FIRE BRIGADE, U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter€¦ · Marines in the Korean War Commemorative...

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Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series FIRE BRIGADE U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter by Captain John C. Chapin U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

Transcript of FIRE BRIGADE, U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter€¦ · Marines in the Korean War Commemorative...

Page 1: FIRE BRIGADE, U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter€¦ · Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series FIRE BRIGADE U.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter by Captain John C. Chapin

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

FIRE BRIGADEU.S. Marines in thePusan Perimeterby Captain John C. Chapin

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

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SourcesThere are two basic official sources

for the story of these early days in thePusan Perimeter. For the Marine Corps,Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, USMC, The Pusan Perimeter,vol. 1 of U.S. Marine Operations inKorea (Washington: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954). For theArmy, Roy E. Appleman, South to theNaktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), United States Army inThe Korean War (Washington: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1961).

Also published officially is: LtColGary W. Parker, USMC, and Maj Frank M.Batha, Jr., USMC, A History of MarineObservation Squadron Six (Washington:History and Museums Division, HQMC,1982).

Three articles that are very helpfuland share a common publisher are:Ernest H. Giusti, “Marine Air Over thePusan Perimeter,” Marine Corps Gazette,May 1952; Lynn Montross, “The PusanPerimeter: Fight for a Foothold,” MarineCorps Gazette, June 1951; Col NicholasA. Canzona, USMCR, “Marines Land atPusan, Korea-August 1950,” MarineCorps Gazette, August 1985; and MajFrancis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC, “ChangallonValley,” Marine Corps Gazette,November 1951.

There is a wide range of commercial-

ly published books. Among those thatcontained useful material are: JohnToland, In Mortal Combat-Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow andCompany, 1991); Lynn Montross,Cavalry of the Sky-The Story of U.S.Marine Helicopters (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1954); Edwin P. Hoyt, ThePusan Perimeter-Korea 1950 (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1984); DavidDouglas Duncan, This Is War! A Photo-Narrative in Three Parts (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1950-51); ClayBlair, The Forgotten War (New York:Times Books, 1987); Max Hastings, TheKorean War (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1987); T. R. Fehrenbach, ThisKind of War (New York: Macmillan,1963); Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: TheUntold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982); Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,Soldiers of the Sea: The United StatesMarine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis:United States Naval Institute, 1962); andRobert Leckie, Conflict (New York:Putman, 1962).

A recent publication is by BGen UzalW. Ent, USA (Ret), Fighting On TheBrink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter(Paducah, Ky: Turner PublishingCompany, 1996).

Particular acknowledgment is madeof the valuable quotations in DonaldKnox, The Korean War-Pusan to Chosin-An Oral History (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1985) and AndrewGeer, The New Breed-The Story of the

U.S. Marines in Korea (Nashville: TheBattery Press, 1989).

In a different category is a bookwhich the author affirms is based onactual Chinese sources: Russell Spurr,Enter the Dragon-China’s UndeclaredWar Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51(New York: Henry Holt, 1988).

Personal interviews were helpful inmeetings with: MajGen Robert D. Bohn,USMC (Ret); MajGen Charles D. Mize,USMC (Ret); and Col Robert D. Taplett,USMC (Ret).

Information also was contributed byMajGen Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret),and Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC(Ret), who kindly furnished postwarcopies of The Guidon, a newsletter of BCompany, with personal memoirs ofcombat.

The oral history transcripts at theMarine Corps Historical Center focusmainly on later events in Korea, but dohave some observations by Craig,Murray, Bohn, Stewart, Sivert, Lucy, andLtCol Charles H. Brush, Jr., USMC, relat-ing to the early days. In the PersonalPapers Collection [now located at theMarine Corps University] there is a longmemoir by PFC Herbert R. Luster whowas a BAR-man in Company A (#1918-1A44). The files of the Reference Sectioncontain much information pertinent toindividual biographies and unit histories.Acknowledgement also is made to ColDavid Douglas Duncan, USMCR (Ret),for the use of his dramatic images.

About the Author

Captain John C. Chapin earned abachelor of arts degree with hon-

ors in history from Yale University in1942 and was commissioned later thatyear. He served as a rifle-platoonleader in the 24th Marines, 4th MarineDivision, and was wounded in actionin World War II during assault land-ings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.

Transferred to duty at theHistorical Division, HeadquartersMarine Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5thMarine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of the war,he earned a master’s degree in history at George WashingtonUniversity with a thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922.”

Now a captain in retired status, he served for many years, start-ing in 1983, as a volunteer at the Marine Corps Historical Center.During that time he wrote the history of Marine Fighter-Attack(VMFA) Squadron 115. With support from the Historical Centerand the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent someyears researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book,Uncommon Men—The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps. Thiswas published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.

As part of the Historical Center’s series of pamphlets commem-orating the 50th anniversary of World War II, Captain Chapinwrote accounts of Marine operations in the Marshall Islands, onSaipan and Bougainville, and Marine aviation in the Philippines.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by a gift from Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bertram Z. Lee,USMCR (Ret), in honor of his son, Sergeant Joshua Lee.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 190 00315 00

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he Marines havelanded.” How familiarthe phrase, howextraordinary the cir-cumstances on 2

August 1950. Instead of a beachsaturated with enemy fire, thescene was a dock in the port ofPusan in the far southeast cornerof Korea. The landing force wasthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigade;the situation it would soon facewas one of desperate crisis.

The men arriving on board thetransport ships that day knew theywere going into battle, and theirbrigade commander, BrigadierGeneral Edward A. Craig, hadmade his combat standards veryclear in a meeting with his officersbefore the ships had sailed fromSan Diego: “It has been necessaryfor troops now fighting in Korea topull back at times, but I am statingnow that no unit of this brigadewill retreat except on orders froman authority higher than the 1stMarine Brigade. You will neverreceive an order to retreat fromme. All I ask is that you fight asMarines have always fought.”

At sea, no one knew where thebrigade would be committed toaction, and the men knew nothing

about the forthcoming enemyexcept it was called the NorthKorean People’s Army (NKPA). Onboard their ships they had seen thesituation maps which daily showedthe steadily retreating line ofdefense, as the enemy drove irre-sistably farther and farther intoSouth Korea. The regular physicalfitness drills and weapons targetpractice took on an urgent newsense of purpose for the Marines.

Captain Francis I. “Ike” Fenton,Jr., then executive officer ofCompany B, later recalled:

While on board ship ourtraining area was limited. Itwas an impossibility to getthe whole company togetherat one location. Consequent-ly, we used passageways,boat decks, holds—any spacewe could find to lecture tothe men and give them the lit-tle information that we had asto what was happening inKorea.

We lectured on the charac-teristics of the T-34 tank andtold the men about the kindof land mines we mightexpect. A lot of time wasspent on blackboard tacticsfor the fire team, platoon, andcompany. We had the 3.5rocket launcher, but no onepresent had ever fired one.

A variety of old World War IIships had brought the brigade.Task Force 53.7 had 10 ships. Twotransports and a light carrier, theBadoeng Strait (CVE-116), trans-

ported the air arm, Marine AircraftGroup 33 (MAG-33). Two LSDs(landing ships, dock), two AKAs(cargo ships, attack), and threeAPAs (transports, attack) providedfor the ground units. Pulling upalongside the dock at Pusan, themen of the brigade were split intothree main units: the 2d Battalion,5th Marines, on the George Clymer(APA-27), known to its passengersas the “Greasy George”; the 3dBattalion on the Pickaway (APA-222), with the regimental comman-der of the 5th Marines, LieutenantColonel Raymond L. Murray, onboard; and the 1st Battalion on theHenrico (APA-45), which camelimping into port last after a seriesof mechanical problems (eventhough it was known as the“Happy Hank”).

Standing on the pier to meet themen was a disparate group of peo-ple: General Craig; Marines whohad guarded the U.S. Embassy staffin its perilous journey all the wayfrom the South Korean capital ofSeoul to refuge in Pusan; someU.S. Army soldiers; a local bandgiving an earnest but painfullyamateurish rendition of TheMarine Corps Hymn; crowds ofcurious South Korean on-lookers;and undoubtedly some NorthKorean spies.

Craig was shocked to see theMarines watching the docking, asthey casually leaned over the railsof their ships. He had previouslysent an order through Army chan-nels for the brigade to be preparedto march off the ships, combatready, with weapons loaded. His

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FIRE BRIGADEU.S. Marines in the Pusan Perimeter

by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

On the Cover: Moving up to meetthe North Korean forces, Marines passthrough one of the many small, bat-tered South Korean villages. NationalArchives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1148At left: Moving to attack: A corpo-ral leads his automatic-rifle manthrough a rice paddy, oblivious to thedead enemy soldier underfoot. Photoby David Douglas Duncan

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immediate, sharp inquiry to anofficer on board revealed that hisorders had never been received atsea. Accordingly, Craig immediate-ly convened an officers’ confer-ence on the Clymer. His G-3,Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L.Stewart, announced that thebrigade would move out at 0600the following morning. This meant

the men would spend the wholenight unloading the ships and issu-ing full supplies of ammunitionand rations, so that the brigadecould move out on time. Aftermaking clear that he did not yetknow where the brigade would besent by Lieutenant General WaltonH. Walker, the commanding officerof the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea,

Craig concluded: “The Pusanperimeter is like a weakened dikeand we will be used to plug holesin it as they open. We’re a brigade,a fire brigade. It will be costlyfighting against a numericallysuperior enemy. Marines havenever yet lost a battle; this brigadewill not be the first to establishsuch a precedent.”

After a night of bedlam on thewaterfront, 9,400 tons of supplieshad been unloaded, but thebrigade was to travel light, so mostof these supplies and all personalbaggage had to be left behind.Thus it was that the brigade wasready to move out on the morningof 3 August.

There was still uncertainty as toexactly where the men wouldenter combat. Walker’s headquar-ters had telephoned Craig at mid-night and told him to move thebrigade to a town called Chang-won, where Walker would tem-porarily hold the Marines in EighthArmy reserve. This would positionthe brigade strategically if Walkerdecided that his most pressingdanger was an enemy break-through threat by the NKPA 6thInfantry Division and the 83dMotorcycle Regiment. The divisionwas a highly professional, well-trained unit of Chinese Civil Warveterans, and it had won a seriesof smashing victories since theinvasion of South Korea a monthearlier. Now these units had seizedthe town of Chinju and werepoised to strike at the far south-western corner of Walker’s defenselines. Masan was their next proba-ble target, and that was only 35miles from Pusan.

The scene on the waterfront thatmorning was a study in contrasts.On one hand was the panickyatmosphere of the city of Pusan. AMarine officer felt it immediately:“A tension and excitement that waspalpable . . . you could sense—

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almost feel—fear. The people werescared to death. The NorthKoreans were very close.”

On the other hand, there stoodthe solid, poised brigade which,with its aviation components,totaled 6,534 men. The three riflebattalions each had only two riflecompanies, but, taken from theskeleton 1st Marine Division atCamp Pendleton, was a widerange of auxiliary units: a companyeach from the division’s Signal,Motor Transport, Medical, ShoreParty, Engineer, Ordnance, andTank Battalions; detachments fromthe Service Battalion, CombatService Group, Reconnaissance,and Military Police Companies; the1st Amphibian Tractor Company;and Amphibian Truck Platoon. The1st Battalion, 11th Marines, withthree firing batteries, was alsoattached to provide the vitalartillery support.

These units were permeatedwith an esprit de corps that wasunique to the Marines. Author T. R.Fehrenbach had this analysis in his

book, This Kind of War:

In 1950 a Marine Corpsofficer was still an officer, anda sergeant behaved the waygood sergeants had behavedsince the time of Caesar,

expecting no nonsense,allowing none. And Marineleaders had never lost sight oftheir primary—their only—mission, which was to fight.The Marine Corps was notmade pleasant for men whoserved in it. It remained thesame hard, brutal way of lifeit had always been.

In 1950 . . . these menwalked with a certain confi-dence and swagger. Theywere only young men likethose about them in Korea,but they were conscious of astandard to live up to,because they had had goodtraining, and it had beenimpressed upon them thatthey were United StatesMarines.

Those young men of 1950undoubtedly did not know thattheir predecessors had been toKorea before—four times, in fact.There had been a brief skirmish in1871 (where the Marines werefired upon by a cannon dated1313!). Subsequent landings took

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1229

Life on board ship was busy as the Marines prepared for battle. Here three of themare test-firing their Browning Automatic Rifles.

Other Marines, in this case members of Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,huddled intently over instructions in the use of their light machine guns.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1291

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place in 1888 and 1894, and in1905 Marines served as theLegation Guard in Seoul—littledreaming of the ordeal their suc-cessors there would undergo 45years later.

Two things that were prominent-ly visible on the pier were the 3.5-inch rocket launchers (“ba-zookas”)and the M-26 Pershing tanks whichequipped the Marines—newweapons that the battered Armydivisions lacked.

Invisible, but fundamental to theaction that lay ahead, were thequalities that had been ingrainedinto the Marines themselves. JosephC. Goulden in Korea: The UntoldStory of the War described the menthis way: “They had been in com-bat training in the United States;they arrived in cohesive units in

which officers and men had servedtogether for months . . . . Theyinsisted on controlling their ownair support in coordinated actionsbased upon years of experience.”Another writer, Clay Blair, in TheForgotten War, pointed out that“the ranks were filled with physi-cally tough young men who hadjoined the corps to fight, not tosightsee. The Marines had superiorfirepower in squads, platoons, andcompanies.”

However, amongst all the unitsin the Pusan Perimeter there wasone point of similarity. Except forsenior generals, no one—soldier orMarine—had more than a vagueidea of how or why they came tobe there in a life-or-death situationin a country of which they hadnever heard five weeks before.

High-Level Decisions

The actual events that had ledup to the brigade being poised onthat dock were a tangled skein ofhigh-level meetings, flurries oforders, and long-distance airplanetrips that spanned half the globefrom New York to Washington,D.C., to California, to Honolulu,and to Tokyo.

It all began when alarm bellswent off in the pre-dawn of 25June 1950 at the United Nations inNew York and the U.S. StateDepartment in Washington. Therehad been a violent, surprise attackacross the 38th Parallel, an inva-sion of South Korea by some90,000 well-trained, heavily armedsoldiers of the North KoreanPeoples Army (NKPA). As the star-

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A color guard from the South Korean Army, carrying thecolors of the United States, the United Nations, and South

Korea, joins with a Korean band to greet 1st ProvisionalBrigade Marines on the dock at Pusan.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1257

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tling news continued to pour in, itquickly became apparent that thehalf-trained, lightly armed Republicof Korea (ROK) troops defendingSouth Korea were being smashedand overrun.

At an emergency meeting of theU.N. Security Council that sameafternoon, followed by anothertwo days later (27 June), there wasa decision to call for armed forceto repel the invaders. That was allthat was needed for GeneralClifton B. Cates, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, to seize the ini-tiative. The next day, 28 June, hearranged a meeting with AdmiralForrest P. Sherman, Chief of NavalOperations, and Francis P.Matthews, Secretary of the Navy,and he recommended that theFleet Marine Force (FMF) “beemployed.” Their reaction wasnoncommittal, since U.S. groundforces were not yet involved inSouth Korea. Cates, however, hadlearned over a long career a fewthings about combat—whether itwas called by a euphemism suchas “police action,” as in this case,or was realistically a “war,” in sev-eral of which he had distinguishedhimself. Acting upon instinct,when he returned from the indeci-sive meeting, he sent a warningorder to the 1st Marine Division atCamp Pendleton, California, to getready to go to war. (Due to peace-time cuts, the strength of the entireMarine Corps at that time was only74,279, with 11,853 in the divisionand its accompanying aircraftwing. Thus, in reality, the “divi-sion” was little more than a rein-forced regimental combat team infighting strength, and the “wing”little more than a Marine air group.

Cates’ gut reaction was con-firmed the following day, on 29June, when President Harry S.Truman authorized General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur, Com-mander in Chief, Far East, in

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Brigadier General Edward A. Craig

Edward A Craig was born on 22 November 1896 in Danbury,Connecticut, and attended St. Johns Military Academy in Wisconsin.After being commissioned in the Marine Corps in August 1917, he

served in a wide range of posts: in Washington as aide to Major GeneralCommandant John A. Lejeune in 1926, and in Haiti, the DominicanRepublic, China, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, combined with tours onboard the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise.

By May of 1942 he had been promoted to colonel, and this brought himcommand of the 9th Marines. He led his regiment in combat onGuadalcanal in July 1943, then that November on Bougainville where hewas awarded the Bronze Star. In December 1943, he was given a tempo-rary promotion to brigadier general. In July-August 1944 his regiment ledthe attack on Guam. Craig’s valiant conduct there brought him a NavyCross.

Moving to a staff assignment, he served as operations officer, VAmphibious Corps, in the assault on Iwo Jima in February 1945. A Legionof Merit was presented to him for that service.

Duty as assistant division commander, 1st Marine Division, in China in1947, came with his promotion to permanent brigadier general. Craig thenassumed command of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in June of thatyear. This brought him back to Guam, almost three years after he had par-ticipated in its recapture.

In 1949, he was transferred to Camp Pendleton as assistant divisioncommander, 1st Marine Division. Very soon thereafter came the attack onSouth Korea, which led to his designation, for a second time, asCommanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. This time, howev-er, it moved quickly to combat. When the brigade, after its victories in thePusan Perimeter, was deactivated in September 1950, its troops weremerged into a reformed 1st Marine Division. Craig reverted to his formerbillet as assistant division commander. For his noteworthy performance ofduty during 1950 operations in Korea, he received an Air Medal with goldstar, a Silver Star, and a Distinguished Service Medal.

January 1951 brought his promotion to lieutenant general, and a fewmonths later, in June, he retired with 33 years of distinguished service. Hedied in December 1994.

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Tokyo, to use the U.S. naval,ground, and air units he had avail-able to support the desperateRepublic of Korea forces.

Now there ensued examples ofthe arcane complexities of high-level decision-making at a time ofgreat stress. At Cates’ urging,Admiral Sherman asked AdmiralArthur W. Radford, Commander inChief, Pacific Fleet, how long itwould take to ship out a Marineregimental combat team (RCT).Radford replied on 2 July: “load insix days, sail in ten.” Then, in atime-honored communicationsprocedure for top-ranking officers,Sherman sent a private message forthe eyes of MacArthur via his navalcommander in the Far East, ViceAdmiral C. Turner Joy, asking if thegeneral would like a Marine RCT.Swamped with bad news fromSouth Korea, MacArthur acceptedimmediately with “unusual enthu-siasm.”

Accordingly, he fired off toSherman in Washington, D.C., thatsame day (2 July) an urgent radiorequest for a Marine RCT and asupporting Marine aircraft group(MAG).

A Brigade is Born

Sherman took the request to ameeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) for their decision. Althoughthe Commandant of the MarineCorps was not, at that time, amember of the JCS, Cates felt that,since the decision directly affected“his Marines,” he should beinvolved in it. Showing up uninvit-ed at the meeting, he was allowedto join it in view of the disastrousnews from the Korean front.

