Smith, Judg e Ap pro ve s Pay m en t in CIA Sexual Bias Ca se,

Washington Post, 10 June 1995, p. A3.

9. The author completed this training himself during his f irst year in the CIA.

10.

John W alcot t, M iss ion Imposs ible? A nth on y Lake Takes on a De m oral

ized, Recalcitrant CIA, Washington Post, 8 December 1996, p. C I ; CIA Should

Clean H ou se on Ho nd ura s : Agency Disc ip l ines 10 for Shie ld ing H um an Right s

A b u s e s , Baltimore Sun, 13 Oc tober 1995, p . 22A.

11 .

Associa ted P ress , Ne w Spy Agency Prop osed,

Boston Globe,

20 Janu ary

1996.




repor ts ranging f rom shor t- range dai ly repor ts to long- term stra tegic

judgments . To be sure tha t these judgments were ca re fu l ly cons ide red ,

Do nov an app oin te d a bo ard of wise m en to oversee the process , an d

perhaps because Donovan was a prac t ic ing Ca thol ic , he dubbed th is

gr ou p of w ise m en the College of Ca rdin als . This , too, carr ied over

into the CIA, and the wise men became the Board of National Est imates .

The Leg a cy o f P ea r l Ha rbo r

Par t of the dr ive to crea te an R&A unit s temmed f rom the World War

II experience. The intell igence failure at Pearl Harbor was believed by

most observers to have been a fa i lure of inte l l igence analysis ra ther than

a failure to gather the secrets. The inevitable investigation into the Pearl

Harbor disaster revealed tha t some of the inte l l igence tha t might have

given c lues to the Japanese a t tack was e i ther not repor ted to Washington

or no t shared am on g the inte l ligence uni ts of the U.S. A rm y an d N av y.

There was a clear need for a central clearing house for intell igence re

por t ing , and so Donovan recommended to Pres ident Rooseve l t in 1944

that a civilian-run central intell igence organization be created after the

war to serve as an all-source repository for intell igence data.

4

D o n o v a n

env is ion ed this ne w agency as a repl ica of the OSS, w ith para l le l oper

a t ions and analysis uni ts .

After a false start in 1945 when J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI leaked

D on ov an ' s r ecom m end a t ions to the press and s torie s c i rcu la ted tha t FDR

w as p lan nin g a pos t -w ar sec re t po l ice organiza t ion m ore l ike the Na z i

Gestapo than an inte l l igence agency, the CIA was crea ted by President

Tr um an in 1947 m uc h as Do nov an ha d sug ges ted . The new agency ha d

the para l le l analysis and opera t ions s t ruc ture of the OSS, and many old

hands f rom the OSS days f locked back to the new agency to resume

careers they bel ieved were more exci t ing and valuable than e i ther aca

demics or business .

President Truman had a lready come to value the idea of an a l l -source

inte l ligence agency eve n before the CIA 's crea t ion. In 1946 T ru m an ha d

seen the need for some kind of inte l l igence leadership and had tapped

Admiral Sidney Souers to serve as his director of central intell igence

(DCI) . Tru m an ca lled h im h is head sno op , bu t Souers w as app aren t ly

not offended.

5

Later the post was given to Lieutenant Genera l Hoyt Van-

denberg of the U.S. Army Air Corps, who was wait ing in the wings for

the establ ishm ent of the ne w in de pe nd en t U.S. Air Force , w hic h he w as

to head . Whi le se rv ing as DCI , Vandenberg dec ided to begin sending

Truman a dai ly inte l l igence repor t , and the president l iked i t .

The practice of sending a special daily intell igence report to the pres-



Puzzles and M ysteries

45

i de n t

has

continued ever since that f irst

one in 1946.

T o d a y

the

supe r -

sensi t ive repor t

is

called

the

President's Daily Brief (PDB)

and it

conta ins

informat ion tha t appears

in no

other inte l l igence publica t ion,

in

addi t ion

to

the

r e gu la r

run of

daily intell igence items. Because

of its

sensitivity,

th e

PDB is

usua l ly ca r r ied

to the

W h i te H o u s e

by a

special briefing officer

w h o

may sit

w i t h

the

p r e s ide n t wh i l e

he

goe s th r ough

the

repor t .

If the

p r e s i d e n t

has

que s t ions ,

the

briefing officer

can

a nswe r the m

or the an

swe r

can be put in the

ne x t da y ' s

brief.

C omme nts f r om

the

pres ident

a re eager ly sought

by the PDB

staff

to

ma ke su r e

the

r e po r t

is

me e t ing

the ne e ds

of the

Whi te House . Usua l ly

the PDB is

a lso carr ied

by

h a n d

to

the

secretaries

of

sta te

and

defense ,

the

c h a i r m a n

of the

Joint Chiefs

of

Staff, and the

nat ional secur i ty advisor . They

are

av id readers ,

if for

no o the r reason than tha t they want

to be

sure

to

k n o w w h a t

the

p r e s

ide n t

is

be ing to ld

by the CIA.

D a i l y I n t e l l i g e n c e P r o d u c t s

Other in te l l igence cus tomers , pe rhaps

as

m a n y

as

se ve r a l hundr e d ,

receive

a

dai ly publica t ion f rom

the CIA as

well , called

for

ma ny ye a r s

th e National Intelligence Daily. A l t h o u g h

it

d o e s

not

conta in

the

most sen

s i t ive i tems hand-ca r r ied

to the

W h i te H o u s e ,

it is

classified

Top

Secret.

This da i ly publ ica t ion

is

s u p p o s e d

to be a

jo in t do cum ent th a t co nta ins

not only ar t ic les wri t ten

at the CIA and

c oor d ina te d w i th

the

o the r

key

in te l l igence agencies

but

a lso p ieces produced

by the

other agencies

the mse lve s . Thus ,

the

publ ica t ion

is

nat ional- level in te l l igence analysis

a n d may inc lude d i sa g r e e me n t s or d issen ts about the j u d g m e n t s m a d e

b y

the

p r oduc ing a ge nc y . Th i s doc ume n t

has

t rad i t iona l ly been pr in ted

and d is t r ibu ted

as a

pa pe r p r oduc t ,

but

a dva nc e s

in

desktop publ i sh ing

and e lec t ron ic de l ive ry mean tha t mos t consumers c lea red for th is p rod

uct

can now

receive such mater ia l

on

their secure office computers.

The de l ive ry

of a

da i ly repor t about cur ren t events

is one of the

mos t

t rad i t iona l

of

intell igence activit ies

and is

repl ica ted

at

many levels f rom

the highest offices

of

g o v e r n m e n t

in

W a s h i n g t o n d o w n

to

field units

in

the va r ious agenc ies involved

in

foreign

and

security affairs. Some cyn

ica l in te l l igence consumers have told evaluators tha t

the

dai ly repor ts

a re

no

better—and

some t ime s

far

less—informative

tha n

the

dai ly press

or TV n e w s , yet persis tent qu est ion ing of ten reveals tha t such r ead ers

do ac tual ly

use

current inte l l igence .

The

va lue

of

current inte l l igence

is

d e m o n s t r a t e d

by the

fac t tha t though in te l l igence managers push ana

lysts

to

wr i te longer

and

more complex ana lyses ,

it is the

shor te r

and

more focused dai ly inte l l igence tha t pol icymakers ac tual ly take

the

t ime

to read.




T h e A n a l y t i c C h a l l e n g e

The challenge for the analyst in writing current intell igence is to in

form pol icymakers and o the r consumers , inc lud ing in te l l igence use rs ,

no t on ly about wha t i s happening and why but a l so about wha t i s l ike ly

to happen next . This shor t- term forecast requires a judgment f rom the

analyst and is the grea t dif ference between journal ism and inte l l igence .

Newswr i te r s do no t have to make such judgments , bu t in te l l igence an

a lysts have to take the plunge. There is no grea t t r ick to making such

shor t- term forecasts . They are usual ly based on his tor ic t rends, pa t terns

of behavior, the context in which the activity takes place, and the actors

involved .

The analyst must be s teeped in the his tory of the target a rea and must

be immersed in the information f low from i t . That ' s why inte l l igence

analysts are such information junkies; they are a lways looking for keys

and c lues in the inputs they rece ive . Many ana lys ts become nervous

when separa ted f rom the i r ma i lboxes by ho l idays and weekends , and

this explains why many analysts tend to go to their off ices to read their

incoming traff ic even on days off . Analysts are aided in their judgments

by discussing t rends and forecasts with col leagues. Coordinat ion, as this

process is ca l led, he lps prevent judgmenta l e r ror and surface disagree

ments and d i f fe rences . Some ana lys ts , though, may become a r rogant

over t ime and think tha t they a lone have correc t ly analyzed events ; the ir

att i tude can lead to intell igence failure.

The judgment about wha t might happen next i s the va lue in te l l igence

analysts add to the f low of information. After all , many policy people

see the same incoming information a t about the same t ime as the ana

lysts.

In theory, however , and usual ly in prac t ice , the inte l l igence ana

lys ts can make judgments wi thout concern for po l icy cons ide ra t ions and

without fear of pol i t ica l pressure .

From the perspect ive of the analyst , current inte l l igence is the favored

me thod o f c ommunic a t ing judgme n t s to de c i s ionma ke r s . Whe n e ve n t s

abroad are changing rapidly, da i ly repor ts mean the analyst can focus

on the shor t- term forecasts , which are usual ly easier to make and more

meaningful to users , than on a

longe-range

prediction that is of l i t t le use

to a pol icymaker coping with a near- term cr is is . The dai ly repor ts are

incrementa l and enable the analyst to give users inte l l igence judgments

as events unfold. Current inte l l igence crea tes a dia logue between inte l

l igence producer and pol icy consumer , the most ef fec t ive way of de l iv

ering intell igence. I t is no surprise, therefore, that current intell igence

takes up a grea t deal of an analyst ' s t ime and energy and tha t da i ly



Puzzles and M ysteries 47

repor ts are the most useful of inte l l igence products , according to feed

back f rom users .

W a r n i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e

Inte l l igence analysts have the responsibi l i ty of warning pol icymakers

about impending c r i ses or events , e spec ia l ly those tha t may requi re a

response by the United Sta tes . Based on the exper ience of Pear l Harbor

an d o the r such su rpr i ses , the goa l i s to pro vid e wa rn in g before the event ;

bu t c lea r ly surpr i se cannot be comple te ly avoided . None the less , the an

a lyst benef i ts f rom a var ie ty of systems designed to detec t changes in

world events tha t may s ignal the possibi l i ty of a potent ia l surpr ise . An

alysts look for indica tors tha t might serve as warning s ignals . By estab

l ishing specif ic ta rgets tha t can be monitored f requently and regular ly ,

changes to es tabl ished pat terns of behavior may be observed. For ex

ample , movements of mil i ta ry vehic les f rom regular rout ine t ravel ,

changes in fuel supplies or food shipments, shif ts in polit ical rhetoric by

key pol i t ic ians , o r even changes in communica t ions pa t te rns may s igna l

tha t someth ing i s happening tha t dese rves ex t ra a t ten t ion .

An a lys ts th ro ug ho ut the U.S . in te l ligence sys tem can take a dv anta ge

o f a wor ldwide c ommunic a t ions a nd wa r n ing ne twor k tha t mon i to r s

events through mil i ta ry commands and other fac i l i t ies so tha t the

changes , once obse rved , can be eva lua ted . This sys tem opera tes twenty-

four hours a day , seven days a week , and i s supplemented , o f course ,

by the twenty- four -hour news se rv ices such as CNN. The ana lys t , how

ever , cannot jus t push the panic bu t ton every t ime change i s obse rved .

Though it is tempting to try to alert policy officials just to be sure there

is no surp r ise , do ing so m ay lead to the cry

wolf

syndrome. Tha t i s ,

a f ter be ing awakened severa l t imes by overeager or nervous inte l l igence

officers, policy officials may become blase; disinterested, or just annoyed.

Then they might no t r e spond when the re rea l ly i s a p roblem. Thus , an

a lysts have to be careful about ini t ia t ing the a ler t ing process .

Once they do ini t ia te the process , analysts have to be able to convince

their managers tha t there rea l ly is a problem, and there have been oc

cas ions when the ana lys ts had warn ing of surpr i se bu t were unable to

alert policymakers because senior intell igence officials were skeptical

about the data. The senior off icer in charge of warning at the CIA be

l ieved s t rongly tha t Saddam Husse in was prepar ing to invade Kuwai t

in 1990 but could not prove this to his bosses .

6

When he went to po l icy

officials anyway with his information, they rejected it because senior CIA

leaders had not approved. In the end, of course , the warning off icer was




correc t , but some observers remember only tha t the CIA gave them l i t t le

warning of the invasion.

P r e v e n t i n g S u r p r i s e

Although the system may not be able to prevent surpr ise in every case ,

the t rack record of American inte l l igence in de tec t ing surpr ise is ac tual ly

qui te go od. U nfor tun ate ly , there is l it tle w ay to pro ve this , s ince in m an y

cases the warnings issued by inte l l igence came ear ly enough for pol i

cymakers to deal with the problems before they got out of hand. Thus,

there were no cr ises , no public i ty , and therefore no public record of suc

cess. Even within the intell igence system there was li t t le effort to keep

track of successful warning opera t ions. We are le f t , then, with records

only of failure, and these are not l ikely to be forgotten.

Fai lure to de tec t changing events may be inevi table in inte l l igence , as

Richard Betts has said, but he also points out that intell igence failure

may rea l ly be pol icy fa i lure when decis ionmakers fa i l to pay a t tent ion

to warnings or fail to take action.

7

Inte l l igence warnings in the Middle

East in regard to potent ia l danger to U.S. Marines in Lebanon or soldiers

in Saudi Arabia were apparen t ly ignored by opera t iona l leaders , who

took no ac t ion to protec t the ir t roops. The resul ts were deadly. Repr isa ls

by I ranians af ter the United Sta tes admit ted the a i l ing Shah in 1978 were

expected by inte l l igence analysts , but the U.S. embassy in Teheran was

s to r me d a nywa y a nd hos ta ge s t a ke n .

8

To make the warn ing process work proper ly , ana lys ts have to provide

deta i led requirements to col lec tors so tha t the indica tor ta rgets can be

regular ly monitored. This suggests tha t there ought to be a c lose re la

t ionship between analysts and col lec tors and tha t e f for ts to have them

work more c lose ly together make sense . Of course , the monitor ing of

many indica tors wil l be der ived f rom technica l col lec t ion systems ra ther

than f rom espionage agents . Thus, analysts , especia l ly those in the CIA

or the Defense Intell igence Agency (DIA) have to communica te regula r ly

with the agencies tha t run the sa te l l i te systems. Modern e lec tronic l inks

be tw een the agencies ou gh t to faci li ta te this , bu t analysts hav e to un

derstand the col lec t ion disc ipl ine of the technica l agencies and spend

t ime becoming known to the i r counte rpa r t s a t NSA and the new NIMA.

Although U.S. inte l l igence may not be able to avoid surpr ise com

pletely, i t can ameliorate the effects of surprise through rapid alerting of

officials to crisis. This is an area in which the intelligence system is usu

ally quite effective. Because all the intell igence agencies operate an alert ,

wa tch , o r opera t ions center—the terms are more or less

s y n o n y m o u s —

on a twenty-four-hour , seven-day-a-week basis , incoming inte l l igence

f rom a round the wor ld can be rev iewed rap id ly , and h in ts tha t some-




the consumer th inks

are his or her

n e e d s

but

a lso pro vid ing m ate r ia l tha t

m a y not necessar i ly be welcome.

C ur r e n t s tud ie s

as

wel l

as

those carr ied

out in

pr ior years

all

p o i n t

to

t he impor ta nc e

of the

re la t ionsh ip be tween in te l l igence producers

and

pol icy consumers . There are m a n y i m p e d i m e n t s , h o w e v e r , to m a k i n g

th is r e la t ionsh ip work .

The

intell igence agencies

are, for the

most pa r t ,

phys ica l ly separa ted f rom the i r consumers .

The CIA, the

DIA's analytic

c o m p o n e n t , and NSA are all loca ted away f rom Washington . They are

eas i ly connec ted th rough secure e lec t ron ic communica t ions bo th wi th

each other

and

wi th c onsume r s ,

but the

phys ica l separa t ion means tha t

the es tab l i shment of persona l r e la t ionsh ips is m a de tha t m uc h m or e dif

f icult . Analysts,

who

d o n ' t w a n t

to

leave the i r desks anyway

in

case

a

key message comes

in, are

faced with heavy traffic, lack

of

p a r k i n g ,

te

d i o u s bus sys te ms , and o the r such problems in g o i n g d o w n t o w n to the

Nat iona l Secur i ty Counc i l

Staff, to the

S ta te Depar tment ,

or

over

to the

P e n ta gon , whe r e

the

c o n s u m e r s

are

loca ted . M any ana lys ts

are

introver ts

w h o are h a p p y not to h a v e to go out to mee t people they do not know.

The idea

of

calling some faceless policy official

and

a r r a ng ing

a

me e t ing

i s a na the ma

to an

in t rover t ,

who

wo u ld m uc h r a the r

do all the

c o m

m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h

the

re la t ive dis tance

of the

computer screen.

Circu i t Riders

One so lu t ion

to

this chronic problem

is to

replicate

in

s o m e w a y s

the

m e t h o d u s e d

to

ke e p

the

pres ident in formed, namely ,

by

se nd ing

brief

ing officers out to the various policy officers on a per iodic basis to give

an inte l l igence br ief ing. This rare ly works well because

the

briefers can

n o t

be

exper ts

on

e ve r y th ing

and

wil l e i ther have

to

a r r a nge

to

obta in

a n s w e r s to the ques t ions they cannot handle or, more dangerous ly , te l l

more than they know. Such br iefers were of ten referred

to as

circuit

r ide rs ,

and

they of ten wore

out

the ir we lc ome w he n

it

bec am e c lear tha t

the y we r e not the exper ts the policy officials wanted to see. Intell igence

managers somet imes re fe r red

to

such vis i ts

as

par is h ca l ls

and

we r e

clearly

not

interested

in

such v is i t s , a r ranging them only

to

satisfy

a

ma nda te f r om the top.

O n e a n s w e r

to

this quest ion

of

establ ishing

a

be t te r work ing re la t ion

sh ip be twe e n p r oduc e r s

and

c o n s u m e r s

is to put an

analytic office

in

d o w n t o w n W a s h i n g t o n , w h e r e it w o u l d be relatively easy to find com

mon ground between pol icy off ices

and the

ana lys ts .

The

intell igence

sys tem

has

a lways avoided this , c la iming tha t pol i t ica l pressure

on the

analysts would destroy the ir objec t ivi ty . Inte l l igence managers have ar

gued tha t ana lys ts would

be

sucked into pol icy debates

and

w o u l d

be

p r e s s u r e d

to

tailor their analysis

to

mee t po l icymakers ' needs . This

is



Pu zzles and M ysteries 51

not a f r ivolous argument . Pol icymakers of ten admit tha t what they

want f rom inte l l igence is information to he lp them achieve the ir pol icy

a ims .

They do not want to be told tha t the world is dif ferent f rom the

way they see i t , and they expecia l ly do not want to be told tha t the pol

ic ies they are pushing might not work. They see such negat ive infor

mation as obstructive or even as an effort by intell igence analysts to

give assis tance to the ir pol icy adversar ies .

T h e N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e C o u n c i l

During his tenure as DCI, Rober t Gates se t out a ser ies of reform mea

sures , among which was a p lan to move the Na t iona l In te l l igence Coun

ci l (NIC) to a downtown locat ion to fac i l i ta te be t ter communicat ion

between senior inte l l igence off ic ia ls and the ir consumers . The NIC is

made up of twelve to e ighteen very senior off ic ia ls , each of whom has a

specific functional or regional specialty. Some of the officials are profes

s ional inte l l igence analysts who have r isen through the ranks; others are

drawn f rom the mil i ta ry, f rom the fore ign service , academe, or even f rom

the operational side of intell igence. These officers, called national intel

l igence officers or NIOs, report directly to the DCI, are responsible for

overseeing inte l l igence product ion in the ir specia l ty , and are in charge

of coord ina t ing th is p roduc t ion th roughout the In te l l igence Communi ty .

The NIOs are a lso supposed to serve as a l ia ison with senior consumers

to de te rm ine the i r in te l ligence need s . The NIOs superv ise the p rod uc t io n

of interagency inte l l igence s tudies , inc luding National Inte l l igence Est i

mates .

The NIC has an in te res t ing h is tory . The sys tem w as pu t toge the r w he n

Bi l l Colby was DCI as a way to improve and modern ize the Board and

Office of National Estimates, which dated back to the earliest days of the

CIA an d w hic h ha d i ts roots in the OSS. The bo ard w as seen as archaic ,

and some cr i t ics thought i t had become merely a place to put senior

officials before they retired. I t had certainly become a poor imitation of

the board of wise men envis ioned by Wil l iam Donovan and la te r e s tab

l i shed by DCI Bee t le Smi th . A rgu ing and de fending an es t ima te in

front of the board had become something l ike defending a Ph.D. thesis ,

only with professors who knew less about the subjec t than the ir s tudents .

Pe rhaps Colby had envis ioned a counc i l tha t would a lso se rve as a

substant ive board of f ina l review for interagency in-depth analysis , but

the NIC never reach ed tha t po in t . Ins tead , the NIO s each w en t the ir o w n

wa ys in de te r min ing wha t wou ld be p r oduc e d , a nd e ve n tua l ly e a c h wa s

given a deputy drawn f rom the ranks and the power to a ss ign work to

o the r In te l l igence Communi ty components a s needed . I t never became

collegial,

as the old Board of National Est imates had been, but i t d id




create a new level of expertise at the highest levels of the intell igence

system. In fact, the f inal level of review for estimates became the National

Fore ign Inte l l igence Board, which was made up of the direc tors of each

of the

IC

agencies.

The first director of the

NIC—the

chairman of the board, so to speak—

w as George Carver , a CIA professiona l w ho h ad com e thro ug h the ranks ,

and a man who had considerable substant ive exper t ise in a var ie ty of

areas and the complete confidence of the DCI. Carver set the tone for

the role of the chair of the NIC as a close confidant of the DCI, his

substant ive spokesperson on inte l l igence issues and his a l te r ego in meet

ings with senior adminis tra t ion off ic ia ls , members of Congress , or within

the In te l l igence Communi ty . Subsequent NIC cha i r s took on the same

role , and severa l of Carver ' s successors came f rom prest igious univer

s i t ies with no par t icular inte l l igence exper ience but with the cachet of

be ing wise , we l l known, and we l l connec ted .

T h e I m p a c t o f t h e N I C

I t is no t clear w h y the pl an s to m ov e this latest ver sion of the w ise

m e n do w nto w n ne ve r we n t a nyw he r e . I n s te a d , t he y r e ma in loc a te d a t

the CIA, although they are technically not a part of the agency itself but,

ra ther , a par t of the DCI 's community system. Because they are the most

senior off ic ia ls , meet ing with the ir pol icy counterpar ts is made easier by

the i r ab i l i ty to a r range t ranspor ta t ion downtown and to re turn them

quick ly , except in Washington ' s no tor ious rush hour , and they a re usu

a l ly well enough known to be able to ge t in to see the most senior people

much more easi ly than an analyst in the lower ranks could. As usual in

gove r nm e n t , the NI O r e c o rd in r e ga r d to imp r ov ing p r odu c e r - c onsum e r

re la t ions is a mixed bag. Some NIOs have been par t icular ly ef fec t ive in

this role ; others have tended to c lose t themselves a t Langley.

I t st i l l seems to make sense to have the NIOs closer to the people they

are supposed to serve . Not a l l of Washington 's business is done in the

office. Lunchtime is a critical part of the working day for senior officials

a t Sta te , Defense , or the White House , and being c lose enough to take

par t in this da i ly r i tua l is important . In many respects , ge t t ing c lose to

pol icy people is an opera t ional problem for inte l l igence . Substant ive of

f icers, l ike their operational colleagues, have to establish a relationship

through pe rsona l contac t . This requi res pe rsona l p resence , and be t te r

e lec tronics is not going to make the re la t ionships more c lose .

L o n g - t e r m A n a l y s i s

Although dai ly or current inte l l igence analysis is the product most

used by pol icy consumers , the inte l l igence system continues to be l ieve



Puzzles and Mysteries 53

that i ts most effective output l ies in the area of longer-term analysis.

There has been a grea t deal of debate over the years about which longer-

term or in-depth inte l l igence analyses are the most useful for consumers .

In the 1960s, senior officers in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence

(DI)

decided tha t the dai ly and weekly analyt ic publ ica t ions sent to

pol icy

makers were fa l l ing shor t of the ir needs. Of course , in-depth s tudies had

been done f rom t ime to t ime, especia l ly in the economic and mil i ta ry

analytic off ices, but the Office of Current Intell igence, where most of the

poli t ica l analysis was performed, had done re la t ive ly few of them. Even

tual ly the f low of longer- term studies increased, and as the Direc tora te

of Inte l l igence reorg aniz ed itse lf in var i ou s w ay s, the press ure to p ro du ce

m ore th ink-p ieces inc reased . An effort w as m ad e to s tu dy not on ly the

substance of the mater ia l but the methodology as well .

Could the t r ad i t iona l ana ly t ic me thods be improved by us ing s ta t i s

t ica l or other analyses be ing pioneered in academe? The

methodologists

discovered tha t the i r new techniques were unpopula r wi th ana lys ts be

cause they had no t ime to absorb these systems in the face of t ight dead

l ines . F inal ly , in 1981, on bec om ing the d ep ut y d irec tor for inte l ligence

(DDI),

Bob Gates decided tha t the Direc tora te of Inte l l igence would pro

duce a l l the in -depth mate r ia l he sa id po l icymakers were demanding .

Every DI analyst was expected to produce a t least two papers a year on

subjec ts tha t would en l igh ten the i r consumers and provide the encyc lo

pedic in te l l igence tha t dec is ionmakers needed .

The resu l t o f th is campa ign was the produc t ion of some

5,000

repor ts

a year , a f igure of which Gates was qui te proud. Looking back on this

per iod, i t now seems c lear tha t th is enormous effor t achieved far less

tha n Ga te s ha d hope d . Ma ny c onsume r s ha d no ide a why the y ha d r e

ce ived the papers they got f rom the CIA, were not interested in the

subjec t , or had no need for the analysis when i t a r r ived.

9

Typical ly these

resea rch papers went ou t to severa l hundred consumers , and in formal

surveys showed tha t some addressees had s tuck them in a sa fe unread ,

passed them to o the rs , o r des t royed them wi thout ac tua l ly read ing them.

In some cases, the recipients had moved on to other off ices or had left

the gove rnm ent . In one case , the addressee h ad been d ead for qu i te some

time, but the off ice had never informed the CIA, which cont inued to

send mater ia l .

K n o w i n g C o n s u m e r s

Par t of the problem, of course , was tha t some CIA analysts had l i t t le

idea about the ir consumers or the ir needs. The analysts were a lso

t r a ppe d by the p r oduc t ion p la nn ing sc he du le , wh ic h r e qu i r e d the m to

forecast the papers they planned to wri te . Because the plan ca l led for

quar te r ly

submissions—every

three

months—many

p a p e r s w e r e p u b -



Pu zzles and M ysteries 55

do so. In prac t ice , Br i t ish analysts were indeed able to reach judgments

about the future , but they tended to be ra ther genera l because the ana

lysts could agree with each other only at a relatively low level.

Over t ime the Americans modif ied Br i t ish prac t ice to look a t a var ie ty

of possible scenarios for the future instead of seeking some basic thesis

on which a l l could agree . Since the major analyt ic agencies were repre

sented in drawing up the est imates , each had a voice in the conclusions.

If the major i ty took one pos i t ion, those w h o disagreed c ould take a

footno te . Tha t is , the m ino r i ty view cou ld be repr esen ted as a dissent

or disagreement , but only in small type a t the bot tom of the page . In

pract ice , i t was a way for inte l l igence managers to t ry to int imidate dis

senters by forc ing them to make the ir ident i t ies and dissents specif ic .

Alternat ive ly, i t gave agencies who disagreed with the major i ty a chance

to cover themselves i f the est imate proved to be wrong.

In la ter years , as the Board of Est imates became the National Inte l l i

gence Counci l , the

NIEs

have t r ied to presen t d isagreements in the body

of the text and argue out varying scenarios, especially when it is diff icult

to reach an agreed conclusion. The process of crea t ing an est imate is

lengthy and complica ted, a l though in cr is is s i tua t ions, specia l es t imates ,

or SNIEs, as they are ca l led, have been turned out in just a few days.

Each par t ic ipa t ing agency is expected to make inputs to a se lec ted ana

lyst or team that drafts the actual paper. Then, in a series of meetings,

agency representatives hash out a f inal text. Finally, the draft is briefed

to the National Fore ign Inte l l igence Board (NFIB) , made up of the direc

tors of the agencies tha t const i tute the Inte l l igence Community . I f the

NIE passes tha t hurdle , i t is s igned by the DCI and dis tr ibuted to con

sume r s .

T h e P r e m i e r P r o d u c t ?

Inte l l igence managers be l ieve tha t the NIE is the premier output of the

in te l l igence process . Al though these papers may not necessa r i ly pred ic t

the future , they do out l ine th e mos t like ly course of eve nts , som e possib le

scenar ios tha t ought no t to be over looked , and even some unl ike ly pos

s ibi l i t ies tha t should not be ignored. The text is supposed to provide

policymakers with a sense of the cer ta inty of the analysts in the ir judg

m ents . Because con sum ers m ay hav e d i ffer ing v iews on w ha t p rob ably

or l ike ly m ean s , ana lys ts hav e be gu n to use be t t ing te rminolog y . They

might , for example , indica te tha t they bel ieve a scenar io has one chance

in f ive of taking place . Analysts are a lso supposed to indica te blanks in

their knowledge, but this is dif f icul t because any blank implies cr i t ic ism

of the col lec t ion system. Nonetheless , where gaps exis t is important for

readers to know.




have g iven pol icymakers the impress ion tha t the NIE wi l l indeed be an

accura te forecas t, even thou gh they sho uld k no w tha t too m an y va r iab les

ex is t in most s i tua t ions to make such pred ic t ions more than educa ted

judgments . In the ir e f for ts not to over look any possibi l i ty , the managers

have a l lowed the es t ima tes to become too compl ica ted . They have no t

so ld th is p ro du c t to consu m ers , and i t sho uld no t be surpr i s ing tha t N IEs

are no t mee t ing consumers ' needs .

Interest ingly, mil i ta ry inte l l igence est imates have fared bet ter in the

world of defense planning and receive higher marks than the ir c ivi l ian

counte rpa r t s . War p lans , cont ingency p lans , and o the r such pol icy-

p la nn ing doc ume n t s in the P e n ta gon ha ve a lwa ys inc lude d w i th in the m

a threa t assessment or es t imate about a potent ia l enemy. Because these

inputs are par t of the plans, they are read and absorbed by mil i ta ry and

defense leaders as a matter of course . They tend to be shor ter than the

NIEs and more specif ic . Wri t ten within the Pentagon system, they are

usua l ly no t coord ina ted or even d iscussed wi th o the r agenc ies , a l though

the analysts who wri te them are aware of what analysts in other agencies

think about the issues conta ined in the threa t analysis .

The same process takes place a t the Sta te Depar tment , where i ts small

inte l l igence uni t , INR, wri tes analysis keyed to pol icy ini t ia t ives as di

rected from the various policy offices. Although the forecasting done at

Defense and Sta te are well regarded by the ir respect ive consumers , th is

ana lysis can be crit icized as be ing po lit iciz ed in the sens e tha t i t gives

dec is ionmakers in format ion tha t they want to make and suppor t po l icy .

I t is not necessar i ly pol icy neutra l . In theory the NIEs wri t ten under the

direc t ion of the National Inte l l igence Counci l a re independent of pres

sure from policy officials and free of politicization. They are also irrele

vant to the making of na t ional secur i ty pol icy in many cases . Can this

situation be f ixed?

Perhaps i t is t ime for inte l l igence to admit tha t analysts cannot predic t

the fu ture , desp i te the bes t inputs , the most competen t me thodologies

and the smar tes t wr i te r s . What they can and should do , however , i s to

p r ov ide po l i c yma ke r s w i th inde pe nde n t judgme n t s a bou t poss ib le

courses of events untainted by polit ical pressure or bias. This is sti l l a

tall order and is the reason, more than any other , tha t es t imates ought

to be wr i t ten by groups ra the r than by ind iv idua ls . Team wr i t ing tends

to e l iminate bias because each team member wil l have dif ferent views

and pre judices . A team is more l ike ly to s tand up against pol i t ica l pres

sure, especially if the members come from different parts of the Intell i

ge nc e C ommuni ty .

There is no m agic bu l le t in t ryin g to forecast the m ost l ike ly course

of future events. Just as in current intell igence, analysts must look for

ward seeking t rends, looking a t the his tor ica l record, evaluat ing how

ind iv idua l s be ha ve , a nd unde r s t a nd ing the a tmosphe r e in wh ic h e ve n t s




might take p lace . The process requi res a thorough unders tanding of the

cul ture and dynamics of an a l ien socie ty and i ts people , and i t requires

a good deal of r isk taking. Nonetheless , exper ience shows tha t th is pro

cess can be taught to analysts whose academic exper t ise is usual ly in

looking backward , r a the r than forward .

An Intera c t iv e P ro cess

I t seems c lea r tha t the bureaucracy sur rounding the es t ima tes needs

to s implif ied and s treamlined. Inte l l igence managers have to rea l ize tha t

pol icymakers are not wait ing around for the NIC to del iver i ts wise

judgments before they take ac t ion. This suggests tha t the est imates team

ought to have a way of te l l ing consumers where they a re go ing whi le

they are going there . The est imates ought to be par t of an interac t ive

process in which consumers a re consul ted a t each s tep . Consumers

should be consulted as the terms of reference of the estimate—that is,

the quest ions the est imate wil l seek to answer or the issues i t wil l d is

cuss—are

put together , and they ought to be pr ivy to the del ibera t ions

as they progress . I f th is process is carr ied out proper ly , the team's basic

judgments wil l be known to decis ionmakers well before the f ina l vers ion

hits the street.

Inte l l igence deals with uncer ta inty , and no par t of the inte l l igence

process is more uncer ta in than predic t ing the future course of events .

Yet, if the creation of an estimate can be a dialogue rather than the de

l ivery of a judgment as i f f rom Mount Olympus, end-users wil l f ind the

process more useful . Fur ther , in te l l igence managers are going to have to

trust the est imates teams they se lec t to carry out the est imates dia logue

without the constant supervis ion tha t has been so f rustra t ing for analysts .

In the ear ly days of the CIA, analysts were hired because they were

the best and the br ightest and were therefore t rusted to provide judg

ments to the i r consumers wi thout hav ing to pass the i r work th rough

several levels of review. Fear of failure, however, has led to a process in

which some analysts hardly ever see the ir analysis appear in pr int the

way they wrote i t . Everything wri t ten in the CIA's Direc tora te of Inte l

l igence seems to have been wr i t ten by the same nerd . Managers a rgue

tha t they have to be sure tha t wha t i s de l ive red to consumers represen ts

an agency ra ther than an individual viewpoint , but i f the CIA is rea l ly

h i r ing the bes t and the br igh tes t , agency managers should be more con

f ident about the ir t roops.

T h e C o m p e t e n c e o f A n a l y s t s

This ra ises an issue tha t appears f rom t ime to t ime about the compe

tence of intell igence analysts. Melvin Goodman, a frequent crit ic of in-




te l l igence analysis and a former senior analyst and inte l l igence manager

himself,

has suggested tha t they are less than the best and of ten not the

br ightest .

1 3

Similar cr i t ic isms appeared in the repor t prepared by re t i red

U.S. Na vy a dmi r a l Da v id Je r e mia h , who wa s a ske d to de te r mine why

the CIA failed to catch Indian nuclear tests in 1998.

14

Other crit ics, es

pec ia l ly in the academic wor ld , have made s imi la r a rguments . I s the re

meri t in these cr i t ic isms? I f so , what can be done about the problem?

Analysts are recrui ted in much the same way as opera t ions off icers .

Adver t i sements a re a imed a t s tudents a t the gradua te leve l , and rec ru i t

e r s v isi t key co llege cam pu ses to in te rv iew p oten t ia l candida tes . Em pha

sis is placed on language ski l ls and area knowledge, but there has a lways

been a cer ta in bias in hir ing in favor of those who might become case

officers. Recruits who do not meet the operations officer personality test

are relegated to the analytic directorate or to support f ields. Just as in i ts

failure to seek well-qualif ied operations officers, the agency does not

rea l ly go af ter graduate s tudents who might f i t the analyt ic bi l l . Rather ,

the CIA offers the oppor tuni ty to apply and hopes tha t the r ight people

wi l l r ead the adver t i sements .

At col leges and universi t ies where inte l l igence is taught as an aca

demic subjec t , s tudents have the oppor tun i ty to lea rn more about in te l

l igence . Academics who teach the subjec t repor t consis tent ly tha t in terest

in inte l l igence as a career is high, a l though i t is the rare s tudent who is

ac tual ly accepted into the profession. Unfor tunate ly , in te l l igence agen

c ies seem unaware of the growth and intensi ty of inte l l igence s tudies

and have not taken advantage of this process as a recrui t ing tool .

The CIA and other inte l l igence agencies cont inue to be re luctant , as

well , to take in qual i f ied analysts a t mid- level grades. This might be

understandable in inte l l igence opera t ions, where t radecraf t is a ski l l tha t

is not easi ly learned in c ivi l ian endeavors . A great many people in the

pr ivate sec tor have the ta lent , a rea knowledge, language abi l i ty , and ex

per ience to become good analysts . Even i f in terested in serving in inte l

l igence , however , they could hardly be expected to go back to square

one in the ir l ives . They would have to be convinced tha t they could do

some good by switching careers , and they would have to be offered

sufficient monetary incentive to come aboard. So far , the CIA has failed

to take advantage of the ta lent tha t is out there , cont inuing to run i ts

personnel system just as i t d id in the Cold War .

Analysts have been promised, s ince the ear l ies t days of the CIA, tha t

they could reach sen ior g rade wi thout hav ing to become managers . This

promise has never been fulf i l led in any meaningful way. Some analysts

hav e indeed be en pro m ote d to the low er sen ior g rades , bu t the top ra nk s

stil l go to office directors and division chiefs. I t would seem feasible to

c rea te a separa te ca ree r t r ack for no n-m ana gers a nd p rom ote th em to the

highest pay grades based on the ir capabi l i ty and t rack record, but again,

inte l l igence managers are mired in the old ways of doing things.



Puzzles and Mysteries 61

Firs t , t ravel funds are usual ly in shor t supply in the analyt ic direc tor

ate.

Opera t ions people t ravel a l l the t ime and rare ly run into a t ravel

budge t c runch , whereas t r ave l for ana lys ts has a lways been cons ide red

someth ing of a luxury . Second , opera t iona l s ta t ions abroad do not we l

come vis i t ing analysts , consider them outs iders , and are re luctant to have

to hand-hold them while they are in the area . Opera t ions off icers fear

tha t the ana lys ts wi l l do s om eth ing s tup id to jeopard ize opera t ions , an d ,

indeed, there have been some horror s tor ies . F inal ly , analyt ic supervisors

a re re luc tan t to have the i r jun ior ana lys ts running a round overseas when

they should be a t the ir desks reading the ir mail . All of this must change

if analysts are to become well versed in the pol i t ics , the cul ture , and the

ambience of their area of expertise.

W o m e n a n d M i n o r i t i e s

Another issue recently raised is crit icism of the government 's effort to

a t t rac t more women and minor i t ies into the profession of inte l l igence to

redress the imbalance in the inte l l igence profession, which is s t i l l run

most ly by white males . The CIA has t r ied a var ie ty of schemes to t ry to

rec ru i t more women and minor i ty candida tes , bu t wi th on ly l imi ted suc

cess. In his book on his experiences in the Clandestine Service, former

opera t ions off icer Dewey Clarr idge complains tha t the emphasis on fe

male and minor i ty hir ing may well produce case off icers who cannot be

successful in recrui t ing agents .

1 5

In the world of analysis , though, sex

and race should play no par t . There is no posi t ion in the Direc tora te of

Inte l l igence tha t could not be f i l led by someone other than a white male .

In fac t , the CIA's problem is not in hir ing women and minor i t ies , but

in re ta in ing them and in promot ing them to sen ior pos i t ions . Al though

the CIA ha s recog nized the glass ce i l ing pro ble m facing w om en , i t ha s

promoted or appoin ted on ly a few women to sen ior pos i t ions . Minor i ty

officers are another story. No black, Latino, or Asian American has ever

reached top rank anywhere in the Agency . Unt i l tha t s i tua t ion i s r eme

died, the minor i ty re tent ion problem wil l cont inue , with l i t t le just i f ica

tion for the CIA's failure to deal more forthrightly with the issue.

The pr od uc t io n of f inished intel l igence is t ruly the en d g am e of the

inte l l igence business . Unless cogent analysis is provided to decis ionmak

ers ,

the sa te l l i tes and spies are not worth the money spent on them.

Inte l l igence managers have to rea l ize tha t in te l l igence analysis , while

hard ly the g lamorous or adventurous pa r t o f the in te l l igence process ,

may be the most meaningful in te rms of how the process serves pol i -

cymaking. Observers of inte l l igence have been saying these things for

years .

Now i t is t ime for the inte l l igence leadership to pay a t tent ion.




Notes

1.

The au tho r f irst pro po sed this usa ge in his M ana gin g Intel ligence An al

ysis:

Strategies for Playing the End Game,

International Journal of

Intelligence

and

Counterlntelligence. vol . 2 , no. 3, pp. 321-343.

2.

Edwin Fishel ,

The Secret War for the Union

(New York: Houghton Miff l in,

1996),

pp. 298-299.

3. Barry M. Katz, R esearch and An alysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-

1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univers i ty Press , 1989) .

4.

George J . A. O'Toole, Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence,

Espionage, and C overt Action from the American Revolution to the CIA

(New York:

Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991).

5.

Ibid.

6. Michae l W ines , W ash ingto n at W ork; CIA Sidel ines I ts Gulf Ca ssan dra ,

New York Times, 24 Jan ua ry 1991, p . D22.

7.

Rich ard K. Betts , A na lysis , W ar an d Decision: W hy Intel l igence Failures

Are Inevi table, World Politics, vol. 31, 1978.

8. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (Har r i son-

burg, VA: R. Donnelly & Sons, 1986).

9. The author par t icipated in several s tudies on the value of long- term anal

ysis;

al l reached more or less the same conclus ions .

10. Joh n C. Ga nn on, Sha r ing Secrets w i th Law m ake rs : Co ngre ss as a User of

Intel l igence/ ' address to a conference at Georgetown Univers i ty, 20 March 1997.

11.

Consumer surveys have cons i s tent ly produced such judgments .

12.

The author s tudied the uses of intel l igence in the Car ter adminis t rat ion

while serving as a DCI Fellow in the Center for the Study of Intel l igence.

13. Melvin Go odm an, The Road to In te l ligence Reform: Paved w i th Goo d

Intent ions , pap er presented a t the ann ual meet ing of the In ternat ional S tudies

Associat ion, Toronto, Canada, 1997.

14 .

W alter P incus , CIA Chief Ci ted Loss of A gen cy's Capabi l i t ies ,

Washing

ton Post, 25 May 1998, p. A4.

15.

Duane R. Clar r idge , A Spy for All Sea sons (New York: Scribner, 1997).




A Third Option

What i s cover t ac t ion? Most modern schola r s who have wr i t ten about

cover t ac t ion agree about what i t is , a l though they do not necessar i ly

agree about how dif ferent aspects of cover t ac t ion should be ca tegor ized.

Som e say tha t cover t ac t ion is des igne d to serve as a third opt i on , ly ing

somewhere be tween mi l i ta ry force on one end of the spec t rum and d i

p lomacy on the o the r . Cover t ac t ion would be used to accompl ish an

objec t ive when mil i ta ry force is too s t rong and where open diplomacy

is not s t rong enough. Others argue tha t cover t ac t ion by i tse lf cannot be

decis ive and should be used only as an adjunct to some larger scheme

of pol icy. Professor Roy Godson, an inte l l igence scholar a t Georgetown

Un iversi ty , ha s po inte d ou t tha t cover t ac t ion is not a m agic bul le t .

1

A V a r i e t y o f A c t i v i t i e s

Cover t ac t ion encompasses a var ie ty of ac t ivi t ies designed to accom

plish objec t ives in such a way tha t the hand of the ac t ion country is not

seen, or a t least in a way tha t provides deniabi l i ty . Cover t ac t ion may

include polit ical operations to aid favored parties or factions in a target

country, especia l ly in s i tua t ions where these groups may be a t a ser ious

d isadvantage . Thus , the Uni ted S ta tes a ided Sol ida r i ty in Poland when

it bec am e the vic tim of a gov ern m en t cra ck do w n in the 1980s, bu t this

had to be done secre t ly of course , to protec t Sol idar i ty members and the

reputa t ion of the par ty .

Cover t ac t ion can mean the use of economic ac t ion to disrupt an ad

versary ' s f inancia l s t ruc ture or other par ts of i ts economy. I ran has been

accused of secre t ly forging U.S. ba nk no tes as a w ay of dis rup t in g the

American economy, a l though most of the counterfe i t b i l ls have c ircula ted

ou ts ide the United Sta tes . Form er m em be rs of the KGB, high ly ski l led in

the techniques of forgery, may be doing the same thing.

Cover t ac t ion encompasses var ious aspects of psychologica l warfare ,

inc lud ing the use of b lack pr op ag an da tha t h ides the or ig in of the

information; decept ion, especia l ly in mil i ta ry opera t ions; and dis infor

mation, c ircula t ing fa lse information to disrupt or discredi t an adversary.

Dur ing the Cold War the Uni ted S ta tes sponsored a number of c landes

t ine radio s ta t ions whose funct ion was to broadcast news as the United

Sta tes saw i t , bu t who se spo nsors h ip w as h idd en; these s ta t ions in c lude d

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liber ty . Later , these s ta t ions became ac

knowledged en t i t ie s o f the U.S . government .

Decept ion o pera t ions a re w ide ly kn ow n in U.S . h is tory , f rom George

W ash ing ton 's use of decept io n to tr ick the Br it ish and the ir He ssian a l lies



Secret Operations 65

at the Bat t le of Trenton to Genera l Schwarzkopf ' s decept ion to mask his

f lank a t tack on Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War . Decept ion to t r ick an

enemy is a key fac tor in Sun Tzu 's wri t ings; there is no more graphic

exa m ple of i ts use tha n the All ied crea t ion of a p h on y arm y in W orld

War I I to convince the Nazis tha t the D-Day invasion was to come a t

Ca la is r a the r than a t Normandy.

Disinformation was a major part of the KGB's efforts to discredit the

United Sta tes and the CIA dur ing the Cold War . Some of the charges

seem lud ic rous , bu t they

were—and

still

are—widely

bel ieved in par ts

of the Third World. The Russians c ircula ted s tor ies tha t the CIA had

crea ted the AIDS v i rus a s a by-produc t o f i t s d rug exper iments and tha t

the United Sta tes was behind the assassinat ions of world leaders f rom

Olaf Pa lme in Sweden to Ind i ra Gandhi in Ind ia , no t to ment ion Mar t in

Luther K ing and M alco lm X. Al th oug h no fac ts were ever presen ted to

subs tan t ia te such charges , they we re couched in a such a w ay as to ma ke

them bel ieveable . The Sovie ts va lued dis information so highly tha t they

co-opted the Czech inte l l igence service to carry out dis information op

era t ions on behalf of the USSR throughout the Cold War .

2

Suppo rt fo r P a ra mi l i ta ry F o rces

Final ly , cover t ac t ion inc ludes suppor t for guerr i l la , i r regular , or para

mil i ta ry forces who may f ight as surrogates for the ir secre t sponsors .

During the American Revolut ionary War , the French sent secre t a id to

the Americans as a way of ge t t ing back a t the Br i t ish , and they even

enlis ted c landest ine help f rom Spain for the enterpr ise . Later the United

Sta tes sen t sec re t a id to Panamanian revolu t ionar ies who were t ry ing to

throw off Colombian rule . Of course , the U.S. ass is tance was not a l t ru

istic;

ra ther , i t was par t of an agreement to give r ights to the United

States to build a canal if the revolutionaries were successful.

Dur ing the Cold War there were many cases on both s ides of a id to

parami l i ta ry groups . For example , in Cent ra l Amer ica , the KGB a ided

the Farobundo Mart i guerr i l las in El Salvador , who were f ight ing a U.S. -

favored g ove rnm ent ; whi le nex t door in N ica ragua , the U.S .-backed C on-

t ras were t ry ing to unsea t a Sovie t - suppor ted Sandinista regime. Both

sets of guerr i l las w ere con sidered f reedom f ighters by the ir respect ive

c landes t ine suppor te r s .

The use of terrorist tactics, including assassination, is also part of co

ver t ac t ion, but the United Sta tes has foresworn such opera t ions ever

since they were banned by the f irst of a series of presidential executive

orders in 1976.

3

The Sovie ts w ere no t so fussy an d w ere kn ow n to hav e

carr ied out

assassinations— wet

ope ra t ion s in the i r

t e rmi n o l o g y —

against defec tors such as Stefan Bandera and Georgi Markov. Other




nat ions, inc luding Syr ia , Libya , and I ran, a re be l ieved to be using the ir

inte l l igence services to carry out s ta te-sponsored ter ror ism against ta r

gets in the West and in Israel.

T h e A g e n t o f I n f l u e n c e

In covert action operations, a key f igure is the so-called agent of influ

ence , a secre t agent who does not s tea l information but , ra ther , manages

the cover t ac t ion. He or she may be recrui ted and handled by the spon

sor ing inte l l igence service in much the same way as a spy who gathers

data, but the role of the agent of influence is different. The covert action

agent se rves as the cond ui t fo r pass ing m oney , p ro vid in g a rm s , o r g iv ing

other ass is tance to pol i t ica l par t ies or mil i ta ry groups. When the opera

t ion becomes too la rge , the sponsor ing count ry may seek broader he lp

from another inte l l igence service . The CIA repor tedly used the Pakis tani

intell igence service to handle support for the guerril la f ighters trying to

dr ive the Sovie ts out of Afghanis tan, for example .

4

The KGB turned to

the Cuban intell igence service, the DGI, to assist in defeating anti-

Communis t guer r i l la s in Angola and Eth iopia .

The Cold War is over , but cover t ac t ion remains par t of the arsenal of

the major powers as well as tha t of many lesser na t ions. Now observers

of intell igence as well as reformers are asking if covert action should be

used aga ins t the pos t -Cold War problems such as g loba l o rganized

cr ime, te r ror ism, and drug car te ls . To answer tha t quest ion, a more de

tailed examination of covert action and its history is necessary. Just as

in the case of espionage, the roots of covert action lie deep, although the

inform ation is f ragm entary a nd a necd ota l .

E a r l y U s e s o f C o v e r t A c t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

Over the past ten years a number of good books on cover t ac t ion have

appeared, most ly focused on cover t ac t ion by the United Sta tes , par t ly

because the h is tory of i t s use has been h idden and because so much

cont roversy sur rounds i t .

5

We know now tha t cover t ac t ion has been a

par t of American his tory s ince the ear l ies t days of revolut ionary fervor

in the British colonies and that is i t not merely a child of the Cold War.

Even before the Declara t ion of Independence , the American colonis ts had

formed secre t committees to ga ther arms and to share information about

their Br i t ish masters . When war broke out , i t was c lear tha t George

Washington would have to use a l l poss ib le methods i f h is r ag- tag a rmy

of poor ly t ra ined colonia ls was going to defea t what was then par t of

th e

best-trained

a nd - e qu ippe d a r my in the wor ld . Wa sh ing ton ma y




never have hea rd of Sun Tzu , bu t Washington ' s tac t ic s in winning the

war might have come r igh t ou t o f the anc ien t Chinese ph i losopher ' s

book.

