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Mark L. Robin, PhD

DuPont Chemicals & Fluoroproducts

mark.l.robin@chemours.com

Fire Risk Mitigation in Mission Critical Facilities

2015 NFPA Conference & Expo

McCormick Place in Chicago, IL

June 23, 2015

2http://blogs.mprnews.org/newscut/2012/10/hurricane_impact_on_air_traffi/

Air Traffic Control Towers: Mission Critical

Typical Monday Morning Air Traffic Snapshot

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Airline traffic at 10:20 a.m. EDT over the United

States Sept. 26, 2014, following a fire at

a suburban Chicago ATC Facility

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/Chicago-air-traffic-halted-over-fire-at-faa-facility/

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Consequences of Fire at a Mission

Critical Facility: Aurora ATC Facility

• More than 2,000 flights in and out of

Chicago cancelled by evening of fire

• Flights as far away as Dallas cancelled

• Ultimate cancellation of 3900 flights

in the four days following the fire a

• Cost to American, United and Southwest estimated

in the hundreds of millions of dollars for each airline b

• $123 million cost in passengers lost economic activity a

• Some passengers diverted to Detroit

a US Travel Association estimateb Boyd Group Int’l estimate

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Fires in Mission Critical Facilities: Recent Examples

Facility Location

Aurora ATC Tower Chicago, IL

State Police Data Center Maryland, USA

Iowa Legislative Building Iowa, USA

Samsung SDS Gwacheon, South Korea

Iron Mountain Buenos Aires, Argentina

Cowboyminers Bangkok, Thailand

NSA Spy Center Utah, USA

Shaw Communications Calgary, Canada

Macomb County IT facility Michigan, USA

Samsung SDS Facility Fire

Cowboyminers Fire

Fires DO occur in

mission critical facilities

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Fire Risk in IT Facilities

Fire History

Typically involve small fires

Potentially large impact

• Equipment, Data and Business Continuity at Risk

Equipment and data loss

High cost of downtime

Leading cause: electrical distribution equipment

Wires, cables, cord, plugs, outlets

Fire Hazard

Fuel load primarily electronic equipment and power

cables: plastics

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Electronic Equipment: Fire Damage

Thermal Damage

- Due to fire itself (heat)

Non-thermal Damage: Combustion Products

- Smoke, soot, water, acids

Non-thermal Damage: Suppression Agent

- e.g., water, foam, dry chemical

Electronic equipment is very

susceptible to damage from fire

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Electronics: Thermal Damage

Component Onset of Damage

Storage media (magnetic

tape, floppies, etc.) 125 oF (52 oC)

Hard drives 150 oF (66 oC)

Electronic components 174 oF (79 oC)

Paper 350 oF (177 oC)

Polystyrene cases, reels 650 oF (310 oC)

Microfilm 225 oF (107 oC)

Damage results in loss of equipment and data

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Electronics: Non-Thermal Damage

from Combustion Products

Steam, Smoke, Soot, Various Combustion Products

Hydrogen Chloride

- From combustion of PVC

- Reacts with galvanized zinc components forming ZnCl2

- ZnCl2 layer formed, reacts with humidity to produce a

corrosive ZnCl2 solution

Corrosive Combustion Gases

- HF, HBr, SO2, CH3COOH, NO2, HCN

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Cost of datacenter downtime

is high… and getting higher

Average cost per minute

increased 41% from 2010

2010: $5,617 per minute

2013: $7,908 per minute

Cost of Business Interruption

Source: Ponemon Institute 2013

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FOAM

CO2

CLEAN

AGENTS

WATER

POWDER

Fire Protection Options for

Mission Critical Facilities

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• Extinguishment via oxygen depletion and heat absorption

• Is a clean agent

• Toxicity concerns

CO2 lethal at its required extinguishing concentrations

Carbon Dioxide (CO2)

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Powder-based Agents

• Efficient fire extinguishment via chemical interaction with flame

• All incorporate solid particles

• Corrosion concerns

• Major cleanup required

• Significant downtime

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• Efficient extinguishment via separation of fuel from air

• Aqueous = Corrosion concerns

• Major cleanup required

• Significant downtime

Foam

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POWDER

CO2

CLEAN

AGENTS

Fire Protection Options for

Mission Critical Facilities

Toxic

Corrosive

Extensive

Clean-up

WATERFOAM

Corrosive

Extensive

Clean-up

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Fire Protection Options for

Mission Critical Facilities

WATER-

BASED

SYSTEMS

CLEAN

AGENTS

Required by code

for

STRUCTURE

protection

Protection of

Structure’s CONTENTS

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NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation

of Sprinkler Systems

Principle document addressing design

and installation of sprinkler systems

NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm Code

NFPA 75 Standard for the Protection of Electronic

Computer/Data Processing Equipment

NFPA 76 Recommended Practice for the Fire

Protection of Telecommunications Facilities

Automatic Sprinkler Standards

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Automatic Sprinkler Systems:

Design Objectives

- “In general terms of property protection,

sprinkler systems are typically designed to

achieve fire control...”