The JCS voted to commit theMarine RCT and MAG, and withTruman’s concurrence, gaveMacArthur the good news on 3July. (Cates later asked Shermanhow it had all come about, and the

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M-26 Pershing Medium Tank and ItsNorth Korean Counterpart

The M-26 Pershing, shown above, was the backbone of Marine armorduring the first half of the Korean War. The 1st Tank Battalion, FleetMarine Force, at Camp Pendleton, replaced its M-4A3 Sherman

tanks with Pershings during the summer of 1950, shortly after the invasionof South Korea.

Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, sailed for Korea with the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade after having been able to test drive and fire only two of itsnew tanks. While enroute, 14 tanks were damaged when the cargo holdof a ship flooded. Landing at Pusan in August 1950, the tank crews had abrief familiarization period before going into action. In concert with theclose-air support of Corsairs, 75mm recoilless rifles, and 3.5-inch rocketlaunchers, the tanks gave the brigade a level of firepower that proved veryeffective against the North Korean enemy.

Technical DataEngine: Ford V-8 gasoline, liquid-cooled, 500HPDimensions: Length: 20 feet 8 inches

Width: 11 feet 4 inchesHeight: 9 feet 1 inches

Weight: 46 tonsMaximum Speed: On roads: 30mph

Cross country: 18mphRadius of Action: On roads: 92 miles

Cross country: 62 milesCrew: 5Armament: One 90mm M3 gun

Two .30-caliber machine gunsM1919A4 (bow & coaxial)One .50-caliber M2 machine gun on turret

T-34 North Korean Medium TankAfter great success early in the war and acquiring a fearsome reputa-

tion, the T-34, not shown, met its nemesis in the Marines’ anti-tankweapons. Supplied from Russian stocks, it weighed 32,000 kilograms andcarried a crew of five men. A V-12 diesel engine gave it an off-road speedof 30 kilometers per hour. Armament was an 85mm gun, supplemented bytwo 7.62mm machine guns.

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admiral replied in a baseballmetaphor: “From Cates toSherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, toJCS!”)

Now Cates (and the MarineCorps) had to deliver. On 7 July hehad the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade activated, but then a mon-umental effort, carried out at afrantic pace, was needed to assem-ble the essential manpower, equip-ment, and weapons—and to do allthat in one week flat!

The initial building blocks werethere, the 5th Marines at CampPendleton and MAG-33 at thenearby El Toro Marine Air Station.The critical manpower problemwas to flesh out these units fromtheir peacetime reductions so thatthey could fight with maximumeffectiveness. By telegraph andtelephone orders went out to regu-lar Marines all over the country:“get to Pendleton NOW!” And sothey came pouring in day and

night by bus and plane and train, aflood of men from 105 posts andstations.

Captain “Ike” Fenton long re-membered the ensuing problems:

These men were shippedfrom the posts and stations byair, most of them arriving withjust a handbag. Their seabagswere to be forwarded at alater date. They didn’t havedog tags and had no healthrecords to tell us how manyshots they needed. Theirclothing generally consistedof khaki only, although a fewhad greens.

They had no weapons andtheir 782 equipment wasincomplete. We had a prob-lem of trying to organizethese men into a platoon andgetting them all squared awaybefore our departure date.

Other officers recalled oddaspects of those hectic days: noone got any sleep; some men weredetailed to help in the filming of

7

The 3.5-Inch Rocket Launcher

The 3.5-inch rocket launcher (also known as the “Super Bazooka”)offered the infantryman a portable rocket weapon, designed to beused as an anti-tank defense. Introduced in early 1950, the 3.5-inch

launcher gave the Marine Corps the means to pierce any armored vehiclefrom a greater distance than previous launchers, and with improved accu-racy.

The M20 3.5-inch launcher appeared after its predecessor, the 2.36-inchlauncher (developed in World War II), proved ineffective against theRussian tanks in Korea. The M20 was a two-piece, smooth-bore weaponformed by connecting the front and rear barrels together. Weighing only12 pounds with an assembled length of 60 inches, the 3.5-inch launcherwas easily transportable and could be fired from a standing, sitting, orprone position. The M20 rocket had a “shaped charge” that concentratedthe force of the explosion on a very small area, thus allowing the projec-tile to penetrate armor plate as thick as 11 inches. In addition to theweapon’s deadly force, a unique gunsight that allowed for various rangesand speeds provided the 3.5 an accuracy up to 900 yards.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo

General Clifton B. Cates

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Hollywood’s “Halls of Monte-zuma”; other men were detailed tofight fires in the Santa MargaritaMountains. The supply crisis wasovercome by a precipitous changefrom an attitude of “countingshoelaces” to “take whatever youneed.” Acquisition of the new 3.5-inch rocket launcher was madepossible by shipments from allover the country. There was aninflux of senior staff noncommis-sioned officers, some of whomwere physically unfit, and this ledto some sergeants major beingassigned to ride shotgun on ambu-lance jeeps. A number of WorldWar II officers with no infantryexperience also arrived.

The 5th Marines was beefed upby an emergency authorization toadd a third platoon to each of thetwo rifle companies, but it provedimpossible to get a third rifle com-pany for each of the three battal-ions. This was a serious shortage.It meant that the battalions wouldhave to go into battle without acompany they could use formaneuver or have in reserve. Andthat would cause extra casualtiesin the weeks ahead. There were,however, two compensating fac-tors for the shortages. First, theregiment was a well-trained, cohe-sive unit. Murray put it this way:“We had been extremely lucky, inthe previous year we had virtuallyno turnover . . . so that we had aregiment which, for all intents andpurposes, had been together for afull year, training.”

Second, 90 percent of thebrigade’s officers had seen combatbefore on the bloody beaches andin the jungles of the Pacific. Thiswas also the case for two-thirds ofthe staff noncommissioned offi-cers. Here was a group of leaderswell prepared for the rigors ofcombat.

With the addition of supportingunits hastily assembled, a rein-

8

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray

Born 30 January 1913 in Los Angeles, California, Murray grew up toattend Texas A&M College. While there he was enrolled in theReserve Officer Training Course. Graduating in 1935 with a bache-

lor of arts degree, he did a short stint in the Texas National Guard and thenwas commissioned in the Marine Corps on 1 July. After Basic School, hewas ordered to duty in China, 1937-1940. A radical change of scenery ledto an assignment as a captain with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade inIceland, 1941-1942.

Moving overseas in November 1942 with the 2d Division, he wasawarded the Silver Star in January 1943 for his service as CommandingOfficer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, on Guadalcanal. Now a lieutenantcolonel, he took his battalion on to Tarawa in November 1943, where hereceived a second Silver Star. This was followed by exploits on Saipan thatbrought him a Navy Cross and a Purple Heart in June 1944.

The years after World War II saw Murray in a variety of peacetimeMarine Corps duties, leading to his taking over in July 1950 asCommanding Officer, 5th Marines (a billet normally reserved for a fullcolonel). When his regiment became the core of the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade in Korea, and then was a key unit in the Inchon-Seoul battles, heagain distinguished himself in combat and was awarded his third SilverStar, a fourth one from the Army, and a Legion of Merit with Combat “V”in August and September 1950.

Further combat at the Naktong River, Inchon, Seoul, and the ChosinReservoir brought a second Navy Cross and an Army Distinguished ServiceCross.

In January 1951, after nearly eight years as a lieutenant colonel, he waspromoted to full colonel, and then, after a sequence of duties inWashington, Quantico, and Camp Pendleton, to the rank of brigadier gen-eral in June 1959. This led to his assignment as Assistant DivisionCommander, 3d Marine Division, on Okinawa. Promoted to major generalin February 1963, he saw duty as Deputy Commander, III MarineAmphibious Force, in Vietnam in October 1967.

After 33 years of highly decorated active duty, Murray retired in August1968 as a major general.

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forced RCT came into being. Sucha unit normally would be com-manded by a full colonel, but thiscase was different. As then-Lieutenant Colonel Murray laterrecalled:

I was sure that a colonelwould be brought in. It was-n’t until sometime later whenI was talking to [Major]General [Graves B.] Erskine[commanding the 1st MarineDivision] . . . and he told methat when this broke, GeneralCates told him, “I’ll get you acolonel as soon as I can to getout and take the regiment,”and General Erskine said hetold General Cates, “Don’tneed one. I’ve got somebodywho can take the regiment.”

Along with the manpower prob-lem came materiel problems. Thepeacetime economies forced on allthe military Services by politicaldecisions in Washington had hithard the resources of equipment,

supplies, and weapons. TheMarine Corps, however, had an aceup its sleeve for just such a highpressure, short-deadline situationas this.

Tucked away in the Californiadesert was the huge Marine SupplyDepot at Barstow. It had beenfilled five years earlier by followinga prudent, far-seeing policy thatcountless past emergencies hadtaught the Marine Corps: “Whenyou get a chance to stock up, do it,because you’ll never know whenyou’ll really need it!”

Thus, at the end of World War II,Marine salvage teams had lookedaround the Pacific islands for aban-doned equipment. Then theybrought it back to Barstow, re-painted it “Marine green,” stenciled“USMC” on it, and “mothballed” itfor future use. From this treasuretrove came the old jeeps, the oldtrucks, and the old amphibian trac-tors that would be so vital to thebrigade’s operations. Brand new,however, were the M-26 tanks withtheir 90mm guns. The Marines in

the 1st Tank Battalion had trainedin a different, older tank with dif-ferent armament, and their race toswitch over, train, and prepare forembarkation was typical of thepressure to which all hands weresubjected. (Each tanker got to fireexactly two rounds before depar-ture.)

It was the same frantic scene atEl Toro as MAG-33 struggled to getits aviators and planes up to com-bat readiness. As with the groundtroops, the organizational unitswere mere peacetime skeletons.Thus the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing(1st MAW) was a wing in nameonly, and had to be stripped barejust to give MAG-33 what it need-ed.

Adding a wholly new resourcewere “the first helicopter pilots ofthe United States Armed Forces tobe formed into a unit for overseascombat service.” They came fromQuantico, Virginia, where, since1947, the Marine Corps had pio-neered helicopter combat tech-niques. On their arrival, there werejust 48 hours to join up the fourHO3S-1 helicopters with the fourusable OY-2 observation planes,and have Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6) ready to shipout.

Somehow, it was done underthe unbelievable pressure of time,and the brigade air-ground teamwas ready to sail on schedule.There was one final vignette thatexemplified the morale of the men.A reporter-photographer, DavidDouglas Duncan, in his book, Thisis War!, described a scene whereGeneral Craig had spoken to amass meeting of his men justbefore they went on board ship.When they heard they were head-ed for Korea and Craig referred tothe traditional Marine role, “themen were dead-panned . . .expressionless.” But Duncan con-tinued:

9

When a brigade goes to war, it needs a lot of supplies and equipment. HereMarines labor on the dock at San Diego to load up the ships that will take themto war.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1063

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Then Craig, with hisBrigade Surgeon standing athis side, told his men that aslong as there were anyMarines alive in Korea whocould still fire a rifle, or toss agrenade, no other Marineswould be left behind uponthe battlefield, either wound-ed or dead. Over four thou-sand men shouted in unisonas his Leathernecks gleefullyslugged each other in the ribs,grinned happily and wantedto know when the hell theywere going aboard ship.

On 14 July the ships left SanDiego, taking Marines to combatonce more.

Preparing the Way

With the troops enroute at sea,General Craig and BrigadierGeneral Thomas J. Cushman hadboarded an airplane and flown toHawaii. There they met withLieutenant General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific(FMFPac). Craig underscored thepainful shortage of rifle companies;the missing 105mm howitzers in hisartillery, the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines; and his lack of motortransport.

Flying on to Tokyo on 19 July,the two Marine generals wentquickly to meet General Mac-Arthur. Craig made his feelings veryclear:

While talking to GeneralMacArthur, I informed himthat we were on a peace-strength basis, that we werean air-ground team and hadtrained as such at Pendletonand would be very effective ifleft intact. However, I told himthat if they took our air forceaway from us, our fighting

potential would be cut about99 percent as far as I was con-cerned.

MacArthur went on to assureCraig that the Marines could retaintheir planes, and he so informedLieutenant General George E.Stratemeyer, commander of the U.S.Far East Air Forces. This was a greatrelief to Craig, who later stated that“Stratemeyer was very anxious to

get Marine air under his commandas soon as they arrived in that area.”

The discussion continued on aharmonious note, with MacArthursaying, “I’m very glad to have youhere with the 1st Brigade.” Whenhe learned of Craig’s manpowershortages, he directed that a dis-patch go to the JCS requesting fullwar strength for the brigade.(During this time, messages contin-ued to fly back and forth regarding

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the mobilization of the full 1stMarine Division for a future cam-paign that MacArthur was alreadyplanning. This led to the call-up ofMarine Reserves on 19 July.)

The meeting ended with a direc-tive from MacArthur to set up bil-lets for the brigade in Japan. It wasnot to be. The situation in Koreahad degenerated to a near-col-lapse. U.S. Army troops had beenrushed from comfortable occupa-tion duty in Japan to bolster thereeling ROK divisions. Things hadgone badly—very badly. The offi-cial Army history recounts a con-tinuous series of problems: tanksambushed, sentries asleep, soldierskilled while riding in trucks insteadof marching, repeated retreats,communication breakdowns, etc.The history characterizes the situa-tion at the time the Marine brigadearrived by stating: “Walker wasconcerned about the failure of histroops to carry out orders to main-tain contact with the enemy.”Overall, it summarized the crisis instark language: “Never afterwardswere conditions as critical . . . .

Never again did the North Koreanscome as close to victory.”

Faced with this situation,Walker, as ground commander,had withdrawn all the troops into alast-stand enclave called the PusanPerimeter.

This was a 60-by-90-mile rectan-gle with the Sea of Japan on theeast, the Korean Strait on thesouth, the Naktong River on thewest, and a line of mountains onthe north. It did have one advan-tage crucial to Walker. This was hisability, in this constricted area, touse his interior lines of movementto set up a final defensive perime-ter with the capacity to rush emer-gency reinforcements to quell anyserious enemy threat where abreakthrough seemed imminent.

With the whole beachhead onthe Korean Peninsula now in suchperil, Craig received new, urgentorders on 25 July: the brigadewould go straight to Korea to serveas Walker’s “fire brigade” wheremost needed. The next day Craigwas in Taegu, Walker’s headquar-ters in South Korea. He used his

stay there to absorb all possibleinformation on the fluid situationon the front lines—including acareful aerial survey he made ofsites where his brigade might bethrown into action.

On 30 July, Craig headed forPusan, set up a temporary com-mand post, and wrote out a pre-liminary operations order for thebrigade as the NKPA tide rolledover Chinju and headed for nearbyMasan. Arrangements were madewith MAG-33 in Japan to be readyfor action the moment the brigadearrived on board its transports.

The next day, still without adecision by Walker on the deploy-ment of the brigade, Craig sensedthe threat to Masan, looming sucha short distance from Pusan, as aprobable priority. Accordingly, hedecided to supplement his previ-ous aerial view with a groundreconnaissance by jeep. Then hewaited tensely for his brigade toarrive.

It came 2 August; it moved out 3August. One historian, DonaldKnox, crystallized that moment in

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1185

The men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade have landed in Pusan, Korea, and are marched off to combat.

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his book, The Korean War:

The fluid situation thebrigade would encounter inthe Pusan Perimeter woulddemand the very elements theMarines had in abundance—courage, initiative, élan . . . .morale in the rifle companieswas extremely high. In spiteof what they’d heard, theMarines knew the NorthKoreans could be beaten. TheMarine Corps was sending toKorea the best it had.

The Fire Brigade Goes to War:Crisis Number One

It was an early start; at 0600 on3 August the “fire brigade” moved

out to meet head-on the mosturgent enemy threat. It went with aringing message from Cates: “Theproud battle streamers of ourCorps go with you in combat. Thepride and honor of many genera-tions of Marines is entrusted to youtoday. You are the old breed. Withyou moves the heart and the souland the spirit of all whoever borethe title United States Marine.Good luck and Godspeed.”

Part of the men (1st Battalion)went by truck to the staging areaof Changwon. Since the Marineshad been forced by a shortage ofshipping to leave their heavyequipment back in the UnitedStates, the transportation was madepossible by borrowing two Armytruck companies, with an addition-al bonus in the form of a loan ofcommunication jeeps and recon-naissance company jeeps with .50-caliber machine guns. Going bytrain were the precious tanks andsome of the men. Duncan, thereporter, described what thosekind of trips were like:

The first stage of movingup to the front was no prob-

12

Loading up the old Korean railroad cars, the men have their packs full, andcarry entrenching tools, as they head for their Changwon staging area.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1181

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-416920

The F4U Corsairs of VFM-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513, with a helicopter ofVMO-6, jam-pack the deck of the USS Badoeng Strait enroute to Pusan.

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lem, but it was slow. Thetroop trains were sturdy,wooden-bodied old coaches,leftovers from the days whenthe Japanese had run thecountry. . . . The Marinesinside showed almost nointerest in the slowly passingscenery. They ate theirrations, oiled their weapons,slept in the vestibulesbetween the cars with theirrifles held close. They wereprofessional men riding towork.

The planes of MAG-33 had abusy time that same day of 3August. Under the command ofGeneral Cushman were the fightersquadrons VMF-323 (“DeathRattlers”) under Major Arnold A.Lund and VMF-214 (“BlackSheep”) commanded by LieutenantColonel Walter E. Lischeid. Theywere equipped with 60 of the gull-winged Corsair F4Us. One of theirpartners was Marine Night FighterSquadron 513 (VMF[N]-513)(“Flying Nightmares”) under MajorJoseph H. Reinburg. This was asquadron specially trained fornight fighting with its F4U-5NCorsairs and new twin-engine F7FTigercats. The other partner wasVMO-6, commanded by MajorVincent J. Gottschalk, with its fourusable OY-2 light observationplanes and, for the first time in realcombat for any U.S. Service, fourSikorsky HO3S-1 helicopters.

When the ground elements ofthe brigade were unloading inPusan, MAG-33 had been in Kobe,Japan. From there, VMF-323 hadgone on board the Badoeng Strait,while VMF-214 was based on theSicily (CVE-118). VMF(N)-513 wasbased at Itazuke Airfield onKyushu Island. Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)traveled by ship to Pusan. VMO-6amazed the Japanese citizens

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Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman

Born on 27 June 1895 in Saint Louis, Cushman graduated from theUniversity of Washington in Seattle and subsequently enlisted in theMarine Corps in July 1917. Commissioned in October 1918, he

received his naval aviator wings the following year. Duty in Guam,Nicaragua, and Haiti followed the diverse Marine aviation pattern of the1920s.

Next, in June 1933, came a tour in the Bureau of Aeronautics of theNavy Department, and then, broadening his interservice experience, heattended the Army Air Corps Tactical School in 1935. With the commitmentof Marine aviation in World War II, Cushman was appointed Chief of Staff,Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific. With a temporary rank of brigadier generalin January 1944, he was next assigned as Air Defense Commander,Marianas Islands. For these services he was awarded a Bronze Star and theLegion of Merit with Combat “V.”

