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Five Lessons We Should Have Learned In AfghanistanStrategic Issues in Policy PlanningJoshua Foust

July 2012

• ThewarinAfghanistanhascost$570.9billionsince2001.[1]

• Beforethe2009surge,morethan2milliontroopshaddeployedtoIraqandAfghanistan,800,000morethanonce.[2]

• Inmid-2011,therewere99,800soldiersinAfghanistanand90,339contractors[3]

• AsofJuly12,2012,morethan3,070soldiershavediedinAfghanistan.Morethan15,000soldiershavebeenwounded.Morethan2,800contractorshavebeenkilledand15,000contractorswounded.[4]

Introduction

TheUSconflict inAfghanistan ismoving into itsfinal stages.Over thenext eighteenmonths,thenumberofUSandNATOtroopsdeployedtherewilldecline,Afghansecurityforceswillofficiallytakeoverresponsibilityforthecountry,andthemissionwilltransi-tionfromcombattotraining.

Thenatureofthechallengewillbecomeoneofmaintenanceratherthanoutrightvictory–managingtheriskposedbyacontinuedTalibaninsurgency,ratherthandefeatingtheinsurgencythroughmilitaryvictory.

AsthetransitioninAfghanistanmovesforward,itisimportanttostepbackandreflectonthelessonswehavelearnedfromthelastelevenyearsofconflict.

Muchoftheretrospectivediscussionofthewarin Afghanistan has focused on early inatten-tion,theefficacyofcounterinsurgencydoctrine,or the individualdecisionsmadebyPresidentsObamaandBush.However,therearemorefun-damental lessonstobelearnedfromthewarinAfghanistan: our magical thinking, misunder-standing the environment, ignoring politics,poorplanning, andadisturbing refusal toplanforthefuture.

Joshua Foust is the Fellow for Asymmetric Operations at the American Security Project

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ThispaperispartofaseriestheAmericanSecurityProjectispublishingthroughout2012thatexam-inesU.S.foreignpolicyanditslongtermstrategiceffects.

Oneimportantwayofunderstandingthestrategiceffectsofforeignpolicydecisionsistounderstandrecentconflicts–whatwentrightandwhatwentwrong.Establishingmetrics(seeASP’srecentre-port, “MeasuringSuccess:AreWeWinning inAfghanistan?”)aidsus inunderstandingaconflictwhileitisstillongoing;butwiththeAfghanconflictwindingdownwecanbegindrawinglessonstomakefutureconflictsshorterandlesscostly.

ManyotherstudiesofthelessonslearnedfromAfghanistanfocusonoverlybroadtopicsoroverlynarrowones.HowthePresidentarrivedatthedecisionto“surge”troopsintothecountryin2009isabroadquestionthataddresseshigh-levelpolicymakingratherandcivil-militaryrelationsratherthananythingspecifictoAfghanistan,theoperationsofthewar,ortheindividualdecisionswediscussbelow.

Whether the counterinsurgency doctrine as ex-pressedinFM3-24isappropriateforfutureconflictsisanarrowquestionofmilitaryoperations,butdoesnotaddressspecificissuesinAfghanistanortheU.S.government’srecord,either.

ThispaperismeanttoidentifysomeofthelessonsthatpolicymakersandthepublicneedtolearnaboutAfghanistan. It is meant to establish a frameworkforunderstandingwhytheAfghanistanwarisinthestateitisin,andhowpolicymakerscanavoidmak-ingsimilarmisstepsinthefuture.

This isnotmeanttobeanexhaustive listofevery-thing that went wrong in the war; it is, however,meanttosparkapublicdebateaboutthedecisionsmadebytwoPresidentialadministrationsfrombothparties.

Thefivelessonsweidentifybelowencapsulatetheclearestexamplesofpolicyfailures,strategicshort-sightedness,andflawedreasoningthathavecontributedtotheAfghanistanwar’scurrentstatus.

Theselessonsarenottheentirestoryofthewar,nordotheyaccountforthesuccessesmanycom-mentatorsalsonotewhendiscussingthewarinAfghanistan.Thispaperidentifiesthelessonsthatarecurrentlynotenteringthepublicdiscourse.

WhenthinkingaboutthelessonstobedrawnfromAfghanistan,however,weshouldalsobemindfulofhowtointegratethemintofutureplans.Accountingforthelessonsweidentifybelowcouldhavepotentiallyresultedinashorter,lesscostlywar.

ThefollowingarefivelessonsweshouldhavelearnedinAfghanistan.

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1. The danger of magical thinkingMagicalthinkingiscausalreasoningthatassumesacorrelationbetweenactsorutterancesandcertainoutcomes.Araindanceisaverybasicexample:thebeliefthatdancinginaparticularpatternwillcauseraincloudstoappear.Magicalthinkingconfusescoincidencewithcausality–assumingactionsarerelatedtoanoutcomewhentheyarenot.

Magicalthinkingisbasedinhumannature:assumingpatternsandseeingconnectionsbetweeneventsandactionsenabledhumanstoevolve.“Survivalrequiresrecognizingpatterns—nightfollowsday,berriesthatcolorwillmakeyouill.”[5]

TheUSgovernmenthasengagedinsignificantmagicalthinkinginAfghanistan.

Forthelasttenyears,militaryandcivilianleadershavepromisedthatifsomethingwasbuilt,oracertainareaofthecountrywas“cleared”ofmilitants,orifsomeothersingulareventlikeapresidentialelectiontookplace,thewarwouldbewon.Itwasthepoliticalequivalentofaraindance–ratherthanunderstand-ingthecomplexreasonswhybadthingshappenedinAfghanistan,policymakerschosetoassumethatsimplefixescouldproducevictory.

Theresultwasexpensive–notjustinlives,butinmoney.