- “Fire control can be described as limiting the fire

size by decreasing the rate of heat release and

pre-wetting adjacent combustibles, while

maintaining ceiling gas temperatures so as to

avoid structural damage”

NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 19th Edition, p. 10-193.

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Time

HeatReleaseRate

Fire Control

sprinkler activation

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Automatic Sprinkler Systems

Thermal Response Heat detection serves as basis of sprinkler system response

fusible link

glass bulb

Activation at ceiling temperatures 135 oF

Fire size at activation 100s of kW

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Clean AgentsNFPA 2001 (2015) 3.3.6Electrically nonconducting, volatile, or

gaseous fire extinguishant that does not

leave a residue upon evaporation.

ISO 14520 2006 Edition

Minimum cleanup required

No to minimum downtime

Fire Protection Basics: Clean Agents

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Clean Agent Fire Suppression Systems

NFPA 2001 Standard for Clean Agent Fire

Extinguishing Systems (2015)

Total flooding agents

Uniform distribution of agent throughout enclosure

Ability to extinguish hidden and obstructed fires

Primary Design Objective = Fire Extinguishment

Rapid detection

Rapid extinguishment

Fire size at activation 0.1 to several kW

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Time

HeatRelease

Rate

sprinkler activation

clean agent

system activation

detection

FIRE CONTROL

FIRE EXTINGUISHMENT

Clean Agent System vs. Sprinkler System

(Fire Extinguishment vs. Fire Control)

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Comparison Testing of Preaction

Sprinkler and Clean Systemsa

Clean Agent System: FM-200®

System designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 2001

Preaction Sprinkler System

Designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 13

Detection/Alarm Systems

Designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 72

a M.L. Robin and E.W. Forssell, "Comparison Testing in a Simulated Data Processing/

Telecommunications Facility: FM-200 and Automatic Sprinkler Systems, 2004

Halon Options Technical Working Conference, May 4-6, 2004, Albuquerque, NM.

In-cabinet fire: ABS sheets

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Fire Location

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ABS Sheets

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Preaction Sprinkler System

Designed in accordance with NFPA 13

Based on Ordinary Hazard Class I classification

Nine sprinkler heads in main space

Nine sprinkler heads above suspended ceiling

11 ft spacing for area coverage of 121 ft2

Maximum spacing allowed under NFPA 13 is 15 ft

Recessed pendant standard response glass bulb

sprinklers

Temperature rating 135 oF

Application density of 0.15 gpm/ft2 required

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FM-200® Suppression System

Designed in accordance with NFPA 2001

7% by volume FM-200®

Discharge time: 9.5 seconds

Hygood Ltd cylinder

Hygood Ltd 8-port aluminum nozzle

orifice area 1.57 in2

System design via Hygood Ltd’s design software

30 s delay employed from detection to system activation

Maximum delay time allowed under recommendations of FM

Global Property Loss Prevention Sheet 5-14 on

Telecommunication Facilities

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Results: Preaction Sprinkler System

Photoelectric detector in NE corner in full alarm

at 94 seconds from ignition

Ionization detector in NE corner in full alarm at

112 seconds from ignition

Complete obscuration due to smoke at approximately

240 seconds from ignition

Sprinkler head in NE corner actuated at 273 seconds

from ignition

Sprinkler head in N corner actuated at 347 seconds from

ignition

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Results: Preaction Sprinkler System

Fire not extinguished by sprinkler system

IR camera shows fire burning through entirety of test

Fire contained to source cabinet

Max ceiling temperature of 560 oF observed at

thermocouple tree nearest fire

Fire Damage

Entire cabinet and contents destroyed

Non-Fire Damage

Extensive water, smoke and soot damage

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Results: Preaction Sprinkler System

Non-Fire Damage Black “ring” around entire enclosure

Ceiling tiles discolored

Soot particles scrubbed from smoke layer cover

floor, horizontal surfaces

Walls discolored from smoke damage

Water damage to paper goods

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Pre-action System

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Pre-action System

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Pre-action System

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Pre-action System

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Pre-action System

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Pre-action System

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Pre-Action Sprinkler System

Performance Summary

Design objective attained: Fire was controlled

System performed exactly as expected

Fire contained to origin

Ceiling temperatures managed such that

structural damage and/or collapse did not occur

Structure saved

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Results: FM-200® System

AnaLASER II alarmed at 78 seconds from ignition

FM-200® system activated at 108 seconds from

ignition

Fire extinguished at 125 seconds from ignition

7 seconds from end of system discharge

No change in ceiling temperatures

Fire damage

Slight scorching of inside of test cabinet

Non-fire damage

Several ceiling tiles displaced

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FM-200 System: Before…..