When his rank was made permanent in 1947, he became CommandingGeneral, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, the following year. With theoutbreak of the Korean War, he was assigned as Assistant WingCommander, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, in June 1950. With the forward ech-elon of the wing, he provided the air support for the Marine Brigade whenit went to Korea. In 1951 he took command of the wing. His leadershipthere brought him his second Legion of Merit and a Distinguished ServiceMedal.

His final billet was Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, asa major general in 1953, and, after promotion to lieutenant general in 1954,he retired. He died in July 1972.

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when it simply took off in its lightobservation planes and helicoptersfrom the streets of Kobe. Four ofits helicopters and four of its OYplanes made the short hop toPusan on 2 August, so they werethere, ready to go with the brigade,even though they had not beenvisible in that memorable scene onthe waterfront.

VMF-214 launched an eight-plane flight from the Sicily on 3August and pummeled Chinju withincendiary bombs, rockets, andstrafing, a small preview of whatthe Marines had in store for theNKPA 6th Division. This attacktook place less than a month afterthe receipt of official orders send-ing the planes to the Far East. (Aneven earlier mission—the first forMarine planes—had been on 4 Julywhen two F4U Corsair photo-graphic planes from MAG-12 onthe carrier Valley Forge (CV-45)had joined in a Navy air strikeagainst the North Korean capital ofPyongyang.)

On a succession of those earlyAugust days, all three of theMarine fighter squadrons kept up asteady pattern of bombing, straf-ing, and rocketing attacks on NKPAtargets. On 5 August, for instance,Major Kenneth L. Reusser led afour-plane division of Corsairs toInchon, the port of the SouthKorean capital of Seoul. There hewas responsible for the discoveryand the destruction of an enemytank assembly plant, an oil refin-ery, and an oil tanker ship. Thetwo Corsairs which Reusser flewon two successive strikes duringhis attacks of that day were severe-ly damaged by enemy fire. He wasawarded a gold star in lieu of asecond Navy Cross for his heroismon this mission.

VMO-6 was also busy. Thesquadron had moved west fromPusan to Chinhae, a base close tothe threatened city of Masan and

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Vought F4U-4B Corsair

The familiar Vought F4U Corsair emerged out of World War II syn-onymous with American victory in the Pacific and became the air-craft most closely associated with Marine Corps aviation. The

Corsair was a versatile, tough, and heavy fighter-bomber and night-fight-er, and was easily recognized by its distinctive inverted gull wings. At theconclusion of the war, Vought’s concentration was in the limited produc-tion of the F4U-4 models, producing 2,356 up to 1947.

The 4B model was equipped with a 2,100 horsepower engine of thePratt and Whitney R-2800-18W type. The aircraft had a top speed of almost450 mph, a climb rate of 3,870 feet per minute, and a range of more than1,000 miles. Operational altitudes could be reached as high as 41,500 feet.Standard armament for the 4B were the awesome six .50-caliber machineguns, and a payload capability of eight 5-inch rockets and up to 4,000pounds of ordnance.

When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade made its entry into the KoreanWar, supporting the Marines on the ground were both Navy squadronsand, in particular, the Marine units from the carriers Badoeng Strait andSicily,VMF-214, better known as the Black Sheep Squadron, and VMF-323,the Death Rattlers Squadron.

Starting on 7 August 1950, VMF-214 and -323, both of which had effec-tively absorbed the lessons of close air support during WWII, provided thebrigade support by having four to 10 Corsairs continuously overhead.Flying a total of 6,575 combat support missions, the favorite ordnance car-ried for close air support missions was napalm, deadly jellied gasoline thatwas most effective against NKPA armor. The Corsairs usually carried two150-gallon napalm bombs that weighed approximately 1,400 poundsapiece.

During the month of August, the close air support missions fromBadoeng Strait and Sicily gave everyone a lasting impression. Observingfrom the ground, said an Army soldier of the Marine aviators: “The effec-tiveness of Marine close air support astonished Army troops fighting along-side the Leathernecks.’’ On 18 August, several hundred NKPA fell underthe Death Rattler’s Corsairs’ merciless air assault that pounded their retreatacross the Naktong River.

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the brigade’s forthcoming zone ofaction. This location had been aSouth Korean naval base andammunition depot, but it had a2,600-foot airstrip with two com-pleted hangars and quonset hutsfor housing. So VMO-6 set upquickly for business.

Craig took off early on 3 Augustin one of its helicopters and put ina remarkable day that demonstrat-ed the amazing versatility and use-fulness of the new aircraft. Hestopped to give instructions to thelead battalion on the march; hethen selected a site for his forwardcommand post (CP); and he thenflew to Masan to confer withWalker and Major General WilliamB. Kean, USA, commander of the25th Infantry Division, to whichthe brigade would be attached.Finally, on his return trip, Craiglanded three more times to meetwith his unit commanders.

Craig’s own later evaluation ofthis mobility was very specific.After noting that fast travel by jeepwas often impossible due to traffic-clogged roads, considerable dis-tances to his objectives, and fre-quent tactical moves, he contrastedthese impediments with his obliga-

tions. These included conferenceswith Army generals, the need toreturn to his CP to issue orders,then to observe his Marines in thefield, as well as the requirementthat he reconnoiter the terrainbefore operations began. He thencommented: “My staff faced thesame problems. Time was alwayspressing. Fortunately, Marine heli-copters attached to VMO-6 werealways available for observation,communications, and control.These aircraft made my day!Without them I do not believe wewould have had the success wedid.”

The squadron’s OY-2 lightplanes were equally useful on thatday as they flew convoy for thebrigade and made reconnaissanceflights over the staging area, look-ing for any signs of enemy infiltra-tion. This proved so successful thatVMO-6 set up a regular procedureto have an OY over the brigadearea at all times during daylighthours. To provide this non-stopsupport, there were shifts with anew plane, new pilot, and newobserver coming in relays everytwo hours. Similarly, two heli-copters went every morning to the

brigade CP, to be relieved at noonby two others.

This new element of air mobili-ty proved to be a vital asset to theground troops. Craig pointed outthat “maps were poor, and no onein the brigade had personal knowl-edge of the terrain over which wewere to fight. Helicopters were alife saver in this connection, asthey provided the means for evencommanders of small units to getinto the air quickly from almostany point and identify roads, vil-lages and key points prior to mov-ing their troops.” The helicopterssoon were employed for a widevariety of additional missions:evacuating the wounded; trans-porting supplies to inaccessible hillpeaks; scouting enemy locations;and rescuing downed fighterpilots.

Of course, the NKPA was quickto open fire whenever it spottedone of the helicopters on theground. Duncan, the reporter, wasagain on the spot for one typicalepisode. He was cutting across oneof the rice paddies to where an air-craft sat with rotor blades keptspinning for a fast take-off.General Craig emerged from that

15

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130913

The eyes of the brigade: the OY light observation plane was invaluable in the rugged terrain and endless hills.

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helicopter, checking the disposi-tion of his troops. As the reporterlooked closely at him, a convictiongrew: “I knew that [he] could takeanything that Korea could handout.”

Duncan’s account continues:“Suddenly that old familiar bucket-swinging swoosh cut out all othersounds and two mortar bombsdropped into the riverbed. Greatgeysers of mud and gravel mixedwith red-hot fragments shot intothe sky. So did the helicopter.Before another bracket of bombscould fall the aircraft was halfwaydown the valley, General Craigwas in his jeep headed for his CPon the mountainside.”

With the full brigade concentrat-ed at Changwon by the late after-noon of 3 August, Craig faced avery uncertain situation. Althoughhe had been ordered into a“bivouac” status as Eighth Army

reserve, he was wary, for hisChangwon location was very closeto a vital road junction atChindong-ni where heavy fightingwas taking place. With the perime-ter shrinking at an alarming rateand an NKPA envelopment fromthe west headed straight for Pusan,Craig decided:

We felt that going intobivouac would leave us wideopen for surprise. To ensureour security and be preparedfor any eventuality, I deployedthe brigade tactically.

Although a little trigger-happy, we were ready forcombat, even though situatedbehind the so-called front-lines. During the few days wewere at Changwon, we knewwe were observed by enemyobservation posts and patrolsoff on the flank. They did not

bother us. A major penetrationof the U.S. Army lines atChindong-ni could have beenfatal to us if we had beencaught in bivouac.

The general’s reference to “a lit-tle trigger-happy” was an under-statement made some time later, forthe first night they were anythingbut professional. In pitch darkness,with thoughts of enemy infiltrationmaking some of the men tense,nervous firing broke out among theMarines.

Although there were varyingopinions of how widespread thefiring was, one private first classnamed Fred F. Davidson, laterrecalled:

I raised my carbine andsqueezed the trigger. Themuzzle flash blinded me. Forthe next few seconds I saw

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17

AMarine in a rifle company had a wide variety ofweapons that he could use himself, or that wereavailable in other units to support him. As always,

his basic weapon was his rifle.

U.S. Rifle, .30-Caliber, M1The .30-caliber M1 rifle was a gas-operated, clip-fed,

air-cooled, semi-automatic weapon. It weighed 9.5pounds, had an average rate of aimed fire of 30 roundsper minute, a muzzle velocity of 2,600-2,800 feet persecond, and a bullet clip capacity of eight rounds.Inherited from World War II, the M1 provided strong andaccurate firepower for the rifleman.

U.S. Carbine, .30-Caliber, M1The .30-caliber M1 carbine was a gas-operated, mag-

azine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic shoulder weapon.The weight was only 5.75 pounds. Eight inches shorterthan the M1 rifle, it had a muzzle velocity of just 2,000feet per second, and a magazine capacity of 15 rounds.This size and weight led to its issuance to officers,although it lacked the hitting power of the M1.

Automatic Pistol, .45-Caliber, M1911A1Regardless of what was officially prescribed, a num-

ber of Marines carried a .45-caliber automatic pistol inKorea. This was a time-honored weapon featured in thelore of the Corps. Described as a recoil-operated, maga-zine-fed, self-loading hand weapon, the .45-caliberweighed 2.76 pounds when fully loaded, was 8.59 inch-es in length, and had a capacity of seven rounds. Themuzzle velocity was 802 feet per second, while the max-imum effective range for the troops using it was only 25yards. In close combat, it often proved invaluable.

To furnish a high volume of direct fire in support ofthe rifle platoons, there were three types of automaticweapons.

Browning, .30-Caliber, M1919A4The .30-caliber “Browning” light machine gun was a

recoil-operated, belt-fed, air-cooled weapon. It weighed31 pounds, but with its tripod mount that rose to 49.75pounds. While the “cyclical” rate of fire was 400-550rounds per minute, the “usable” rate was really 150rounds per minute. Muzzle velocity varied between2,600 to 2,800 feet per second, depending on the car-tridge used.

Browning, .30-Caliber, M1917A1The “Browning” .30-caliber water-cooled “heavy”

machine gun was extensively used in the battle forSeoul and in the trenches at the end of the war. Its effec-tive rate of fire was 350-450 rounds per minute. With amuzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per minute, in direct fire itsmaximum effective range was 3,000 yards. This droppedto 300 yards for indirect fire. Its length was 38.5 inches.“Heavy” was an accurate term, since the gun alone

weighed 41 pounds, and its tripod added another 53pounds. Each ammunition belt contained 250 rounds.

Browning Automatic-Rifle,.30-Caliber, M1918A2

As a mainstay of the rifle squad, the “B-A-R” (as itwas always called) was an air-cooled, gas-operated,magazine-fed, shoulder weapon. Weighing 20 pounds,it had a magazine capacity of 20 rounds. The man usingit carried still more weight in the magazine pouches onhis web belt. Although maximum range could be 5,500yards, its effective range was 500 yards. There were twocyclical rates of fire for the BAR-man to choose: slow,350, and normal, 550.

Two other specialized weapons were invaluable forthe Marines during Pusan and the subsequent streetfighting in Seoul. Against North Korean tanks, strongpoints, and snipers in buildings, they were deadly.

3.5-Inch Rocket LauncherFamiliarly call the “bazooka,” the rocket launcher

fired an 8.5-pound rocket with a hollow-shaped chargein its head. It weighed 15 pounds and was usually han-dled by a two-man team.

75mm Recoilless RifleThe 75mm recoilless rifle fired conventional shells in

a flat trajectory, weighed 105 pounds, and required atripod in use. Its effective range was 1,000 to 2,000yards.

MortarsThe 60mm mortar was a smooth-bore, muzzle-load-

ing, high-angle-fire weapon used by a rifle company.With its base plate and bipod support, it weighed 42pounds. Normal rate of fire was 18 rounds per minute,using either high explosive, white phosphorous, or illu-minating shells. These had ranges varying from 1,075 to1,985 yards.

The 81mm mortar could fire a 6.8 pound high explo-sive shell up to 3,290 yards. Its weight, combining bar-rel, base plate, and tripod totaled 136 pounds. Elevationcould be varied from 40 to 85 degrees.

The 4.2-inch mortar, affectionately referred to as the“four-deuce,” fired a round with more explosive powerthan a 105mm howitzer. Equivalent to 107mm in cal-iber, it could fire a 25.5-pound shell up to 4,400 yards.Total weight was 330 pounds.

105mm Howitzer M101A1As a light, towed field artillery weapon, this was used

in direct support of infantry units. A battalion had threebatteries with six howitzers each. Weighing 4,950pounds, the cannon fired a 33-pound shell to a maxi-mum range of 11,000 meters. While usually moved bya truck, a heavy helicopter could also carry it. The 105needed only three minutes to emplace and could sus-tain a rate of fire of three rounds per minute.

Weapons

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lights and stars. Andy shouted,“Hey, you almost hit me!” Oh,God, I didn’t know I was aim-ing in that direction. It was sodark I couldn’t see my frontsight. I said to myself, “Youbetter take it easy, ol’ buddy,before you kill some Marine.”Over to my rear someone elsepulled off a round. Next it wassomeone to my front.

Then the firing pinballedfrom place to place all overthe hill and back down towardthe railroad track . . . . Finally. . . all firing ceased . . . . Therest of the night I lay awake,scared, my finger on the trig-ger.

The brigade’s stay at Changwonwas brief but useful. The rifle unitsgot a pithy lecture about fire disci-pline and conducted patrols to thehigh ground beside them—a fore-taste of the endless hill climbsahead. The tank and artillery unitshad a opportunity at last to dosome training in firing theirweapons, and the ReconnaissanceCompany started its probing oper-ations. Firm communications wereset up with the fighter squadronsafloat.

Craig made two trips to Masanfor planning meetings with Walkerand Kean, and late on 5 August thebrigade got the word to be pre-pared to move out by truck thenext day to Chindong-ni withaction to come immediately there-after. The town was eight milessouthwest of Masan on the road toChinju. It was the point now sub-ject to imminent NKPA attack.

Walker had assigned three unitsto this first offensive: the Marinebrigade, two regiments of the 25thInfantry Division, and the Army’s5th RCT. They would be calledTask Force Kean.

For the brigade, the 3d Battal-ion, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Robert D. Taplett, wasdesignated to move first on 6August. Arriving at Chindong-ni,Taplett had to scout out the situa-tion, since his battalion was due tobe temporarily under the opera-tional control of an Army colonelcommanding the Army’s 27th RCTthere. When he got to the Armyregimental command post (CP),the colonel was not there, and hisoperations officer did not knowwhere he could be found, and nei-ther could Taplett contact the com-manding officer of the battalion inChindong-ni. Its CP was there,right in the middle of the road, soTaplett quickly chose a very differ-ent location for his CP—on thereverse slope of a ridgeline.

As 7 August began, Task ForceKean was ready to jump off on thefirst real American offensive of theKorean War. Looking back on thisday, Craig later felt that the funda-mental requirement was for com-

bat readiness. He had seen this ina brigade which was activated atCamp Pendleton on 7 July and wasin combat by 7 August—only onemonth later.

It was in truth a memorable datefor the brigade: exactly eight yearsearlier, to the day, Marines hadopened the first American groundoffensive of World War II atGuadalcanal. The plan now calledfor a three-pronged attack, withthe brigade on the left followingthe south (roundabout) fork of themain road, the 5th RCT movingstraight ahead on the road in thecenter (the direct line west toChinju), and a regiment of the 25thInfantry Division swinging aroundin an arc on the right to join upwith the 5th RCT halfway toChinju.

It looked good on paper, but theNKPA refused to cooperate. The6th Division fully expected to con-tinue its unbroken string of victo-

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A Marine guides a work detail of South Korean carriers, bringing ammunitionand water to the front lines.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1303

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ries. Its commander, under ordersto roll into Pusan forthwith, hadissued this stirring proclamation tohis men:

Comrades, the enemy isdemoralized. The task givento us is the liberation ofMasan and Chinju and theannihilation of the remnantsof the enemy. We have . . .accelerated the liberation ofall Korea. However, the liber-ation of Chinju and Masanmeans the final battle to cutoff the windpipe of theenemy. Comrades, this glori-ous task has fallen to our divi-sion! Men of the 6th Division,let us annihilate the enemyand distinguish ourselves!

Thus, just as Task Force Keanlaunched its attack, so did the 6thDivision. The Army’s 5th RCT ledoff on the 7th with its 1st Battalion.When it got to the road junctionwest of Chindong-ni, for someunknown reason it took the left(south) fork that was assigned tothe Marines instead of goingstraight ahead (west) on the roadthat led to Chinju. Advancing threemiles on the wrong road, it leftopen to enemy control Hill 342which overlooked and command-ed the main supply route that thetask force would need. Kean hadordered that this was to be held “atall costs.”

A company of the 2d Battalion,5th RCT, had earlier been on thehill, but it was now quickly sur-rounded and cut off. To help breakthe siege, a midnight order camefrom the 25th Division, via thecommanding officer of the Army’s27th Infantry Regiment, to send aMarine platoon to help the belea-guered Army company on Hill 342.It would be the first infantry actionfor the brigade.

Second Lieutenant John J. H.“Blackie” Cahill from Company Ggot the job that night of 6-7August. Reinforced with a machinegun squad and a radio operator, heset out for the CP of the Army’s27th Infantry and then the CP ofthe 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. There hereceived the astonishing order thathis one platoon was to relieve theArmy’s besieged company andhold the hill by itself. Moving outthrough the night of 6 August, theMarines suffered two woundedfrom fire that proved to be fromthe 2d Battalion, 5th RCT. Therefollowed the next morning (7August), the beginning of a hotday, an agonizing series of hillclimbs in untempered sun whichled to heat prostration and emptycanteens, and then enemy fire onthe platoon as it staggeredupwards to the hilltop, urged onby Cahill and his noncommis-sioned officers. Only 37 of theoriginal 52 men reached the top.Once there, Cahill used his radio tocall his own 3d Battalion for badlyneeded supporting artillery fireand air drops of water and ammu-nition.

When the severity of the prob-lems on Hill 342 became clearer,

Company D from LieutenantColonel Harold S. Roise’s 2dBattalion was sent into action on 7August. As the NKPA continued toreinforce its troops, the rest of the2d Battalion became heavilyengaged nearby. In air temperatureof 112 degrees men continuallycollapsed from nausea and heatexhaustion. Water was scarce andthe slopes of the hill seemed to goon straight up forever. Finally, atthe end of the day (7 August),Company D had nearly reachedthe crest, but, exhausted, dug inwhere it was for the night.