KarlEikenberry,whocommandedUSforcesinAfghanistanandlaterservedasambassador,recentlytoldStanfordNewsaboutthedangerofmagicalthinking.“WhenwewentintoAfghanistan,”hesaid,“it’sfairtosaythatallofus–theinternationalcommunity,theAmericans,theAfghans–didnotfullyunderstandthelevelofeffortthatwouldbeneededtoachievesomeofthegoalsandobjectivesthatweinitiallysetforourselves.”[6]

TheKajakiDam inHelmand province is a perfect example ofmagicalthinking.OriginallybegunasaUSAIDprojectintheearly1950s,thedamquicklybecameamodelofdevelopmentintheregion.LashkarGah,theprovincialcapitalofHelmand,becameknownas“LittleAmerica”becauseof thenumberof aidworkerswho lived there andbuiltnewneighbor-hoodsintheirownimage.USAIDremainedinvolvedinHelmandprov-inceuntiltheSovietInvasionof1979,anddidn’treturnuntilaftertheTali-bangovernmenthadfallen.

ManyintheUSconsideredtheKajakipowerplantasymbolofAmericancommitmenttoAfghanistanandthebestwaytoensurethelongtermvi-abilityofsouthernAfghanistan.[7]In2004,USAIDcontractedoutworktorepairthedamandrestorethepowerplants.[8]NATOneverestablishedcontrolofthearea[9]andby2007hadfoughtaseriesofpitchedbattlestotrytochaseawayinsurgents.[10]Constructionontheturbinesthatwouldrestorethepowerplanttooperationalcapacity,stalled—leadingoneaidworkerin2010todeclareit“amassiveconcession,notonlyoffailure,butofdefeat.”[11]

In2008Britishtroopsassemblednearly5,000troopsinahundred-vehicleconvoytodeliveranewturbinetotheKajakipowerplant.[12]Twomonthslater,however,itlayun-installedinacourtyardoutsidethedamfacility(describedbyareporteras“deepinsideTalibanterritory”).[13]Afterpartoftheexistingdamwasrepaired,AfghanofficialscomplainedthatitwassendingelectricitytoareastheTalibancontrolled–essentiallylettingthemprofitfromtaxingtheelectricityWesternworkersandsoldierswerestrugglingtogenerate.[14]

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Nearlythreeyearsafterdeliveringthenewturbine,itstillsatunopenedoutsidethepowerplant.Withre-centeconomicgrowthinHelmandandinnearbyKandahardramaticallyincreasingdemand,eventhenewturbinecan’tproduceenoughelectricitytohelpthelocals.[15]

Despitethesemanysetbacks,failures,andfalsestarts,theUSstillplanstospend$471millionoverthenexttwoyearstotrytofinishthedam.[16]USofficialsinsistthatKajakiisvitaltothefutureofsouthernAfghanistan,eventhoughyearsofworkhavenotyetfixedthedam.

Thereisnoreasontoassumetheprovincewillsuddenlybecomesecureshouldeverythingonthedamfunction,however.USofficials are thinkingmagicallyaboutKajaki, assuming that completinga singlemassivepieceofinfrastructurewillsomehowremedysouthernAfghanistan’sinsecurity.

TheTarakhilpowerplant,builtoutsideofKabul,isanotherexampleofmagicalthinking.USAIDdesignedandbuilttheplantin2009,throughacontractor,toprovideelectricityforKabul.[17]

However,thedieselpowerplanthascostoverthreetimesasmuchassimilarpowerplantsinPakistan,anditsannualoperatingcostof$280millionismorethanathirdofAfghanistan’stotaltaxrevenues.[18]Yearsafteritsofficialopening,however,TarakhilproducesalmostnoelectricitybecausethedieselfuelneededtoruntheplantcostsmorethantheratechargedtoKabulresidents.Thepowerplantwillalmostcertainlyneverbeabletosustainitselfwithoutmassivesubsidies.[19]

Tarakhilismagicalthinking:assumingacomplexissuecanbesolvedwithasimplesolution,inthiscaseonethatactuallymakestheissueworse.JumaNawandish,theformerdeputyministerofenergyandwater,toldareporterthatheneveraskedforapowerplanttobebuiltnearby.[20]HewantedtodevelopAfghani-stan’snortherngasfieldssotheexpensiveimportsofdieselfuelwouldbeunnecessary.Nearbylakesandriverscouldhaveprovidedfarcheaperhydropower.ButUSplannerswantedadieselplant,sotheybuiltit.

Magicalthinkingisn’tlimitedtofailedpowerplants.RoadconstructionisanotherareawhereUSofficialsassumeasimplesolutionwillsolveacomplexissue:thatcertainkindsofdevelopmentwillcreatesecurity.In2008,aseniorcounterinsurgencyadvisorfortheUSArmywroteontheinfluentialSmallWarsJournalsiteaboutthevalueofroadconstruction. [21]“LiketheRomans,counterinsurgentsthroughhistoryhaveengagedinroad-buildingasatoolforprojectingmilitaryforce,extendinggovernanceandtheruleoflaw,enhancing political communication and bringing economic development, health and education to thepopulation.”

AnotherwriterwhowasembeddedwithUSforcesmadethecasemoresuccinctly:“Roadsaredevelop-mentmagic.”[22]Roads,however,arenotmagic: theyareroads.While themilitarywasexplaininghowroadswouldcurethemanycomplexproblemsofruralAfghanistan,Talibanmilitantswereusingthosenewlypavedroadstolaysiegetovillages,[23]captureentiredistricts,[24]brutallyattackroadconstructioncrews,[25]andexecutecomplexambushesagainstCoalitionforces.[26]

UsingdataleakedontotheinternetbyWikileaks,universityresearchershaveshownthatoverthepastsev-eralyearsattacksinAfghanistanhavebeenconcentratedalonghighways—thelargestpavedroadsinthecountry.[27]TheresultisthatroadshaveactuallycontributedtoinsecurityinAfghanistanbyfacilitatingthemovementandactivityoftheinsurgency.

