Fisheries: an Ecosystem Approacharchive.nefmc.org/tech/ebfm workshop/A4469 - M...An ecosystem...

21 Governance for ResponsibleFisheries: an Ecosystem Approach

Michael P. Sissenwine and Pamela M. MaceNortheast Fisheries Science Center, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, USA

Abstract

The term, ‘responsible’ can be interpreted in many ways. For fisheries, we believe responsible meanssustainable production of human benefits, which are distributed ‘fairly’, without causing unacceptablechanges in marine ecosystems. Governance is broader than fisheries management. It consists of formaland informal rules, and understandings or norms that influence behaviour. Responsible fisheries requiresself-governance by the scientific community, the fishing industry and the public (including politicians), aswell as responsible fisheries management. An ecosystem approach to fisheries management, also knownas ecosystem-based fisheries management, is geographically specified fisheries management that takesaccount of knowledge and uncertainties about, and among, biotic, abiotic and human components ofecosystems, and strives to balance diverse societal objectives.

Much has been written about the principles that should underlie an ecosystem approach to fisheriesmanagement. The key elements of the approach should be: (i) goals and constraints that characterize thedesired state of fisheries and undesirable ecosystem changes; (ii) conservation measures that are precau-tionary, take account of species interactions and are adaptive; (iii) allocation of rights to provide incentivesfor conservation; (iv) decision making that is participatory and transparent; (v) ecosystem protection forhabitat and species of special concern; and (vi) management support, including scientific information,enforcement and performance evaluation. Fisheries ecosystem plans are a useful vehicle for designing andimplementing fisheries management systems that capture these six elements. Such plans should highlight ahierarchy of management entities, from an ecosystem scale to the local scale of communities; ocean zoning,including marine protected areas (MPAs) and other geographically defined management measures; andspecification of authorized fishing activities, with protocols required for future authorizations.

The scientific community needs to govern itself so that it produces scientific information that isrelevant, responsive, respected and right. A multi-faceted approach is needed, including monitoring offisheries and ecosystems, assessments and scientific advice tailored to management needs, and strategicresearch investments to improve monitoring and assessments in the future. One serious problem facingscientists is the controversial nature of assessments and scientific advice. This problem needs to beaddressed with a three-pronged strategy that calls for: separation of scientific institutions from manage-ment; collaborative research with the fishing industry; and transparent quality assurance of scientificadvice. The last-named requires peer review, which either can be integrated into the process of preparingthe advice (referred to as integrated peer review) or can be conducted following the preparation of theadvice (referred to as sequential peer review). The appearance of potential conflict of interest by peerreviewers is a factor in the credibility of the peer review process.

For an ecosystem approach for responsible fisheries, the fishing industry should govern itself to acceptresponsibility for providing fisheries information, embrace collaborative research, participate in the fisherymanagement process and live with the outcome, comply with regulations, avoid waste and develop train-ing to instil a responsible fishing ethic. Environmentalists and the public in general should also participate

© 2003 by FAO. Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem(eds M. Sinclair and G. Valdimarsson) 363

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in the fisheries management process and live with the outcome. Politicians should produce legislation thatis clear in intent and achievable within realistic funding levels. No one should make or condone ‘end runs’,which undermine fishery management decisions. All stakeholders should be respectful of otherstakeholders.

Introduction

The title of a paper should inform the readerabout its subject. However, the words usedto discuss governance, fisheries and ecosys-tems often are ambiguous. This problemreflects the mixture of scientific informationand personal values that relate to fisheriesand ecosystem issues, and the differingperspectives of the people involved in gover-nance. Thus, we begin this chapter with anelaboration on what the words in the titlemean, at least to us.

From our perspective, a fishery has threedimensions: the people who catch fish, thecapital and other inputs they use to fish, andthe fish populations that produce the fish thatare caught. A fishery may be defined nar-rowly (such as people from a specific port,using a specific gear, fishing a specific popula-tion of fish) or broadly (all of the people, gearand fished populations within a geographicarea that encompasses all of their activities).The more narrowly a fishery is defined, themore likely it is that interactions with otherfisheries will have an important influenceon it. Ecosystems include fisheries (humans,fishing inputs and fish populations), but theyalso have many more dimensions, such asthe physical and chemical environment, andunfished species. Ecosystems are usuallydefined by geographic area. The boundariesselected to define an ecosystem determine thedegree to which it is influenced by other eco-systems. Ecosystems that are isolated fromother ecosystems are referred to as ‘closed’.

This chapter considers fisheries as com-ponents of marine ecosystems because fisher-ies are influenced by marine ecosystems, andfishing affects the non-fisheries componentsof marine ecosystems, either directly or indi-rectly. We define an ecosystem approach tofisheries management, also known as ecosys-tem-based fisheries management, as follows:

An ecosystem approach to fisheriesmanagement (or ecosystem-based fisheriesmanagement) is geographically specifiedfisheries management that takes account ofknowledge and uncertainties about, andamong, biotic, abiotic and human compo-nents of ecosystems, and strives to balancediverse societal objectives.

An ecosystem approach uses knowledgeabout the relationship between fisheries andecosystems and, where knowledge is lacking,makes robust decisions in the face of uncer-tainty (such that the outcome is likely to beecologically benign, and unlikely to beirreversible).

Today, it is generally understood thatto conduct responsible fisheries, one mustalso be responsible about the effects on thenon-fishing components of ecosystems; butwhat does responsible mean? We think thereare four criteria that must be met for a fisheryto be considered responsible: it must be (i)sustainable; (ii) produce human benefits; (iii)have a ‘fair’ distribution of benefits; and (iv)not cause ‘unacceptable change’ in marineecosystems. Our four criteria for responsiblefisheries are consistent with the recommenda-tions of the first US National Conference onScience, Policy and the Environment (NCSE,2000), which called for sustainability that inte-grates economic security, ecological integrityand social equity.

Sustainability is virtually a universallyaccepted criterion. It means that a fisherypotentially can continue forever into thefuture, which requires that the fisheryresource population must continue to pro-duce fish. This is not a very restrictivecriterion, since even overfishing of a depletedresource often can be sustained indefinitely.However, the sustainability criterion isusually interpreted in association with thesecond criterion, that of producing humanbenefits. The second criterion is the reason

364 M.P. Sissenwine and P.M. Mace



for fisheries. It acknowledges that fisheriesare beneficial and, indeed, necessary for thesurvival of a large number of people. Evenwhere actual survival is not an issue, fisheriescontribute much to human welfare (as food,livelihood, recreation and for cultural rea-sons). Thus, we believe that responsiblefisheries should produce a high level ofhuman benefits on a sustainable basis, whichgenerally disqualifies overfishing. In fact, itimplies that the concept of maximum sus-tainable yield (MSY), which has often beencriticized (e.g. Larkin, 1977), is a useful foun-dation for responsible fisheries, as argued byMace (2001).

A ‘fair’ distribution of benefits is hardto quantify because fairness is in the eye of thebeholder (which is also true for quantifying‘responsible’). However, the fairness criterionacknowledges that people (both participantsin fisheries and non-participants) care aboutthe distribution of benefits. Caring aboutthe distribution of benefits is a logicalconsequence of all people having a stake inmarine ecosystems (ultimately, sustainabilityof the biosphere depends on the perceptionthat everyone has a stake). The moreclosely associated people are with marineecosystems (in terms of distance and activi-ties), the greater their sense of ownership.A sense of ownership makes it natural thatpeople care about who benefits. The criterionof a fair distribution of benefits will continueto increase in importance because the propor-tion of people who can benefit directly fromfishing will continue to decrease due tohuman population growth and advances infishing technology.

The unacceptable changes in marineecosystems referred to in the fourth criterionare not necessarily restricted to changesthat prevent fisheries from being sustainable(e.g. habitat destruction), or from producinga high level of benefits (e.g. stock depletion).There may also be other changes that peopledislike, such that the intangible (non-market)value of marine ecosystems is unacceptablyreduced.

The relative importance of the fourcriteria is subjective, and there may belittle agreement on the meanings of ‘fair’ and

‘unacceptable change’. However, it is ourobservation that individual perspectives withrespect to all four criteria are important inshaping debates and decisions about fisheries.Ultimately, all four criteria determinewhether or not people judge fisheries to beresponsible.

The final key word in the title thatneeds to be defined is governance. Fisheriesmanagement and governance are commonlythought of as synonymous, but governanceis broader. There are many definitions ofgovernance in the literature (e.g. Juda andHennessey, 2001). For the sake of simplicity,we think of governance as formal or informalrules, understandings or norms that influencebehaviour. To sustain fisheries and ecosys-tems, fisheries managers govern some of thebehaviour of the fishing industry. Sustain-ability also requires self-governance by thefishing industry. However, managers and thefishing industry are not the only humandimensions of fisheries systems. In addition,scientists, politicians and the public can eitherfoster or undermine the responsibleness offisheries, depending on how they govern theirown behaviour.

In the following sections of this chapter,we offer our views on an ecosystem approachto governance for responsible fisheries. We donot pretend to be experts on governance. Webase our opinions on decades of experiencesat the interfaces of science, fisheries manage-ment, politics and public opinion. The secondsection focuses on key elements of fisheriesmanagement that are necessary for res-ponsible fisheries in an ecosystem context.The third section discusses institutionalarrangements for an ecosystem approachto fisheries management, including the con-cepts of fisheries ecosystem plans (FEPs) andocean management areas (OMAs). The fourthsection emphasizes the importance of a well-governed scientific enterprise as an underpin-ning of responsible fisheries, while the fifthsection calls for self-governance by the fishingindustry and the sixth calls for behaviour bypoliticians and the public that is conduciveto responsible fisheries. We conclude in thelast section with some thoughts on futuregovernance challenges.