Meanwhile, the Army companyand Cahill’s platoon on the cresthad had a brutal day. Parched forwater and completely surroundedby enemy fire, they managed tohang on with reinforcements nownear at hand. And so the day forthe 2d Battalion ended in a stale-mate with the enemy on andaround Hill 342.

There were problems every-where else. The 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, under Lieutenant ColonelGeorge R. Newton, was backed upin Chindong-ni because the Armybattalion had taken the wrongroad. Taplett’s 3d Battalion hadrelieved a battalion of the Army’s

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A413601

The pin-point attacks of their Corsairs gave the Marines invaluable close air sup-port. Here the F4Us of VMF-323 are being loaded with rockets on board the USSBadoeng Strait before a mission.

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27th RCT the day before, but nowthe latter found itself attacked as ittried to move into reserve in therear. The 5th RCT was stalled.

The official Army history de-scribes this day of 7 August per-fectly when it refers to “a generalmelee” amid “confusion.” Theproblems were compounded whenthe NKPA slipped around Chin-dong-ni and occupied a command-ing height, Hill 255, that dominatedthe task force’s supply road toMasan in the rear.

Hearing of the stalled attack ofhis 5th RCT, Kean was exasperatedand took prompt action. He con-tacted Craig, who never forgot theday. His men were relieving theArmy’s 27th RCT, with Chindong-nito be the jump-off point for theMarines’ attack once the Army’s 5thRCT had cleared the road intersec-tion just ahead. Craig remembered:“At Chindong-ni I found the most

confused situation that I’ve encoun-tered in the Marine Corps . . . .Finally, due to the inability of theArmy to clear the road junction andthe hold-up of our offensive,General Kean put all troops in thatarea under the Marine brigadecommander, and I was given thebrigade plus the [Army’s] 24thRegiment and the 5th RCT.”

This took place on 7 August, andnow Craig would have to sortthings out and get the task forcemoving forward. To do this, heacted in a typical way: he wentstraight to the front lines to observethe situation first-hand. This kind ofon-the-spot leadership immediatelystruck Second Lieutenant Patrick G.Sivert, an observer overhead in anOY. He was “amazed” on that veryfirst day at how close the brigadeCP was to the front lines. In con-trast, he noted that “with the otheroutfits in the surrounding area, it

was just the converse. Conse-quently, our communications, forthe most part, with the Marine unitson the ground were almost alwaysvery good, and with the other unitsalmost always very bad.”

When Craig went forward, hefound that the 5th RCT, underColonel Godwin L. Ordway, USA,was still held up, even though“enemy resistance was light.” It wasclear to Craig that, to break thedeadlock, he would need to launcha series of aggressive attacks by allhis ground units, with heavyartillery and air support.

Thus, early the next morning, 8August, Company D pushed to thecrest of Hill 342. Cahill and the bat-tered survivors greeted them withenormous relief. It remained, how-ever, a touch-and-go situation.Enemy fire was sweeping the encir-cled position, Marine officers weregoing down, and NKPA riflemen

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Exhausted due to the strenuous climb and scorching heat,Marines establish a hasty perimeter on a hillcrest west ofChindong-ni. Chingdong-ni would be where they got their

“first taste of the enemy,” whom they found to be “spirited,tenacious, and well trained.”

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A12036

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were slowly and steadily wormingtheir way up the approaches. Aprivate in Company D, DouglasKoch, felt the pressure: “I felt pret-ty bad. This was a very hectic time.There’d been a lot of climbing, wewere under fire . . . . Someonehollered that the lieutenant wasdead . . . . Firing was hot andheavy. Guys fell around me.” Itgrew worse. NKPA soldiers cameright up to the Marine lines. Thefirefight continued to grow inintensity. When word was shoutedthat there was a new commandingofficer, First Lieutenant Robert T.Hanifin, Jr., it was soon followedby the depressing news that hehad collapsed in the heat. Thispassed command of the companyto a veteran gunnery sergeant.Koch knew that there was onlyone thing for him and the sur-rounded men to do: hang on.

One of the reasons that theycould “hang on” was that theMarines called on a weapon thatthe enemy had not previouslyexperienced: air strikes that werenot only immediate but also gavetruly close air support. Panels werelaid out to mark the ground posi-tions, a radio call went to the for-ward air controller at battalionheadquarters (who personallyknew the pilots) and then to thecontrol plane in the Corsairsalready orbiting overhead. Downthey screeched, strafing and rock-eting. They came close in—veryclose in—to the defender’s lines.Empty shell casings from theirmachine guns fell into the laps ofthe men below. This was morethan the previously all-victoriousNKPA troops had bargained for.Their firing slacked off, and thecrucial hilltop held. Some 600enemy attackers had failed in theirattempt to cut the task force’s mainsupply route.

These strikes were part ofCraig’s plan to push his men ahead

with continuous close air support.In the first three days of combat,the two Marine fighter squadronsflew well over 100 sorties. Thesquadrons had tailored their flightschedules so that one or the otherwas always overhead, readyinstantly to respond to calls forstrikes during the daylight hours.

The other planes of MAG-33were also daily demonstrating theirworth. The OYs had bomb racksattached to their wing struts, thusenabling them to carry rations orcans of water to the ground troopspanting in the heat and strugglingup the ever-present hill slopes.This was supplemented by “daisychains” of South Korean laborerswho would pass up five-galloncans of water, along with ammuni-tion, to the men on the hilltops.The observation planes alsobecame expert at spotting artilleryfire for the 11th Marines. The OYsslow speed proved to be a bigadvantage. Sivert explained:

In this type of terrain theenemy was so adept at cam-ouflage that most of the timehigh-performance aircraftwere just too fast to get downand search out a target. We inthe slower moving aircraftwere able to get down muchlower, take our time in spot-ting a target, and then tostand off to one side or theother of the [bombing] runs,and make sure the aircraftwere hitting the correct tar-gets.

Too, we were using thesame maps that the groundcommanders were using.They were able to give us tar-gets and pinpoint the targetswith exact coordinates.

Another advantage of the OYswas the ability to look down onhills (particularly reverse slopes)

where the forward air controller(FAC) with the infantry on theground was blocked from seeingthe enemy target. Sivert found thata pattern of effective teamworkdeveloped: the FAC would call onan OY to spot a target and givehim the direction in which thebombing runs should be made.Sometimes the OY would evengive the type of ammunition to beused on the target. Then, when thebombing runs had been complet-ed, the OY would furnish damageestimates to the FAC. Teamworkwas essential, since the OY couldonly communicate with the aircraftby relaying all directions throughthe FAC.

Helicopters also carried precioussupply cargoes to isolated areas. Inaddition, they became invaluablein evacuating wounded riflemen.The fighter pilots developed anenthusiastic appreciation of thesenew “birds” when they similarlyproved adept at rescuing pilotswho had been shot down.

The full 2d Battalion was con-solidating its control of Hill 342 on8 August, much to the relief ofCahill (who received a Silver Starfor his leadership). Meanwhile, theother rifle units of Murray’s 5thMarines were also very busy.Taplett’s 3d Battalion drew theassignment on 7 August of drivingthe enemy off the strategic Hill255, which overlooked andblocked the main supply route(MSR) to the rear. The first small-scale attack on 8 August wasdirected at a lower hill that wouldgive access to 255. It was repulsed.The commander of Company H,Captain Joseph C. Fegan, Jr., waslater awarded a gold star in lieu ofa second Silver Star for his boldactions when he personally led thenext assault, after a platoon leaderrefused to move (Fegan relievedhim for that). It came down to themessy business of cleaning out

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each enemy foxhole, one at a time,for the NKPA troops fought to thedeath. Fegan was ably assisted bythe heroics of such men asCorporal Melvin James (ArmyDistinguished Service Cross andSilver Star), and Technical SergeantRay Morgan and Private First ClassDonald Terrio (Silver Stars).

When Company H hastily dug infor the night, Staff Sergeant JamesC. Davis had his platoon in a for-ward position only 75 yards fromthe enemy. While repairing adefective hand grenade, it slippedout of his grasp and dropped inthe midst of his men. A posthu-mous award of a Navy Crossdescribed his immediate reaction:“Without a moment’s hesitation, hechose to sacrifice himself, ratherthan endanger his companions,and threw himself upon the livegrenade.”

In parallel action by Company Gthat day, Sergeant Jack E. Macywould later be awarded aDistinguished Service Cross for hisperilous rescue trips to bringwounded men into safety. By theend of the day, the Marines weresecurely in possession of the first

hill, with 255 looming ahead. Thecompany had advanced more than1,400 yards in the teeth of a fierce-ly resisting enemy. It had takennine gruelling hours with great suf-fering from lack of water, heatexhaustion, and overexertion inthe stifling weather. One man inthe battalion later admitted: “Guysalmost went mad for water. I neverfelt the kind of heat I felt in Korea.I just burned up. My hands wentnumb. I couldn’t help myself; Ibegan crying like a baby. I wasashamed. I felt I could crawl into amouse hole and die, but I couldn’thelp what was happening to me.”

This kind of water-deprivationand dehydration in the midst ofblinding heat seriously affected thecombat strength of all of the bat-talions. Murray, the regimentalcommander, admitted: “One time Ifigured I had about at least a thirdof my regiment lying at the side ofthe road with heat prostration.”

In spite of the gruelling physicalproblems—and the fanatical resis-tance by the enemy—the battalionhad now successfully positioneditself for the final lunge at Hill 255.

As Craig jockeyed his forces to

meet the NKPA thrusts and launchhis own attacks, Newton’s 1stBattalion was finally able to moveout of Chindong-ni early on 8August. Its orders were to proceedto the now-famous road fork andtake the left (south) route, whilethe Army’s 5th RCT was to take thestraight-ahead (west) route. Tryingto approach the junction, Newtonfound that the 5th RCT was stillstalled there. The road to the forkwas jammed with soldiers andArmy vehicles; it was a scene of“congestion and confusion.” Withthe advance of the Marine battal-ion thus blocked, the solution forprogress came in an order fromKean to Murray: send your 1stBattalion on a night march to Hill308 to relieve the Army battalionthat took your south road in error.It was expected to be a dangerousmaneuver. The commander of theArmy battalion felt that his compa-nies were “cut off” by the NKPA;the Marines were to veer off themain road short of the cloggedjunction and file in column alongnarrow dikes in a wide rice paddy,totally exposed if fired upon; twoSouth Korean civilians of unknowntrustworthiness were to guidethem through the pitch black night(since the assigned Army guidenever appeared). Newton wasdeeply upset when the Army bat-talion prematurely withdrew fromits position without waiting for theMarine relief force. As AndrewGeer described this unfortunatedevelopment in The New Breed,“there was a display of temper”between the two battalion com-manders.

By midnight the Army troopshad cleared the rice paddy paths,and the Marines quickly movedout. To the gratified surprise of themen, they encountered no enemy,and by dawn on 9 August theywere safely assembled at the baseof Hill 308. The battalion had been

22

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2262

Supporting fire from the howitzers of the 11th Marines was a crucial prelude toevery attack of the riflemen.

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on the move, afoot, for 22 consec-utive hours; the men were thirstyand dog-tired, but they had carriedout the relief as ordered.

Kean, meanwhile, had not limit-ed himself to his orders to Murray.He had come up to the deadlock atthe junction, and his next orderswere short and to the point.Indicating the hill that controlledthe junction to one of his battalioncommanders (who had earlierfailed to capture the hill), Keanbarked, “I want that hill tonight!” Itwas finally done.

The events of 8 August were notdecisive in themselves, and did notappear to represent any realprogress for the task force.Nevertheless, the groundwork hadbeen laid, and Craig now had histroops where they were in positionnot only to crush the enemy’soffensive, but also finally to makereal progress of their own towardthe ultimate objective of Chinju.

Two of the opposing forces,NKPA and Marine, had learnedsomething about each other inthese first clashes. Colonel RobertD. Heinl, Jr., in Soldiers of the Seasummed it up:

The Marines got their firsttaste of the enemy. Theyfound him spirited, tenacious,well trained, and generouslyequipped with Russian gear.Used to having the campaigntheir own way, the NorthKoreans fought confidently,but reacted with considerablesurprise when they foundthemselves facing troops whogave no ground, hung on totheir weapons, and broughtin their wounded and dead.

A subsequent article in theMarine Corps Gazette by historianLynn Montross analyzed the battleskills of the NKPA this way:

The Marines learned torespect a hardy enemy for hisskill at camouflage, ambush,infiltration, and use of cover.They learned that supportingair and artillery fires often hadlimited effect on a foe makingclever use of reverse slopedefenses to offset Marine con-centrations. Thus a ridgemight protect and conceal anenemy strong point untilattackers were too close forsupporting fires.

When this situation developed,with the heavy firepower of theMarines neutralized, their attackwas reduced to the familiar basicessential of small arms fire fights.In these circumstances, the NKPAwas able to meet them on eventerms, man-to-man.

Just as the Marines had sized upthe enemy, so, too, they hadformed their own opinion of the

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Army units with whom they werein contact. Other judgements werealso being made at this time. AnArmy colonel had been sent byGeneral Mark Clark’s Army FieldForces Headquarters to evaluatethe units of the Eighth Army in lateJuly and early August. On 9 Augusthe made his report to LieutenantGeneral Matthew B. Ridgway,whose aide prepared a detailed 12-point memorandum on the find-ings.

The report was very harsh. It isquoted at length in a recent bookby Brigadier General Uzal W. Ent,USA (Ret), entitled Fighting on theBrink: Defense of the PusanPerimeter. The book has Ent’ssummary, saying that the report“verbally ripped the officers andenlisted men of Eighth Armyapart.” It underscored three “prin-cipal deficiencies”: lack of knowl-edge of infantry fundamentals; lackof leadership in combat echelons;

and the absence of an aggressivefighting spirit.

Regardless of Army problemsand wary of a tough enemy, butconfident it could smash ahead,the 5th Marines made real progresson 9 August. Murray was a driverwho knew that aggressive attackswould, in the end, reduce his casu-alties. Even though his 1stBattalion had barely arrived at thebase of Hill 308, Murray radioed anorder to attack immediately. Onceagain it was the familiar story ofover-tired, thirsty men staggeringup one more hill—this time after27 hours of continuous, tense exer-tion. Fortunately, there was onlysniper fire and the crest wassecured, as the men collapsed onthe broiling ground.

There was to be no let-up, how-ever, for the beat-up 1st Battalion.Murray kept pushing. He orderedNewton to take his men backdown from the hill they had just

climbed so laboriously and tomove along the south roadtowards the next objective, a vil-lage called Paedun-ni. It was apathetic remnant that was able tocome down that hill. There wereonly 30 men and two officers outof the whole company who wereable to make it down without col-lapsing. Captain John L. Tobin, inbad shape himself, stayed with therest of the men on the hilltop.Fenton painfully recalled thescene:

The troops that had passedout had to be left where theyhad fallen, since no one hadthe strength to move them.The men who had heat pros-tration, but weren’t out, triedto place themselves along theridge where they could covertheir fallen buddies in case ofan enemy attack. The heatreached 114 degrees, and I

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personally don’t believe thatour men on the hill couldhave repulsed 10 enemytroops.

Once Newton finally was able toget his survivors down to thePaedun-ni road, they were joinedby his Headquarters Company, hisWeapons Company, and a platoonof tanks. But Newton’s troublescontinued. He was stuck withobsolete Japanese maps which fre-quently used different names fortowns, had no contour lines for thehills, and were undependable as toroads. This resulted in his takingthe wrong fork in the road shortlyafter starting. Not one to be out oftouch with his troops, Murrayappeared shortly to correct theproblem. It developed that themaps Newton and Murray hadwere each different. The upshotwas that Murray decided that thewhole column had to turn aroundon the primitive narrow road,retrace its steps, and take the otherfork. Amidst the milling in thisreversal, Newton was probably dis-mayed to see Craig appear on theconfused scene. The general wasnot pleased, and without knowingthe background, he expressed histhoughts in vivid language. Whenthe battalion finally got restartedon the proper fork, Craig—anotherofficer who kept in close touchwith his troops—went with themto supervise the further attack hewas planning. As evening fell, the1st Battalion had come two milesfrom its jump-off and was orderedto dig in for the night.

Back in the zone of the 3dBattalion, the payoff came on 9August for the hard fight the daybefore. The day began with a thor-ough saturation of Hill 255 by theartillery of the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines, under Lieutenant ColonelRanson M. Wood.

The artillery batteries had to

improvise their tactics during theseearly days in Korea. Ironically,they had suffered more casualtiesthan the riflemen when the taskforce had begun its attack. Then,to counter the skillful infiltration ofthe NKPA, the three batterieswould try to set up with one aim-ing to the north, one to the east,and one to the west, with protec-tive foxholes around them.(Because the brigade was movingso fast, and with the penchant ofthe enemy for lightning hit-and-runtactics, the 11th Marines oftenwould be able to set up only onebattery for action.)

After the artillery had plasteredthe enemy positions on Hill 255,the battalion’s forward air con-troller, First Lieutenant DanielGreene, got on his radio, and theCorsairs then came wheeling in,this time with napalm’s firstscourge of the NKPA. It was a near-classic demonstration of theMarine concept of an air-groundteam. When the riflemen scaledthe final crest of the hill, there was

little opposition. Nevertheless, thebattles that led to the conquest ofHill 255 had cost Company H theloss of 25 percent of its men. Whenthe 3d Battalion then joined upwith part of the Army’s 24thInfantry, the threat to the rear sup-ply route (Masan to Pusan) hadbeen eliminated.

With these hill captures by thethree Marine battalions, the errantArmy battalion of the 5th RCT,which had earlier taken the wrongfork at the junction, could nowretrace its steps and rejoin its regi-ment. At last the 5th RCT movedout west towards a new objectiveon the road to Chinju.

This breakup of the log jamenabled Kean to relieve Craig ofoverall command of the task forceand allowed the general to returnto his own men on the afternoonof 9 August.

With his brigade now movingalong its designated south road,Craig planned to exert maximumpressure on the NKPA by havingthe Marine battalions leap-frog

25

Marines carefully check individual huts to successfully drive North Koreandefenders out of this village.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A15986

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each other, pushing forward hard.The same procedures would beused by the companies and pla-toons. Whether it was advanceguard, flankers out on the sides, orin the main column of the brigade,all the units would rotate. Thisenabled Craig to keep driving.

He had Murray pull Roise’s 2dBattalion off Hill 342, and put it ontrucks which brought it to anassembly point near Hill 308, aspot familiar to the 1st Battalion.Arriving there nearly at midnighton 9 August, Roise contemplatedhis situation. He had had 9 killed,44 wounded, and a shocking 94cases of heat prostration, the lossof key officers, and now his tiredmen were due to lead the attack intwo hours—after the past 69 hoursof climbing, fighting, and march-ing. Despite all this, he wasrelieved to see that the morale ofhis men appeared high. Further-more, his riflemen had been rein-forced by the attachment of a bat-tery of artillery, a platoon of thepowerful Pershing tanks, and a75mm recoilless rifle platoon.