TherearecountlesscasesoftheUSengaginginmagicalthinkinginAfghanistan.Frompoliticstocon-struction, from insurgent reconciliation tonight raids,policymakers seem to (incorrectly)believe thatsimpleactionswillfixcomplexchallenges.

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2. understand the environmentCounterinsurgencyadvocateshaveinsistedforyearsontheimportanceofunderstandingtheenemyandthepopulationwhereyou’reworking.ItisalessontheUSArmyistryingtointernalize.ColonelThomasRoe,thedirectoroftheUSArmy’sCenterforLessonsLearned,recentlysaidinaninterviewthattroopsneedtoadoptamoreculturalapproachtofighteffectivelyinplaceslikeAfghanistan:“Thatgoesverydeepinthesensethatonevillagemaybedifferentculturallyfromthenextone.”[28]

However,thisunderstandinghasmostoftentakentheformofcrashcoursesin“culture”duringpre-de-ploymenttrainingforsomesoldiers.TensofthousandsofothercivilianshavealsoservedinAfghanistan,butonewouldbehardpressedtoidentifywhereincreasedculturalunderstandinghasbecomepractice.

Forexample,anewpartofpre-deploymenttrainingforsoldiersinvolvesteachingthemagriculture:bee-keeping,treepruning,andotherpractices.[29]ThetraininglastsoneweekandtakesplaceinCentralCali-fornia,whichtrainerssayissimilartoAfghanistan(“fertilevalleys,semi-aridplainsandmountains”).

Whiletheseshortagriculturaltrainingcampssoundinnovative,theybumpupagainstothereffortstoac-countforAfghanistan’sfarmingculture.AgribusinessDevelopmentTeams,orADTs,areNationalGuardunits from US farming communitiesthatalreadytravelaroundAfghanistanwith the purpose of liaising with lo-cal farmers. [30]ManyADTsencounterAfghandemonstrationfarms,[31]whichseem to function and thrive withoutmuchwesterninput. [32]Afghanfarm-ers even teach the ADTs about localfarmingconditionsandissues. [33]It isdifficult to seewhy and howAfghansactually needhelp farming –whetherfromanADTorfromregularsoldierswhospentaweekatanorchardinCali-fornia.

TheUSgovernment’sapproachtoun-derstanding Afghanistan is based onsuperficialassumptionsanddoesnotaccountforwhatAfghansalreadyknow.Soldierscannotmeaning-fullylearnaboutAfghanistan’sfarmingcultureortechniquesinaweeklongcrashcourseinCalifornia.ExperiencedfarmerswhodeploywiththespecificpurposeofsupportingAfghanistan’sfarmsarrivesur-prisedatAfghans’abilitytofarmontheirown.

WhatdeployingsoldiersreallyneedtolearnishowandwhyAfghanfarmersdocertainthings–likeusingshovelstodigirrigationcanalsnearroads.ManysoldiershaveconfusedAfghanfarmersengagedinbasicconstructionworkwithinsurgentslayingIEDs.[34]Learningtotellthedifference–whichdoesn’trequireaweekofbeekeeping–willleadtoabetterunderstandingoftheenvironment.

Understandingtheenvironmentcannotonlybeamilitaryaffair:itrequireseffortsfrombeyondthemili-tary.InreflectingonthewarinAfghanistanattheendof2011,then-SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatessaid,“Oneofthemostimportantlessons…isthatmilitarysuccessisnotsufficienttowin:economicde-velopment,institutionbuildingandtheruleoflaw,promotinginternalreconciliation,goodgovernance,providingbasicservicestothepeopleareessentialtosuccessinstatebuilding.”[35]

GateswasindirectlyreferencingClausewitz’sdictumthatwarmustservepolitics–arefrainthathasbe-comecliché.Thepublicdiscourseaboutthewar,however,isdominatedbyanarbitrarydebateovertroop

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numbersratherthandiscussinganysubstantivepoliticalgoalsorevenanendstatetotheconflict.[36]ThecurrentstrategyfavoredbytheWhiteHouse,transitioningsecurityresponsibilitytotheAfghanNationalSecurityForces,isamilitary-firstpolicythatdoesnotincludeapolitical,cultural,oreconomiccomponent.[37]

For example, a recent project spearheadedby theUSEmbassy inKabul created anAfghan versionofSesameStreetinDecemberof2011.[38]“TeachershereinAfghanistanwilldiscoverthatSesameStreetcanhelpchildrenstartschoolwellprepared,”saidtheUSambassadortoKabul,RyanCrocker.“Perhapsmostimportantly,itshowschildrentheworldaroundthem.”

TheproblemwithbringingSesameStreettoAfghanistanisthatmosthomesdonothaveanyelectricity.Itismagicalthinkingbornofnotunderstandingtheenvironment.Despitetheinternationalcommunityspendingnearly$60billiontodevelopAfghanistan’selectricalinfrastructure,only497,000ofAfghanistan’s4.8millionhouseholdshaveanyaccesstoelectricity.[39]AccordingtothemostrecentUNdata,Afghani-stan’spercapitaGDPisonlyabout$500,orlessthan$2perday,[40]yetitcostsAfghans$11permonthtopoweratelevision.Everysinglelightbulbcosts$2.60perday.