Washington t r icked the Br i t ish genera ls into bel ieving tha t his army

was much larger than i ts ac tual s t rength by c ircula t ing fa lse information

to Br i t ish spies , and Washington 's deputies were able to keep the Br i t ish

from at tacking by decept ive demonstra t ions of s t rength by a handful of

t r oops . Wa sh ing ton unde r s tood the va lue o f p r opa ga nda a nd a t one

poin t a r ranged the purchase of a newspaper , the Montreal Gazette, as a

way of t rying to convince the Canadians to join the revolut ion. The

French engaged in decept ion as we l l in suppor t ing the Amer icans by

se t t ing up a phony t rad ing

company—what

w e w ou ld ca ll tod ay a pro

prietary —to

cover the secret transfer of funds and arms to the United

States.

Af te r the war , Washington ins is ted , when he became pres ident , tha t a

secre t fund, the Contingent Fund for Fore ign Intercourse , be establ ished

to give him the abi l i ty to carry out secre t opera t ions without having to

revea l to Co ngress w ha t he w as do ing , on ly tha t he ha d sp ent the mo ney .

Th e first allocation a m o u n te d to $40,000, b u t it soo n gre w to $1 m illion,

a lm ost 12 perc ent of the federa l bu dg et . It de m on stra ted tha t C ong ress

understood tha t in matters of c landest ine opera t ions, the chief execut ive

was to be the control ler and ra t i f ied the views conta ined in the Federa l is t

Papers tha t such opera t ions would be possible only i f they were kept

h idde n .

Al though the re i s no ev idence tha t John Adams dabbled in cover t ac

t ion, his successors in the White House were not re luctant to take ad

vantage of secre t opera t ions in carrying out fore ign pol icy. Thomas

Jefferson became the f i rs t president to approve an opera t ion to over

throw a government hos t i le to the Uni ted S ta tes , and James Madison

used secre t agents to t ry to wrest East and West Flor ida away f rom

Spanish ru le . When Congress sought to f ind ou t more about these op

era t ions, the White House refused to turn over ful l information, a t ra

di t ion tha t has las ted unt i l the modern era .

D i s p a t c h i n g S e c r e t A g e n t s

A nd rew Jackson , our f irs t w es te rn pres iden t , w as no t above sendin g

secret agents to bribe foreign officials to bend to American will . John

Tyle r (who became pres ident in 1841 only because Wil l iam Henry Har

r ison contrac ted pneumonia and died in off ice af ter a long-winded in

augura l speech in f reez ing Washington wea the r ) pe rmi t ted h is sec re ta ry

of s ta te to engage in a highly quest ionable dis information campaign

in order to convince the people of Maine to s ign on to the Webster-




Ashbur ton Trea ty es tab l i sh ing the nor the rn border wi th Canada . This

effort involved the circulation of doctored maps, the use of foreign funds,

and secre t deals tha t br ing to mind the la ter scandals of the

Iran-Contra

affa ir . When Congress sought to invest iga te , Tyler ' s successor , James

Knox Polk, refused to turn over the data , c la iming execut ive pr ivi lege .

In a statement that r ings as true today as i t did in 1846, Polk wrote:

The experience of every nation on earth has dem onstrated that em ergencies

may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety

or the public good to make expenditures, the very object of which would

be defeated by publicity. Some governments have very large amounts at

their disposal, and have made vastly greater expenditures than the small

amounts which have from time to time been accounted for on the presi

dent's certificates. In no nation is the application of such sums ever made

public. In time of war or impending danger the situation of the country

may make it necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining

information or rendering other important services who could never be pre

vailed upon to act if they entertained the least apprehension that their

names or their agency would in any contingency be revealed.

6

As they did f rom t ime to t ime in such c ircumstances, members of

Congress ra ised a fuss but in the end permit ted the chief execut ive to

pro tec t the opera t ions and agents jus t a s Polk had demanded .

C o v e r t A c t i o n a n d W a r

Polk engaged again in cover t ac t ion in order to suppor t rebels seeking

to over throw Mexican rule in Cal ifornia and to foment war with Mexico

over Texas. According to Professor Stephen Knott , who has documented

these opera t ions in de ta i l , Polk ' s instruct ions to his agents were vague

and occasional ly contradic tory. Nonetheless , they resul ted in a vast ex

pansion of the United Sta tes a long i ts present borders . Polk thus deserves

credi t , not only for his def t handling of American expansionism, but a lso

for his understanding of the util i ty of covert action as an adjunct to

foreign policy.

During the Civi l War both s ides engaged ac t ive ly in cover t ac t ions,

f rom the use of pol i t ica l ac t ion to propaganda, dis information, and sab

otage. President Lincoln sent agents to Europe to squelch efforts by the

European powers to recognize the Confederacy , and h is agents a r ranged

to inter fere with ship construct ion in England, the main source of sup

pl ies for the rebels . We don ' t know quite as much about Confedera te

opera t ions because many records were destroyed in the sack of Rich

mond, bu t r ebe l agents were known to have g iven c landes t ine suppor t

to the an t i -war Copperheads in the Nor th .



Secret Op erations 69

Toward the end of the ninetee th century, President Benjamin Harr ison,

taking a page f rom President Madison 's book, used a secre t agent to

foment rebe l l ion among the Amer ican p lan te r s who had moved in to the

Hawai ian I s lands , eventua l ly forc ing Queen Li l iuoka lan i ou t o f power .

Har r i son ' s successor , Grover C leve land , whi le express ing regre t about

the queen ' s over throw, re fused to undo the ac t ion tha t had resu l ted in

the is lands ' becoming a te r r i tory of the United Sta tes .

T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A c q u i r e s a n E m p i r e

There was probably no more b la tan t sec re t opera t ion run ou t o f the

Whi te House than the one tha t c rea ted the Republ ic of Panama and gave

the Uni ted S ta tes the land to bu i ld the Panama Cana l . P res ident Theo

dore Rooseve l t h imse l f p rovided the gu id ing hand behind the opera t ion ,

tak ing advantage of a rebe l movement in Panama tha t was seek ing to

throw off Colombian rule . One of the secre t agents in the opera t ion,

M a n u e l Amador, la ter became Panama's f i rs t president—the first but

cer ta inly not the las t president of Panama to take money f rom the United

Sta tes . Roosevel t was quick to c la im credi t for the adventure when he

was cr i t ic ized by Congress , thereby viola t ing the unwri t ten rule of den-

iabili ty. Roosevelt 's secretary of war later said that Roosevelt had been

accused of seduction but was in fact guilty of rape.

7

The United Sta tes had thus acquired an empire par t ly as a resul t of

i ts secre t opera t ions, a ided by the power of the U.S. Navy. The United

Sta tes then entered a per iod of isola t ion, broken only by i ts re luc tant

entrance into World War I . Not unt i l Frankl in Delano Roosevel t became

pres ident d id the Uni ted S ta tes aga in tu rn to sec re t opera t ions , spur red

by the specter of war . I t was FDR who crea ted America ' s f i rs t organized

intell igence service, the Office of Strategic Services, under the leadership

of Genera l Wil l iam Donovan , and pa r t o f i t s manda te involved cover t

action. The creation of the OSS enabled the White House to shif t re

sponsibi l i ty for secre t opera t ions to this new organiza t ion, a s i tua t ion

that lasted until 1945.

During World War I I the OSS and other mil i ta ry inte l l igence uni ts

carr ied out secre t opera t ions against the Nazis and the Japanese a t the

d i rec tion of the W hi te Ho use a nd U.S. mi l i ta ry com m and ers . Sabo tage ,

psychologica l warfare , the use of secre t agents , even assassinat ion, be

came the order of the day. The United Sta tes a ided the Norwegian un

derground in destroying Nazi nuclear research fac i l i t ies , the U.S. Army

Air Corps ta rge ted Japan ' s Admira l Yamamoto for a ssass ina t ion , and

secre t agents in France were enl is ted to sabotage roads and br idges in

advance of the All ied invasion of the Continent . Such opera t ions, when




they became known, were applauded as an in tegra l pa r t o f the war e f

for t , a l though they might not have been tolera ted in peacet ime.

T h e C I A T a k e s o n C o v e r t A c t i o n

After W orld W ar II the OSS w as dis ba nd ed an d i ts secret op era t io ns

handed over to the Pentagon. These opera t ions inc luded effor ts , la rgely

unsuccessful , to prevent the Sovie ts f rom putt ing puppet regimes in

power in Eas te rn Europe , bu t a l so opera t ions des igned to sna tch German

scientists before they could fall into Soviet hands. After the CIA was

created in 1947, m ost of these secre t op era t io ns w ere pas sed to the n ew

agency despi te grumbling f rom the Pentagon. Some CIA off ic ia ls ques

t ioned whether or not the CIA rea l ly had author i ty to carry out cover t

ac t ion. The law that c rea ted the CIA merely sa id tha t i t should carry out

ac t ivi ty re la ted to inte l l igence as direc ted by the president or the Na

tional Security Council .

The f i rs t DCI under the new system, Admira l Roscoe Hil lenkoeter ,

asked for advice f rom his legal counsel , who recommended against co

ver t ac t ion, but Hil lenkoeter decided to go ahead in 1948 with plans to

aid the Christian Democratic Party of I taly stave off an election bid by

the Communist Par ty (PCI) . The Sovie ts threw their suppor t to the PCI ,

bu t the Am er icans ha d m uc h m ore exper ience in bu yin g e lect ions an d

in the end, the PCI was defea ted. This opera t ion conf irmed the role of

CIA in covert action.

This system for carrying out secret operations at the direction of the

Whi te House requi red tha t Congress be brought in to provide the fund

ing . The sec re t fund opera t ion used by so m an y pres id ents w as no

longer in ef fec t , s ince the mandate had got ten so big. Congress wanted

to kno w in gene r al w ha t w a s go ing on , a l though m a ny m e m be r s thou gh t

tha t they should no t be pr ivy to opera t iona l de ta i l s because tha t would

be dangerous. Since there were no inte l l igence committees in those days,

the CIA worked wi th key members and subcommit tees to a r range f i

nancing of secre t opera t ions.

8

The record of accomplishment is mixed.

C o n t r o v e r s i a l O p e r a t i o n s

Effor ts to over throw a reformist and f ree ly e lec ted government in Gua

temala in 1954 remain controversia l even now. At the t ime the replace

ment of President Jacobo Arbenz was seen as a vic tory against the spread

of communism in Cent ra l Amer ica , a l though Arbenz was ha rd ly a Com

munist . His reformist ideas inc luded plans to se ize the proper ty of the




Uni te d F r u i t C ompa ny a nd pa y c ompe nsa t ion ba se d on the me a s ly sum

the company had dec la red as the va lue of the proper ty . Uni ted Fru i t

lobbied Secre tary of Sta te John Foster Dulles , who had served United

Frui t as i ts genera l counsel , and Dulles turned to his brother

Al len ,

the

DCI, to he lp out . The CIA carr ied out a psychologica l warfare campaign

and was able to force Arbenz to quit . Crit ics of the policy, even now,

note tha t th is may have been the main cause behind Gua temala ' s sub

sequent c ivi l war , which raged into the 1990s and repor tedly resul ted in

thousands of dea ths .

A no the r vic to ry for cover t ac t ion w as the ov er th row of the M ossa

degh reg ime in I ran a t about the same t ime as the Gua temala campa ign .

The you ng a nd t im id sha h ha d been forced into exile by Pr im e M inis ter

M oh a m m e d M ossa de gh , wh o p la nne d to t a ke ove r B r it ish a nd Am e r ic a n

oi l a sse ts in I ran . Na tura l ly th is made h im a Communis t in some eyes .

The s i tua t ion was fur ther complica ted by the threa t tha t the USSR might

somehow move in to nor the rn I ran i f Mossadegh remained in power . The

CIA was again enlisted to save the day. Chief of Station Kermit Roosevelt

organized r io ts and demonst ra t ions aga ins t Mossadegh , and the pr ime

minis ter was forced to resign. The shah re turned, thanked Roosevel t for

sav ing h is th ron e , an d beg an a pe r iod of ru le tha t ende d in h is o ver thro w

by th e fun da m ent alis t Shiite clergy in 1978. I t w as an oth er case of sho rt-

term vic tory becoming a long- term disaster .

A b u s e s o f C o v e r t A c t i o n

Other opera t ions to change governments unacceptab le to the Uni ted

States did not go as well as those in I taly, Guatemala, and Iran. An effort

to oust President Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958 fa i led miserably; the CIA

had tr ied to convince the Eisenhower adminis tra t ion not to t ry i t but was

pressed to ca r ry ou t the opera t ion a nyw ay. In te res t ing ly , the Indon es ians

the mse lve s e ve n tua l ly ous te d S uka r no ' s gove r nme n t . A l though the sub

sequent reg ime under Pres ident Suhar to was on ly min imal ly democra t ic ,

i t was s tab le and an t i -Communis t , jus t wha t Washington wanted . In th is

case , shor t- term fa i lure resul ted in a long- term vic tory in the Cold War .

The worst abuse of cover t ac t ion came in the wake of Fidel Castro ' s

r ise to po w er in Cub a in 1959. W he n Castro an no un ced tha t he w as rea l ly

a Marxis t-Leninis t an d th rew in his lot w ith the Sovie ts , he bec am e an ath

ema to Washington . The a t tempt to ous t h im by a r ranging an invas ion

by anti-Castro Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs was not only a disaster ,

i t turned out tha t the direc tor of opera t ions a t the CIA—then called the

deputy direc tor for plans—Richard Bisse l l had l ied to the White House ,

Congress, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff,

the DCI, and his col leagues about the

opera t ion .

9

Bissell knew it had li t t le chance of success, but apparently he



72 Fixing

the Spy

Machine

t hough t tha t some how the new pres ident , John F. Ke nned y, w ou ld ba i l

o u t the opera t ion with U.S. mil i ta ry t roops.

The failure

to get rid of

Cas t ro

by

military force

led to a new

ope r a

tion—spurred,

it

a p p e a r s ,

by the

pres ident ' s b ro the r , At torney Genera l

Rober t F. Kennedy—to assass ina te the C uba n l e a der . The youn ge r Ke n

n e d y

may not

ha ve sa id ki l l

him in so

m a n y w o r d s ,

but CIA

leaders

de te r mine d tha t a hit was w h a t the W h i te H o u s e w a n t e d . Of course , the

many ra the r b iza r re a t tempts to kill Castro failed, and he has out la s ted

six U.S. pre sid ent s

at

last count . Even

now a

psychologica l warfare cam

pa ign aga ins t Cas t ro seems to be ongo ing , a l thoug h it is no longer c lan

dest ine .

T h e D o o l i t t l e M a n d a t e

In

all

these cases,

the U.S. was

fol lowing

a

pol icy out l ined

by

Genera l

J immy Dool i t t le

in 1954.

D ooli t tle

had

been asked

to

carry

out an ex

a mina t ion of U.S. intell igence as p a r t of a la rge r s tudy on g o v e r n m e n t

a t

the

t ime .

In

regard

to

covert action, Doolit t le wrote:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed

objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost.

There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human

conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing

American concepts of fair play must he reconsidered. We must. . . learn to

subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophis

ticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may

become necessary that the American people be m ade acquainted with, un

derstand,

and

support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

10

This policy of seeking to be at least as de v ious as our adversa r ie s

c on t inue d

for

a lmost twenty yea rs . Orders

to

carry

out

covert action

came f rom the Whi te House but we r e d r ive n at t imes by the State De

p a r t m e n t or the pres ident ' s c lose advisors . Members of C ongr e s s p r o

v i d e d

the

m o n e y

and did not ask too

ma ny que s t ions .

The CIA

never

made f ina l decis ions about cover t ac t ion by itself, a l though it may from

t ime

to

time ha ve ma de sugge s t ions

to

State officials

or the

W hi te Ho use

staff.

None the le s s ,

the CIA

ga ined

a

r e pu ta t ion

as a

sec re t government ,

p l a n n i n g and carrying out covert ac tion wi th ou t any oversigh t f rom any

one , r a i s ing money by sec re t means to fund the opera t ions .

In rev iew ing

the

covert actions carried

out by the CIA

d u r i n g

the

early

Cold

War

pe r iod ,

CIA

his tor ian M ichael W arne r descr ibes

in

some deta i l

efforts by the CIA to recruit l iberal and even leftist groups to take up

the ideologica l s t ruggle against

the

C o m m u n i s t e n e m y .

1 1

These cooper

a t ive groups inc luded labor organiza t ions , s tudent

and

academic orga -




nizat ions, and pol i t ica l groups of var ious leanings. In some cases key

officials in these organizations were aware of the t ies to the CIA, but

ma ny l e a de r s a nd the rank-and-file were kept in the dark.

A Mixed Record

Looking back, i t seems c lear tha t many of these groups would have

been unable to combat the i r Sovie t - sponsored counte rpa r t s wi th

ou t fund ing f rom the U.S. go vern m ent . Because of the ra m pa nt ant i -

Communis t hys te r ia in the Uni ted S ta tes a t tha t t ime , open funding by

Congress would have been imposs ib le . Thus , h id ing the funds by le t t ing

the CIA manage the money gave Congress a way out . We know now

that some key members of Congress were qui te aware of these secre t

opera t ions but chose not to seek the deta i ls .

1 2

The other aspects of cover t ac t ion dur ing the Cold War per iod have

bee n descr ibed an d discu ssed in de ta i l e lsew here in bo ok s, journ al ar t i

cles,

and the press . Both the Americans and the Sovie ts used the ful l

panoply of cover t ac t ion opera t ions against each other with mixed suc

cess. We suppor ted prac t ica l ly anyone wil l ing to declare himself ant i -

Co m m unis t , whe reas the Sovie ts w ere wi l ling to a id those wh o sa id they

were Marxis t-Leninis t . The outcomes of these ef for ts were hardly what

each s ide professed as i ts goals . We ended up backing a var ie ty of dic

tators from Somoza in Nicaragua to Mobutu in Zaire , a l l in the name of

democracy , and the Sovie ts found themse lves backing such s ta lwar t

C om m un is ts a s M engis tu in Eth iopia and Na j ibu l lah in A fghanis tan .

I ronica l ly , the one rea l ideologue in the mix, Salvador Allende in Chile ,

got relatively l i t t le support from the USSR.

Finally, a series of revelations in the press about covert action opera

t ions, t r iggered in par t by the Watergate af fa ir and hints of CIA involve

ment , a s we l l a s by the over throw of the Al lende government , caused

the pot to boi l over . Senator Frank Church of Idaho led a congressional

inquiry in the Senate on the a l legat ions tha t the CIA was a secre t gov

ernment—a

r ogue e l e pha n t in C h ur c h ' s

terminology—carrying

out the

foreign policy of the nation using covert action.

1 3

C hur c h though t tha t

nei ther the president nor Congress was pr ivy to the CIA's ac t ivi t ies . We

now know tha t Church was qu i te wrong . The inves t iga t ion and subse

quent repor t have become publ ic and pe rmi t an examina t ion of a l l the

al leged abuses in de ta i l .

R e s u l t s o f t h e C h u r c h C o m m i t t e e I n v e s t i g a t i o n

In fac t , the CIA never plot ted i ts opera t ions behind c losed doors with

out d i rec tion from the W hi te H ou se , and m em bers of Con gress w ere on ly




too wil l ing to provide the money as long as the ir role could remain

secret. If CIA officials were guilty of anything, i t was perhaps a bit more

enthus iasm for some of the more ha i r -bra ined schemes than was war

ranted. In retrospect, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patr ice

Lumumba seem amateur ish . Fa r worse , the CIA ' s involvement in drug

exper imenta t ion , in which mind-a l te r ing drugs were adminis te red to un

wi t t ing v ic t ims , one of whom subsequent ly commit ted su ic ide , might

lead today to an indic tment for cr iminal behavior . White House over

s ight of the opera t ions was loose a t best , and Congress preferred not to

know. Is i t any wonder tha t there were s ignif icant er rors in judgment?

With the revela t ions of the Church Committee and those of the press ,

Co ngre ss w as forced to com e to gr ips w ith i ts fa ilure to exerc ise a de qu ate

oversight of the inte l l igence process . At the same t ime the White House

recognized tha t i t , too, needed to take a s t ronger hand in the direc t ion

of inte l l igence opera t ions. The resul t was the establ ishment of oversight

committees for inte l l igence in both houses of Congress and the issuance

of the f irst of a series of executive orders by President Gerald Ford reg

ula t ing inte l l igence . The execut ive order banned assassinat ion or any ef

for t to suppor t such prac t ices and forbade drug exper imenta t ion as well .

The congressional committees soon rea l ized tha t the ir role should go

well beyond the narrow oversight of cover t ac t ion. They establ ished, as

their mandate , budget review, evaluat ion of inte l l igence analysis and

management prac t ices , and counte r in te l l igence mat te r s . On the Sena te

side, the Senate Select Committee on Intell igence (SSCI) became the

group responsible for de termining the sui tabi l i ty of the president ' s

choice for DCI, a role tha t has become increasingly important and in

creasingly visible. In fact, the establishment of r igorous congressional

oversight of inte l l igence has changed the balance between the execut ive

and leg is la t ive branches in ways tha t would have as ton ished the Found

ing Fathers of the nat ion, who thought tha t in te l l igence opera t ions were

an executive function only.

St i l l , the establ ishment of congressional oversight has provided an un

expected benefit in regard to covert action. To have a covert action, the

pre sid ent m us t issue a w ri t ten f ind ing tha t the ope ra t ion is necessa ry

and has his approval , and then the DCI must advise Congress of the

pres ident ' s in ten t ions th rough the overs igh t commit tees . Al though the

committees cannot ve to the opera t ion, they can seek to have the presi

dent withdraw his plans, or they can t ry to s top funding for the cover t

ac t ion. The committee members are not supposed to reveal the cover t

ac t ion in order to t ie the president ' s hands, but there have been leaks

from Capitol Hil l f rom t ime to t ime. Nonetheless , having a system that

requires the White House to keep Congress in the loop on cover t ac t ion

means tha t though the publ ic can ' t know about these ac t ions ahead of



Secret Operations

75

t ime, the ir representa t ives in Congress are ac t ing on the public ' s behalf

to make sure tha t cover t ac t ions are acceptable .

C o n t r o l l i n g C o v e r t A c t i o n

The overs igh t sys tem has no t e l imina ted the tens ion be tween the ex

ecut ive and legis la t ive branches over the control of inte l l igence opera

t ions. I t has , however , made i t more vis ible . Congress has for years

sought to force the president to provide information about cover t ac t ion

before the s tar t of opera t ions, but without success . Modern presidents

have c la imed execut ive pr ivi lege just as ear ly presidents had done. The

president is required to provide information only on a t imely basis and

may even restr ic t the br ief ings on cover t ac t ion to key members of Con

gress in the interests of national security.

In the cover t ac t ion se t up to f ree hostages taken by mil i tant s tudents

in Iran after the fall of the shah, Congress was kept in the dark to prevent

leaks tha t might have scut t led the ef for t . Even though the main mission

fa i led, some Americans were taken out of Teheran in a secre t opera t ion

in coopera t ion wi th Canada tha t would have been imposs ib le i f even a

hint of i t had become

public .

1 4

Although Congress was cr i t ica l of the

handling of the hostage rescue opera t ion, i t d id not complain about the

adminis tra t ion ' s re luctance to advise i t about the cover t ac t ion aspects

of the scheme. Perhaps Congress would have taken a dif ferent s tance

had the coopera t ive ef for t with Canada gone awry, but success is usual ly

welcomed by congress iona l oversee rs .

Fai lure to advise Congress about var ious aspects of the Reagan ad

minis t ra t ion ' s suppor t fo r the Cont ras in Nica ragua , however , became a

key factor in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. I t appears that Pres

ident Reagan was given bad advice about his responsibi l i t ies in te l l ing

Congress about his secre t opera t ions. Some of the president ' s c lose ad

visors thought tha t the oversight rules a l lowed them to keep secre t op

era t ions f rom the oversight committees i f the opera t ion was run direc t ly

f rom the Whi te House ra the r than th rough the CIA. A number of ru les

were viola ted, causing Congress to t ry to micro-manage the inte l l igence

process to prevent fur the r abuse . The publ ic was unhappy about the

a dmin i s t r a t ion ' s C e n t r a l Ame r ic a n po l i c y a nywa y a nd wa s une n thus ia s -

t ic about a iding the Contras in t rying to over throw the Sandinis tas in

Nica ragua and in g iv ing suppor t to the r igh t -wing reg ime in ne ighbor ing

El Salvador . Yet , the public favored cover t ac t ion to suppor t the

muja-

hedeen in Afghan is tan , even th ou gh the re w as no t m uch d is t inc t ion be

tween the Afghan rebels and the Contras .




R u l e s f o r C o v e r t A c t i o n

This demonst ra tes severa l impor tan t le ssons . Cover t ac t ion wi l l p rob

ably gain public support if the overall policy of which the action is a

par t is popular , and the public wil l oppose secre t opera t ions in suppor t

of a policy it does not l ike. Second, if the administration chooses to have

a cover t opera t ion, i t should use the system se t up to run i t , not turn to

White House amateurs as s tand- in case off icers . F inal ly , t rying to make

an end run around the rules se t up to control cover t ac t ion only leads

to abuse. There are other rules, as well , that will be discussed later .

The tension between the execut ive and legis la t ive branches of the U.S.

government regard ing cover t ac t ion has led to making Congress become

increasingly aggressive about i ts role in de termining the scope of U.S.

inte l l igence opera t ions, with the White House t rying to f ight back by

restr icting the information it gives Capitol Hill . Thus, CIA officials, re

quired not to l ie to Congress , have taken a page f rom DCI Bil l Casey 's

book , answer ing on ly the ques t ions asked in congress iona l hea r ings and

voluntee r ing no th ing . I f congress iona l staffers—some of whom are for

mer intelligence officers

themselves—do

the i r homework and ask the

r ight quest ions, the committees can perform their oversight funct ion. I f

they do not probe in the r ight places , the committees are l ike ly to remain

in the dark about secre t opera t ions.

W ith the end of the Cold W ar an d the defeat of the im placab le en

em y, new q ues t ions have been ra ised about cover t ac tion . W hether or

not covert action was a signif icant factor in the Cold War is extremely

difficult to say, but there is no question that the intelligence officers en

gaged in the bat t les thought they were doing the r ight thing in going

head to head wi th the Communis t adversa ry . C lea r ly the re were suc

cesses and fa ilu res , bu t one can on ly imagine w ha t m ight have ha pp en ed

ha d we done no th ing .

I s C o v e r t A c t i o n S t i l l N e c e s s a r y ?

Crit ics of cover t ac t ion argue tha t as the world ' s leading democrat ic

nat ion, the United Sta tes has no business engaging in such prac t ices . Yet ,

all the investigations of secret intell igence

operations—the

C h u rc h C o m

mittee, the Rockefeller Commission, the Joint Investigation of the

Iran-

C ont r a Affair—have a l l concluded tha t cover t ac t ion is and ought to

rem ain an im po rtan t par t of the U.S. na t io nal secur i ty arsenal and tha t

the capabi l i ty to carry out such opera t ions should be mainta ined, but

ca re fu l ly cont ro l led . No pres ident in modern t imes , Democra t o r Repub-




l ican, l iberal or conservative, has stood for election on a platform that

ca l ls for the end of cover t ac t ion, and no president in modern memory

has sa id tha t he would not use i t .

Pe rhaps cover t ac t ion made sense dur ing the Cold War when we were

fac ing an adversary who was highly ski l led in i ts use ; i t seemed then to

be good policy to f ight f ire with f ire . But now the problems are different.

W e a re no longer t ry ing to w in the hea r t s and m ind s of the un com m it ted

and to rol l back Communist ideology. Instead we face what former DCI

R. James W oolsey ca lled po iso nou s snak es , p rob lem s tha t du r ing the

Cold War were minor i r r i tan ts bu t now have become poten t ia l th rea ts

to American secur i ty . These inc lude the so-ca l led rogue s ta tes , na t ions

that seem to defy the rule of law and internat ional agreements , s ta tes

including I ran, I raq, Libya , and North Korea . Other threa ts come f rom

te r ror i s t s , some of whom are sponsored by the rogue s ta tes , f rom drug

dealers, and from foreign organized crime. Is there a role for covert ac

t ion in combating these threa ts? Should secre t opera t ions cont inue to be

a regular part of U.S. national security policy? So far , the answer seems

to be a qualif ied yes.

Dur ing the Cold War the CIA was accused of over throwing govern

m ents th rou gh ou t the wo r ld , a l thou gh in rea l ity i t r an re la t ive ly few such

opera t ions and with only l imited success . I t seems unl ike ly tha t cover t

opera t ions to depose Saddam Husse in or o the r d ic ta tor s we d is l ike wi l l

work un less the people they lead rea l ly want to depose them as we l l .

Mor e a nd mor e , we a r e se e ing ind ige nous move me n t s g r ow in oppos i

t ion to some of our former Cold War pa r tne rs , and these movements do

not seem to w an t our he lp . They und ers tan d tha t they could be ta rn ished

if they were to be perce ived as the handmaidens of the United Sta tes .

This d id no t keep House Speaker Newt Gingr ich f rom press ing $20 mi l

l ion on the CIA to over throw the government of I ran, of course , but the

g la re of publ ic i ty sur rou nd ing the i ssue w ou ld ce r ta in ly pre ven t the CIA

from carrying out the opera t ion in secre t .

15

Dealing with ter ror is ts is another vexing problem for cover t ac t ion.

Terror is t groups are dif f icul t to penetra te because they opera te in small

ce l ls and the ir members are prone to violence . Distaste for recrui t ing

such people i s g rowing , and t ry ing to s top or thwar t the i r opera t ions

does not seem to be a va l id ta rget for most cover t opera t ions. The same

may be sa id about opera t ions to s top drug dea le r s and organized c r im

inal opera t ions. Some conservat ives have argued tha t cover t ac t ion might

be used to disrupt te r ror is ts or cr iminals , but i t seems more l ike ly tha t

a combination of good intell igence and effective police operations will

be more successful at thwarting crime. This creates a different set of

problems, which wil l be discussed in a la ter chapter .




M a n a g i n g t h e N e w C o v e r t A c t i o n

Cover t ac t ion

operations—or

at least the capabili ty to carry out such

activity—has been eroded by the loss of inte l l igence veterans f rom the

Cold War pe r iod . Coupled wi th low mora le a t the CIA and inc reas ing

publ ic a t ten t ion , ca r ry ing ou t such c landes t ine work has become inc reas

ingly diff icult for the United States. Supporters of the system and re

formers a l ike nonetheless agree tha t the United Sta tes should mainta in

the capabi l i ty to carry out cov er t ac t ion. Only tho se on the

fringes—some

of them who decry cover t ac t ion as inappropr ia te for a f ree and open

socie ty and others who think i t ge ts in the way of other inte l l igence

work—have

called for an end to i t . Since the polit ical leadership in the

United Sta tes , Republican and Democrat a l ike , seems to want to have

the capabi l i ty to use cover t techniques, i t seems unl ike ly tha t cover t ac

t ion wi l l d i sappear anyt ime soon .

Evaluating the success or failure of a covert action is probably more

diff icult than judging intell igence collection or analysis. Keeping score in

the col lec t ion of intel l igence come s do w n to wh eth er or not the col lec tors

were able to obta in the needed information and i f the ir techniques were

appropr ia te . Evaluat ing analysis is more dif f icul t , but in te l l igence man

agers have deve loped use fu l sys tems for making such judgments . Eva l

uat ing cover t ac t ion is not so easy, though. Judging cover t ac t ion on the

basis of the accomplishment of the mission may miss the long- term im

pl ica t ions of what has been done.

In Guatemala , for example , the over throw of Jacobo Arbenz was seen,

in 1954, as a vic tory against the Communist menace in Centra l America ,

and the restoration of the shah in Iran kept a fr iendly ruler in power. In

the long run , however , wha t happened was ha rd ly of benef i t to e i the r

the United Sta tes or the target countr ies . Guatemala s l ipped into a per iod

of prolonged instabi l i ty and c ivi l war and thousands died. I ran has gone

from b ein g a stal w art de fend er of U.S. intere sts in the M idd le East, a lbeit

under a weak ruler , to an adversar ia l , theocra t ic s ta te tha t wants to

spread i t s fundamenta l i s t ph i losophy throughout the Musl im wor ld and

vie w s the U nited Sta tes as the Grea t Satan. Sho r t- term success ha s led

to long-term failure in both cases.

Of course , there is another s ide to the coin. There have been occasions

when a cover t ac t ion has fa i led, but the long- term outcome sought by

the Uni ted S ta tes was ach ieved anyway. Fa i lu re to over throw Sukarno

in Ind on esia in 1958, for exam ple , led to the dev elo pm en t of a stable

regime, a l though the United Sta tes could hardly c la im responsibi l i ty for

the outcome. Even in Chile there has been a vic tory, though not without

a high pr ice . The over throw of le f t is t Salvador Allende, sought so




strongly by the Nixon adminis tra t ion, came about in spi te of ef for ts by

the CIA. I t was Allende's o w n a r m y chief, Genera l Augus to P inoche t ,

w h o brou gh t d o w n h is p res id ent an d w i tho ut U.S . he lp . This led to al

most f i f teen years of draconian rule by the Chilean mil i ta ry; but democ

racy has now been res tored in Chi le , the ou tcome sought in va in by

N ixon. This wa s ha rd ly a vic tory for U.S. cover t ac t ion, bu t the end resul t

w a s w h a t W a s h i n g t o n w a n t e d .

Only Fidel Castro remains to demonstra te tha t cover t ac t ion is not a

m agic bu l le t . Efforts to ki ll h im consis tent ly fai led, an d op era t io ns to

destabi l ize his regime were neutra l ized by Castro ' s ruthless secur i ty

se rv ice . P ro pa gan da rad ios hav e no t don e the job e i ther . H ere i s a case

where shor t- term fa i lure has led to a long- term problem. In fac t , the

reve la t ions abo ut W ash ingto n ' s e ffor ts to br ing d ow n the Cu ban d ic ta tor

have only s t rengthened his hand and his resolve to mainta in the las t of

the Marxis t-Leninis t d ic ta torships .

R e c e n t C a s e s

Two more recent cases are instruct ive of how a shor t- term cover t ac

t ion vic tory can lead to an unexpected outcome in the long run. U.S.

a t tempts to unseat the Sandinis ta regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s by

backing a rag- tag coal i t ion of rebel groups quickly became widely

known. Many in the Uni ted S ta tes opposed th is po l icy , even though the

pre sid en t ca l led the rebels the m oral equ ivalen t of the Fo un din g Fa

the rs .

This led to pro tes ts , demonst ra t ions , and an ou tc ry in the Uni ted

States against covert action.

Although cover t suppor t for the Contras , as the U.S. -backed rebels

were known, d id no t b r ing down the Sandin is ta s , the po l icy ce r ta in ly

weakened the Managua government . F ina l ly , the Sandin is ta reg ime de

c ided to ho ld an open and hones t e lec t ion , pe rhaps to demonst ra te once

and for a l l tha t i t was the legi t imate government of Nicaragua. To every

one ' s surpr i se , the Sandin is ta s los t a t the po l l s the power they had won

by the bul le t . But the Contras did not win e i ther . Instead, a new power

cente r deve loped tha t pu t Nica ragua back on the road to s tab le democ

racy . One could a rgue tha t th is happened desp i te Washington ' s bes t e f

forts.

In Afghanis tan, a dif ferent s i tua t ion developed. Again, the cover t ac

t ion campa ign became wide ly known, bu t in th is case the adminis t ra

t ion ' s

policy—to

force the Sovie ts out of Afghanis tan, where they had

been ever s ince the ir invasion of the country in the

1970s—garnered

broad suppor t . The rebe ls in Afghan is tan—again , a coalit ion of disparate

groups—became known a s the mujahedeen, and the CIA establ ished a




c ondu i t t h r ough P a k i s t a n to p r ov ide the m wi th a r ms , a mmuni t ion , a nd

tra ining. Instead of protest ing, however , the American people cheered,

and there was a sense of vic tory when the Sovie ts were forced to with

draw. In this case , the vic tory was shor t- l ived.

The puppet regime the Sovie ts had insta l led in Kabul under former

security chief Najibullah did not collapse, as the CIA had predicted,

when the Sovie ts pul led out . Instead, the mujahedeen be gan f ight ing

among themse lves over who was to take power , the i r squabble lead ing

to chaos and civil war. The current r ise of the Taliban, a fanatic , funda

menta l i s t Musl im group , has produced a reg ime tha t i s , i f anyth ing ,

worse than the Sovie t-backed Najibul lah dic ta torship. A shor t- term vic

tory for the United Sta tes and for cover t ac t ion has become a long- term

disaster .

E v a l u a t i n g C o v e r t A c t i o n

The preceding examples demonstra te tha t judging the success or fa i l

ure of a cover t ac t ion sole ly on the accomplishment of the shor t- term

mission may not be par t icular ly sound. In fac t , the evaluat ion of cover t

action is a subject that has received relatively l i t t le attention by intell i

gence managers . F igur ing out whether or not a cover t ac t ion has been a

success is diff icult partly because covert action is a policy rather than an

intell igence function.

From the v iewpoin t o f the po l icymaker , the judgment about the u t i l

i ty or success of a covert action will be based on the success or failure

of the policy governing the action. From the perspective of the intell i

gence manager , the judgment wi l l p robably be na r rowly focused . Were

the r ight agents recrui ted? Was appropr ia te t radecraf t used? Was the

Clandestine Service 's part of the operation effective? Judging a covert

ac t ion f rom the manager ' s perspect ive is thus going to deal with oper

a t ional de ta i ls ra ther than overa l l outcomes. Seeing the issue only f rom

the po l icymaker ' s pe r spec t ive may ignore how the ou tcome was

achieved.

In the United States the evaluation of a covert action might well l ie

with the public , which learns about such ac t ions only f rom the press .

Inevi tably, the public wil l quickly hear about a cover t ac t ion tha t

fails—

such as the f lawed effort at the Bay of Pigs or more recently abortive

effor ts to over throw Saddam Hussein—but wil l rare ly hear about a suc

cessful venture . Examples abound of cover t ac t ions gone awry, but there

is relatively l i t t le information about success. This is not surprising, since

CIA managers have long bel ieved tha t the only way to have success is

not to talk about i t . One senior CIA officer is alleged to have said that



Secret Op erations 81

the secret of ou r success is the secret of ou r succ ess. Re ade rs m ay h av e

to repeat th is a few t imes to understand i t .

E x p l a i n i n g C o v e r t A c t i o n t o t h e P u b l i c

I t seems surpr i s ing tha t an agency supposedly so adept a t ca r ry ing

Amer ica ' s messages behind the I ron Cur ta in dur ing the Cold War has

never been able to explain i tself to the American people, especially in

regard to so controversia l a subjec t as cover t ac t ion. The CIA seems un

able to gauge public reac t ion to i ts opera t ions, does not ant ic ipate when

covert actions will be revealed, and usually falls back on the old l ine

tha t i t can nei the r confirm nor den y allega tions of intell igenc e activ-

i ty .

The s i tua t ion i s exacerba ted by those who in tend to do damage to the

Agency, including some former officers who circulate credible but false

stor ies about cover t ac t ion. The public , the press , and even scholars seem

to pick up these s tor ies and in repeat ing them give them a credibi l i ty

they do not deserve . Dur ing the Cold War the Sovie t Union and i ts a l l ies

took advantage of this s i tua t ion by c ircula t ing dis information about CIA

opera t ions to make i t appear tha t the CIA was carrying out i l legal ac t iv

i ty . Thus, the CIA was given the blame for assassinat ions i t d id not

commit , f a i led governments i t d id no t over throw, and bank scanda ls i t

d id not touch. In spi te of voluminous evidence tha t the CIA had nothing

to do with drug deal ing in the United Sta tes , press s tor ies to the contrary

have t r iggered severa l congressional invest iga t ions, each of which has

turned up nothing. Yet , the s tory does not die .

The issue of how a secre t in te l l igence agency should deal with the

public in a f ree and democrat ic socie ty wil l be addressed la ter . The issue

here i s how the

public—and

the officials they elect to run the govern

ment—can judge the util i ty, the value, and the success or failure of covert

ac t ion. There are no quick answers . Most cover t ac t ions wil l eventual ly

become public over t ime, especia l ly i f they involve large numbers of

opera t ives and s ignif icant resources as in Nicaragua or Afghanis tan. The

government , when i t chooses to use a cover t ac t ion , should be prepared

to expla in what i t d id and why i t d id so. Merely responding to negat ive

media coverage is not as effective as preparing for the inevitable reve

lations.

Because covert action will remain a part of the U.S. security arsenal—

no mains t ream pol i t ic ian has ind ica ted a wi l l ingness to g ive up the op

t ion of using cover t action—the issues of management and cont ro l

sho uld be review ed. The U nited Sta tes ha s the m ost careful ly constru cted

and scrut inized system of any major na t ion in managing cover t ac t ion.

I t should prec lude abuse . Nonetheless , problems s t i l l a r ise . Why?




F r i ct io n b e t w e e n th e P r e s i d e n t a n d C o n g r e s s

Par t of the problem re la tes to the inevi table f r ic t ion between the pres

ident and Congress over pol icy matters . Unlike inte l l igence col lec t ion or

analysis, covert action is a policy issue; but unlike other kinds of policy

debates, discussion of covert action must take place in secret if the action

is to have any chance of success . Thus, the president wil l be re luctant to

te l l Congress what ac t ion is planned, and the legis la tors wil l t ry to pry

the information out of the White House or out of the DCI. I f Congress

does not l ike what i t hears or what i t th inks i t knows, i t wil l seek ways

to shor t-c ircui t the cover t ac t ion plan. Nothing does this be t ter than pub

licity. Current legislation requires the DCI to brief the intell igence over

s ight committees on planned cover t ac t ion on a t imely basis , but

presidents f ind tha t these rules tend to inter fere with the ir f reedom of

action. The result is that presidents tend to tell Congress as l i t t le as pos

s ible , especia l ly when the cover t ac t ion may become controversia l , and

legis la tors tend not to l ike what they cannot learn about ahead of t ime.

The repor t ing requirement probably inhibi ts r isk taking in cover t ac

t ion, not a lways a bad thing. The Counci l on Fore ign Rela t ions, in i ts

s tudy on in te l l igence re form, sugges ted tha t CIA managers should be

rewarded for taking r isks in secre t opera t ions, but recent exper ience

shows tha t CIA off ic ia ls can be qui te vulnerable when a cover t ac t ion

goes sour .

1 6

The experiences of the Reagan period and efforts to crimi

nalize the actions of senior CIA officials in the

Iran-Contra

affair have

lef t CIA career is ts wonder ing how much suppor t they can expect i f they

take r isks that lead to failure. I t is one thing to be given an internal

rep r im an d for er rors in jud gm en t or fai lures in control. I t is qui te ano ther

to be treated as a criminal, to be hauled into court, and to face the enor

mous expense as well as the public humil ia t ion of a t r ia l .

M a i n t a i n i n g a C o v e r t A c t i o n I n f ra s tr u c tu r e

I f future adminis tra t ions want to mainta in the capabi l i ty to under take

cover t

actions—and

all the signs suggest that they

do—then

changes

must be made both in the p lanning and in the implementa t ion of cover t

ac t ion management and control . In recent years cover t ac t ion has been

initiated in a variety of ways. State Department off icials sometimes seek

to use covert action, init iatives for i t may come from the National Se

cur i ty Counci l , or the CIA i tse lf may suggest i ts use . No matter where

the idea comes from, new initiatives for covert action must, f irst of all ,

be coordinated a t the White House level , usual ly in a committee se t up



Secret O peration s 83

for jus t tha t purpose . The members usua l ly inc lude represen ta t ives f rom

the policy offices as well as from the CIA's operations directorate. The

aim of the committee is to make sure the cover t ac t ion f i ts in with other

pol icy plans and tha t i t is pol i t ica l ly acceptable to the National Secur i ty

Counc i l . This commit tee , however , may not be the bes t p lace to make

judgments about cover t ac t ion or analyze i ts chances for success . That

judgment ought to come much ea r l ie r in the p lanning process .

The CIA has had considerable success in es tabl ishing centers to deal

with such issues as counter inte l l igence ,

co u n t e r t e r ro r i s m,

and counte r -

narcot ics . Perhaps a s imilar center could be establ ished to deal with co

ver t ac t ion. The centers are supposed to br ing together representa t ives

of the var ious CIA direc tora tes , as well as representa t ives f rom the other

inte l l igence agencies . A ltho ug h this w as not favored a t f irst by tho se w h o

wanted a s t r ic t separa t ion between analysts and opera t ions off icers and

between inte l l igence and law enforcement , the centers have ac tual ly

worked we l l . Ana lys ts have demonst ra ted tha t they can pro tec t sources

and methods, opera t ions off icers have shown that they wil l not skew

analysis to suppor t opera t ions, and inte l l igence off icers f rom the CIA

have been work ing we l l wi th represen ta t ives f rom the o the r agenc ies .

At present, as far as we know, there is no covert action center either

in be ing or p lanned . The CIA does repor ted ly ask the most sen ior man

agers to review cover t ac t ion ini t ia t ives , but th is is not the same as sub

mit t ing such plans to an intensive analysis . The purpose of the intensive

review would be to look a t severa l issues tha t inevi tably ar ise in cover t

action. Since a covert action cannot, on its own, be successful, reviewers

ought to ask whether or not the cover t ac t ion f i ts in with some larger

scheme of foreign policy.

Second, the cover t ac t ion must have some rea l is t ic chance of ac tual ly

achieving the goal se t for i t . Throwing large sums of money a t a ques

t ionable project—as was done a t the Bay of Pigs in the 1960s and more

recent ly in va in a t tempts to over throw Saddam Hussein—not only is

was te fu l bu t a l so s tands a good chance of be ing counte rproduc t ive ,

squander ing prec ious cover t r e sources and pe rhaps pu t t ing agents in

danger .

Third, the cover t ac t ion must be ac t ivi ty tha t would, i f revealed, be

seen as sens ib le by the Am er ican publ ic . W ithou t publ ic su pp or t a cover t

ac t ion i s bound to be p i l lo r ied in the press , even though i t would have

been approved by the Whi te House and by the overs igh t commit tees in

Congress . The adminis t ra t ion ought to be prepared to expla in why i t

chose to under take the cover t ac t ion i f the matter becomes public , a pos

s ib i l i ty tha t seems inev i tab le in today ' s media -hungry wor ld .

Final ly , the cover t ac t ion ought to have long- term as well as shor t-

term benef i ts . Too of ten adminis tra t ions have chosen to use cover t ac t ion

for a quick f ix in a s i tua t ion where wiser heads might have chosen a




different app roa ch . Unless a cover t ac t ion offers som e ho pe tha t the long -

term outcome wil l be as benef ic ia l as the shor t- term resul ts , the cover t

action m ay be a po or cho ice for po licy m ak ers. If policy officials h ad tak en

the longer view in Cuba or Chile , for example , they might have chosen

different policies.

A C o v e r t A c t i o n C e n t e r

A cover t ac t ion center within the inte l l igence system would be able to

weigh the var ious issues to de termine i f a planned cover t ac t ion meets

the cr i te r ia out l ined above. Analysts and opera tors would be able to

d iscuss the long- te rm prospec ts for p lanned opera t ions and make rec

ommendations to pol icy off ic ia ls who would make the f ina l decis ion on

using covert action. If such a system had been in place, policy officials

might have understood the fol ly of the invasion of Cuba because analysts

knew the re was no groundswel l o f suppor t fo r the over throw of Cas t ro .

In the case of Chile , the analysts not only rea l ized tha t there was no way

to prevent the e lec t ion of Salvador Allende; they saw no evidence tha t

he would re fuse to s tep down when h is te rm was over .

In addi t ion to changing the way cover t ac t ion is reviewed within the

inte l l igence bureaucracy, we a lso need to overhaul the exis t ing system

for oversight . No one is suggest ing tha t the present method of repor t ing

to the oversight committees is a mistake; but in assessing this matter , the

Counci l on Fore ign Rela t ions has ra ised an important issue: Cover t ac

t ion can be ki l led by leaks, and this seems to be happening with increas

ing f requency in recent years . The W hite Ho us e som etim es leaks a cover t

action plan either to gain support for i t or to see if there are objections

to i t . Congress has been known to leak as well , sometimes to undercut

support for a covert action or at least to voice i ts displeasure.

Cover t ac t ion cannot be successful unless secrecy is mainta ined unt i l

the ac t ion has taken place . After the ac t ion mainta ining secrecy may be

impossible . Therefore , the White House ought to be prepared to defend

the pol icy choices i t made, and the oversight committees have to expla in

that they reviewed the cover t ac t ion. Dur ing the Cold War both the

White House and Congress chose to take the path of deniabi l i ty , par t ly

because to do so meant tha t a cover t ac t ion choice might be repeated

without a breach in secrecy. Today, however , cover t ac t ions receive so

much scrut iny tha t they ought to be defended af ter the fac t , a l though

the secre t resources involved s t i l l deserve protec t ion.

Fur ther , the CIA ought to be more aggressive about declassifying and

re leasing information about past cover t ac t ions tha t remain controversia l .

Agency managers do not seem to rea l ize tha t the public is wil l ing and

able to understand and analyze these cases , of ten to the benef i t of the




CIA. I f anything, the system se t up by DCI Casey, in an agreement with

Congress ear ly in the Reagan adminis tra t ion, for a systematic review and

re lease of his tor ic inte l l igence documents has been a l lowed to fa l ter , es

pecia l ly in regard to controversia l issues such as the over throw of Arbenz

in Gua tem ala or the Al len de ep iso de in Chi le . The CIA has p lead ed tha t

i t lacks the resources to carry out a more extensive review program, but

tha t i t has sought more suppor t f rom Congress is not c lear .

Covert action is an irresistable tool for American presidents. Since it

wi l l be needed in the fu ture , in te l l igence managers must ma in ta in the

infrastructure to plan, review, and carry out such ac t ions. There seems

to be no good reason to shif t cover t ac t ion away f rom the CIA to some

other par t of the government . The CIA has the exper ience and the per

sonnel to do this well , but they need the backing of the White House ,

Congress , and the Amer ican publ ic . Fa i l ing such suppor t , the CIA wi l l

cont inue to have to face public anger when cover t ac t ion goes awry and

wi l l cont inue to seem to be a rogue e lephant , even though everyone in

Washington wi l l know be t te r .

Notes

1.

Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counter-

intelligence

(Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995), p. 121.

2.

As related by Professor Larry M artin of Boston Un iversity, who as Ladislav

Bittman managed such operations for the Czech intelligence service.

3. The last such executive o rder, EO 12333, issued by the Reagan adm inistra

tion in 1981, states, No person employed b y or acting on behalf of the U.S.

Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

4.

Brian Cloughley, Pakistan Secret Service Leaves V iolent Legacy from Cold

War, Washington Times, 11 February 1995, p. A8.

5.

Am ong the best books on the subject are Stephen F. Knott, Sec

ret and Sanc

tioned: Covert Operations

and

the American Presidency

(New York: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1996); and Christopher Andrew, For the President s Ey

es Only (New

York: HarperCollins, 1995).

6. Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Un derpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence

Community,

International Journal

of

Intelligence and Counterlntelligence,

vol. 1, no.

1, 1986, p . 15.

7.

Andrew,

For

the

President s Eyes

Only, pp . 27-28.

8. Anne Karalekas, His tory of the Cen tral Intelligence Agency, in William

M. Leary (ed.), The Central Intelligence Agency: H istory and Documents (Tuscaloosa:

University of Alabama Press, 1989).

9. Uri Bar-Joseph,

Intelligence Intervention

in the

Politics

of

Democratic

States

(University Park, PA: Perm State Press, 1995).

10.

Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, pp . 64-65.

11. Michael W arner, Soph isticated Spies: CIA 's Links to Liberal An ti-




Communis t s , 1949-1967, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-

intelligence, vol . 9 , no. 4, pp. 425-433.