Governance for Responsible Fisheries 365



Elements of an Ecosystem Approachfor Responsible Fisheries

Management

There are many scientific papers and com-mittee reports on exploitation of ecosystemsthat are applicable to fisheries management.Over two decades ago, Holt and Talbot(1978) stated seven principles that called formaintaining ecosystems at a desirable state,including safety factors in decisions, avoid-ing waste of non-target species, and resourceassessments preceding resource use (see Box21.1 for a more complete statement of the

principles). Holt and Talbot’s principles wererevisited and revised by a meeting of morethan 40 international scientists (Mangel et al.,1996) as indicated in Box 21.2. The EcosystemPrinciples Advisory Panel (1999), establishedas a mandate of the USA Magnuson–StevensFishery Conservation and Management Act,recommended seven principles and six poli-cies for achieving the overarching goal of eco-system health and sustainability (Box 21.3).Some of the key principles acknowledgedthat predictability is limited, that diversity isimportant and that ecosystems have thresh-olds and limits which, if exceeded, can result


Box 21.1. Holt and Talbot’s (1978) principles for conservation of wild living resources.

1. The ecosystem should be maintained in a desirable state such thata. Consumptive and non-consumptive values could be maximized on a continuing basis;b. Present and future options are ensured; andc. The risk of irreversible change or long-term adverse effects as a result of use is minimized.2. Management decisions should include a safety factor to allow for the fact that knowledge is limitedand institutions are imperfect.3. Measures to conserve a wild living resource should be formulated and applied so as to avoidwasteful use of other resources.4. Survey or monitoring, analysis, and assessment should precede planned use and accompanyactual use of wild living resources. The results should be made available promptly for critical publicreview.

Box 21.2. Holt and Talbot’s (1978) principles, as revised by Mangel et al. (1996).

Principle I. Maintenance of healthy populations of wild living resources in perpetuity is inconsistentwith unlimited growth of human consumption of and demand for those resources.

Principle II. The goal of conservation should be to secure present and future options by maintainingbiological diversity at genetic, species, population and ecosystem levels; as a general rule,neither the resource nor other components of the ecosystem should be perturbed beyondnatural boundaries of variation.

Principle III. Assessment of the possible ecological and sociological effects of resource use wouldprecede both proposed use and proposed restriction or expansion of ongoing use of aresource.

Principle IV. Regulation of the use of living resources must be based on understanding the structureand dynamics of the ecosystem of which the resource is a part and must take intoaccount the ecological and sociological influences that directly and indirectly affectresource use.

Principle V. The full range of knowledge and skills from the natural and social sciences must be broughtto bear on conservation problems.

Principle VI. Effective conservation requires understanding and taking account of the motives,interests and values of all users and stakeholders, but not by simply averaging theirpositions.

Principle VII. Effective conservation requires communication that is interactive, reciprocal andcontinuous.



in structural changes that may be irreversible.Some of the key policies called for applyingthe precautionary approach, making incen-tives compatible with goals and promotingparticipation and fairness.

Another set of recommendations wasproduced by the Committee on EcosystemManagement for Sustainable Marine Fisheriesof the USA National Research Council (NRC,1999). It recommended: (i) conservativesingle-species management; (ii) incorporatingecosystem considerations into management;(iii) dealing with uncertainty; (iv) reducingexcess fishing capacity and assignment ofrights; (v) using marine protected areas(MPAs) as part of a suite of tools for managingfisheries; (vi) taking account of by-catch anddiscards; (vii) effective institutions for fisher-ies management; and (viii) better information.These recommendations are noteworthybecause they (i) do not call explicitly for eco-system management (which might have beenexpected, given the name of the Committee)and (ii) do call for single-species managementapproaches, albeit conservative.

While our scientific understanding offisheries and marine ecosystems has

advanced tremendously, we now acknowl-edge that we cannot manage ecosystems.Even with perfect knowledge, humans canonly control what humans do. We have onlyan indirect influence on other components ofecosystems. With limited knowledge relativeto the complexity of ecosystems (e.g. as indi-cated in Fig. 21.1, from Link, 1999), which islikely to be the case for the foreseeable future,there will be a high degree of uncertaintyabout the magnitude of indirect influence.However, we have learned enough to pre-dict often the directionality of perturbations,which is a valuable scientific foundation for anecosystem approach.

There is another important aspect of theevolution in our thinking about fisherieswithin an ecosystem context. It often hasbeen argued that we need an ecosystemapproach because single-species fisheriesmanagement has failed to prevent undesir-able outcomes, such as depleted fish stocks.It is now recognized that these undesirableoutcomes usually result from the failure toapply the scientific advice being given basedon single-species approaches. There is noinherent reason why the scientific advice for


Box 21.3. Principles, goals and policies recommended by the Ecosystems Principles AdvisoryPanel (1999).

Principles

• The ability to predict ecosystem behaviour is limited.• Ecosystems have real thresholds and limits which, when exceeded, can effect major system

restructuring.• Once thresholds and limits have been exceeded, changes can be irreversible.• Diversity is important to ecosystem functioning.• Multiple scales interact within and among ecosystems.• Components of ecosystems are linked.• Ecosystem boundaries are open.• Ecosystems change with time.

Goals

• Maintain ecosystem health and sustainability.

Policies

• Change the burden of proof.• Apply the precautionary approach.• Purchase ‘insurance’ against unforeseen, adverse ecosystem impacts.• Learn from management experiences.• Make local incentives compatible with global goals.• Promote participation, fairness and equity in policy and management.



sustainable management of single-speciesfisheries should in general be inconsistentwith an ecosystem approach (although itmight be in specific situations).

Thus, the NRC (1999) Committee onEcosystem Management for SustainableMarine Fisheries emphasized conservativesingle-species management as a key elementof an ecosystem approach. It stated that

. . . a significant overall reduction in fishingmortality is the most comprehensive andimmediate ecosystem-based approach torebuilding and sustaining fisheries andmarine ecosystems.

In a similar vein, Hall’s (1999) book onThe Effects of Fishing on Marine Ecosystems andCommunities emphasized this point with asection in the concluding remarks of thebook entitled ‘Reduce effort, reduce effort,reduce effort’. The Commission on FisheriesResources of the World Humanity ActionTrust (WHAT, 2000) makes the same point.It states that applying

. . . less complex single-species models andreversing the tendency towards risk-pronedecisions could make a substantial differenceto effectiveness of the management effort.This is likely to be much more cost effectivethan the information-hungry, and thereforecostly, ecosystem models that would beneeded.

All of the groups cited above (theNRC Committee, WHAT and the EcosystemsPrinciples Advisory Panel) highlighted theproblem caused by the tradition of openaccess to fisheries (i.e. where anyone canfish) and risk-prone fisheries managementdecisions (i.e. to err toward overfishing ratherthan conservation) in the face of uncertainty.The problem is illustrated in Fig. 21.2 fromSissenwine and Rosenberg (1993). It is thereason that rights-based allocation of access tofisheries and the precautionary approach areimportant elements of responsible fisheries(see the discussion below).

There are numerous other publishedstatements of goals, principles, indicators


Fig. 21.1. Species and links for a northwest Atlantic food web. The boxes are (1) detritus and (2)phytoplankton, and the circles represent higher trophic levels, either species or species groups, with 81being humans. The left side of the web generally contains pelagic organisms, and the right and middlerepresents more benthic or demersal organisms. Reproduced from Link (1999).



and approaches for an ecosystem approachto fisheries management (e.g. Gislasonet al., 2000; Murawski, 2000; Pajak, 2000;Pitcher, 2000; Mace, 2001). Based on the scien-tific literature, and our own experiences,we believe an ecosystem approach to aresponsible fisheries management systemshould include:

• Goals and constraints that characterizethe desired state of a fishery, and unde-sirable changes in ecosystems (includingthe human dimension) that fisheriesshould not be allowed to cause.

• Conservation of fisheries resources that isprecautionary, takes account of speciesinteractions, and is adaptive.

• Allocation of fishing rights in a mannerthat provides incentives for conservationand efficient use of living resources.

• Decision making that is participatory andtransparent.

• Ecosystem protection for habitat, andfor species vulnerable to extinction or

deemed by society to warrant specialprotection.

• Management support that providesscientific information, enforcement andperformance evaluation.

The matrix in Table 21.1 indicates therelationship between the above elements ofa system for responsible fisheries manage-ment and the four criteria for responsiblefisheries specified in the Introduction.Note that five of the six elements of thefisheries management system (i.e. otherthan ecosystem protection) are necessaryfor single-species fisheries management.However, they are implemented differentlyfor an ecosystem approach. The similaritybetween single-species fisheries managementand an ecosystem approach should not bea surprise. As noted above, more rigorous(usually more cautious) application of single-species methods is an important step towardan ecosystem approach, and realistically wecan only move to an ecosystem approach


Fig. 21.2. The causes and consequences of the ‘race for the fish’. Re-drawn from Sissenwine andRosenberg (1993).



incrementally. Next, we discuss each of theelements.

Goals and constraints

The purpose of fisheries management is toachieve societal goals. There are many waysto state goals, such as in terms of net eco-nomic benefits, food production, recreationor employment, or a combination. The goalmay be to provide a livelihood for a specificsegment of society, such as coastal communi-ties, or to provide subsistence to people wholack other options. Some goals may meanforgoing a large proportion of the potentialtotal economic benefits, but this is legitimatein the context of responsible fisheries thatrecognize the need for a fair distributionof benefits (assuming there is societalagreement on what is fair).