TheSesameStreetproject isnot just an exampleofmagical thinking– assuming that aTV showwillsomehowgetmorechildrenthroughschool–itisalsoastonishinglyignorantofthelocalconditionsthatwillpreventitfromeverhavinganeffectonAfghanchildren.Even“tweaks”theshow’sproducerscameupwith–callingdancing“exercise”inaneffortnottooffendconservativeMuslimparents–ringssofalseitisdifficulttounderstandwhattheprojectleaderswerethinkingwhentheycreatedit.Additionally,anunderstandingofbasicinfrastructureinthecountrywouldhaveshownthatcreatingahigh-costAmeri-can-importedchildren’sshowwouldn’thaveachancetobesuccessfulbecausesofewwouldeverhavetheopportunitytowatchit.

ThewarinAfghanistanhasbeenfoughtlargelyoutsideabasicunderstandingofthecountryanditscul-ture.Asaresult,manymisstepshavebeenmadeandbillionsofdollarswastedonschemesthathadlittlechanceofsuccess.Moreover,whatshouldhavebeenacollaborativeeffortbetweenthemilitaryandcivilianagenciesofthegovernmenthasbeenoverlymilitarizedandfocusedonnarrowmilitaryobjectives.Eventhemuch-vaunted“civiliansurge” [41]–meanttosupplementthemilitarymission,noless–neverfullymaterialized.[42]Abetterunderstandingofthesocietyinwhichawartakesplacewillallowforlessexpen-ditureandfewerlostlives.

3. The war is a political conflict IfonethinghasbeenmissingfromUSpolicyinAfghanistan,itisAfghanpolitics.

USofficialsroutinelycomplainaboutthebehaviorofAfghanPresidentHamidKarzai.Thesecomplaintshavebecomewidespreadenoughthatonegeneralwasrelievedofhiscommandlastyearforspeakingthemtoofreely.[43]USofficialscomplainaboutHamidKarzaibecausetheydonotunderstandAfghanpolitics.Karzai’sdomesticpoliticalcontextmakeshisbehaviorunderstandable,evenpredictable.

Asanexample,PresidentKarzaihasremarkedthathewouldsidewithPakistanintheeventofaconflictwiththeUnitedStates.[44]WhileKarzaicertainlydidnotexpresshispointverywell,hiscommentsstemfromthelegitimatepositionthattheAfghangovernmentisnotinterestedinawarwithPakistan,evenifitmeansupsettingitsAmericanbenefactor.ItwasanattempttodeescalateagrowingissueofinsecurityalongtheAfghanistan-Pakistanborder.[45]

UnderstandingwhyAfghanistan’spoliticalleadersbehavethewaytheydoiscriticaltocreatingpoliciesandplansthatwillworkmosteffectivelywiththem.Karzaiisrightnowinthemiddleofamajorpoliti-calcampaignbothwithinhisowncabinetandwiththemajorPashtunfiguresintheparliamenttobuild

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enoughsupporttofinishhisterm.OneofthewayshehasbeendoingthatisbyplayinguphisoppositiontotheU.S.campaigninAfghanistan:complainingaboutnightraids[46]andciviliancasualties.[47]WhenUSofficialspubliclyberatehim,KarzaicanfurtherhisargumentthatheisopposingtheUS,anditmakeshimlookweakintheeyesofhisAfghanrivals.ItsendsthemessagethatKarzaiisstilldependentontheU.S.,butalsoincapableofdoingthemanythingsUSofficialswanthimtodotostartcleaninguptheAfghangovernment.Itcreatesanintolerablesituation.

HamidKarzaimustnavigatedifficultdomesticpolitics.Afghanistandoesnothavethebenefitofstronginstitutions,sogovernanceisbasedonrelationshipsandpatronage:tradingfavorsorappointments,formoney.IntheWest,thispracticeisnormallycalledcorruption.

InAfghanistan,though“corruption”is,howthesystemworks.KarzaicouldnothaveremovedthewarlordIsmailKhanfromHeratin2004,forinstance,ifhehadn’tofferedKhanaministerialpositiontocompen-satehimforthelossofpowerandprivilege.[48]NorcouldhehavesimplywishedawayGulAghaSherzai’spredatoryruleofKandaharwithoutpromisinghimpower,money,andinfluenceelsewhere(inthatcase,theprovinceofNangarhar,whereSherzai isnowgovernor). [49]Withonly limitedpower tocoercehisrivals,andmoralsuasionoflimitedvalueinalandruledbyruthless,unsentimentalmen,patronage(orcorruption)isjustabouttheonlytoolanAfghanpresidenthas.

Meanwhile, theObamaadministrationhasvested itspolitical fortunes inanegotiated settlementwith theTaliban.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonsaidrecentlythatPresidentObama’s2010policyreviewemphasizedthat“ourcivilianandmilitaryeffortsmust supportadurableandfavorablepoliticalresolutionof thecon-flict.In2011,wewillintensifyourregionaldiplomacytoenableapoliticalprocesstopromotepeaceandsta-bilityinAfghanistan.”[50]

Yet, theObamaplanfornegotiationhasneglectedtoincorporateAfghanpoliticsintoitsnegotiationstrat-egy.MultiplegroupsofpoliticalAfghans,fromwithin

andwithoutthegovernment,arenoworganizingtoresisttheUS’sattemptstonegotiatewiththeTalibanbecauseAmericannegotiatorsarenotcognizantofAfghanpolitics.Manypro-governmentfiguresinAf-ghanistanhavebuilt lucrativepositions,homes,andcareers–theyareafraidof losingthat inasettle-ment.Asaresult,broadswathsofAfghanistan’spoliticiansareopposedtothecurrentnegotiationsbid.HamidKarzaihaspubliclycondemnedsomeaspectsoftheUSnegotiationspolicy.Hisgovernmenthasdeliberatelyunderminedotherattemptstostarttheprocess.[51]OppositiongroupshavealsorejectedtheUSnegotiationstrack:Inmid-2011alargerallyconvenedbyapreviouslyunheardofgroup,theNationalMovement,washeldinKabultoprotestthenegotiations.[52]

ManyAfghansrejecttheUSnegotiationstrackbecausethereisnoconsensusaboutwhatAfghanistanwilllooklikeafterthe2014withdrawal.Thatisbecausenoonehasevercreatedaviablepoliticalframeworkforthecountry.Thegoalofnegotiationsshouldn’tbeanendtoalldisputesinAfghanistan(sincethatisimpossible);itshouldinsteadbethecreationofapoliticalframeworkthatallowsAfghanstoworkouttheirdisputeswithoutresortingtoviolence.WhiletheUSsaysitisdoingthat,fromthepubliclydiscussedaspectsofthenegotiationsthereisnotalkofaframeworktomanagefuturedisputes–justademandthattheTalibanstopfighting.