The attack on Paedun-ni wasonly the first objective enroute tothe towns of Kosong and Sachon,the keys to the final goal of Chinju.Craig later described his reason-ing:

This night attack was inaddition to an attack duringthe day, and, although themen were very tired and Ihesitated to carry out thenight movement, I consid-ered that, if we could surprisethe North Koreans and keepmoving when the otherAmerican troops had alreadystopped for the night, that wemight gain some addedadvantage—and this provedto be the case. We marchedthroughout the night andgained quite a bit of distance

with only occasional shotsbeing fired.

Moving through the 1stBattalion, the 2d Battalion hadpressed forward through the nightof 9-10 August, grateful that therewas no opposition. There was anepisode with a couple of tanks thatgot stuck, bringing both Craig andMurray to the spot with somestrong words to move the rest ofthe column forward. By 0800 on 10August, Roise and his men were inPaedun-ni.

And so 9 August ended with theMarine brigade finally all togetheras a unit and really starting to rollin high gear down the south road.The next day (10 August) broughtsome brisk action when theretreating enemy forces pickedstrategic places to delay the rapidadvance of the Marine column. Asusual, Craig had arrived at Paedun-ni by helicopter, and his refrain tothe troops was to move ahead with“all speed.” Accordingly, the 2dBattalion, even though it had justarrived, got ready to move outquickly for Kosong. The 3dBattalion followed.

With only a few trucks available,part of Company D was put onboard, with the rest of the troopsmarching behind. As the trucksrolled down the road, they werepreceded by a four-jeep reconnais-sance team. Some 2 1/2 miles fromPaedun-ni there was a section ofthe road where it made a sharpturn and narrowed along a defile1,000 yards long underneath alarge hill. It was called theTaedabok Pass, and 300 of theNKPA were dug in and carefullycamouflaged waiting there inambush. Their mortars, antitankguns, and artillery were ready toinflict heavy casualties on anytroops who moved blindly into thepass.

However, the advance guard of

the Marines was not moving blind-ly. Craig was well aware of theskill of the NKPA in ambushes andenvelopments. He therefore had apolicy of using his helicopters andOY planes to the maximum forreconnaissance of his front andflanks. In addition, he deployed areconnaissance platoon in jeeps toscout ahead of the lead battalion.These men, Craig commented, “ontwo occasions uncovered verystrong ambushes and sufferedsome casualties in getting out, butthey did protect the main column.”

One of those riding in a recon-naissance jeep was a young pri-vate first class. They were rollinghappily down the road, thinkinghow quiet it was, when sudden-ly:

The North Koreans openedup. [They] cut up the first cou-ple of jeeps pretty bad. Mygroup tumbled and ran forthe ditch. I landed calf-deepin warm water. I heardmachine guns chatteringaround me. Dirt kicked upalong the road that was nowlined with abandoned jeeps.

Sergeant Dickerson shout-ed over the noise, “Thosehills, the little low ones, overto the right, we gotta get overthere. Gotta return fire fromthere.” I picked up my BAR[Browning Automatic Rifle],and, crouched over, ran downthe ditch.

At the same time an OY obser-vation plane, flying less than 50feet off the ground, spotted theambush. With all hope of trappingthe main column of Marines nowgone, the NKPA poured on the fire.An antitank gun smashed a jeep.Now, coming up fast and deploy-ing in counterattack on both sidesof the road, the men of CompanyD went after the high ground at

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1500 that afternoon. Their 60mmmortar fire silenced the antitankgun, and, when two MarinePershing tanks arrived at 1630,their 90mm guns, combined withCorsair attacks, beat down theenemy fire.

The fact that there had been anysurprise was on Murrays mind. Hesaid later: “We moved pretty wellalong this road for a day, I guess,when we ran into an ambush.Shouldn’t have been ambushed,we should have discovered it, butdidn’t. The advance guard failed tospot these people and got hit.Fortunately, though, the bulk ofthe regiment didn’t get involvedinitially.”

The ambush had delayed thebrigade, but not for long and at acost to the NKPA of hundreds ofdead, wrecked vehicles, and largelosses in weapons. Now theMarines were poised to sweep intoKosong.

Reinforcements arrived: the restof the 2d Battalion on foot and the3d Battalion by truck. Murray, ofcourse, was there waiting for them.He took Taplett up to the top ofone of the hills and they could seeKosong five miles away. The regi-mental commander, in his usualstyle, told Taplett to move his 3dBattalion through Roise’s men at1715 and attack immediately toclean out the pass and clear theway to Kosong. It was an unusual“pass through,” since neitherMurray or Taplett could locateRoise or his command post.

This order came as music to theears of 2d Battalion Marines. Roisehad had them moving and fightingfor 88 hours over a distance ofalmost 50 miles. In spite of thenever-ending hills and oppressiveheat, the battalion had won eachof its battles and inflicted morethan 600 casualties on the enemy.Now it could actually relax for themoment. For the first time since

going into action, there wasenough water to drink and themen could eat their field rations inpeace. Perspiration-soaked sockshad brought on ulcer sores ontheir feet and ankles, so it was ablessed relief to be issued clean,dry socks.

As the 3d Battalion moved intoposition for its attack, the menwere naturally concerned aboutenemy fire, but the first thing to hitthem was friendly fire. One enlist-ed man later recounted his reac-tion:

We passed through one ofthe other battalions. About5:00 in the afternoon twoAmerican fighters [U.S. AirForce F-51s] zoomed downthe road around 150 feetabove our heads . . . . Nomatter where I ran, I couldn’tseem to find an escape. Their.50-caliber bullets hit thathard, dry road and it soundedas if each was exploding.There was just nowhere to goto get out of the line of fire.Someone screamed, “Breakout the air panels! Get the airpanels!” The fighters left assuddenly as they had arrived.

By 1830 on 10 August, the leadplatoons had jumped off in theattack, but they soon receivedheavy fire from two NKPA machineguns hidden at the far end of thepass. During this encounter, someMarines at the point were wound-ed, and platoon leader FirstLieutenant Jack “Big Jack”Westerman made a daring rescuefor which he was later presented aNavy Cross. Neutralizing thoseguns took the last of daylight, andso Murray had the battalion dig infor the night, sending men up thedominating hills for security. FirstLieutenant Robert D. Bohn, thecommander of Company G, was

not very happy about that order:“It was just contrary to everythingyou’re taught, to go up intoenemy-held territory at night, noreconnaissance, nothing like that,and hold it.”

Things got worse at dawn. TheNKPA hit Bohn’s company.Because he had had to feel his wayup there in darkness, he really didnot know exactly where he and hismen were, but the enemy attackrevealed:

I was on the front line. Iwas on the forward slope ofthis hill, and my commandgroup got hit. I got wounded,my mortar section chief gotkilled, and I had a couple ofother casualties. But we werea well-trained outfit, so weimmediately returned fire—Ithink there were maybe eightor ten of them, probably adelaying party—and we killedthem all.

It was very close. It washand-grenade range andhand-to-hand in a couple ofinstances. I took hand-grenade fragments in theneck and shoulder, but theyweren’t too serious. It was thesame hand grenade that killeda Marine right next to me. Ikilled the guy that threw it.

By the time the attack was final-ly beaten off, Bohn’s cool anddecisive handling of his menwould result in the award of aSilver Star. However, Company G,which was due to lead thebrigade’s advance the morning of11 August, was a half hour late get-ting to the appointed line of depar-ture. John Toland’s history, InMortal Combat, records a remarkto Bohn: “Murray was furious,‘When I say 0800, I don’t mean0801!’ ”

Company G then moved out at a

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Rotary-wing aircraft had come too late to have anyeffect on the tactics of World War II, although afew Sikorsky aircraft were used experimentally in

the European and Pacific theaters near the end of theconflict. Following the war, it was the Marine Corps thattook the lead in developing techniques and proceduresfor this new combat aircraft.

In February 1948, the first Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopterwas delivered to the first Marine helicopter squadron,experimental Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), atQuantico, Virginia. Three months later, the squadronmade the first helicopter troop lift in history.

Shortly after the Korean War broke out on 25 June1950, 7 pilots, 30 enlisted men, and 4 HO3S-1 helicopterswere detached from HMX-1 for service with the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade. Upon arrival at Marine CorpsAir Station, El Toro, California, these elements were com-bined with 8 fixed-wing pilots, 33 enlisted men, and 4“usable” OY-2 light observation planes to form thebrigade’s air observation squadron, Marine ObservationSquadron 6 (VMO-6). The squadron’s commanding offi-cer, Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, was given just 48 hoursto weld these two elements together before beingshipped overseas.

Upon arrival in the Pusan Perimeter, VMO-6 set up itsbase at Chinhae on 2 August, ready for business. Therewas not long to wait. The next day, the brigade com-mander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, took off inone of the helicopters and gave a vivid demonstration ofits versatility. In one day, he stopped to instruct a battal-ion, picked out the location for his forward commandpost, held a conference with U.S. Army commanders,

and held three more meetings with his ground comman-ders.

Besides this role in command, the squadron’s heli-copters were “always available for observation, commu-nications, and control.” In addition, there were a widevariety of other missions: evacuating the wounded, res-cuing downed fixed-wing pilots, transporting supplies,artillery spotting, and, scouting enemy dispositions.During the month of August 1950, VMO-6 helicoptersamassed a total of 580 flights and the HO3S-1s chalkedup the first successful combat missions. These missionswere a harbinger of the large-scale deployments thatwould come.

Aircraft DataManufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Aircraft CorporationPower Plant: Pratt and Whitney R 985 AN-7 Wasp Jr.Engine 9 Cylinder; Radial; Fan-Cooled; 450HorsepowerRotor Diameter: 48’: 3 Blade Composite ConstructionTail Rotor Diameter: 8’5”; All Wood; 3 BladesLength: 41’ 13/4” Without Rotor BladesOverall Length: 57’ 1/2”Height Overall: 12’ 11”Weight Empty: 3,795 PoundsMaximum Gross Weight: 5,300 PoundsCruising Speed: 85 Miles Per HourMaximum Speed: 103 Miles Per Hour at Sea LevelRange: 260 MilesService Ceiling: 13,000’Fuel Capacity: 108 U.S. GallonsSeating: Four including Pilot

Sikorsky HO3S-1 Helicopter

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fast clip. It would be the pace ofthe point platoon which wouldgovern the speed of the entirebrigade. Accordingly, the advanceflankers moved at a run to keep upwith their platoon leader on theroad. He, in turn, relieved themwith fresh men as often as possi-ble. The fast pace they set provedinvaluable when they came uponany of the enemy. The Marinescame to the first machine gunemplacement lurking on the route,and they hit it so hard and sounexpectedly that the five NKPAgunners were killed before theycould fire a shot. Three moreenemy positions fell to the sameaggressive tactics of the point pla-toon.

With this kind of speed and skillup front, and with two Corsairsand an OY cruising overhead look-ing for any trouble, the brigadecame wheeling down the road toreach the outskirts of Kosong by1000. Softening up any potentialdefenders, the 105mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines began raininghigh explosives on Kosong. Thisbarrage and the onrushing brigadeforced the opposing 83dMotorcycle Regiment to pack upand seek safety in a hasty depar-ture.

With the flight of the main bodyof the enemy, only a few snipersremained in Kosong. Company Hpassed through G and pushedrapidly into the town. On its heelscame Taplett and Craig, with theirhands on the helm, always close tothe action. Meanwhile, CompanyG raced to seize control of Hill 88southwest of the town and domi-nating the road to Sachon. Theenemy was waiting there, but notfor long. The Corsairs swooped inlow with napalm, tank fire pouredin, the howitzers of the 11thMarines blanketed the position,and the crest was quickly taken.

It was at Kosong that there was

a clear example of the payoff fromthe long years of Navy-Marinecooperation: support of thebrigade by Landing Ship Tanks.Craig fully realized their greatvalue, for they proved a readysolution to the problem of gettingsupplies by truck on primitive,congested roads. Accordingly, hehad had his helicopters make areconnaissance of usable harborson the nearby coast. Then the LSTswould move into a harbor thatmatched the brigade’s advance.Craig described the pay-off:

When we reached Kosong,we had an LST within sixmiles of that place on a cov-ered road where we couldunload and push forwardsupplies and build up abrigade dump at Kosong.Wounded could be evacuatedimmediately to the LST . . . .We always felt that we had amobile base of supplieswhich we could bring in asnecessary and that, eventhough we were separated bylong distance or cut off fromour rear base, we couldalways depend on these LSTsfor supplies.

With Hill 88 secured, Craig hadTaplett pull the men of CompanyG back, disregard other hills, andconcentrate for an immediate driveby the brigade to Sachon. A pair ofNKPA antitank guns were waitingon the route, but were discoveredwhen an ambulance jeep was hit(killing a Navy corpsman). With itslocation disclosed the pair wasquickly knocked out and the col-umn surged forward, led byCompany H with the forward aircontroller right up with the pointmen.

A few hours later the the march-ing men came upon an astonishingsight. When the 83d Motorcycle

Regiment hurriedly decampedfrom Kosong, its timing proveddisastrous, for, just at that juncture,a flight of Corsairs from VMF-323appeared on the scene. The pilotscould hardly believe the temptingtargets arrayed before their eyes,and the slaughter began; it came tobe known as the “Kosong TurkeyShoot.” The Corsairs swung low upand down the frantic NKPA col-umn, raining death and destructionin a hail of fire from rockets and20mm cannon. With the vehicles atthe front and rear ends of its col-umn destroyed, the enemy regi-ment was trapped. It was a sceneof wild chaos: vehicles crashinginto each other, overturned inditches, afire, and exploding;troops fleeing for safety in everydirection. Another flight from VMF-323 arrived, and, joined by U.S. AirForce F-51s, finished off thedestruction of the trucks, jeeps,and motorcycles. Accounts of thisNKPA debacle vary widely in theirtallies of the number of vehiclesdestroyed: 100-200.

One thing was certain: when theground troops reached the scene,the usable vehicles were quicklyappropriated for the transporta-tion-starved brigade. There was, infact, a momentary slowdown inthe fast advance of the Marines tostare. Joseph C. Goulden’s Korea:The Untold Story of the War pic-tures the scene: “Black SovietArmy jeeps and motorcycles withsidecars, most of which had goneinto battle in mint condition.Looking under the hoods, theMarines found the jeeps poweredby familiar Ford Motor Companyengines—apparent relics ofAmerican lend-lease aid to theSoviet Union during the SecondWorld War.”

The Marines found other things,too. Included in the wreckagewere American jeeps the NKPAhad captured earlier from U.S.

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Army troops, and Toland assertsthat there were duffel bags con-taining Russian officers’ uniforms.

There was another colorfulepisode which happened on theroad that led back to Sachon in therear of the motorcycle regiment.Andrew Geer’s The New Breed: TheStory of the U.S. Marines in Koreadescribes how Master Sergeant

Herbert Valentine and SecondLieutenant Patrick G. Sivert were inan OY skimming the route whenthey observed a jeep making ahigh-speed getaway from the bat-tle site. Sitting rigidly erect, armsfolded, eyes never wavering fromstraight ahead, a high-rankingNKPA officer sat unmoving in therear seat. The Marines in the OY

came down close to the jeep andbegan firing their revolvers (theplane’s only armament) at the flee-ing target. Rifle fire came backfrom the jeep’s front seat, but theofficer remained rigid. This contin-ued for a 20-mile stretch with noresults. Finally, the terrified drivertook one too many looks at theplane so close overhead, and thejeep hurtled over a cliff. The officernever budged from his fixed posi-tion as he plunged to his death.

Cruising the rest of the day inadvance of the brigade, Marine airfound other targets of opportunity.Geer totalled up the results:

Score for the day to MarineAir: vehicles (all types) des-troyed, 118; supply dumpsdestroyed, 2; ammunitiondumps left burning, 2; build-ings housing troops des-troyed, 8; southeast section ofSachon set on fire; concentra-tions of troops south ofSachon, north of Kogan-niand along route of withdraw-al neutralized and dispersedwith heavy casualties; onejeep presumed to be carryinga Very Important Person,destroyed.

There was, as always, a pricethe Marine aviators had to pay forthese dramatic achievements. Onepilot, Captain Vivian M. Moses, hadhis Corsair shot down by groundfire. When a helicopter from VMO-6 arrived to rescue him behindenemy lines, he was dead, the firstdeath for MAG-33.

Another pilot, Lieutenant DoyleH. Cole, was luckier. Hit, his planemade a forced landing in the near-by ocean. He climbed out onto hisemergency raft, and almost imme-diately a rescue helicopter ap-peared overhead and dropped to aposition close above him. A ropewas lowered and he was pulled up

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Photo by David Douglas Duncan

Across the rice paddies and up the endless hills, it was always on foot

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to safety. Glancing at the whitehair of his rescuer, Cole slappedthe old timer on the shoulder andsaid, “Thanks for the lift, buddy!” Asecond glance gave Cole a start.He saw the star on the dungareesand realized that it was Craig. Anembarrassed, “Thank you, sir,”blurted out, followed by a relaxedreply, “Glad to be of service,Lieutenant.”

Down on the road, the brigadesped forward. Taplett and his aircontroller were up front with thelead platoon, and any time enemyresistance developed, in came theCorsairs. This immediacy of sup-port was due to three factors. First,the Marines had been able to keepcontrol of their own aviation, asMacArthur had promised Craig.Secondly, there were no upperechelons of command to delaystrike requests. Each battalion andthe regiment had its own tacticalair control party. These controlparties each consisted of an officerand six enlisted men; they eachused a radio jeep and portableradios for direct orders to theplanes. They worked with pilotswho had had infantry training andhad been carefully briefed on theground situation. In addition, thebrigade staff had an air sectionusing four different radio networksfor overall coordination, plus anobservation section which used theOYs and helicopters of VMO-6 topinpoint enemy targets for the Cor-sairs and control parties. Thirdly,the Marine fighter squadrons werevery close by, based on the jeepcarriers just offshore. Thus theycould be overhead in minutes,rather than finally arriving frombases in Japan with only enoughfuel for 15 minutes’ support, whichwas the predicament of the U.S.Air Force.

As 11 August drew to a close,Taplett, after nearly being shot byan enemy soldier “playing pos-

sum,” deployed his 3d Battalion ontwo hills by the road and had themdig in for the night. Sachon layahead, only a day’s march away.

The men felt good. They weremaking rapid progress. As the offi-cial Marine history noted: “theenemy seemed to be disorganizedif not actually demoralized. For thefirst time since the invasion began,a sustained Eighth Army counterat-tack had not only stopped the RedKorean steamroller but sent it intoreverse.”

In this happy frame of mind, thebrigade got moving again early onthe morning of 12 August. Enemyopposition was light, and the 1stBattalion in the lead quicklyleaped forward 11 miles. Fentonnoted that “the boys took quite abit of pride in the fact that we haddone all this moving on foot, whileArmy units moved mostly bymotor. Morale was very high . . .There was evidence of consider-able enemy disorganization . . . .We had them on the run and want-ed to finish them off.” By noon thebrigade was only four miles fromSachon, and Chinju lay just eightmiles beyond that. According toGeer, when a NKPA major wascaptured, he confessed, “Panicsweeps my men when they see theMarines with the yellow leggingscoming at them.”