12 .

Ka ralekas , His to ry of the Cen tral Intell igence Ag enc y, p. 66.

13 .

A good account of how the Church Commit tee inves t iga t ion was managed

app ears in Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: C ongress and Intelligence (Chicago:

Dorsey Press, 1988).

14 . Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (Har r i son-

burg, VA: R. Donnelly & Sons, 1986).

15.

T im Weiner , U.S. P lans to O ust I ran 's Lead ers Is an Op en Secret before

It Begins, New York Times, 26 January 1996.

16.

Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence, report of an in

dependent task force, Counci l on Foreign Relat ions , 1996.



CHAPTER 5

Catching the Enemy's Spies

I t s tands to reason tha t i f the United Sta tes is running espionage op

e ra t ions aga ins t o the r count r ie s , those same count r ie s may be spying

on the United States. Of course, if the United States is carrying out es

pionage, i t is only because it is necessary for national security, i t is ac

cepted as a part of international practice, and there is no alternative for

se lf -defense . I f , however , o ther countr ies run espionage opera t ions

against the United Sta tes , they are seen to be evi l , they must be viola t

ing in te rna t iona l law, and they must be s topped . Counte r in te l l igence

(CI)—the bus iness of ca tch ing enemy spies—has long been a part of

the inte l l igence world and has deep roots in the United Sta tes . Today

coun te r ing esp ionag e i s jus t one pa r t o f counte r in tel l igence , w hich no w

may include counter ing ter ror ism, narcot ics t raf f icking, or global

cr imes. We can examine these other threa ts la ter , but we should begin

by looking a t the system designed to s top espionage by other inte l l i

gence services.

George Washington unders tood ve ry we l l the uses of e sp ionage

against the Br i t ish , but the Colonia ls were chagr ined and f rustra ted to

discover tha t they were i l l -prepared to take ac t ion against Br i t ish spies

who penetra ted the ir a rmy and the ir government . One of the f i rs t spies

the Br i t ish used against the upstar t Americans was Dr . Benjamin Church,

the surgeon genera l o f the Amer ican Army.

1

I t wa s C hur c h who ha d

leaked information about the weapons held by the colonia l mil i t ias in

Lexington and Concord . I t was no wonder tha t the Br i t i sh seemed to

know so much about the p lans of the revolu t ionar ies in and a round

Boston . Ch urch w as the m ole . W hen the good doc tor w as d iscovered

af ter his mistress gave an encoded le t te r f rom Church to an acquaintance




in the Amer ican Army, the Amer icans d iscovered tha t they had passed

no laws aga ins t e sp ionage and could do no more than ja i l Church and

repa t r ia te h im to England .

Subsequent ef for ts correc ted tha t fa i lure , and soon the Committee on

Spies and a law against spying were establ ished. Major John Andre

found out the ha rd way when he was cap tured a f te r he lp ing Benedic t

Arnold in the ef for t to be tray West Point and was hanged for his work.

I f Washington ' s p lans to k idnap Arnold had succeeded , the former

Amer ican he ro might have ended up swinging f rom a rope as we l l .

Th rou gh ou t the Revolu t ionary W ar , the Am er icans had to face esp ionage

opera t ions by Tory loyal is ts and the ir Br i t ish masters , but the lesson was

wel l lea rned . The d iscuss ions sur r ou nd ing the Con s t i tu t iona l C onv ent ion

after the war—as i l lustra ted in the Federa l is t Papers—show how c on

ce rned John Jay and Alexander Hamil ton were about po ten t ia l fo re ign

ef for t s to undermine or pene t ra te the pending new government .

2

Their

wri t ings show their de terminat ion to give the president the dual role of

carrying out fore ign opera t ions and protec t ing the government f rom for

e ign opera t ions.

Dur ing the Civ i l War Amer icans showed tha t a l though they were ea

ger to have protec t ion f rom their enemies, they were not wil l ing to sac

r i f ice legal or c ivi l r ights . President Abraham Lincoln ' s unprecedented

step of denying suspected Confedera te spies the wri t of habeus corpus

and Lafayet te Baker ' s draconian pol ice methods were re jec ted by the

pos t -Civ i l War Congress . Baker had se t up wha t amounted to a sec re t

pol ice in the s tyle of author i tar ian regimes, and his minions were known

to drag c ivi l ians out of the ir houses in the middle of the night , throw

them in ja i l , and t rea t them harshly.

3

In spite of his cruel tactics, Baker

never picked up the plot to assassinate Lincoln, a major counter inte l l i

gence failure.

Meanwhile , Alan Pinker ton, a former ra i l road detec t ive , was able to

pro tec t L incoln us ing methods tha t would be fami l ia r today . P inker ton

pene t ra ted groups p lo t t ing aga ins t the pres ident and , us ing surve i l lance ,

iden t i f ied the famous Confedera te spy Rose Greenhow, a l though not be

fore she had given away the bat t le plans for what turned out to be the

Union disaster at the First Battle of Bull Run.

4

P inker ton la te r became

Genera l McClel lan ' s chief of inte l l igence , consis tent ly overest imating the

strength of the Confedera te enemy and thus helping McClel lan snatch

defeat f rom the jaws of vic tory in the Penninsula campaign. Perhaps this

i l lustra tes the not ion tha t good CI off icers do not necessar i ly make good

collectors of intell igence or good analysts.



Catching the Enem y's Spies 89

C i v i l a n d H u m a n R i g h t s

Concern for legal , c ivi l , and human r ights has of ten af fec ted the way

in which Amer icans apply CI methods . This i s sue came up dur ing the

hys te r ia sur ro un din g the Bolshevik Revolu t ion , w he n U.S . At to rney G en

e ra l Pa lm er m ou nte d ra ids aga ins t suspec ted red s , and it a rose aga in

in the M cC arthy pe r io d after W orld W ar II , w h en the Wiscon sin sen ator

sought to ous t suspec ted Communis ts f rom the government . As i t tu rned

out , Sovie t -d i rec ted Communis ts had indeed pene t ra ted the government ,

bu t it w as J. Ed gar H oo ver a nd the FBI, no t Josep h McC arthy , w h o

rooted them out , a ided by defec tors and double agents and by infor

mation der ived f rom intercepts of Sovie t cables .

5

Racism was cer ta inly a fac tor in counter inte l l igence in the United

Sta tes bo th d ur in g a nd after W orld W ar I I. Th ere w as re la t ive ly l i tt le

c lamor , fo r example , when pe rsons of Japanese descent were rounded

up and thrown in to wha t amounted to concent ra t ion camps ea r ly in

W orld W ar II ; an d the dea th sentences app l ied aga inst Jul ius an d E thel

Rosenberg , the Sovie t sp ies who t ransmi t ted in format ion about the

atomic bomb to the ir Sovie t handlers a t the end of World War I I , might

have been a b i t l igh te r had they no t been both Jewish and Communis ts .

There was a s t rong outcry when revela t ions about CIA and FBI ac t ivi ty

dur ing the Vie tnam War showed tha t spec i f ic ru les , des igned to prevent

abuse in CI cases , w ere rou t ine ly v io la ted by bo th the John son an d Nix on

adminis tra t ions, a l l to f ind out whether fore ign inf luence was responsible

for the anti-war movement in the United States. Of course, if the tactics

ten de d to int im idate the peac e-niks , so m uc h the bet ter , as far as the

two adminis t ra t ions were concerned . The reac t ion to reve la t ions tha t the

rules had been broken was so s t rong tha t i t not only led to fur ther reg

u la t ions aga ins t abuse bu t a l so spur red congress iona l hea r ings and even

tual ly a new system of oversight to protec t c i t izens f rom extra- legal

practices.

A P le tho ra o f Spy Ca ses

Toward the end of the Cold War , a ple thora of espionage cases became

kn ow n to the publ ic , inc lud ing the John W alker spy r ing , w hich revea led

U.S.

N av y code secre ts to the Sovie ts; the Ch inese m ol e Larry W u-ta i

Chin, who spied for Bei j ing for decades; and the infamous Aldr ich Ames

case,

in which a number of Sovie t agents , spies for the United Sta tes ,

were executed after their identit ies were blown by Ames, a CIA officer .

Perhaps more t roubl ing was the case of Jonathan Pollard, who spied for

the Israe l is dur ing the 1980s, showing tha t f r iends as well as adversar ies




engage in such practices. In all these cases the legal restraints on CI

ac t iv i ty were sc rupulous ly fo l lowed, pe rhaps de lay ing the apprehens ion

of the Americans working for the other s ide . This s tands in marked con

trast to the work of the reknowned CI officer in the CIA James J. Angle-

ton, who hounded a number of CIA off ic ia ls out of the Agency in the

1960s using what would be unacceptable tac t ics today.

6

We can examine the rules la ter , but to begin we should s tar t with the

fundamenta ls of counter inte l l igence . Counter inte l l igence remains an im

por tant par t of the American inte l l igence system, just as i t does through

out the rest of the world. Explor ing i t in some deta i l has been made

easier by public ly avai lable information about spy cases , te r ror is t ac t iv

i ty , c r ime gro up s, narcot ics deale rs , an d a ll k in ds of bad g u ys the in

te l l igence system is supposed to counter . We can s tar t by looking a t

counterespionage, the most basic and fundamenta l of a l l CI opera t ions.

The t rad i t iona l wisdom about counte r ing esp ionage i s tha t a pene t ra

tion of the adversary's intell igence service is the most effective way to

lea rn about the opera t ions be ing run aga ins t the count ry . Al though th is

is rarely successful, when it does work, i t enables CI and security officers

to thwar t the adversa ry ' s spy ing opera t ions and pe rhaps tu rn them in to

an advantage . The cases we know about i l lustra te this qui te well . No

penetration of an intell igence service is a better i l lustration of this than

the case of Kim Philby.

P h i l b y , t h e M a s t e r S p y

Kim Philby was a British intell igence officer , a member of MI-6, Brit

ain 's foreign intell igence service and a Soviet mole.

7

This is one of the

few cases where the agent was recrui ted to become a member of an

inte l l igence service , and Philby carr ied out his mission a lmost to perfec

t ion. He had been recrui ted a t Oxford Universi ty , in par t because of his

communis t lean ings , and began h is in te l l igence ca ree r dur ing the Span

ish Civi l War , ostensibly as a journal is t sympathet ic to the Spanish Fas

c is t genera l Francisco Franco, but secre t ly repor t ing to the Communists

suppor t ing the Loya l i s t s .

Dur ing World War I I Phi lby worked for MI-6, r is ing in rank as the

war progressed. After the war ended, Phi lby s tayed on a t MI-6, even

tually becoming a senior counterintell igence officer and liaison to the

Amer ican CIA, where he worked c lose ly wi th James J . Angle ton , the

CIA' s top counte r spy . Angle ton was convinced tha t the re was a mole in

the CIA but he apparent ly never rea l ized tha t i t was Phi lby, and not a

CIA off icer , who was the penetra t ion. Phi lby was thus able to give away

to his Sovie t masters the CIA's secre t opera t ions, inc luding the planned

invasion of Albania , and information about CIA's espionage ac t ivi t ies

against the Soviets.




Another case involving a mole , recrui ted to penetra te a host i le inte l

l igence service , w as th a t of Larry W u-ta i Ch in, w h o w as sent to inf il t ra te

Amer ican in te l l igence soon a f te r the Communis ts d rove the Na t iona l i s t s

ou t of m ain lan d C hina in 1949. Ch in beca m e a t ransla to r for the A m er

icans on Okinawa and eventua l ly worked h is way in to the CIA as a

transla tor for the Fore ign Broadcast Information Service . Although Chin

did not have access to the most sensi t ive opera t ions, he was a regular

employee of the agency and could meet with CIA off icers who might

have use fu l in te l l igence for h is Communis t Chinese handle r s . We don ' t

know the ex ten t o f the damage Chin was ab le to do because he com

m it ted s uic ide after be i ng arreste d by the FBI w h en a defec tor g ave aw ay

his ident i ty .

8

R e c r u i t i n g a M o l e

These two cases aside, recruiting an agent to infil trate an intell igence

service is chancey indeed. Even if a hostile intell igence service were to

f ind someone of the r ight age and with the r ight credent ia ls and who

was wil l ing to take on the task, just ge t t ing this person into the pool of

appl ican ts wo uld b e no m ean feat. Every yea r tho usa nd s of peo ple a pp ly

for jobs in American inte l l igence , and only a re la t ive handful are asked

to take the next s tep, which is to send in a de ta i led background form.

From this handful only a se lec ted few are invi ted to Washington to in

terview, and many who reach this s tage fa i l to pass the polygraph tes t

or some o the r hurd le in the h i r ing process . The prospec t ive pene t ra t ion

would probably fa i l to pass the secur i ty screening, a l though there are a

few cases where secur i ty checks fa i led. Most of these cases involved em

ployees a l ready on board , r a the r than new h i res . Thus , i t seems unl ike ly

that there would be a payoff for an inte l l igence service t rying to pene

tra te American inte l l igence by using this s t ra tegy.

The more probable way to infil trate an intell igence service is to recruit

an agent who is a lready a member of the target service . Most profes

s ional inte l l igence off icers would, however , recognize immedia te ly tha t

they were being targeted and would not fa l l for the ploy unless the ir

super iors decided to have the inte l l igence target pre tend to go a long with

the rec ru i tment to see wha t deve loped . Al though th is works in f ic t iona l

espionage s tor ies , i t is unl ike ly to be product ive in rea l i ty .

W a l k - I n s

Most efforts to penetrate a hostile intell igence service involve defectors

or w alk -in s, intell igenc e officers w h o seek to f lee their o w n co un try or

to se l l out to the enemy. Most of the cases we know about f i t in to this



Catching the Enemy s Spies 93

A m e s a n d N i c h o l s o n

Of course , the cases of Aldr ich Ames and Harold J . Nicholson, both

walk- ins to the Russians f rom the CIA, are the ones with which we are

m ost famil iar beca use so m uc h wa s revealed ab ou t them . Sti ll , bo th cases

follow the pattern of an intell igence officer who seeks to sell out to the

enemy. In the cases of many Communis t wa lk- ins , inc lud ing those jus t

ment ioned , ideo logy had as much to do wi th the i r se l l -ou t a s the money

involved. In the Ames and Nicholson cases , however , as well as those

of other American inte l l igence off icers who sought out the oppor tuni ty

to spy for the enemy, greed was the motivat ing force tha t drove them

into the enemy camp. Ames was able to give his Sovie t handlers infor

mation about American and Bri t ish penetra t ions of the KGB, resul t ing

in the deaths of a t least ten of them. Nicholson gave away the ident i t ies

of several classes of new case officer trainees, thus ending their careers

in the Clandest ine Service before they ever got s tar ted.

1 2

Although greed and ideology seem to be the major fac tors behind the

defection of intell igence officers to their adversaries, anger, frustration,

revenge, and perhaps the thr i l l of such ac t ivi ty cannot be discounted.

Unlike f ic t ional spies , who are lured to work for the ir enemies by sexual

encounters or by blackmail , the defec tor or walk- in cases we know about

don ' t seem to involve such fac tors . Trying to escape a bad marr iage or

a deteriorating family situation has been a factor in defections as well as

a lcohol i sm or drug use .

Presented with a walk- in , in te l l igence services not only would check

to make sure the walk- in is genuine and rea l ly has something to offer

(by seeking proof of access to secret materials, for example) but also

would want to make sure the wa lk- in i s s tab le enough to cont inue to

opera te within his own inte l l igence service . The walk- in , who might very

well want to defec t on the spot and not re turn to his service , might be

told tha t he would have to earn his t ransfer by spying on his service for

some specif ied per iod of t ime. Of course , the walk- in would be given an

escape plan in case he had to bai l out of his s i tua t ion. Not providing

such a plan was the er ror the Israe l is made in handling the Pol lard case .

Double Agents

Another t radi t ional method of inf i l t ra t ing an opposi t ion inte l l igence

service is to turn a penetra t ion into a double agent . In order to save

himself f rom possible prosecut ion, a mole might be wil l ing to cont inue

to work with the service tha t control led him, but he would repor t to the

service in which he was the penetra t ion and perhaps pass fa lse infor-




mation to his opposition controllers at the direction of the service in

which he was the mole . This sounds confus ing , and i t i s no wonder tha t

som e w ri ters hav e referred to this s i tua t ion as a w ildern ess of m irro rs .

The evidence tha t such double-agent cases have been successful is l im

ited. In the recent spy cases neither the CIA nor the KGB tr ied to double

the agents they caught spying for the other s ide . The CIA did not con

sider do ing this in e ither the Am es or the Nicho lson case , no r did the

KGB; the Sovie ts preferred execut ion, whereas the Americans chose plea

bargains . Are such double-agent tac t ics even possible?

According to Fidel Castro , a l l the agents the CIA recrui ted in Cuba

were a l legedly tu rned and run aga ins t the Amer ican se rv ice , and ap

parent ly the same was t rue for a t least some American agents in East

Germany before the Ber l in Wall fe l l . We know that in Opera t ion Double-

Cross in World War II , Brit ish intell igence officers were able to turn the

German sp ies they caught and were ab le to use them to he lp suppor t

the decept ion designed to convince Hit ler tha t the All ied invasion a t

Normandy was just a fe int and tha t the rea l invasion was to come a t the

Pas de Cala is . I t thus seems possible tha t under the r ight c ircumstances,

a mole can be turned into a double agent , but we have no deta i ls of

modern cases to conf irm this .

There are other ways to learn about a host i le inte l l igence service be

sides trying to infil trate the organization. For one intell igence service to

be aware of the ident i t ies of a t least some of the members of opposi t ion

inte l l igence services is not unusual . Thus, c landest ine survei l lance of the

known intell igence officers may well reveal their contacts or their oper

a t ional pa t terns . I t may be possible to deduce f rom this the nature of

the ir ta rgets or the ir opera t ional in terests . The survei l lance has to be

discree t , however , so as not to a ler t the opposi t ion tha t they are be ing

wa tc he d .

Moni tor ing of communica t ions may a lso provide in format ion of in te r

est as long as i t can be done without de tec t ion. Modern systems of com

munica t ions surve i l lance have la rge ly e l imina ted the need to tap phones

or pu t bugs in wa l l s , bu t these methods may s t i l l p rove use fu l under

cer ta in c ircumstances. According to press repor ts , a CIA off icer was ar

rested in Vienna in 1997 while trying to bug the office of several North

Korean representa t ives , and Israe l i in te l l igence off icers were caught in

Switzer land around the same t ime trying what the professionals ca l l an

au di o op . In bo th cases the local pol ice w ere a lerted by w ha t a pp ea rs

to have been clumsy tradecraft by the intell igence officers install ing the

taps and bugs . A more sophis t ica ted approach might have been be t te r ,

but i t is possible tha t in tercepts were not picking up the wanted mater ia l

off -s i te , thus making the audio op necessary.




A Bizarre Case

In a rat he r biza rre case in 1998, a CIA officer n am ed D ou gla s G roa t

was ar rested by the FBI af ter he a t tempted to blackmail the CIA by

threatening to reveal de ta i ls of CIA c landest ine opera t ions to s tea l code

and other opera t ional mater ia ls f rom fore ign inte l l igence services by

bre aki ng into the ir emb assies . The deta i ls of the Groat case em erg ed after

Groa t and the government reached a p lea ba rga in . Groa t had th rea tened

to seek, in discovery, de ta i ls tha t the government would have preferred

to keep secre t . I t turned out tha t Groat was a former pol ice and mil i ta ry

officer who had trouble in his previous careers. In some foreign intell i

gence services, an attempt by a career off icer to blackmail his masters

might well resul t in the quie t disappearance of the off icer concerned.

Penetra t ions, the use of walk- ins , or survei l lance may indeed reveal

something about the activit ies of a hostile intell igence service directed at

one ' s own inte l l igence system, but these counter inte l l igence col lec t ion

opera t ions have to be suppor ted by de fens ive measures to pro tec t one ' s

own service against the enemy. This process is , a t least in the American

sys tem, cons ide red more an adminis t ra t ive func t ion than one involv ing

inte l l igence opera t ions. Perhaps this might he lp to expla in why fa i lures

have occurred f rom t ime to t ime.

D e f e n s i v e M e a s u r e s

Typical ly , defensive measures fa l l under the ca tegory of secur i ty; they

involve the protec t ion of da ta and fac i l i t ies against penetra t ion by an

adversary, as well as the careful screening of personnel to ensure the ir

reliabili ty, to monitor their behavior and limit their access to sensitive

information. No matter how careful ly these processes are handled, his

to ry shows tha t a de te rmined in te l l igence profess iona l who wants to

overcome secur i ty hurdles can sometimes do so, as we can see in cases

that have come to l ight in recent years .

Am er ican in te l ligence , beg innin g w i th the OSS and cont inu ing as m ore

modern in te l l igence agenc ies deve loped , has re l ied on background in

ves t iga t ions based on mate r ia l suppl ied by the appl ican t to de te rmine

the re l iabi l i ty and s tabi l i ty of potent ia l new hires . This means tha t pro

fessional invest iga tors have had to interview acquaintances, family, and

former employers of each potent ia l in te l l igence recrui t , a pa instaking and

expensive process , to ver ify the data submit ted. The invest iga tors look

for d isc repanc ies in the da ta suppl ied by each appl ican t in vo luminous




i ca lly to m ak e sure tha t the em ployee has no t gone sou r and be com e

either an agent of a fore ign service or engaged in compromising behavior

such as drug use or cr ime. This is not a fool-proof process , a l though in

the negat ive cases we know about , i t was the interpre ta t ion of the ma

chine ' s readouts ra ther than the machine i tse lf tha t was a t faul t . Larry

Wu- ta i Chin repor ted ly sa id tha t he repea ted ly passed the po lygraph

exam because he was able to l ie easi ly in English, but he might have had

diff iculty if the exam had been given in his native Chinese dialect. Al

dr ich Ames was shown to have ind ica ted decept ion on the po lygraph a t

least twice but in each case was le t go by the opera tor or his supervisor .

Cases of success are a lso well known. Harold J . Nicholson was quickly

put under survei l lance and eventual ly ar rested af ter c lear ly t rying to beat

the m ach ine in 1995, an d E dw ard Lee H ow ar d, the CIA officer w h o

defected to the Soviets in 1985, w as f ired after th e p ol yg ra ph led to rev

e la t ions about h is misconduc t .

1 3

Most of us in the CIA bel ieved tha t the

polygraph would ca tch us i f we broke the secur i ty ru les or engaged in

conduc t unacceptab le to the Agency .

T h e B a c k g r o u n d C h e c k

The background check is not foolproof e i ther , as we have learned f rom

some espionage cases . Invest iga tors in the Ames case never seemed to

be aware of his increasing a lcoholism or his binge dr inking, and a se

curity officer sent to Colombia to verify the source of his new found

wealth—Ames c la imed i t came f rom his wife ' s r ich Colombian

family—

fa i led to de tec t tha t Ames was wildly oversta t ing the ir resources . In the

years s ince the author has le f t the CIA, secur i ty invest iga tors have f rom

time to t ime checked on s tudents or former col leagues, but they seem to

fol low a rote scr ipt and never probe beyond the formal quest ions on

their in terview forms.

In fact, the security system depends a great deal on self-revelation. A

determined rogue officer may be able to beat the system, at least for a

whi le , by h id ing de roga tory in format ion and coaching ind iv idua ls l i s ted

as references. Of course , we have to remember tha t the system is gen

era l ly successful in weeding out problems, and the cases tha t we know

of represent only a handful of security failures in a system that has over

fifty yea rs had re la t ive ly few disasters . As usu al in inte l l igence , ho w ev er ,

i t is the disasters tha t we remember .

Another de fens ive mechanism t rad i t iona l ly appl ied in in te l l igence

work i s ca l led compar tmenta t ion , which means tha t in te l l igence workers

a t a l l levels have access only to the information they need to know to

do the ir jobs. This need to know pr inciple is supposed to prevent an

insider bent on obtaining information for a foreign intell igence service




from having unl imited access within the system. In severa l of the well-

known spy cases , secur i ty a le r t s were sounded when the moles began to

seek out sens i t ive in format ion to which they were no t supposed to have

access . This move was the f i rs t c lue tha t Jonathan Pollard was a secur i ty

r isk and one of the s teps in bui lding a case against Harold Nicholson.

At the CIA and in other American inte l l igence services , compar tmen

tation is

reinforced

by secur i ty access controls tha t provide physica l bar

r ie r s to keep unauthor ized ins ide rs f rom a reas where they have no

bus ines s . Thu s , even ins ide the c lose ly gua rde d CIA headq uar te r s , w her e

employees have Top Secre t secur i ty c learances, there are vaul ted doors

wi th secur i ty locks tha t r equi re employees who do not be long to a pa r

ticular off ice to request entry and identify themselves at the door. Of

course , th is requires tha t the gate-keepers quest ion even people they

know re la t ive ly we l l , which was probably how Aldr ich Ames was ab le

to gather mater ia ls f rom off ices where he had no business , but where he

wa s we l l known .

D o c u m e n t C o n t r o l s

CIA off icers are t ra ined ear ly in mainta ining control over documents

en t rus ted to them so tha t o the rs who have no need to know about the

mater ia l cannot casual ly peruse them. Even in vaul ted off ices , sensi t ive

mater ia ls are supposed to be locked away in safes within the vaul ts for

added secur i ty , and the vaul t s a re regula r ly checked to make sure the

pract ice is fol lowed. Perhaps the worst breach of good secur i ty prac t ice

in this regard was the

Kampiles

case, in which a junior off icer , William

Kampiles , f i red dur ing his probat ionary hir ing per iod in the 1970s, took

away with him a manual for the then-Top Secre t KH-11 photo sa te l l i te .

1 4

No one knew the document , despi te i ts Top Secre t labels , was missing

unti l Kampiles revealed to a f r iend tha t he had sold the manual to the

Sovie ts . Kampiles was ar rested by the FBI and ended up serving a

lengthy pr i son sen tence .

Good secur i ty prac t ices can in theory prevent even a c lever mole f rom

gaining access to more than just a slice of the intell igence pie, but as we

know from the Ames case , even tha t s l ice can be devasta t ing. Given the

his tory of inte l l igence in which moles appear f rom t ime to t ime despi te

even the most s t r ingent secur i ty , in te l l igence managers have to a ssume

that there is a mole , even i f they have no evidence . But there has to be

a balance between the extreme paranoia of James Angle ton and the lax

pract ices tha t le t Ames run loose for a lmost nine years . Among inte l l i

gence professionals , good secur i ty prac t ices have to be learned and en

forced, even though this may crea te an a tmosphere tha t is less warm

tha n ma ny ma na ge r s ma y p r e f e r .




Counte r ing esp ionage requi res no t jus t lea rn ing about the opera t ions

of host i le inte l l igence services and good secur i ty prac t ices to l imit dam

age;

i t a lso requires punishment of spies to de ter others f rom espionage

against the United Sta tes . Thus, there has to be a combinat ion of inte l

l igence w or k an d law en forcemen t . In the United S ta tes , th is has not bee n

so easy to achieve. Part of this diff iculty resulted from animosity that

was genera ted by J . Edgar Hoover , the legendary direc tor of the FBI ,

Amer ica ' s t r ad i t iona l counte r in te l l igence organiza t ion .

C I A - F B I F r i c t i o n

Hoover was in ten t on prevent ing the deve lopment of a c iv i l ian-based

inte l l igence service , even before World War I I . Although he could not

stop the creation of the OSS, he was able to keep it out of Latin America,

which he considered to be the FBI ' s turf. His leaking of the plans Bill

Donovan had submit ted to President Roosevel t in la te 1944 about cre

ating a follow-on service to the OSS delayed the creation of the CIA.

Hoover ' s leak and subsequent press s tor ies led the public to be l ieve tha t

Donovan wanted to crea te a secre t pol ice in the image of the hated Ge

s tapo of Naz i Germany.

When Genera l Hoyt Vandenberg deve loped the leg is la t ion tha t even

tual ly led to the crea t ion of the CIA in 1947, the m ar ke d- up bi l l conta in ed

specif ic res tr ic t ions tha t kept the CIA from having pol ice or subpeona

power or any role in internal secur i ty .

1 5

The law was in te rpre ted so

str ic t ly tha t for many years the CIA was unable to have i ts own guard

force and had to use secur i ty pol ice a t the gates and guard posts f rom

the Genera l Se rv ices Adminis t ra t ion . When Mir

Aimal

Kansi , the Pak

is tani te r ror is t , gunned down severa l CIA off icers on the road leading to

the CIA headquar ters bui lding in 1994, i t was the Fair fax County pol ice

who came to the scene . I f Kansi had been caught a t the t ime, the CIA

guard force would have had no ju r i sd ic t ion ou ts ide CIA proper ty .

In i ts ear ly days, because of Hoover ' s res tr ic t ions, there was a lmost no

contac t be tween the FBI and the CIA. One FBI specia l agent was ap

pointed as l ia ison with the CIA, and i t was this agent a lone whom CIA

officers were to contact.

1 6

Occasional FBI repor ts were sent to analysts a t

the CIA, but they were of l imited ut i l i ty . An informal agreement was

apparen t ly reached be tween Hoover and James Angle ton tha t the CIA

would dea l wi th i t s own in te rna l secur i ty , inc lud ing the pursu i t o f sus

pected moles and penetra t ions. Because of the legacy of this agreement ,

the FBI was not ca l led in unt i l la te in the Howard case : Ed Howard had

bee n dism issed b y the CIA in 1983 w he n his fa iled p oly gra ph , and re-

inves t iga t ion sho w ed poss ib le c rimina l behav ior and d ru g use , bu t the

FBI w as app are nt l y no t inform ed unt i l a fter Ho w ar d left W ash ing ton .




I m p a c t o f t h e H o w a r d C a s e

Accord ing to au thor David Wise , who wrote ex tens ive ly about the

Howard case , sen ior CIA of f ice r s , d i smayed tha t Howard tu rned out to

be a problem while he was being prepared to serve his f i rs t opera t ional

ass ignment in Moscow, were e i the r a shamed, embar rassed , o r a r rogant

in fail ing to inform the FBI that Howard was being f ired for cause. In

the event , H ow ar d so ug ht o ut KGB off icers in 1984 w hile in Vienn a an d

la ter e luded FBI survei l lance in order to escape to the USSR. Howard

w a s ,

as far as we know, the only CIA officer ever actually to defect to

the Sovie ts dur ing the Cold War; but some of the CIA's Sovie t agents

tha t Howard a l legedly be t rayed , we know now, were ac tua l ly g iven

away by Aldr ich Ames .

In the a f te rmath of the Howard case , Congress manda ted tha t coop

era t ion between the FBI and the CIA be increased, and FBI agents were

ass igned to CIA headquar te r s . This coopera t ion was inc reased even fur

the r wh en DCI W ill iam W ebste r e s tab li shed the Counte r in te l ligence Cen

ter a t the CIA and FBI agents were assigned to i t . The move was spurred

by w h at bec am e kn o w n as the Year of the Spy, in 1985, w he n the Jo hn

Walker spy r ing, the Howard and Pollard cases , and the case of Larry

Chin became public . The press made i t appear tha t the U.S. Inte l l igence

Communi ty was r idd led wi th sp ies and tha t these cases were on ly the

t ip of the iceberg. From the perspect ive of the counter inte l l igence and

secur i ty off icers who had broken the cases , however , the ar rests of these

fore ign agents appeared to be a major vic tory.

Coopera t ion be tween the FBI and the CIA in counte r ing esp ionage

improved even fur the r in the Ames case , a l though press repor t ing a t the

t ime and the subsequent f lood of books on the case might make i t seem

otherwise . A careful reading of the case shows how both agencies

worked together to s top Ames, a l though i t was too la te to prevent the

enormous damage he had done to Amer ican and Br i t i sh in te l l igence as

sets in the former Soviet Union. Dogged efforts by CIA and FBI profes

s iona ls, w ork ing toge the r , eventua l ly broke the Am es case desp i te s loppy

secur i ty , fa i lure to fol low up on repor ts f rom Ames 's co-workers tha t he

was a problem, and some c lever t radecraf t by Ames to e lude detec t ion.

1 7

After Ames was arrested, another senior CIA officer , Harold J. Nich

olson, a former station chief, was found to be working for the Russian

Intell igence S ervice (SVR). In the Nic ho lson case, w hic h surface d in 1996,

FBI and CIA officials worked together as soon as evidence of Nicholson's

betray al surfaced. Nich olson fa iled a po lyg rap h, and af ter survei l lance

w as begu n , was seen photo gra ph ing secret docum ents in h is o ffice us ing

a CIA document camera he had obta ined f rom the Off ice of Technica l




Services . This ra ther bla tant f launt ing of proper espionage techniques by

a man who was supposed to be an exper t led to Nicholson ' s a r res t .

C o p s v e r s u s S p i e s

The fa l lout f rom the Ames case led to even fur ther FBI encroachment

onto t radi t ional CIA

turf.

A senior FBI agent was made chief of coun

terintell igence at the CIA, and the role of FBI agents abroad was ex

panded. When legis la t ion enabled the FBI to task CIA and other

American inte l l igence uni ts to col lec t information tha t might be used in

cr iminal cases , fear grew among some inte l l igence professionals tha t the

t rad i t iona l ba r r ie r be tween in te l l igence and law enforcement was e rod

ing. This ha s led to w ha t som e obse rvers ha ve ca l led the cop s versu s

sp ie s p r ob le m.

1 8

Beginning with the founding of the CIA, intell igence officers overseas

were supposed to dea l wi th counte r in te l l igence i ssues abroad , whereas

the FBI was the lead agency work ing aga ins t e sp ionage in the Uni ted

Sta tes . I f the CIA uncovered information about Americans spying for

foreign powers, i t was to turn the intell igence over to the FBI for action.

The CIA would dea l wi th esp ionage involv ing i t s own employees jus t

as did the mil i ta ry counter inte l l igence uni ts , such as the U.S. Army

Co un terin tell ig en ce C or ps or the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Inves

t iga t ions . The recent spy cases , however , show tha t more coopera t ion

be tween in te l l igence and law enforcement i s needed .

Intell igence officers— spies —are not interested in making cases in

the sam e w ay as are law enforcement officers , the co ps . Inte l l igence

off icers want to obta in information by recrui t ing sources and exploi t ing

them. Law enforcement off ic ia ls want to ar rest law breakers , convic t

them of cr imes, and see tha t they are punished. These two a ims are rea l ly

incompatible. Intell igence officers are reluctant to see their sources ar

rested, even if they are criminals, because if the sources are arrested,

the ir abi li ty to pr ov id e ne w in form ation effec tive ly ceases . The cops w an t

evidence tha t enables them to ar rest a perpetra tor of a cr ime, and they

want to be able to present tha t evidence in cour t to obta in a convic t ion.

Thus , the ev idence has to be handled in ways tha t a re cons is ten t wi th

goo d legal prac t ice . The cops hav e to be pre pa red to tes ti fy in cou r t a bo ut

how they obta ined the ev idence , and they must be prepared to provide

information in disc losure to the perpetra tor ' s defense . The spies want

nothing to do with such prac t ices .

Inte l l igence off icers would be hard-pressed to develop information

from sources tha t might be considered evidence or to handle the infor

mation according to legal rules . The spies could hardly be expected to




appear in cour t , destroying the ir cover in the process; nor would they

be interested in reveal ing the ir sources and methods to a defense a t tor

ney. I t ' s easy to see , under such c ircumstances, why cul ture and t radi

t ion, as well as a marked dif ference in professional procedure , c rea te the

spies versus cops di lemma. Legal rules exacerbate the problem.

C o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e t o C r i m i n a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n

In the Ames and Nicholson cases , counter inte l l igence off icers in both

the CIA and the FBI were able to obta in warrants to put the suspected

spies under survei l lance f rom a l i t t le -known secre t body, the Fore ign

Inte l l igence Survei l lance Cour t . This cour t can author ize wire taps , phys

ical surveillance, mail opening, or other such practices to obtain infor

mat ion to p inpoin t an Amer ican who might be spying for a fore ign

power . No such rules are necessary i f the suspect is a fore ign espionage

agent . The a im of the warrants is to ident ify spies; but to ar rest them

and obta in evidence of the ir espionage, a cr iminal invest iga t ion is

needed. The spies cannot do this . They must turn the cases over to the

cops ,

who then obta in war ran ts under the c r imina l code , ga the r ev idence

suitable for tr ial , and make the arrests.

The adminis t ra t ive problem here i s to de te rmine when the counte r -

in te l l igence inves t iga t ion ends and when the c r imina l p rocedure begins .

The United States has no f ixed rule for this turnover and relies on a

ser ies of informal agreements be tween the inte l l igence agencies and the

Just ice Depar tment about the t ransi t ion f rom spy business to cop busi

ness .

Clearly, a f irewall is necessary to make sure that intell igence

sources and methods are not dragged into a cr iminal case , or tha t a cour t

case might be compromised in the interest of protec t ing secre t asse ts . In

severa l recent espionage cases defense lawyers have threa tened to chal

lenge the constitutionality of the Foreign Intell igence Surveillance Act,

but plea bargains have kept these cases f rom coming to t r ia l .

Although i t is cer ta inly necessary to s top, a r rest , and punish enemy

spies , in te l l igence managers want to be sure tha t no loose ends are le f t

dangl ing . They want to be ab le to de te rmine the ex ten t o f the damage

done by the spy and ensure tha t no remaining enemy agents are le f t in

place . In the Ames case there was much discussion about the possibi l i ty

that Ames had recruited other CIA officers for his Soviet masters and

tha t they had g one unde te c ted . Unless the pr inc ipa l agent— Am es, in th is

case—willingly

gives up his subagents or reveals the extent of his op

e ra t ions , the re may be no way to de te rmine wi th ce r ta in ty the answers

to these r iddles . In many espionage cases a plea bargain was one tool

used to obta in information for a damage assessment . In the Ames case ,




i t seems c lear tha t Ames had kept some of his secre ts to

himself,

p e r h a p s

in hopes of one day wri t ing a book about his exploi ts .

The end of the Cold War has no t ended spying by Amer ica ' s adver

sar ies or competi tors . I f anything, the s i tua t ion is now more complica ted

because the number of po ten t ia l enemies , o r adversa r ie s , has inc reased ,

no t d imin ished . We can see f rom the Ames and Nicholson cases tha t the

Russian intell igence service has taken up where the KGB left off , and

that o ther co untr ies are wil l ing an d eager to t ry to stea l A m erica ' s secre ts .

This m ean s tha t counte r in te ll igence has to rem ain a po ten t too l in A m er

ica 's intell igence arsenal. Press reporting suggests that i t is a sign of

intell igence failure when spies are caught; to the contrary, i t is , in fact,

a form of v ic tory . The concern should be about how many sp ies remain

at large.

C o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e a s a C a r e e r

To ensure Amer ican capabi l i ty to combat e sp ionage , more emphas is

must to be put on t ra ining and establ ishing a cadre of professionals who

devote themselves to counter inte l l igence as a career . J im Angle ton and

his associates had become career CI officers in the early days of the CIA,

but the ir system of inst i tut ional ized paranoia crea ted ser ious problems.

They suspec ted as po ten t ia l moles everyone they d id no t know and t rus t

pe rsona l ly , and the hos t i le c l ima te th is a t t i tude c rea ted was counte rpro

duc t ive and , to some people , dangerous . I s the re a way to avoid th is

di lemma? Paul Redmond and his associa tes , the CIA off icers instrumen

ta l in ca tching Aldr ich Ames, were c lever , dedica ted, but hardly para

noid . The i r example shows tha t wi th proper t r a in ing and exper ience , a

CI corps tha t uses professional techniques to work against enemy espi

onage can be bui l t .

Tra in ing has to be coup led w i th a secur i ty a tm osp here tha t m ake s c lea r

to inte l l igence employees tha t they are under scrut iny a l l the t ime. This

means cons is ten t appl ica t ion of background checks , f ind ing a more re

l iab le mechanism to rep lace the po lygraph , and an indoc t r ina t ion in se

cur i ty awareness for everyone. Inte l l igence is a specia l profession, and

those who engage in i t must be prepared to sacr if ice personal f reedoms

routine ly enjoyed by employees in other work in the interest of preserv

ing the secur i ty of inte l l igence sources and methods. This is a hard se l l

in the Un i ted S ta tes , w he re so mu ch e m ph as is i s p laced on the pro tec t ion

of civil and human rights. Stil l , for those of us who toiled in intell igence

dur ing the Cold War , accept ing these restr ic t ions seemed a very low

price to pa y for the exci tem ent of servin g the cou ntry in this specia l w ay .



104 Fixing the Spy M ach ine

Notes

1.

Thomas F l emi ng ,

Liberty: The American Revolution

(New York: Viking Pen

guin, 1997), p. 147.

2.

Steph en F . Kno t t , Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American

Presidency (New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), pp. 42-47.

3. Edwin Fishel , The Secret War for the U nion (New York: Houghton Miff l in,

1996), p. 27.

4.

Ibid. , pp.

58-61.

5. Rober t L. Benson and Michael Warner (eds .) , VENONA : Soviet Espionage

and the American Response (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996) .

6. Ronald Kessler ,

Inside the CIA

(New York: Pocket Books, 1992), pp. 60-62.

7.

Phi l l ip Knight ley, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby (New York: Vin

tage Books, 1988).

8. Kessler, Inside the CIA, p. 155.

9. D avid E. M urp hy , Sergei K on dra she v, an d George Bailey, B attleground Ber

lin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale Universi ty Press, 1997).

10 . C hris t ine Spolar , On ce Sp urn ed , Pol ish Spy Re turns to H ero 's W elcom e,

Washington Post,

28 Ap ri l 1998, p. A l l .

11 .

Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard (New

York: H arp er & Row, 1989) ; Sey mo ur M. H ersh , The Traitor : The Case agains t

Jonathan Pol lard , New Yorker, 18 January 1999, pp. 26-34.

12.

Ar th ur S. Hulnick , U nd ers tan din g the Am es Case ,

International Journal

of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 8 no. 2, pp. 133-154; for detai ls on the

N ich olso n case, see R. Jeffrey Sm ith an d Ro bert Su ro, W aiting to Close the Tr ap

on Suspected Spy,

Washington Post,

24 January 1996, p.

A l .

13. David Wise , The Spy Who Got Away (New York: Random House, 1988) .

14. The auth or w as one of Ka m piles ' s supe rvisors a nd raised the issue of f ir ing

him . The detai ls of w ha t hap pe ne d sub seq uen t ly ap pe ar in Jeffrey T. Richelson,

A Century of Spies

(New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1995), pp. 346-347.

15 . Ar thur Dar l ing , T he Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Governm ent

to 1950 (State College: Pennsylvania State Universi ty Press, 1990), p. 28; see also

M ichael Tu rner , CIA-FBI No n-C oop erat ion : Cu l tural Trai t or Bureau crat ic In

er t i a? International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence,

vol. 8, no. 3, p.

265.

16 .

Car tha DeLoach, Hoover's FBI (Wash ington, DC : Regn ery Pu bl ishing, 1995);

Ronald Kess ler , The FBI (New York: Pocket Books, 1993).

17 .

Hul n ick , Un der s t and i n g t he Am es Cas e .

18.

Stewar t D. Baker , Sho uld Co ps Be Spies?

Foreign Po licy

no. 97 (Winter

1994-95) , pp . 36-52; see also A rthu r S. Hu lnick, Intell igence an d Law Enforce

ment : The Spies Are Not

C o p s ' P r ob l em, '

International Journal of Intelligence and

Counterlntelligence, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 269-286.



CHAPTER 6

Stopping the Bad Guys

During the Cold War , beginning even before the establ ishment of the

modern U.S. intell igence system just af ter World War II , the major focus

of America ' s in te l l igence resources was the Sovie t Union, the only nat ion

tha t had the power to des t roy our count ry . Never the less , and f rom the

very beginning, in te l l igence resources were a lso spent on other ta rgets .

The CIA and the other services could not ignore potent ia l threa ts or hot

spots a round the wor ld , g iven the wide range of Amer ican in te res ts

abroad and the huge number of Amer icans who l ived , worked , o r t r av

e led overseas . Collec tors and analysts a l ike worked on country issues ,

inc luding pol i t ics , economics, and mil i ta ry and socia l problems as well

as such t ransnat ional issues such as te r ror ism, instabi l i ty , and revolut ion.

The U.S. Inte l l igence Community had to be able to respond to pol icy

makers ' needs, no matter the subjec t .

Since the end of the Cold War , a myth has prol i fera ted tha t American

intell igence failed to watch the the non-Soviet topics and was il l-

p repared to dea l wi th the t r ansna t iona l i s sues tha t had became the new

national security threats. This was hardly the case. In fact, the intell igence

system had been col lec t ing and analyzing information re la ted to these

problems for many years . But the inte l l igence system was in la rge par t

merely a passive ac tor . I t was designed to a ler t pol icymakers to issues

wi th which they had to dea l , bu t i t was no t supposed to g ive recom

mendat ions for ac t ion. The ac t ion was lef t to the Sta te Depar tment or the

military for response. In rare cases, as we have seen, the intell igence

system might provide cover t ac t ion as par t of the pol icy, but tha t was

carr ied out by a handful of opera t ives .




T h e E q u a t i o n H a s C h a n g e d

In the post-Cold War era the equat ion has changed. The inte l l igence

sys tem h as a l ready been en l i s ted to he lp com bat the t r ansna t iona l th rea ts

by using a combinat ion of counter inte l l igence and law enforcement tech

niques. In some cases cover t ac t ion might be added to the mix. This

means tha t in te l l igence asse ts wil l no longer be used only as passive

observers; they wil l instead become par t of the arsenal of measures used

to f ight a t least some of the problems. The issues are wide-ranging, f rom

the growth in weapons of mass destruct ion control led by so-ca l led rogue

states to terrorism, global organized crime, narcotics traff icking, and in

dus t r ia l e sp ionage .

Can U.S. in te l l igence , e i ther on i ts own or working with fore ign se

cur i ty services , combat these new threa ts to na t ional secur i ty? Clear ly

some of the same techniques t r ad i t iona l ly used in counte resp ionage op

era t ions might well prove useful . Just as in counterespionage, however ,

combating the threa ts wil l require coopera t ion among inte l l igence , law

enforcement , and mil i ta ry organiza t ions in ways tha t none of the par t ic

ipants are used to , or in ways they may very well oppose . Yet , they must

be brought together i f they are to deal with the new threa ts and beat

them back.

W e a p o n s o f M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n

Working aga ins t weapons of mass des t ruc t ion (WMD) ought to be the

easiest target for intell igence because the threat seems more like the Cold

War issue than any other . We successful ly t racked Sovie t weaponry dur

ing the Cold War using a combinat ion of photo reconnaissance , SIGINT,

and espionage. Now that the Cold War is over , we can look back and

see that the U.S. intell igence system's analysis of Soviet military capa

bi l i ty was, i f anything, oversta ted, a l though we had the order of ba t t le

cor rec t ly ana lyzed . What we may have missed was poor ha rdware pe r

formance and the inflexibili ty of the battle tactics. This was i l lustrated

very well in the Gulf War in which the I raqis , using Sovie t equipment

and tac t ic s , p roved qui te vu lne rab le to Weste rn weaponry and ba t t le

techniques .

1

Despite assurances tha t Russia no longer ta rgets the United Sta tes and

that the Un ited Sta tes is not c urren t ly po int in g i ts m issi les a t Russia , both

sides co uld e asily retarg et if nec essary . Thu s, som e U.S. intell igence effort

must remain focused on Russia, to keep track of not only i ts strategic

weapons but a lso i ts abi l i ty to mainta in secur i ty and control over i ts

arsenal . The possibi l i ty tha t a rogue genera l or cr iminal group might take



Stopping the Bad Guys 107

control of a s t ra tegic weapon cannot be ruled out . S ince China is poten

t ia l ly an adversary of the United Sta tes and has some l imited capabi l i ty

to launch s tra tegic missi les a t the United Sta tes , addi t ional resources

have to be directed against the Beijing arsenal as well .

Using a mix of col lec t ion methods, U.S. in te l l igence working with so

phis t ica ted Western services ought to be able to t rack weapons of mass

destruct ion in the hands of potent ia l adversary s ta tes other than Russia

and China , but the targets are e lusive . Weapons of mass destruct ion are

comprised of nuclear , chemical , and biologica l systems. Nuclear weap

ons a re the most f r igh ten ing , pe rhaps because many of us , r emember ing

the end of W orld W ar II , ha ve seen for ourse lves the aw eso m e p ow er

and gruesome des t ruc t ion of an a tomic explos ion . Al though nuc lea r

weapons have not been used in ac tual combat s ince World War I I , the ir

destruct ive power , increased many t imes over , remains a threa t . Both the

United Sta tes and Russia mainta in large arsenals of such weapons, a long

w ith France , Grea t Br i ta in , an d C hina , the so-cal led N ucle ar C lub . In 1998

India and Pakis tan bo th te s ted nuc lea r dev ices desp i te wor ldwide con

demnation. Thus, these two powers joined the second t ie r of nuclear

weapons s ta tes , a g roup tha t inc ludes I s rae l and probably Nor th Korea .

A ltho ug h the re is l i tt le fear tha t India or Pak is tan mig ht a t tack the U nited

Sta tes , there is grea t anxie ty over the possibi l i ty tha t the two countr ies

could use nuc lea r weapons aga ins t each o the r .

If the U.S. intell igence system is capable of tracking nuclear capabili ty,

why did i t fail to pick up the 1998 testing by India until the tests were

completed? The s tudy carr ied out in the wake of this in te l l igence fa i lure

has not ye t been made public , but the reasons seem clear enough, just

based on press repor t ing .

2

Clear ly , the sa te l l i te reconnaissance systems

that would have been able to de tec t prepara t ions for a tes t were not

focused on the tes t ing area targets . This resul ted f rom a combinat ion of

factors: India carried out a deception to divert attention to a missile test;

analysts who should have recognized the potent ia l for tes t ing based on

publ ic s ta tements by the new government in New Delh i and who should

have provided requirements to the sa te l l i te managers fa i led to do so;

apparent ly none of the inte l l igence agencies had developed a capabi l i ty

to col lec t information f rom human sources in India ; there was a problem

wi th mi r r o r ima g ing by

less-than-expert

analysts with l i t t le exper ience

who judged Ind ia ' s in ten t ions based on fau l ty pe rcep t ions ; and pol icy

off ic ia ls seemed uninterested in the potent ia l for t rouble . The system had

no dif f icul ty in de tec t ing the tes ts carr ied out by Pakis tan, but the dam

age had been done .

Since nei ther Pakis tan nor India can hur t the other with nuclear weap

ons unt i l each develops a de l ivery system and the abi l i ty to mate the

weapon and the del ivery vehic le , the inte l l igence targets now are obvi

ous . I t ap pe ar s tha t as of 1998, Ind ia w as perfecting the abili ty to use




miss i le s aga ins t bo th Pakis tan and poss ib ly China , whereas the reg ime

in Is lamabad might choose an a ir - launched weapon. Sure ly U.S. in te l l i

gence needs no fur ther guidance to f igure out what inte l l igence data i t

should be col lec t ing and analyzing in regard to this issue .

W e a p o n s an d D e l i v e r y S y s t e m s

Equally t roubl ing is the possibi l i ty tha t other na t ions, some of which

seem to be rogue s ta tes tha t do not behave according to the rules es tab

l ished by the United Nations or genera l in ternat ional prac t ice , might

have nuclear capabi l i ty . These s ta tes inc lude North Korea , I ran, and I raq.

North Korea has hinted tha t i t has se t as ide i ts nuclear weapons devel

opment program, and I raq ' s fac i l i t ies were badly damaged by Israe l in

its attack on the Osirak reactor , even before the Gulf War targeted sus

pected nuclear facili t ies.

3

None the less , bo th Nor th Korea and I raq remain

suspect as possible or potent ia l nuclear s ta tes . I ran, another rogue s ta te ,

m ay hav e nuc lea r w arh ea ds tha t it ob ta ined f rom Russ ia or Khaz akhs tan ,

according to some press repor ts , but i t does not ye t have the capabi l i ty

to manufac ture i t s own.