TheUSapproachrejectspoliticalcontext,whichgoesa longway toexplainingwhypolicymakersstilldon’tunderstandhowAfghanistanworks.Withoutanappropriatepoliticalframework,anypolicywillfailtoengageproperlywithAfghanistan’spolitics–andthuswillnotendsuccessfully.

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4. A failure to planTheUSwarinAfghanistansufferedfromafailuretoenactplansthatmakesensetoregularAfghans.Thisfailingtookmanyforms:bybuildingschools,roads,andhospitalsbutnotprovidinganywaytosustainablymaintainthem;bycreatingacasheconomybutnotdevisingasystemofaccountabilitytolimitcorruption;andbysendingoutsiderstoadministercommunitiestheydidnotunderstand.

TheUShasfocusedmuchofitseffortoninfrastructuredevelopment.ThiswasmostclearlyarticulatedbyRoryStewart,thenrunningasmallNGOinAfghanistanandnowaBritishMemberofParliament.In2007,hemadeaboldsuggestionforhowtoapproachAfghanistan:“Towin[Afghans]overweshouldfo-cusonlarge,highlyvisibleinfrastructuretowhichAfghanswillbeabletopointin50years—justastheypointtothegreatdambuiltbytheUnitedStatesinthe1960s.”[53]

Itwasastartlingargument,especiallyconsideringtheessayarguedforcefullyforlimitingwesternambi-tionsinAfghanistan.TheUS-ledreconstructionofAfghanistanhasfocusedonvisible,easily-measuredconstructionprojectsbuthasneglectedwhateffectthoseprojectshavehad:domorepeopledrinkcleanwater,haveelectricity,accessmedicalcare,andlearntoread?Evenignoringboondoggleslikethe$400mil-liondollarinoperablepowerplantoutsideofKabul,[54]thereconstructionefforthasbeenmarkedmorebymagicalthinking,[55]unfoundedassumptionsaboutlocalneeds,[56]andpervasivecorruption.[57]

Despite the concerted effort to improve Afghani-stan, projects have faltered for predictable reasons.Theinternationalcommunityhasbuiltschoolswith-outtrainingorhiringteachers,[58]roadsthataretoodangerous to travel on because of insurgents andcriminals,[59]andhospitalswithoutdoctorsormedi-cine.[60]Itisdifficulttoarguethattheseprojectshavematerially helpedAfghans becomemore educated,travelmoreeasily,orgainaccesstobetterhealthcare.Similarly, it iseasytoseehowsuchpoorlyplannedprojects couldcreate resentmentand frustration inthecommunitiesthey’remeanttoserve.

The reason infrastructure projects didn’tmake anysense is because they were conceived backward.Building schools, roads, andhospitals is really justbuildingtheinputstoAfghanistan’sinfrastructure.Thetruemeasureoftheseinputsishowwelltheresult-inginfrastructureworks.Ifaschoolbuildinghasa“MadeinAmerica”signbutthecommunitydoesn’thaveteachersandcannotaffordbooks,itstandsnotasatestamenttoAmericangoodwillbuttoAmericanincompetence.Themeasureofeffectivenessforaschoolisnotbuildingitorfillingitwithchildren,butactuallyeducatingchildrenandimprovingliteracy.

Similarly,roadsthatcannotbeusedbecauseofillegalcheckpointsorhomemadebombsdon’treallyhelpcommunities.BasicroadtransportationalongAfghanistan’shighwaysremainsincrediblydangerous,[61]whichlimitspeople’sabilitytomovefreely.Despiteenormouseffortsatpavingroads,thoseroadshavedonepreciouslittletomateriallyimproveAfghancommunities.

Lastly,hospitalsthatdonotactuallytreatpatientsreallydon’thelpAfghansortheinternationalcommu-nity’simage.[62]MosthospitalsinAfghanistanstrugglewithbasics:enoughbeds,enoughmedicine,andmostimportantlyenoughdoctorsandnursestorunthemsafelyandeffectively.Buildinghospitalsisanimportantstepinprovidinghealthcaretothecountry,butwithoutalsotrainingmoremedicalpersonnelandkeepingthemproperlyresourcedtheeffortisnotjustwastedbutactivelyantagonistic.ItteasesAf-ghanswiththeprospectofhealthcarebutdoesn’tactuallyprovideit.

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Thepoorplanningisnotlimitedtoinfrastructure,however.WorldBankPresidentRobertZoellickwrotein2011ofthedesperateneedforAfghanstodeveloptheprivatesector:“Beyondsecurityandcorruption,obstaclesthatbusinessesfaceincludeexpensiveandunreliablepower,noproperlandregistrationsystem,andweaklegalstructures.”[63]

The ideaofdevelopingAfghanistan’seconomy isalmostasoldasOperationEnduringFreedomitself.Yet,despitespending$57billiononaidanddevelopment[64]andaneconomywithseeminglystrongag-gregatenumbers,[65]theAfghaneconomyrestsonshakyfoundations.Nearly90percentofthecountry’sgrowthcomesfromforeignaid.[66]Andfutureprospectsforgrowtharehobbledbythepervasivelackofelectricity.[67]TheKabulBankscandal,[68]whereinpowerfulAfghanslootedthebankofitsreservesandembezzledmorethan$1billion,demonstratedthehollownessattheheartoftheAfghangovernmentand

economy.Itisalmosthopelesslycorrupt,thankstoyearsof cash infusions by the international community thatwerenevermonitoredoraccountedfor.