Goals are not useful to guide fisheriesmanagement unless they are accompanied byconstraints that specify the ‘price’, in terms ofecosystem or social change, that is unaccept-able. Some constraints are almost universallyagreed, such as the premises that speciesshould not be driven to extinction, and thatecosystems should not be changed irre-versibly. Society may also agree on otherconstraints, such as the premise that marinemammals should be protected (as required bylaw in some countries, but not others), or thattraditional participants in fisheries should notbe displaced.

There is great flexibility in the goalsand constraints for responsible fisheries since

responsibility is subjective. However, goalsand constraints must be stated clearly for theother components of the fisheries manage-ment system to be effective.

Conservation of fisheries resources

The direct effect of fisheries on fisheriesresources is through fishing mortality, whichcan be expressed as the annual fractionof a population removed by fishing (theexploitation rate). There are many examplesof fisheries removing more than half ofthe exploitable fish in a population annually(sometimes much more). With today’sdemand for fish, and modern technologyfor catching fish, responsible fisheries usuallyrequire measures to control fishing mortality.The main issues are: what should the fishingmortality rate be? and how should it becontrolled?

Fishing mortality rates

Biological reference points are used by fisher-ies scientists to guide fisheries managementin terms of the fishing mortality rate andthe future size of fisheries resources that fish-eries management measures are intended toachieve. There is a vast scientific literatureon biological reference points (e.g. Mace,1994) to achieve a high sustainable yield(such as the MSY), including recent work thatsuggests precautionary reference points andcontrol rules to make the precautionaryapproach operational (e.g. Restrepo et al.,1998). The precautionary approach is a key


Sustainable Human benefits FairNo unacceptable

changes to ecosystems

Goals and constraintsConservation of fisheries resourcesAllocation of fishing rightsDecision makingEcosystem protectionManagement support

XXX

XX

XXX

X

X

XX

X

XX

XXX

Table 21.1. Matrix showing the relationship between elements of a fisheries management system(rows) and criteria for responsible fisheries management (columns). The elements of fisheriesmanagement may all help to fulfil the criteria for responsible fisheries management, but only the mostimportant relationships are indicated in the matrix.



element of the United Nations Agreement forStraddling Fish Stocks and Highly MigratoryFish Stocks (United Nations, 1996) and theFAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fish-eries (FAO, 1995a). FAO (1996) described theprecautionary approach as the applicationof prudent foresight, taking account ofthe uncertainties in fisheries systems, andthe need to take action with incompleteknowledge. A more complete description isgiven in Box 21.4.

Simply stated, the precautionary approachmeans that, when in doubt, err on the sideof conservation. The bottom line from thescientific literature on fishing mortality ratesand international policies on the precaution-ary approach is that: (i) the fishing mortalityrate should be limited to the rate that couldproduce the MSY (i.e. FMSY) if the resourcepopulation size is large enough; (ii) the targetfishing mortality should be lower than thelimit to take account of scientific uncertainty;and (iii) the target might be reduced furtherwhen the resource population size is smallerthan the size required to produce the MSY.We refer to this approach as a precautionaryfishing mortality rate strategy. At this point,our description of the strategy is only basedon single-species considerations, not an eco-system approach. However, as emphasized

by Mace (2001), reducing fishing mortalityrates below single-species FMSY levels formost, if not all, harvested species would be asubstantial first step towards satisfying manyof the commonly stated ecosystem objectives,such as maintaining ecosystem integrity andbiodiversity.

There is also a vast literature thataddresses trophic (e.g. predator–prey) inter-actions between species (e.g. Daan andSissenwine, 1991; Sissenwine and Daan, 1991;Link, 1999; Hollowed et al., 2000). It is clearthat trophic interactions have a great dealof influence on the dynamics of fisheriesresources, but we usually lack predictivemodels that can be used quantitatively toadjust fishing mortality rates to take accountof these interactions. Ecosystems may be socomplex (for example, see Fig. 21.1), that itis unrealistic to expect models to be capableof generating realistic predictions. However,this is not an excuse to ignore speciesinteractions.

We believe that an ecosystem approachfor responsible fisheries management requ-ires taking account of trophic interactionsin a precautionary fishing mortality ratestrategy. One way of taking account of inter-actions is to keep fishing mortality rates low sothat perturbation of the trophic web is small.


Box 21.4. Description of the precautionary approach according to the technical consultations of theFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1996).

The precautionary approach involves the application of prudent foresight. Taking account of theuncertainties in fisheries systems and the need to take action with incomplete knowledge, it requires,inter alia:

• consideration of the needs of future generations and avoidance of changes that are not potentiallyreversible;

• prior identification of undesirable outcomes and of measures that will avoid them or correct thempromptly;

• that any necessary corrective measures are initiated without delay, and that they should achievetheir purpose promptly, on a time scale not exceeding two or three decades;

• that where the likely impact of resource use is uncertain, priority should be given to conserving theproductive capacity of the resource;

• that harvesting and processing capacity should be commensurate with estimated sustainable levelsof resource, and that increases in capacity should be contained further when resource productivityis highly uncertain;

• all fishing activities must have prior management authorization and be subject to periodic review;• an established legal and institutional framework for fishery management, within which management

plans that implement the above points are instituted for each fishery; and• appropriate placement of the burden of proof by adhering to the requirements above.



Pauly et al. (1998) highlight the problem ofperturbing ecosystems by fishing down thetrophic food webs. Given our current stateof understanding of ecosystems, it seemsprudent to avoid disproportionate impacton any trophic level.

In order to take account of trophicinteractions, trophic information should besummarized, and used to identify the mostimportant interactions. Which species havethe greatest influence on other speciesthrough predation? Which species are themost important prey species? For importantprey species, it may make sense to considermodifying the precautionary fishing mortal-ity rate strategy so that a high prey speciesabundance is maintained. For importantpredators, it is less clear how to adjust theprecautionary fishing mortality rate strategy.Predatory species play an important rolein stabilizing ecosystems (Pace et al., 1999),but they may also reduce the productionof species lower in the trophic web. Thus,the advice that no trophic level shouldbe impacted disproportionately is probablyappropriate for important predators.

After considering information on trophicinteractions, it may be concluded that forsome species the precautionary fishing mor-tality rate strategy should be adjusted, or theconclusion may be that given our current stateof understanding, no changes are justified. Webelieve that either outcome may be justifiable,depending on the specific situation, so long asall of the fishing mortality rates are low, toensure that the food web is not seriouslyperturbed (thus making the approach robust).

An ecosystem approach also needs totake into account environmental variabilitythat affects the productivity of fisheriesresources (Steele, 1996; Mantua et al., 1997). Itis now known that there can be extended peri-ods (decades or more) where environmentalconditions either favour, or do not favour,production by certain fish populations.Favourable periods for some populationsoften will be unfavourable for others. Thus,a fishing mortality rate strategy that is pre-cautionary during favourable periods maynot be sustainable when the environment isunfavourable. Also, efforts to rebuild a popu-lation to the size that is required to produce

the MSY with a favourable environmentmay be unrealistic when the environment isunfavourable. Thus, the precautionary fishingmortality rate strategy must be flexible sothat management can adapt to changes inproductivity of fisheries resources, even ifthe linkage to environmental change isunclear or unknown.

There is another aspect of the precaution-ary approach that needs to be reflectedin responsible fisheries management. Somerefer to it as a change in the burden of proof(Sissenwine, 1987; Dayton, 1998; EcosystemPrinciples Advisory Panel, 1999). Holt andTalbot (1978) captured it in one of their princi-ples, which called for resource assessments toprecede resource use. Traditionally, fisherieshave been permitted without restriction untilthere is evidence that they cause unacceptableimpacts. A responsible approach to fisheriesmanagement would require all fishingactivity to be authorized. An analysis ofthe risk of a fishery having an unacceptableimpact should be conducted prior to authori-zation. This will usually require research,which could include a scientifically designedexperimental fishery, prior to authorizationof a full-scale fishery. The Commission forthe Conservation of Antarctic Marine LivingResources (CCAMLR) has adopted a protocolfor collecting information in an experimentalor exploratory mode, prior to authorizing afishery.

The standard of evidence that a fisherywill not cause an unacceptable impact shouldbe commensurate with the severity of the riskof making a mistake. Making the standard toorigid (such as ‘beyond any shadow of doubt’)would virtually always prohibit human bene-fits from fishing, which would not constituteresponsible fisheries management, accordingto our definition.

Control measures

Many types of control measures are available,such as setting a total allowable catch (TAC),limiting the amount of fishing effort (e.g.days of fishing), controlling the size of fishthat are caught, applying time and area clo-sures, and restrictions on fishing gear type.There are advantages and disadvantages




of each method (some are discussed bySissenwine and Kirkley, 1982). In general, thecontrol measures do not matter with respectto the responsibleness of fisheries manage-ment, so long as there is adherence to thefollowing criteria. They must:

• result in the precautionary fishingmortality rate strategy being fulfilled;

• not cause unnecessary or unacceptableharm to the ecosystem (such as allowingdestructive fishing practices); and

• not cause an ‘unfair’ distribution ofbenefits.

There is one type of control measurethat has been highlighted as particularly wellsuited to an ecosystem approach to responsi-ble fishing. MPAs (Agardy, 1994; Bohnsackand Ault, 1996; Roberts, 1997) are a form ofthe time-area closures that have been usedas fisheries control measures for decades.However, MPAs are usually thought of aspermanent, year-round closures. Advocatespoint out that MPAs protect biodiversity, aswell as the resource species that are the targetsof fisheries. They may also provide some

degree of robustness to uncertainty aboutfish populations and the effectiveness ofother types of fisheries management controlmeasures.