As we have seen, c rea t ing a viable nuclear threa t requires both a

w ea po n an d a de l ive ry sys tem. The m ost ava ilab le de l ive ry sys tem seem s

to be a missi le with a nuclear warhead. The rogue s ta tes do not have

nor do they seem likely to obtain the kinds of aircraft that might be used

for a nuclear bomb. We have seen I raq ' s capabi l i ty to use missi les in the

Gulf War when Saddam Hussein ' s forces f i red shor t- range surface- to-

surface Scud missiles at Israel and Allied targets. We know that Iran has

tested missi les i t has acquired f rom China and North Korea; and, of

course , Nor th Korea i tse lf has tes ted missi les of shor t- and medium-

range capabili ty. So far , none of these countries has been able to mate a

non -conven t iona l w arh ea d to such a miss i le , bu t they m ight ve ry w e l l

have the sophis t ica t ion to do so. To have a credible threa t , however ,

would require the tes t ing of a missi le with a nuclear warhead a t tached,

something none of the rogue s ta tes has ye t been able to do.

Just because these countr ies have not ye t tes ted a nuclear weapon does

not m ean tha t the U.S . In te l ligence Com m un i ty sh ould be c om placent

about keeping an eye on them. During the Cold War U.S. in te l l igence

t racked nuc lea r deve lopments in a number of count r ie s f rom Argent ina

and Brazi l to South Afr ica . In one case tha t remains something of a mys

tery, a U.S. satell i te reportedly detected a nuclear air burst off the coast

of South Afr ica , and the supposi t ion a t the t ime was tha t th is could have

been a South Afr ican nuclear tes t and tha t the white- run government

had obtained help from Israel for the test .

4

Of course , bo th nat ion s den ied

the repor ts .



Stopping the Bad

Guys

109

K e e p i n g T r a c k o f W e a p o n s a n d D e l i v e r y S y s t e m s

Nonetheless , as evident by i ts t rack record in the Cold War , U.S. in

te l l igence is qui te capable of keeping t rack of nuclear weapons and de

l ive ry sys tem s wh en it w an ts to . A com bina t ion of ph oto reconna issance ,

SIGINT, and HUMINT ought to enable us to f ind ou t who ac tua l ly has

nuclear weapons and the ir s ta tus . Just as in the Cold War , though, the

ac t ion tha t might be taken once the weapons or de l ive ry sys tems a re

ident if ied l ies outs ide the purview of inte l l igence . A diplomatic or mil i

ta ry res po nse , an d no t cover t ac t ion, is the mo st l ike ly w ay for the U nited

States or i ts all ies to respond to a rogue state 's nuclear threat.

More insidious is the possibi l i ty tha t non-sta te

actors—terrorists

or

guerr i l la bands—or rogue s ta tes may deve lop a por tab le nuc lea r dev ice ,

a su i tcase bomb. This would be used as a te r ror weapon ra the r than as

a combat weapon. In fac t , according to press repor ts , the United Sta tes

had just such a weapon in i ts inventory unt i l 1989.

5

This device, the

Spec ia l Atom ic Dem ol i t ion M uni t ion , w e igh ed about s ix ty p ou nd s and

could be carr ied in a backpack by a para trooper . Designed to be used to

destroy f ixed targets, i t would have had the explosive force of one kil-

o ton . I t ' s no t c lea r how the pa ra t rooper p lac ing the device would have

escaped injury in the blast , but s ince the United Sta tes does not re ly on

su ic ide miss ions , some pro tec t ion for the pa ra t rooper was probably en

vis ioned.

Russian genera l Alexander Lebed f r ightened many in the West in 1997

when he suggested in one of his pol i t ica l speeches tha t the former Sovie t

Union had hundreds of such su i tcase weapons , many of which were no

longer under government cont ro l . Fur the r inves t iga t ion revea led tha t Le

bed was speaking more for pol i t ica l e f fec t than to warn the West . The

Russians denied a t the t ime tha t they had such weapons, but a defec tor

from the Soviet military intell igence service, the GRU, told congressional

invest iga tors in 1998 tha t he had scouted potent ia l s i tes in the United

Sta tes for such weapons, which he c la imed were the s ize of a golf bag.

6

The image crea ted by Genera l Lebed was one of te r ror is ts bl i the ly car

r y ing

Samsonite-style

luggage th rough a i rpor ts o r c i t ie s , d ropping them

at su i tab le loca t ions , and wa tch ing the m us hr oo m c louds grow . The GRU

defec tor ind ica ted tha t the weapons were to be de tona ted by remote

control.

T e r r o r is t s a n d N u k e s

We expect tha t guerr i l la groups or te r ror is ts would not have the so

phis t ica t ion required to crea te a rea l ly small bomb, even though the in-




formation needed to crea te such a weapon seems readi ly avai lable on

the Internet . The nuclear mater ia l necessary for a bomb is well guarded

in both the United Sta tes and the former Sovie t s ta tes . Even though t iny

amounts have been d iscovered in the hands of smuggle r s , a g roup would

have to ob ta in severa l k i los of r ad ioac t ive , bomb-grade uran ium or p l u -

tonium and then have the machinery to form the components in to a

weapon. This sounds good to f ic t ion wri ters such as Tom Clancy, but

the reality is quite different.

7

Inte l l igence resources are well p laced to t rack nuclear mater ia ls par t ly

because of the wil l ingness of most na t ions to coopera te in this endeavor .

Shar ing of inte l l igence among secur i ty services ( the methodology tha t

revealed the small amounts of loose nuclear mater ia l and ident if ied the

smugglers) coupled with s t r ic t controls among the nuclear s ta tes is prob

ably a s t rong deterrent to those who might t ry to bui ld a sui tcase bomb.

Besides , rogue s ta tes , te r ror is ts , and guerr i l la groups have a much easier

way to achieve the ir ends. They can develop cheaper and more easi ly

cons t ruc ted chemica l or b io log ical wea po ns , the w eap on of m ass d es t ruc

tion of choice for all of them.

C h e m i c a l a n d B i o l o g i c a l W e a p o n s

Chemical weapons are usual ly found in the form of poison gas and

have been used by combatants ever s ince World War I . Both s ides used

var ious po ison gases in tha t war , and both s ides began a t the same t ime

to develop protec t ive gear to permit soldiers to f ight while gas was being

used. The gas mask became standard issue for soldiers in most armies ,

and the expec ta t ion was tha t chemica l weapons would be used in fu ture

wars . In fac t , the major combatants in World War I I had the capabi l i ty

to use pois on gas bu t ref ra ined f rom do ing so. The United Sta tes did use

na pa lm and f lamethrow ers in W or ld W ar II, Korea , and Vie tnam . These

w eap on s use a jel lied pe t ro leum pro du c t bu t a re no t cons ide red chemica l

weapons in qu i te the same way as po ison gas .

M od ern technology h as inc reased the range of po ison an d debi l i ta t ing

gases as we l l as w ays to manu fac ture such prod uc ts . W hereas the Un i ted

Sta tes has been going through the process of destroying i ts ra ther im

mense s tockpiles of chemical weapons, other s ta tes seem to be producing

new chemical weapons of the ir own. We know from the exper ience of

the Gulf War tha t ident ifying chemical weapons using overhead recon

naissance or battlef ield observation is not so easy. In fact, one weapons

du m p in I ra q wa s de s t r oye d us ing c onve n t iona l m e tho ds a nd a ppa r e n t ly

resul ted in the re lease of toxic gas tha t caused l inger ing i l lness among

American and other U.N. forces . A CIA study published af ter the event

to explain what happened concluded that the munitions did

not have




the usua l chemica l weapons mark ings and the re was no o the r way to

te l l wha t they were .

8

That chemica l w eap on s can be d isguised to look l ike conven t iona l m u

n i t ions compounds the in te l l igence problem, bu t much can s t i l l be done .

Overhead reconna issance can iden t i fy produc t ion

facilities—they

seem

to have particular characteristics visible from above—as well as s torage

dep ots an d han dl in g fac il it ie s. Chem ica l w ea po ns d o requi re va r io us spe

c ia l handling techniques, and these too, may be observable . I f t ime per

mi t s ,

i t i s conce ivable tha t human sources may be rec ru i ted to provide

informat ion about a na t ion ' s chemica l weapons . Al though the West d id

not have a l l the da ta i t would have l iked about I raq ' s chemica l weapons

capabil i ty , i t d id know quite a bi t even before the Gulf War s tar ted. This

inte l l igence was not sa t isfac tory to ba t t le f ie ld commanders , but i t was

suff ic ient to a l low for planning and t ra ining before the combat phase

began , and some ta rge ts were iden t i f ied dur ing the bombing tha t p re

ceded the land a t tack.

We kne w some th ing a bou t how I r a q migh t e mploy c he mic a l we a pons

based on the ir use in the I ran-I raq war and on the I raqi use of poison

gas against Kurdish diss idents . This enabled analysts to develop the sce

na r ios needed to pred ic t wha t I raq might do . As i t tu rned out , I r aq d id

not ac tual ly use chemical weapons against e i ther the U.N. forces or

against Israe l . Nonetheless , I srae l is went through gas-mask dr i l ls and

buil t var ious shel ters to defend against the possibi l i ty tha t they would

become v ic t ims of SCUD-launched poison gas .

T e r r o ri s ts a n d C h e m i c a l W e a p o n s

Inte l l igence can ident ify nat ions tha t e i ther have or plan to develop a

chemical weapons capabi l i ty . I t is much more dif f icul t to pinpoint non-

sta te actors—that is , guerr i l la groups and terrorists—who are seeking to

deve lop and use such weapons . This was brought home c lea r ly when a

Japanese cul t group ca l led

Aum

Shinr ikyo re leased sar in gas in the To

kyo su bw ay s ys tem in 1995, k i ll ing and in jur ing h un dre ds .

9

Sarin is rel

a t ive ly easy to make in a home lab, is extremely toxic , but can be

employed wi thout pa r t icu la r ly sophis t ica ted methods . Another tox ic gas ,

r ic in , can be made f rom castor beans. Both r ic in and sar in are nerve

gases , and a only a t iny amount of e i ther is needed to cause para lysis or

dea th .

The U.S. a t tack on what i t c la imed was a chemical weapons fac i l i ty in

Augus t 1998 in Sudan demonst ra tes wha t can be done when in te l l igence

do es ident ify a ta rget . The U.S. go ve rnm en t sa id tha t in te l ligence so urces

had enabled i t to ident ify a plant in Sudan tha t was crea t ing a precursor

chemical for VX nerve gas.

1 0

Al thoug h the S uda ne se gov e r nm e n t qu ick ly




denied tha t the p lan t was do ing any more than produc ing medic ine , the

evidence must have been compel l ing to back up Washington ' s c la im.

B i o l o g i c a l W e a p o n s

Attent ion has a lso begun to focus on biologica l weapons as an a l ter

na t ive to chemica l compounds . A f lu r ry of p ress repor ts was s t imula ted

by reve la t ions tha t I raq ha d been de ve lop ing a w ay to use an thrax spores

in combat . Fur the r repor t ing showed tha t the Uni ted S ta tes had been

test ing s imilar weapons in the past , pr imar i ly as a way of developing

defens ive measures .

1 1

Included in the tes ts was a form of encephal i t is

virus tha t would disable but not ki l l an enemy.

Whereas most countr ies have s igned a 1972 trea ty out lawing the use

of biological weapons, the rogue states have either failed to do so or

could not be counted on to abide by the t rea ty in any event . Bio-weapons

hav e becom e more sophis t ica ted because the v i ruses or o the r in gred ien ts

can be gene t ica l ly a l te red to make them more deadly and ha rder to com

bat . Nonetheless , de l iver ing a bio-weapon may not be so easy. A rocket-

launched de l ive ry sys tem wi th some form of explos ive warhead might

very well destroy the disease- laden mater ia ls when they reach the target ,

and condit ions of wind and other var iables have to be just r ight to re lease

bio-weapons

on the battlef ield.

Ident ifying the manufactur ing plants , the del ivery systems, or the na

ture of the b io-weapons themse lves presen ts much the same cha l lenge

for inte l l igence as in the case of chemical weapons. Reconnaissance , sur

vei l lance , and HUMINT are the tools needed; and again, the necessary

countermeasures wil l l ike ly fa l l in the rea lm of diplomatic or mil i ta ry

act ion, especia l ly in the case of rogue s ta tes . But what would happen i f

a te r ror is t group were to ga in the capabi l i ty to produce and del iver a

chemical or biologica l weapon? Given the nature of te r ror is ts and ter

ror ism, ident ifying groups with chemical or biologica l weapons capabi l

i ty is a tough task for inte l l igence . Stopping them is even tougher . The

same may be sa id for te r ror ism.

T h e N a t u r e o f T e r r o r i s m

What is terrorism? It is the use of violence to create fear and panic, to

call attention to a group or i ts philosophy, to target victims, or to exact

revenge aga ins t an enemy. I t i s ce r ta in ly no t a new phenomenon, bu t i t

has become more dangerous and threa ten ing in recent yea rs because

terror is ts have access to such a wide var ie ty of weapons and because

terror is t v iolence is sure to ga in broad media a t tent ion. Coupled with



Stopping

the Bad

G uys 113

the fac t tha t rogue s ta tes have sponsored , t r a ined , encouraged , and pro

tec ted ter ror is ts , te r ror ism has become a threa t in ways tha t no one might

have imagined just a few years ago.

Ter ror i s t s usua l ly have a spec i f ic agenda . They may commit random

violence to ca l l a t tent ion to themselves , but more of ten they have a par

t icular ta rget in mind when they s tr ike . Terror is ts may be re l igious fa

nat ics who seek to destroy those who do not conform to the ir view of

worship or behavior , such as the Tal iban in Afghanis tan, or they may

combine re l igious fanat ic ism with e thnic vengeance , such as the Hez

bol lah in Lebanon. They might have a pol i t ica l ideology, such as the

maoist Sendero Luminoso of Pe ru , o r they could be mot iva ted by mon

etary gain, such as som e of the ne w m afia families in Russia . Acco rd

ing to some ter ror ism exper ts , the new style of te r ror ism is based on

revenge for perce ived abuses or as an out le t for rage .

1 2

The challenge for

inte l l igence is not only in f inding out who the ter ror is ts a re but in s top

ping them before they can ki l l and destroy.

Since ter ror is ts opera te in small cells—handfuls o f pe op le who know

and trust each other , usual ly because they come f rom the same e thnic ,

re l igious, and socia l

background—and

because they are by nature ex

tremely violent , t radi t ional methods of counterespionage are dif f icul t to

use ag ainst th em . Penetr a t ing a te r ror is t ce ll by recrui t ing one of i ts m em

bers is not just extremely dif f icul t and dangerous; i t means working with

a per so n w h o l ike ly is a violent cr imin al . Establ ishing a c lose re la t ion ship

with such a person puts both the case officer and the terrorist at r isk of

a quick end i f the re la t ionship is discovered.

I n f o r m a n t s a n d S u r v e i l l a n c e

Exper ience shows tha t a more l ike ly route to learning about a te r ror is t

ce l l is through informants and survei l lance . We know from past expe

r ience tha t good invest iga t ive techniques can ident ify and locate te r

ror is ts . When Brigadier Genera l Wil l iam Dozier of the U.S. Army was

kidnapped by ter ror is ts in I ta ly in the 1980s, informants in the neigh

bo r hood whe r e he wa s be ing he ld r e c ogn iz e d tha t some th ing unusua l

and suspic ious was going on, and eventual ly the I ta l ian secur i ty forces

were able to pinpoint his locat ion and f ree him.

1 3

S imi la r me thods were

used to keep t rack of hostages being held by the Hezbollah in Lebanon,

even though the hos tages were moved pe r iod ica l ly to thwar t counte r -

me a su r e s .

Even more pa ins tak ing forens ic work was involved in t r ack ing down

the te r ror i s t s who used a bomb h idden in a rad io to br ing down a

Pan

A m air liner , Flight 103, over Lock erbie, Scotland. Ev entu ally, careful

s if t ing of shards and pieces produced bi ts of the bomb, and the nature




of these f ragments enabled invest iga tors to de termine tha t the ter ror is ts

must have come f rom Libya . The Libyan government , however , den ied

complic i ty and refused to extradi te the individuals , though invest iga t ive

and inte l l igence work had ac tual ly been able to ident ify the ter ror is ts .

F ina l ly , L ibyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi agreed to pe rmi t the two

suspects to be t r ied outs ide the United Sta tes , apparent ly in a bid to have

economic sanct ions against Libya l i f ted. This meant , as well , tha t he was

prepared to wr i te o f f the two te r ror i s t s , who were repor ted ly members

of the Libyan security services.

14

Terror ism is cr ime, and U.S. secur i ty and inte l l igence services have

become qui te good a t ident ifying ter ror is ts and even a t br inging cases to

cour t to convic t and punish perpetra tors . The fore ign ter ror is ts who ex

p loded a bomb in the Wor ld Trade Cente r in New York were qu ick ly

identif ied, their terrorist cell exposed, and the terrorists convicted and

ja i led . The two men who b lew up the Federa l Bui ld ing in Oklahoma

City—not fore ign ter ror is ts a t a l l but two Americans who sought revenge

aga ins t the government for i t s supposed abuses—were a lso brought to

justice in short order.

To bols ter i ts abi l i ty to go af ter te r ror is ts who have targeted Ameri

cans, the United States has declared that i t will use extra-terr itorial ju

r isdic t ion to indic t fore ign ter ror is ts outs ide the United Sta tes and

at tempt to br ing them to just ice in the United Sta tes . This is i l lustra ted

by the case of Fahwaz Yunis , who was lured into internat ional waters

by the CIA, snatched by the FBI , and brought back to the United Sta tes

for trial.

15

Yunis was ta rge ted because he had ha rmed Amer ican c i t izens ,

was indic ted in a U.S. cour t , and was vulnerable . Other te r ror is ts who

target Americans wil l cer ta inly have learned a lesson f rom this case .

O t h e r A s p e c t s o f C o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m

The inte l l igence system has assis ted in other aspects of counter ter ror

i sm in addi t ion to us ing t rad i t iona l me thods . Dur ing the 1980s , when

hostage taking by ter ror is ts was a favored ploy, CIA and Sta te Depar t

ment psychia t r i s t s work ing toge the r deve loped negot ia t ing s t ra teg ies to

dea l wi th hos tage take rs . M eanw hi le , the mi l i ta ry deve lo ped opera t iona l

teams designed to s torm hostage havens, par t icular ly hi jacked a ir l iners .

In one famous case the CIA chief in Argentina was able to talk a hijacker

in to sur render ing and re leas ing h is hos tages . Most opera t iona l un i t s ,

however , were taking a lesson f rom the famous Israe l i opera t ion to f ree

hos tages taken to Uganda by te r ror i s t s . I s rae l i commandos s tormed the

Air France a ir l iner on the ground, ki l l ing the ter ror is ts , losing only one

hostage and one soldier in the opera t ion.

1 6

Now a i r l ine h i jack ing has become much reduced through s t rong se -



Stopping

the Bad

Gu ys 115

cur i ty measures . As the danger sh i f ted to a i r l ine bombing , new deve l

opments in secur i ty screening have made i t increasingly dif f icul t for

ter ror is ts to br ing explosives into an a ir l iner . What this means is tha t

ter ror is ts wil l have to develop new methods for violence , and tha t the

inte l l igence system wil l have to f ight back with new secur i ty methods.

An area of increasing vulnerabili ty l ies in other parts of the U.S. infra

s t ruc ture .

In fact, President Clinton in 1997 issued a directive to increase efforts

by intell igence and security forces to protect the U.S. infrastructure, in

c lud in g t ransp or ta t ion s ys tem s, b r idg es and h ig hw ays , an d the in for

ma t ion ne twor k .

1 7

The U.S. reliance on computers in all aspects of

modern l i f e has made the na t ion vu lne rab le to wha t have become known

as

cy ber- terror is ts .

These new e lec tronic te r ror gangs have been breaking

in to compute rs to d is rup t opera t ions of government and pr iva te indus

try , s tea l funds through unauthor ized e lec tronic t ransfers , and t rash e lec

tronic da tabases . As one cyber-exper t pointed out , no matter how clever

the cyber- ter ror is ts might be , countermeasures are l ike ly to be developed

to thwar t them.

1 8

This means tha t the ter ror is ts wil l just have to develop

new methods of e lec t ron ic v io lence in wha t has become an unending

game of ca t -and-mouse .

The Internet has now become a useful tool for fore ign ter ror is t groups

as well as for to those groups based in the United Sta tes . According to

press repor ts , a number of fore ign ter ror is t groups have web s i tes , in

c lud ing the Na t iona l L ibe ra t ion Army in Colombia , the Hezbol lah in

Lebanon, and the Zapat is ta guerr i l las in Mexico.

19

The In te rne t p rovides

a means for them to share the ir views with the public , but i t a lso enables

security forces to keep track of them.

Despi te the horrors of the two major te r ror is t inc idents in the United

States in the

1990s—the

bombing of the Wor ld Trade Towers in New

York by fore ign ter ror is ts and the destruct ion of the Federa l Building in

Okla homa C i ty by two Americans—the United Sta tes has been re la t ive ly

free of terrorism in recent years. A good deal of this can be laid to the

effectiveness of the FBI in identifyin g an d th w ar tin g terroris ts before the y

can do damage. Of course , the FBI has been re luctant to reveal how i t

has been able to counter te r ror is ts , point ing out tha t reveal ing i ts meth

ods would on ly a id po ten t ia l bad guys bent on v io lence . A good le sson

to be learned f rom the two inc idents c i ted above is tha t i t takes only a

handful of people and re la t ive ly s imple methods to crea te a good deal

of destruction.

U . S . E m b a s s i e s a s T a r g e t s

That te r ror i sm may not r equi re grea t sophis t ica t ion was brought home

to the Amer ican people by the s imul taneous t ruck bombings of U.S . em-




bassies in Keny a an d Ta nzan ia in the sum m er of 1998. These a t tacks

demonst ra ted tha t a l though we may be re la t ive ly sa fe a t home, we a re

increasingly vulnerable overseas . U.S. embassies , American businesses ,

and even American tour is ts provide ready targets for te r ror is ts , and the

reasons are s imple : American fac i l i t ies and people abroad are vis ible ,

open, and accessible . Attacks on Americans and the ir embassies and

businesses , especia l ly in the Third World, a re guaranteed to genera te just

the kinds of publ ic i ty and a t tent ion ter ror is ts c rave . Though the U.S.

p r e s s a nd the gove r nme n t ha ve c onde mne d the a ppa r e n t ma s te r mind

behind the bombings , the rec lus ive , wea l thy Saudi Osama Bin Laden ,

the unceas ing press coverage of the events have undoubted ly made Bin

Laden a he ro to many.

When the Uni ted S ta tes re sponded to the embassy a t tacks by launch

ing cruise missi les a t Bin Laden 's te r ror is t headquar ters in Afghanis tan,

many U.S. ac t ivis ts were encouraged, especia l ly those who bel ieve the

system ought not to wait for te r ror is ts to commit violence before seeking

to br ing them to just ice , those who bel ieve in pre-emptive ac t ion against

the ter ror is ts . There are a number of problems with this view. The Amer

ican system of just ice requires tha t c r iminals , such as te r ror is ts , have to

be ar rested in the commission of a cr ime and s tand t r ia l by the ir peers .

Is the American public complete ly prepared for a vigi lante system to

str ike terrorists, e ither as acts of revenge, as in the 1998 embassy bomb

ings ,

or in a p re -em pt ive s t rike? Are Am er icans prep ared

for

wha t migh t

become an esca la t ing war wi th te r ror i s t s? Al though pol l s showed publ ic

suppor t for the a t tacks against Bin Laden 's base and the Sudanese chem

ica l plant , th is suppor t may change i f te r ror is ts began to increase the ir

opera t ions against Americans. Israe l has long favored a pol icy of s t r iking

back against te r ror ism, but i t has not de ter red ter ror is ts who are pre

pared to become martyrs in the ir ba t t le against the Jewish s ta te .

Using Terro r a g a ins t Terro r i s t s?

In the wake of the kill ings of Israeli athletes in Munich in 1979 by

Arab ter ror is ts , the Israe l i Mossad took on the task of vengeance against

the a l leged perpetra tors .

2 0

Unfor tunate ly , one of the ir ta rgets was an in

nocent c ivi l ian working as a waiter in Norway, where he was ki l led by

mistake . The chances of making such mistakes is probably very grea t ,

given the e lusive nature of the ter ror is t . This means tha t democrat ic so

c ie t ies have to be very careful in using extra- legal methods against te r

ror ism, les t the ir secur i ty organiza t ions become ter ror is ts themselves .

The f ight against te r ror ism requires pa t ience and typica l in te l l igence

methods : ca re fu l recordkeeping to ident ify known ter ror is ts , the devel

opment of sources who might be ab le to provide in format ion about



Stopping

the Bad

Guys

117

te r ror is t ac t ivi ty , and coordinat ion with law enforcement and secur i ty

forces who may be able to s top the ter ror is ts and br ing them to just ice .

Al though the Uni ted S ta tes has made s t r ides in s topping or thwar t ing

some forms of terrorism, i t is unlikely that this type of polit ical expres

sion will go away. In fact, we can expect new kinds of terrorism to arise,

pe rhaps us ing methods we don ' t ye t r ecognize . There fore , the in te l l i

gence system has to be prepared to ident ify these threa ts and assis t in

deve loping counte rmeasures , jus t a s i t has done in the pas t .

One effec t ive development in deal ing with ter ror ism has been the es

tabl ishment of the Counter-Terror ism Center within the U.S. Inte l l igence

Communi ty . Resembl ing the cen te r e s tab l i shed to dea l wi th counte r in

te l l igence , the uni t br ings together representa t ives f rom around the U.S.

In te l l igence Communi ty to sha re in format ion , he lp deve lop requi rements

for col lec t ion, and coordinate analysis on ter ror ism issues . In addi t ion,

the D ep ar tm en t of Sta te issues an an nu al pub l ica t ion ent i t led Pat te rns

of Globa l Ter ror i sm , w hich provid es an unc lass if ied co m pe nd ium of

da ta on t er r o r ism w or ldwid e .

2 1

The FBI has establ ished a secur i ty aware

ne ss ne twor k

(ANSIR)

to provide warn ings to the pr iva te sec tor about

potent ia l secur i ty threa ts , and pr ivate businesses can subscr ibe to con

sul tant services tha t ga ther and analyze secur i ty threa t information.

P o s s i b l e C o u n t e r m e a s u r e s

The S ta te Depar tment has pu t toge the r he lpfu l b rochures for Amer i

cans w ho t rave l o r w ork abroad , a l thoug h th is m a te r ia l tend s to be d a ted

by the t ime i t appears . More and more of such information is avai lable

on- l ine , thus speeding up the repor t ing process . In format ion va luable to

U.S. bus inesspeople i s ava i lab le f rom the Commerce Depar tment a s we l l .

The aim of all this intell igence data is to enable Americans to be able to

make sens ib le judgments about t r ave l ing , work ing , o r inves t ing abroad .

I t does no t take much, however , to rep lace reason wi th panic .

Dur ing the bu i ldup to the Gulf War , Saddam Husse in ' s agents were

able to place s tor ies in the press suggest ing tha t I raq might ta rget a ir l in

ers carrying Americans as re ta l ia t ion for s t r ikes on I raq. Even though

noth ing ac tua l ly happened and the re was no te r ror i s t a t tack by Saddam's

people , the fear and panic genera ted by the s tor ies , mult ipl ied by press

repor t ing , led many people to cance l p lanned t rave l , thus ach iev ing Sad

dam's a im of d is rup t ion wi thout ac tua l ly do ing anyth ing . P ress re s t ra in t

in cases of te r ror ism would be welcome, but in a f ree socie ty such re

s tra int is not l ike ly . Terror is ts know this and can be counted on to take

ful l advantage of the press .

Som e ter ror is m exp er ts ha ve sugg ested th a t U.S. in te l ligence de velo p

the c landes t ine capabi l i ty to undermine te r ror i s t s by a t tack ing the i r sup-




por t ne tworks, ident i fying the ir sources of funds and equipment , and

cutting them off . This sounds good in theory, but i t is l ikely to be highly

labor- intensive and potent ia l ly dangerous to those involved. This tac t ic

may work aga ins t someone wi th vas t wea l th and connec t ions , such as

Osama Bin Laden, but i t is not l ike ly to work against the small te r ror is t

cell . Attacking a terrorist infrastructure will require focused intell igence

col lec t ion and analysis to ident ify and pinpoint the targets before any

action can be taken. In that sense, i t will require the polit ical will to go

after the terrorists as well as good intell igence.

G l o b a l O r g a n i z e d C r i m e

The la test threa t to na t ional secur i ty in the United Sta tes is one with

which U.S. intell igence has had relatively l i t t le experience. That is the

threat of global organized crime (GOC). Of course, the FBI has long bat

t led the t radi t ional I ta l ian Mafia , the so-ca l led Cosa Nostra , with some

success , whi le the CIA was apparen t ly work ing wi th some Maf ia dons

to assassinate Fidel Castro , but the threa t of cr ime has taken on severa l

new dimensions in recent years . The most famil iar problem is tha t of

countering the i l legal f low of narcotics into the United States. The more

recent issue conce rns the grow th in the U nited Sta tes of cr ime famil ies

f rom around the globe who are expor t ing the ir mil i tant s tyle of cr ime

from a base abroad. What role should U.S. in te l l igence play in ba t t l ing

crime? The answer is not so clear .

When Judge Webster was direc tor of Centra l Inte l l igence in the 1980s,

probably based on his own exper ience in law and as direc tor of the FBI ,

he com pla ined tha t the so-ca l led wa r on na rco t ics was a m isnom er . Web

s te r a rgued tha t d rug dea le r s were c r imina ls and should be a t tacked

using law enforcement ra ther than mil i ta ry techniques. The United Sta tes

has t r ied a var ie ty of methods to combat i l legal shipments of narcot ics

into the United Sta tes , and a l though there have been some spectacular

tactical successes, strategically the problem remains as acute as ever.

What should be the role of intell igence in this f ight?

Over the years the role of inte l l igence has expanded considerably f rom

a t ime when i t was hardly an issue . From mil i ta ry inte l l igence service in

the Far East , the author can remember discussions a t the t ime about drug

lords running opium in Burma and e lsewhere in the reg ion . I t was ra ted

of l i t t le importance because the drugs were not af fec t ing the United

States at the t ime. Later , in Latin America in the 1960s, the drug issue

again received a low pr ior i ty because i t was not a direc t threa t to the

Uni ted S ta tes , even though we knew tha t some La t in Amer ican mi l i ta ry

off icers were running i l legal drug-smuggling opera t ions.

Once the drugs s tar ted to f low to the United Sta tes in increasing vol-




um e, the s i tua t ion c han ged . The role of inte l l igence seem ed c lear: ident ify

the areas where raw mater ia ls were being cul t iva ted; f ind the processing

uni t s tha t p ro du ced the actua l na rco tic s ; de te rm ine the sh ip p ing chann e ls

used to br ing the drugs in to the Uni ted S ta tes ; and coord ina te wi th the

FBI and , la te r when i t was es tab l i shed , the Drug Enforcement Admin

is t ra t ion, so tha t law enforcement organiza t ions could se ize the drugs

and arrest the dealers . Some of this work could be done easi ly with

overhead reconnaissance systems, some in l ia ison with fore ign secur i ty

and inte l l igence services , and some using t radi t ional sources . Gather ing

the in format ion was no t the problem. S topping the drugs be fore they h i t

the s t ree t was much tougher .

C o u n t e r i n g N a r c o t i c s F l o w s

Farmers in Bolivia , for example , were re luctant to give up a s teady

cash crop in coca leaves, and they cer ta inly objec ted when the U.S. and

Bolivian governments t r ied to defol ia te the coca planta t ions. Even today

growers of coca and poppy plants , the source of opium, are f ight ing to

re ta in the r ight to grow their c rops. Stopping the processing proved

equally diff icult , since most narcotics are easily fabricated in crude fa

c i l i t ies tha t can be picked up and moved qui te rapidly. Destroying them

only de layed but d id no t s top produc t ion . Try ing to s top the sh ippers

ran up aga ins t the so-ca l led drug ca r te l s , whose wea l th and power ex

ceeded tha t of severa l fore ign governments . The drug lords were able to

co-opt local and nat ional law enforcement and, in some cases , prac t ica l ly

destroyed the fabr ic of the just ice system by systematica l ly execut ing

those who s tood in the i r way .

Emphas is then sh i f ted to s topping the drugs a t the border us ing a

combina t ion of surve i l lance and ea r ly warn ing techniques . Mi l i ta ry

units , pol ice , an d D EA (D rug Enforcemen t A dm inis tra t ion ) , FBI, an d in

te l ligence perso nn el a l l got in to this , w ith so m e success . I llegal shi pm en ts

were detec ted in the a ir , a t sea , and on the ground, and substant ia l quan

t i t ies were intercepted and destroyed. Nonetheless , i t seems c lear tha t

drug shippers can continue to profit even if a great deal of their i l legal

narcot ics is se ized. This led severa l adminis tra t ions in Washington to

begin to w ork aga ins t d ru gs on the de m an d s ide , beg innin g wi th Na ncy

Re aga n 's Just Say N o cam pa ign in the 1980s. This ha s a lso ha d on ly

l imited success .

I t seems c lear tha t working against the narcot ics t rade wil l cont inue

to be a signif icant task for U.S. intell igenc e in the years ah ea d, bu t success

may well be e lusive . I f the United Sta tes did nothing, the prol i fera t ion

of drugs on the s t ree ts would increase , a l though the pr ice of drugs might

drop. I f ant i -narcot ics work were given a high pr ior i ty , the number of




dr ug sh ipme n t s de s t r oye d migh t go up , bu t d r ug sh ipme n t s wou ld no t

l ike ly be eradica ted. The American people would have to accept the fac t

tha t increased effor ts a t drug eradica t ion wil l be only par t ia l ly success

ful—a

concept that f l ies in the face of the American experience that f inds

success the only acceptable outcome.

T h e C I A a n d D r u g S m u g g l i n g

Ame r ic a n

intelligence—especially

th e

CIA—has

been vic t imized by i ts

involvement in the an t i -drug campa ign . In 1996 an en te rpr i s ing repor te r

for a newspaper in San Jose, California, wrote a front-page article in

which he c la imed tha t the CIA was responsible for br inging drugs into

black and Lat ino areas of Los Angeles .

2 2

According to the ar t ic le , Nicar-

aguan Cont ras , some of whom had been suppor ted by the CIA, were the

ac tua l d rug runners , bu t the CIA was a l legedly aware of the drug dea ls

and complic i tous in the shipments . This s tory crea ted a f i res torm in the

media , desp i te den ia ls f rom Washington . A Ca l i forn ia congresswoman

attacked the CIA, and other pol i t ic ians were quick to ge t on the band

wa gon . The

then-DCI ,

John De utch, w en t to Los An geles to ho ld a tow n

m ee tin g to ans w er the a l legat ions f i rs thand, but this achieve d li t tle ,

s ince h is answers to the v igorous pro tes ts were no t wha t the c rowd

wanted to hea r .

This wa s just the last in a series of such alleg ations th at ha d f loated

around Washington for years . In fac t , the CIA and the oversight com

mit tees of Congress had invest iga ted each of the a l legat ions, and no cred

ib le ev idence of CIA drug- running was d iscovered . When he was DCI ,

Judge Webste r p romised tha t he would ass i s t in the prosecut ion of any

CIA or o the r in te l l igence pe rsonne l who were involved in drug dea l ing ,

but again no evidence surfaced. As usual in such cases , the a l legat ions

were f ront-page news, whereas the resul ts of the invest iga t ions hardly

made it into print at all .

In the San Jose case the repor ter was eventual ly forced to resign and

the paper issued an apology for running the s tory without more careful

scrut iny. The s tory was hard to ki l l , however , and the repor ter has now

writ ten a book deta i l ing his charges, a l though his case remains pre t ty

weak accord ing to rev iewers .

2 3

Final ly , the CIA's inspector genera l is

sued a repor t on the subjec t tha t showed tha t in te l l igence managers did

make some mis takes in dea l ing wi th the Cont ras suspec ted of d rug dea l

ing , bu t tha t the managers were ce r ta in ly no t suppor t ing drug smug

gl ing.

2 4

De spite the adve rse pre ss the CIA and the other U.S. in te l ligence age n

c ies cont inue to work against i l legal drugs. The Counter Narcot ics Cen

ter , l ike the other centers, remains the focal point for collecting and



122 Fixing the Spy M achin e

tent ion. As in the case of te r ror ism, the Depar tment of Sta te provides

warning information to pr iva te industry tha t may face threa ts f rom

globa l o rganized c r ime when doing bus iness abroad . This i s bo ls te red

by the FBI, w hich sen ds ou t w arn in g not ices to dom est ic indu str ia l con

sum ers , jus t a s it w arn s them abou t te r ror ism.

S h a r i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e o n C r i m e

The FBI, to the dismay of t radi t ional is ts in the CIA, has expanded i ts

legal a t tache system abroad, in par t to he lp America ' s a l l ies in working

against organized cr ime. The United Sta tes shares information about

global organized cr ime through Interpol and other centers where inte l

l igence abou t c r ime gro up s can be bro ug ht toge the r . Beyond informat ion

shar ing and coopera t ion among pol ice forces , a re there other s teps tha t

might be taken? Some obse rvers have sugges ted tha t c r ime groups might

be a t tacked through public i ty or even sabotage . Based on exper ience

with the I ta l ian maf ias , th is seems unl ike ly. In the ir hey-day, Mafia dons

seemed to glory in publ ic i ty and were not af ra id to be ident if ied in pub

lic,

dar ing law enforcement to ca tch them in the ac t . And sabotage usu

a l ly involves some cr iminal ac t itself—not a tac t ic welcomed by pol ice .

The most l ikely step for the United States is to develop the kinds of

information shar ing systems seen e lsewhere , such as the Cr iminal Inte l

l igence Service Canada or the Bundeskr iminal Amt in Germany. So far ,

tha t task has fa l len to the National Counter inte l l igence Center (NACIC);

but as global organized cr ime prol i fera tes in the United Sta tes , a more

comprehens ive sys tem cente red a round law enforcement a t na t iona l ,

state , and local levels, will probably be more effective. In addition, a

regular ized way to share inte l l igence information wil l have to be devel

oped. We know this is possible because a system was se t up for just such

inte l l igence shar ing to protec t the Olympic Games in Los Angeles and

Atlanta . I t needs only to be inst i tut ional ized on a permanent basis .

I n d u s t r i a l E s p i o n a g e

Industr ia l espionage is a problem the United Sta tes has fought s ince

the height of the Cold War. We realized fair ly early on that the USSR

was t rying to s tea l technologica l secre ts f rom the West , using the re

sources of the KGB and the GRU. The Sovie ts even recrui ted the Pol ish

inte l l igence service to specia l ize in industr ia l espionage. This was

brought home in the 1980s when a Pol i sh spy , Mar ian Zacharsk i , was

arrested by the FBI in California 's Silicon Valley after trying to recruit

an engineer to s tea l sensi t ive industr ia l secre ts .

2 6



Stopping

the Bad

Gu ys 123

When the United Sta tes and i ts a l l ies developed a system for prevent

ing the export of defense-related technology to the USSR, the Soviet in

te l l igence services became even more heavi ly involved in s tea l ing both

the secre ts and the machinery. When he was DCI, Bil l Casey used to

point out in his publ ic speeches tha t the Sovie ts were using Western

techno logy in the ir m issi le gu ida nce sy stem s and f ighter a ircraf t avion ics ,

just to name two examples . With some success the FBI took the lead in

root ing out a t tempts a t such technology t ransfer , with the CIA working

to develop leads tha t might he lp ident ify potent ia l ta rgets .

Since the end of the Cold War , industr ia l espionage has become even

more of a problem because a number of former adversary services a long

with some f r iendly ones have got ten into the business . One former head

of the French inte l l igence service , the DGSE, admit ted openly tha t the

French were a t tempting to s tea l industr ia l secre ts , and the evidence is

s trong tha t the Germans and Israe l is , as well as the Chinese and Rus

sians, a re doing the same thing.

2 7

This was brought home very c lea r ly

in 1999 when Chinese pene t ra t ion of U.S . nuc lea r weapons labs became

k n o w n .

After the United Sta tes passed the Economic Espionage Act in 1996,

industr ia l espionage became a federa l c r ime, thus enabl ing the FBI to

work against the problem direc t ly , ra ther than wait ing to be ca l led in by

state or local off icials. The FBI has also been given the authority to be

able to task the CIA and other intell igence agencies to collect information

to help the Bureau f ight this and other cr imes. Although this author i ty

has been accepted war i ly by the inte l l igence agencies , i t should help s top

some industr ia l espionage as well as other kinds of organized cr ime. The

FBI cannot f ight this battle alone. The role of the private sector and the

growth of non-governmenta l in te l l igence and secur i ty wi l l be examined

in a later chapter .

C o u n t e r i n g S u b v e r s i o n

One problem the United Sta tes has not had to deal with very of ten,

bu t which requi res counte r in te l l igence techniques , i s tha t o f counte r sub-

version. Indeed, in many countr ies , counter ing subversion is one of the

main tasks of the intell igence service. This is especially true in authori

tar ian socie t ies where the ruler may well have come to power by over

throwing a prev ious government and needs to be sure the same th ing

does no t r epea t itself. Even in democrat ic socie t ies , however , subversion

cannot be ruled out, as we have seen in the cases of the Front for the

Libera t ion of Quebec in Canada or in severa l Lat in American countr ies

where guer r i l la g roups , such as the Sendero Luminoso in Peru seem

inten t on over throwing an e lec ted reg ime .




The t rad i t iona l approach to counte r ing subvers ion i s to pene t ra te the

movement wi th agents , iden t i fy leaders and opera t ions , and a r res t the

leadership before the movement can sol idify i tse lf or win conver ts to i ts

cause. Usually security forces are able to f ind agents will ing to join a

subvers ive movement , and unl ike te r ror i s t g roups , the subvers ive groups

are usual ly la rge , eager for new members , and of ten care less with se

cur i ty . Once on the inside , the agents can provide inte l l igence to the ir

handlers , and opera t ions can then be developed to s t r ike back a t the

d iss idents . In Peru th is worked ve ry we l l indeed when Abimae l Guz

man, the leader and s t ra teg ic th inker beh ind Sendero Luminoso , was

cap tured b y the go vern m ent in 1992 , thu s we aken ing the m ov em ent an d

depriving it of i ts brain.

2 8

Of course , democrat ic socie t ies have to be careful to dis t inguish be

tween genuine pol i t ica l organiza t ions and subversives . Clear ly , the

United Sta tes government viola ted the rules in the 1960s and 1970s by

using inte l l igence resources against the ant i -war movement . The CIA and

other inte l l igence agencies opened mail , put people under survei l lance ,

and failed to abide by the internal security restr ictions built into the

enabl ing legis la t ion of the 1940s. The ant i -war movement was not run

f rom abroad , was no t des igned to over throw the government , and had

a legi t imate pol i t ica l agenda, a l though there were t imes when i t used

tactics that could be called extra-legal if not subversive. In fact, the CIA

did s tudy the move me n t a nd a dv i se d the Johnson a nd N ixon a dmin i s

t ra t ions tha t i t was not fore ign dominated, but this was not inte l l igence

tha t was we lcome in the Whi te House .

The abuses of the Vie tnam War pe r iod have no t been repea ted , and

legis la t ion has been crea ted in the wake of congressional and White

House invest iga t ions in the 1970s to ensure tha t the government seeks

legal sanct ion before t rea t ing a pol i t ica l movement is i f i t were a sub

versive ent i ty . Nonetheless , the inte l l igence and secur i ty services must

deal with subversion as a threa t to na t ional secur i ty when the need

arises.

P r o b l e m s i n I n t e l l i g e n c e S h a r i n g

The Brown Co m m iss ion , in 1996, r eco m m end ed tha t the CIA an d o the r

U.S.

inte l l igence agencies deal with the t ransnat ional issues discussed

here , in par t , through inte l l igence shar ing with a l l ies and f r iendly coun

tr ies.

The not ion of broad-based shar ing of sensi t ive inte l l igence crea tes

problems for inte l l igence agencies because of concerns about protec t ing

sources and methods. Tradi t ional ly , in te l l igence agencies , inc luding

those of the United States, share intell igence on a bilateral basis, giving

a pa r tne r service , to use the G erm an term , useful inform ation in re t urn




for s imilar considera t ion. The unspoken rule is tha t no third-par ty service

wil l be informed about the nature or content of the shared information

and tha t both s ides wil l protec t careful ly the re la t ionship as well as the

shared da ta .

Shar ing f inished or evaluated inte l l igence is much easier than shar ing

opera t ional information, such as agent repor ts , sensi t ive intercepts , or

some forms of overhead reconna issance mate r ia l s . Ana ly t ic p roduc ts

have a l ready been wr i t ten to pro tec t sources and methods , bu t even

though the sensi t ivi ty might not be so grea t , b i la tera l shar ing has been

the rule . Clear ly , th is is mater ia l tha t could be more broadly dissemi

nated, and tha t seems to be the case now that the Cold War is over . But

to combat the t ransnat ional issues , shar ing of opera t ional da ta is going

to be required. Why are inte l l igence services so nervous about mult ipar ty

intell igence sharing? This is not an irrational fear .

On a bi la tera l basis , in te l l igence services want to learn about the pro

tec t ive abi l i t ies of the par tner service and whether or not the par tner

service can ac tual ly protec t the mater ia ls be ing shared. As we have a l

ready learned, opposi t ion services t ry to penetra te a ta rget by get t ing a

mole on the inside .

I t is easy to understand why the United Sta tes and Bri ta in , perhaps

the two nat ions tha t share inte l l igence more easi ly with each other than

in any o the r pa r tne rsh ip , became concerned about pene t ra t ion of the

partner, f irst when British intell igence officer Kim Philby gave away to

the Sovie ts secre ts he had learned while in l ia ison with the United Sta tes

and la ter when i t was learned tha t the United Sta tes had a lso been a

vic t im of a Sovie t mole in the person of Aldr ich Ames. Could Ames have

learned about Br i t ish sources inside the Sovie t system? Indeed he did,

reveal ing to his Sovie t masters tha t Oleg Gordievsky, a Br i t ish agent and

Soviet rezident in London, was a mole .

2 9

Fortunately, the British MI-6

was able to rescue Gordievsky, exf i l t ra t ing him from the USSR where he

was be ing de ta ined and in te r roga ted by the KGB.

We knew, dur ing the Cold War , tha t the West German se rv ices were

penetra ted by the opposi t ion services in East Germany. Cer ta inly in such

a c i rcumstance one would have to a ssume tha t in format ion g iven to our

West German a l l ie s might ve ry we l l end up in Potsdam. With tha t a s

sumption in mind, i t would have been possible to ta i lor the inte l l igence

we gave our German a l l ie s so tha t our German adversa r ie s could no t

take advantage of obta ining i t . Of course , the rea l i ty remains shrouded

in secrecy.

I f in te l l igence services have to be wary about bi la tera l shar ing, mul

t i la tera l shar in g crea tes even m ore pro ble m s. W ha t if one of the accessing

services has been penetra ted by organized cr ime or by one of the rogue

sta tes? Once the opera t ional information has been made avai lable , con

trol by the originating service is lost , for all practical purposes. How can



Stop ping the Bad G uy s 127

15.

Duane R. Clar r idge , A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York:

Scribner, 1997), pp. 349-359.

16.

Raviv

a n d M e l m a n , Every Spy a Prince, pp. 217-219.

17 .

Mike Bi ll ington , U.S . to Erec t 'Cyber -W al l ' a ro un d Com pu ter N etw ork s ,

United Press International, 9 April 1998.

18 .

Ge org e I . Seffers , NS A Chief up s Info W ar A nte ,

Defense News,

29 June

1998, p. 1.

19.

Kevin W hitelaw , Terror is ts on the W eb: Elect ronic Safe H av en , U.S. News

& World Report, 22 June 1998, p. 46.

20. Rav i v and Mel man , Every Spy a Prince, pp. 184-194.

21.

U.S. D ep ar tm en t of S tate,

Patterns of Global T errorism,

A pril 1998; this seem s

to be an annual publ ica t ion .

22.

A nd rea Orr , Disgrac ed Rep or ter S tan ds by Stor ies of CIA D rug L ink,

Reuters, 10 August 1998.

23.

G a r y W e b b ,

Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Ex

plosion (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998).

24. W alter P incu s , CIA Ignored Tips Al leging Co ntra D ru g Links , Re por t

Says , Washington Post, 3 No vem ber 1998, p . A4.

25.

Car tha DeLoach, Hoover's FBI (W ashingto n, DC : Reg nery P ubl ishin g, 1995) ,

p p . 297-317.

26.

W ins ton W i ll i ams , Spy Case and Tool Indu s t ry ,

New York Times,

4 July

1981,

p. B25.

27.

John Fialka, War by O ther Means: Econom ic Espionage in America (New York:

W. W. Norton, 1997).

28. Alonso Cu eto , Ce lebrat ion s an d Reflect ions af ter Pe ru 's Ca ptu re of the

Cen t u r y , Wall Street Journal, 9 October 1992, p. 15.

29.

Chr i s t opher Andr ew and Ol eg Gor d i evs ky , KGB: The Inside Story ( New

York: HarperCol l ins , 1990) , pp. 8-16.



CHAPTER 7

Managing and Control l ing

Secret Intelligence

Managing an inte l l igence service is no dif ferent than running any large

bureaucracy , bu t i t i s compl ica ted by sec recy , compar tmenta t ion , need-

to-know, and the fac t tha t some of i ts employees are devious, manip

ula t ive , and t ra ined to hide the ir ac t ivi t ies f rom others . How can

inte l l igence managers and pol i t ica l leaders be sure tha t the ir in te l l igence

off icers are doing only what they are supposed to , tha t they are not

s tea l ing the secre t funds so careful ly hidden f rom public scrut iny, or tha t

they are not plot t ing some off - the-record opera t ion bypassing the chain-

of -command and the sys tem des igned to moni tor the i r ac t iv i t ie s? How

do in te l l igence managers handle a sys tem in which a subs tan t ia l number

of employees are under cover, their aff i l iation with their service carefully

hidden, even f rom other government off ic ia ls and the ir own fe l low in

te l l igence off icers? And how does anyone manage a system in which the

direc tor has l ine author i ty over only one of severa l in te l l igence agencies

in a convoluted and complica ted system, l i t t le budget control , and very

lit t le real power?

This is a subjec t tha t has not rece ived much a t tent ion in the media and

the s tandard books on inte l l igence , a l though the reform studies in recent

yea rs have g iven the problem cons ide rab le focus .

1

In fact, unless a crisis

e rupts about these i ssues , mos t people probably never th ink much about

them at a l l . We can begin by looking a t some of the internal management

issues tha t any inte l l igence service must face , fol lowed by an examina

t ion of the overa l l U.S. system of management and control . Despi te nu

merous shor tcomings, the system, l ike the bee tha t should not be able to

f ly but does anyway, funct ions remarkably well .

All in te l l igence services have to deal with s tandard adminis tra t ive is

sues , but the nature of inte l l igence opera t ions makes many of these func-




t ions more complica ted than in pr iva te industry or other par ts of the

government . These func t ions inc lude handl ing human resources , secu

r i ty , t r a in ing , communica t ions , money management , and log is t ic s . These

last three functions are quite sensitive in intell igence for a variety of

reasons, and it would not be surprising if an intell igence service objected

to much d iscuss ion about them. Throughout the Cold War—and even

before

that—communications

act ivi t ies required considerable protec t ion

because a breach of security in this area could lay bare many of an

agency 's most highly pr ized opera t ions. The case of Igor Gouzenko, a

Sovie t code c lerk who defected in Ottawa, Canada, soon af ter the end of

World War I I highl ighted the value of ge t t ing a t an adversary ' s com

mun ic a t ions .