Atthelocallevel,theAfghanistaneconomyisalmosten-tirely dependent on spending by the international com-munity, especiallyon securitymeasures. [69]While someareashavethrivingsmallbusinesses,[70]themomentinter-nationalmoneydriesup,theselocaleconomieswilllikelycollapse.[71]Therehasbeenalmostnoplanningforbuild-ing a normal economy inAfghanistan outside ofKabulandafewbigcities,andAfghanswillpaytheprice.

Thereisnoreasonforthistobethecase.Afghanistanhasthepotentialtohaveathrivingagriculturaleconomywithlimitedmanufacturingandmineralextractionindustriesaswell.Enablingthoseindustries,however,isnoteasy–itrequiresmanyyearsofhardworkbuildingtheinstitutionsthatgovernafunctioningeconomy:trustworthybanks,aworkingsmall-scalecreditsystem,sufficientsecuritytoensureafavorableinvestmentclimate,alegalframeworktoestablishasocialcontract,andsoon.Theinternationalcommunitysimplynevermadethedevelopmentoftheseinstitutionsapriority,whichleftAfghanistan’seconomyahollowedoutmess.

5. real success only matters over the long term IftheUSgovernmenthadplanned,in2001,onstayinginAfghanistanthrough2014,itwouldhavemadeverydifferentplansforthecountrythanwhathashappenedthelasttenyears.TheoldclichéaboutViet-nam–itwasnotaten-yearwarbutaone-yearwarfoughttentimes–appliestoAfghanistanaswell.Plan-ningcyclesrarelyaccountedforeventsmorethan12monthsintothefuture,whichmeansthelong-termconsequencesofanygivenpolicywerelargelyignored.

As soldiers arrive on the battlefields ofAfghanistan, they face enormous expectations to show “prog-ress.”Itisanimpossiblesituation:themilitary’scounterinsurgencystrategyrequires,byallaccounts,yearstoimplementandevenlongertosucceed.Yetofficersarepressured,bothbypoliticalconsiderationsinWashingtonandcommandexpectationsinKabul,toaccomplishbigobjectivesinveryshorttimeframes.Becauseit’srareforatourofdutytolastmorethan12months,commandersareseverelyconstrainedinwhatchoicestheycanmake.It’sdifficulttobeslowanddeliberatewhenonemustshowprogress,rightnow,intimeforaCongressionalhearingorastrategicreview.Thosepressuresconstrainincentivesandshapeday-to-daydecision-making.

ThevillageofTarokKolacheprovidesausefulexampleofhowpoliciesenactedwithaneyetowardtheshorttermcanunderminelong-termobjectives.OnOctober6,2010,LieutenantColonelDavidFlynn,

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chargedwithclearingthetinyvillageofTarokKolacheintheArghandabdistrictofsoutheastAfghanistan,calledin49,200poundsofrocketsandaerialbombs,levelingitcompletely.AccordingtoPaulaBroadwell,aformeradvisertoGeneralDavidPetraeus,Flynnbelievedthatthevillagewasemptyofciviliansandfullofexplosivetraps.TheTaliban,BroadwellrecountedforForeignPolicy.com,had“conductedanintimidationcampaign”tochaseawaythevillagersandpromptlysetupshopinsidethevillage.[72]

Inearlierattemptstoclearit,Flynn’sunithadtakenheavylosses,in-cludingmultipleamputationsfromhomemadeexplosivesandseveraldead.Hedecidedtheonlyreasonablewayto“clear”themine-riddledvillagewastobombittotheground.WhenTarokKolache’sresidentstried toreturn to thehomes their familieshadmaintained forgen-erations,theyfoundnothingbutdust.Flynnofferedthemmoneyforreconstructionandreimbursement,butgettingitrequiredjumpingalongseriesofbureaucratichoops,someofthemcontrolledbynotori-ouslycorruptlocalpoliticians.Flynn,andlaterBroadwell,declareditasuccess.

Eighteenmonthslater,thedecisiontodestroythevillagehasseveralconsequencesthatarestillbeingfeltinthearea.Immediatelyafterdestroyingthevillage,U.S.forcesreachedouttotheAfghanBorderPolice,runbyanotoriouswarlordnamedAbdulRaziq,forhelpinsecuringthearea.Raziqhasawell-establishedreputation forcorruptionanddrugsmuggling,andhumanrightsgroupsaccusehimofperpetratingamassmurder.[73]Evenifthatreputationisunwarranted,Raziq’sborderforcedidnothavelegaljurisdictiontouseforceinTarokKolache,accordingtoaCanadianformerembeddedmilitarytrainerwhoservedinKandahar.[74]InthispartofKandahar,Afghanforcesaregenerallyconsidereddestabilizingfactorsbecauseoftheirdisputeswiththelocalpeople.[75]

Inaddition,thereareotherseriousconsiderationsthatwilltakeyearstoplayout.ThedestructionofTarokKolachealsolaidwastetothenearbypomegranategroves,thevillage’sprimarysourceofincome.WhiletheUSforcesreplantedthegroveswithnewpomegranatetrees,theywon’tbebacktofullmaturity–whichisneededtogenerateincomeforthevillage–foranotherfouryears.ThedestructionofTarokKolachewillcontinuetohaveaneconomicimpactuntilatleast2016asaresult.TheUSalsoreorganizedsocialrelation-shipsintheareawhentheydecidedtoadministerreconstructionfundsthroughalocalAfghangovern-mentofficialinsteadofthetraditionalvillageelders.TheUSwas,ineffect,pickingnewwinnersandlosersinthevillage,anditisdifficulttopredicthowthatwillplayoutinthefuture.