There are many examples of the appli-cation of MPAs in fisheries management,although the closures rarely have beenlabelled MPAs. Year-round closures of largeareas on Georges Bank off the northeast coastof the USA (Fig. 21.3) have been an importantpart of fisheries management plans torebuild once severely overfished groundfishpopulations, and the results are very promis-ing (Murawski et al., 2000). However, theselarge closed areas or MPAs are only part ofthe control measures that have been necessaryto prevent overfishing and begin rebuild-ing the depleted populations. Limits werealso placed on the days per year thatvessels could fish, such that the total fishingeffort was cut in half. Lauck et al. (1998) andHannesson (1998) showed that for MPAsto be relied on entirely as a managementcontrol measure, they would have to beunrealistically large (perhaps 70–80% of thetotal fishing grounds).


Fig. 21.3. Large closed areas on Georges Bank and surrounding areas off the northeast coast of theUSA.



Allocation of fishing rights

One reason that MPAs may not be effectiveon their own is that many of today’s fisheriesare characterized by such high levels of over-capacity (in terms of inputs such as capitaland labour) that area closures may simplyresult in displacement of fishing effort, notan overall reduction in fishing effort. In fact,overcapacity frequently has been highlightedas one of the key factors threatening thelong-term viability of exploited fish stocksand the fisheries that depend upon them(e.g. Mace, 1997). If the overcapacity problemcould be solved, overfishing would probablybe a non-issue or, at worst, a spatially or tem-porally local issue. However, overcapacityhas proved extremely difficult to control inthe absence of systems that allocate fishingrights.

There are many reports (some of themare cited in the previous section of thischapter) that emphasize the importance ofallocating fishing rights. WHAT (2000) givesa useful overview, which is the basis of thediscussion that follows.

The amount of fish that a fishery can catchon a sustainable basis is shared by the partici-pants in the fishery. The traditional manner inwhich their share is determined is by com-petition. Individual fishing boats (in small-scale fisheries it may be individual peoplewithout boats) compete to catch as largea share of the available fisheries resourcesas possible. This situation is often referred toas ‘the race for the fish’. Total costs increase(due, for example, to people competing bybuying more expensive boats and fishinggear) but, since the total amount of fish avail-able to be caught does not increase, profitsdecline. This behaviour of spending more inthe race is rational from the perspective of anindividual, but it does not make sense for thefishery overall.

The race for the fish also encouragesoverfishing. Since the amount of catch thatfisheries resources can sustain varies as aresult of environmental fluctuations, eventu-ally, a fishery that is marginal under mostenvironmental conditions will face economiclosses when the catch needs to be reduced

(regardless of the cause – whether it wasoverfishing or natural environmental varia-bility). The fishing industry usually resistsregulations that decrease catch becausethis will increase their losses in the shortterm, even though it will be beneficial inthe long term. From the industry’s perspec-tive, there will be no future in the fisheryif they cannot pay their bills in the shortterm. Also, even if they remain in the fishery,they risk having to compete with evenmore fishing capacity in the future andtherefore they may not benefit from cut-ting their catch now. When pressured by thefishing industry to give more considerationto short-term financial losses, rather thansustaining fisheries resources and long-term economic benefits, fisheries managersoften yield to the pressure, particularlywhen faced with uncertain scientific informa-tion (i.e. perhaps a cut is not really neces-sary?). Making risk-prone decisions (relativeto the condition of a fisheries resource) inthe face of scientific uncertainty and pres-sure from the fishing industry becomes avicious cycle that ultimately makes mattersworse for the resource and the fishingindustry (Fig. 21.2).

The solution to this problem is to assignrights to shares of the fishery. With rights,participants in the fishery have an incentiveto use their right efficiently (i.e. to producethe greatest value at the lowest cost), and toconserve its value for the future.

Governance systems that assign rightsto shares of a fishery can take many forms.The systems are characterized by the natureof the shares in the fishery, the types of entitiesthat hold rights and rules about transferabilityof rights. Shares can be in the form ofan amount of catch, units of fishing effort(e.g. days of fishing or numbers of traps),or an exclusive geographic area and timeperiod where fishing is allowed. The sum ofall of the shares must not result in overfishing.Shares that are specified as effort units orfishing areas and time periods where fishingis allowed are not as effective at eliminatingthe race for the fish as shares specified asan amount of catch, but they may haveother advantages (e.g. greater acceptance by




the fishing industry, and greater ease ofenforcement). There may be additionalrules, such as size limits, gear restrictions orclosed areas, that apply to all shareholders inthe fishery.

Rights may be assigned to individuals,corporations, communities or other groups ofpeople. The type of entities assigned rights isalso important in ending the race for the fish.In an ideal system, individuals should have noincentive to race. Corporations have internalgovernance rules such that they use theirshares for the common good of the corpora-tion (i.e. they use their shares as if they werean individual). Communities (or other groupsof people) may be cohesive enough, or havesufficient internal governance mechanisms, touse their shares for the common good of thecommunity, although this is not necessarilythe case.

Options for the transferability of rightsto shares in a fishery range from totallyprohibiting rights to be transferred, toallowing transfers without restrictions.Allowing transferability tends to increaseeconomic benefits, but it might also acceler-ate social changes that could be deemedundesirable.

One form of rights-based fisheries man-agement that is increasing in popularityis known as individual transferable quota(ITQs). There is little doubt that ITQs effec-tively eliminate or alleviate the incentives forthe race for the fish. They are now appliedin several countries, including Iceland, NewZealand, and parts of the USA and Canada,Australia, Namibia and Chile. ITQs probablyare not a practical option for most small-scalefisheries in developing countries, and alsoin many fisheries in developed countries,because of the complexity of multispecies fish-eries, limitations of the scientific informationneeded to set catch quotas, difficulties withenforcement, and the large number of peopledependent on fisheries. While ITQs havesome theoretical advantages over otherrights-based approaches, we believe that evenimperfect rights-based approaches are betterthan the systems promoting the race for thefish that still exist in most fisheries throughoutthe world.

Decision making

Responsible fisheries management requiresmany decisions about goals and objectives, aprecautionary fishing mortality rate strategy,a rights-based allocation method that isdeemed to be fair, and avoidance of unac-ceptable changes in ecosystems. As notedabove, many of these decisions are subjective.Therefore, stakeholders need to have theopportunity to participate in the decision-making process and they need to be ableto understand the basis for decisions. Stake-holders include the fishing industries (thereare usually several segments of the industrywith different perspectives, including thoseinvolved with recreational fishing), environ-mentalists with concerns about the effects offishing on ecosystems, and anyone who isinterested in the distribution of benefits.There are many papers that highlight theimportance of participatory fisheries man-agement decision making (e.g. Pinkerton,1992; Jentoft and McCay, 1995; Sen andNielsen, 1996).

There are also many different types ofarrangements for stakeholders to participatein decision making, ranging from having theopportunity to comment before final deci-sions are made, to having input into the initialstages of decision making where options arebeing formulated, to delegation of manage-ment authority to some stakeholders to makesome of their own decisions. We believe thatresponsible fisheries management requires asmuch participation in decision making as ispractical, recognizing that, ultimately, a man-agement authority (e.g. government officialsor a council of stakeholders) must be chargedwith weighing the options and making adecision.

Some authors (e.g. Jentoft, 1989;Pinkerton, 1989) advocate almost totally dele-gating decision-making authority to the locallevel of communities. This approach makesdirect use of local knowledge, with manage-ment decisions that are made locally beingmore likely to be accepted (and adhered to)than rules imposed from a distant (imper-sonal) decision-making authority. However,there is an inherent limit to the type of




decision-making authority that can be dele-gated to communities, particularly from anecosystem perspective.

Ecosystems and fisheries resource popu-lations usually cover large geographicareas. Conservation measures and ecosystemprotection needs to be effective over the entirerange of resource populations and the area ofecosystems. They usually are impacted by theactivities of many local communities. There-fore, the authority delegated locally mustbe constrained by management measuresand ecosystem protection that applies overentire ecosystems. Local decision-makingauthority is likely to be limited to communitydecisions about implementation of higherlevel decisions. Communities may also beallocated rights to shares of a fishery, whichthey can then manage.

One purpose of participatory andtransparent decision making is to garnerthe broadest possible support for decisions.However, there will usually be some par-ticipants in the process who are unhappywith the outcome. Responsible fisheriesmanagement requires that even those whodislike decisions are nevertheless boundby them.

Unfortunately, there are situationswhere unhappy participants gather thepolitical strength to over-rule the dulyconstituted decision-making process, oftenwith disastrous consequences. The USANational Research Council (NRC, 1997)concluded that this phenomenon, which itreferred to as an ‘end run’, was a cause ofthe collapse of the New England groundfishfisheries. More recently, the ‘end run’ hastaken another form. It has become commonin the USA for participants in the fisheriesmanagement decision-making process to seekto overturn decisions using litigation, some-times over trivial matters or legal techni-calities, in our opinion (as non-lawyers).At present, the US National Marine FisheriesService is coping with more than 100legal actions attempting to overturn fisher-ies management decisions. In almost allcases, the litigating parties actively par-ticipated in the debates leading up tothe decision, but they disagreed with theoutcome.

Ecosystem protection

This element of the fisheries managementsystem goes beyond the conservation mea-sures that are applied to conserve the fisher-ies resource populations that are the targetsof fishing. Fisheries also depend on habitat.Habitat is the place where fish live. Itsphysical, chemical and biological characterdetermines how favourable it is for produc-tion. From a fisheries perspective, our imme-diate concern is the habitat of the fisheriesresources. There are also other aspects of eco-systems that society wants to protect fromunacceptable effects of fishing; in particular,species of special concern that are not targetsof fishing. We discuss protection of habitatand species of special concern below.