2

Gouzenko knew a grea t dea l about Sovie t pene t ra t ions of

the U.S. M an ha t tan Projec t, the a tom ic bo m b research, an d ho w th e So

vie ts had made the ir way inside . Genera l ly inte l l igence services restr ic t

access to the ir in ternal communicat ions systems to a small group of spe

c ia l ly c leared people and no one e lse is permit ted entry .

F i n a n c e a n d L o g i s t i c s

Finance and logis t ics are not qui te so sensi t ive , but consider the prob

lems for an inte l l igence service opera t ing abroad in which most i f not

all of i ts overseas staff are under cover. The service couldn' t very well

furn ish i t s sa fe houses wi th s tandard i ssue government desks and cha i r s

that would instantly give away to any visitor the nature of the facili ty.

I t might also want to keep secret the contracts i t le ts for goods and ser

vices or when i t outsources some of i ts ac t ivi t ies to contrac tors . I t would

have to keep secre t the funds i t used and f ind a way to hide the paper

trail the logistics activities created.

Similarly, the intell igence service would want to hide the f inancial con

nect ion between i tse lf and i ts employees under cover . Thus, an ar range

ment would be needed to c rea te a sys tem for pay and a l lowances tha t

would show tha t the employee under cover was be ing pa id by h is cover

employer , inc lud ing tax da ta , pens ion p lans , insurance , and re imburse

ments . In deal ing with agents overseas ( fore ign nat ionals the service ' s

case off icers have recrui ted) , a payment system would be needed to hide

any connection with the case officer . In other words, the intell igence

se rv ice w ou ld hav e to lau nd er w ha te ver cur rency w as use d so tha t

the agent could account for the payments received. This was one of the

major mistakes the Sovie ts made in handling i ts spy cases in the United

Sta tes , paying such people as John Walker and Aldr ich Ames in U.S.

cash currency, which the rec ipients then deposi ted in banks, c rea t ing a

paper t ra i l tha t was eventual ly fol lowed by the FBI . Had Sovie ts used



Managing and Controlling Secret Intelligence 131

fore ign cur rency and the depos i t s been made abroad , fo l lowing the

money might have been much tougher for the inves t iga tors .

The other adminis tra t ive matters are less sensi t ive , more easi ly dis

cussed here and are matters tha t lend themselves to a measure of reform.

This i s e spec ia l ly t rue in the handl ing of human resources , the modern

eu ph em ism for w ha t w as once ca lled pe rso nne l . Am er ica ' s in tel ligence

services seem to be having ser ious problems in this regard, a l though this

was no t a lways the case . How does an organiza t ion such as the CIA

find, recrui t , and re ta in the best and the br ightest?

H e l p W a n t e d

Open any major newspaper and turn to the he lp wanted sec t ion . I f a

reader hits this on the r ight day, he or she will see a small , catchy ad

ver t isement by the CIA seeking those people who might be qual i f ied to

serve abroad in chal lenging assignments . The ads note tha t speakers of

exot ic languages, or those with pr ior mil i ta ry service , or individuals with

exper ience l iving or working overseas would be preferred. Similar in

format ion now appears on a web s i te , and both the pr in t ad and the

elec tronic ad advise the prospect ive employee to wri te to the agency a t

a post off ice box for further consideration. This method of attracting new

talent is just the latest effort by the CIA to fill its ranks, but it is hardly

recrui t ing and i t probably does not reach a l l those the agency ought to

attract.

In i ts ear ly days the CIA did indeed recrui t those with the ta lents i t

nee ded , us ing a sys tem la te r con dem ned as the o ld bo y m ethod .

3

For

m er m em be rs of the service or of the OSS, m an y of them teach ing on

col lege campuses , would iden t i fy s tudents they thought might be r igh t

for the CIA and encourage them to apply .

4

Since m an y of these spo t

t e r s

were work ing on Ivy League campuses , i t was no t surpr i s ing tha t

a grea t many CIA recrui ts emerged f rom what might be ca l led the East

e rn es tab l i shment . La te r the CIA sought to broaden i t s employee base

by se t t ing up recrui t ing off ices around the country. The recrui ters would

use a var ie ty of methods to f ind the r ight people and encourage them to

apply. At f irst , this resulted in bringing together at the CIA a mix of

ta lented and interest ing people with a broad range of ski l ls and exper i

ence . As the CIA grew bigger , however , th is system began to deter iora te .

The search for ta lent began to be overshadowed by the search for

numbers . Dur ing the Reagan adminis t ra t ion a f r iendly Congress gave

the In te l l igence Communi ty funds for new bui ld ings and more people .

I t was unders tood by in te l l igence managers tha t Congress would look

unkindly at them if they failed to f i l l the slots, so CIA recruiters came




under pressure to send more and more f i le s to Washington . The rec ru i t

e r s w ere sup po sed to bea t the bu sh es for new ta len t. Unfor tuna te ly

for them, this recrui t ing push came a t a t ime when protests began to

grow against the Reagan adminis tra t ion ' s pol ic ies in Centra l America .

The CIA recrui ters became the focus for ant i -government protests . The

CIA was a lso cr i t ic ized for what many thought was discr iminat ion

aga ins t h i r ing homosexua ls . Al though tha t had ce r ta in ly been t rue in the

ea r ly days , the CIA emp ha t ica l ly den ied , du r ing the rec ru i ting pus h , tha t

any discr iminat ion cont inued. The Agency 's credibi l i ty in this regard

seemed to be qu i te low on many campuses .

P r e s s u r e f r o m C o n g r e s s

Under pressure f rom Congress and in response to cr i t ic ism that the

CIA was s t i l l l a rge ly domina ted by whi te , ma le employees , the CIA be

gan to seek out more women and minor i t ies to f i l l i ts ranks. This was

cer ta inly the r ight thing to do, not only because of pressure to open up

the agency to women and minor i t ies but a lso to broaden the base of i ts

employees and take advantage of the ir ski l ls and ta lents . Despi te i ts best

ef for ts , however , th is campaign was only par t ly successful . Among some

minor i ty groups the CIA had a poor image based on media coverage ,

dis information, and apocryphal be l iefs .

5

Women needed only to look a t

who was se rv ing in top pos i t ions in the CIA; the re were few women

a m on g the m . Thu s , a t tr a c ting me m be r s o f the non- w hi t e , non - m a le pop

ulation was a hard sell for the recruiters.

Al though the CIA has repor ted ly made ga ins in h i r ing more minor i t ie s

and women, i t is not c lear tha t these groups are remaining in the Agency

for the ir careers . A s tudy under taken some years ago seemed to indica te

that minor i ty professionals were leaving the CIA af ter severa l years be

cause they found tha t there were re la t ive ly few role models in higher

grades, tha t there was no minor i ty ne twork they could re ly on for sup

por t , and tha t senior managers fa i led to understand dif ferences in the ir

cul tura l backgrounds. Although the CIA has issued s ta t is t ics f rom t ime

to time ind ica t ing tha t the Ag ency ' s m inor i ty h i r ing is g row ing , m inor i ty

re ten t ion might be a more in te res t ing measure of how wel l the Agency

is deal ing with this aspect of the human resource problem.

T h e D r e a d e d P o l y g r a p h

Ini t ia l screening of the thousands of appl icants for CIA posi t ions,

based on lengthy appl ica t ion forms and pe rsona l in te rv iews , usua l ly pro

duces a crop of potential new hires that probably look f ine, but all these




recrui ts have to pass a secur i ty screening tha t inc ludes a polygraph in

terview. The polygraph remains a controversia l tool for such screening.

In theory , by measur ing a va r ie ty of phys ica l r e sponses , the po lygraph

is supposed to enable a t ra ined opera tor to de tec t prevar ica t ion or with

ho ld ing of in format ion . Even to a pe rso n wh o has regula r ly been thro ug h

such interviews, the polygraph interview is highly s t ressful , and i ts ac

curacy remains in se r ious ques t ion . To a po ten t ia l new h i re who has

ne ve r be e n th r ough a po lyg r a ph interview/the exper ience can be a dis

aster.

The poor recrui t s i ts fac ing a blank wall , the machine opera t ing behind

him or he r , the unseen in te rv iewer ask ing ques t ions tha t p robe the most

personal exper iences of the recrui t ' s young l i fe . Some of the quest ions

relate to counterintell igence issues that the recruit most l ikely f inds to be

no prob lem : H ave yo u g iven sec re t in format ion to a fore ign pow er?

for examp le . M ore t roubl ing a re ques t ions abou t sex , d ru gs , an d pe rso na l

behavior . These are quest ions tha t the recrui t ' s most int imate f r iends or

family are not l ike ly to ask, and they are be ing asked by someone the

rec ru i t has never seen be fore and who must seem te r r ib ly in t imida t ing .

I s i t any wonder tha t many ta len ted young people , e spec ia l ly the more

imagina t ive , never ge t th rough th is te s t?

6

Secur i ty off ic ia ls defend the polygraph and the way i t is adminis tered

as the ir most re l iable tool to root out potent ia l penetra t ions of the CIA

and those whose re l iabi l i ty and s tabi l i ty are open to quest ion. One wri ter

notes tha t an inc reas ing number of ve te ran CIA employees were having

dif f icul ty with the polygraph, even though they had no rea l secur i ty

p r o b l e m s .

7

In cont ras t , Aldr ich Ames twice showed decept ion on the

polygraph, but no ac t ion was taken. No inte l l igence agency can afford

to tread lightly in investigating the security and reliabili ty of i ts potential

ne w h i res a s we l l a s i ts ve te rans ; bu t in the au th or ' s v iew , base d o n m an y

years of observing the resul ts of i ts use , the polygraph is cost ing the CIA

dear ly in turning away potent ia l ta lent . Other inte l l igence agencies in the

U.S.

sys tem tha t use the po lygraph may be having s imi la r p roblems, bu t ,

of course, the data either to confirm or to deny this are not publicly

available.

C I A T r a i n i n g

Once hired, the new recrui t is then turned over to the CIA's t ra ining

system to learn the ropes. Unfor tunate ly , not everyone gets the same

rop e. Typica l ly the ne w recrui t beg ins w ith w ha t som e call CIA 101 ,

a basic examinat ion of the world of inte l l igence , inc luding emphasis on

la ws ,

regula t ions , e th ics , and mora l i ty . S tudents who have s tud ied s t ra

tegic inte l l igence a t the universi ty level , based on admit tedly anecdota l




repor t ing, indica te tha t the CIA's t ra ining is less de ta i led than what they

had a lready s tudied. But this is only the beginning. Then the recrui t

begins to s tudy the mater ia l d irec t ly re la ted to his or her ass ignment .

Here the CIA and the mil i ta ry services tend to par t company.

The CIA ' s t r a in ing ph i losophy pa ra l le l s i t s ph i losophy about human

resources . According to CIA pract ice , new people are hired based on

specif ic needs, and the Agency uses a var ie ty of methods to de termine

the work for which each recrui t is best sui ted. Thus, some new hires

bec om e op era t ion s officers , som e becom e analys ts , som e go into scienti fic

work, and others are direc ted into adminis tra t ive f ie lds . Genera l ly there

is l i t t le movement between career f ields, so the training is career-specif ic

r ight f rom the beginning. In the mil i ta ry a dif ferent phi losophy appl ies:

Intell igence officers are expected to be able to perform a wide variety of

tasks in inte l l igence , so the t ra ining is more broadly based.

8

All new

intelligence officers receive the same training, regardless of their future

ass ignment .

In the CIA additional training is designed to advance the officer in

one specif ic career f ield. Thus, CIA's mid-grade officials tend to know a

good deal about the ir own work but re la t ive ly l i t t le about those in other

depar tments or direc tora tes . Years ago the CIA would br ing off ic ia ls a t

mid-grade toge the r f rom the va r ious depar tments for more advanced

and genera l t r a in ing , bu t work pressure , lack of funding , and pe rhaps

secur i ty considera t ions reduced this prac t ice . I t used to be repeated for

more senior off icers headed for top management , but tha t too was cut .

The result is that senior CIA officers have li t t le experience in f ields out

s ide the ir own career and tend not to know their contemporar ies outs ide

their own offices.

T h e M i l i ta r y S y s t e m

The military seems to have a much better system. Intell igence officers

who t ra in toge the r deve lop a bond tha t ex tends th roughout the i r ca ree rs .

This is re inforced when they are brought together la ter for fur ther t ra in

ing. At mid-career and senior levels, intell igence officers have the

opportunity to train with officers from other career f ields. Military in

te l l igence off icers would a lso have had a var ie ty of ass ignments as they

advanced in rank. The result is that senior intell igence officers in the

mi l i ta ry a re proba bly be t te r equip ped than the i r CIA cou nte rpa r t s to take

on senior management posi t ions and are more f lexible in how they can

be used.

A second major dif ference between the CIA and the mil i ta ry concerns

tra ining for leadership and management . Mil i ta ry off icers are t ra ined

ear ly on in how to lead, as well as how to manage, based on the as-




sumpt ion tha t they wi l l have to do bo th in the yea rs ahead . The CIA

does not t ra in i ts managers unt i l they ac tual ly take on a posi t ion tha t

requi res management sk i l l , and they do no t t r a in people for leadersh ip

roles a t a l l . CIA managers tend to advance because they are good ana

lysts or good opera t ions off icers , not because they have displayed ta lent

as leaders . One would of ten hea r tha t someone had been appoin ted to

a senior posi t ion a t the CIA, but tha t th is person was a te r r ible manager .

Surely this is a system that begs for correction.

L a n g u a g e T r a i n i n g a n d A r e a K n o w l e d g e

In the Cold War e ra , when the CIA had a subs tan t ia l number of op

era t ions off icers abroad, a grea t deal of emphasis was put on language

tra ining and area knowledge. This seems no longer to be the case . Years

ago a f ledgling case officer might spend one or two years just perfecting

language abi l i ty in an overseas assignment , or he or she might serve in

a suppor t pos i t ion whi le absorb ing the cu l ture and ambiance in an a rea

where the case officer would later have to recruit agents. Based on the

recen t ex am ina tion of the intell igence failure in Ind ia in 1998, i t app ea rs

tha t the CIA is no lo ng er in ves ting th e m o ne y it took to give a case officer

language and a rea knowledge ; most p robably th is i s so because of

budge t cu ts .

Similar ly , the CIA used to have analysts take f requent or ienta t ion t r ips

to the countr ies or areas they were cover ing. That prac t ice began to erode

as early as the 1960s, and the situation has gotten worse ever since. The

CIA has never invested as much effor t in analyst t ra ining as in the t ra in

ing of case officers, and now both categories of substantive officers are

be ing shor t -changed . Admira l Je remiah ' s r ev iew of the Ind ia debac le

conf irmed tha t analysts had committed one of the cardinal s ins in inte l

l igence analysis , tha t of mirror- imaging. The analysts had apparent ly

assumed tha t the Ind ian leadersh ip would no t te s t nuc lea r weapons be

cause Western leaders in s imilar c ircumstances would not do i t . The

ana lys ts f a i led to unders tand the Ind ian mindse t la rge ly because they

had not been exposed to i t .

P e r s o n n e l C u t s

Human resources in inte l l igence were deal t a fur ther blow a t the end

of the Cold War when budget cuts forced severe cutbacks in personnel .

This is par t icular ly dif f icul t in inte l l igence work because a disgrunt led

employee may take revenge on the inte l l igence service tha t f i red him or

her by seeking to peddle information to a host i le inte l l igence service . In




fac t , there was just such a case years ago when an angry employee , le t

go in a round of personnel cutbacks, offered to deliver secret information

by throwing a package of classif ied f i les over the fence of the Soviet

embassy in downtown Washington , wi th a no te expla in ing tha t the re

was more where tha t came f rom.

9

In the event , the KGB watcher on duty decided tha t the package might

be a bomb and turned it over, unopened, to the Secret Service officer on

duty outs ide the embassy. This led eventual ly to a s t ing opera t ion in

which the FBI was able to t rap the disgrunt led CIA off icer when he went

to pick up what he thought was his payoff f rom the Sovie ts . We don ' t

kn ow w ha t hap pe ne d to the KGB wa tcher , bu t we can specula te tha t he

was cer ta inly not rewarded for his caut ion.

As fa r a s we know, the va r ious schemes deve loped by the government

in general, and not just for the intell igence services, have succeeded in

thinning the ranks a t the CIA and other agencies . These schemes have

included buyouts for ear ly re t i rement and cash payouts for those wil l ing

to leave . From al l accounts , th is has crea ted a ser ious morale problem,

s ince many employees who used to th ink of themse lves as hav ing tenure

in the inte l l igence profession have now rea l ized tha t they are as vulner

able to downsiz ing as any f i rm in the pr iva te sec tor . This has , according

to some repor ts , caused some inte l l igence professionals in mid-grades to

leave to seek their fortune elsewhere.

1 0

Who can be tota l ly dedica ted to

a service tha t might force an employee out when the employee has

served in such unique work? In some cases , the former inte l l igence of

f icer would be hard pressed to account for years of service under cover.

The downsiz ing has a lso led to the consol ida t ion of the hir ing system.

In 1991-92, the CIA began closing its recruiting offices around the coun

try , re lying on a centra l ized system opera ted out of the Washington area .

Now i t appears tha t pressure to rebui ld the ranks, especia l ly in te rms of

case off icers , may require re thinking the way the system opera tes . I f

col lege campuses are any indica t ion, s tudents are very interested in in

te l l igence work and of ten seek advice about how to prepare for a career

in the f ield. Unfortunately, the CIA seems to know lit t le about this and

has not taken advantage of the network of professors who teach about

inte l l igence around the country.

N o L o n g e r S p e c i a l

A fur ther blow to morale came in 1998 when DCI George Tenet an

nounced tha t because of budget res tr ic t ions, CIA re t i rees who had pre

v ious ly had the i r r e t i r ements managed by CIA employees would now

be turned over to the Off ice of Personnel Management and would be

trea ted just as any other re t i red c ivi l ian employees of the government .

1 1




This sends an ominous message to the inte l l igence ranks, and not just a t

the CIA, because inte l l igence employees are not par t of the regular c ivi l

service ; ra ther , they serve in a ca tegory ca l led the excep ted service .

This gives the DCI and other inte l l igence managers considerable leeway

in handl ing pe rsonne l ma t te r s , a l though they have t rad i t iona l ly re l ied

on c ivi l service rules as a matter of uniformity and convenience .

Thus inte l l igence personnel in the c ivi l ian ranks, who used to think of

them selve s as a specia l bree d, now rea l ize they are no t m uc h dif ferent

than the rest of the Washington bureaucracy. In the mil i ta ry, however ,

things have been a bit different. Intell igence as a career f ield used to be

thought of as only for those who could not make i t in the combat arms.

In World War I one German genera l was repor ted to have lef t h is in te l

l igence off icer behind when his t roops went into combat because the

officer was excess baggage.

1 2

Over t ime, however , as inte l l igence off icers have achieved senior ranks

and genera ls ' s ta rs , tha t a t t i tude has changed. Mil i ta ry inte l l igence is no

longer an oxymoron, and inte l l igence off icers are no longer considered

second-class cit izens when it comes time to choose officers for senior

schools and advancement . Like the CIA the mil i ta ry has a lso suffered

budget cuts and has had to force officers into retirement, and intell igence

personnel are t rea ted in the same way as the ir counterpar ts .

One would think tha t the c ivi l ian inte l l igence services would be eager

to recrui t ve terans of mil i ta ry inte l l igence , and indeed, the inte l l igence

agenc ies under the Depar tment of

Defense—the

Defense Intell igence

Agency and the Na t iona l Secur i ty Agency among them—have done so.

The CIA has t radi t ional ly hired only those beginning a career , and i ts

record of taking on veterans who would have to be hired a t mid- or

senior grades is not a good one . In fac t , the CIA has even discr iminated

against i ts own off icers who have served outs ide the CIA on var ious

a s s ignme n t s , r e w a r d in g the m by a sk ing the m to p r ove the m se lve s

upon the i r r e tu r n a nd de ny ing the m p r omot ion o r r e wa r d ba se d on the

work they have pe r formed e lsewhere .

O t h e r S e r v i c e s

U.S. inte l l igence agencies perform other tasks tha t should be noted

because some of them a re un ique and requi re re sources tha t suppor t the

main tasks of col lec t ion, analysis , or other opera t ions. For example , the

CIA has to mainta in a medical s taf f to assis t employees overseas who

are se rv ing in a reas w he re m edica l ca re i s e i the r inade qu a te or dan ger ou s

compared to tha t in the United Sta tes . This is another of the funct ions

that has to take account of cover and c landest ine ac t ivi ty abroad. Some

employees need he lp and counse l ing for d rug- or a lcohol - re la ted prob-




lems, if not for themselves, then for their families, especially in an over

seas environment where such problems are endemic . After a l l , famil ies

have to l ive under cover , too, even when they are not ac tual ly CIA em

ployees.

In recent years the CIA has had to deal with problems tha t no one

foresaw when the Agency was crea ted. Because of the Freedom of In

formation Act (FOIA), the CIA and other inte l l igence agencies have to

search secre t f i les and re lease mater ia l when proper appl ica t ion is made.

Bi l l Casey d id manage to make a dea l wi th Congress , when he was DCI ,

to exempt opera t ional f i les f rom such searches because tha t mater ia l was

a lmost never re leased anyway.

1 3

But this deal c rea ted a new problem.

Casey agreed tha t he would begin a systematic ef for t to review and re

lease old Agency f iles that might be of historic interest , but this meant

that a s ignif icant number of resources had to be assembled because no

intell igence service can release documents in bulk if there is the slightest

dan ger tha t sources and m eth od s migh t be com prom ised . This i s an i ssue

that wil l be examined la ter when we look a t how inte l l igence services

deal with the public .

T h e S e c u r i t y F u n c t i o n

One cr i t ica l adminis tra t ive funct ion, a lready discussed in par t , is tha t

of security. Security, as we have seen, is a key defensive element in

counter inte l l igence , but i t is cer ta inly more than tha t . The secur i ty func

tion is wide-ranging and includes protection of physical facili t ies, of per

sonn el , of opera t iona l ac t ivit ies , an d p rotec t ion of da ta . As in ma ny large

organiza t ions, the secur i ty funct ion inc ludes protec t ing the organiza t ion

from its personnel as well . Thus, the security function is not only an

adminis tra t ive necessi ty but serves as a control e lement as well .

W h e n M i r Aimal Kansi , a Pakis tani c i t izen, gunned down severa l CIA

off icers on the road leading to CIA headquar ters in Virginia , i t brought

home to many the need for protec t ion of CIA people and fac i l i t ies .

14

In

this case, the CIA itself could do very li t t le because its jurisdiction, in

terms of physica l secur i ty and pol ice power , covered only CIA bui ldings

and grounds. Outside those areas the CIA must turn to the local pol ice

for aid, just as any private cit izen would do. In fact, the CIA obtained

the r ight to maintain i ts own security police only in the 1980s. Before

that t ime the CIA re l ied on government uniformed secur i ty pol ice , the

same people who guarded museums and o the r government fac i l i t ie s—

to guard i ts domest ic bui ldings. This system was used because of the

1947 law prevent ing the CIA from engaging in law enforcement ac t ivi

ties.



M anag ing and Con trolling Secret Intelligence 139

S e c u r i t y A b r o a d

Overseas the CIA is a lso dependent on others for much of i ts physica l

secur i ty . The bo m bi ng s of the U.S. em bassies in Ken ya an d Tan zan ia in

August 1998 revived discussion about the vulnerabi l i ty of U.S. diplo

matic fac i l i t ies abroad, many of which were bui l t to be open and avai l

able to the public . CIA off ic ia ls have undoubtedly not forgot ten about

that vulnerabili ty. CIA officers were taken in the storming of the U.S.

em ba ssy in Te he ran in 1979, an d se vera l CIA officers w er e lost in th e

bo m bi ng of the em bas sy in Beirut in 1983. At the t im e a com m ittee w as

se t up to review secur i ty a t embassies abroad, and the CIA concluded

tha t the secur i ty provided by the S ta te Depar tment was inadequa te . Any

one who has se rved abroad in a CIA pos t would ce r ta in ly be ab le to

conf irm that conclusion. Nonetheless , very l i t t le was done, except tha t

more t r a in ing was deve loped to he lp of f ice r s abroad pro tec t themse lves

through defensive dr iving and other such ski l ls .

Even though the CIA has to re ly on other agencies to protec t i ts fac i l

i t ies at home and abroad, there is sti l l a role for i ts own security office.

A key e lement in deve loping pro tec t ive measures i s to de te rmine the

na ture of the th rea t . Here , secur i ty pe rsonne l can work wi th bo th ana

lysts and opera t ions off icers to develop threa t assessments , so a t least

the CIA can decide where i t is most vulnerable . Secur i ty can a lso play a

ro le in pro tec t ing pe rson ne l by he lp in g to deve lop de fens ive t r a in ing and

by p rov id in g ac tua l phys ica l p ro tec t ion to key leaders . I t a lw ays seem ed

a b i t excess ive , however , tha t such pro tec t ion was provided ins ide the

CIA headquar ters , a place we a l l thought was one of the safest places in

the count ry . When Pres ident Reagan v is i ted CIA headquar te r s in 1985

for the groundbreaking for a new bui lding, the Secre t Service brought a

bomb-sn i ff ing do g to pa t ro l the Langley cam pu s , an event tha t led m an y

to w on de r jus t ho w safe w e were . The Kans i shoot ing , yea rs late r , p rov ed

that the CIA security officials and the Secret Service were not wasting

their t ime.

C o n t r o l a n d P r o t e c t i o n

I t is perhaps an unfortunate fact of l ife that the Office of Security at

the CIA has had to become an e lement of control as well as one of pro

tec t ion. Yet , we know that as in any large bureaucracy, people must

be l ieve tha t wrongdoing wi l l be de tec ted and punished . In the pr iva te

sector , white-col lar c r ime is endemic and a grea t deal of money is lost

in business because of f raud, embezzlement , extor t ion, and more recent ly




electronic theft . The CIA probably has one of the most carefully con

trol led, careful ly screened, most re l iable workforces of any organiza t ion

in the country, and the other inte l l igence services seem to be the same.

Despi te the specia l na ture of i ts personnel , the CIA has been vic t imized

by inside cr ime f rom t ime to t ime.

One of the more egregious cases was tha t of Ed Wilson, a contrac t

operations officer who was arrested by the FBI in 1981 after i t was

learned tha t he had become a rogue agent , se l l ing i l legal a rms to East

Ge r ma ny a nd L ibya .

15

A second CIA off icer was implica ted in Wilson 's

nefar ious opera t ions and was a lso ar rested. More recent ly we learned

that Douglas Groat , a former mil i ta ry and pol ice off icer , had a t tempted

to extor t money f rom the CIA by threa tening to inform target countr ies

about CIA p lans to ga the r in format ion about them. In the summer of

1998, Groa t wo rke d o ut a p lea ba rg a in wi th the gov ernm ent tha t focused

on the extor t ion ra ther than the more ser ious charges of espionage tha t

might have forced the government to reveal sensi t ive data in cour t .

1 6

These famous cases are among the few that have reached the public .

More low-level cr ime goes largely unrepor ted. One CIA off icer was

found to have t r ied to take advantage of a CIA purchase of automobiles

he was administering to get a free car for

himself;

he w as qu ick ly cau ght

and prosecuted . Agency employees a lways be l ieved tha t any a t tempt to

do anyth ing i l lega l would eventua l ly be de tec ted by the po lygraph or

other secur i ty checks. I t is not a bad a tmosphere to crea te in an agency

where keeping sec re ts i s the norm.

T h e I n s p e c t o r G e n e r a l

Another control element in the CIA is the Office of the Inspector Gen

eral

(IG).

In the ear ly days of the CIA, the inspector genera l was a lways

a senior Agency official with many years of service and his staff was

drawn f rom a round the va r ious d i rec tora tes and components o f the or

ganiza t ion.

1 7

This was a so-ca l led rota t ional tour of duty, and i t was

expected tha t the IG staf fer would re turn to his or her component when

the tour was over . The IG off ice was supposed to serve not only as a

uni t to inspect and evaluate the components of the Agency but a lso as

a grievance office as well . Employees were told that if they could not

get a hear ing f rom within the ir own chain-of-command, they could go

to the inspector genera l with a gr ievance . This meant , however , repor t ing

to off ic ia ls who were ac tual ly peers and co-workers . Many employees

were undoubted ly re luc tan t to a i r g r ievances wi th people wi th whom

they might la ter have to work.

This system mil i ta ted against a hard-charging examinat ion of internal

components as well . What career off icer wanted to a t tack the managers



Managing

and

Controlling Secret Intelligence

4

of a un i t for poor pe r f o r ma nc e and then f ind out tha t these ve ry same

ma na ge r s migh t l a t e r be the i r superv isors or be in a pos i t ion to rev iew

the i r p r omot ions? De sp i t e the se d r a wba c ks , mos t e mploye e s wou ld

probably agree tha t

the

Office

of

Inspec tor Genera l

did

per form

a

useful

funct ion, even if its rep or ts we re sof ter tha n som e m igh t ha ve l iked.

After the Iran-Contra affa ir , Congress began an a t tack on the C I A ' s IG

s y s te m , d e m a n d i n g t h a t

the CIA

h a v e

an

independent inspec tor genera l ,

a n d

not

som e one d r a w n fr om w i th in

the

r a nks . Th is wo u ld

put the CIA

on equa l foo t ing wi th the rest of government , where inspec tors genera l

a r e a ppo in te d by the p r e s i d e n t and conf irmed by the Senate , as are m os t

pol it ica l appoin tees . P res ident B ush agreed

to

th is r equi rement , appoin t

in g

as his

f irst insp ector gen era l Freder ick H itz ,

a

l a wye r

who had

se rved

in the CIA b o t h as a case officer and later in the Office of Ge ne r a l C oun

sel. He was not

really

an

outs ide r ,

but he was not

then se rv ing wi th in

th e

CIA. He was

easi ly conf irmed

and his

tenure , which s t re tched

on

t h r o u g h m u c h of the Cl in ton adminis t ra t ion , has set a tone tha t bodes

wel l

for the

sys tem.

Hi tz

led the IG

off ice through examinat ions

of

a l le ge d d r ug r unn ing

or complic i ty in such affa irs , bank scandals , and the Ames case .

1 8

Some

of these examina t ions tha t have been re leased

to the

pub l ic sho w

an IG

office that

has not

been re luc tan t

to

d r a w a t t e n t ion

to CIA

m is ta ke s

in

m a n a g e m e n t

and

substance . After Hitz re t i red

in

1998,

his

successor ,

L.

Britt Snider, was a lso conf irmed by the Senate.

1 9

Snider , while not truly

a

CIA

ins ide r ,

had

se r ve d

on the

Senate Select Com m ittee

on

Intell igence

staff, had

wr i t ten about in te l l igence mat te r s

for

publ ica t ion ,

was

well

k n o w n to ma ny se n io r CIA officers, and was not a ba be -in -the w oo ds

w h e n it c ome s to a sk ing the tough que s t ions . None the le s s , the IG staff

is s t i l l drawn f rom Agency ranks

and is

still subject

to

r e tu r n ing

to the

r a nks ,

and

th i s r e ma ins

a

w e a k n e s s

in

w h a t

has

o the r wise be e n

a

very

effective system for control .

T h e A u d i t S t a f f

One a spe c t

of the

Office

of the

Inspector Genera l tha t

is not

well

k n o w n is the a u d i t staff, w h o s e job is to ensure tha t CIA officers who

s p e n d

the

A g e n c y 's m o n e y

are not

s k i m m i n g

off the top or

m i s h a n d l i n g

funds .

This

is

espec ia l ly impor tan t

in a

sys te m whe r e

a

grea t dea l

of

m o n e y is s p e n t in c landes t ine ways . Noth ing s t r ikes more fea r in the

he a r t s of off icers serving abroad than when the a ud i to r s c ome and each

officer

has to

a c c oun t

for

e ve r y pe nny , whe the r

in

dol la r s

or

r u p e e s

or

lekas . Control l ing the m o n e y may we l l be the key to control l ing every

thing e lse because no r ogue ope r a t ion is poss ib le wi thout funds . By fol

lowing

the

m o n e y

the

pe r pe t r a to r s

in the

Iran -C on tra affair we re soo n




tracked, and so the audi t funct ion remains one of the key tools manage

ment has to be sure tha t i ts secre t opera t ives are fol lowing the rules .

For the most par t the president re l ies on the DCI and other agency

leaders to control the ir agencies , deal with legal and management issues ,

and make sure tha t c landes t ine opera t ives a re do ing only wha t the man

agement has approved and funded . The execut ive branch has two o the r

tools to use to oversee the inte l l igence system, but both are re la t ive ly

weak and have been judged ineffec t ive f rom t ime to t ime.

P r e s i d e n t s F o r e i g n I n t e l l i g e n c e A d v i s o r y B o a rd a n d

I n t e l l i g e n c e O v e r s i g h t B o a r d

When President Eisenhower inher i ted the inte l l igence system from

President Truman, he establ ished a board of review to access outs ide

advice about the ef f ic iency of the inte l l igence agencies he commanded.

This board became the President ' s Fore ign Inte l l igence Advisory Board

(PFIAB), p ro no un ced PIFF-ee -ab in the w or ld of W ashin gton ac ro

n y m s .

Then, as now, i t was made up of retired senior off icials, retired

business leaders , and f r iends of the president . PFIAB members received

clearances and were able to investigate allegations of inefficiency or mis

management a s we l l a s sub tan t ive judgments made by the U.S . In te l l i

gence Communi ty , no t by jus t the CIA.

Except for expenses, PFIAB members are not paid for their services,

but most seem sufficiently wealthy that this is no bar to their public

service . Unfor tunate ly , we know re la t ive ly l i t t le about how well PFIAB

members perform their funct ion because the ir repor ts are sent only to

the Whi te House and a re no t sha red wi th the work ing leve l a t the in

te l l igence agencies themselves . The small s taf f tha t suppor ts the PFIAB

is equa l ly c lose -mouthed , po in t ing ou t tha t by repor t ing d i rec t ly and

only to the president , they can be more f ree about what they say. I t may

well be tha t the DCI and other senior leaders in the Inte l l igence Com

muni ty a re pr ivy to these repor ts , bu t no in format ion about th is , wi th

rare except ions, has ever surfaced.

The second e lement of this White House mechanism is the Inte l l igence

Overs igh t Board

(IOB).

This i s composed of th ree members , aga in ap

poin ted by the pres ident to se rve wi thout pay , who inves t iga te a l lega

tions of malfeasance or i l legal behavior. The Intell igence Oversight Board

has issued s ta tements f rom t ime to t ime about i ts work, but i ts most

famous—or infamous—moment came wh en i t w as revea led tha t the law

yer who was serving a t the t ime as legal advisor to the board had given

the Whi te House bad advice , say ing tha t members of the Whi te House

staf f did not have to repor t to Congress about cover t ac t ion in the same

way as did intell igence officials. This apparently led to Ollie Nor th ' s



Managing

and

Co ntrolling Secret Intelligence 143

misadventures in the I ran-Contra af fa ir , for which the IOB lawyer was

soundly cr i t ic ized by congressional invest iga tors .

2 0

Given tha t these two boards a re made up of pa r t - t ime pol i t ica l ap

pointees, i t is diff icult to see how effective they might be in dealing with

ser ious matters requir ing in-depth invest iga t ion. Their s taf fs are too

small to do much invest iga t ing on the ir own, and so this appears to be

a re la t ive ly weak control mechanism for any president . Most recent pres

idents have a lso had off icers drawn f rom professional inte l l igence ranks

to serve on the White House s taf f as inte l l igence advisors or coordina

tors, but these officials do not form part of a control mechanism. They

are there to deal with the development of inte l l igence pol icy, inc luding

cover t ac t ion, or to ensure tha t in te l l igence judgments are reaching senior

officials on the president 's

staff.

Taken as a whole , i t seems c lear tha t the president has to re ly for the

most par t on his DCI and the other inte l l igence agency heads to control

the system on behalf of the execut ive branch. This serves in sharp con

trast to many other countr ies where the chief execut ive , whether a pr ime

minis ter or a president , has direc t control of the severa l in te l l igence ser

vices of the nation, each of which reports directly to the top. Of course,

in most countr ies the inte l l igence services are much smaller and the sys

tem much less complica ted than the services and system in the United

States.

P r e s i d e n t i a l O r d e r s

In response to crit icism of presidential control of intell igence, in 1976

Pres ident Ford i ssued a pres ident ia l execut ive orde r de ta i l ing who was

respons ib le for w ha t w i th in the U.S . In te l ligence Co m m uni ty .

2 1

The orde r

spec if ical ly b an ne d the use of a ssass ina t ion an d hu m an exper im enta t ion ,

activit ies that had come to l ight in the course of investigations of the

In te l l igence Communi ty , and tha t o rde r , somewhat rev ised , was re i ssued

by Pres ident Car te r and then by Pres ident Reagan .

2 2

Despite the fears of

som e hu m an r igh ts ac tiv is t s tha t the Reagan order w as un leas h in g the

CIA to carry out domest ic inte l l igence opera t ions, the order proved to

be suff ic ient ly non-par t isan tha t i t was adopted wholesa le by both the

Bush and Cl in ton adminis t ra t ions . Fu ture pres idents may choose to re

vise this order again i f they see a need to change the pr ior i t ies and l ines

of author i ty i t conta ins .

The United Sta tes has another control mechanism that is unique , e f

fective, and perhaps only possible in i ts peculiar polit ical system of

checks an d balan ces. Since 1976 the Unite d Sta tes ha s ha d a cong ressional

committee for inte l l igence oversight in each house of Congress , a devel

opme n t tha t wou ld ha ve be e n se e n a s unwor ka b le by the F ound ing F a -




thers of the nat ion, who thought tha t in te l l igence matters were the

purview of the chief execut ive a lone . In fac t , many presidents s tone

wal led a t tempts by Congress to inves t iga te sec re t opera t ions , po in t ing

out the dangers of reveal ing sources and methods to a la rge , e lec ted

assembly and thus to the publ ic .

Chief execut ives in the United Sta tes had to inform Congress tha t they

were making sec re t expendi tures , bu t they were no t r equi red to expla in

the deta i ls . In the af termath of World War I I and the coming of the Cold

War, members of Congress were sa t isf ied to have only the sketchiest of

information about secre t in te l l igence opera t ions, preferr ing not to know

m o r e .

2 3

Since there were no committees to oversee the growing U.S. In

te ll igence Co m m un i ty , m em bers of the U.S . A rm ed Serv ices Com m it tee

were usually the ones to sign off on funds for the CIA or the other

services . Mil i ta ry inte l l igence ac t ivi t ies were deal t with more openly as

par t of the regular mil i ta ry budgets .

C o n g r e s s i o n a l O v e r s i g h t

This a l l changed in 1974 when Senator Frank Church began his land

mark invest iga t ion of charges tha t the CIA was a rogue e lphant . Out of

the Church and companion P ike Commit tee in the House of Represen

ta t ives emerged a demand for more r igorous oversight of inte l l igence ,

which led to the establ ishment of the Senate and House oversight com

mit tees .

2 4

The Senate Selec t Co m m ittee o n Inte ll igence

(SSCI)

and th e H ou se Per

manent Select Committee on Intell igence (HPSCI), each created in 1976,

a re made up of members of Congress appoin ted by the congress iona l

leadership—making

them se lec t

committees—and

a re gran ted comple te

access to inte l l igence mater ia ls through the highest levels . Whereas the

members themse lves need go th rough no secur i ty or background checks ,

the staffs of the two committees are cleared in the same way as intell i

gence professionals. In fact, over t ime the staffs have usually contained

former inte l l igence professionals who have decided to leave the execu

t ive branch.

The or iginal dr ive to crea te these committees was most ly based on a

need to oversee cover t ac t ion opera t ions, the kinds of ac t ivi t ies tha t Sen

a tor Church thought were be ing run by CIA profess iona ls wi thout even

the d i rec t ion of the Whi te House . The Church Commit tee and the P ike

Committee learned, to the ir chagr in , tha t th is had not been the case a t

all;

a l l the cover t ac t ions were direc ted by the White House and were

made known to ce r ta in key members of Congress , who then a r ranged

the funding.

Once the SSCI and HPSCI were in place , a new system for deal ing




with cover t ac t ion was establ ished in which the DCI was to repor t to the

commit tees any pres ident ia l po l ic ies requi r ing cover t opera t ions . The

pre sid en t w as to issue a w ri t ten f indin g a t tes t ing to the ne ed for such

act ion, and the DCI was to tes t i fy to the deta i ls before the committees .

Al though ne i the r the SSCI nor the HPSCI could ve to the pres ident ' s o r

der , each could withhold funds or express i ts reservat ions to the presi

dent . The commit tees were no t supposed to to rpedo the po l ic ies by

leaking the deta i ls .

This system worked reasonably well and should have given cr i t ics of

inte l l igence some assurance tha t while the public was not able to learn

in advance about cover t ac t ion, the ir representa t ives on Capitol Hil l were

careful ly reviewing plans for secre t ac t ivi t ies . This assurance was badly

eroded by the I ran-Contra af fa ir . The invest iga t ions of the Reagan White

House revealed tha t senior adminis tra t ion off ic ia ls and the DCI had e i

ther misled the committees , l ied to them, or withheld information f rom

them about cover t ac t ion. Of course , th is caused congressional leaders to

seek even tighter control of intell igence activit ies, including more careful

rev iew of bu dg e ts , m ore w ide- ran ging eva lua t ion of in tel l igence ana lys is ,

and inc reas ing a t tempts to mic ro-manage the in te l l igence process .

A n E f f e c ti v e C o n t r o l M e c h a n i s m ?

Despite the rancor and f r ic t ion crea ted by the seemingly constant de

bate over inte l l igence ac t ivi t ies be tween the White House and Congress ,

the U.S. oversight system has proven to be an ef fec t ive way to control

secre t organ iza t ion s, a lbe it a t a hig h pr ice . I t is a rema rkab le cha ng e f rom

the or iginal not ion tha t in te l l igence ac t ivi t ies were supposed to be an

execut ive func t ion a lone , immune f rom congress iona l p ry ing . Now we

have a system in which the representa t ives of the people , on the ir behalf,

have an ob l iga t ion on a non-par t i san bas is to rev iew the work ings of the

inte l l igence agencies and in which the execut ive branch is required to

coopera te in this ra ther intrusive and adversar ia l process .

Some problems a re inev i tab le a s Congressmen probe more deeply than

is needed and as intell igence officers seek to avoid giving out informa

t ion tha t might compromise the i r opera t ions . With good wi l l on bo th

sides , the system can work. We know from the I ran-Contra af fa ir , how

ever, that i t is st i l l possible to subvert this control mechanism for a t ime,

but tha t in the end, malfeasance , i l legal ac t ivi t ies , or s tupidi ty are bound

to surface . When tha t happens, fur ther congressional controls and re

s tr ic t ions are inevi table . And if Congress is less than careful about pro

tec t ing secre ts , more information wil l be withheld for secur i ty reasons.

Thus, i t pays for both s ides , execut ive and legis la t ive , to play by the

rules.




T h e I n t e l li g e n c e C o m m u n i t y

Final ly , we have the issue of the system

itself,

the convolu ted , com

pl ica ted , m ul t ihe ade d U .S. In te l ligence Co m m un i ty . W hen Pres ident

Truman appointed the f i rs t DCI, Rear Admira l Sidney Souers , in 1946,

he was seeking a way to coordinate the information he was receiving

from the FBI and the Sta te , War , and Navy Depar tments , each of which

had inte l l igence e lements .

2 5

Truman d idn ' t have t ime to s i f t th rough the

conf lic ting re po r ts or assess the inform ation

himself.

Creat ing the Centra l

In te l l igence Agency was pe rhaps an inev i tab le nex t s tep , endowing i t

not only with the abili ty to sif t and evaluate but to collect and operate

as well .

2 6

The DCI could then have an agency to suppor t h im, and th is

c rea t ion would g ive h im t roops to lead , a budge t , bu i ld ings ,

turf—all

the e lements of bureaucra t ic power in Washington .

Technica l ly , the DCI was to serve not only as the head of the CIA but

a lso as the inte l l igence advisor to the president and coordinator , what

ever that meant, of all U.S. intell igence activit ies. In reality the DCI's

power to coordinate was l imited to the extent tha t other agencies were

wil l ing to coopera te . J . Edgar Hoover , who fought bi t te r ly against what

he saw as a t tacks on his

turf,

pow er , an d his be lov ed FBI, w as not abo ut

to le t h imself be overshadowed by this upstar t new agency or the DCI.

As addi t iona l in te l l igence e lements were c rea ted wi th the Depar tment of

Defense—the

National Secur i ty Agency in 1954 and the Defense Inte l l i

gence Agency in 1961—the secretaries of defense were also wary of ef

for ts tha t might compromise the ir control of DOD inte l l igence resources .

Similar ly , the secre tary of s ta te wanted to be able to keep the Bureau

of Intell igence and Research (INR) out of the clutches of the CIA and

the DCI.

T u r f I s s u e s

The resul t of these turf issues was a system in which the DCI had

almost no power over any agency outs ide the CIA. The only tools he

could use were his access to the White House , his legal requirement to

pro tec t sources and methods , and h is force of pe rsona l i ty . When he met

per iodica l ly with the other agency heads as chair of the National Fore ign

Inte l l igence Board to coordinate es t imates or review inte l l igence pol icy,

his abi l i ty to ge t everyone to play f rom the same sheet of music was

more l imited than tha t of the direc tor of the National Symphony.

At the working level the var ious inte l l igence agencies did deal with

each other on substant ive issues f rom t ime to t ime. Because the CIA

styled som e of i ts pub l ica t ion s as na t io nal in te l l igence , CIA analy sts




were requi red to coord ina te wi th ( tha t i s , seek comments and approva l

f rom) Sta te , INR, DIA, and even NSA, when wri t ing for the nat ional-

level publ ica t ions. INR, DIA, and NSA were not required to rec iprocate .

Communi ty ana lys ts d id make inputs to Na t iona l In te l l igence Es t ima tes ,

most of which were draf ted a t the CIA and then sent out for coordina

t ion, but analysts a t o ther agencies wrote the ir own forecasts for internal

use at Defense and State.

As for adminis tra t ive matters , each agency was on i ts own. Effor ts to

coordinate secur i ty c learances, for example , went nowhere . Each agency

wanted to do i t s own background checks and gran t i t s own c lea rances .

Budgets were submit ted by each agency to the Off ice of Management

and Budget and then defended a t the congressional level . And access

between agencies was restr icted so that off icials of one agency often had

to be escor ted when they vis i ted other e lements of the Inte l l igence Com

muni ty , even though they had the necessa ry c lea rances . The CIA even

mainta ined two cafe ter ias , one for open employees and one for those

un de r cover . G uests w ere no t a l low ed in the cov er cafe ter ia .

Cha ng e in the 1 9 7 0 s

All this began to change in the 1970s, spurred by three major devel

opments. First , the vast expense of intell igence collection satell i tes re

quired the agencies to share the ir use . Second, the new inte l l igence

overs igh t commit tees of Congress demanded tha t the DCI submit one

consol ida ted budget tha t covered a l l the inte l l igence agencies a t the na

t ional level . Third, DCI Wil l iam Colby had scrapped the system for wri t

ing National Intell igence Estimates, eliminating the CIA Office of

National Est imates and i ts s taf f and crea t ing the National Inte l l igence

Counci l (NIC) . The NIC was to be made up of senior off icers drawn

f rom a round the In te l l igence Communi ty , and they were supposed to be

able to tap talent at any agency to draft the new estimates.

These changes meant tha t the In te l l igence Communi ty had to

co

opera te and work toge the r , whe the r i t s members wanted to or no t . A

system was needed to task the col lec t ion sa te l l i tes and to manage the

budge t . I t was assumed tha t the NIC would dea l wi th subs tan t ive i ssues

on i ts ow n. Ev entua l ly , un de r D CI Stansfie ld Tu rner in 1978, the Inte l

l igence Communi ty S ta f f was se t up , some of whose members were as

s igned f rom the IC agencies and some of whom were hired direc t ly ,

a l though they were cons ide red CIA employees and made to go th rough

CIA c lea rance procedures to avoid even more bureaucra t ic p rocesses .

The IC

Staff,

as i t was ca l led, se t up committees to deal with require

ments and tasking, not just for the sa te l l i tes but for human col lec t ion as

wel l . A budge t g roup was to br ing toge the r the budge ts deve loped by




each agency and establ ish an overa l l budget , with funding requests l is ted

by pr ior i ty . Other s taf f e lements deal t with evaluat ion and planning. The

s ta f f was loca ted in downtown Washington in a bu i ld ing tha t once

housed Genera l Lewis Hershey and the Selec t ive Service Commission.

Unfor tunate ly , for off icers drawn f rom the IC agencies , word got around

that serving on the staff w as tan tam ou nt to career de ath , so m an y

officers were reluctant to serve on the staff or to stay there very long.

The pe rmanent cadre was in formed tha t they had no r igh t to t r ansfe r to

the other agencies , even to the CIA, unless someone rea l ly wanted them.

Despi te these hassles , the IC Staff did br ing the Inte l l igence Community

together on a variety of issues and became an effective clearinghouse for

d iscuss ing problems of mutua l concern .

When Bob Gates took over as DCI, the IC Staff was moved to the CIA

a nd r e s ty l e d the C ommuni ty Ma na ge me n t

Staff;

a lso , an a t tempt was

made to br ing together the adminis tra t ive e lements of the old IC Staff

and the substant ive uni ts tha t made up the NIC. The funct ions of deal ing

wi th requi rements and ta sk ing , budge ts and p lanning remained more or

less the same.

T h e R o l e o f t h e D C I

Much of the focus of the reform studies carried out in 1996 focused

on th e role of the DCI and the org aniz a t ion of the U.S. Inte ll igence C om

munity . Most cr i t ics agreed tha t the present ar rangement was not ef

fective or sensible. The DCI has too li t t le power to really run the

community , most of which belongs to the secre tary of defense and the

Depar tment of Defense . The overa l l budget is skewed in tha t way as

well , s ince the CIA repo r ted ly con trols only abo ut 10 percen t . No ne the

less,

effor ts by the Congress to give the DCI more power and more con

trol over the budget fa i led. Giving the DCI more power meant taking

power away f rom the secre tary of defense . In the zero sum game of

Washington pol i t ics , tha t was not about to happen. This is an issue tha t

deserves more careful scrut iny in a la ter chapter .

Why does the sys tem work i f i t i s so d iv ided and cumbersome? The

answer l ies in the fac t tha t the people involved want i t to work and seek

ways e i the r to evade , ignore , o r c i rcumvent the bureaucra t ic ru les when

these rules ge t in the way of coopera t ion. This is t rue throughout the

gov ernm ent , bu t pa r t icu la r ly t rue in the In te l ligence Com m un i ty , d esp i te

turf ba t t les , personal i ty c lashes, secrecy, and compar tmenta t ion. Severa l

years ago the then-IC Staff carr ied out a survey that showed that at least

seventy-f ive informal committees and working groups in the IC had been

created by the ir members to solve problems or deal with issues . These

groups had not been orde red or leg is la ted , o r even budge ted , bu t be -




cause the re was a need , an in formal so lu t ion was found . The same may

be t rue today .

The DCI makes the sys tem work in much the same way. I f the DCI

has a personal i ty tha t c rea tes harmony ra ther than f r ic t ion, much can be

accompl ished . Even when pr ick ly J . Edgar Hoover was running the FBI ,

DCIs such as R ichard He lm s lea rned ho w to ge t a long w i th the o ld

m an . In the end , the Ag ency heads a ll w an t to accom pl ish the same

genera l goals , even i f they disagree on the methods. This means tha t

DCIs must reach out to the ir counterpar ts in the other agencies and br ing

the m on boa r d .