Things looked good—too good.The old hands knew that some-thing unpleasant always followedthe good times. And so it did. Withmen from the ReconnaissanceCompany on the alert out front,Company B of the 1st Battalionpoked its nose into a valley with asmall village called Changchon.The Marines took a few shots at apair of disappearing enemy sol-diers, the first they had seen allday. The reply was thunderous.From the hills ahead and on eitherside of the road all hell brokeloose, as 500 of the NKPA poured

in fire from carefully camouflagedpositions above the Marines. Theenemy had brought up reinforce-ments from Sachon during the pre-ceding night and set up an ambushhere with the surviving membersof the 83d Motorcycle Regimentand part of the 2d Battalion, 15thRegiment. The reconnaissance menhad caused the trap to be sprungprematurely, before the wholeMarine column could be caught inthe heavy crossfire. Company Bimmediately rushed to help itsreconnaissance men, but it wasquickly pinned down by theavalanche of fire. An article byFenton in the November 1951Marine Corps Gazette told how itscommander, Captain John L.Tobin, took his runners and head-ed forward, but halfway there:

An enemy machine guntook them under fire, pinningthem down in the rice paddy.Things were pretty hot, andTobin noticed one of the run-ners shaking like an oldModel-T Ford. He asked theMarine what was wrong andthe boy replied that he wasscared. Tobin put a big scowlon his face and replied, “Lad,Marines are never scared.”Just then the enemy machinegunner got the range and wasreally kicking up the waterand mud around them. Tobinturned to the runner andquickly added, “I see yourpoint now. Let’s get the hellout of here!”

The Corsairs and their napalmwere called in, and, with their sup-port, then fire from the tanks’90mm guns, 4.2-inch mortars, andbattalion artillery, the rest of thebattalion cleaned the enemy offone hill after another in a hardfour-hour battle. There was aggres-sive action by the rest of the

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Marine column, and a squad leaderin the 3d Battalion, CorporalDonald D. Sowl, was later award-ed the Army’s DistinguishedService Cross by order of GeneralMacArthur.

There was a final flourish at theend of the day. A number of theenemy was spotted sneaking upthe reverse slope of one of thehills. A veteran noncommissionedofficer took a squad, deployedthem along the ridgeline, and toldthem to wait silently. When theNKPA soldiers got within 75 feet,the sergeant gave his men the sig-nal, and they poured out a sheet offire. All 39 of the attackers werekilled instantly, except for the offi-cer leading them who was wound-ed and captured. Turned over toSouth Korean police to take backto the battalion CP for interroga-tion, the enemy officer did not sur-vive the trip. As Geer wrylyobserved: “In the future they [the

Marines] would conduct their ownprisoners to the rear.”

With all units dug in for thenight, a rice paddy area of 1,000yards between the two companiesof the 1st Battalion was covered bythe preregistered fire of mortarsand artillery in case the enemy hadany thoughts of a night attack. Thebrigade had now covered 29 milesof road (and much more countingthe interminable distances up anddown hills) in four short days. Ithad defeated the NKPA in everyencounter, and here it was poisedfor the short step into Sachon. Nextstop after that was the final objec-tive, Chinju, now within easy reachof the hard-hitting brigade. Again,things looked good—too good.

This time the surprise came notfrom the NKPA in front but fromthe U.S. Army in the rear. Craighad received orders from Kean latein the morning of the day justended, 12 August, to send without

delay a reinforced battalion all theway back to the original startingpoint of the task force’s drive,Chindong-ni. The Army’s 5th RCTwas in trouble again; its “push”towards Chinju had totally boggeddown in what one account called“an epic disaster.” With only twobattalions left, Craig noted in hisunderstated way that “the conse-quence was that our right flank . . .was exposed. There were manyNorth Korean troops in that area,and we were, more or less, out ona limb at Sachon.” Now the NKPAwas cutting the main supply routebehind the 5th RCT, and three bat-teries of the 555th and 90th FieldArtillery Battalions had been com-pletely overrun by the enemy. TheMarine battalion was urgentlyneeded to rescue the survivorsfrom the shambles and restore thetactical situation.

The call from Kean began a hec-tic afternoon for Craig. Lynn

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Montross in his book, Cavalry ofthe Sky, stressed the crucial mobil-ity Craig enjoyed by repeated useof the helicopter. In a single after-noon, he took off from his CP atKosong, then made two landingsto give orders to his regimentalcommander, Murray, and to Taplettfor the roadlift of the 3d Battalionto the crisis spot. Montross contin-ued the story:

Next, he spotted twocolumns of Marine trucksfrom the air and landed twicemore to direct them to dumptheir loads and provide trans-portation for the troops. HisG-3 [operations officer] andthe battalion commander hadmeanwhile been sent aheadby helicopter to reconnoiterthe objective area and planfor the Marines to deploy andattack upon arrival. Owing tothese preparations, the assaulttroops seized part of theenemy position before dark-ness.

This fluid movement of Craig’senabled him, as a finale, toobserve the start of the sunsetattack enroute to a conferencewith Kean at Masan. While therehe got the disheartening news thatWalker wanted him to withdrawthe brigade at daybreak. It was agloomy ride for Craig back to hisCP where he landed in early dark-ness.

The meeting with Kean not onlyconfirmed the overwhelming prob-lems of the 5th RCT, but alsobrought still more ominous news.The operations of Task Force Keanhad been in the far southwesternsector of the Pusan Perimeter. Nowthe NKPA had crossed the NaktongRiver in the west center of theperimeter, broken the Army’s lines,and were threatening to unhingethe entire defense of the peninsu-

la. It was a time of real crisis, andWalker was calling on his battle-proven “fire brigade” to save thesituation. This presented Craigwith an even bleaker picture: hehad to pull the rest of his brigadeout of its successful drive towardSachon and rush it north to stemthe enemy breakthrough.

Withdrawal in the face of anaggressive enemy is one of themore difficult military operations.Newton, commander of the 1stBattalion, had gotten the wordfrom Murray at midnight on 12August to withdraw his men fromtheir hilltop positions and form upon the road below at 0630 the fol-lowing morning. There truckswould move them to their nextcombat assignment—unknown, asusual, to the men who would dothe fighting.

Before it could get to the road,as the 1st Battalion was preparingto evacuate its positions on Hill202, it was hit by a heavy assault.The veteran soldiers of the 6thInfantry Division were experts atnight attacks, and at 0450 theystruck. It was close-in work. For awhile, the outcome was in doubt.Separated from Company A,Company B was on its own. Itsentire left flank was overrun, thecommunications wire was cut, andtwo Marine machine guns werecaptured and turned on the com-pany. Fighting back face-to-face,the Marines called in fire from their81mm and 4.2-inch mortars,together with artillery and 3.5-inchrocket rounds that pinpointed theenemy with fire barely in front ofthe defenders. Finally, at dawn, thesituation was stabilized.

There now occurred “one of themost demoralizing incidents inCompany B’s experience for theentire campaign,” as Fenton latercommented. Tobin was ready atfirst light to move back and recov-er the wounded and missing men,

just as Marine tradition (and Craig)had promised. It was not to be.Iron-clad orders from Walker toCraig to Murray to Newton forcedan immediate withdrawal, in spiteof Tobin’s pleadings.

Fenton summarized the unani-mous feeling:

Twenty-nine bloody, sweat-ing miles down the drain . . . .The men couldn’t believe it. Icouldn’t believe it. It didn’tseem possible, with all thelives we’d lost taking thisground, that we’d now justwalk off and leave it. BakerCompany’s casualties for themorning’s counterattack alonewere 12 dead, 16 wounded,and 9 missing in action. AndI’m certain those last ninewere dead, too.

I found it difficult to seemen, veterans of the last war,older guys, sitting by the sideof the road crying. They justdidn’t give a hoot. They weretired, disgusted. People justcouldn’t understand this partof the war.

A Relief Force

Leaving the 1st and 2d Battal-ions temporarily in the positionsthey had won in the Changchonarea, Craig moved quickly on 12August to organize the deploymentof his 3d Battalion as a relief forcefor the overrun Army field artillerybattalions. The orders from Keanhad come at 1130 and by 1300 theriflemen and an artillery batterywere in the trucks, on their way. Ahalf hour later Taplett and thebrigade operations officer, Lieu-tenant Colonel Stewart, were air-borne to scout the disaster area byhelicopter. They saw plenty oftrouble: artillery pieces in disarray;jeeps on fire; American bodieslying in a stream bed; and, incon-

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gruously, one white table set in themidst of it all. The Army had “esti-mated” that 2,000 to 2,500 NKPAtroops had infiltrated the area,smashed the Army artillery units,and were threatening the mainsupply route, so Taplett had origi-nally presumed that there wouldbe heavy combat for his battalionwhen it arrived. At the scene hesaw no evidence of any suchquantity of NKPA, and he stronglydoubted the estimate.

The chaotic situation theMarines now saw had its roots inthe events of the preceding day,11 August. Without opposition,the 5th RCT had advanced justfive miles from where it had start-ed at the infamous road junctionto a small village called Pongam-ni. The 555th “Triple Nickel” and90th Field Artillery Battalionswere in support, but were notprotected or prepared for anenemy attack.

Marine procedures were muchdifferent. Craig later commentedon this:

The artillery had beentrained in Pendleton in themethods of security. Theywere armed with bazookas,.50 calibers, and everythingthat the infantrymen wouldneed to defend a position,and they were well trained indefense of their artillery posi-tions. And they from that[first] day on took up defen-sive positions wherever theymoved.

As a result we never had agun overrun. There wereattempts at sniping and soforth, but we never had agun taken or overrun; where-as I notice that the Army ona number of occasions in theperimeter lost whole batter-ies. It was simply, I think,because the artillerymen

were not trained along thesame lines as the Marines.

At this time, Kean was underheavy pressure from Walker to getthe 5th RCT to leap ahead. So thedivision commander ordered hisregimental commander (ColonelGodwin L. Ordway) to move partof his units quickly forwardthrough the pass near Pongam-ni.Then there was indecision, delay,conflicting orders, and repeatedfailures in radio communications.As a result, part of the regimentwent through the pass that night,and part stopped at Pongam-ni.With his command thus split up,and with enemy fire falling on thesupply route to his rear, Ordwaywas in a difficult situation. It gotworse after midnight on 11 Augustwhen telephone and radio com-munications with the artillery bat-talions was lost and the sounds ofbattle came from their direction.With the NKPA now on the highground above him, Ordway decid-ed at 0400 on 12 August to try tomove the rest of his troops throughthe pass. A massive traffic jamensued. As the official Army histo-ry noted: “During the hour or morebefore daylight, no vehicle inOrdway’s range of vision movedmore than 10 or 20 feet at a time.”

As the infantry slowly movedout, the enemy quickly moved intothe valley. Now the Army artillery,stalled behind the traffic jam, was asitting duck. NKPA tanks and self-propelled guns were able to“approach undetected and unop-posed, almost to point-blankrange, and with completely disas-trous effects.” Enemy infantry fromthe 13th Regiment of the 6thDivision closed in and added itsfirepower. It was a slaughter, andthe artillery was completely over-run. A traumatic phone call fromBrigadier General George B. Barth,USA, the 25th Division artillery

commander, to Kean revealed thescope of the disaster and led Keanto order the rescue mission by the3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Kean also ordered a battalion ofthe 24th Infantry to bring relief byan attack towards Pongam-ni. Thiseffort went nowhere on 12 August,and by the next day it was still twoand a half miles from the artillerypositions. The 555th had lost six ofits 105mm howitzers, and the 90thhad lost all six of the 155mm how-itzers in one of its batteries. Alongwith some 300 men, probably 100vehicles had been captured ordestroyed (although the NKPAclaimed an inflated 157 vehiclesand 13 tanks). The Army had giventhe site the name “Bloody Gulch.”

This was the grim situation thatTaplett faced when his helicopterarrived on 12 August. He immedi-ately had the aircraft land and helooked for the liaison officer whowas supposed to meet him, nowthat he was coming under theoperational control of the Army’s25th Infantry Division. No sign ofany such person.

To try to get some information,Taplett was finally able to tap intoa telephone line to the divisionheadquarters in the rear and askfor orders. The reply was to “dowhat he thought was proper.” Thatvague verbal order was all the lee-way Taplett needed for immediateaction. A helicopter reconnais-sance was followed by a juncturewith his troops. Then he led themby air to the valley from where heplanned to attack the commandingridges.

Less than three hours afterboarding their trucks, the men ofthe 3d Battalion were at theirassembly area, ready to jump off inan attack on a cold, rainy, miser-able day. Taplett aggressivelydelayed only 15 minutes for anartillery preparation and somenapalm runs by Marine Corsairs,

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and then moved out the riflemen.Without a single casualty, theysoon reached the top of the firstridge. There they found signs thata substantial body of enemy troopshad made a hasty departure, butthis was a far cry from the resis-tance they had expected from the“2,000” or so enemy troops thatOrdway had estimated hadwreaked such havoc.

At 1900 Barth arrived to takecommand. Not knowing Taplett’sstyle, he asked when the Marineswould be ready to attack. Taplettpresumably enjoyed a responseone can easily imagine, “Sir, we’vealready done that, and my men arenow digging in on top of theridge.” Barth graciously congratu-lated him.

The next morning, 13 August,the 3d Battalion attacked to securethe final ridges overlooking thepitiful remnants of the lost artillery.Again, there was no opposition,and by 1000 they were on top oftheir objectives. Craig later com-mented: “We found quite a numberof Army artillerymen scatteredthrough the area, hiding in variousplaces.” Besides those rescued bythe Marines, some had fled andstruggled back to safety with the25th Division.

Taplett’s men were now readyto go down, clean out any enemy,and retrieve the artillery pieces inthe valley, but the Marines oncemore got orders that they couldnot take the objective they werepoised to seize, but must, instead,move to the rear to meet the newenemy threat along the Naktong.

That marked the final episode inthe Marine mission to aid theArmy’s 5th RCT. With all troops,Marine and Army, now pulledback to their starting point atChindong-ni, it was the end of theoffensive to occupy Chinju and, on16 August, Task Force Kean wasdissolved.

First Week’s Results

Things had gone badly for the5th RCT and its artillery, and thecommanding officers of the regi-ment and the “Triple Nickel” bat-talion were both relieved of duty.Higher Army echelons were notpleased with their leadership orthe morale and combat effective-ness of their men.

Craig, on the other hand, waspleased. He had seen his brigadedrive forward with vigor and pro-fessional skill. His officers wereconstantly aggressive, and the rifle-men had done very well underfire. He noted that his men were“well trained and well led” by out-standing noncommissioned offi-cers and “professional” officerswho “knew their stuff.” The reasonfor the brigade’s achievementswere clear to Craig:

We were a generation ofofficers who grew up with theMarine Corps’ standing oper-ating procedures (SOPs) foramphibious operations. Thesewere my “Bible” when I orga-nized and trained an earlierMarine brigade on Guam dur-ing the period 1947-1949.During World War II we hadrepeatedly tested and refinedour organization and tech-niques in landings all over thePacific. These same SOPsenabled us to deploy toKorea quickly and fight effec-tively when we got there.

Equally important, the support-ing arms had coordinated wellwith the infantrymen, with theclose air support of MAG-33demonstrating a wholly new ele-ment in the Korean War, flyingmore than 400 sorties in support ofthe brigade and other units of theEighth Army. The Marines hadtwice been on the verge of seizing

their objectives—first at Sachon-Chinju and then the recovery ofthe Army artillery—only to bepulled back by the strategic needsof the Eighth Army. Geer in hisaccount concluded:

The brigade came out ofChangallon [Changchon]physically tough and psycho-logically hard . . . . Theyknew the enemy to be avicious, skillfully led andwell-equipped foe that couldinflict heavy casualties in anyaction. They were preparedto meet with heavy losses andto carry on the attack, andwere openly scornful of unitsunable to face these hardfacts of war.

There had been a price, howev-er. The brigade had had a total of315 casualties, with 66 killed ordied of wounds, 240 wounded,and 9 missing in action (when the1st Battalion had not been allowedto recover them).

The action of that week hadbrought results on a wider, strate-gic scale. While there had been afailure to occupy Chinju, TaskForce Kean had nevertheless beenthe first real American offensive ofthe Korean War. In a report to theUnited Nations, General MacArthurstated that “this attack not onlysecured the southern approachesto the beachhead, but also showedthat the North Korean forces willnot hold under attack.”

The official Army historyacknowledged in summary that“the task force had not accom-plished what Eighth Army hadbelieved to be easily possible—thewinning and holding of the Chinjupass line,” and, omitting any refer-ence to the dramatic advance ofthe Marine brigade, admitted thatthe rest of the task force, “after aweek of fighting, . . . was back

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approximately in the positionsfrom which it had started itsattack.” That history, however,went on to note “certain beneficialresults . . . . It chanced to meethead-on the North Korean 6thDivision attack against the Masanposition, and first stopped it andthen hurled it back . . . . TaskForce Kean also gained the timeneeded to organize and wire in thedefenses that were to hold theenemy out of Masan during thecritical period ahead.”

The official Marine history couldafford to be positive about thebrigade’s achievements:

The Communist drive inthis sensitive area came clos-est of all NKPA thrusts to thevital UN supply port of Pusan.Up to that time the NKPAunits spearheading theadvance—the 6th Infantry

Division and the 83dMotorcycle Regiment—hadnever suffered a reverseworth mentioning since theoutset of the invasion. Thenthe counterattack by the 1stProvisional Marine Brigadehurled the enemy back 26miles in 4 days from theChindong-ni area to Sachon.

It was estimated that theMarine air-ground team killedand wounded 1,900 of theenemy while destroying near-ly all the vehicles of an NKPAmotorized battalion in addi-tion to infantry armament andequipment. The enemy threatin this critical area was nulli-fied for the time being, and

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A Marine skirmish line attacking over exposed ground to a nearby treeless hill-crest. Photo by David Douglas Duncan

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never again became so seri-ous. Marine efforts assistedArmy units of Task ForceKean in taking new defensivepositions and defending themwith fewer troops, thus free-ing some elements foremployment on other fronts.Finally, the Marines earnedmore time and space for thebuilding up of Eighth Armyforces in preparation for adecisive UN counteroffen-sive.

Interlude

With the conclusion of the drivetowards Sachon, the Marineshoped for a respite before the nextcall to combat, which they knewwas sure to come. Craig, however,had received orders at 0130, 14August, to move his brigade assoon as possible to a place calledMiryang. Using rail, trucks, andeven an LST, his battalions madethe trip of 75 miles in 26 hours.When the “Fire Brigade” arrivedthere, it was desperately needed ina new crisis.

Before the men moved out forcombat, there was one blessed—though brief—interlude of relax-ation: Marines from the rear, fromstaff positions, even tankers andartillerymen, were fed into thedepleted rifle companies. (Anotherof the many times when there wasa vital payoff for the Marinemaxim, roughly: “No matter whatyour ultimate assignment may be,you will be trained first as a rifle-man!”) There was a pleasant groveof trees at Miryang, and the mencould rest in the shade, get theirfirst-ever bath in the river there,eat their first hot food, andexchange filthy, rotted uniformsfor a fresh issue. Fegan comment-ed: “Not only did I smell to highheaven, I also had dried blood allover my jacket.”