Protection of habitat

Fish may occupy habitat as an option (i.e. it issuitable for them, but they can be productivein other habitats) or because it is essential forthem to be productive. We refer to the latteras essential fish habitat (which is also a termused in the USA Magnuson–Stevens FisheryConservation and Management Act). It is rarethat we know definitively which habitat isoptional and which is essential, but we thinkthere are some common-sense approaches toidentifying the habitat that is most likely to beessential.

In some cases, there is research to demon-strate preference for a specific type of habitatwith a reasonable scientific explanation forwhy that habitat is preferred. For example, thecoarse bottom area with high vertical relief onthe northern edge of Georges Bank has beenidentified as preferred habitat for juvenilecod, because it provides protection frompredators. There are also situations where aparticular life stage of a species is known toconcentrate in a particular type of habitat thatis uncommon compared with other types ofhabitats. We think information like this (i.e. ascientific rationale for why one type of habitatis likely to be more important than another, orempirical evidence that a particular type ofrelatively uncommon habitat is heavily usedby a species) is a useful basis for identifyingthe places and habitat types that are most




likely to be essential. An important part of anecosystem approach to responsible fisheriesmanagement is to identify essential fishhabitat so that it can be protected from threats.

There are many potential threats tohabitat, including fishing (Hall, 1999 providesa comprehensive overview of the topic; theUSA National Research Council currently isreviewing the topic and will issue its reportsoon). Mobile bottom-fishing gear clearlyimpacts some habitat types. Particular habitattypes may be more vulnerable to the effects offishing than others. Coral reef habitat is partic-ularly fragile. Certain habitat changes may notmatter to most species (the suitability of thehabitat may not be changed), but it seemslikely that other changes caused by fishingwill be harmful to many species. Therefore,we think that responsible fisheries manage-ment requires that essential fish habitatbe protected from fishing activity that has thepotential to make the habitat less suitable.This may mean changing the fishing activityso it is more benign, or it may mean prohibit-ing the activity from areas identified asessential fish habitat.

There are many other threats to habitat.Boesch et al. (2001) give an overview of theproblem of marine pollution in the USA. Theyidentify toxins, bio-stimulants, oil, radioactiveisotopes, sediments (including bottom alter-ations by dredging, and sand and gravelextraction), plastics and other debris, noise,human pathogens and alien species as formsof pollution. All of these can cause habitatdegradation. Management of the humanactivities that are responsible for these formsof pollution is not within the scope of fisheriesmanagement, but is within the scope ofgovernance of marine ecosystems overall.The fisheries management system can iden-tify the threats for particular ecosystems, andparticipate as stakeholders in the decision-making processes for regulating the activitiesthat threaten ecosystems from a fisheriesperspective.

Protection of species of special concern

There are some species in marine ecosystemsthat society does not want to be harmed byfisheries. Here we are referring to species that

fisheries do not intend to catch, but thatmay be taken incidentally (as by-catch). Fish-eries may also harm them by adversely affect-ing their habitat or reducing the abundanceof their prey. The rationale for protectingthem varies. In some cases, they are vulner-able to extinction, which is almost universallyaccepted as a reason for protection (notethat there are 180 parties to the Conventionon Biological Diversity). Other species maybe deemed by society (for whatever reason)to merit special protection (e.g. marine mam-mals in the USA and some other countries),regardless of their population status.

An ecosystem approach to responsiblefisheries management requires information onthe fishing activities that have the potential toharm species of special concern so that theycan be protected. To protect them, there mayneed to be area–time restrictions on fishing, orprohibitions on certain types of fishing activi-ties. The precautionary fishing mortality ratestrategy may need to be adjusted to ensurethat the prey of a species of special concernremains abundant (or that other predators arenot too abundant). The abundance of the preymay only be important in the vicinity of thespecies of special concern, such as within theforaging range of land-based predators (e.g.seals and penguins in the Antarctic).

Management support

Fisheries management depends on scientificinformation. It is ineffective unless there iscompliance with fisheries management rules(conservation measures, allocation rules andrestrictions for ecosystem protection). Fish-eries management needs to evaluate its ownperformance in order to be responsible.

Scientific information on which manage-ment depends needs to be:

• relevant by providing the type of infor-mation that is needed in a form thatfisheries managers can use, and thatstakeholders can understand;

• responsive by being timely;• respected (i.e. credible), which means that

it must be perceived to be unbiased, andbased on science conducted according




to high scientific standards, includingquality assurance; and

• right, which requires an investmentin research and appropriate data, inaddition to high scientific standards andquality assurance.

We discuss the governance of thescientific activity that is necessary to fulfilmanagement needs later in this chapter.There are also aspects of scientific informationthat depend on the fishing industry, and theseare discussed in a later section on theirself-governance.

Compliance with fisheries managementrules requires either rules that the fishingindustry believes in, such that most of theindustry willingly comply and they do nottolerate non-compliance by others in theindustry; or enforcement capability and suffi-ciently severe penalties to force compliance.Obviously, the former is preferable. Wealso consider compliance and enforcementfurther in the section on self-governance bythe fishing industry.

Performance evaluation is a valuableelement of a fisheries management systembecause it is a way of learning fromexperience, so that management can beimproved. FAO (1999) discusses indicators ofsustainability for fisheries. Such indicatorscan serve as the basis for performanceevaluation.

Institutional Arrangements foran Ecosystem Approach to

Fisheries Management

Most countries have legislation that autho-rizes management of the fisheries withintheir jurisdiction. The Magnuson–StevensFishery Conservation and Management Actis the primary fisheries management legisla-tion in the USA. It established eight regionalFishery Management Councils (FMCs) toprepare fishery management plans (FMPs)consistent with broad policy requirements.The Act is noteworthy because it capturestwo important elements of an ecosystemapproach. It institutionalizes participatoryfisheries management since the members of

the FMCs are drawn from stakeholders inthe fisheries (i.e. from commercial andrecreational industries, state and federalgovernment officials, environmental interestsand other members of the public). The FMCsalso have responsibility for all fisherieswithin geographic areas that are of reason-able size to define ecosystems, and to managemost fisheries as a whole.

The historical and legal basis of interna-tional fisheries management was reviewed byJuda (1996). The foundation of internationalfisheries management is the Convention of theUnited Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea (Law of the Sea Convention – LOSC),which has now been ratified or acceded toby 132 countries. An important provision ofLOSC is recognition of national jurisdictionover the waters within 200 miles of their coasts(know as exclusive economic zones; EEZs).This makes most fisheries subject to nationaljurisdiction, although there are importantfisheries that operate on the high seas, andthere are many transboundary resources withgeographic distributions in more than oneEEZ, or straddling an EEZ and the high seas.

In 1995, the application of the LOSCto fisheries was strengthened by the UnitedNations Agreement on the Conservationand Management of Straddling Fish Stocksand Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The Agree-ment proclaims the right of all countries tofish on the high seas, but it also establishesa general obligation to cooperate in theconservation and management of straddlingfish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.It highlights the role of Regional FisheryManagement Organizations (RFMOs) as vehi-cles for cooperation in conservation andmanagement. The Agreement also adoptsthe precautionary approach.

Another important international agree-ment for responsible fisheries management isthe FAO Agreement to Promote Compliancewith International Conservation and Manage-ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on theHigh Seas, adopted in 1993 (FAO, 1995b).The agreement specifies the responsibilities ofcountries for high seas fishing vessels flyingthat country’s flag. The agreement makes itharder for fishing vessels to avoid complyingwith international fisheries management




measures by ‘re-flagging’ to a country thatdoes not require its vessels to comply.

In addition to these binding legalagreements for international fisheriesmanagement, there are several non-bindingagreements that establish expectations aboutresponsible conduct in fisheries. The mostsignificant of the non-binding agreementsis the Code of Conduct for ResponsibleFisheries (FAO, 1995a). The Code establishes19 general principles (an abbreviated versionfrom Edeson, 1999, is given in Box 21.5)which include prevention of overfishingand excess fishing capacity, conservation ofecosystems, application of the precautionaryapproach, transparency in decision making,and decisions based on the best scientificevidence available. Several non-bindingInternational Plans of Action (IPOAs) havealso been adopted by the FAO to promote

implementation of the Code, includingan IPOA for the Management of FishingCapacity, and one to prevent illegal, unre-ported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Thesenon-binding agreements are referred to as‘soft governance’, and Edeson (1999) con-cludes they are a useful instrument for achiev-ing responsible governance of fisheries. Animportant aspect of the Code and the IPOAs isthat they apply to fisheries within nationaljurisdictions, in addition to fisheries on thehigh seas.

There are numerous additional inter-national treaties, agreements and otherarrangements that are part of the governanceframework for fisheries and ecosystems.Weiskel et al. (2000) catalogue and summarize123 arrangements that involve the USA,which is only a fraction of the total numberof arrangements that exist worldwide. Of


Box 21.5. Abbreviated version of the General Principles (Article 6) of the Code of Conduct forResponsible Fisheries (from Edeson, 1999).

• Conserve aquatic ecosystems, recognizing that the right to fish carries with it an obligation to act in aresponsible manner.

• Promote the interests of food security, taking into account both present and future generations.• Prevent overfishing and excess capacity.• Base conservation and management decisions on the best scientific evidence available, taking into

account traditional knowledge of the resources and their habitat.• Apply the precautionary approach.• Develop further selective and environmentally safe fishing gear, in order to maintain biodiversity,

minimize waste, minimize catch of non-target species, etc.• Maintain the nutritional value, quality and safety in fish and fish products.• Protect and rehabilitate critical fisheries habitats.• Ensure fisheries interests are accommodated in the multiple uses of the coastal zone and are

integrated into coastal area management.• Ensure compliance with and enforcement of conservation and management measures and

establish effective mechanisms to monitor and control activities of fishing vessels and fishingsupport vessels.