Ad m inis t ra t ion , m ana gem ent , a nd cont ro l a re no t the s tuff o f spy no v

els, but they are crit ical issues in a system that now costs $27 bill ion to

run and engages thousands of people . I t i s no wonder tha t r e formers

zero in on these issues when it comes seeking f ixes. Yet, revising the

lines of command—the p lum bing c ha r t s o r w i r ing d ia g r a m s , a s

Washington ins ide rs ca l l them—may not be the key. The American sys

tem is ve ry much dependent on the pe rsona l i t ie s o f the people involved

and the i r wi l l ingness to coopera te and work toge the r . Rewir ing the bu

reaucracy may not make tha t happen and may even s t i f le the energy tha t

makes the system funct ion.

Notes

1. Books that do discuss management issues include Bruce Berkowitz and

Allan Goodman,

Strategic

Intelligence for

American National Security

(Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1989); Loch K. Johnson,

Secret

Agencies: U.S. Intelli

gence in a Hostile World

(New Haven , CT: Yale University Press, 1996); and

Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992).

2. John

Sawatsky,

Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security

Service

(Toronto:

Doubleday Canada, 1980), pp.

71-91.

3.

See Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the

CIA (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992).

4.

In fact, the author was recruited for the CIA in just such a fashion.

5.

When the author was chairman of the DCI Management Advisory Group,

he wo rked closely with a grou p of minority em ployees wh o were trying to study

and fix the retention problem.

6. Although their stories are admittedly anecdotal, a number of the author's

former students have reported a variety of horror stories about the polygraph.

7.

Vernon Loeb, CIA Still Recuperating from M ole's Afterm ath,

Washington

Post 22 February 1999, p . A13.

8. The author was trained in both the military system and the CIA system.

9. Ronald Kessler,

Inside

the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), p. 158.

10.

Tim Weiner, Spies W anted/

7

New York Times Magazine, 24 January 1999,

p.

36.




11. Let ter to annui tant s f rom George C. Clark , CIA Human Resource Man

agement Office, May 1998.

12 .

Jock Haswel l ,

Spies and Spymasters

(London: Thames and Hudson, 1977) ,

p .

114.

13 .

A rth ur S. H uln ick, Le arn ing abo ut U.S. Intel l igenc e: Diff icult bu t N ot Im

poss ib le , International Journal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, vol. 5, no. 1,

p p . 89-99.

14 . Dan iel K leid m an an d Gre go ry Vistica, In Search of a Kil ler, Newsweek,

11 August 1997, p. 37.

15 .

Peter Maas , Manhunt (New York: Ra nd om Ho use , 1986), p. 278.

16.

Wa lter Pinc us an d Bill M iller , Ex-CIA Ope rativ e Plea ds G uil ty to Black

mai l At tempt a t Langley , Washington Post, 28 July 1998, p. A l .

17.

Scott D. Breckinridge,

The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence System

(Boulder , CO:

Westview Press, 1986).

18. The Inspector General Repor ts released to the publ ic were avai lable on the

CIA websi te at w w w . o d c i . g o v .

19.

Whi te House press announcement , 5 May 1998 (www.fas .org) .

20. Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society

(New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1989), pp. 237-238.

21. E xecu tive O rd er 11905, U.S. Fore ign Intel l igence Ac tivit ies , 19 Fe bru ary

1976.

22.

Pres ide nt Car ter ' s orde r was Execut ive O rde r 12036, U.S. Intell igence Ac

t ivi t ies , 26 Janu ary 1978; Pres ide nt Reag an's was Execut ive O rde r 12333, U.S.

Intel ligence Act ivi ties , 4 De cem ber 1981.

23. A nn e Karalek as , His to ry of the Cen tral Intell igence Ag ency , in W il liam

M. Leary (ed.) , The Central Intelligence Agency: H istory and D ocuments (Tuscaloosa:

Univers i ty of Alabama Press ,

1955),

p. 66.

24. Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence (Chicago:

Dorsey Press, 1988).

25.

Chr i s t opher Andr ew, For the President's Eyes O nly: Secret Intelligence and the

American Presidency from Washington to Bush

(N ew York: Ha rperC ol l ins , 1995) , p .

164.

26.

Ar thur Dar l ing , The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government

to 1950 (State College: Pennsylvania State Universi ty Press, 1990), pp. 171-183.

http://www.odci.gov/

http://www.fas.org/

http://www.fas.org/

http://www.odci.gov/



CHAPTER 8

Spying for Profit

When most people th ink about in te l l igence , they probably cons ide r i t a

funct ion of government , and indeed, in te l l igence ac t ivi ty has la rgely

been run by governments s ince ea r ly h is tory . At f i r s t mos t governments

used inte l l igence to spy out subversion. Thus, we have evidence of

the

K ing's ey es in a nu m be r of c ivi l iza t ions, inc lu din g ear ly Eg ypt an d the

lands conquered by Genghis Khan and the Mongols . Spying to lea rn

about fore ign enemies was well descr ibed by Sun Tzu in The Art of War

and prac t iced by Hideyoshi in un i t ing the feuda l war lords of Japan un

der the Tokugawa shoguns. Before the Cold War , in te l l igence was of ten

thought of as a par t of mil i ta ry opera t ions, but with the development of

c ivi l ian inte l l igence services in the twentie th century, tha t concept was

broadened. St i l l , i t was the government tha t ran such secre t services

whe ther in democrac ies or d ic ta tor sh ips .

The idea of using intell igence techniques in the private sector is rela

t ive ly new. Perhaps i ts ear l ies t manifesta t ions can be found in the f i rs t

days of the Industr ia l Revolut ion, a l though the evidence is scanty and

ane cdo ta l a t best . W e do k no w that in 1811, Francis Cabot L ow ell , an

Amer ican , managed to memor ize the cons t ruc t ion and opera t ion of the

Br it ish co t ton loom desp i te s tr ingent cont ro ls im pos ed to prev ent any on e

from stealing the secret of this machine.

1

Lowell was able to reconstruct

the machine f rom memory , thus c rea t ing a new indus t ry in the Uni ted

Sta tes . In an even more bizarre inc ident , a farmer in Maine is a l leged to

have orde red h is daughte r to en te r a Shaker communi ty in the s ta te so

she could s tea l the formula for condensed milk the Shakers had invented.

Even be fore W or ld W ar II , Am er ican au to m anu fac ture r s cons is ten t ly

tr ied to learn about new developments in s tyle or construct ion f rom their

competi t ion. Using photo reconnaissance , the inte l l igence col lec tors




would s take out tes t t racks or roads used to t ry out the new vehic les . To

thwar t th is , manufac ture r s would t ry to d isguise the i r new ca rs to pre

vent anyone f rom seeing what they rea l ly looked l ike .

If the marketplace is a battlef ield, as some suggest, then trying to out

fox one ' s advera r ie s and com pet i to r s requi res a m e tho d of kn ow ing one ' s

enemies, just as in polit ical or military affairs. Can the traditional func

t ions of governmenta l in te l l igence work in the pr iva te sec tor as well?

Compar ing the the two sec tors shows wha t works and wha t doesn ' t .

D i f f e r e n c e s i n L a w

A key e lement tha t separa tes the public and pr ivate sec tors when i t

comes to intell igence is the law. Espionage is i l legal all over the world,

yet governments rout ine ly prac t ice i f and even admit i t i f they are caught

in an esp ionage opera t ion . Agent handle r s , a s long as they have d ip lo

mat ic immuni ty , may suf fe r no more than be ing dec la red persona non

grata and sen t home f rom a fore ign pos t . The agents they handled , how

ever , may well be severe ly punished or even executed. St i l l , i t appears

that most nations are will ing to accept the fact that foreign intell igence

off icers wil l be posted in the ir countr ies and wil l conduct espionage.

In the private sector the rules are quite different. Private espionage is

theft , and those caught in the act are treated as thieves. This has led to

two in te res t ing deve lopments . The f i r s t i s tha t many governments have

begun to use their off icial intell igence services to engage in industr ial

e sp ionage , thus g iv ing pro tec t ion to the agent handle r s .

2

They use the

information col lec ted to he lp make the ir domest ic industr ies more com

pet i t ive with fore ign f i rms. The second development is tha t the United

Sta tes has f ina l ly begun to protec t i tse lf against industr ia l espionage by

using i ts in te l l igence services in a counter inte l l igence and law enforce

ment role. In fact, the 1996 Economic Espionage Act signed into law by

the Cl in ton adminis t ra t ion has tu rned indus t r ia l e sp ionage in to a federa l

crime, thus permitting the FBI to go after the criminals instead of relying

on s ta te and local law enforcement .

D i f f e r e n c e s i n C o s t

Another fac tor tha t separa tes governmenta l in te l l igence and pr ivate

intell igence is cost. In the government the cost of carrying out intell i

gence opera t ions is based on an annu a l bu dg e t dev e loped b y the In tel

l igence Communi ty , suppor ted by the pres ident ' s Of f ice of Management

and Budge t , and passed by Congress . Whereas in te l l igence managers



Sp yin g for Profit 153

may concern themse lves wi th keeping the i r opera t ions wi th in budge t

guidel ines , th is is not usual ly a concern of those ac tual ly doing the work.

No one worr ies about the cost of each agent meet ing or of a da i ly inte l

l igence report. In the private sector , in contrast , each intell igence activity

has to be measured against cost and the contr ibut ion i t makes to cor

pora te earnings and prof i t .

I t is easy to see, then, that intell igence activity in the private sector

faces obstac les tha t e i ther do not appear in government or are not of

major co ncern. We can exam ine inte l ligence in the pr iva te sec tor by com

par ing the var ious funct ions of col lec t ion, analysis , counter inte l l igence ,

and cover t ac t ion wi th the i r governmenta l equiva len ts , and we can see

how inte l l igence ac tual ly manifests i tse lf in the marketplace .

M o r e N a r r o w F o c u s

Inte l l igence col lec tors in the pr iva te sec tor have a more narrow focus

than the i r counte rpa r t s in government , and the ru les govern ing the i r

behavior are more s t r ic t , a t least for the United Sta tes . The government

has declared severa l t imes, through severa l adminis tra t ions, tha t i t wil l

not use i ts intell igence services to spy for American industry, even if

other countr ies do so. Since espionage is i l legal when prac t iced by non

governmenta l opera t ives , th is ef fec t ive ly rules out t radi t ional forms of

spying as a collection method. The cost of trying to carry out electronic

intercepts would be prohibi t ive for the pr iva te sec tor , even i f i t were

legal, so technical collection has to be l imited to the kinds of overhead

photography tha t can be purchased f rom the growing number of sources

that provide such data . The Russians, for example , have sa id tha t they

wil l se l l sa te l l i te photos of par t icular ta rgets on demand, and the cost

seems reasonable for a f i rm that might be seeking such data .

Realistically, then, most private intell igence collection, at least as far

as Americans are concerned, is going to be l imited to open sources , le

gal ly obta ined. We a lready know that a grea t deal of information is avai l

able , e i ther through pr int or e lec tronic sources , and can be gathered

merely for the cost of Internet t ime or sending someone to the l ibrary.

Som e informat ion i s ava i lab le f rom the U.S . gov ernm ent a nd m ay hav e

been der ived f rom governmenta l in te l l igence col lec t ion systems, sui tably

declassif ied to protec t sources and methods.

A third ca tegory of op en inform ation has bee n du bb ed grey inte ll i

ge nc e by som e w ri ters an d refers to legal ly obta ina ble inform ation no t

open to the genera l publ ic but accessible through some form of appl i

ca t ion process .

3

Many f inancia l and proper ty records can be seen in this

way, and some can be ob ta ined f rom the government th rough the Free

dom of Information Act (FOIA), which a lso requires an appl ica t ion pro-




ers for a product in order to ga ther pr ic ing data or seeking information

from suppliers using fa lse references.

6

However i t i s done , the in format ion ga the red f rom human sources has

to be col la ted, just as in government , to be useful for analysis . Whereas

an opera t ive in government might use sec re t r ecord ing devices to make

sure no information is lost in speaking with a human source , th is is

i llegal in the pr iv a te sec tor unless the source is inform ed tha t a rec ord ing

is to be made. In such cases , e l ic i ta t ion becomes interview—not neces

sar i ly a bad thing, but something tha t has to be done openly. In fac t ,

in terviews are good ways to obta in information as long as the inter

v iewer i s we l l p repared , has thought ou t ques t ions ahead of t ime , and

does not try to hide the real reason for the session.

A n a l y s i s i n t h e P r i v a t e S e c t o r

In government, as we know, intell igence collection is a rather specif ic

opera t ion , whe the r f rom open sources , f rom human sources , o r f rom

technica l sensors . Those who col lec t information then turn the ir raw data

over to analysts , who funct ion qui te separa te ly f rom the col lec tors . This

is done, in par t , to avoid bias in analysis and to protec t sources and

methods. In the pr iva te sec tor , in contrast , because of cost considera t ions

and the small s ize of the uni ts involved, those who col lec t a re a lmost

a lways those who analyze the col lec ted data . S ince the divis ion between

collec t ion and analysis disappears in the pr iva te sec tor , an inte l l igence

worker may be do ing both th ings a t the same t ime .

Intell igence analysis in the private sector falls into different categories

than in government , a l though some of the ou tput may appear s imi la r .

One kind of analyt ic product is focused on the feasibi l i ty of doing busi

ness in the ove rseas en viro nm en t and is genera l ly ca lled pol i t ica l r isk

ana lysis or s im ply r isk analysis . I t is a im ed a t bu sine ss abr oad bec ause

the assumpt ion i s tha t the re a re no sec re ts to do ing bus iness domest i

ca l ly . All the information an investor needs about the United Sta tes is

readi ly avai lable , and there are no myster ies about rules and regula t ions,

cu l ture and envi ronment , o r secur i ty and sa fe ty . Overseas , however ,

these issues may not be so c lear .

7

In invest iga t ing the business c l imate outs ide the United Sta tes , in te l

l igence col lec t ion and analysis is necessary because some information

needed for business decisions may be diff icult to f ind, hidden, or falsi

f ied. The security climate is of particular interest because of possible

corrupt ion or incompetence . No one can do business safe ly and effec

t ive ly i f the big goons who come to the door demanding payoffs or

protec t ion money are the pol ice . The topics tha t need to be invest iga ted

in the fore ign environment range f rom legal res tr ic t ions on hir ing and




fir ing, to the health and welfare of personnel, to restr ictions on repatr i

ation of capital and profit . The li terature on r isk analysis clearly specif ies

the range of topics to be investigated.

M uch of the nee ded da ta on such top ics can be ga the red th ro ug h read

i ly avai lable open sources e i ther through the pr iva te sec tor or f rom the

U.S.

Depar tments of Sta te and Commerce . Get t ing a good fee l for the

business c l imate , the secur i ty s i tua t ion, or the cul tura l a tmosphere prob

ably me an s an invest iga t ive t r ip to the target cou ntry by som eon e f luent

in the local language, familiar with local customs, and capable of seeing

be yond the hos t gove r nme n t ' s p r opa ga nda to f ind ou t wha t ma y be go

ing on behind the scenes.

Businesses tha t a re used to working in the United Sta tes may forget

tha t in some countr ies , pol i t ica l and economic s tabi l i ty are much shakier

than they are in the United Sta tes . Even though democracy is growing

in Third World countr ies more accustomed to pol i t ica l dic ta torships and

to economies prone to inf la t ion, the recent exper ience in Russia ought to

be instruct ive . Under communism, Sovie t rulers rout ine ly fa ls i f ied and

hid economic data to make the ir system appear more ef fec t ive than i t

really was. Today, the reliabili ty of economic statistics seems li t t le im

proved , a l though the reason may be based on incompetence ra the r than

on d ic ta tor sh ip .

Forecasting in Risk Analysis

Risk analysts in the private sector have to be able to forecast the cli

mate for business , the l ike ly outcomes of investment , and potent ia l se

cur i ty issues in much the same way tha t governmenta l in te l l igence

analysts wri te na t ional es t imates for secur i ty and planning. Both the

processe s an d the m etho do log ies are s imilar , bu t there is a major dif fer

ence between the public and pr ivate sec tors . In government , analysts

avoid a t a l l costs suggest ing what ac t ion pol i t ica l leaders should take on

the basis of the ir es t imates . When asked what should be done, in te l l i

gence analysts in government usual ly reply by saying tha t such decis ions

are none of the ir business . When he was DCI, Judge Wil l iam Webster

went so far as to walk out of cabinet meet ings when pol icy issues were

under discussion so as to avoid polit ical taint of intell igence.

8

In the

private sector the approach is quite different.

Firms tha t under take r isk analysis want to see c lear ly the bot tom l ine

of any forecas t. They w an t a go or no -go recom m enda t ion , and th ey

would be impa t ien t indeed i f a r i sk ana lys t to whom they had pa id b ig

money avoided the issue . This means tha t before reaching the conclu

sions of the r isk analysis, the intell igence analyst must consult with f i

nanc ia l and management exper ts in orde r to provide bo th a forecas t and




a recommenda t ion . Thus , r i sk ana lys is c lose ly resembles mi l i ta ry th ink

ing and p lanning .

As in government , r isk analysts in the pr iva te sec tor have to be adept

a t p resen t ing the i r conc lus ions to management . This i s made eas ie r by

the fact that most f irms, at least in the United States, rely on consultants

to provide r isk analysis ra ther than having an internal in te l l igence uni t .

This is not surpr is ing, given concerns about cost and a lso about the pro

pr ie ty of ha vin g a un i t labeled inte l l igence , s ince this sm acks of in

dustr ia l espionage. Risk analysis may be the easiest form of inte l l igence

to outsource anyway, unless the f i rm is one constant ly looking for busi

ness oppor tun i t ie s abroad . Hir ing a consul tan t may be cheaper and more

effec t ive and e l iminates the need to acquire exper t ise for what may be a

one-shot deal . Although the evidence is anecdota l a t best , consul tants

who carry out r isk analysis indica te tha t they have bet ter access to top

management than counte rpa r t s in in te rna l in te l l igence un i t s and a re

more able to give the f rui ts of the ir work to those who may ac tual ly do

someth ing wi th the in format ion .

Doing bus iness abroad may requi re more than jus t a one- t ime r i sk

analysis forecast , however . Once the f i rm actual ly s tar ts opera t ing in a

fore ign country, i t may need other kinds of inte l l igence to protec t i ts

opera t ions. The f i rm needs to pay a t tent ion to the pol i t ica l , economic ,

and secur i ty s i tua t ion in the country where i t opera tes , so in this respect

the f irm's concerns are similar to those of U.S. off icials in that country,

and the U.S. embassy there may well be the best source of current in

te l l igence . As well , the f i rm may wish to subscr ibe to one of the growing

number of secur i ty newsle t te r s wr i t ten for such s i tua t ions . These news

le t ters usual ly conta in inte l l igence analysis s imilar to the current inte l l i

gence analysis written for senior policy officials in Washington, and a

subscr ipt ion is l ike ly to be much cheaper than hir ing someone to be an

intell igence collector and analyst in the overseas location.

C o m p e t i t i v e I n t e l l i g e n c e

A second kind of inte l l igence product in the pr iva te sec tor is ca l led

competi t ive or competi tor inte l l igence because i t concerns adversar ies

an d c om peti tor f irms in the m arketp lace . I t is as m uc h tac t ica l as s t ra tegic

inte l l igence and seems to be the fastest-growing form of pr iva te inte l l i

gence today . In m an y w ay s it i s m ore l ike govern m enta l in te l ligence th an

r isk analysis because i t involves gather ing and analyzing information

that the f i rm's competi tors would rea l ly prefer to keep conf ident ia l . The

practit ioners of this form of private intell igence are more like their gov

e rnmenta l counte rpa r t s than the resea rchers who ca r ry ou t r i sk ana lys is ,

and this makes many pr ivate prac t i t ioners a l i t t le nervous. They cer ta inly




do not want to be seen as spies or to be accused of industr ia l espionage,

and these concerns color the way competi t ive inte l l igence , usual ly ca l led

CI by i ts prac t i t ioners (but not to be confused with counter inte l l igence)

is conducted in the United Sta tes .

In many countr ies , competi t ive inte l l igence is seen as a necessary par t

of doing business , and CI professionals are incorpora ted into the f i rm in

both s t ra teg ic p lanning and marke t ing depar tments . One former CIA

official , who left the CIA to become one of the pioneering CI profession

als in the United States, believes that almost all f irms in Japan have CI

de pa r tme n t s a nd ma ny Eur ope a n f i r ms ha ve the m a s we l l .

9

Fur ther , in

many countr ies the government ' s professional inte l l igence service col

lec ts and analyzes CI information and provides i t to businesses in the

c oun t r y to ma ke the m mor e c ompe t i t i ve a b r oa d . A l though some c oun

tr ies deny tha t they ac tual ly do this , the evidence is s t rong tha t such

activity exists. In fact, the former head of the French intell igence service

some years ago not only admit ted tha t his service carr ied out such prac

t ices but a lso expla ined in some deta i l why this was a necessary and

r ight thing to do.

1 0

In the United States the situation is quite different. The U.S. govern

ment is happy to provide assis tance to f i rms wil l ing to invest abroad and

makes information avai lable for r isk analysts openly through the De

par tments of Sta te and Commerce . Some of this information is indeed

der i ved f rom inte ll igence collec ted by the U.S. Inte ll igence C om m un ity

and declassif ied to protec t sources and methods. But when i t comes to

competi t ive inte l l igence , the U.S. government draws the l ine . This issue

has been deba ted ever s ince Admira l Turner was DCI in the Car te r ad

minis tra t ion, and each succeeding adminis tra t ion and DCI has ra t i f ied

the original decision. The U.S. government will not assist U.S. f irms to

become more compet i t ive abroad , and the reasons ce r ta in ly make some

sense .

There seems to be no reasonable way to provide CI inte l l igence to

pr ivate f i rms ev en -h an d ed l y ; that is , there is no way to share equal ly

between large corpora t ions and smaller f i rms. Second, the nature of cor

pora t ions in the United Sta tes is tha t ownership is of ten mult ina t ional .

How could the government provide in te l l igence to f i rms tha t might be

par t ly owned by fore igners? And why should taxpayers fund such ac

t iv i ty when they might de r ive no benef i t f rom such opera t ions? Funding

governmenta l in te l l igence to provide for na t ional secur i ty gives each c i t

izen a benefi t, bu t fund ing pr iv ate inte l l igence benef its only s to ckh olde rs .

As one CIA opera t ive is a l leged to have put i t , he was wil l ing to r isk his

life for his country, but he was not will ing to r isk i t for General Motors.

Interest ingly, most CI professionals in the United Sta tes and the f i rms

tha t use them a re re luc tan t to seek the government ' s he lp anyway. They

do not want the government to be involved in the i r bus inesses ; they do




not want to have he lp f rom governmenta l in te l l igence profess iona ls ; and

they bel ieve , w ith som e just if ica t ion, th a t they are capab le of finding ou t

wha t they need to know on the i r own. Fur the r , some of them d is t rus t

former governmenta l in te l l igence opera t ives , pe rhaps expla in ing why

rela t ive ly few former inte l l igence professionals have found the ir way

into competi t ive inte l l igence , a l though they may be ac t ive in other as

pects of business inte l l igence or industr ia l secur i ty .

T h e B u s i n e s s I n t e l l i g e n c e U n i t

The da ta remain somewhat anecdota l , bu t i t appears tha t some k inds

of f i rms do see the need for having a competi t ive inte l l igence uni t in te

gra ted into the business , whereas others prefer to outsource this funct ion.

Serv ice f i rms such as banks , insurance companies , and communica t ions

f irms and the l ike seem to be a t t rac ted to integra t ion, whereas manufac

tur ing and pharmaceutica ls l ike to outsource the ir CI needs. Overa l l , the

use of a CI consul tant f i rm may make economic and manager ia l sense

in the United Sta tes , and the number of such f i rms seems to be growing.

Despi te the growing re l iance on consul tant CI f i rms, the argument for

having a CI un i t in tegra ted in to the bus iness i s a s t rong one . A pe rma

nent uni t can s tay on top of the competi t ion, cont inuously monitor the

m arke tplac e , an d pr ov id e w ha t one w ri ter ca lls ac t ion able inte l ligence ,

the kind of information tha t managers can use to s teer the f i rm to beat

the c ompe t i t i on by de ve lop ing ne w p r oduc t s , s e e k ing p r oduc t ive ma r

kets , or inst i tut ing new services .

1 1

The C I un i t ca n p r ov ide m a na g e m e n t

with a regular f low of inte l l igence , whereas the consul tant CI f i rm can

del iver inte l l igence only to meet specif ic requirements . However , the na

ture of modern bus iness management in the Uni ted S ta tes works aga ins t

an integra ted CI uni t .

Too many managers seem to focus on quar te r ly ea rn ings s ta tements

and are not able to see how the CI uni t contr ibutes to corpora te prof i t ,

according to CI prac t i t ioners . When cuts have to be made, the CI uni t

may be the f irst to feel the axe. Some firms may see competit ive intell i

gence as only a market ing tool ra ther than as a s t ra tegic planning mech

anism. I f the CI uni t is re legated to the market ing depar tment , i ts rea l

value to the f irm may be lost .

Some of the problems may l ie with CI professionals themselves . Few

of them admit to having any professional inte l l igence exper ience , a l

though the number of former government in te l l igence ve te rans in com

pet i t ive inte l l igence seems to be growing. Many CI professionals are

tra ined in l ibrary sc ience and are very good a t pul l ing information to

gether , but they may not be capable of making the data into the kind of

ac t ionable inte l l igence the f i rm rea l ly needs. Unlike in government , CI




professionals in the pr iva te sec tor seem to learn most ly on the job. There

are very few courses on competi t ive inte l l igence in American col leges

and universi t ies , and most of the t ra ining programs tha t do exis t a re

one- or two-day seminars put on a t ra ther heavy pr ices by the CI con

sul tant f i rms themselves . Although the l i te ra ture in the f ie ld is growing,

a ided in par t by the work of the Socie ty of Competi t ive Inte l l igence Pro

fessionals (SCIP), w hic h pu blish es a professional journ al and a ma gaz ine ,

basic texts are few indeed.

1 2

Fur ther , there is no s tandard tha t CI pro

fessionals have to meet , and one can become a CI professional without

pr ior exper ience or t ra ining.

Given the ra ther loose nature of competi t ive inte l l igence , some busi

ness managers may bel ieve they are be t ter served by an exper ienced CI

f irm than by crea t ing the ir own integra l uni t f rom scra tch with people

who may have to learn on the job. Of course , whether the CI professional

is working as a consul tant or is in tegra ted into the f i rm, the work re

mains the same. The task is to f ind out about competi tors , using legal

and e thica l methods, to improve the tasking f i rm's posi t ion in the mar

ketplace .

C o l l e c t i n g C o m p e t i t i v e I n t e l l ig e n c e

Th us, for the CI professional , the req uire m en ts m ay vary f rom learnin g

about a compet i to r ' s p r ic ing s t ra teg ies to produc t ion methods , marke t ing

techniques, or the introduct ion of a new product . Fur ther , the CI profes

s ional must not only col lec t the data using legal methods but a lso der ive

the appropr ia te ana lys is and usua l ly make recommenda t ions to the ta sk

ing f i rm about how to counter the opera t ions of the competi tor . From

the l i te ra ture on competi t ive inte l l igence , i t seems c lear tha t the means

of doing this work involve lots of clever techniques and fall short of

operations that violate either the spir it or the letter of the Economic Es

pionage Act. A great deal of information can often be collected from the

tasking f i rm's ow n em plo yee s, an d m uc h of the rest can be obta ined f rom

open sources or gray inte l l igence , or f rom using methods a lready dis

cussed.

D e f e n s i v e M e a s u r e s

Just as the government ' s in te l l igence services have to protec t them

selves against espionage, the target pr iva te sec tor f i rm has to protec t

itself against competitor intell igence. The defense methods are similar to

those used in government , but they involve a qui te separa te group of

professionals , the prac t i t ioners of industr ia l secur i ty . Unlike CI profes-




sionals , the world of industr ia l secur i ty is f i l led with people who have

con siderab le exp er ience in inte ll igence , invest iga t ive , or pol ice w ork . The

ski l ls learned in government t ransla te easi ly into the pr iva te sec tor , and

those ind iv idua ls wi th pr ior government exper ience a re we lcomed and

not t rea ted with suspic ion as in competi t ive inte l l igence . Because many

industr ia l secur i ty professionals have extensive exper ience and t ra ining

acqui red in government , they tend to be be t te r equipped to dea l wi th

pr ivate secur i ty issues .

Industr ia l secur i ty professionals who enter the f ie ld without govern

ment exper ience wil l f ind a broad range of t ra ining avai lable to them

either through col lege programs or in courses taught by secur i ty profes

s ionals . There is even a cer t i f ica t ion program suppor ted by the American

Society for Ind us tr ial S ecurity (ASIS); ach ievin g the Certif ied Pro tection

Professional certif icate is a reliable indicator that the holder has met na

t ional s tandards. Tra ining l i te ra ture in the secur i ty f ie ld is much broader

tha n tha t in busin ess inte l l igence as we ll , so the aspir in g professional has

a good chance of learning the basics just by going to the l ibrary.

1 3

Industr ia l secur i ty can be broken down into a number of f ie lds , each

of which has i ts own problems and character is t ics . These f ie lds inc lude

protec t ion of plant , fac i l i t ies , and equipment; personnel secur i ty; and op

era t ional and data secur i ty . Given the s imilar i t ies to governmenta l prac

tices as well as the differences in each f ield, making the comparison with

government methods can be ins t ruc t ive . We can begin wi th pro tec t ion

of plant , fac i l i t ies , and equipment because pr iva te sec tor secur i ty and

government secur i ty deal with s imilar issues in tha t a rea .

P h y s i c a l S e c u r i t y

Both government and the pr iva te sec tor face l imited jur isdic t ion when

it comes to physica l protec t ion. Pr ivate ly hired secur i ty guards can patrol

the per imeter of a fac i l i ty , but the ir jur isdic t ion ends where the ir prop

er ty ends. In government , the same rules apply. Local pol ice take over

if a cr ime has been committed or i f t respassers have entered the proper ty

and then f led. CIA secur i ty guards can no more pursue cr iminals off CIA

grounds than can Wackenhut guards pa t ro l l ing a fac tory . In fac t , sum

moning the pol ice is one of the key roles secur i ty plays in both govern

ment and the pr iva te sec tor .

Both government and pr iva te companies want to c rea te an image of

secur i ty to de ter i l legal or unwanted entry . Strong fences topped with

barbed or razor wire , good l igh t ing , surve i l lance cameras , and manned

pa t ro ls , e spec ia l ly wi th guard dogs , should ce r ta in ly in t imida te anyone

trying to penetra te a government fac i l i ty , and s imilar tools are avai lable

to pr iva te companies . Many companies in the pr iva te sec tor , however ,




want to be open to the publ ic and appear f r iendly and we lcoming ra the r

than in t imida t ing . Who would want to s tay in a ho te l tha t appeared to

be as we l l gua rde d as the CIA, or shop in a depar tm ent s to re w i th gu ard

dogs and pa t ro ls nea rby?

Mainta ining secur i ty in the pr iva te sec tor of ten means crea t ing the

i l lusion to the casual observer tha t there is none while a t the same t ime

le t t ing potent ia l t roublemakers know that secur i ty off ic ia ls are on the

job.

There is probably no bet ter example of this than in the many casinos

in Las Vegas and other gambling centers , where secur i ty is pervasive but

very low key. The same is t rue for spor t ing events or other la rge gath

er ings, where managers want the presence of secur i ty to be vis ible but

not intrusive . In re ta i l t rade where shoplif t ing is a problem, managers

might want to give security surveillance a high profile to deter theft .

Physica l secur i ty a lso inc ludes barr ier protec t ion to prevent unauthor

ized entry . In some f i rms, expecia l ly in manufactur ing, unauthor ized vis

itors are a threat to safety and to operational security and can be kept

out in much the same way as in government . The use of va r ious forms

of entry and exi t devices is growing and becoming increasingly sophis

t ica ted . Today , ins tead of hav ing to swipe an encoded badge th rough a

reader to ga in entry , employees may use recognit ion devices tha t check

f ingerpr ints or eyebal l pa t terns . Many businesses have been re luctant to

use such expens ive and in t imida t ing machinery , though, p re fe r r ing in

s tead to re ly on low-paid recept ionis ts or guards to scan photo IDs. Pen

e tra t ing businesses tha t do not use barr ier devices is s imple for the thief

or industr ia l spy; of ten entry can be gained merely by looking as i f you

know where you a re go ing or by mel t ing in to a th rong .

T h e S e c u r i t y I n v e n t o r y

To assess the capabili t ies and vulnerabili t ies of the f irm in terms of

physica l secur i ty , the secur i ty force should probably under take a secur i ty

inventory to de te rmine the s t rengths and weaknesses of the f i rm' s phys

ica l secur i ty systems and barr ier entry devices . Secur i ty professionals

may even go so far as to a t tempt to bypass the f i rm's secur i ty systems

in order to f ind s trengths and weaknesses and thus be able to recom

me nd c ha nge s whe r e ne e de d .

Such attempted forced entry is often carried out in military units. In

one such inte l l igence uni t in which the author served, the t roops pene

trated a high-tech, highly classif ied collection unit by hiding in the trunk

of the commander 's off icial vehicle and were eventually able to place a

box labe led bo m b on the co m m an de r ' s desk w i thou t be ing de tec ted .

In that case secur i ty was increased in a hurry.

Secur i ty professionals must deal with the fac t tha t in many par ts of



Spying for Profit 163

the country, each employee wil l dr ive his or her car to work and expect

to f ind a place to park. Parking secur i ty is a cont inual ly growing head

ache in bo th go vern m ent and the pr iva te sec tor and has been exacerba ted

by the threa t of te r ror is t car bombs. In government , parking fac i l i t ies

have been upgraded to ensure en t ry on ly by au thor ized employees . The

faci l i t ies themselves may have pop-up road barr iers or other obstac les

to keep bad guys f rom get t ing c lose enough to do damage. In the pr iva te

sec tor , however , pa rk ing and pa rk ing pro tec t ion c rea te expenses most

f i rms would ra ther do without . This crea tes a secur i ty vulnerabi l i ty tha t

m ay d eg rad e wha teve r ba r r ie r p ro tec t ion the fi rm h as ins t i tu ted . Tu rn ing

parking management over to a specia l ty f i rm to control both access and

safety of the area may prove cost-effective in the long run.

Cars are a secur i ty headache in other ways, especia l ly in the world of

in te l l igence . Whereas CIA employees may themse lves be under cover

and have the i r pay and a l lowances rou ted th rough the i r cover agenc ies ,

the ir cars are not under cover and become ident if ie rs . Dur ing the Cold

War, rumor had i t tha t Sovie t agents occasional ly hid outs ide entrances

to the CIA to photograph l icense pla tes as a way of breaking the cover

of c landest ine service employees. Since the cars could not be going any

where e lse , th is must have been a useful way for the KGB to f ind out

who we were . This was a lso a fac tor in the Mir Aimal Kans i case when

tha t Pakis tan i te r ror i s t k i l led and wounded CIA employees by shoot ing

them as they waited in l ine to make the turn onto the CIA access road.

The people wait ing a t tha t par t icular place had to be CIA—the access

road goes nowhere e l se .

The CIA is not the only inte l l igence service whose employees can be

given away by the ir cars . We have recent ly learned tha t the former East

German inte l l igence service was able to t rack vir tua l ly a l l the employees

of the West German se rv ice , the Bundesnachr ich tendiens t , th rough the i r

l icense pla tes . And i t should come as no surpr ise tha t the Sovie ts and

their a l l ies were a lso vulnerable to ident if ica t ion in this way in Wash

ington or those few restr ic ted areas where they were a l lowed to t ravel .

Overseas , for the United Sta tes , the s i tua t ion is somewhat be t ter . A s tory

surfaced in 1998 that a CIA officer overseas was able to maintain a so-

called clean car , not identif ied with him at all , and he used this car to

rescue one of the agents revealed to the Sovie ts by Aldr ich Ames.

1 4

P e r s o n n e l P r o t e c t i o n

Inte l ligence services , especia lly tho se in the United Sta tes , w an t to pro

tec t the i r pe r sonne l f rom harm both a t home and abroad . They a lso want

to protec t the ir agencies f rom their em ploy ees w h o m ay go sou r . W e

have a lready discussed the s teps inte l l igence agencies take to be sure




they are hir ing the r ight people . I f an employee does not measure up,

an ex tended proba t ionary pe r iod of employment enables the CIA or

other U.S. services to te rminate the employee without too much fuss .

Indeed, there have been cases where the f i red employee sought revenge,

a problem the inte l l igence services have to keep in mind.

In the private sector , the situation is different. Private f irms hire and

fire people all the t ime, but the f irm's abili ty to investigate a potential

employee i s much more res t r ic ted than in government . In the pr iva te

sector , protec t ing the f i rm from employees has higher pr ior i ty than pro

tec t ing the employees f rom secur i ty hazards. Pr iva te f i rms lose mil l ions

of dol lars a year through employee cr ime, a problem the CIA rare ly has

to face . Overseas , however , the pr iva te sec tor has to devote as much

effor t to employee protec t ion as do many government agencies .

Many of the methods the government can use to c lea r po ten t ia l em

ployees, especially in the security sector , are not available to the private

f i rm. The CIA can use the polygraph, extensive background checks, and

access to f inancia l and cr iminal records, a l l methods forbidden to the

pr ivate f i rm for legal reasons. Pr iva te companies , unless they are doing

business with the secur i ty sec tors of government , cannot rout ine ly use

the polygraph or ga in access to pr iva te records without cause . Thus, they

have to re ly on se lf - repor t ing by the potent ia l employee and on infor

mat ion f rom prev ious employers to de te rmine the re l iab i l i ty and

dependabil i ty of the new hire . Only in the secur i ty sec tor , where gov

ernment c learances are required, is the pr iva te f i rm able to carry out an

invest iga t ion s imilar to tha t in government . Drug tes t ing, however ,

seems to be equal ly appl ied in government and the pr iva te sec tor .

O t h e r R e s t r i c t i o n s

The CIA can look a t a broad range of issues when i t in terviews po

tent ia l new recrui ts , and i t can ask about pr iva te ac t ivi ty , inc luding sex

ual ac t ivi ty , or other personal issues more or less without res tr ic t ion. In

the pr iva te sec tor , quest ions about sex or personal ac t ivi ty are restr ic ted

unless an issue tha t the potent ia l employee is wil l ing to discuss surfaces .

Unless the f irm is will ing to pay a private investigator to look into a

potent ia l employee ' s past , even a cr iminal record might easi ly be covered

u p .

Unable to learn about a person 's past in ways the CIA considers

rou t ine , the f irm is vu lnera ble to hir ing peo ple of ques t ionable re l iabi l ity .

In the CIA, secur i ty off icers monitor employees more or less without

res t r ic t ion , a s we know. When moni tor ing becomes inves t iga t ion , how

ever , such as in the Ames or Nicholson cases , then a cour t order is nec

essary. In the pr iva te sec tor , employers have to be much more careful

about employee moni tor ing and must warn employees i f they a re go ing



Spying

for Profit 165

to be wa tched through surve i l lance cameras or i f the i r phone conversa

t ions wil l be recorded. In the CIA, secur i ty awareness requires tha t em

ployees a ler t secur i ty off ic ia ls to suspected improper conduct by the ir

co-workers . This d id happen in the Ames case , when severa l Agency

of f ice r s repor ted Ames ' s ques t ionable behavior , though wi thout much

effect. Private sector employees are not l ikely to report on their off ice

mates wi thout p rovoca t ion , r equi r ing managers to be v ig i lan t in looking

for bad conduct .

Thef t is a lways a potent ia l problem in the pr iva te sec tor , especia l ly in

businesses tha t have something to s tea l . White-col lar c r ime is by far the

more dif f icul t problem to deal with , however , because i t is less over t

than, say, someone who s tea ls products on the sa les f loor . White-col lar

cr ime inc ludes, but is not l imited to , extor t ion, embezzlement , f raud, and

increasingly, e lec tronic vandal ism. This is an area where the f i rm's se

curity force may not be effective without outside help. The security force

is, after all , not the police. But the security force can be helpful in dealing

with white-collar crime. Their f irst job is to determine that a crime has

been co m m it ted , som eth ing they wi l l p rob ably ha ve to do in conjunct ion

wi th management . Then they need to iden t i fy the poss ib le cu lpr i t s and

make sure tha t any evidence re la ted to the cr ime is protec ted. Beyond

that, their task is to summon law enforcement officials, again in con

junc t ion wi th management , make ev idence ava i lab le , and then provide

wha tever he lp inves t iga tors need to pursue the c r imina ls .

1 5

An over -

zealous secur i ty force eager to s top a cr ime might well ta int the evidence

or give the cr iminals enough warning to cause them to f lee .

O p e r a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y

Industr ia l secur i ty uni ts have a major task in protec t ing the opera t ions

and the propr ie tary information of the f i rm. In the face of growing

threa ts f rom indus t r ia l e sp ionage , da ta pro tec t ion i s becoming an in

creasingly important par t of the industr ia l secur i ty umbrel la . Taking a

page f rom the government ' s secur i ty book can be ins t ruc t ive . Through

out the secur i ty system of the U.S. government , da ta protec t ion is a key

issue. All information of a sensitive nature is classif ied according to how

much damage would be c rea ted by i t s loss or accord ing to the na ture of

the sources and the methods by which the in format ion was ob ta ined .

Informat ion handl ing and s torage a re governed by s t r ic t ru les about

mark ing the in format ion , r ecord ing the passage of the in format ion

through the system, and s tor ing i t in safe conta iners .

Those of us responsible for information handling a t the CIA probably

never even considered the cost to the government of the recordkeeping,

the cost of the storage containers, or the price of the cover sheets used




to protec t documents . In the pr iva te sec tor , however , these costs cannot

be ignored. Yet , i t seems c lear tha t many f i rms tha t have valuable pro

pr ie tary data to protec t , inc luding such things as the formula for a phar

maceutica l drug, a new sof t dr ink, or a sof tware product would help

themselves i f they copied the procedures used in government . The U.S.

government encourages f i rms tha t do bus iness abroad to pro tec t the i r

data using readi ly avai lable encrypt ion technology or even commercia l ly

ava i lab le sc ramble r phones . F i rms tha t do bus iness a t home might con

sider these economical measures as well .

F irms tha t do business overseas have to face the possibi l i ty tha t they

might be targeted by the host country ' s in te l l igence or secur i ty service

ei ther for the purposes of industr ia l espionage or just to ver ify tha t the

f irm is doing what i t sa id i t would when i t moved into the country. In

the la t te r case , of course , there is nothing to worry about as long as the

f i rm is indeed l iv ing up to wha tever commitments i t made when i t

opened for bus iness . In dea l ing wi th indus t r ia l e sp ionage abroad , the

firm will probably need help if i t becomes an intell igence target.

H e l p f ro m t h e G o v e r n m e n t

Although the U.S. government has sa id repeatedly tha t i t wil l not he lp

f irms to be more competi t ive by carrying out industr ia l espionage, i t has

agreed to assis t f i rms tha t may be the vic t ims of fore ign spying a t home

and overseas . The FBI has been tasked with a ler t ing f i rms to possible

dangers f rom industr ia l espionage and is now able to task the col lec t ion

agencies—the CIA or NSA primarily—to gather information about for

e ign indus t r ia l e sp ionage .

1 6

The f irm has the responsibili ty of taking

measures to pro tec t i t s p ropr ie ta ry da ta th rough proper handl ing and

storage procedures , and i t should be using i ts own secur i ty force to take

steps to de tec t possible problems. Employees should be a ler ted to repor t

any a t tempts to col lec t da ta on the f i rm, however innocent the approach

may seem; barr ier devices should be used to de tec t a t tempts a t unlawful

en t ry ; an d com m unica t ion s sys tem s sho uld be secured from in te rcep tion .

I f a problem is uncovered, the f i rm's managers ought to be repor t ing to

the U.S. embassy.

Industr ia l espionage tha t takes place within the United Sta tes is def i

nitely the responsibili ty of the FBI, and f irms working in areas that may

leave them vulnerable to espionage ought to be on the FBI ' s a ler t ing

network even before they detec t a problem. During the Cold War the

Soviets or their all ies used to cruise areas where high-tech f irms were

loca ted , looking for oppor tun i t ie s to mee t employees who might some

how be seduced in to esp ionage . One approach was to seek publ ic ly

avai lable da ta f rom the employee; i f a re la t ionship developed, then the

industr ia l spies would go af ter more sensi t ive mater ia ls , point ing out to



Sp ying for Profit 167

the v ic t ims tha t they had a l ready v io la ted the company ' s ru les and tha t

they might lose the ir jobs i f word got back to the ir bosses about what

they had done . For tuna te ly , mos t o f these a t tempts a t b lackmai l pushed

the vic t ims to repor t the inc idents and in some cases led to FBI s t ing

opera t ions aga ins t the enemy.

S e c u r i t y A w a r e n e s s

Secur i ty awareness is a key fac tor in deal ing with industr ia l espionage.

Employees who have access to a f i rm's propr ie tary data and t rade secre ts

must be t ra ined to recognize s igns of potent ia l industr ia l spying and

ought to be encouraged to repor t anyth ing out o f the ord ina ry . They

need to be taught how to protec t the ir information, how to avoid saying

too much a t mee t ings and confe rences to the wrong people , and how to

recognize a t tempts a t e l ic i ta t ion. This is the kind of t ra ining rout ine ly

g iven to government employees who handle c lass i f ied mate r ia l s , and the

private sector could easily follow suit at relatively low cost.

To assist the f irm in data protection, the security force should carry

out both a vulnerabi l i ty assessment and a threa t assessment . Secur i ty

profess iona ls should be ab le to advise management no t on ly where the

f irm might be vulnerable to the loss of da ta but a lso who might be the

l ike ly culpr i ts i f an a t tempt is made to s tea l propr ie tary information or

trade secre ts . This might enable the f i rm to s t rengthen weak points , but

a lso to se t up warn ing devices tha t might ind ica te a t tempts a t pene t ra

t ion. In e lec tronic da ta systems, for example , a t tempts a t penetra t ion

ought to be detec table to provide ear ly warning of possible industr ia l

espionage. Then the f i rm can make a de terminat ion about ca l l ing for he lp

from law enforcement . The f i rm needs to weigh potent ia l losses against

poss ib le adverse publ ic i ty tha t might a r i se f rom acknowledging a pos

s ible secur i ty weakness .

In this area the pr iva te sec tor has an advantage over government . In

the private sector a f irm can seek to indemnify itself against loss by

purchas ing insurance . The government , in cont ras t , i s e ssen t ia l ly

self-

insured and has to seek budgetary re l ief in case of loss , under the c ir

cum stances suf fe r ing w ha t could be em bar rass in g reve la tions about po or

secur i ty . Unl ike government , a p r iva te f i rm, proper ly insured , can make

choices about how i t seeks to cover losses f rom secur i ty penetra t ions or

data theft.

A v o i d i n g T u r b u l e n c e

Operat ional secur i ty can be a headache for the pr iva te f i rm, but i t is

an issue tha t cannot be ignored. To genera l ize about opera t ional secur i ty




is diff icult because businesses come in so many varieties, but in all cases,

f irms seek to avoid w ha t som e wr i te r s desc r ibe as tu rbu lence , any th ing

that might disrupt the smooth opera t ion of the f i rm. These disrupt ions

may range f rom natura l disasters , such as ear thquakes and f loods, to

man-made disasters l ike f ires or electr ical failures, to crime or just plain

stupidi ty . To protec t against turbulence , the secur i ty uni t should develop

a threa t analysis to t ry to out l ine the most l ike ly problems tha t might be

d is rup t ive in addi t ion to cont ingency p lans to dea l wi th the d is rup t ions .

As in other secur i ty issues , the f i rm must choose which ac t ions to take

to deal with turbulence and insurance to cover the cost of damage f rom

disrupt ions .

Developing a threa t analysis requires the same input and ta lent tha t

dr ive the crea t ion of any inte l l igence product , but in this area secur i ty

units often fall short . Only in the last few years or so has the security

l i te ra ture begun to discuss the development of inte l l igence analysis . A

ser ious disconnect seems to exis t be tween the var ious forms of business

intell igence an d the secu rity function. Since m ost U.S. f irms d o no t ha ve

internal in te l l igence uni ts , there is no one to assis t the secur i ty people in

determining possible threa ts to the f i rm and in developing the analysis

to suppor t cont ingency planning. This forces the f i rm to seek outs ide

help w h en i t m igh t be m or e cost-effec tive an d f it be t ter to ha ve the w ork

done by those employees famil iar with the f i rm's opera t ing character is

t ics and internal cul ture .

Since there is no way to predic t with any cer ta inty what disasters the

firm may face, the security office must examine a broad range of prob

lems and develop cont ingencies for each. This is an issue with which

government has had a grea t deal of exper ience , so the pr iva te sec tor can

learn another lesson in this case . At the Pentagon, for example , cont in

gency plans are wri t ten for a l l k inds of s i tua t ions, and each plan has , a t

i ts core, a threat assessment prepared by intell igence officers. These plans

can be adjusted when ac tual ly needed. After the Gulf War some wri ters

suggested tha t the plan used for the defense of Kuwait and the subse

quent invasion of I raq was based on a cont ingency plan for an invasion

of I ran tha t was never ac tual ly used.

P r e p a r i n g f o r D i s a s t e r

Unl ike the Pentagon the pr iva te sec tor cannot spend t ime and money

drawing up a wide range of cont ingency p lans , and the re fore the th rea t

assessment has to focus on the problems most l ikely to face the f irm so

tha t management can dec ide whe the r to e s tab l i sh a d isas te r p lan , buy

more insurance , or ar range some combinat ion of both. Some disasters

cer ta inly require a cont ingency disaster plan as well as insurance . For



Spying for Profit 169

example , a ir l ine companies must plan for crashes, hote ls and re ta i l es

tabl ishments for f i re , and manufactur ing companies for power fa i lures .

The f i rm should prac t ice the procedures out l ined in the plan, but f i rms

are usual ly re luctant to do this because such prac t ices are disrupt ive and

can crea te adverse public i ty .

Governmenta l exper ience shows tha t even the bes t p lans wi l l no t a l

ways work smoothly even i f cont inual prac t ice is he ld. Firms can take

another leaf f rom the government ' s book by using a form of prac t ice tha t

in the Pentagon is ca l led a command post exerc ise . In such a scenar io

p lans a re rehearsed in a ve ry l imi ted way to te s t communica t ions , lead

ership roles , or systems needed for opera t ions. In the pr iva te sec tor a

l imi ted exerc ise would te s t to make sure tha t a la rm sys tems work , emer

gency com m unica t io ns sys tem s funct ion , o r subs t i tu te po w er sys tems a re

ready to go.

M i x i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e a n d S e c u r i t y

Planning for disaster or the disrupt ion of opera t ions requires a mix of

intell igence and security activit ies that seem to be absent in most f irms,

a t least according to the l i te ra ture and to anecdota l mater ia l tha t appears

among professionals in both f ie lds in the pr iva te sec tor . The CIA and the

FBI seem to be working coopera t ive ly in a way no one could have an

t ic ipa ted years ago. This same coopera t ion could take place in the pr iva te

sector i f secur i ty professionals were more a t tuned to the inte l l igence

function, or if f irms were to establish internal intell igence units along

with security offices.

Inte l ligence an d se cur i ty in the pr iva te sec tor can protec t f irms in m uc h

the same way tha t in te l l igence and secur i ty opera t ions serve to protec t

nat ional secur i ty . The United Sta tes has a long way to go in developing

such opera t ions in the pr iva te sec tor , but c lear ly progress is be ing made.

So far the government is playing only a l imited role in a iding and pro

tec t ing the pr iva te sec tor , and pr ivate f i rms do not a lways take advan

tage of the services the government has to offer . I t seems clear that

a l though the U.S. government is not going to use i ts in te l l igence re

sources to spy on fore ign f i rms the way the French or Russians do, in

tell igence information is available to the private sector if i t wishes to use

it . Similarly, the United States is not going to provide security directly

for f irms to protect them against foreign industr ial espionage, but i t is

going to provide assis tance , information, and ul t imate ly the force of law

to a id them.

