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![Page 1: Fiscal policy institutions, the role of research and independent fiscal policy councils Lars Calmfors Interim seminar, Prime Minister’s Office, Königsted,](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062718/56649e865503460f94b89419/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Fiscal policy institutions, the role of research and
independent fiscal policy councils
Lars Calmfors
Interim seminar, Prime Minister’s Office, Königsted, Vantaa
12 August, 2010
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The role of independent fiscal policy institutions
Lars Calmfors
Interim seminar, Prime Minister’s Office, Königsted, Vantaa
12 August, 2010
![Page 3: Fiscal policy institutions, the role of research and independent fiscal policy councils Lars Calmfors Interim seminar, Prime Minister’s Office, Königsted,](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062718/56649e865503460f94b89419/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Structure of paper
1. Causes of excessive government debt accumulation
2. Fiscal rules
3. Independent fiscal institutions (fiscal watchdogs, fiscal policy councils)
4. The problem of securing sufficient research input into economic policy making in general
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Causes of deficit bias
• Insufficient understanding of long-run constraints
- lack of understanding of intertemporal budget
constraint
- overoptimism
- overconfidence• Politicians acting in their own interest – rent-seeking
behaviour
- lack of fiscal transparency
- political business cycles
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Causes of deficit bias (continued)
• Short-sightedness - higher discount rate for politicians than for the electorate• Time inconsistency - optimal policy depends on the expectations of the public - time-inconsistent preferences: more impatience associated with short-run than long-run trade-offs• Common-pool problems - concentrated benefits, dispersed costs - wars of attrition
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Fiscal rules
• Medium-term targets or constraints as well as principles for how deviations from them should be handled
• Intermediate objectives designed to make it easier to attain more fundamental, higher-level objectives
• Easier to agree on policies reflecting ”true” social preferences when choice framed as ex ante matter of principle
- evaluation against well-defined benchmark
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Credibility vs Flexibility
Germany• Well-defined and binding
budget-balance rule• Deficits accumulated on
an account• Obligation to act when
accumulated deficits above 1.5 per cent of GDP
Sweden• Surplus of one per cent of
GDP over a business cycle
• Imprecise target• Many (five) different
indicators
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Better trade-off?
• Definition of clear threshold for well-defined fiscal-balance indicator
• Not automatic response• Obligation for government to write to the
parliament and explain why breach has occurred and whether (and if so what) response is required
• Cf Bank of England obligation to write to the Chancellor if the inflation target is missed
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Independent fiscal watchdogs
Recent interest from IMF, Ecofin Council, European
Commission, and ECB
Recently established institutions• Sweden – Fiscal Policy Council 2007• Canada – Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) 2008• Hungary – Fiscal Council 2008• Slovenia – Fiscal Council 2009• UK – Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 2010
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Earlier existing institutions
• Belgium – High Council of Finance (HCF) 1936 (1989)
• Netherlands – Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 1947
• Denmark – Economic Council 1962• US – Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 1975• Austria – Public Debt Committee 2002
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Academic proposals on Fiscal Policy Councils
• von Hagen and Harden (1994)• Wren-Lewis (1996, 2002)• Ball (1997)• Blinder (1997)• Wyplosz (2002, 2005)• Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation
Policy in the Event of Membership in the Monetary Union (2002)
• European Economic Advisory Group (EEAG) (2003)• Calmfors (2003, 2005)
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A Fiscal Policy Council can increase fiscal transparency
Direct effects• Increase awareness of
future costs of deficits• Offset tendencies to
overoptimism and overconfidence
• Harder for politicians to pursue their own interests
Complement to fiscal rules• Higher reputational cost
of deviating from the rules• But independent
monitoring also allows rules to be more flexible
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Tasks of a Fiscal Policy Council
• Objective macroeconomic forecasts
(CPB in Netherlands, OBR in the UK)
• Costing of government policy initiatives
(CPB in Netherlands, CBO in US, PBO in Canada)
• Ex ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy will meet its medium-term targets
(Fiscal Council in Hungary, OBR in UK)
• Ex post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets
(Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden)
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Tasks of a Fiscal Policy Council (continued)
• Fiscal sustainability analysis
(CPB in Netherlands, Public Debt Committee in Austria,
Fiscal Council in Hungary, Fiscal Policy Council in
Sweden)
• Normative fiscal policy recommendations
(Public Debt Committee in Austria, Economic Council in Denmark and Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden)
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Why does a watchdog need official status?