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FM-200 System: After…..

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FM-200® System

Performance Summary

Design objective attained: Fire extinguished

System performed exactly as expected

Contents of structure saved

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Fire Risk Management 101

“Fire risk analysis is a process to characterize the risk

associated with fire that addresses the fire scenario or

fire scenarios of concern, their probability, and their

potential consequences. Risk factors to be considered

include life safety and (direct and indirect) economic

losses from the loss of function (capacity) or data, loss of

professional reputation, and the costs of redundant

systems”

R.W. Bukowski, Fire Protection Engineering Emerging Trends, Issue 76 (09/2013)

“Risk Considerations for Data /Center Fire Protection

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1. Risk

2. Scenario

3. Probability

4. Consequences

Direct

Indirect

Fire Risk Management 101

KEY ELEMENTS

Equipment-related fire

Cables, electronic equipment

NOT zero

Due to fire and extinguishant

Ex: Business interruption

Mission Critical Facilities:

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Fire Risk Management

Standards & Guides

SFPE Engineering Guide: Fire Risk Assessment

(SFPE G.04.2006)

NFPA 551 Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk

Assessments

NFPA Handbook of Fire Protection, Chapter 8, Section 3,

Fire Risk Analysis

ASTM E1546-09a Standard Guide for Development of

Fire-Hazard-Assessment Standards

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Mission Critical Facility

Fire Protection

Sprinkler and Clean Agent systems vastly different

Design objectives different: Control vs Extinguishment

Preaction systems best suited to protection of structure

Clean agent systems best suited to protection of contents

of structure

Sprinkler systems alone inappropriate for protection of high

value assets

Clean agents not ideally suited for structural protection

Loss during a fire NOT limited to fire damage

Potential loss differs for clean agent vs sprinkler systems

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Quantifying Loss: Direct vs. Indirect Costs of Fire

Direct:• Equipment involved in the fire

• Data

• Historical and Intellectual

Property

• Financial records

• Cost of Clean up

Indirect:• Business interruption &

downtime

• Insurance

• Lawsuits

• Collateral Damage

• Loss of customer confidence

Losses and costs associated with a fire are not

limited to the equipment involved in the fire

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Shaw Datacenter Fire:

Minimum Fire Protection and Its Consequences

The potential consequences of adopting a

minimum protection approach to fire protection

can be clearly seen in the results of the recent

Shaw datacenter outage in Calgary

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Shaw Datacenter Fire:

Transformer fire sets off sprinkler system

• Sprinklers take out backup systems housed on site

• Knockout out of primary and backup systems

supporting key public services

• Crippled city services, including 311 services

• Delay of 100s of surgeries at local hospitals

• IBM Canada forced to fly backup tapes holding

vehicle and property registration data

to a backup facility in Markham, Ontario

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Shaw Datacenter Fire:

• Extensive water damage to furniture, walls and

sensitive electronic equipment on the floors

below the top story fire location

• Temporary relocation of over 900 Shaw employees

while damage is repaired

• Six days of service outage

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• More than 20,000 Shaw business and household clients

watched their cable, telephone and Internet services

disappear almost immediately

• City and provincial clients watched their own networks

go dark as the water trickled down, affecting other data

companies below the fire.

• Some cellular carriers were also said to be affected, as

well as ATB banking services, ATMs and debit terminals

throughout the city

Shaw Datacenter Fire:

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“Water needs to be there by law,” said Q9

chief executive Osama Arafat, “but you

want to try and deal with a fire using less

destructive means first.”

“Competitor Q9 Networks Inc., which operates three

data centres in the city, has early detection systems

that can detect smoke and use gases that don’t harm

people to prevent fires from starting.”

Source: http://m.controlfiresystems.com/news/data_fire/

Shaw Datacenter Fire:

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Case Study: Iowa State Legislature Building

Datacenter Fire: February 18, 2014

Mission Critical Facility

Payroll processing for state

employees was scheduled for that evening

Dept of Revenue needed to

process tax collections.

Justice Dept needed to process

claims and fee payments.

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http://www.govtech.com/state/Fire-in-your-Data-Center-No-Power-No-Access-Now-What.html

Iowa Legislature Fire Timeline

3pm • Fire ignites: FM-200

System deploys

9pm• Data Center

Cleared of burnt equipment

2am• Major websites and

agency systems restored

3am• Remaining

major agency applications restored

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Fire Protection for Mission

Critical Facilities

• Fires DO Occur in Mission Critical Facilities

• Risk, Consequences, Losses dependent on facility & fire protection system

Sprinklers : fire control/structure protection

Clean agents: fire extinguishment/content protection

Substantial risk reduction at very high benefit/cost

ratios may be realized by protecting sensitive,

valuable and mission-critical assets, such as those

found in IT and telco facilities, with both a clean agent

system and a sprinkler system.

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Thank You