Is the government doing enough to help the pr iva te sec tor in the

United Sta tes? One would have to conclude tha t potent ia l ass is tance is

avai lable , but tha t the pr iva te sec tor may not know i t . Perhaps the in-




t e l li g e n c e a n d s e c u r i t y a g e n c i e s i n g o v e r n m e n t o u g h t t o t r y h a r d e r t o

e d u c a t e p r i v a t e fi r m s a b o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e t h e y a r e p r e p a r e d t o o ff er;

u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e a g e n c i e s d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h i s a m a j o r m i s s i o n , so i t ' s

n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e C I A o r t h e o t h e r a g e n c i e s a r e r e l u c t a n t t o d o

m o r e . O n l y t h e FB I h a s m a d e a n in t e n s i v e e ff or t to s e t u p a w a r n i n g

n e t w o r k f o r t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . U n t i l t h e g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e s t h a t m o r e

h e l p is n e e d e d , c h a n g e i n t h e s i t u a t i o n i s n o t l i k e ly .

Notes

1.

John Fialka,

War b y O ther Means: Econom ic Espionage in America

(New York:

W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. xi-xiv.

2.

Ibid.; Peter Schweizer, Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Eco

nomic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993).

3.

Jon Sigu rdso n an d Patr icia Ne lson, Intel ligence G ather in g an d Japan : The

Elusive Role of Grey Intel l igence, International Journal of Intelligence and

Counterlntelligence, vol. 5, no.

1,

pp. 17-34.

4.

Leonard M. Fuld , The New Competitive Intelligence (New York: John Wiley

& Sons, 1995).

5.

Ibid., p. 33.

6. Alfonso Sapia Bosch and Robert S. Tancer, Navigating through the Le

gal /Eth ica l Gray Zone: What Would You Do? Competitive Intelligence Magazine,

vol .

1, no. 1, pp.

22-31.

7.

Wen Lee Ting, Multi-national Risk Assessment and Ma nagemen t: Strategies for

Investment and Marketing D ecisions (New York: Quorum Books , 1988) ; David M.

Raddock (ed.) , Assessing Corporate Political

Risk:

A Guide for International Busi

nessmen (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Litt lefield, 1986); an d W ill iam D. C op lin an d

Michael K. O'Leary (eds .), The Handbo ok of C ountry and Pol i t ical Risk An alys is (E.

Syracuse, NY: Political Risk Services, 1994).

8. Mark Perry, Eclipse: The Last D ays of the CIA (New York: Wil l iam Morrow

& Co., 1992), p. 78.

9. Jan P . H err ing , Senior M an ag em en t M ust C ha m pio n Business Intell igence

P r o g r a m s , Journal of Business Strategy, September 1991.

10 . French Spy Ad m i t s Economic Espionag e ,

United Press International,

10

January 1996.

11.

Jan P . He rr ing, The Role of Intel ligence in Form ulat ing Strategy, Journal

of Business Strategy,

S ep t ember

1992,

pp. 54-59.

12.

In addi t ion to

Competitive Intelligence Magazine

c i t ed above and publ i shed

by the Society of Competi t ive Intel l igence Professionals (SCIP), see also Compet

itive Intelligence Review, publ ished by John Wiley. Both publ icat ions are dis t r ib

uted to members of SCIP.

13 . Two texts the author has used in class are Rober t J . F ischer and Guion

Green,

Introduction to Security

(Boston:

B u t t er w o r t h -H e i n e m a n n ,

1998); and Rich

ard S . Pos t and Arthur S . Kingsbury, Security: An Introduction to the Protective

Services (Boston: But terworth-Heinemann, 1991) .




14. Dav id Wise , The Spy W ho W ou ldn ' t Die , GQ, July 1998, p. 198.

15 .

Fischer and Green, Introduction to Security, pp. 447-450.

16 .

A rth ur S. Hu lnick, Intel ligence an d Law Enforcem ent , International Jour

nal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence,

vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 269-286.



CHAPTER 9

Secret Intelligence and

the Public

Secrecy in intell igence is a vir tue as well as a necessity. The sources of

informat ion and the methods by which the in format ion i s ga the red must

remain unknown to the targets of inte l l igence . The extent of knowledge

about an adversa ry as we l l a s the opera t ions a imed a t h im have to be

hidden. But in modern democracies inte l l igence services require publ ic

suppor t and need to earn public t rust to be complete ly funct ional . With

out such suppor t and t rust the services wil l not be able to obta in re

sources or r ec ru i t ta len ted peo ple and the ir jud gm ents w i ll be q ues t ioned

by those who use the inte l l igence product . Mainta ining secrecy while

gaining public suppor t c rea tes a di lemma for inte l l igence services in de

mocracies in genera l and in the United Sta tes in par t icular .

In 1998, dur ing the U.S. government ' s e f for ts to broker a Middle East

peace agreement , President Bil l Cl inton sought to use the CIA as a t rea ty

monitor , a role apparent ly welcomed by Palest inians and Israe l is a l ike .

The plan to use the CIA in this fashion, however , caused something of

a stir in the United States despite the fact that the CIA and the other U.S.

inte l l igence services had been engaged in t rea ty monitor ing for many

years. This was no secret, but the role of intell igence in this regard was

obvious ly no t we l l known or recognized by the Amer ican publ ic . Should

U.S.

inte l l igence m an ag ers h ave m ad e m ore of an ef fort to pub l ic ize the ir

t r ea ty-moni tor ing work? I t may never have occur red to them to do so

because secrecy in intell igence is not only a tradition but also a habit .

The Bri t ish , who have served as inte l l igence role models for the ir

Am er ican cou s ins f rom t ime to t ime , hav e ha d a lmost an obsess ion

with secrecy in intell igence. For many years the British refused to ac

knowledge the existence of their secret services, and their records of the

inte l l igence services remain largely sea led, even now that the Cold War




is over. Under the Official Secrets Act members of the British services

are rare ly given permission to speak about the ir work, journal is ts can be

enjoined by the government f rom wri t ing about inte l l igence , and inte l

l igence matters have only la te ly been debated in Par l iament . The Bri t ish

at t i tude about secrecy is wel l character ized by Bri t ish author Malcolm

M ug ger idg e , himself a ve t eran of Br i tish inte l ligence , w h o w rote : Se

crecy is as essential to intell igence as vestments and incense to a Mass,

or darkness to a spir i tua l is t seance , and must a t a l l costs be mainta ined,

qui te i r respect ive of whether or not i t serves any purpose .

1

As of ten seems to happen in democracies , a ser ies of scandals involv

ing intell igence officers eventually forced public discussion about intel

l igence matters in Great Br i ta in . When the government t r ied to suppress

the publica t ion of a book about

MI-5 ,

the internal security service, the

issue engendered fur the r publ ic deba te . Pe te r Wr ight ' s book Spycatcher

turned out to be an interest ing memoir of his exper iences in MI-5, but

his accusation that Sir Roger Hollis, a t one time the head of MI-5, had

been a Sovie t m ole prov ed to be groun dless .

2

Holl is , who had died before

the book ' s publ ica t ion , was unable to de fend

himself,

but o the rs tu rned

out to be more careful researchers than Wright . This inc ident and the

subsequent publ ic turmoil eventual ly led to a loosening of Br i t ish re

str ictions on intell igence data; f inally in 1994, Parliament passed the In

tell igence Services Act, which established a statutory basis for the British

inte l l igence organiza t ions.

3

Nonetheless , the Br i t ish remain more c lose-

mouthed about in te l l igence than a re many o the r Weste rn democrac ies .

T h e A m e r i c a n E x p e r i e n c e

The American exper ience is somewhat dif ferent despi te the inf luence

of Br i t i sh cus tom and t rad i t ion . Dur ing the count ry ' s beg innings Amer

ican leaders extol led the vir tues of keeping inte l l igence matters secre t .

George Washington unders tood th is ve ry we l l indeed . In 1777 he w rote

to Colonel

Elias

Dayton out l ining the need for inte l l igence suppor t for a

planned a t tack on the Br i t ish by the American genera l Wil l iam Alexan

der , who referred to himself as Lord St i r l ing. Washington wrote :

The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be

further urged—all that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole

matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most

enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated,

however well planned and promising a favourable issue.

4

The Centra l Inte l l igence Agency thought so much of this s ta tement

that i t reproduced the letter in i ts entirety and hung it on the wall of i ts

headquar ters for a l l employees to see .



Secret Intelligence and

the

Public 175

During the discussions leading to the crea t ion of the U.S. Const i tut ion,

John Jay and Alexander Hamil ton discussed the need for secrecy in in

te l l igence matters , urging tha t the inte l l igence funct ion remain the pur

view of the chief m agis tra te , po int in g ou t tha t i t w ou ld be dif ficult to

ca r ry ou t sec re t cor res pon den ce if i t ha d to be m ad e kn ow n to the

se lec t members of the planned upper chamber of the legis la ture , and i t

w ou ld be impo ss ib le if g iven to a la rge po pu la r a ssembly . Th us , the

Founding Fathers accepted the not ion tha t in te l l igence matters were to

be left in the ha n ds of the chief m agis tra te . W he n W ash ing ton becam e

pre sid en t in 1790, he aske d for and w as gran ted by C on gress a secre t

fund for fore ign opera t ions. Congress s t ipula ted tha t the president need

only submit a voucher cer t i fying tha t the funds had been spent , but tha t

he need not expla in the deta i ls of the expenditures .

In la ter years Congress chal lenged the president f rom t ime to t ime

about his expenditures for fore ign inte l l igence . In response to one such

challenge, as we have seen, President James Knox Polk in 1846 rejected

congressional demands for de ta i ls of the use of secre t funds by his pre

decessor , John Tyler . As i t turned out , Polk was helping to cover up the

ra ther scandalous use of secre t funds and Bri t ish money to convince the

ci t izens of Maine to suppor t the Webster-Ashburton Treaty establ ishing

the nor the rn border wi th Canada . Today such ac t iv i ty would ce r ta in ly

resul t in publ ic hear ings and intense media scrut iny, but Polk was able

to face down Congress in this case . His s ta tement about keeping the

secre ts is as va l id today as i t was more than a century ago.

During the Civi l War Lafayet te Baker es tabl ished what was ca l led the

Secre t Service , a l though i t was not the forerunner of the modern service

we have today. In fac t , Baker ' s service was ra ther draconian, opera t ing

wi th few cons t ra in ts under the suspens ion of some normal jud ic ia l p ro

cedures , and became a kind of secre t pol ice .

5

After the war the reaction

to Baker ' s excesses was s t rong and demonstra ted tha t even in t imes of

c ri si s m os t Am er icans wi l l no t sup po r t such organiza t ions , a l thoug h they

are prepared to accept the need for secrecy in other par ts of government .

T h u s ,

when the Office of Strategic Services was created at the beginning

of World War I I , Americans understood tha t l i t t le could be sa id about

wha t i t d id because enemy esp ionage could sur face anywhere . As we

now know, i t was no t the enemy who was ca r ry ing ou t e sp ionage in the

United States as much as i t was our ally in World War II , the Soviet

Union .

Secrecy a nd the CIA

W hen th e CIA wa s c rea ted in 1947 , the govern m ent d id no t a t tem pt

to hide i ts exis tence; instead, i t kept secre t the deta i ls about what the




agency w as to do. The law crea t ing th e agency is sui tably vag ue , so m uc h

so tha t ear ly leaders of the CIA wondered f rom t ime to t ime about the

l imits of the ir char ter . When President Truman asked the CIA to help

prevent the election of the Communists in I taly in 1948, DCI Roscoe

Hil lenkoeter sought legal advice to de termine i f the CIA was ac tual ly

au thor ized to ca r ry ou t Truman ' s r eques t . Despi te some misg iv ings , the

opera t ion went forward, and i ts success cemented the role of the CIA in

cover t opera t ions.

I t was no t surpr i s ing tha t the CIA sought to bu i ld i t s headquar te r s in

a wooded pa rk land se t t ing , making i t a lmost inv is ib le to the casua l ob

server. In a speech in 1959 at the laying of the cornerstone, President

Eisen how er said: By i ts very natu re , the w ork of this agency de m an ds

of i ts members the highest order of dedica t ion, abi l i ty , t rustworthiness

and se lf lessness . . . . Success cannot be adver t ised; fa i lure cannot be ex

pla ined. In the work of inte l l igence , heroes are undecora ted and unsung,

of ten even among their own f ra terni ty .

6

For many years this was the norm in American inte l l igence . The

United Sta tes did not hide the establ ishment of the National Secur i ty

A gen cy in 1954, b ut d etails of its activit ies w ere no t m a d e pub lic , eve n

after the defection of two of its officers to the USSR. Nonetheless, as in

the case of the CIA, information dug up by journal is ts or leaked by the

adminis tra t ion made i t possible for pers is tent researchers to f igure out

wha t went on to some degree , even i f the government would re fuse to

confirm the facts. Even the super-secret National Reconnaissance Office,

crea ted to manage technica l in te l l igence col lec t ion, became known, a l

though its very existence was classif ied. This led to the rather bizarre

concep t tha t inform ation kn ow n to the pub lic could s t il l be secre t as long

as the government did not conf irm i t . Of course , for adversary inte l l i

gence services , th is made gather ing information about U.S. in te l l igence

act ivi t ies no more complica ted than subscr ibing to defense-re la ted mag

azines such as Aviation Week.

Secrecy abo ut U.S. intell igence activit ies suffered a grie vo us blow after

a ser ies of newspaper revela t ions about a l leged CIA excesses . F irs t came

stor ies about the CIA's re la t ionship with the National Student Associa

t ion, then a ful l -blown expose by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times.

The main thrust of these s tor ies was tha t the CIA was carrying out cover t

opera t ions in contravent ion of U.S. pol icy and U.S. law; i t was a l leged

to be a government unto i tse lf without benef i t of control by e i ther the

White House or Congress . Coming as i t d id in the wake of the Watergate

scan dal , in w hich the CIA ha d only the m ost per ip her a l role , these s tor ies

led Sena tor F rank Ch urch to co nd em n the CIA as a rogu e e le ph ant

and to call for hearings to investigate the allegations raised in the press.

The Church Commit tee inves t iga t ion became someth ing of a wa te r -



Secret Intelligence and the Public 177

shed in American inte l l igence . I t not only led to the development of

r igorous congressional oversight of inte l l igence but a lso opened up

Amer ican in te l l igence to a degree the Founding Fa the rs could no t have

imagined. To his credi t , DCI Bil l Colby decided to be open and f rank

wi th the Church Commit tee , r evea l ing in format ion tha t had , un t i l then ,

remained h idden . Colby ' s d ramat ic te s t imony probably conf i rmed to

many the ir worst fears about the CIA. When Colby died of an apparent

hear t a t tack while canoeing many years la ter , conspiracy theor is ts were

quick to c la im that his death was a revenge ki l l ing by old CIA hands

who never forgave Colby for h is openness and hones ty on the wi tness

s tand .

O p e n i n g u p I n t e l l i g e n c e

So the genie was out of the bot t le . The Church Committee repor t ac

tua l ly contradic ted the a l legat ions tha t the CIA was out of control and

that i t was a secre t government . Clear ly the CIA had only done what

pres idents had orde red , and key members of Congress were no t on ly

pr ivy to the opera t ions, but had eager ly suppor ted c landest ine ac t ivi t ies

they could not have voted for in open session. The hear ings nonetheless

exposed the CIA, and the re w as no tu rn in g back . P res ident Gera ld Fo rd ' s

execut ive order out l ining the roles and dut ies of the inte l l igence system

and banning assass ina t ion as we l l a s d rug exper imenta t ion was i ssued

as a publ ic document . Coupled wi th congress iona l demands for com

ple te repor t ing to the new inte l l igence oversight committees about

p lanned cover t opera t ions , the CIA became the most h igh ly sc ru t in ized

and control led inte l l igence service anywhere in the f ree world.

President Car ter ' s DCI, Admira l Stansf ie ld Turner , took openness a

step farther at the CIA by creating the Public Affairs Office, saying that

the American people were shel l ing out big bucks for the inte l l igence

sys tem and tha t they dese rved to know wha t i t was do ing wi th the i r

money . I t was a bo ld s tep tha t was gree ted wi th uncer ta in ty and anger

by some in te l l igence profess iona ls who thought the admira l , and not the

CIA, was out of control . Turner began to hold press conferences a t CIA

headquar ters . He c ircula ted declassif ied inte l l igence analysis to the pub

lic, and the Public Affairs Office began to answer letters and take phone

calls . I t w as a br an d of open nes s un see n an yw he re e lse in the inte ll igence

world, even in other U.S. intell igence agencies.

The resul ts of DCI Turner ' s openness are dif f icul t to measure . The

press was no more inc l ined than before to wri te posi t ive ar t ic les about

the CIA just because the door had occasional ly been thrown open to

them, nor were crit ics of CIA analysis less harsh. In fact, some were even

more virulent in cr i t ic iz ing the

CIA—especially academics—because



Secret Inte l l igence and the Pub lic 179

The F BI In f luence

Casey 's successor , Judge Wil l iam Webster , the former direc tor of the

FBI, br ou gh t a n ew ap pro ac h to pub lic af fa irs w h en h e ask ed a ski l led

FBI career agent to run the Public Affairs Office. Bill Baker, the new

public affairs chief, carr ied w ith hi m th e ope n t radi t io n of the FBI. Un like

the CIA, which had a lways been c losed to the public , the FBI opened a

par t o f i t s headquar te r s in downtown Washington to tour i s t s , who were

able to see displays demonstra t ing the FBI ' s vic tor ies over cr iminals and

spies , peer into the vaunted cr ime lab, and watch an agent f i re a machine

gun. J . Edgar Hoover had establ ished a t radi t ion of openness ear ly in

h is leadersh ip of the FBI. Ho over s up po r ted rad io and TV pro gra m s tha t

made the FBI look good and had h is agents undergo publ ic re la t ions

training before they took charge of FBI offices.

Baker no t on ly ea rned a good reputa t ion wi th the press bu t a l so began

to move toward improving re la t ions be tween the FBI and the CIA as

wel l . Coupled wi th DCI Webste r ' s publ ic appearances in the a f te rmath

of the Iran-Contra affair , the CIA's image began to recover from the

scanda l - r idden days of the immedia te pas t . Al though Webste r had no

foreign affairs experience and suffered from the distrust of some career

is ts in the CIA 's Direc tora te of O pera t ion s, he pro ve d to be a quick s tu dy

and was soon ab le to handle tough ques t ions f rom skept ica l audiences .

H e w ou ld occasional ly preface his resp on ses by saying, I can ' t w ai t to

hea r m y answ er to tha t ques t ion. His a ides w ere final ly able to convince

him to s top saying tha t his job was so secre t tha t even he did not know

wha t he wa s do ing .

G a t e s T a k e s O v e r

When Bob Gates became DCI a t the end of the Bush adminis tra t ion,

he und er to ok a nu m be r of s tud ies on re forming in te ll igence , am on g th em

the quest ion of openness . According to one s tory tha t c ircula ted a t the

t ime, a repor ter a l legedly ca l led the CIA to f ind out who was chair ing

the s tudy on openness , only to be told tha t the information was secre t .

This unfor tunate knee- jerk answer says something about the t radi t ion of

secrecy a t the CIA; the CIA's normal response to quest ions about oper

a t ional matters was to say tha t the Agency could nei ther conf irm nor

deny allegations of intell igence activit ies.

Bob Gates ' s ra ther shor t tenure as DCI kept him from complet ing

many of the reforms he had planned. Nonetheless , h is successors , R.

James Woolsey and John Deutch , cont inued the pa t te rn of openness .




Both m ad e pub lic app eara nce s, an d both u sed the pub lic affairs funct ion

to t ry to educate the public about inte l l igence matters . Unfor tunate ly ,

deal ing with a publ ic tha t seems prepared to be l ieve the worst about i ts

inte l l igence services demonstra tes the f rustra t ion of a t tempting to be

open and honest about inte l l igence .

When the San Jose, California, Mercury News surfaced a story alleging

tha t the CIA had somehow been compl ic i tous in drug dea l ing in Los

Angeles as par t of an ef for t to suppor t the Nicaraguan Contras , even the

best e f for ts by DCI Deutch to turn the s tory around proved fut i le . Al

though the newspaper la te r r epudia ted the s tory , Congress launched ye t

another invest iga t ion on top of severa l previous ones, and some pol i t ica l

ac t ivis ts used the s tory as an excuse to blast W ash ing ton 's rac is t polic ies.

A fur ther invest iga t ion by the CIA's inspector genera l showed tha t the

CIA was probably aware of suspic ious ac t ivi t ies by Contra funct ionar ies

and did t ry to cut off suppor t to those who might have been involved

in drug deal ing, but the s tory of the CIA's complic i ty in drug deal ing

remains imbedded in the da tabases and cont inues to sur face f rom t ime

to t ime.

8

T h e M o s t O p e n I n t e l l i g e n c e S y s t e m

In spite of the frustration of dealing with conspiracy theorists, such as

those who bel ieve the CIA is hiding a l iens f rom outer space who landed

in

Roswel l ,

New Mexico, in 1947, or with polit ical activists who like to

use the CIA as a ta rget for government bashing, the American inte l l i

gence system has become the most open of any in the industr ia l ized

world. The evidence to suppor t th is is readi ly avai lable to the public a t

la rge and to those who s tudy inte l l igence matters a t col leges and uni

versit ies.

For m ore th an a deca de , beg inn ing in the la te 1980s, the CIA p ub lish ed

books on inte l l igence matters tha t conta in formerly secre t mater ia l re

viewed and re leased with only a few blacked-out words or phrases .

These publica t ions, pul led together by the his tory s taf f and others in the

CIA Center for the Study of Intell igence, covered such diverse subjects

as the Cuban missi le cr is is , the views of President Harry Truman on

inte l l igence , the ear ly a t tempts to launch photo sa te l l i tes in the Corona

Project, and Soviet spying in the United States as revealed in the Venona

files.

Each of these publica t ions was preceded by a conference to which

outs iders were invi ted in order to discuss the issues and hear f rom key

intell igence officials. All publications available to the public were l isted

in a catalog available from the National Technical Information Service

and increasingly appeared on the CIA's Internet web s i te .

In addi t ion, Penn Sta te Press , in coopera t ion with the CIA, published




United Kingdom. Most of the s i tes provided information about internal

secur i ty services ra ther than about fore ign inte l l igence , but with the

growing interest in inte l l igence matters and the breakdown in the Br i t ish

tradition of secrecy, i t seemed likely that even the foreign intell igence

services would put something up on the web before long. Since the Br i t

ish have served as a role model for many intell igence services, their foray

into the public e lec tronic arena may spur others to do the same. So far

MI-5,

the internal security service, has a web site , but MI-6, the foreign

intell igence service, does not.

During this per iod, the CIA seemed to be out in f ront in regard to the

world wide web, mainta ining a web s i te for scholars and potent ia l re

crui ts as well as for chi ldren. The appearance of the junior web page

drew a grea t deal of publ ic i ty when i t f i rs t appeared and both the regular

and k ids-only web s i te s demonst ra ted wha t could be done to educa te

people about inte l l igence . The drawback to this ef for t involves vandal

ism; in i ts ear ly days the CIA web page was t rashed by hackers . None

theless, the abili ty of an intell igence service to tell i ts story on the web,

release unclassif ied information, provide access to such useful tools as

th e Worldwide Fact Book, or pro vid e the text of the DCI 's speeches, w as

a posi t ive s tep.

R e l e a s i n g D o c u m e n t s

A key issue in reg ard to open nes s is the who lesa le re lease to the p ublic

of documents tha t no longer need to be c lassif ied. In many industr ia l ized

countr ies a systematic re lease of documents takes place af ter twenty or

thir ty years ; these documents are not necessar i ly reviewed but are re

leased based on the date of the ir c rea t ion. Some scholars in the United

Sta tes have argued tha t in te l l igence documents should be t rea ted l ike

those of the Sta te Depar tment , which regular ly re leases a compendia of

documents on U.S. fore ign pol icy. Wholesa le re lease of inte l l igence doc

uments , however , c rea tes a number of problems for inte l l igence services .

One of the voices crying out for document re lease was tha t of Senator

Danie l Patr ick Moynihan of New York, a former member of the Senate

Selec t Committee on Inte l l igence . Senator Moynihan, in his book

Secrecy,

pu blis hed in 1998, arg ue d tha t beca use secrecy in go ve rnm en t crea ted

inefficiency and fr iction, we would be better off without i t .

10

But Senator

Moynihan seemed to confuse secrecy in government pol icy with secrecy

in intell igence. The senator did, from time to t ime, call for the disestab

l i shment of the CIA, so one must to wonder wha t he may have lea rned

dur ing his service on the SSCI. Moynihan appeared to twist the fac ts to

fit his arguments—a ques t ionable prac t ice indeed for someone who used



Secret Intelligen ce and the Pub lic 183

to be an academic ian . Moynihan c la imed, for example , tha t P res ident

Truman was never told about the Sovie t spying in the United Sta tes tha t

was revealed by the Venona intercepts . In fac t , we don ' t rea l ly know

whether Truman was to ld or no t , on ly tha t Genera l Omar Bradley to ld

his subordinates tha t he would take on the responsibi l i ty of informing

th e president—not a bad decis ion in a case where the White House i tse lf

might have been pene t ra ted by Sovie t agents .

1 1

Moyniha n r e pe a te d wha t ha d be c ome some th ing o f a ma n t r a a mong

intell igence-bashers in the aftermath of the Cold War: that the CIA failed

to predic t the fa l l of the Sovie t Union. Moynihan a lso s lammed the CIA

for e s t ima t ing dur ing the Cold War tha t the economy of Eas t Germany

was growing faster than tha t of i ts weal thy, highly product ive s ibl ing,

West Germany. No one who ever saw the p las t ic -bodied , lawn-mower-

engin ed Eas t G erm an Trabi au tom obi le an d com pared it to a M ercedes

or even a Volkswagon Beet le could reach such a conclusion, and so far

no evidence to suppor t Senator Moynihan 's c r i t ic ism has surfaced. The

alleged failure to predict the fall of the USSR was equally incorrect, yet

those crit icisms continue to be voiced despite the careful analysis of the

facts by CIA officers and their counterparts.

1 2

Would doc ume n t r e l e a se he lp c l e a r up misunde r s t a nd ings a bou t C I A

successes and failures? Perhaps, but no intell igence service can afford the

wholesa le re lease of documents i f doing so jeopardizes sources and

me thods o r g ive s a n a dve r sa r y knowle dge a bou t how muc h we know

about him. As par t of an ef for t to win re lease f rom the CIA's having to

rev iew opera t iona l documents under the Freedom of Informat ion Ac t ,

DCI Bil l Casey agreed tha t the Agency would begin a systematic and

comprehensive his tor ica l review of documents and re lease a l l tha t i t

could . Over t ime , however , the ta sk proved to be more t ime-consuming

and expens ive than anyone expec ted .

The CIA, for the most part , had to rely on annuitants—retired CIA

officers—to

review an d re lease inte l ligence m ater ia ls , bu t f inding pe op le

wi l l ing to spend th i r ty hours a week redac t ing documents and coming

up wi th the money to pay them was a problem. More recent ly , in ex

p la in ing why the process was so s low, DCI George Tene t b lamed the

shor tage of re sources and de fended h is r e luc tance to re lease documents

until he could be sure that U.S. intell igence assets and abili t ies were

protec ted. Clear ly the CIA should have cont inued to re lease what i t

could as qu ick ly as poss ib le , bu t un less Congress was prepared to pro

vide addi t ional resources , the CIA was l ike ly to crea te more secre ts in a

year than i t could review and make avai lable to the public .

Even more dangerous in cons ide r ing wholesa le document re lease was

the possibili ty that the identity of a former clandestine service officer or

an agent might somehow be compromised . This seems unl ike ly in re

leasing analyt ic products of an ear l ie r e ra , but who can be sure? When




the ir presenta t ions are more for thcoming than those of the ir ac t ive duty

colleagues. The Association of Former Intell igence Officers (AFIO),

whose membership inc ludes veterans of a l l the U.S. in te l l igence services

as we l l a s o the rs in te res ted in the bus iness , has made known i t s wi l l ing

ness to f ind speakers for publ ic presenta t ions. Although some of the ir

knowledge may be ou t o f da te , the members br ing wi th them a grea t

deal of credibi l ity bec ause they ha ve seen the e lep han t , as Civi l W ar

veterans used to say.

F i x i n g t h e I m a g e

I t would be nice to think tha t the pol i t ica l leaders who oversee and

use inte l l igence would defend i t more of ten, but this rare ly happens. Nor

can we expect the media to be even-handed in i ts t rea tment of inte l l i

gence matters . Occasional ly repor ters do t ry to f ind posi t ive things to

say about U.S . in te l l igence and the CIA, bu t most r epor te r s would prob

ably agree that to get a story above the fold on page one, or as the lead

on the n igh t im e TV new s, i t has to be a grabbe r . Tha t usua l ly seems

to mean scandal or fa i lure ra ther than success . Journal is ts a rgue tha t

scandal and failure are news, but success is not. The result of this is that

the public has developed a skewed view of the inte l l igence system in

genera l and the CIA in par t icular .

Should American inte l l igence spend scarce resources to f ix i ts image?

This is an issue tha t has been debated f rom t ime to t ime inside the sys

tem. Using governmenta l resources for the purposes of publ ic re la t ions

is dif ficult to just ify a nd m ay ev en be forbidden by go ve rnm en ta l reg

ula t ions. Public educat ion, however , can be just i f ied i f i t improves the

abili ty of the intell igence services to perform their functions, including

as noted ear l ie r , the abi l i ty to obta in resources , to recrui t employees, or

to serve the ir con su m ers . This is not m uc h of an issue for the inte l l igence

components o f the Depar tment of Defense , which make up most o f the

American inte l l igence system, or for the small components of the other

c ivi l ian depar tments such as Sta te or Treasury, because the ir funct ions

a re subsumed wi th in the la rge r ac t iv i t ie s o f the i r depar tments . And

clearly it is no t a pro ble m for the FBI, w hic h has de ve lop ed pol ish ed

and effective methods of tell ing its own story or having others tell i t the

way the FBI would like. But the CIA has a different image and a different

p r ob le m.

T h e B u d g e t D e b a t e

One of the issues re la ted to openness tha t surfaces f requently in the

United Sta tes is tha t of the budget for the Inte l l igence Community . In



186 Fixing the Spy M ach ine

most countries that subject is not only kept secret; i t is not even debated

in the legis la ture . In most countr ies the budget a lso involves far fewer

resources than in the United Sta tes . In 1997, af ter considerable pressure

from Congress and f rom specia l in terest groups, par t icular ly the Feder

ation of American Scientists, the overall budget f igure for f iscal years

1997 an d 1998 w ere reve aled to the pub lic , a l th ou gh specific inform ation

about the allocations for the several agencies was not. The DCI refused

to reveal the 1999 f igure , however , despi te cont inuing pressure to do so.

In fac t , in terest in learning about the inte l l igence budget has been high

for many years . Those who think i t should be revealed c la im that con

st i tut ional rules require i t , forget t ing the long-establ ished precedent , da t

ing back to our f i rs t president , tha t such sums would not be made public .

In rea l i ty the genera l budget f igures , as well as the breakdown of spe

cific a l locat ions, seem to be well kn ow n to inte ll igence watc hers in W ash

ington. A s tory in USA Today pu bl ish ed in the early 1990s ga ve a

breakdown of the budge t by agency , bu t the government re fused to con

f i rm the f igures . Nonetheless , th is meant tha t adversary inte l l igence ser

v ices probably knew how much the Uni ted S ta tes was spending on

inte l l igence , for whatever tha t is wor th . Was this an issue worth the fuss

that a rose each year as the inte l l igence budget was prepared?

Wo rth the F uss?

Ever s ince the cong ressional ove rsight p rocess w as establ ished in 1976,

the prepara t ion of the inte l l igence budget has been subjec t to intense

scrutiny, f irst within the agencies, then by the president 's Office of Man

agement and Budge t , then by the Overs igh t Commit tee of the House of

Representa t ives . Consider ing the sensi t ivi ty of some of the issues con

ta ined in these budge t submiss ions , i t i s no wonder tha t the en t i re p ro

cess is handled under s t r ingent secur i ty . This is not a subjec t for publ ic

debate , nor should i t be . Keeping the budget secre t was the intent ion of

the Founding Fa the rs , a s we know f rom the documents in the Federa l i s t

Papers, and this policy has been ratif ied from time to t ime ever since.

Mainta ining the secrecy of the budget has l i t t le to do with protec t ing

opera t ional information. Knowledge of the overa l l budget f igure hardly

al lows ev en a careful rese archer to learn m or e than the genera l a l locat ion

funds for each of the U.S. intell igence agencies. Rather, maintaining the

secrecy of the budget keeps i t f rom being debated in publ ic and thus

poli t ic ized. Hiding the budget in the l ine i tems of other agencies prevents

eager researchers f rom making the inte l l igence budget publ ic just to

show how clever they are . I f Americans want resul ts f rom the money

they spend on inte l l igence , then they should ensure tha t the ir represen

ta t ives in Washington are asking the tough quest ions of inte l l igence man

agers.




R e l e a s i n g A n a l y s i s

A second push comes f rom those who be l ieve , inc lud ing , apparen t ly ,

Senator Moynihan, tha t the analysis prepared by inte l l igence exper ts in

the var ious agencies should be made avai lable to the public . Such a pro

cess would destroy the ut i l i ty of the analysis i tse lf and would drag the

analysis into endless pol i t ica l debate over the issues . The whole point of

having an independent centra l in te l l igence service was to enable i t to

make judgments wi thout cons ide ra t ion of Washington ' s po l i t ica l winds

or pressures or the opera t ional in terests of the var ious federa l depar t

ments . Although the t rack record is not perfec t , exper ience shows tha t

intell igence analysts at the CIA as well as those in the Defense and State

Depar tments a re eager to te l l the i r consumers wha t they want to know

as well as what they ought to know. Public disc losure of current inte l l i

gence analysis would inevi tably ra ise pol i t ica l issues .

In la te 1998 a press s tory appeared tha t suggested tha t Vice President

AI Gore had refused to accept CIA analysis concerning the former pr ime

minis ter of Russia because Gore l iked the minis ter and did not apprecia te

in te l l igence tha t sugges ted the min is te r might be having problems. Of

course , both the White House and the CIA denied tha t the inte l l igence

analysis had been rejected, but the story revealed that intell igence offi

c ia ls recognize tha t the ir analysis may make pol i t ica l leaders uncom

for table , i f not downright angry. This should not s top the analysis f rom

be ing wr i t ten or de l ive red , however . Making any of th is ma te r ia l publ ic ,

tho ug h, wo uld enm esh the ana lys ts a s we l l a s the rec ip ien ts in an endless

and fruitless debate.

Inte l l igence analysis is prepared to a id decis ionmakers in formula t ing

and implement ing po l icy . Degrad ing tha t p rocess by making cont rover

s ial analysis publ ic w ou ld b e harm ful . R eleasing inte l ligence analysis tha t

is twenty or thir ty years old , however , should be of his tor ica l in terest

and show the mindse t o f those who were do ing the work . Sure ly we

have learned a grea t deal f rom the re lease of documents re la ted to the

Cuban missi le cr is is , inc luding the fac t tha t both s ides were a lot c loser

to a nuclear confronta t ion than e i ther be l ieved a t the t ime. As more and

more of this in te l l igence product becomes avai lable , scholars wil l have

plenty to do. As i t is , the inte l l igence system does re lease a considerable

amount of current da ta and analysis to the public , but the best s tuff must

remain secret to be useful.

H a n d l i n g O p e n n e s s

A careful examinat ion of the issues suggests tha t the CIA is handling

openness about as well as can be expected, given the nature of what i t




does. Yet there are s teps tha t may be taken within the restr ic t ions of

pro tec t ing sources and methods , a s we l l a s budge t cons t ra in ts tha t may

be t r ied. To begin, CIA managers ought to make an ef for t to f ind out

wha t the publ ic rea l ly knows, e spec ia l ly ou ts ide the Washington

Belt

way, a roadway tha t seems to restr ic t th inking as well as t raf f ic . Asking

academics or former professionals who regular ly deal with the public on

inte l l igence matters around the country may be a good f i rs t s tep.

Although just i fying the resources needed to crea te a museum for the

CIA would be diff icult , establishing a display at an existing facili ty, such

as the Smi thsonian ' s Museum of Amer ican His tory , may be a re la t ive ly

inexpensive way to show the public some of the CIA's more interest ing

artifacts. The CIA does open itself up to visitors on occasion, although

the security effort to do this is costly. Allowing selected groups to see

pa rt of the facility te nd s to create a po sitiv e im ag e of the CIA, an d careful

p lanning can reduce the po ten t ia l secur i ty haza rds .

P u b l i c A p p e a r a n c e s

Public appearances by CIA officials, from the DCI, to senior managers,

to the work ing t roops , a lmost a lways draw favorab le comment in the

local press , even though they might not rece ive coverage in the Wash

ington Post. The public is usually fascinated to meet CIA officials, but the

officials need to be schooled in what to say and how to say it . Experience

shows tha t in te l l igence professionals in genera l and CIA employees in

par t icu lar are not aw are of the copiou s l i te ra ture on inte l l igence a vai lable

to the public . Th us, ser ious s tud en ts of inte l ligence a t the univ ersi ty level

may be bet ter read about some aspects of inte l l igence than the ir profes

s ional counterpar ts . This information is admit tedly anecdota l , but the

author has been questioned by active service intell igence officers from

time to t ime about what to say in publ ic , indica t ing the ir ignorance of

the open l i te ra ture . The CIA occasional ly publishes a shor t bibl iography

of inte l l igence l i te ra ture ; i t w ou ld b e interest ing to surv ey CIA em plo yee s

to see how many of them have ac tual ly read the i tems l is ted.

P l a n n i n g f o r D i s a s t e r

The Agency needs to put more effort into planning for disaster , a for

mula security officials in the private sector emphasize a great deal. In

most cases , revela t ions about CIA c landest ine ac t ivi ty surface only when

th ings go wrong . The CIA ' s re sponse to such reve la t ions usua l ly begins

wi th denia l , then grudging admiss ions , and the agency ' s c red ib i l i ty suf

fers accordingly. In the pr iva te sec tor , managers are urged to plan for




disas te r , inc lud ing the publ ic re sponse tha t might be needed . For ex

ample , a ir l ine off ic ia ls ought to be prepared for crashes, hote l managers

for f i res , or manufacturers for na tura l disasters , and a l l should prac t ice

how they wi l l dea l wi th the publ ic should a d isas te r happen . But CIA

managers seem to ignore the possibi l i ty tha t the ir secre t opera t ions wil l

be revealed unt i l the word gets out . Then, the responses seem ad hoc ,

wi thout much thought about long- te rm consequences . This was c lea r ly

the case in the Los Angeles drug s tory.

Prepar ing for publ ic revela t ions of secre t in te l l igence ac t ivi ty ought to

be par t of any opera t ional plan. This requires a level of coopera t ion be

tween c landest ine service managers and public af fa irs personnel tha t

might be uncomfor tab le for the opera t ions people and compromises

good secur i ty prac t ices , the need- to-know pr inc ip le , and compar tmen

ta t ion , bu t good prepara t ion i s necessa ry to reduce mispercept ions , mis

interpre ta t ions, and outr ight l ies about what happened. After a l l , CIA

professionals in public affairs are just as interested in CIA successes as

a re the opera t ions people , even though the two func t ions a re qu i te dif

ferent.

S e r v i c e i n P u b l i c A f f a i r s

De aling wi th th e public is as m uc h a function of inte l ligence these d ay s

as the recruiting of agents or the forecasting of future events. Yet the

public affairs function is considered by many professionals as a side

show to the main event. Service in that part of the profession is not

considered f i rs t - l ine work, and for some professionals , taking on the pub

l ic af fa irs funct ion probably prec ludes fur ther employment in anything

clandest ine . Tradi t ional ly inte l l igence services seek people for the public

affa irs funct ion f rom among their own ranks, probably with the idea tha t

s ince the service has hired the best and the br ightest , the inte l l igence

officers hired ought to be just as good at public affairs as they are at

secre t opera t ions. This may not a lways be the case . Deal ing with the

public requires professional t ra ining and exper t ise , but few inte l l igence

professionals are ever given such schooling, even af ter they are assigned

to the job. Th e FBI ha s foun d that the inv es tm en t in pu blic affairs train ing

pays off for i ts senior agents; the CIA might give this some consideration.

Malco lm Mugger idge was a t leas t pa r t ly cor rec t when he sugges ted

that a cer ta in aura and level of mystery is necessary in an agency tha t

carr ies out espio nag e an d secre t ope ra t ion s. Inte ll igence professiona ls a re

indeed d i f fe ren t f rom o the r government bureaucra ts and should no t be

perceived the same as the typica l c ivi l servants who gr ind away a t more

mundane dut ie s . Dur ing the Middle Eas t peace negot ia t ions , DCI George

Tenet wrote tha t mispercept ions about inte l l igence are the pr ice of doing



190 F ix ing the Spy M ac hin e

b u s i n e s s , b u t s u c h m i s p e r c e p t i o n s m a y b e c o s tl y , e s p e c i a ll y w h e n a n

a g e n c y n e e d s p u b l i c s u p p o r t . O p e n n e s s h a s it s l i m i t s i n s e c r e t i n t e ll i

g e n c e , b u t i n t e l l ig e n c e m a n a g e r s o u g h t t o p l a n fo r w h a t t h o s e l i m i t s

s h o u l d b e . B e i n g p u b l i c a b o u t s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e m a y b e j u s t a s i m p o r t a n t

i n a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y a s b e i n g s e c r e t a b o u t i t. I n t e l l ig e n c e m a n a g e r s

h a v e t o b e e q u a l l y c o n c e r n e d a b o u t b o t h is s u e s w h e n t h e y p l a n t h e i r

o p e r a t i o n s .

Notes

1.

Mal co l m Mugger i dge ,

Chronicles of Wasted Time

(New York: Wil l iam Mor

row & Co., 1974), p. 123.

2.

Peter Wright , Spycatcher (New York: Viking Books, 1987).

3. Ke nn eth G. Ro ber tson, Recent Reform of Intell igence in the Un i ted King

dom: Democra t i za t ion or Risk Management? Intelligence and Nationa l Security,

vol . 13, no. 2, pp. 144-158.

4.

As quoted in Intelligence and the War of the Revolution (Washington, DC:

Central Intel l igence Agency, 1976).

5. Edwin Fishel , The Secret War for the Union (New York: Houghton Miff l in,

1996),

pp. 27-28.

6. As quoted in

Presidential Reflections on Intelligence,

Center for the Study of

Intel l igence, CIA, at w w w . o d c i . g o v / c s i / m o n o g r a p h / f i r s t i n / e i s e n h o w e r / h t m l .

7.

A short history of the Public Affairs Office appears in Ronald Kessler ,

Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), pp. 213-236.

8. A good summary of the San Jose Mercury News story and i ts aftermath can

be found in W al ter P incus , CIA Igno red Tips Al leging Co ntra D rug Link s ,

Washington Post, 3 N ov em be r 1998, p. A4; Peter Ko rnbluh , The Fresh Do pe on

CIA Drug Link, Baltimore Su n, 30 A ug ust 1998, p .

C I ;

and in the CIA's Inspector

General ' s Repor t .

9 . Ludwel l Lee Montague ,

General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central

Intelligence (Universi ty Park: Pennsylvania State Universi ty Press, 1992).

10. Senator Danie l Pa t r i ck Moynihan,

Secrecy

(New Haven, CT: Yale Univer

sity Press, 1998).

11.

See Rober t L. Benson and Michael Warner (eds .) , VEN ON A: Soviet Espio

nage and the American Response (Washington, DC: NSA and CIA, 1996), p. xxiv.

12 .

A careful analys is of this controversy appears in Douglas J .

MacEachin ,

CIA Asse ssme nts of the Soviet Un ion: The Record vs . the C harg es , Cen ter for

the Study of Intel l igence, CIA, 1996.

http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/firstin/eisenhower/html

http://www.odci.gov/csi/monograph/firstin/eisenhower/html



CHAPTER 10

Fixing the Spy Machine

A m erica ' s in te l l igence sy stem is , by a ny m eas ure , the largest in the free

wor ld and ce r ta in ly the most compl ica ted , bureaucra t ic , convolu ted , and

expensive system anywhere . I ts fa i lures , as President Eisenhower noted,

are of ten hera lded and i ts successes hidden. With the end of the Cold

War, some cr i t ics have argued tha t the system is too big for what i t does,

and others have suggested tha t we don ' t need i t a t a l l . Wiser heads,

however, generally agree that intell igence is our f irst l ine of defense and

tha t i t should be s t rengthened , no t made weaker . I s the re a way to im

p r ove wha t we ha ve ?

Despi te the re la t ive ly enormous cost of American inte l l igence and i ts

bureaucra t ic complexi ty , i t does work surpr i s ing ly we l l . None the less ,

the re a re severa l w ay s in wh ich the sys tem could be m ad e to w ork be t te r

i f there was suff ic ient wil l among inte l l igence managers and pol i t ica l

leaders. So far efforts at reform have been either too diff icult to manage

or too polit ically charged to be acceptable. Further, efforts at reform have

almost a lways been t r iggered by percept ions of fa i lure or hints of scan

dal . Typica l ly the response to e i ther scandal or fa i lure has been to look

for ways to reorganize the system ra ther than seek to change the way i t

works . There a re o the r ways to approach the problem, bu t f i r s t we have

to unders tand the presen t s t ruc ture and i t s opera t ing ph i losophy.

I n t e l l i g e n c e S t r u c t u r e

In most deve loped count r ie s and even in some less -deve loped na t ions ,

the intell igence structure is made up of a foreign intell igence service,

whose role is to fer re t out threa ts to the country f rom abroad; an internal




secur i ty service to work against threa ts a t home; a mil i ta ry inte l l igence

service to suppor t the combat arms; a pol ice inte l l igence service ; and in

more sophisticated countries, a technical intell igence service for SIGINT,

or communicat ions intercepts . The overa l l chief of the system is usual ly

the prime minister , chief of state , or key minister in the cabinet. Only

the United States has a director of central intell igence, a role with real

responsibili ty but l i t t le real power. The DCI, as we have seen, is not

an officer of first rank compared to cabinet officers, nor does he have

control or author i ty over most of the inte l l igence system he is supposed

to oversee.

In fact, the American system is so convoluted that efforts to depict i t

by us ing the s tanda rd org aniza t iona l d ia gram s do not work w e l l . In m ost

of the l i terature the system is drawn as a circle with all the agencies

around the c ircumference and the DCI in the middle . S ince the DCI has

no control over any agency but the CIA, no organiza t ional l ines of au

thor i ty are shown. A bet ter way to descr ibe the system would be to

out l ine the inte l l igence agencies tha t be long to the var ious depar tments

a t the nat ional level . Thus, most of the system would be shown as sub

ordinate to the Secretary of Defense, and the rest , except for the CIA, to

o the r depar tments . Only the CIA is t ru ly an independent agency .

1

The U.S. system is further complicated by the fact that i ts major inter

nal security service, the FBI, combines the functions of internal security,

federa l pol ice powers , and cr iminal inte l l igence , whereas America ' s tech

nical services such as signals intell igence or imagery intell igence belong

to the defense structure. Some of the intell igence units are part of the so-

ca l led Inte l l igence Community and thus fa l l under the aegis of the DCI;

o the rs do no t . No one could have invented such a sys tem, bu t because

i t grew in bi ts and pieces , i t has become the complica ted s truc ture we

have today .

Most reform effor ts s ince World War I I have focused on making the

system more eff icient, more reliable, and less prone to failure. By and

large, efforts at restructuring have not been successful. In recent years

reforms of intell igence have received a great deal of attention but not

much ac t ion. Var ious reform studies publ ished in 1996-97 a l l seemed to

focus on the role of the DCI. The Brown Commission, for example , the

most p res t ig ious of the s tudy groups , sugges ted tha t the way to make

the sys tem work be t te r was to g ive more power and au thor i ty to the

DCI. Unfor tunate ly for the reformers , th is meant taking power f rom the

Secretary of Defense, who quickly squelched the effort . Thus, the money

and t ime spent by the commiss ion was la rge ly was ted , a l though the re

were some good ideas genera ted by tha t s tudy as well as the others .



Fixing the Spy M achine 193

I n t e l l i g e n c e P o l i c y a n d O p e r a t i o n s

Perhaps a be t ter way to look a t reform is to divide the issues into

quest ions of inte l l igence pol icy and inte l l igence opera t ions ra ther than a

question of intell igence structure. Since the key actor in all this is the

direc tor of centra l in te l l igence , perhaps we should s tar t by examining

this ra ther anomalous posi t ion. The DCI, a posi t ion establ ished by Pres

iden t H ar ry T rum an in 1946 , p red a tes the CIA. Some DC Is hav e bee n

strong and effec t ive ; others have been re la t ive ly weak. Most have been

poli t ica l or mil i ta ry appointees , and only a few have been career inte l

l igence officers. Some have had ready access and a close relationship

with the president they served; others have had to t ry to reach the pres

ident through White House s taf fers and a ides . Some of the appointees ,

especia l ly those with l i t t le in te l l igence background, seem to have ab

sorbed qui te a bi t about the world of inte l l igence; others never seemed

to unders tand exac t ly how to handle the pos i t ion .

With the creation of the CIA in 1947, the DCI acquired an agency to

head. This f leshed out the posi t ion so tha t the DCI was now not only

the inte l l igence adviser to the president and the National Secur i ty Coun

cil and the coordinator of all U.S. intell igence activit ies but also the head

of an agency.

2

Now the DCI had bureaucra t ic power , a budge t , and

t roops . Before long the DCI was ensconced in a sprawl ing new campus

hidden in the woods in Langley, Virginia , severa l miles f rom the White

House and even more d is tan t f rom the rea l dec is ionmakers in govern

ment . As the Amer ican In te l l igence Communi ty cont inued to grow, the

DCI ' s pos i t ion became weaker . He was supposed to coord ina te in te l l i

gence ac t ivi t ies , but he had no rea l author i ty over any inte l l igence agen

c ies but his own. As we have seen, th is changed with the coming of

sa te l l i te s , coord ina ted budge ts , and pressure for long- range p lanning .

C o m m o n I n t e r e s t s

DCIs such as Dick Helms, the consumate professional , or George Bush,

the ers twhile pol i t ican, deal t with the other agencies through meet ings

of the agency heads in a forum cal led the National Fore ign Inte l l igence

Board . W here the re we re com m on in te res ts , the agency d i rec tors usu a l ly

agreed to work toge the r , bu t o f ten the demands of the ind iv idua l agen

c ies took pr ior i ty , especia l ly in the Defense Depar tment . Unti l Admira l

Turner became DCI, there was no rea l need for the agencies to work

together , except in regard to producing coordinated est imates and other

analysis . Overseas the CIA chiefs of s ta t ion were supposed to coordinate



Fixing

the Spy

Machine

95

his close ties to P r e s ide n t B ush p r ov e d his u n d o i n g . W h e n the pres ident

failed to be ree lec ted, Gates knew he had to go.

5

T h e C l i n t o n

Era

Under Pres ident C l in ton ,

the

role

of the DCI as

c ommuni ty l e a de r

and

in te l l igence manager de ter iora ted even fur ther . Cl inton 's f i rs t

DCI, R.

Ja me s Woolse y , p r ove d une qua l to any of the tasks set for him, either

as

CIA

leader

or as

in te l l igence communi ty manager ;

and

President Clin

ton ' s second

DCI,

John De u tc h , tho ugh w e l l m e a n ing

and

ha r d - wor k ing ,

w a s

no

bet ter . President Clinton 's th ird

DCI,

George Tene t , tu rne d

out

to

be

be t te r than anyone

had

expected. Tenet

was

ne i the r

a

career intel

ligence officer

nor a

rea l pol i t ica l app oin tee ; ra ther ,

he was

s o m e o n e

who

ha d se r ve d on the Senate Selec t Co m m ittee on Intell igence staff, and later

in

the

C l in ton Whi te House

as

inte l l igence coordinator . Some observers

thought tha t Tene t

had

got ten

the job

be c a use

no one

e l se wa n te d

it.