• Exercise effective flag state control in order to ensure the proper application of the Code.• Cooperate through subregional, regional and global fisheries management organizations.• Ensure transparent and timely decision-making processes.• Conduct fish trade in accordance with the principles, rights and obligations established in the World

Trade Organization Agreement.• Cooperate to prevent disputes, and resolve them in a timely, peaceful and cooperative manner,

including entering into provisional arrangements.• Promote awareness of responsible fisheries through education and training, as well as involving

fisheries and fish farmers in the policy formulation and implementation process.• Ensure that fish facilities and equipment are safe and healthy and that internationally agreed

standards are met.• Protect the rights of fishers and fish workers, especially those engaged in subsistence, small-scale

and artisanal fisheries.• Promote the diversification of income and diet through aquaculture.



particular importance for implementing anecosystem approach to responsible gover-nance are 34 organizations with responsibilityfor providing scientific information on fisher-ies and/or for managing fisheries (referredto as regional fisheries bodies, RFBs), and13 Regional Seas Conventions (RSCs). Theseorganizations have geographic responsibilityas indicated in Fig. 21.4. The RSCs are broadframework agreements that could serve as anumbrella for an ecosystem approach to fisher-ies within their geographic jurisdictions but,in general, they have not been consideredfisheries management organizations.

Since ecosystems are defined geographi-cally, an ecosystem approach to responsiblegovernance of fisheries requires managementinstitutions or arrangements that are definedgeographically. Accordingly, Sherman (1994,and in several other papers and books)and Sherman and Alexander (1993) proposed49 large marine ecosystems (LMEs), cover-ing coastal waters that account for mostfisheries production, as logical units forresearch and governance. Juda (1998) andJuda and Hennessey (2001) discuss aspects ofthe governance of LMEs.

However the geographic areas usedfor management are labelled, they must be

sufficiently large to encompass reasonablyself-contained ecosystems and fisheriesthroughout their range. Following theproposal of the Ecosystem Principles Advi-sory Panel (1999), we believe that fisheriesecosystem plans (FEPs) are useful vehicles fordesigning and implementing an ecosystemapproach to responsible fisheries manage-ment. Our vision of an FEP would address theelements of the fisheries management systemdescribed earlier in this chapter (thus, itwould differ from the outline given by theEcosystem Principles Advisory Panel).

Three key elements of an FEP that wewant to emphasize are:

• Decision-making processes. We proposethat a hierarchy of management entitiesshould be formed from the ecosystemscale to more local scales, such as com-munities. The primary role of the local-scale entities should be to implement theFEPs locally. Local entities can also beuseful to represent the views of peoplewithin their local jurisdiction during thedevelopment of the FEPs.

• Ocean zoning. An ecosystem approachshould make use of several geographi-cally defined management measures.


Fig. 21.4. Jurisdictions of Regional Marine Fisheries Bodies (see Appendix for definitions of acronyms).Reproduced from FAO (2001).



MPAs could be one part of an ocean zon-ing plan. There may also be geographi-cally defined management measures toprotect habitat or species of special con-cern, or to separate competing segmentsof the fishing industry (including recre-ationalists). Certain areas might be setaside for aquaculture or research. Oceanzoning should also take into accountalternative, non-fisheries-related uses ofthe oceans, such as aquaculture, research,oil and gas exploration, ocean mining,dredging, ocean dumping, energy gener-ation, ecotourism, marine transportationand marine defence.

• Authorized fishing activities. The planshould state specifically what type offishing activities are allowed, and theprotocols (e.g. data collection require-ments, qualifying criteria and applica-tion procedures) for getting a new typeof fishing activity authorized.

The geographic areas covered by FEPsmay be embedded within even larger areas(i.e. they may be part of an even larger hierar-chy). Such an arrangement generally will beuseful for dealing with interactions betweenecosystems (which are never entirely closed).However, it will also mean that FEPs mustadhere to policies established higher-up in thehierarchy, which will generally be the case. Inthe USA, FEPs developed by Fishery Manage-ment Councils will have to adhere to theNational Standards of the Magnuson–StevensFishery Conservation and ManagementAct, and international FEPs will have toadhere to LOSC and other internationalagreements, such as the Convention onBiological Diversity (CBD).

Gislason et al. (2000) considered oceanmanagement areas (OMAs) as potentially use-ful management units. They also proposed ahierarchical approach. We interpret the con-cept of OMAs as broader than FEPs. The for-mer addresses the management of all humanactivities that affect ecosystems within the areaof an OMA. FEPs apply only to the manage-ment of fisheries, although they should describethreats from other human activities and howfisheries stakeholders ought to try to influencemanagement of these other activities.

Ideally, there should be integrated man-agement of all human activities that affect eco-systems for entire OMAs. This will be hard toachieve since the responsible governmentagencies and legal authority for differentactivities (e.g. fishing, oil and gas exploration,and dredging) are almost always independ-ent. Nevertheless, all entities responsible formanaging the activities that affect an OMAshould make arrangements to plan and coor-dinate their management together, in the formof an OMA ecosystem plan (OMAEP). Even ifthe plans are non-binding, they could be auseful form of soft governance. This wouldbe consistent with the ecosystem protectionelement of an FEP, which deals with threatsfrom human activities other than fishing.

Governance of the ScientificCommunity

It is the responsibility of the scientific com-munity to govern itself so that it producesscientific information that is relevant, respon-sive, respected and right (we refer to thesecharacteristics as the ‘four Rs’). What is neededis a multifaceted approach that includesscientific institutions that are designed to: (i)collect the scientific data that underpin fisher-ies management, especially long time seriesmonitoring fisheries resources and ecosys-tems and the performance of fisheries; (ii)conduct assessments and provide scientificadvice tailored to the needs of management;and (iii) strategically invest in research toimprove (i) and (ii). All three elements arecritically important. Today’s fisheries man-agement advice depends on time series of sci-entific data that were begun years or decadesago. Progress toward a more comprehensiveecosystem approach in the future depends onstrategic research investments today, in orderto advance understanding of trophic inter-actions, fish habitat and other relevant con-cerns. Assessments tailored to the needs ofmanagers are required to be relevant andresponsive.

We believe that responsible governanceof science requires ‘firewalls’ between thefunds for monitoring, for strategic research




and for assessments, so that pressure to domore of one activity (usually assessments)does not jeopardize the others. However,we do not believe in isolating the scientistsinvolved in these three activities. To do sowould mean that: (i) the scientists conductingstrategic research would lose touch withwhat is needed to be relevant; (ii) the scientistswho conduct assessments would be less likelyto have the cutting-edge scientific skillsrequired for research; and (iii) neither groupof scientists would appreciate the strengthsand weaknesses of the monitoring datathey use, nor would the scientists collectingthe data understand the requirements forthe data to be useful. Therefore, we believethat governance of science for responsiblefisheries requires scientific institutions thatare to perform all three elements. We likenthese scientific institutions to combinedteaching–research hospitals that conductresearch, maintain health care infrastructureand treat patients.

One of the most serious issues facing thescientific community, and governance of fish-eries, is controversies over assessments andscientific advice. These controversies shouldcome as no surprise. Thompson (1919) expres-sed the problem well when he said ‘proof thatseeks to modify the way of commerce andsport must be overwhelming’. More recentcalls for a precautionary approach shift theburden of proof, but they do not eliminatethe tendency for those who disagree withmanagement decisions to challenge scientificadvice. In fact, the tendency for today’smanagers to make tough decisions in theface of uncertain scientific information mayintensify some of the controversies.

Today, it is routine for scientific adviceon fisheries management to be challenged(by environmentalists, the commercial fishingindustry, recreational anglers and subgroupsof any of these). In some cases, these contro-versies have led to accusations about theobjectivity of scientific advice, as exemplifiedwhen Hutchings et al. (1997) asked the ques-tion ‘Is scientific enquiry incompatible withgovernment information control?’ Sissenwineet al. (1998) described similar challenges tothe objectivity of scientific advice for manage-ment of western Atlantic bluefin tuna.

We believe that a three-pronged strategyis necessary to deal with the all too commonlack of respect for scientific advice. Ourstrategy calls for: (i) separating scientific insti-tutions from management; (ii) collaborativeresearch with the fishing industry; and (iii)transparent quality assurance of scientificadvice. Each element of this strategy is dis-cussed below. We also warn about a loomingcrisis regarding controversies over scientificadvice.

Separating scientific institutionsfrom management

The rationale for this element of the strategyis that it is common for opponents of fisheriesmanagement decisions to call for ‘independ-ent’ science. The opponents are implying thatmanagers have a management agenda withwhich they disagree, and that the managersare influencing the scientific advice to gettheir way. In our experience, these percep-tions are not valid, but separating scientificinstitutions from management will help toeliminate them as a basis for underminingfisheries management decisions.

There is usually some degree of bothintegration and separation between scientificinstitutions and management. At some orga-nizational level, they are integrated becausethey are part of the same government ordepend on funds that the government con-trols. At a lower organizational level, they areindependent, because scientists are usuallysupervised by other scientists, not managers.In order for scientific advice to be morecredible, we envisage that scientific institu-tions should be separate from managementat least at the organizational level where man-agement decisions initially are made (usuallythey will require approval at a higher level).