That rest period was soon over.Upon arrival at Miryang, thebrigade was placed under theoperational control of the Army’s24th Infantry Division to meet anew threat. The situation wasindeed critical. Ten days before,author Russell Spurr asserts,General Kim Chaek, front com-mander of the NKPA, hadaddressed his staff. Moving fromthe past (Sachon) battle to theforthcoming (Naktong) attack, hereputedly acknowledged that loss-es had been heavy, with the 6thDivision “reduced by half in thepast week.” He then went on toissue a clarion call for victory:

The situation is not irre-trievable. We have committedonly a portion of ourstrength. I am thereforeordering the 4th GuardsDivision to cross the NaktongRiver north of the presentbattlefield, capture Yongsan,and drive on to Miryang. Thisas you can see from the map,will sever the main supplyroute between Pusan andU.S. headquarters in Taegu; ifwe succeed, and I trust weshall, the northern part of theperimeter will collapse. It isdefended largely by puppettroops and we know howthey react when outflanked.

Enemy Breakthrough

The commander of the 4thDivision was Major General LeeKwon Mu, a hardened profession-al who had fought with theCommunists in China and servedas a lieutenant in the RussianArmy. Awarded North Korea’shighest military decorations, theOrder of Hero of the KoreanDemocratic People’s Republic, andthe National Flag, First Class, forhis earlier triumphs in South

Korea, Mu had moved his 7,000men into position on 4 August fora crucial attack across the NaktongRiver. The 4th Division was acrack unit, given the honorary titleof the “Seoul” Division for its tri-umphant earlier capture of thecapital of South Korea. Leadingthe way were the 4th, 16th, and18th Infantry Regiments. They hadmoved stealthily into action thenight of 5 August, wading acrossthe Naktong under cover of dark-ness, while machine guns werepulled along on crude rafts. By themorning of 6 August, 1,000 ofthem had established a positionon the east side, soon beefed upby artillery brought across theNaktong on a hidden, underwaterbridge the NKPA had secretly con-structed. This assault had meantthe breaching of the last naturalbarrier which was counted on toprotect the vital lifeline fromTaegu to Pusan. It was at Taeguthat General Walker had his head-quarters for direction of thedefense of the Pusan Perimeter.

This attack had come as a sur-prise to Brigadier General John H.Church, commander of the 24thInfantry Division. The subsequentthreat was obvious. From the hillsthe NKPA had seized it dominatedthe road to Yongsan, five milesaway. Twenty-five miles beyondthat lay Miryang, and then the vitalPusan-Taegu main supply route(MSR). As Toland recorded: “Panicreached the government offices inTaegu.” Walker, however, hadremained cool, and the Army hadentered a period of continuousbattle. Some units were overrunand some soldiers had fled asNKPA soldiers appeared on flanksand rear. In a confusing period ofseparate confrontations, Armytroops had been unable to pushthe NKPA here, and at anotherpoint in the north, back across theNaktong.

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‘Fire Brigade’: Crisis Number Two

That was when Walker called inthe Marines. Thus, on 15 August,Craig met with Church. Walker hadearlier told Church, “I am going togive you the Marine Brigade. Iwant this situation cleaned up—and quick!” Craig made his plansfollowing his meeting with Church.The brigade would move out of

Miryang on 16 August to go on theattack. Geer records a British mili-tary observer who saw them get-ting started and sent a dispatch toTokyo. He emphasized a “critical”situation in which Miryang couldwell be lost, then Taegu wouldbecome untenable, and “we willbe faced with a withdrawal fromKorea.” In spite of these grimprospects, he got a premonition

about the brigade. In spite of the“impossible odds” that he felt itfaced, he described his gut feelingthat it would check the NKPAadvance:

I realize my expression ofhope is unsound, but theseMarines have the swagger,confidence and hardness thatmust have been in StonewallJackson’s Army of theShenandoah. They remind meof the Coldstreams at Dunker-que. Upon this thin line ofreasoning, I cling to the hopeof victory.

That night, the tone of the attackwas set when Murray told Newton:“You must take that ground tomor-row! You have to get on that ridgeand take it! Understood?” Newtonreplied: “Understood! Understood!This battalion goes only oneway—straight ahead!”

The brigade was to jump off at0800 on 17 August as part of aplanned full-scale effort by theArmy’s 24th Division, reinforcedby the 9th Infantry Regiment.There was a happy history of link-age between the Marines and the9th Infantry. They had servedtogether in the battle for Tientsinduring the Boxer Rebellion inChina at the turn of the century,and again in the 2d InfantryDivision in France during WorldWar I. Now the 9th would operateon the brigade’s right, with theMarines as the left wing of theattack. Three objective lines wereassigned to the brigade, with thefirst being Obong-ni Ridge. Craigand Murray made an on-the-spotreconnaissance of the terrainwhich was a jumbled mass of hillsand gullies. Because of the type ofterrain to the left and the presenceof the Army’s 9th Regiment to theright, the only, reluctant choicewas a frontal attack.

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The shift to the new crisis areawas a pressure-laden one for theMarines. Stewart, Craig’s opera-tions officer (G-3), remembered inlater years that he was advised thatthe Naktong River line had beenbroken through, threatening thePusan-Taegu MSR, and the brigadehad to move there immediately torestore the front. He recalled:

Things were so hectic thatRoise, who was commandingthe 2d Battalion, which wasgoing on the line belowMasan in a defensive position,received minimum orders tomove. In fact, our radio con-tact was out and I wrote on alittle piece of brown paper,“These are your trucks, moveto Naktong at once.”

Those were the only ordersRoise ever got to move to theNaktong front. But they were all heneeded in the hectic situation inwhich the Marines found them-

selves, for, when only a portion ofthe promised trucks showed up,many men in the battalion had tomarch until 0130 the next morningto reach the jump-off point fortheir attack a few hours later.

Waiting for the Marines, welldug-in and confident of victory,were the 18th Regiment and a bat-talion of the 16th Regiment of theNKPA 4th Division. Geer quotes aspeech by Colonel Chang Ky Dok,the regiment’s veteran command-ing officer:

Intelligence says we are toexpect an attack by AmericanMarines. To us comes thehonor of being the first todefeat these Marines soldiers.We will win where othershave failed. I consider ourpositions impregnable. Weoccupy the high ground andthey must attack up a steepslope. Go to your men andtell them there will be noretreat. I will take instant

action against anyone whoshows weakness.

Preparation by supporting unitsfor the Marine riflemen’s attackwas inadequate. Artillery fire wasineffective. When the enemy posi-tions were later examined, the fox-holes were found to be very deep,sited along the length of the ridgeslightly on the reverse slope. Thusshellfire on the forward slopescaused few casualties, nor couldartillery get a trajectory to reachthe enemy on the reverse slopes.Adding to the problem, there wasonly one air strike. Moreover, therewould be little or no natural coverfor the men who had to climbtoward the six hills of Obong-ni,called by the news correspondents“No Name Ridge.”

The 2d Battalion Attacks

Murray had an agreement withthe Army’s 9th Infantry on the rightflank that the Marines would attackfirst, supported by fire from the9th. He picked Roise’s 2d Battalionto lead off. It was a very thin frontline for such a crucial moment:four understrength platoons total-ing only 130 men from CompaniesD and E to lead the assault (withtwo platoons as reserves). “RedSlash Hill” was to be their dividingline.

One platoon of Company E, ledby Second Lieutenant Nickolas D.Arkadis, hit the village of Obong-niat the foot of two of the companyobjectives: Hills 143 and 147.Driving ahead through heavy fire,the platoon fought its way to theslopes beyond. Arkadis’ leadershipwas later recognized by the awardof a Silver Star.

Now both companies were outin the open, sometimes forced tocrawl upwards, met with a contin-uous hail of enemy machine gunand mortar fire with barrages of

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2246

Marches had the men well spaced out to avoid unnecessary casualties. As thiscolumn heads toward its objective, the man second from the rear carries a flamethrower, while the man in front of him has a 3.5-inch rocket launcher. This pic-ture was taken during a Naktong battle, showing a burning enemy tank, withthe Marines carefully circling around it to avoid any explosion of its ammuni-tion.

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grenades. Casualties mountedrapidly. Joseph C. Goulden tells ofa correspondent who was watch-ing and described the bloodyscene: “Hell burst around theLeathernecks as they moved upthe barren face of the ridge.Everywhere along the assault line,men dropped. To continue lookedimpossible. But, all glory forever tothe bravest men I ever saw, theline did not break. The casualtieswere unthinkable, but the assaultforce never turned back. It moved,fell down, got up and movedagain.”

One platoon of Company D,with only 15 men remaining, didclaw its way to the top of Hill 109on Obong-ni Ridge, but it was tooweak and too isolated when rein-forcements simply could not reachit, so it had to pull back off thecrest. Second Lieutenant Michael J.Shinka, the platoon leader, latergave the details of that perilousstruggle:

Running short of ammoand taking casualties, withthe shallow enemy slit trench-es for cover, I decided to fallback until some of the fire onmy left flank could besilenced. I gave the word towithdraw and take all wound-ed and weapons. Aboutthree-quarters of the waydown, I had the men set upwhere cover was available. Ihad six men who were ableto fight.

I decided to go forward tofind out if we had left any ofour wounded. As I crawledalong our former position (onthe crest of Hill 109), I cameacross a wounded Marinebetween two dead. As Igrabbed him under the armsand pulled him from the fox-hole, a bullet shattered mychin. Blood ran into my

throat and I couldn’t breathe.

Shinka, after being hit again, didmanage to survive, and was laterawarded a Bronze Star Medal.Another Company D Marine, StaffSergeant T. Albert Crowson, single-handedly silenced two deadlymachine gun emplacements andwas awarded the Army’sDistinguished Service Cross byorder of General MacArthur.

By now, it had become clearthat many of the casualties werecaused by heavy enemy fire com-ing from the zone in front of theArmy’s 9th Regiment to hit theflank and rear of the Marines, andthere had been no supporting firefrom the 9th. Other problems arosewhen some men of Company Ewere nearing the crest which wastheir objective and they were hitby white phosphorus shells from“friendly” artillery fire. Then, later,some Marines were hit in a strafingattack by their own Corsairs.

By mid-day the men of the 2dBattalion, halfway up the hills,could do no more, having suffered142 casualties, 60 percent of theiroriginal 240 riflemen. Murrayordered it to pull back, undoubt-edly lamenting the fact that he didnot have a third rifle company in

the battalion, for it might well haveseized the top of the ridge andheld it. Craig stressed this point ina later interview, noting that “with-out a third company, or maneuverelement, the battalion commanderswere at a tactical disadvantage inevery engagement. They lackedflexibility in the attack. On defensethey had to scrape up whateverthey could in order to have areserve.”

Pinpointing an example, Craigrecalled:

This condition became crit-ical in the First Battle of theNaktong. 2d Battalion, 5thMarines’ assault companiestook heavy losses in the initialattack against Obong-niRidge, the strongpoint of theenemy’s bridgehead over theNaktong. Since Roise hadnothing left to use, the attackstalled.

Murray then had to commit1/5 [the 1st Battalion] prema-turely to continue the attack.This took time, giving theenemy a breather right at theheight of the battle. Thatnight, when the enemy hitour positions on the ridgewith a heavy counterattack,

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A Marine tank bulldozer clears a destroyed NKPA T-34 tank from the road.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1338

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Newton certainly could haveused another company online or in reserve. We werespread pretty thin, and it wasnip and tuck on that ridge forseveral more hours.

The original battle plan hadcalled for an attack in a column ofbattalions, with each battalion tak-ing successively one of the series

of three ridge lines (objectives 1, 2,and 3) that shielded the NKPA rivercrossing It was now painfully obvi-ous that a sharp change must bemade. Accordingly, Newton’s 1stBattalion relieved the battered 2don the hillsides at 1600 (17August), with Company A replac-ing E, and B replacing D.

While the 18th Regiment had hitthe 2d Battalion hard, the bravery,

skill, and determination of thoseMarines had caused serious lossesin the enemy’s ranks: 600 casual-ties and severe reductions in ser-viceable weapons. With his ammu-nition running low and no medicalsupplies so that most of hiswounded men were dying, theNKPA commander’s situation wascritical, as described by Fehren-bach:

He knew he could notwithstand another day ofAmerican air and artillerypounding and a fresh Marineassault up the ridge. Becausehe had a captured AmericanSCR-300 radio, tuned in onMarine frequencies, he knewthat the 1st Battalion hadrelieved 2/5 along the front ofObong-ni, and he knewapproximately where thecompanies of 1/5 were locat-ed, for the Marines talked agreat deal over the air.

The 1st Battalion Attacks

The relief movement of the twobattalions was covered by what theofficial Marine history described as“devastating fires” from the planesof MAG-33, the artillery of the 1stBattalion, 11th Marines, and thebrigade’s tank battalion. ThenCompanies A and B attacked upthe daunting slopes. Simul-taneously, after Murray had goneto see Church to request a changein the previously agreed-uponplan, the 9th Infantry jumped off inan attack. This eliminated the pre-vious flanking fire on the Marines.

Helped by the advance bom-bardment, the two Marine compa-nies were able to make slow (andcostly) progress towards the crests.Company A attacked repeatedly,trying to reach the battalion’sobjective on the left: the tops ofHills 117 and 143. It proved impos-

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sible, in spite of very aggressiveleadership by the officers (andgunnery sergeants who replacedthem as they fell). The companycould get only part way up theslopes when it was “pinned downby a solid sheet of Communist fire. . . casualties bled [the] skirmishline white and finally brought it toa stop.”

Herbert R. Luster, a private firstclass in Company A, rememberedhis own searing experience in thisbrutal battle:

It was evident no one sawthe enemy but me . . . . Ipulled back the bolt to cockthe action of the BAR, pushedoff the safety, settled back onmy right foot, and opened fire.The flying dirt and tracers toldme where my rounds weregoing. I emptied the rifle . . . .So I pushed the release withmy right thumb and pulled the

empty magazine out, stuck itin my jacket pocket, loadedand raised my BAR to myshoulder. Before I got it all theway up, red dirt kicked up inmy face. A big jerk at my rightarm told me I was hit. I lookeddown and saw blood squirtingonto my broken BAR stock.

As always, there were goryepisodes. Second LieutenantFrancis W. Muetzel in Company Awas in an abandoned machine gunemplacement with his companyexecutive officer and a riflemanfrom the 3d Platoon. He laterrecalled:

The use of the abandonedmachine gun emplacementproved to be a mistake. Enemymortars and artillery hadalready registered on it . . . .Without registration of anykind, four rounds of enemy

82mm mortar fire landedaround it. The blast lifted meoff the ground, my helmetflew off. A human body to myleft disintegrated. Being rathershook up and unable to hear,I crawled back to the CP . . . .About the time my hearingand stability returned . . . Ithought of the 3d Platoon rifle-man . . . . I returned to lookfor him. One of the mortarrounds must have landed inthe small of his back. Only apelvis and legs were left. Thestretcher-bearers gathered upthe remains with a shovel.

On the other side of “Red SlashHill” that was the dividing line,Company B made some progressuntil it was pinned down by heavyfire from a nearby village on itsflank. Captain John L. Tobin waswounded, so Fenton took over ascompany commander. Calling in an

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81mm mortar barrage from the bat-talion’s weapons company, theriflemen were then able to lungeforward and seize the crests of Hills102 and 109 by late afternoon (17August).

The two battered companies set-tled down where they were and

tied into each other to dig in nightdefensive positions. With the floodof casualties, the resulting man-power shortage caused the far leftflank to dangle dangerously in theair. Newton threw together animprovised unit of men from hisheadquarters and service company

personnel to cover that flank. Themortars and artillery were regis-tered on probable enemyapproach routes, including thecrossing point on the NaktongRiver. Then their harassing firemissions went on all night to try todisrupt the enemy.

Smashing Enemy Tanks

At 2000 that night (17 August)the Marines had their first con-frontation with the T-34 tanks ofthe NKPA. These were the tanksthat had had such a fearsome rep-utation earlier in the war. The menof Company B from their hilltopperch saw four of them comingwith a column of infantry, aimed tobypass the Marine riflemen, and, ina typical enemy tactic, probe tosow confusion amongst rear ele-ments.

The Corsairs of MAG-33 werecalled in. They came roaringdown, knocked out one tank, andscattered the accompanying enemyinfantry. With a determination typ-

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1160

Fire from supporting weapons was a crucial element as the rifle companiesattacked. Above: 81mm mortars lay down a barrage. Below: a 75mm recoillessrifle blasts a specific target.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1461

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ical of the hardy NKPA, the otherthree tanks came on.

When the news was flashed toNewton in his CP, he told Fentonto “let them go and they’d be dealtwith in the rear.” Back at Craig’sbrigade CP, there were two oppo-site reactions when the newsarrived. A correspondent wit-nessed the scene: “Naval CaptainEugene Hering, brigade surgeon,jumped to his feet. “GodAlmighty!” he said. “The aid sta-tion’s just a quarter of a mile fromthere! [Lieutenant (junior grade)Bentley] Nelson [one of the battal-ion’s medical officers] won’t leavehis wounded! If those tanks breakthrough . . . .” “They won’t,” thegeneral said. “Newton will knowwhat to do.”

And he did. Summoning theMarine M-26 tanks and antitankweapons, Newton left the NKPAarmor up to them. Fenton and themen of Company B had a ringsideseat for the clash that followed. Helater wrote:

As the first tank roundedthe corner down toward the1st Battalion CP, it was met by3.5” rocket fire from the anti-tank assault section, and firefrom our 75mm recoillessweapons in position on thehigh ground on either side ofthe road. The tank wasknocked out, and the secondtank immediately came upand tried to go around it. Thesecond, too, was hit in thetrack and skidded off theroad. Our M-26 tanks finishedhim off [after a 2.36” whitephosphorus rocket had rico-cheted inside it, creating afiery cauldron]. The third tankmade the same mistake thatthe second tank made. He,too, tried to go around theother two tanks. One of ourM-26 tanks hit this third tank

with a direct hit. All three ofthese tanks were finished offby our M-26 tank platoon.

Back on the hills, the men of the1st Battalion spent the midnighthours on the alert. The attacks thatday had cost the brigade 205 casu-alties, and, to avoid the punishingMarine air strikes in daylight, theenemy was sure to counterattackduring the darkness.

The Enemy Reaction

And it did. At 0230 a green sig-nal flare soared into the sky, andthe enemy hit—and hit hard. Withtheir captured U.S. Army radiotuned to the Marines’ frequency,the attackers knew the exact placewhere the two Marine companieswere tenuously tied together, andthey sought to drive a wedge inthere and then envelop each com-pany separately. With Company Aonly part way up Hill 117, machinegun fire from the crest andgrenades rolling downhill covered

the assault troops of the NKPA, asthey ran down throwing moregrenades and spraying submachinegun fire. A rifle platoon was indeep trouble, the mortar platoonwas decimated, the Marine defenseline was penetrated, the companywas split in half, the battalion wasassaulted, and the enemy forcedCompany A to make a partial with-drawal back to a spot near Hill109.