MorganSheeran,aMasterSergeantwhotaughtat the Counterinsurgency Training Center inKabul,explainedthatdecisionsareoftenmadein the moment without understanding theirlong-term consequences. [76] Drastic policieslikedestroyingentirevillagesalsohavedrasticconsequences,andthereisverylittleconsider-ationgiventothelong-termeffectsofdecisions.

Another example of short-term needs out-weighinglong-termconsiderationsisthedevel-opmentoflocalmilitiagroups.Inthefirstfewyearsofthewar,USandAfghanpolicymakerswereworriedabout theeffectofAfghanistan’smany localmilitias.Thesemilitiashadcreateda lawlessenvironmentmanyblamedfortheriseoftheTaliban.EspeciallyaroundGulAghaSherzai’sKandahar,themilitiashadcreatedsuchadangerous,chaoticenvironmentthatthecitywelcomedtheTaliban’sviolent

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purge.Writing in1994,aWallStreetJournalreportersaidtheTaliban“weren’tsoscary”comparedtothosemilitias,andthattheTaliban“maybethebestthingthathashappenedtoAfghanistaninyears.”[77]

ManyAfghanswereterrifiedthattheremovaloftheTalibanwouldmeanthereturnofmilitias.WhiletheUSarmedsomemilitiagroupsintheearlydaysofthewar(includingSherzai’sKandaharmilitia),publicoutcryquicklyforcedittoabandonthepractice.[78]ItjoinedtheUNtoenacta$300milliondollarDisar-mament,DemobilizationandReintegration(DDR)program.[79]Theideawasthatmilitiafighterscouldbepersuadedtoputdowntheirweaponsandtakeupmoregainfulemployment.

TheDDRprogramneverreallyworked,however.StudiesshowsthattheDDRprogram’sfailuretoade-quatelyemploydemobilizedfightersledtohigh-er-than-beforelevelsofviolenceinsomepartsofthecountry–notfromtheinsurgencybutfromfightersangryabout thebrokenpromiseofde-mobilization.[80]Afollow-upprogram,Disarma-mentofIllegalArmedGroups(DIAG),“clearlyfailed to reach its stated goal” of disbandingarmedgroupsby2007becauseitneverreceivedthe funding or administrative support neededfortheprogramtosucceed.[81]

Evenaspolicymakersgrewfrustratedwiththeirinability to disbandAfghanistan’smilitias, theythought their 2007 success in Iraq was due tothesuccessfuluseofmilitias.Thus,whenhewasCENTCOMCommander in2008,GeneralDa-vidPetraeusannouncedhisintentiontobuilduptribalmilitiasinAfghanistantoreplicatethe“SonsofIraq”movementwestofBaghdad.[82]ISAFimplementedanumberofprogramsdesignedto“raiselocalmilitias”forcommunaldefensearoundthecountry.[83]

Theuseofmilitiastoachievesecuritygoalsthencamefullcircle.Onceagain,policymakersembracedtheideaoffightingthroughmilitias,eventhoughtheAfghanshadbeggedmilitaryleaderstodisbandthem.Inafewlocalizedcases,USmilitaryleadershadtriedtore-constitutelocalmilitias,butallofthemfailedtoachievetheirstatedgoals.[84]ThesemilitiaseitherdefectedtotheTaliban[85]orengagedinsuchrampantabusestheyweredisbanded. [86]DespiteahistoryoffailureandrejectionbythepeopleofAfghanistan,in2009theUSmilitary,undertheleadershipofGeneralsStanleyMcChrystalandDavidPetraeus,onceagainmadelocal,tribalmilitiasthecenterpieceoftheirstrategy.[87]

Thelocalmilitiastrategyhassecuredsomeareas,[88]butthesesamegroupshavealsoengagedinorga-nizedcriminalactivity.[89]AfghanandUSofficialshaveexpressedfearofthemilitias,[90]andreportsofabusearerampant.[91]Humanrightsgroupsaresteppingupcriticismoftheabuseinwhichthesegroupsengage.[92]Mostrecently,aprominentrapecaseresultingfromtheuseofthesemilitiasisraisingdoubtsaboutthewisdomofthepolicy.[93]Itremainsuncertainwhetherthesemilitiaswillcontributetosecurityorwhethertheywill“reset”Afghanistantothechaoticviolenceitexperiencedinthemid-1990s,whenthemilitiaswerelastoperatingwithoutaccountability.

Aseeminglysimpledecision,likebuildingalocalmilitiaordestroyingamine-ladenvillagecarriesseri-ouslong-termconsequences.Theseactionsfundamentallyalterthelocalbalanceofpower,elevatenew,unknownpeopletoleadership,andcontributetothecorruptionandabuseofpowerthattendstodriveAfghansintothearmsoftheTaliban.Yet,U.S.decision-makingstillseemsfocusedonsix-andtwelve-monthtimeframes,andthereisalmostnoplanningfortheconsequencesofthesedecisions.

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conclusionTheselessonsweidentifyalloverlap.MagicalThinking,thefirstandarguablymostimportantlesson,underpinsthesubsequentfourlessons.Thebotchedreconstructionprojects,thepoorlyplannedmilitias,theinexplicableassumptionsbehindcreatingachildren’stelevisionshowinacountrywheremostpeopledon’thaveelectricity–allofitismagicalthinking.