Of course, separating scientific institu-tions from the managers could make thescientific institutions less responsive tomanagement needs. To avoid this problem,managers will need to influence scientificpriorities through budget and funding mech-anisms. Budget control clearly influencespriorities, but it is less likely to lead to the




perception of an influence over results (i.e.the advice) than from supervisory control.Budget control, rather than supervisorycontrol, is consistent with the trend towardquasi-independent businesses or privatiza-tion of scientific institutions, such as thatwhich has occurred in some countries(e.g. New Zealand, Australia, the UK andSpain). However, care must be taken not toallow this trend to go so far that it createsexcessive competition between organizationsbidding on contracts to provide scientificadvice, to the extent that cooperation andcommunication are inhibited. Also, in manycircumstances (e.g. small countries), it is noteconomical for there to be more than oneorganization large enough (e.g. with aresearch vessel) to serve as the backbone forproviding scientific advice. Thus, there maybe an important advantage to having a‘preferred provider’ for scientific advice.

Collaborative research with thefishing industry

Lack of respect for scientific advice oftenreflects a lack of understanding of scientificmethods by the fishing industry, and thefishing industry’s belief that it has usefulknowledge that is ignored by scientists.Collaborative research between scientistsand the fishing industry can help to addressboth problems. To realize its full potential,we believe that the collaboration must:

• be collaborative throughout (i.e. withrespect to defining objectives, planningstudies, implementing studies andanalysis);

• foster open-mindedness and a willing-ness to compromise between scientistsand the fishing industry (i.e. participantsshould not expect to do business asusual);

• ensure that scientists and the fishingindustry are both willing to accept thatthe other may be ‘right’, e.g. scientistsmay have to accept that there may reallybe more fish than they had estimated;

• ensure that the fishing industry hasrealistic expectations, e.g. it must

understand that an assessment thatdepends on a time series of relativeabundance data cannot be replaced by asingle collaborative survey; and

• acknowledge that there must be suffi-cient financial and personnel resourcesto conduct collaborative research, inaddition to ongoing research conductedby scientists, not as a substitute. Muchnecessary research cannot be donewithin a collaborative mode.

Many collaborative research projectshave been undertaken recently. The approachhas become common off the northeastern USAand in Atlantic Canada. The New Zealandexperience with collaborative research isexamined by Harte (2001).

Transparent quality assurance ofscientific advice

There are three primary approaches toimproving the quality and credibility of sci-entific information. They are: (i) certificationof scientists; (ii) use of standard practices; and(iii) peer review. Licensing of medical doctorsand engineers are examples of certification.There are many examples of using standardpractices, such as material standards forbuilding a bridge, procedures for calibratingscientific instruments and criteria for pre-scribing diagnostic medical tests. Certifica-tion and standard practices usually areapplied when scientific methods are appliedroutinely (i.e. the operational end product ofresearch). In situations where research hasnot ‘matured’ to the stage where there is aconsensus on criteria for certification and/orstandard practices, peer review is the mostcommon option for quality assurance. Insome cases where the scientific problem isdifficult or the cost of making a mistakeis high, peer review is applied even whenpractitioners are certified and there arestandard practices, such as when a ‘secondopinion’ is sought for a difficult medicaldiagnosis of a potentially grave illness.

Peer review generally is expensiveand time consuming relative to the othertwo approaches. However, it is the primary




quality assurance mechanism used to governthe preparation of scientific advice for fisher-ies management.

Peer review is a process where the workof scientists is reviewed by other scientists,who are themselves qualified to have per-formed the work (i.e. they are peers). The mostwell known form of peer review is the processused by scientific journals to determinewhether papers merit publication. However,this approach is not practical for mostscientific advice for fisheries management. Italso lacks the transparency that we think isneeded to increase the credibility of scientificadvice. However, there is a high price to bepaid for transparency, as is discussed below.

There are two common forms of peerreview of scientific advice for fisheries man-agement. We refer to them as either integratedor sequential. Integrated peer review is car-ried out while the scientific work is beingconducted. The peer reviewers work with thescientists who take the lead in conductinga scientific study. The reviewers have inputinto numerous decisions that are made asintermediate steps in conducting the study.In general, peer reviewers are not formallyidentified, but they are the individualswhose job description does not include thesubject of the scientific study being con-ducted. Sequential peer review is conductedby peer reviewers after the initial assessmentand scientific advice has been prepared. Itsprimary purpose is to either accept or rejectthe assessment and scientific advice. Oftenthe sequential peer review is able to refine theinitial assessment and scientific advice. Thesequential reviewers or the review paneladopt the assessment and scientific adviceas their own (thus taking responsibility for it).This is clearly a different role from the seq-uential peer reviews conducted for journalpublications.

There are advantages and disadvantagesof integrated and sequential peer reviews.Advantages of integrated peer reviews arethat they are timely, the reviewers gain anin-depth understanding of the scientific studyunder consideration and their expertise can beused effectively to improve the quality of thescientific work (rather than criticizing it after ithas been completed). The disadvantage is that

peer reviewers may be overwhelmed or domi-nated by the scientists primarily responsiblefor the scientific work. The advantage ofsequential peer review is that the reviewershave greater independence. The disadvan-tages are that this type of peer review takesextra time and often it is impractical orimprudent for peer reviewers to correct workthat they think is unsound (e.g. when the peerreviewers lack sufficient detailed knowledge).We believe that both forms of peer reviewshould be used.

Both integrated and sequential peerreviews are usually conducted in a relativelytransparent manner (certainly more transpar-ently than journal reviews). The identity ofparticipants is almost always known. Short-comings of the scientific work that is underreview are usually made public (whereas thecomments of journal reviewers are not), and itis common for there to be observers of the peerreview process.

The advantage of transparency is thatit enhances stakeholders’ understanding ofthe scientific advice. It should also increaseconfidence in the integrity of the process (i.e.that participants are acting objectively). Thedisadvantages are that: (i) participants in theprocess may be reluctant to be forthcomingwith scientific opinions; (ii) points of discus-sion during meetings may be misinterpretedor misused to serve agendas of interestgroups; and (iii) meetings might becomeexcessively long or unruly.

Another aspect of peer review thataffects the credibility of scientific advice is theappearance of a potential conflict of interest.Peer reviewers should be unbiased (i.e. nomotives for being for or against the scientistsand the scientific activities and products theyare reviewing).

A perfectly unbiased review is difficultto achieve, but there are obvious factors thatincrease at least the appearance, if not thereality, of bias. These factors are: (i) the associ-ation between the reviewers and the scientistsbeing reviewed (e.g. are they colleagues, col-laborators or part of the same organization?);(ii) financial considerations (e.g. will the out-come of the review influence the reviewers’financial opportunities in the future?); (iii) theimplication to the prestige of the reviewer of




the scientific work being reviewed (e.g. willacceptance of the work under review castdoubt on the past work of the reviewer?); and(iv) control over reviewers (e.g. can their orga-nizational superiors influence their reviewso that the outcome is more consistent withorganizational objectives or policy agendas?).The more controversial the issue, the moreimportant it is that there be no appearance ofpotential conflict of interest.

A looming crisis

The scientists who provide advice on fisher-ies management must have an unusualcombination of scientific skills, the desire toapply scientific results to policy decisionsand willingness to give advice in the face ofa high degree of uncertainty (to ‘go out ona limb’). The willingness to give scientificadvice, in the face of high uncertainty, isan essential element of the precautionaryapproach, which is now recognized asnecessary for an ecosystem approach toresponsible fisheries management.

However, because scientific adviceincreasingly is being subjected to criticism(sometimes non-constructive or even per-sonal), litigation and externally mandatedpeer reviews that inevitably highlight short-comings, even when the advice is generallysound, there are strong disincentives to beingresponsive to fisheries management needs. Ofcourse, scientists should expect their work tobe reviewed critically but, for most scientists,this is done in private with non-fatal flawsquickly forgotten (e.g. when a manuscript issubmitted for publication), rather than in apublic forum where the results of reviewssometimes attract so much attention thatthey are reported in the news media. Thoseopposed to fisheries management based onthe scientific advice often focus on minorshortcomings, or areas that could beimproved, while ignoring the fact that thereoften is overall endorsement of the scientificadvice.

At what point will the personal aggrava-tion and professional risk of becomingthe focal point of controversial fisheries

management decisions lead scientists to playit safe by not giving advice in the face of uncer-tainty? If this happens, will managers closedown fisheries in the face of uncertainty(as some will argue is required by the precau-tionary approach), or will they presume thatfisheries management is not needed (as someothers will argue), since there is no scientificadvice indicating there is a problem? Eitherextreme outcome is a looming crisis thatmight eventuate if current trends continue.Clearly, it is preferable to put in place institu-tions and processes that provide scientificadvice that is responsive, respected and right.

Self-governance by theFishing Industry

The fishing industry increasingly recognizesthat it must govern itself in an appropriatemanner for there to be responsible fisheries.Fishing industry organizations in Canadahave initiated preparation of their own codeof conduct for responsible fishing. In theUSA, the New England Fishery ManagementCouncil established a Committee on Respon-sible Fishing. We want to highlight severalimportant roles that the fishing industry canplay in an ecosystem approach to governancefor responsible fisheries. We hope the fishingindustry will do the following.

• Accept responsibility for providing fish-eries information (including yield, effort,biological and economic data). This maymean that the fishing industry mustabsorb some cost (such as paying forshoreside weighouts, at-sea observers orsome interference with their normal wayof doing business).

• Embrace collaborative research alongthe lines described in the previous sec-tion of this chapter. The industry mayalso need to absorb some of the costs forcollaborative research.

• Be informed participants in the fish-eries management decision process, andaccept the outcome (i.e. no ‘end runs’).

• Comply with fisheries management reg-ulations and not tolerate violations byothers. In order to make regulations




enforceable, the fishing industry shouldaccept that there may be some inter-ference with its normal way of doingbusiness.