Ne ve r the le s s , he m a n a g e d to rebui ld mora le at the CIA and to r e sume

the in te ragency coopera t ion tha t

had

been miss ing .

The lesson f rom

all of

this

is a

s imp le

one. The

effectiveness

of the

D C I is d e p e n d e n t not on bu r e a uc r a t i c powe r or pol i t ica l power but on

t h e p o w e r

of

persona l i ty

and the

DC I ' s ma na g e m e n t s ty l e.

The

mos t

effective DCIs have been those

who

could br ing

the

d ispa ra te e lements

of the c o m m u n i t y t o g e t he r to coopera te and share tasks . Of course , good

access

to the

p r e s i d e n t

is

necessa ry

as

wel l

as an

u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of the

in te l l igence process . When

the DCI can

b r ing

the

other leaders into

a

coopera t ive c irc le , all th ings are possible . If the DCI c a nno t do this , bu

reaucra t ic s t ruc ture

or

pol i t ica l power won ' t he lp .

The DCI has to be a

l eader

as

wel l

as a

ma na ge r .

F r om t ime to t ime inte l l igence observers and cr i t ics have suggested

tha t

the DCI

pos i t ion shou ld

be

removed f rom

the CIA and

ma de in to

a m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t post—a direc tor

of

nat ional inte l l igence (DNI)

wh o

would ove r se e the c o m m u n i t y . A DNI w o u l d be p a r t of the Nat iona l

Secur i ty Counc i l appara tus

and

w o u l d h a v e

a

smal l

staff, but no

agency

to

run.

Interest ingly,

a

pos i t ion

of

this kind

is

often referred

to as an

in tel l igence tza r . Co ns ide r ing w ha t ha pp en ed to the rea l tzars in R us

sia,

it

se e ms

a

poor t e r m, though pe r ha ps

a bit

mor e be n ign tha n

em

pe ror . M ost insid ers be l ieve tha t c rea t ing

a DNI is a bad

idea.

A DCI w i t h no a ge nc y be h ind him w o u l d h a v e no p o w e r or au thor i ty

at

all,

e ve n

if he

w e r e

an

effective leader

and

m a n a g e r . U n d e r

the

presen t

sys t e m,

as

direc tor

of the CIA the DCI has

bo th

a

very special intell igence

collection capabili ty, the Clandest ine Service , and an i n d e p e n d e n t a n a

lytic

staff, the

Direc tora te

of

Intell igence.

If

inte l l igence crea tes power ,




then separa t ing the DCI f rom the CIA would leave the DNI posi t ion

pow er less . It w ou ld a lso c rea te even m ore bureaucracy , wh ich the sys tem

does no t need . There i s no th ing wrong wi th the presen t sys tem i f the

DCI is capable of making i t work.

P o l i t i c i z i n g t h e D C I

One step tha t should be taken to assis t the DCI in his roles as CIA

m an ag er an d U.S. in te l ligence coordin ator w ou ld be to depoli t ic ize the

position, that is , to make it polit ically neutral as i t was originally con

ce ived and g ive i t t enure . This was the way Pres ident Truman probably

envis ioned i t , but th is s i tua t ion has been ser iously eroded over t ime.

6

Even though the DCI pos i t ion i s one requi r ing pres ident ia l nomina t ion

and ra t i f ica t ion by the Senate , there is no reason why the DCI should

necessar i ly be a member of the president ' s pol i t ica l par ty or even sym

pathetic to the president 's polit ical goals. Intell igence officers are sup

posed to be po l i t ica l ly neut ra l anyway, and the DCI should be no

different in that respect.

The f irst DCIs were military officers, so polit ics did not f igure into

the i r a ppo in tme n t s .

Allen

Dulles was the f irst DCI to have polit ical con

nect ions to the adminis tra t ion s ince his brother , John Foster Dulles , was

sec re ta ry of s ta te under Republ ican pres ident Dwight E isenhower . Dul

les ' s tenure as DCI extended into the Democrat ic adminis tra t ion of Pres

ident John F. Kennedy and might even have las ted longer had i t not

been for the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Dulles 's successor,

Republ ican indus t r ia l i s t John McCone , se rved both Kennedy and Pres i

dent Lyndon Johnson, but he fe l l in to disfavor as Johnson sought to f ind

someone who would be wi l l ing to be more sympathe t ic to h is fore ign

policies, especially in Vietnam.

John son ' s firs t choice , A dm ira l Re d Raborn , p rov ed wi l l ing bu t un

able to do the job, and the task fell to Dick Helms, a polit ically astute

career Clandest ine Services off icer . Helms out las ted Johnson

himself,

se rv ing we l l in to the Republ ican Nixon adminis t ra t ion , bu t He lms ran

afoul of Nixon 's Watergate scandal . When Helms refused to par t ic ipa te

in the coverup tha t eventual ly led to Nixon 's res ignat ion, he was ban

ished to Iran as U.S. ambassador. His successor, Jim Schlesinger, a real

polit ician, soon left the DCI's position for the more prestigious post of

secretary of defense. Another Clandestine Services careerist , Bill Colby,

t r ied to put the role of DCI back into neutra l , but Colby was swept out

in the wake of the Church Committee hear ings and the resignat ion of

Nixon. Another pol i t ic ian, George Bush, took over as DCI, but his pol i t

ica l ambit ions did not s top a t Langley e i ther .



Fixing the Spy Machine 197

T o t a l l y P o l i t i c i z e d

Final ly , the DCI posi t ion became tota l ly pol i t ic ized when President

J immy Car te r , who campaigned in pa r t aga ins t the CIA, nomina ted

Theodore Sorensen , an ac t ive member of the pres ident ' s pa r ty bu t wi th

out any inte l l igence exper ience or leadership his tory, to the DCI 's post .

W he n So rensen ' s nom ina t io n qu ick ly ran in to trouble in the Sena te , P res

ident Car ter turned to his Annapolis c lassmate Admira l Stansf ie ld

Tu rn er to be DC I. T ur ne r w as as apolit ical as an y othe r four-star off icer ,

a t least when he took the posi t ion, and a l though he had no inte l l igence

background, h is management sk i l l s were legendary . Many of us d is

a g r e e d w i th some o f Admir a l Tur ne r ' s a pp r oa c he s to ma na ge me n t a nd

substance , ye t to his credi t he did not use his post for pol i t ica l purposes .

In fac t , some of the reforms in procedures and regula t ions inst i tuted by

Admira l Turner a re s t i l l be ing fo l lowed. None the less , when Pres ident

Car ter was turned out of off ice by the voters , Admira l Turner was forced

out a s we l l . This was pa r t o f the Reagan adminis t ra t ion ' s to ta l house -

c leaning to make sure tha t no Democrat ic appointees were lef t in pol i t ica l

pos i t ions .

Of course , President Reagan 's DCI, Wil l iam J . Casey, was as much a

pol i t ic ian as he was an inte l l igence veteran, a l though he wise ly re jec ted

effor ts by the Reagan t ransi t ion team to place addi t ional Republican ap

pointees in key inte l l igence posts . Casey was not bashful about giving

President Reagan and his key advisors the benef i t of his ra ther conser

va t ive ana lys is on the i ssues , a l though he never ac tua l ly suppressed the

judgments of h is more neut ra l ana lys ts . None the less , we a l l knew who

had the president ' s ear . Af ter Casey passed away, his successor , Judge

Will iam Webster , t r ied to de-pol i t ic ize the posi t ion of DCI by insis t ing

that he not be made a member of the cabinet and by avoiding pol i t ica l

deba te where he could .

When George Bush became pres ident , he asked Judge Webste r to s tay

on. In fac t , there was some discussion a t tha t t ime about giving the DCI

pos i t ion a ten-year tenure , a s had been done when Webste r was d i rec tor

of the FBI. After Webster decided to step down, his successor, Bob Gates,

an inte l l igence career is t , was nominated to be DCI. Gates was ta inted,

however , by h is se rv ice in the Bush Whi te House and the cont roversy

sur rounding h is nomina t ion . When Bi l l C l in ton de fea ted George Bush

for the presidency, Gates knew he would not be asked to s tay. Clinton 's

f irst choice for DCI, R. James Woolsey, seemed non-polit ical, but Wool

sey turned out to be a lackluster leader and eventual ly found a good

excuse to resign. Clinton 's second choice , c lear ly a man sympathet ic to

the president ' s pol i t ics , John Deutch, was no bet ter than Woolsey.




Final ly , toward the middle of his second term, Clinton gave the DCI

job to George Tenet , who was nei ther an inte l l igence veteran nor a pol-

i t ican. Tenet tur ne d ou t be both a be t ter in te l l igence ma na ge r an d a be t ter

analyst than anyone expected. He quickly began to restore morale in the

CIA, s tem the t ide of res ignat ions, and rebui ld consensus among the

other inte l l igence agency leaders . I t was a remarkable performance, but

ce r ta in ly no guaran tee tha t Tene t would be kept on beyond the end of

President Clinton's term of office. This is a situation that begs for f ixing.

Amer ican pres idents would be we l l se rved by g iv ing the DCI the ten-

year tenure tha t the direc tor of the FBI enjoys. Doing this would de-

pol i t ic ize the posi t ion, of course , but i t would a lso give the DCI the

chance to make systematic and meaningful reform within the system. I t

would give employees a sense of s tabi l i ty and take the ent i re system out

of the pol i t ica l a rena . I t should give the pol i t ica l leadership, regardless

of polit ical party, confidence that the intell igence they receive has noth

ing to do wi th who they a re and every th ing to do wi th wha t they need

to know. This is an easy f ix that requires only a bit of polit ical will on

the par t of the president and Congress .

I n t e r a g e n c y C o o p e r a t i o n

Another management f ix tha t would subs t i tu te for wha t we now know

is the a lmost impossible task of res tructur ing the American inte l l igence

system is to encourage interagency coopera t ion a t a l l levels . Years ago a

s tud y unde r t a ke n by c om m uni ty m a na g e r s re ve a le d tha t t he r e we r e doz

ens of informal interagency coopera t ive groups a t var ious levels focused

on subs tan t ive and management i ssues . These groups were formed

most ly because the people involved recognized the need to mee t f rom

time to t ime to discuss problems they faced or to ant ic ipate issues with

which they might have to dea l . These groups can now communica te wi th

each other more easily via the electronic network, but face-to-face meet

ings can help crea te bonding tha t technology does not achieve as well .

The formal interagency groups, such as the Counter inte l l igence Center

and Counter ter ror ism Center , have proven to be ef fec t ive in genera t ing

in te ragency coopera t ion . In te l l igence managers ought to encourage the

form ation of informal interagen cy com m ittees an d grou ps , bu t this

m ean s tha t they have to be m ore to le ran t of em ployees be ing aw ay f rom

their desks f rom t ime to t ime. The groups themselves ought to le t man

agers know more about wha t they a re do ing , a s long as the bureaucracy

is wi l l ing to accept in formal repor t ing ra the r than someth ing more cum

be r some .

I f there is no prac t ica l way to reorganize the American inte l l igence




communi ty and only l imi ted ways to g ive the DCI more c lou t , wha t

other reforms might be meaningful or useful? This leads us to quest ions

of opera t ions more than of s t ruc ture . This is the area where rea l change

might take place . To begin, we might consider the idea tha t in te l l igence

should be d ivorced f rom pol icy . In the Amer ican sys tem th is i s symbol

ized by the fact that almost the entire intell igence system is out of town:

The CIA is in sub ur ba n V irginia , m ost of the DIA is isola ted a t a defunct

a irbase south of the Washington proper , the NSA is near ly in Bal t imore ,

and the NRO is out near Dulles Airpor t . Only the FBI and the small

analysis uni t in the Sta te Depar tment are anywhere near the center of

power . The a rgument made today in suppor t o f th is sys tem is tha t e lec

tronic l inks make locat ion unimportant . But this ignores a crucia l fac tor .

Amer ican secur i ty po l icy i s s t i l l made by people , and human re la t ion

ships are cr i t ica l in making the system work.

T h e I n t e l l i g e n c e - P o l i c y L i n k

A great deal of pol icy is c rea ted in var ious committee meet ings and

ga the r ings where ideas a re tossed a round and pos i t ions on the i ssues

argued. For inte l l igence to count , i t has to be in the loop. This means

that in te l l igence managers have to make an ef for t to encourage the in

clusion of intell igence officers at the appropriate level in policy discus

sions; i t a lso means that policy officials have to seek an intell igence input.

When the author f i rs t jo ined the CIA, this was more prevalent than i t is

today . As t ime went on , in te l l igence managers became inc reas ing ly con

tent with del iver ing inte l l igence in pr int , or more recent ly e lec tronica l ly ,

ra the r than by appear ing in pe rson . This was an easy road to take be

cause i t meant tha t the inte l l igence managers could complete ly control

the content of the inte l l igence tha t was del ivered. In the give and take

of pol icy discussion, who could te l l what an inte l l igence analyst , espe

cially a relatively junior one, might say.

I f the CIA and the other substant ive agencies are indeed hir ing the

bes t and the br igh tes t , then they should be wi l l ing to send these ind i

viduals out conf ident tha t they wil l fa i thful ly de l iver the considered wis

dom of the agencies they represent as well as the ir own views on the

issues . Pol icy off ic ia ls of ten want to have both and welcome the input .

For the most par t , these inputs wil l involve hot-burner issues , tha t is ,

current inte l l igence . Our pol icy system is not well equipped to deal with

long-range issues , even though the inte l l igence system spends a fa ir

amount of t ime in estimating the future. This is a f ix that l ies outside the

realm of intell igence.




N o L o n g - R a n g e P l a n n i n g S y s t e m

The United Sta tes has no rea l long-range nat ional secur i ty pol icy plan

n ing mechanism outs ide the Pentagon . Defense p lanners have to an t ic i

pa te requi rements , e spec ia l ly in regard to weapons procurement , many

years in advance . Therefore , long-range planning is a must , and defense

in te l l igence has had to suppor t th is p lanning requi rement wi th long- te rm

threat analysis . On the c ivi l ian s ide , in contrast , long-range planning of

ten g ives way to more immedia te concerns .

Years ago a long-range pol icy-planning funct ion did indeed exis t

wi th in the Na t iona l Secur i ty Counc i l and in the po l icy p lanning mech

anisms of the Sta te Depar tment . Increasingly over the years , however ,

this funct ion has become pol i t ic ized. Instead of having professional , non-

pol i t ica l appointees in posi t ions where they could del ibera te longe-range

Amer ican po l icy , the pos ts have been f i l led wi th people whose qua l

i f ica t ions must inc lude loyal ty to the president and par ty in power . The

ap po inte es d o not seek to bu i ld A m erican pol icy so m uc h as t ry to sa t isfy

the const i tuencies the president and the ir par ty represent . This subt le

dif ference means tha t pol icy planners want inte l l igence to he lp them

achieve their polit ical goals, and so some of the long-range analysis is

either of no use in that regard or is seen as obstructive. Further, the

policy planners know that the ir tenure is l inked to tha t of the president ,

so the i r long- range v is ion ends when h is te rm ends .

Fixing this system h as not hin g to do w ith inte l l igence , bu t if there w ere

a long-range, non-pol i t ica l pol icy-planning system within the execut ive

branch , then long- range in te l l igence would be more use fu l and more

welcome. How of ten have we seen presidents come into off ice expressing

vis ion s ta tements about the ir long- term fore ign pol icy or na t ional se

cur i ty goa ls on ly to become enmeshed in c r i s i s management? In such

circumstances, decis ionmakers become f i ref ighters , and they want inte l

l igence to he lp them put out the f i re . They don ' t have t ime to think about

the long- term consequences of the ir decis ions, so long- term inte l l igence

is of no use to them. Remedying this s i tua t ion requires the pol i t ica l wil l

of the president and Congress .

The National Security Council staff was created to serve this function,

coo rdin at ing the var iou s pol icy pro po sals of the State , Defense , an d other

depar tments into some coherent na t ional secur i ty s t ra tegy. This funct ion

could be restored if the NSC staff returned to i ts roots, with the staff

bui l t f rom a mix of career is ts seconded f rom the depar tments as well as

pol i t ica l appointees . And they should be given tenure to crea te cont i

nu i ty in long- range p lanning , wi thout the house -c lean ing tha t seems now

to go on whenever the presidency changes hands. I f the United Sta tes



Fixing the Spy Machine 201

had a t ruly ef fec t ive long-range pol icy-planning

staff,

then long- te rm in

te l l igence analysis would be able to provide the necessary inputs tha t

now beg for an audience .

M i c r o - M a n a g i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e

Another opera t ional issue in f ixing inte l l igence concerns the cont inu

ing effor t by Congress to t ry to micro-manage the U.S. in te l l igence sys

tem. The Founding Fa the rs may not have rea l ized tha t the sys tem of

checks and balances they were crea t ing would resul t in es tabl ishing an

adversa r ia l r e la t ionsh ip be tween the pres ident and Congress . The con

gress iona l e ffort to m ic ro-m anage go vern m ent ha s been w i th us f rom the

bir th of the nat ion, but only re la t ive ly la te ly has Congress t r ied to em

ploy inte l l igence management . Ear ly ef for ts by Congress to horn in on

inte l l igence matters was rebuffed by ear ly presidents , and in la ter years

members of Congress indica ted tha t they would prefer to leave inte l l i

gence matters to the execut ive branch. The establ ishment of r igorous

congressional oversight of inte l l igence matters in 1976 changed a l l tha t .

Suddenly members of bo th houses had the too ls to t inker wi th in te l

l igence po l icy and in te l l igence management . The DCI was requi red to

send them a deta i led consol ida ted budget for a l l the inte l l igence agen

c ies , to repor t to them on planned cover t ac t ions, and to provide them

with the same in te l l igence ana lys is p rovided execut ive branch dec is ion-

makers . I t d id not take long for members of the committees to s tar t to

press the ir own agenda on the DCI and to f ind faul t , sometimes in publ ic ,

wi th the way in which the sys tem was run . This po l i t ic ized mic ro-

ma na ge me n t ough t to s top .

Congressional oversight is , in genera l , a good thing for the country as

well as for inte l l igence . I t should give the American people conf idence

that the ir representa t ives are , on the ir

behalf,

seeking to ensure tha t a

system run largely in secre t is not abusing the peoples ' t rust . But i ts

mandate should end there . There should be no need to te l l the DCI, in

deta i l , how to spend the inte l l igence budget . Insis t ing on expenditures

for covert action in public , most recently in the effort to overthrow Sad

dam Hussein of I raq, is cer ta inly counterproduct ive , though pol i t ica l ly

satisfying. Congressional efforts to micro-manage intell igence force in

te l l igence managers to be less than candid and for thr ight in the ir re

por t ing to the commit tees in fea r tha t somehow they wi l l say someth ing

that the members wil l use against the DCI, the president , or them. Only

Congress can pol ice i ts own house in this regard; as par t of the execut ive

branch, in te l l igence managers have to protec t the system they represent .

The 1996 s taf f s tudy on inte l l igence reform under taken by the House




of Representa t ives , IC 21: The Intelligence Community in the Twen ty-first

Century, though we l l meaning and in te res t ing , demonst ra tes th is k ind of

micro-manager ia l e f for t .

7

The s tudy do e s m a ke one r e c om m e nda t ion tha t

deserves ac t ion, however , and i t is one tha t would head off the congres

s ional zea l to dabble in inte l l igence pol icy. The s tudy recommends the

crea t ion of the Committee on Fore ign Inte l l igence (CFI) within the Na

t ional Secur i ty Counci l to be made up of a combinat ion of pol icymakers

and intell igence officials. Their job would be to set out the general di

rection for the use of intell igence resources and establish priorit ies for

in te l l igence managers . Whi le the DCI may not have much cont ro l over

the inte l l igence agencies tha t be long to the Depar tment of Defense or the

o the r depar tments , the Whi te House ce r ta in ly has tha t power and should

use i t . Of course , the DCI and the senior inte l l igence manager f rom De

fense sh ou ld be par t of the CFI, bu t the ul t im ate autho r i t ies sho uld be

the pres ident and the na t iona l secur i ty advisor .

D i r e c t i n g M i l it a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e

Both the

IC 21

s tudy and the Brown Commiss ion sugges ted tha t the re

should be a direc tor of mil i ta ry inte l l igence

(DMI),

presumably a sen ior

genera l or admira l , to oversee the myriad inte l l igence components of the

mil i ta ry services and the joint in te l l igence agencies such as the DIA and

NSA. In addi t ion, there should be an assis tant secre tary of defense to

assist the secretary of defense in creating defense intell igence policy.

These are sensible suggest ions for inte l l igence management , would not

requi re la rge addi t iona l bureaucrac ies , and would c rea te pos i t ions to

manage and control the resources devoted to inte l l igence suppor t for

de c i s ionma ke r s a nd mi l i t a r y c omma nde r s .

Tradi t ional ly the senior mil i ta ry off icers who head the DIA and the

NSA have not been key f igures in intell igence at the national level, a l

though they have played a s ignif icant role within the Depar tment of

Defense. The two leaders are usually three-star off icers with intell igence

background and exper ience , and tha t has been t rue s ince the found

ing of the NS A in 1954 an d the D IA in 1961. The DIA d irector fil ls the

role of the J-2, the chief intelligence officer of the Joint

Staff,

and the

direc tor of the NSA is responsible for SIGINT and communicat ions se

cur i ty . The DIA is smaller than the CIA, but i t does play an important

par t in providing inte l l igence suppor t to mil i ta ry opera t ions as well as

s tra tegic planning. The NSA is be l ieved to be qui te a bi t la rger than the

CIA, but the actual f igures remain classif ied.

With the growth of var ious aspects of mil i ta ry inte l l igence , i t would

make sense to have a very senior off icer , with four-star rank, to oversee

and d i rec t the en t i re p rocess . The Na t iona l Imagery and Mapping

Agency (NIMA) has become a major player within the mil i ta ry system,




and most obse rvers be l ieve tha t measurements and s igna tures in te l l i

gence (MASINT) , now the purv iew of the mi l i ta ry ' s Cent ra l MASINT

Office, is bound to grow.

8

Since most of the nat ional in te l l igence budget

goes to suppor t var ious components of mil i ta ry inte l l igence , and s ince

most of the personnel be long to the mil i ta ry system, i t makes sense to

have a senior off icer in charge of this empire . Although Congress has

suggested tha t the appointment of such a senior off icer be coordinated

with the DCI, the secretary of defense is unlikely to give the DCI a veto

over the off icer nominated. The advice and consent of the Senate ought

to be suff ic ient , but i t would make the ent i re Inte l l igence Community

work a grea t deal be t ter i f the DCI and the DMI got a long well with

each other .

P e r s o n n e l R e f o r m

Congress could he lp re form the in te l l igence sys tem by suppor t ing pe r

sonnel reform. After the turmoil c rea ted by the end of the Cold War ,

inte l l igence personnel have found tha t instabi l i ty in the system, lack of

resources , and percept ions tha t in te l l igence services are no longer needed

in the post-Cold War era have made a career in inte l l igence work less

and less desirable . A s trong economy, good jobs tha t pay bet ter than

government , and perhaps the grea ter f lexibi l i ty of work in the pr iva te

sector may a lso be fac tors . Although i t is t rue tha t the system in genera l

may have been too large , in te l l igence managers fe l l under considerable

pressure to reduce the inte l l igence work force rapidly. This led to var ious

schemes to force people out , schemes a imed especia l ly a t those in a po

sit ion to retire after long years of service.

Soon i t became c lear tha t potent ia l re t i rees were e i ther not leaving fast

en ou gh or w ere seek ing way s to s tay on . In te l ligence ma na ger s t ried n ew

schemes, inc luding payoffs for ear ly re t i rement , or so-ca l led buyouts tha t

p r ov ide d e nough c a sh so tha t pe r sonne l who d id no t ha ve e nough t ime

in the sys tem to re t i r e might be induced to seek o the r employment . In

ma ny wa ys the se sc he me s we r e f a r mor e pa la t a b le tha n wha t wa s ha p

pening in pr iva te industry , where layoffs and outr ight dismissa ls a t a l l

leve ls had become commonplace . None the less , the ea r ly re t i r ements and

buyouts sen t a poor message to mid- leve l ca ree r i s t s , who began to leave

the system while they s t i l l had the chance to f ind other employment .

A Bra in Dra in

In i t s s tudy the Brown Commiss ion po in ted ou t tha t pe r sonne l cos ts

in intell igence had r isen by some 50 percent from 1980 to 1989 and con

c luded tha t the work force ought to be reduced . At the same t ime the




s tudy acknowledged tha t people a re the In te l l igence Communi ty ' s mos t

v i ta l r e source . The commiss ion recommended tha t more e f for t be made

to weed out poor pe r formers , a l though the re was no ev idence in the

s tudy to sugges t how many such weak pe r formers the re were . This may

have been another overreact ion to the Ames case , in which c lear ly Ames

w as h imse l f a w eak pe r former , th ou gh c lever eno ug h to m an ag e to e lude

capture for nine years .

The resu l t of dow nsiz ing h as bee n a bra in d ra in am on g those ca ree r is t s

who would have compr ised the next g roup of sen ior managers in the

inte l l igence agencies . Losing a la rge number of mid-career is ts is a blow

in any organiza t ion, but because of the specia l na ture of inte l l igence

work, i t is par t icular ly devasta t ing to lose the people who would be in

the best posi t ion to nur ture new employees in the arcane ski l ls of inte l

l igence work. Coupled with a system that for severa l years hardly hired

an y ne w p rofessionals a t a l l, the U.S. Inte l ligence Co m m un ity is suffer ing

from a personnel s i tua t ion tha t must be f ixed. This is especia l ly t rue

among those who do c landes t ine work or ca r ry ou t h igh ly technica l in

tell igence collection operations.

I t takes years to train a case officer to be able to operate overseas in a

hos t i le envi ronment and to rec ru i t and handle human sources . To the

dismay of the CIA, when Harold J . Nicholson gave to the Russians the

names of severa l ent i re c lasses of new Clandest ine Service recrui ts in

the ear ly 1990s, he wiped out an ent i re cadre of potent ia l ly capable case

officers.

9

Once the identit ies of these potential case officers was made

known to a host i le inte l l igence service , they could no longer be sent

abroad under cover ; thus the ir careers were ruined before they even

s ta r ted . Coupled wi th downsiz ing in the Clandes t ine Serv ice , the CIA

has had to c rank up a ha rd-dr iv ing rec ru i tment campa ign to seek new

talent, but i t will be years before potential trainees become proficient in

handl ing esp ionage opera t ions .

A similar situation exists in technical areas such as SIGINT or in im

agery in te l l igence , a l though no one has be t rayed the people who do the

work, as far as we know. In most of the technical areas, the intell igence

sys tem has had to do i t s own t ra in ing , s ince in te rcep t ing communica

t ions,

decipher ing codes, or analyzing sa te l l i te imagery is rare ly taught

e lsew here . Un for tuna te ly for inte l l igence m an ag ers , these technica l ski lls ,

once acquired, can lead employees to seek lucra t ive posi t ions in the pr i

vate sec tor , and this has caused yet another bra in dra in within inte l l i

gence .

S t i l l a D e s i r a b l e C a r e e r

Years of downsiz ing and cutbacks in resources , coupled with the

greater benef i ts offered in pr iva te industry , blows to morale f rom spy



Fixing the

Spy

Machine 205

cases,

and a t tacks on the system by pol i t ic ians and the press , have hur t

career is ts in inte l l igence in many ways. The nature of the inte l l igence

profession is such tha t the ir s tor ies are not widely known or f requently

to ld . A ra re few have wr i t ten books or denounced the sys tem in publ ic ,

but most have just quie t ly faded away to seek other oppor tuni t ies . Yet ,

we know from the responses to recrui t ing adver t is ing, web s i te contac ts ,

and repor ts in the press , tha t in te l l igence work remains a desirable career

pa th for many young people . The sys tem has to do more to rec ru i t new

people and , more impor tan t ly , to re ta in those i t has a l ready brought on

boa r d .

One way to revise the system would be to scrap the present pay sca le ,

which is t ied to the genera l c ivi l service sca le , for something more imag

inat ive . The DCI has the author i ty to do this for the CIA, as does the

secre tary of defense for the DOD agencies , but i t has a lways been more

convenient and s imple just to repl ica te the c ivi l service system already

in p lace th roughout the government . The in te l l igence managers who

adopted the civil service pay scale in the early days of the CIA could

then c la im that they were just t rea t ing the ir employees the same as every

one e lse in government . Consider ing the specia l na ture of the inte l l igence

bus iness , however , means tha t in te l l igence pe rsonne l a re no t l ike every

one e lse . Inte l l igence managers ought to invest iga te ways to modify the

system to entice more people to stay, especially in special skills areas,

such as the Clandestine Service, or in the technical f ields.

At tempts were made in the pas t to organize a new sys tem for pay and

a l lowances , bu t employees were no t en thus ias t ic about change . In te l l i

gence ma nag ers o ug ht to try aga in , tho ug h. The in te l ligence sys tem m ust

be prepared to compete wi th pr iva te indus t ry in f ind ing , h i r ing , and

re ta ining the best and the br ightest . Most career is ts enter the world of

inte l l igence not to ge t r ich but to serve the country in a unique f ie ld .

The i r ded ica t ion ought to be rewarded . Congress ought to suppor t pay

reform and var ious incent ives to encourage recrui t ing and re tent ion. Per

sonnel costs in intell igence are not nearly as great as the costs of satell i tes

or other technica l hardware . I f Congress rea l ly be l ieves in the value of

inte l l igence personnel , i t ought to be eager to keep them on duty.

A g a i n , t h e P o l y g r a p h

Further , in te l l igence managers must t ry to f ind a be t ter c learance

mechanism than the po lygraph . Not on ly does i t work aga ins t new h i res ,

bu t we now know tha t long- t ime employees a re running a foul o f th is

ins id ious device . Employees a re repor ted ly f ind ing tha t r e inves t iga t ions

a nd the a c c ompa ny ing po lyg r a ph in t e r v ie w a r e tu r n ing up un r e so lve d

issues tha t a re hur t ing the i r ca ree rs even though they have done no th ing




wrong. This scrut iny is most ly an overreact ion to the Ames case . In the ir

zeal to make up for the secur i ty er rors in checking out Ames, in te l l igence

managers a re bending over backward to make sure such a breach of

secur i ty never happens again. The resul t is tha t they are doing as much

damage to the system as Ames did, though in a dif ferent way.

The polygraph has been a round in in te l l igence usage for more than

forty years, and there seems to be l i t t le effort to f ind something better .

Cons ide r ing the amount of money spent on sophis t ica ted new technica l

inte l l igence techniques to fer re t out biologica l or chemical weapons, nar

cotics,

or e lec tronics , one would think tha t such sophis t ica t ion could be

extended to a way to detec t prevar ica t ion or subterfuge . From t ime to

t ime mention has been made of voice s t ress analysis as one way to te l l

i f a person is ly ing or hiding information. The polygraph has been

judged to be of questionable reliabili ty in court cases, and since at least

one inte l l igence service we know has been told by i ts overseers to drop

the machine, perhaps i t is t ime for the United States to f ind an alter

nat ive .

S i z e a n d D u p l i c a t i o n

One issue ra ised a t the beginning of this work was tha t of dupl ica t ion

of effort. A se con d w as th at of size. Is the U.S. Intell igence C om m un ity

too big? Is there a great deal of duplication of effort? How could outsid

ers judge either of these issues? In fact, we know from the reform studies

done in recent years tha t these judgments are dif f icul t to make even for

those paid to s tudy the problem with a l l the necessary data . There are

good reasons to have duplica t ion in some areas , especia l ly in both col

lection and analysis. Collecting data from a variety of sources, even if

there is over lap, is just what analysts need to solve the myster ies . From

the analyst ' s perspect ive , there is never too much raw mater ia l . Analysts

are comfor ted when severa l analyt ic uni ts go through the data and reach

similar conclusions; when they disagree on the interpre ta t ion, then there

is a good reason to confer and sor t th ings out . Competi t ive analysis is a

good way to avoid inte l l igence fa i lure . One could conclude f rom this

tha t redundancy in the substant ive areas of inte l l igence is genera l ly a

good th ing and should no t be cu t back .

In adminis t ra t ive a reas , the re may be some hope for reduc ing dupl i

ca t ion. This is especia l ly t rue in mil i ta ry inte l l igence , where personnel

management , log is t ic s , and suppor t i s fungib le and where people can be

moved in and out of the var ious par ts of the system. Thus, recrui t ing,

c lea rance procedures , ob ta in ing suppl ies , communica t ions , and o the r

such suppor t services could be centra l ized. I f there were

a

director of

military intell igence and this off icer had control of support services for




al l mil i ta ry inte l l igence , i t seems l ike ly tha t some savings could be made.

But a t tempts to do the same things for the ent i re Inte l l igence Community

are not l ike ly to work, and they viola te sensible rules about compar t

menta t ion .

As far as s ize is concerned, there is no evidence f rom which to draw

a conclusion. Is the system too big? Are there too many people? Does i t

spe nd too muc h mone y? P e r ha ps the r e a r e ma na ge r s w i th in the sys t e m

who might be ab le to answer such ques t ions , bu t the answers would

cer ta inly not be made public . We do know that the inte l l igence oversight

commit tees of Congress do ask such ques t ions and probably rece ive

some fa ir ly de ta i led data in answer . In this case we have to t rust tha t

our represent ives in Congress are sa t isf ied with the information they are

get t ing. From the perspect ive of an inte l l igence professional , however ,

the sys tem does seem to have become inc red ib ly la rge and cumbersome,

bureaucra t ic , and increasingly inf lexible . But tha t ' s just one person 's

v iew, suppor ted on ly by pe rsona l exper iences and pe rspec t ives . Pe rhaps

in te l l igence managers ought to a sk the i r cur ren t employees wha t they

think, as long as they are not af ra id of the answers they may get .

R i s k A v e r s e

One wri ter who knows the world of inte l l igence wrote in 1999 tha t

U.S.

inte l l igence managers have become increasingly r isk averse , fear ing

the wrath of their polit ical masters if they fail to predict the future ac

curately, if their agents are caught by the opposition, or if our system is

penetra ted by a fore ign inte l l igence service .

10

Failure is inevitable in in

te l l igence , and a fa i lure to take r isks a lmost guarantees a poor outcome.

America cannot have a zero-defect in te l l igence system. Perhaps we have

been fooled by the near ly perfec t record of our manned space missions,

where zero-defect technology can be achieved. This does not work in

in te l l igence because of the heavy dependence on people to do the work .

Human judgment is c r i t ica l in inte l l igence , but i t wil l occasional ly pro

duce fa i lure . Pol i t ica l leaders should be prepared not only to accept i t

but to defend the system as well .

Is U.S. intell igence in need of a major overhaul, as some crit ics have

sugges ted? I s the Spy Machine broken? I t appears tha t wha t i s needed

is not a major f ix but , ra ther , a good tune-up. Throughout this work

numerous smal l changes and f ixes have been sugges ted . Implement ing

them wil l require a coordinated ef for t by inte l l igence managers , pol i t ica l

dec is ionmakers and Congress . Even i f i t does no more than spa rk d is

cussion about some of the issues , th is review wil l have been worthwhile .

America ' s in te l l igence system seems to be ready to handle the chal-




l e n g e s of t h e n e w p o s t - C o l d W a r e r a , b u t it s ti ll n e e d s h e l p . W e c a n n o

l o n g e r d o m o r e w i t h l e ss . I n t e l l i g e n c e is , i n m a n y w a y s , A m e r i c a ' s f ir st

l i n e o f d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e n e w t h r e a t s o f t e r r o r i s m , g l o b a l c r i m e , a n d

c y b e r - w a r f a r e , a s w e l l a s t h e a g e - o l d p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d b y n a t i o n a l i s m ,

d i c t a t o r s h i p s , a n d h a t r e d . W i s e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s s h o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t

i n v e s t m e n t s in i n t e l l i g e n c e a r e c h e a p e r a n d h a v e a p o t e n t i a l l y g r e a t e r

p a y o ff t h a n s p e n d i n g h u g e s u m s o n w e a p o n s s y s te m s . T h e C h i n e s e p h i

l o s o p h e r S u n T z u r e c o g n i z e d t h i s a l m o s t 2,5 00 y e a r s a g o . W e s h o u l d p a y

a t t e n t i o n t o w h a t h e h a s t a u g h t u s .

N o t e s

1.

For detai led de scr ipt ion s of the var io us com po ne nts of the U.S. Intel ligence

Community and organizat ional char ts of the agencies , see Jef f rey T. Richelson,

The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

2.

This ear ly his tory is wel l recorded in Arthur Dar l ing,

The Central Intelli

gence Agency: An Instrument of Governm ent to 1950 (State Col lege: Pennsylvania

State Universi ty Press, 1990).

3. The author worked on th i s s tudy dur ing h i s tour wi th the IC

staff.

4.

The chief complainant was General Norman Schwarzkopf , the overal l com

mander of the combined forces . See H. Norman Schwarzkopf , It Doesn't T ake a

Hero

(New York: Bantam Books, 1992).

5.

Rober t M. Gates , From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster , 1996).

6. Michael Warner (ed.) , CIA C old War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intel l igence, CIA, 1994).

7.

John Mill is , s taff chief for the HPSCI, at a presentation in Washington at

the Internat ional S tudies Associat ion Annual Convent ion in February 1999, ar

gued tha t Congress had to micro-manage the CIA and the o ther agencies when

i t saw evidence of poor management or leadership. Mil l i s was himself a former

CIA careerist .

8 . MASINT refers to such exot ic targets as ref lected energy, nuclear emana

t ions, biological weapons , indust r ial pol lut ion, and nerve gas , to name jus t a few.

9. David Wise, The Spy Who Sold the Farm, GQ, M arch 1998, p p .

294-301.

10 . Da vid Ignat ius , Fai lure: Ticket to Success , Washington Post, 3 M arc h 1999,

p .

A23.



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Index

Afghanis tan, 25, 66, 73, 113; U.S. co

ver t act ion in,

75,

7 9-8 1 ,

116, 178

Allende, Salvador , 2, 73, 78-79, 84

Amador,

Manue l , 69

Amer ican Revolut ion , 8; counter in te l

l igence in, 87-88; covert action in,

65 -67

American Society for Indust r ial Secu

rity (ASIS), 161

Ames , Aldr ich , 2, 15, 19, 3 1 , 89, 94,

141,

163-164; betrayal of Gordiev

sky, 125; case results , 101-103; and

Pete Earley, 181; and t he Howar d

case,

100; and the po lygra ph, 97,

133, 206; Soviet er rors in handl ing,

34, 130; views on espionage , 12, 36;

as a wa lk-in, 93

Angleton, James J . , 90, 98-99, 103

Angola , 66

Arbenz , Jacobo,

70-7 1 ,

78

Argent ina , 108, 114

Arnold, Benedict , 88

Association of Former Intel l igence Of

ficers (AFIO), 185

Aum

Shinr ikyo,

111

Aus chwi t z , 10

Baker, Lafayette, 88, 175

Baker, Will iam, 179

Bandera, Stefan, 65

Berg, Moe, 181

Betts, Richard K., 48

Bin Laden, Osama, 116, 118

Bissell, Richard, 71

Blake, Ge orge, 92

Bradley , Genera l Omar , 183

Br own Commi s s i on . See U ni t ed

States , Intel l igence Community, re

form studies of

Bundesnachr ichtendiens t (BND) , 163.

See also G e r m a n y

Bush, George, 3 , 141, 193, 195, 197;

adminis t rat ion of , 143, 179

Cab l e News Ne t wor k ( CNN) , 13, 41 ,

47

Canada , 16,

75,

122-123, 130, 175

Car ter , J immy, 143, 177, 194, 197; ad

ministrat ion of, 56, 158

Carver , George , 52

Casey, Will iam J. , 3 , 76, 85, 123, 138,

178-179, 183, 194, 197

Castro, Fidel , 7 -8 , 40, 71-72 , 74, 84,

94, 118

Central Intel l igence Agency (CIA) , 2 -

4,

8, 18, 105, 142, 192, 199; analys is

in, 13-14, 43-4 5 , 50-54 ,

58 -6 1 ,

1 1 0 -

111,

147-148; clan de stine service of,



Index 219

Fishel , Edwin, 43

Ford, Gerald, 74, 143, 177

Foreign Broadcas t Informat ion Service

(FBIS), 8,

4 0 -4 1 ,

91

Foreign Intel l igence Survei l lance

Cour t , 102

France, 2 1 , 30, 65, 67, 69, 92, 107, 123,

158

Fuld , Leonard , 154

Gandhi , Indi ra , 65

Gates ,

Rober t M. 3 , 7, 14, 5 1 , 53-54,

148,

179, 194-195, 197

Ger many , 8-9 , 25, 70, 94, 99, 122, 125,

137, 140, 163, 183

Global organized cr ime (GOC), 106,

118-119

Godson, Roy, 64

Goodman , Mel v i n , 58-60

Gordievsky, Oleg , 92, 125

Gouzenko, Igor , 130

Great Britain, 64, 67-68 , 71, 87-88,

107, 182; intel l igence services of (MI-

5,

MI-6), 3 , 8-9, 54-5 5 , 90, 125, 1 7 3 -

174

Greenhow, Rose , 88

Groat , Douglas , 95, 140

GRU (Soviet Union, mili tary intel l i

gence service of) , 92, 109, 122

Gua t emal a , 33 -34,

70 -71 ,

78

Gulf War, 65, 106,

111,

117, 194

Guzman , Ab i mae l , 124

Harr ison, Benjamin, 69

Helms , Richard , 149, 193, 196

Hersh , Seymour , 176

Hezbol lah , 113, 115

Hil lenkoeter , Admiral Roscoe, 70, 176

Hi l sman, Roger , 12, 36

Hitz, Freder ick, 141

Hollis , Sir Roger, 174

Hoover , J . Edgar , 1, 15, 18, 44, 89, 99,

146,

149, 179

Howar d , Edwar d Lee , 97, 99-100

HPSCI (House Permanent Selec t

Commit tee on I tel l igence) . See

United States , Congress , intel l igence

overs ight commit tees of

HUMINT (human in te l l igence) . See

Intel l igence, espionage in

Hus s e i n , S addam, 1, 40, 47, 65, 77, 80,

83,

108, 117, 201

Imagery , photo in te l l igence (PHO-

TINT), 10-11 ,

23-24, 27-30, 194

India, 59, 65, 107, 135

Indonesia, 7 1 , 78

Inman, Admira l Bobby Ray, 39, 194

Intell igence: analysis in, 12-15, 2 1 , 4 3 -

61,

155-157; counter intel l igence in,

15-16,

87-103, 106; covert action in,

16-17, 63-85 ; definitions of, 5-7; es

p iona ge in , 11-12, 23, 30-40,

8 7 , 1 5 2 -

155;

management and con t r o l i n ,

1 7 -

20, 129-149; me as ur em en t s and s i g

natures (MASINT), 203; pho t o

(PHOTINT) ,

10-11 ,

23-24 , 27-30,

194; polygraph use in , 3 1 , 96-97 ,

132-133, 205-206; and pr iva te

indus t ry , 2 1 , 151-170; recrui t ing in,

131-132, 136; signals (SIGINT), 8-9,

23-27 , 29, 206-107, 192

Iran, 25 , 48, 64, 66, 7 1 , 75, 77-78, 108,

139

Iran-Contra Affair , 17, 68, 75-76, 82,

141,

143,

145,

178

Iraq, 25 , 77, 106, 108, 111-112, 117

Israel, 66, 89, 92, 94, 107-108,

111,

116,

123, 173

Italy,

7 0-71 ,

113, 118, 121

Jackson, Andrew, 67

Japan, 6, 21, 23 , 69, 111, 151, 158

Jefferson, Thomas, 12, 16, 67

Jeremiah, Admira l David , 59, 135

Johnson, Lyndon, 196; admini s t r a t ion

of, 89, 124

Joint Publications Research Service, 41

Kampiles , Wil l iam, 98

Kansi , Mir

Ai mal ,

99, 138, 163

Kazakhs tan , 108

Kennan, George , 12, 36

Kennedy, John F . , 72, 196

Kennedy, Rober t F . , 72

Kenya, 116, 139



220 Index

KGB. See

Soviet U nio n, intel l igence

service of

KH-11 ,

28, 98

Knot t , S tephen, 68

Kukl inski , Colonel Ryszard, 92

Kuwai t , 1, 47

Lauder , George , 178

Lebanon, 48, 113, 115, 139

Lebed, Genera l Alexander , 109

Libya, 66, 77, 114, 140

Lincoln , Abraham, 68, 88

Lowel l , Francis Cabot , 151

Lumumba, Pat r i ce , 74

McCar thy , Joseph, 89, 96

Mc Con e, John, 196

Madison, James , 12, 17, 67

Markov, Georgi , 65

Mart in, Wil l iam H., 96

Meng i s t u Haile

M a r i a m ,

73

Mexico, 68, 115

MI-5,

MI-6. See G reat Britain, intel li

gence services of

Mitchell , Bernon F., 96

Mossad, 116. See also Israel

M o s s a d e g h , M o h a m m e d , 71

Moynihan, Daniel Pat r ick, 182-183,

187

Mugger idge , Malcolm, 3, 174, 189

Naj ibul lah, 73, 80

National Estimates, Board of, 14, 44,

51,

54-55 , 147, 181

Nat ional Foreign Intel l igence Board

(NFIB),

52, 55, 146, 193

Nat i ona l I mager y and Mapp i ng

Agency (NIMA) , 29-30,

48,

202

Nat ional Intel l igence Counci l (NIC) ,

14, 51-52 , 55, 58, 147-148

Nat ional Reconnaissance Off ice

(NRO), 20, 29, 176, 181, 199

Nat ional Secur i ty Agency (NSA), 2, 9,

50, 146; and CIA, 25, 48, 147; and

controls , 26; costs of, 29; defectors

from, 96, 176; and the FBI; and mil

i tary intel l igence, 202; and t he pub

lic,

181; recruit ing in, 137; secrecy

in, 27

Nat ional Technical Means (NTM), 24

Nicaragua , 65, 73,

75,

81 , 120, 180

Nicholson, Harold J . , 93 , 97, 100-103,

164, 204

Nimi tz , Admira l Ches ter , 6

Nixon, Richard M., 79; admini s t r a t ion

of, 89, 124, 196

Nor th Korea , 25, 77, 92, 94, 107-108

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1, 3 ,

12 ,

36,

4 3 ^ 4 ,

5 1 , 69, 95, 99, 131, 175

Pakis tan, 66, 80, 107-108

P anama , 65, 69

Pear l Harbor , 1, 44, 47

Penkovsky, Oleg , 92

Perry, W il liam, 7

Peru, 113, 123

Phi lby, Kim, 90, 125

Pinker ton, Alan, 88

P inochet , Genera l Augus to , 79

Poland, 64, 92, 122

Polk, James K., 12, 68, 175

Pol lard, Jonathan, 19, 89, 92, 98, 100

Polyakov, Dmitr i , 92

Popov, Pyotr , 92

Powers , Francis Gary, 10, 27

President's Daily Brief

(PDB ), 45

Qaddaf i , Muammar e l - , 114

Raborn, Admiral Wil l iam, 196

Reagan, Nancy, 119

Reagan, Ronald , 75, 139, 143, 178, 194,

197; administrat ion of, 20, 131, 145

Redmond , P au l , 103

Roosevelt , Franklin D., 43-44 , 69, 99

Roosevelt , Kermit , 71

Roosevel t , Theodore, 17, 69

Rosenberg, Jul ius and Ethel , 89

Russia, 106-107, 109, 123, 153, 187,

204;

intelligence service of (SVR),

100,

103, 181

Sandinis tas . See Nicaragua

Saudi Arabia, 2, 7, 48



Index 221

Schles inger , James , 196

Schwarzkopf, Gener a l Nor man , 65

S ender o

L u m i n o s o , 113,

123

SIGINT (signals intel l igence), 8-9 , 2 3 -

27, 29, 106-107, 192

Smith, General Wal ter Bedel l , 5 1 , 181

Snider, L. Britt, 141

Society of Competi t ive Intel l igence

Professionals (SCIP), 160

Sorensen, Theodore , 197

Souers , Admira l S idney, 44, 146

Soviet Union (USSR), 1,

10-11 ,

70;

and the Cold War , 105-106, 130,

166; and Cuba , 7 1 ; an d economic

data, 156, 183; an d SIGINT, 24-28;

and the Thi rd Wor ld , 73, 79-80

Soviet Union, intel l igence service of

(KGB), 1, 136; and cover t act ion, 17,

64-66;

and es p i onage ,

30 -3 1 ,

34, 8 9 -

90, 92-94, 100, 103, 125, 163; and in

dus t r i a l espionage , 122; an d publ ic

affairs, 181

Soviet Union, mi l i tary intel l igence

service of (GRU), 92, 109, 122

SR-71, 10

SSCI (Senate Select Committee on In

tel l igence). See U ni ted States , Con

gress ,

intel l igence overs ight

commit tees of

S u d a n , 111, 116

Sukarno, 71 , 78

Sun Tzu, 23 , 63, 65, 67, 151, 208

U-2, 10, 27

United States: civil war, intel l igence

in, 8, 10, 12, 23, 43 , 68, 88; C o n

gress ,

68, 70, 72-76,

82-83 ,

85, 89,

132,

141, 175, 203; Congress , intel l i

gence overs ight commit tees of , 4,

26,

144-145, 176-177, 186, 195, 2 0 1 -

202;

defense, secretary of , 45 , 148,

192; Depar tment of Defense, 12, 18,

29-30, 146, 185, 193, 200, 202-203;

Depar tment of Jus t ice, 18, 102; D e

par tment of S tate, 18, 40, 50, 52, 72,

105, 117, 122, 139, 156, 158, 182,

187, 200; Depar tment of S tate, Bu

reau of Intel l igence and Research of

(INR),

54,

57,

146-147; Dr ug En

forcement Adminis t r a t ion (DEA) ,

119; Economic Espionage Act , 152,

160;

executive office of (White

House) , 45 , 52, 69, 71-76,

81-83 ,

124, 142-144, 176, 183, 193-194; ex

ecut ive orders , 65, 74, 143, 177;

Founding Father s , 12, 16, 74, 79,

175,

186, 201; Freed om of Informa

tion Act (FOIA), 138, 153, 183; Intel

l igence Community ( IC) , 18-20, 29,

50, 108, 114-115, 117, 124, 137-138,

143-144, 146-149, 152, 158, 191-196,

198-199; In te l ligence C om m un i ty ,

reform studies of , 4,

18 -21 ,

30, 4 9 -

50, 76-82, 191-193, 195, 201-204,

206; Intel l igence Overs ight Board

(IOB),

142-143; Pres ide nt ' s Fore ign

Intel l igence Advisory Board

(PFIAB), 142

USSR. See Soviet U nion

Vandenberg , Genera l Hoyt , 44, 99

Venona, 180, 183

Walker Spy Ring, 89, 130

Walters , General Vernon, 2

Warner , Michael , 72

Washington, George , 12, 16, 64, 66-67,

87,

174

Watergate , 73, 176, 196

weapons of mass des t ruc t ion (WMD),

106-112

Webster , Wil l iam, 100, 118, 120, 156,

179, 194, 197

Tal iban, 113. See also Afghanis tan

Tanzan i a , 116, 139

Tenet , George, 136, 183-184, 189-190,

195,

198

Truman, Har ry S . , 44, 142, 146, 176,

180,

183, 193, 196

Turner , Admiral S tansf ield, 3 , 9, 24,

147, 158, 177-178, 193-194, 197

Twent i e t h Cen t u r y F und . See U ni ted

States , Intel l igence Community, re

form studies of

Tyler , John, 67

Fixing the Spy Machine

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