ThesefolliesalsodemonstrateafundamentalfailureonthepartofUSpolicymakerstograpplewithandunderstandAfghanistanandhowitfunctions.Italsohighlightsthelackoflong-termplanningandsuccessinthecountry.

Atitsmostbasic,thelessonweshouldreallylearnfromAfghanistanistheneedtoconstantlyrevisitone’sassumptions.

In2002, everyoneassumed thecountrywas safeandonlyneededreconstruction to returntonormalcyagain.By2006,theTalibanwascomingback,sopolicymakersassumedsendingmoretroopsintothemixwouldwork.Theymadeasimilarassumptionin2009,thoughthistimecoupledwithrhetoricabouthowcounterinsurgencywouldfundamentallyaltertheover-allstrategyandpolicy.

Noneoftheassumptionspolicymakersemployedinplanningforthewarmatchedtherealityofthewar.

Asaresult,theAfghanwarlurchedfrompolicytopolicywithoutanystrategicplantoensurealong-termsuccess.

Thisiswherethe5thLesson,SuccessOnlyMattersovertheLongTerm,applies.Indesigningaproperstrategy,youmuststartwiththedesiredendstateandworkbackwardfromtheretodevelopthemeansbywhichyouarriveatthatendstate.ThereisnoevidencethateithertheBushorObamaadministrationsactuallydidthat.

ThewarinAfghanistanhaslackedadefinable,achievable,measurablestrategyfromthemo-menttheTalibanfledKabulin2001totoday.

Internalizingthelessonswedrawoutabove–whichrequiresemployinggoodstrategicplan-ningandremainingflexible–willhelppolicymakersmitigatetheeffectsofpastmistakesasthisconflictwindsdownandavoidmakingthesesameerrorsinthenextone.

ThenewStrategicPartnershipAgreement,signedinMayof2012,outlinestheUS-Afghanistanrelationshipthrough2024.ItisanattempttothinkaboutAfghanistaninthelongterm:amuchwelcomedevelopment.ItisbythinkingaboutAfghanistaninthelongterm,andmakingplanstomatchthatlongtermfocus,thatpolicymakerscanputintoplaceprogramsthatwillsupportthecountryforthelongterm.

TheSPAhassomedrawbacks.

IttheISAFcoalitiontofundandsupporttheAfghansecurityforcesbutitdoesnotsayhow.TheAdministrationin2013willhavetoaskCongressforfundingeveryyear–andthesameistrueforeachNATOmemberstate.

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Thereisnoguaranteethatthisfundingwillcontinue,orthatsimplyfundinganAfghanmilitarywillresultinastable,Taliban-freegovernmentafteradecade.

However,theSPAisastepintherightdirection.Itatleastcreatesalongertimeframethan1-2years,whichistheperiodonwhichmostplanningforthewarhastakenplacesofar.

Thereremainsignificantchallenges.

TheUSremainsunder-engagedwithAfghanistan’spolitics–despiteimportantelectionscomingupduringthetransition,thereisalmostnodiscussionabouthowdifferentpoliticaloutcomeswillaffectthetransitionstrategy.Similarly,plansliketherenewedpushtospendhundredsofmillionsofdollarsonthefailedKajakidamprojectinHelmandprovincedemonstrateacontinuedrelianceonmagicalthinkingwhilemisunderstandingtheenvironment.

Thatiswhytheselessonsneedtobelearned.

Policymakersshouldnotcontinuetomakethesameplanswiththesamefaultswiththesamepoorlikelihoodofsuccess.Futureplansshouldbedefinableandachievable,devoidofmagicalthinkingbutalsomadewithaneyetowardlongtermsuccess.

DespitethehopefulchangetheSPAmarksinhowtheUSisrelatingtoAfghanistan,policymakersstilldesperatelyneedtoapplytheselessonstothetransitionstrategyandthefutureofUSopera-tionsintheregion.

Onlybyaddressingthesecriticalshortcomingscanthestrategyhaveanyhopeofsuccess.

Joshua Foust is the Fellow for Asymmetric Operations at the American Security Project

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Building a new American Arsenal

TheAmericanSecurityProject(ASP)isanonpartisaninitiativetoeducatetheAmericanpublicaboutthechangingnatureofnationalsecurityinthe21stcentury.

Gonearethedayswhenanation’sstrengthcouldbemeasuredbybombersandbattleships.SecurityinthisnewerarequiresaNewAmericanArsenalharnessingallofAmerica’sstrengths:theforceofourdiplomacy;themightofourmilitary;thevigorofoureconomy;andthepowerofourideals.

WebelievethatAmericamustleadothernationsinthepursuitofourcommongoalsandsharedsecurity.Wemustconfrontinternationalchallengeswithallthetoolsatourdisposal.Wemustaddressemergingproblemsbeforetheybecomesecuritycrises.Andtodothis,wemustforgeanewbipartisanconsensusathome.

ASPbringstogetherprominentAmericanleaders,currentandformermembersofCongress,retiredmilitaryofficers,andformergovernmentofficials.StaffdirectresearchonabroadrangeofissuesandengagesandempowerstheAmericanpublicbytakingitsfindingsdirectlytothem.

Weliveinatimewhenthethreatstooursecurityareascomplexanddiverseasterrorism,thespreadofweaponsofmassdestruction,climatechange,failedandfailingstates,disease,andpandemics.Thesame-oldsolutionsandpartisanbickeringwon’tdo.Americaneedsanhonestdialogueaboutsecuritythatisasrobustasitisrealistic.

ASPexiststopromotethatdialogue,toforgeconsensus,andtospurconstructiveactionsothatAmericameetsthechallengestoitssecuritywhileseizingtheopportunitiesthenewcenturyoffers.

www.americansecurityproject.org