• Avoid waste and destructive fishingpractices.

• Be respectful of other stakeholders.• Develop training programmes or

apprenticeships to help instil a res-ponsible fishing ethic.

Politicians and the Public:Behaviour that is Conducive

to Responsible Fisheries

The behaviour of the public, including envi-ronmentalists and politicians, can be eitherconducive to, or a barrier against, responsiblefisheries. We hope that:

• the public will consist of informedparticipants in the fisheries managementdecision process, and accept the outcome(i.e. no ‘end runs’);

• the public will be respectful of otherstakeholders;

• politicians will produce legislation thatis clear in intent and achievable withinrealistic funding levels – otherwise, thelegislation invites costly litigation; and

• politicians will not condone ‘end runs’.

Unfinished Business:Future Challenges

We realize that much of our description ofgovernance for an ecosystem approach forresponsible fisheries is not new. For example,there has been considerable recent progressin applying the precautionary approach,defining essential fish habitat, protectingspecies of special concern, making fisheriesmanagement more participatory and trans-parent, conducting collaborative researchand applying peer review to scientificadvice. In some places, managers are proudof the progress they have made towardsan ecosystem approach (e.g. Witherell et al.,2000, for Alaska).

However, the progress that has beenmade should not be taken as a signal thatenough has been done. We want to use thisconcluding section of our chapter to highlightthe governance challenges (in some casesdaunting) that we think need more attention.

Rights-based allocation of sharesin fisheries

We think this is a critically importantchallenge facing fisheries managers. Theneed for rights-based allocation to resolveentrenched problems related to harvestingovercapacity has been well known fordecades, yet rights are either non-existent orineffective for most of the world’s fisheries.We believe that the failure to apply rights-based allocation approaches is a symptom ofnot paying enough attention to the transitioncosts (economic, social and political) inassigning rights (WHAT, 2000). Ironically,traditional fishing rights once existed inmany fisheries throughout the world, butthese have been eroded over time. Whilethese traditional rights are unlikely to besufficient today, they may serve as a usefulstarting point to re-establish rights, especiallyin developing countries where millions ofpeople who are critically dependent onsmall-scale fisheries are in jeopardy.

Rights-based allocation or freedomof the high seas?

The need for rights-based allocation appliesto all fisheries, yet international law treatsfisheries on the high seas as a global com-mons with access open to all. Miles (1998)points out the dilemma and concludes that‘. . . the days of high seas fishing as a freedomof the high seas are numbered . . .’

The general approach to dealing with thedilemma is to form regional fisheries organi-zations, and to expect all countries fishingwithin the region to join. However, once theinitial members of the regional fisheries orga-nizations have allocated shares in the fisheryamong themselves, they often are reluctant to




give up a ‘slice of the pie’ to new members.Thus, prospective new members can eitherjoin with prospects of only getting a smallshare, if any, or they can continue to fish with-out joining, claiming that they are exercisingtheir high seas freedom. At least two regionalfisheries management organizations cur-rently are trying to cope with this dilemma:the International Commission for Conser-vation of Atlantic Tunas and the NorthwestAtlantic Fisheries Organization.

Clearly, creative solutions are needed. Itseems to us that either members of fisheriesmanagement organizations must be willing togive up a reasonable share of their allocations,or it will be necessary to support Miles’prophecy.

Dispute resolution

Even if the dilemma above is solved, there isanother threat to the effectiveness of regionalfisheries management organizations. In most(maybe all) cases, members that dislike man-agement decisions are not bound by them ifthey ‘object’. This is a form of the ‘end run’.Fortunately, objections are rare, but couldbecome more common as tensions rise withpotentially more members competing for a‘slice of the pie’. We think that responsiblefisheries management requires a practicaldispute resolution mechanism to pick thewinner and loser in a dispute. Leavingthe dispute unresolved usually means thefisheries resource loses.

Management of deep-sea fisherieson the high seas

These fisheries are increasing, particularly onmid-ocean ridges and on seamounts. How-ever, little is known about the fisheries andthe ecosystems that contain them, except thatthey are almost certainly fragile (Koslowet al., 2000). We believe that a responsibleapproach to fisheries management requiresthat all fishing activity be authorized and thatan analysis of the risk of a fishery havingan unacceptable impact should be conducted

prior to authorization. This is not the case formost of the deep-sea fisheries that are devel-oping on the high seas. Many of these fisher-ies are not subject to any existing fisheriesmanagement authority, except for the generalprovisions of LOSC. In general, they are notstraddling or highly migratory fish stocks.We think the international community needsto address this apparent gap in the currentinternational fisheries management system,perhaps by developing an internationalinstrument capable of designating deepwaterareas as ‘marine protected areas’.

Develop mechanisms for coordinatingalternative and potentially conflicting

uses of ocean areas

As mentioned previously, there are manyalternative uses of the ocean, including har-vesting marine species for food, for reductionproducts, for the aquarium trade, for medici-nal purposes and other uses; aquaculture,research, oil and gas exploration, ocean min-ing, dredging, ocean dumping, energy gener-ation, ecotourism, marine transportation andmarine defence. It is difficult to integrate themanagement of all such activities because thegovernment agencies and legal authoritiesregulating these activities are usually inde-pendent of one another. Recently, therehave been some initiatives undertaken atthe national level. For example, in 1998,the Government of Australia announced aNational Oceans Policy that provides thegoals, principles and planning arrangementsfor integrated ocean management to beimplemented through regional managementplans requiring institutional coordination.Canada’s Oceans Act of 1997 extendsCanada’s jurisdiction over the oceans to thefull extent permitted under international law,and sets up a governance structure basedon the principles of integrated management,sustainable development, precautionaryapproaches, collaboration and ecosystem-based approaches. In both countries, subse-quent action so far has been limited to theplanning stages for a small number of pilotprojects. In the USA, the Oceans Act of 2000




set up a special commission to undertake athorough review of USA ocean and coastalactivities and develop a national oceanpolicy. While it is essential that efforts suchas these continue and expand at the nationallevel, the international community shouldalso discuss the need for an internationalinstrument to coordinate multiple uses of thehigh seas.

Create a new profession of practitionersgiving scientific advice on fisheries

and ecosystems

Providing scientific advice requires special-ized knowledge of population dynamics,quantitative methods (i.e. mathematics andstatistics), fisheries management systems andfishing practices. It also requires communica-tion skills and the experience to work withpeople from diverse backgrounds (e.g. thecommercial and recreational fishing indus-tries, managers, politicians, news media andother scientists). Yet, the users of the advice(and those affected by it; e.g. the fishingindustry) have little basis for judging thequalifications of the scientists who provideadvice. Unnecessary controversy and confu-sion sometimes result from a naive ormisguided remark by a seemingly wellqualified scientist (in terms of academictraining and a prestigious position) who,in reality, lacks the skills and experienceto advise on fisheries management. Thesituation is analogous to that of an eminentprofessor of zoology second guessing arecommended medical procedure.

Over the last few decades, scientistsof many disciplines (e.g. ecology, analyticalchemistry, oceanography and economics)increasingly have gained experience provid-ing scientific advice on fisheries managementand ecosystem approaches. There are stan-dard practices for some of this work (suchas stock assessments), although they are notformally labelled as such. For many types ofadvice, the scientists giving the advice (againstock assessments scientists are a good exam-ple) generally can describe the scientific skillsand professional experiences that they believe

are necessary to be qualified to give advice.Arguably, a new profession of scientificadvisors on marine ecosystems is emergingas an operational discipline, perhaps matureenough to use certification and standardpractices to improve quality and credibility(as well as to elevate the prestige of the profes-sion). We believe it is time for the scientificcommunity that advises on fisheries andmarine ecosystems to face up to the gover-nance challenge of creating a new professionof certified practitioners to provide suchadvice.

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Appendix

List of Regional Marine Fishery Bodies


FAO bodiesAPFICCECAFGFCMIOTCRECOFISWIOFCWECFC

Asia–Pacific Fisheries CommissionFishery Committee for the Eastern Central AtlanticGeneral Fisheries Commission for the MediterraneanIndian Ocean Tuna CommissionRegional Commission for FisheriesSouth West Indian Ocean Fishery Commission (in process)Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission

Non-FAO bodiesCCAMLRCCSBTCOREPCPPSCSRPCTMFMCWPFFAIATTCIBSFCICCATICESICSEAFIPHCIWCMHLC

NAFONAMMCONASCONEAFCNPAFCOLDEPESCAPICESPSCSEAFOSPCWIOTO

Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living ResourcesCommission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin TunaComité régional des pêches du Golfe de GuinéeSouth Pacific Permanent CommissionCommission Sous-régionale des PêchesJoint Technical Commission for the Argentina/Uruguay Maritime FrontCoordinating Working Party on Fishery StatisticsSouth Pacific Forum Fisheries AgencyInter-American Tropical Tuna CommissionInternational Baltic Sea Fishery CommissionInternational Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic TunaInternational Council for the Exploration of the SeaInternational Commission for the Southeast Atlantic FisheriesInternational Pacific Halibut CommissionInternational Whaling CommissionCommission for the Conservation and Management of Highly MigratoryFish Stocks in the Western-Central Pacific Ocean (Convention signed;Commission not yet established)Northwest Atlantic Fisheries OrganizationNorth Atlantic Marine Mammal CommissionNorth Atlantic Salmon Conservation OrganizationNorth-East Atlantic Fisheries CommissionNorth Pacific Anadromous Fish CommissionLatin American Organization for the Development of FisheriesNorth Pacific Marine Science OrganizationPacific Salmon CommissionSouth East Atlantic Fishery Organization (in process)Secretariat of the Pacific CommunityWestern Indian Ocean Tuna Organization



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