• Official status gives more influence• An official council gan be given a formal role in the
budget process
- an arena for repeated and public exchange between
politicians and economic experts• Commitment on the part of academics and other
economic experts appointed to the council to a sustained and consistent participation in the economic policy debate
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Democratic legitimacy
• Critique: • Unelected experts should not evaluate elected
representatives• But: - Policy evaluation is relative to the government’s own objectives - Better information for citizens increase the possibilities of holding policy makers accountable• Of course: - Agenda-setting powers could be misused
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Independence is crucial for critical assessments
• Clear mandate to pursue its remit without government intervention
• Long-term budget• Long-term and non-renewable terms of office for council
members• Rather the parliament than the government as principal• Appointments after proposals from the council itself• Adequate staff – not rely on Ministry of Finance staff• Not direct input into the preparation of the budget and
provision of the forecast in the budget• Ex post but not ex ante discussions with the government
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Composition of council
• Academic researchers - least likely to be affected by political concerns• Public finance experts with a background in government
administration - more detailed knowledge - but risk of influence of career concerns• Analysts in the financial sector - unclear loyalties• Ex-politicians - boost legitimacy and impact - but often restricted by earlier positions taken
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Amount of resources
• Large variation among existing institutions - CBO in US: 230 - Fiscal Council in Hungary, Economic Council in Denmark: 30 - OBR in UK: now 8, proposal of 20 - Fiscal Policy Council in Sweden: 4• Scope of tasks determine resource need - forecasting/costing of government initiatives, detailed budget calculations - more overall, less-routine evaluations with heavier academic input
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Too little research input into economic policy making in general
• Deficit bias can be seen as manifestation of the general problem of too little attention attached to research input in general
• Strong temptation for politicians to use research strategically to advance their aims
- confounding of value judgements and research results
on various economic relationships
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Measures to increase research input into the policy-making process
• In-house advising is not enough - difficult for in-house advisers to assert themselves - in-house advisers may become co-opted• External advising and evaluation - politicians must take a public stand - increased interest among journalists of confronting policy makers with reserach• External advising/evaluation and in-house advising are
complements - external evaluation provides incentives for more and better in-house advising
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A broader remit for a Fiscal Policy Council?
• CPB in Netherlands
- employment and regulatory policies
- resource depletion
- financial crises• Economic Council in Denmark
- tax, employment and other structural policies
- environmental issues• Sachverständigenrat in Germany
- wide range of issues
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Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
• Evaluate that developments are in line with long-run healthy growth and sustainable high employment
• Evaluate the motivations given for policies in the government’s budget proposals and the grounds for policy proposals
• Contribute to an increased public debate on economic policy
• The Council should thus act as a ”debate watchdog” as well
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Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
• Evaluate whether economic developments are in line with healthy long-run growth and sustainable high employment
- unemployment and sickness insurance
- active labour market policy
- earned income tax credits
- regular education as countercyclical tool• Examine the clarity of the government’s budget bill, the grounds
given for economic policy and the motivations for policy proposals• Work to achieve an increased public discussion of economic policy• Role also as ”debate watchdog”
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Pros and cons of an extended remit
Pros• Interaction between fiscal
sustainability and employment• Greater impact from analysis
of one institution with a solid reputation than by a host of institutions
• Difficult to staff many institutions
Cons• Analytical resources may be
spread too thinly• Less tangible long-run fiscal
sustainability issues may be crowded out by more tangible short-run issues
• ”Monopoly” is a risk
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Are there risks of a political bias?
”There is reason to assume that the Fiscal Policy Council
will be another body providing false scientific clothing for
the government’s right-wing policy”
Swedish Left Party
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Possible bias problems are of other types
• Natural to focus on scope for improvement of government policy
- anti-government bias if opposition party programmes
are not evaluated (as CPB does in Netherlands)
- but this would amount to a large extension of remit• The oppostion will always gain in relative terms because
they have less access to analytical resources
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Conclusions
• Independent fiscal watchdogs are an international trend• Direct disciplining effect as well as complement to fiscal
rules by increasing fiscal transparency• Exact remits vary• Key questions: - Should they provide forecasts? - Should they provide normative recommendations in addition to doing positive analysis? - Should the remit be broader than just monitoring of fiscal policy?
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Conclusions
• Independent fiscal watchdogs are an international trend• Direct disciplining effect as well as complement to fiscal
rules by increasing fiscal transparency• Exact remits vary• Key questions: - Should they provide forecasts? No! - Should they provide normative recommendations in addition to doing positive analysis? - Should the remit be broader than just monitoring of fiscal policy?
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Conclusions
• Independent fiscal watchdogs are an international trend• Direct disciplining effect as well as complement to fiscal
rules by increasing fiscal transparency• Exact remits vary• Key questions: - Should they provide forecasts? No! - Should they provide normative recommendations in addition to doing positive analysis? Yes! - Should the remit be broader than just monitoring of fiscal policy?
![Page 33: Fiscal policy institutions, the role of research and independent fiscal policy councils Lars Calmfors Interim seminar, Prime Minister’s Office, Königsted,](https://reader036.fdocuments.net/reader036/viewer/2022062718/56649e865503460f94b89419/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
Conclusions
• Independent fiscal watchdogs are an international trend• Direct disciplining effect as well as complement to fiscal
rules by increasing fiscal transparency• Exact remits vary• Key questions: - Should they provide forecasts? No! - Should they provide normative recommendations in addition to doing positive analysis? Yes! - Should the remit be broader than just monitoring of fiscal policy? Perhaps!