Things were not much better inthe Company B zone. With the twoMarine companies split by theNKPA, the enemy assault smashedhard into Fenton’s men. A platoonwas overrun under the eerie lightof mortar illuminating shells. Theattackers charged into the CP,where hastily assembled strayMarines met them in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Possession of thetwo hard-won hills and, in fact, theoutcome of the whole brigadeattack hung in a delicate, tremblingbalance.

Just at that precarious moment,the phone rang in the CP of

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On top of Objective Number 3, Marines look down on the Naktong River.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1401

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Company B. It was Newton, callingto say that the position must beheld “at all costs,” and that he waspouring in all the supporting mor-tar and artillery fire he couldmuster. (This apparently preventedthe NKPA from feeding in rein-forcements to exploit the break-throughs.) Newton’s main messagewas a brutally frank reminder that,if the Marines retreated, theywould simply have to grind theirway back to the lost positions inthe forthcoming days. ThenNewton asked if they could holdon until daylight could bring relief.Fenton’s reply has been variouslyreported: “We have gooks allaround us”; “They’ve turned myleft flank”; “Don’t worry, Colonel.The only Marines that will be leav-ing this ridge tonight will be deadones.”

The supporting fire from the 4.2-inch mortar company proved to bean invaluable asset. With its high

angle of fire, it was able to searchout and wreak havoc on NKPAunits shielded in gullies whichMarine artillery fire could notreach. The company’s command-ing officer, First Lieutenant RobertM. Lucy, later recalled:

The 1st Battalion wasreceiving a terrifically heavycounterattack. Our companywas zeroed in on the hill andthe valley in front of the bat-talion. When notified of thisattack, we began firing ourprearranged barrages. Later,where only one of these bar-rages had fallen, they count-ed 120 dead North Koreanswith 12 cart-mounted ma-chine guns, who had beenmassed in this little gulleybehind the hill, a ridge infront of the battalion thatwould have caused themconsiderable trouble.

With many officers down andaided by the supporting fire, thenoncommissioned officers took thelead in regrouping their units, andso the men of the depletedCompanies A and B stood, andfought, and died, and finally heldtheir ground. Typical of theunyielding defense were the exam-ples of two platoon leaders,Second Lieutenant Hugh C.Schryver, Jr., in Company B, andSecond Lieutenant Francis W.Muetzel in Company A. Both offi-cers, although severely wounded,continued to lead their men withthe “fierce determination”described in their citations forawards of the Silver Star. Slowly,toward dawn on 18 August, theenemy attacks weakened. But theMarines had paid a fearful price.Company B had begun the nightwith 190 enlisted men and fiveofficers; the next morning therewere only 110 left, with one officer

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still standing. Company A was inworse shape with just 90 menremaining from the 185 at the startof the night.

But the enemy had also paid aheavy price. The sequential attacksof the 2d and then the 1stBattalions and the dogged night-time defense had caused hundredsof NKPA casualties so that, inFehrenbach’s words, “the 18thRegiment was shattered beyondrepair.”

Craig ordered a resumption ofthe attack at 0700 the next morn-ing, 18 August. None of the menon Obong-ni had had any sleepduring the night past, but theCorsairs were back on station over-head, the enemy was weakening,and both Companies A and Bmoved once more into the assault.Company B worked men to its leftto coordinate with Company A’seffort to seize Hill 117. Four deter-mined NKPA machine gunnersthere held up the advance, so thecompany commander, CaptainJohn R. Stevens, got in touch withNewton to call in an air strike.There was legitimate concernabout the fact that his Marines

were too close, only 100 yardsfrom the target, but a smoke rock-et was fired into the emplacementsfrom the control Corsair, and thenext Corsair put a 500-poundbomb right onto the center of thetarget. The Marines lost one mankilled, but the enemy was totallywiped out, and Company A’s fol-low-up rush quickly took controlof the crest. Time: 0734, request airstrike; 0743, bomb delivered; 0748,on the crest.

There was a brief pause—wellremembered by Muetzel:

In an effort to calm themen after all they’d beenthrough, I told them to breakout rations and eat while theyhad a chance. I sat on theside of a hole and dangledmy feet. On the other side ofthe hole lay a dead NorthKorean. He had caught onethrough the top of the headand looked pretty ugly. I was23 years old and to reassurethe men I tried to pull off aJohn Wayne stunt. When Iwas halfway through my canof meat and beans, decom-

posing gases caused thecadaver to belch. Black bloodfoamed out of its mouth andnose. I promptly lost myentire lunch. By the time theplatoon got through laughing,the tension was broken andthey were ready to go back towork.

And back to work the companywent, moving aggressively to takethe remaining hilltops. Resistancewas minimal now, and soon all theheights of bloody Obong-ni Ridgewere in Marine hands. As the menlooked down the reverse slope ofone of the hills, an unusual sightgreeted their eyes. A clump ofscrub pines lay below them, and,as they watched, astonished, the“clump” turned out to be a groupof camouflaged enemy soldierswho arose and rushed downwardin headlong flight.

The 1st Battalion now countedup the enemy weapons destroyedor abandoned: 18 heavy machineguns, 25 light machine guns, 63submachine guns, 8 antitank rifles,1 rocket launcher, and large stocksof ammunition and grenades.

The seizure of Obong-ni Ridgewas crucial to the elimination ofthe threatening salient which hadbeen driven into the Army’s lines.As Geer summed it up, “it was evi-dent the enemy had staked thedefense of the Naktong Bulge ontheir ability to hold that key ridge.”

Next: Objective 2

With Objective 1 now securedand the enemy in bad shape,Murray kept the pressure on.Taplett’s 3d Battalion moved outthat same morning of 18 August,bound for Objective 2, Hill 207(the next rise west of Obong-ni). Itwas preceded by an intensive bar-rage from air, artillery, tanks, andmortars, including now supporting

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A-157140

With an enemy who was adept at infiltration and night attacks, Marines strungbarbed wire whenever they had an opportunity.

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fire from the 9th Infantry on theright flank.

A correspondent in the rear wasawed:

The 155s began to roar andthe snub-nosed 105s, and toone side the mortars werebarking, and in front thesquat tanks were slammingaway with the 90mm gunswhose muzzle blast canknock a man down at thirtyfeet, and above the hill,swooping low, the planeswere diving in.

You would see the smokeand fire flash of the rocketsleaving the wings, and thenwould come the great tearingsound the rocket made inflight, and then the roar of itsbursting against the hill. Andafter the rockets had gone,you would see the little rounddots of smoke in the sky as

the wing guns fired, and allthe crest of the hill in front ofHow Company was a roaring,jumping hell of smoke andflame and dust and noise.

With this kind of preparation,“Objective 2 was not much of afight,” as an officer in Company Gsaid. There was a grenade flurrynear the crest of Hill 207, but a pla-toon of Company H was then ableto rush the enemy positions, and itwas all over by 1237.

There had been a tide of NKPAtroops running for safety. Now itbecame a flood, increased by mendriven from Hill 207. Everywherethe soldiers of the NKPA’s “crack”4th Division on Obong-ni hadthemselves cracked and were flee-ing westward in a disorganized,panic-stricken rout. It became afield day for the Marine artilleryand planes—a thunderous ham-mering that caused massive waves

of enemy deaths. There were “allkinds of bodies floating in theNaktong.”

Final Victory: Objective 3

Taplett kept driving. Next target:“Objective 3,” Hill 311, the last bar-rier before the Naktong River.There was another round ofpreparatory fire, this one featuringa dose of napalm, and one moretime the riflemen moved out.

Things went fairly smoothly forCompany G which, “brushingaside light resistance,” was on thecrest by 1730. Not so for CompanyH. It was badly hindered by diffi-cult terrain and an obdurateenemy, and by 1825 was pinneddown and unable to advance.Supporting fire from Company Gand an attempted flanking maneu-ver by its Cahill platoon (which, 10days earlier, had had that reliefmission on Hill 342) were not

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A2189

A “turkey shoot” ended the First Battle of the Naktong. Here a BAR man draws a bead on the fleeing enemy.

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enough help for H to be able toadvance.

It was the last gasp of the NKPA,however. A heavy round of battal-ion mortar fire early the nextmorning, 19 August, was followedby a triumphant sweep of the hill-top by Company H, and theMarine battle to seize the three keyridges in the Naktong Bulge wasover. One battalion stood on eachof the three objectives, and themen of the brigade met the Armytroops at the river’s edge. Marineaviators reported, “the enemy waskilled in such numbers that theriver was definitely discolored withblood.”

During the attack on Objective3, the 3d Battalion surgeon cameacross a horrendous sight, demon-strating the savage brutality of theNKPA. A U.S. Army aid station hadbeen overrun a week earlier, thewounded and bed-ridden menshot and bayoneted, their bodiesthen mutilated. Medics who brave-

ly had stayed there to tend theirmen had had the hands wiredbehind their backs and then weremurdered.

An incident occurred on one ofthese final nights that is veryrevealing of how personnel prob-lems could be expeditiously dealtwith in the “Old Corps”—particu-larly in a combat environment.Bohn had told his machine gunplatoon lieutenant to check care-fully on the positioning and coor-dination of the weapons’ sites.When the company commanderdecided to inspect personally, hefound wholly unsatisfactory resultsand crews who had not even seentheir lieutenant. Steaming, hereturned to his CP and hauled thelieutenant in for a very brief con-versation:

I said, “Have you put in themachine gun sections? Didyou get around to check eachsection?” He said, “Yes, sir.”

So I relieved him. I calledTaplett and said, “I don’t evenwant this guy here tonight.” Imade him go back on hisown, back to the battalion,and wrote an unsat report,un-officer-like conduct.

It went up to Craig, and theguy was out of country in twoor three days. It was so easyto do things like that then.And he was out of the MarineCorps. You can’t do thattoday. You have to have aGeneral Court-martial andeverything else. There wasn’teven a Court of Inquiry.Everyone agreed that he wasa coward, and he was gone.

The brigade was now relievedby Army units—not alwayssmoothly, but at least the tiredMarines would get some rest.

The victory price for theNaktong Marines was clear: 66dead, 278 wounded, but only 1man missing in action. That lastfigure was the clearest indicationof the value of Marine training andmorale; there had been other unitswith distressingly high percentagesof missing-in-action, but, as EdwinP. Hoyt summarizes in his history,The Pusan Perimeter—Korea 1950:“The Marines stood and fought,and they took care of their own.”

The final results for the NKPA4th Division were shattering.Fewer than 3,000 men were able toget back across the Naktong, leav-ing more than 1,200 dead behind.The Marine brigade recovered alarge amount of enemy equipment,including 34 artillery pieces (withfive of them being captured Army105mm howitzers), hundreds ofautomatic weapons, and thousandsof rifles. The Army’s official historysums it up: “The destruction . . . ofthe NKPA 4th Division . . . was thegreatest setback suffered thus farby the North Korean Army. The

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2238

BGen Edward A. Craig receives the thanks of South Korean President SyngmanRhee at the Purple Heart ceremony.

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4th Division never recovered fromthis battle.”

After the brigade was pulledback off the hills it had won,Fenton described what he felt wasthe key reason for the Marine vic-tory: “the finest batch of noncom-missioned officers ever assembledin any Marine regiment. Not onlywere 75 percent of them combatveterans, he believed, but they hadoften stepped in as platoon leadersand were “outstanding.” Fentonexpanded on that:

Squad leaders knew theirjob to the last detail. Manytimes I ended up withsergeants as platoon leadersafter a big fire fight, and theydid an excellent job. I justcan’t be too high in mypraise.

In some cases, it wasn’t justnoncoms. It was the PFCs andprivates holding the job of afire team leader or squadleader. It was their fine lead-ership, outstanding initiative,and control of the men thatturned a possible defeat intoa sweet victory.

On 20 August Craig learnedfrom Church that the brigade hadbeen detached from the 24thDivision and was now part ofWalker’s Eighth Army reserve.There were letters of praise fromboth Walker and Church. The for-mer wrote that the brigade’s“excellence in leadership and gritand determination . . . upheld thefine tradition of the Marines in aglorious manner.” Church gra-ciously commented to the Marinesthat their “decisive and valiantoffensive actions . . . predominant-ly contributed to the total destruc-tion of the Naktong pocket.”Perhaps the recognition the men ofthe brigade appreciated most camefrom their own Commandant.

General Cates’ message said: “I amvery proud of the performance ofyour air-ground team. Keep hittingthem front, flanks, rear, and top-side. Well done.”

Another Brief Interlude

Thus the men of the brigademoved back into bivouac in anarea near Masan known foreverafter as “The Bean Patch.” Craig setup his CP there on 21 August andreported back again to Kean of theArmy’s 25th Division. The newswas discouraging: all the land wonin the brigade’s drive to Sachonwas now lost or under heavyenemy pressure, and the 11thMarines was needed to go backimmediately to the original startingpoint two weeks earlier, Chindong-ni, to fire missions in support ofthe 25th Division.

But for the other Marines it wasa wonderful, restorative change.Some 800 replacements arrived tofill in the painful gaps in the ranks;VMO-6 helicopters flew in hotfood; letters from home and beer

miraculously appeared; and newequipment was issued. But notenough of it. Fenton frankly notedthat the equipment they hadarrived with in the Bean Patch wasin “terrible condition.” It had dete-riorated badly from exposure toheat, rain, and frequent immersionin rice paddies.

In addition, he commented:

We were having a hardtime getting Browning auto-matic rifles. Many of our BARmen had been casualties, andwe were down to about threeor four per platoon. You justcouldn’t get a BAR belt inKorea.

Shoes were another bigproblem . . . . We reached thepoint where we had men run-ning around in tennis shoes.Dungarees were in bad shape. . . . Our packs, which hadbeen dropped at Pusan andwere supposed to have beenbrought to us by the rear ech-elon, never arrived. The onlyway we could get a clean suit

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1469

A high point of the brief interlude in the rest area: mail call!

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of dungarees was to washthem or survey the supply atthe laundry unit when wetook a shower.

There were no shelter halveseither, so the men slept out in theopen. A memorable event was aceremony for the award of 87Purple Heart medals, with SouthKorean President Syngman Rheein attendance. The attrition rateamong the officers had been fear-ful: five of the six company com-manders were wounded and nine

of the 18 rifle platoon leaderswere wounded and four of thekilled in action.

One platoon leader, SecondLieutenant Muetzel, received twoPurple Hearts (with a Silver StarMedal to come later for his heroicactions on Obong-ni), while thegunnery sergeant of the Recon-naissance Company, a veteran ofWorld War II wounds, received hisfifth Purple Heart. It was a strainto try to look presentable for theceremony, as Muetzel laterremarked:

My leggings had beenthrown away, my trouserswere out at both knees, myright boot had two bulletholes in it, and my dungareejacket had corporal’s stripesstenciled on the sleeves. Igrabbed a fast shave withcold water, hard soap, and adull blade. Gene Davisloaned me a clean set of dun-garees, Tom Gibson loanedme his second lieutenant’sbars, and off I went with mytroops.

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Commanders and staff of the 5th Marines assembled for aphotograph during a lull in the battle. Pictured in the frontrow, from left, are: LtCol George R. Newton, LtCol Harold S.Roise, and LtCol Robert D. Taplett. Second row, LtColRaymond L. Murray and LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. Thirdrow, Maj R. M. Colland, LtCol George F. Walters, Jr., Capt

John V. Huff, Maj Kenneth B. Boyd, Maj Harold Wallace,Maj William C. Esterline. Fourth row, Capt Ralph M.Sudnick, Lt Robert M. Lucy, Lt Almarion S. Bailey, Lt Leo R.Jillisky, Lt Alton C. Weed, Capt Gearl M. English, WO HaroldJ. Michael, and CWO Bill E. Parrish

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1441

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Future Plans

While the troops were enjoyingthis temporary lull, some of Craig’ssenior staff officers were sent toTokyo to confer on plans for thefuture use of the Marines.MacArthur had made bold—verybold—plans for a daring end-runaround the NKPA besieging thePusan Perimeter by making a sur-prise amphibious landing far to therear, at Inchon. For this purpose hehad urgently requested the full 1stMarine Division. Elements of itbegan arriving in Japan on 28August, but there were massiveproblems to be overcome. The 1stMarines was on hand, but the 7th

Marines would not arrive at Inchonuntil a week after D-day, with onebattalion coming halfway aroundthe world from the Mediterranean.The crucial unit for the forthcom-ing assault was supposed to be thebattled-tested 5th Marines. It hadalready begun shipping its heavyequipment back down to Pusan, asplans were drawn to have it jointhe 1st Marine Division, eventhough it was now fully committedin combat. Morale soared in thebrigade as the men looked forwardto fighting side-by-side with fellowMarines.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo there werevery tense moments. Time wascritically short to mount an opera-

tion as complex as an amphibiousassault. There were vigorous dif-ferences of opinion in Army-Navy-Marine meetings as to when oreven whether the brigade shouldjoin the 1st Marine Division. Onone hand, the Eighth Army stafffelt, as the official Marine historybluntly put it, “Army morale wouldbe hurt by taking the brigade awayat a critical moment.” And Walkerplaced an “extremely excited” tele-phone call to MacArthur’s head-quarters in Tokyo, saying in effect,“If I lose the 5th Marine Regiment,I will not be responsible for thesafety of the front!” Thus there wasstrong Army pressure to substitutean Army regiment for the 5thMarines at the Inchon landing.

On the other hand, MajorGeneral Oliver P. Smith, Com-manding General of the 1st MarineDivision, supported by the threeNavy admirals most closely in-volved, was equally adamant that,for a tricky amphibious landing, hehad to have the 5th Marines whichwas trained for just such an opera-tion. There was a deadlock.

The NKPA Attacks Again

Then, amidst these planningmeetings, harsh reality came crash-ing down to complicate furtherdecisions on the use of thebrigade. The NKPA, realizing thattime was running out for it,launched a final, convulsive attackto eradicate the Pusan Perimeter.Some 98,000 men in 13 divisionshit five separate points on theperimeter. Walker faced a brutalseries of simultaneous problems.Where should he commit his limit-ed reserves—in particular hisproven Marine brigade? The twothrusts closest to Pusan were oneagainst the Army’s 25th Division inthe same area of the far southwest,and another against the Army’s 2dDivision in the west central

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1507

After the First Battle of the Naktong, there was a welcome moment to clean up—with a South Korean boy holding the mirror.

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(Naktong) area. A breakthrough tocapture Pusan would mean totaldisaster. (Military analysts in lateryears would speculate that thatmight well have happened ifGeneral Kim Chaek had orderedonly diversionary attacks at four ofthe points, massed overwhelmingstrength at one point, and crashedthrough there.)

The NKPA assigned the 2d, 4th,9th, and 10th Divisions to destroythe U.S. 2d Infantry Divisionbefore Miryang and drive throughto the vital Pusan-Taegu MSR byway of Yongsan. Smashing intothat division on 1 September, theNorth Korean assault quickly madea 4,000-yard penetration. The com-manding general of the 2dDivision, Major General LawrenceB. Keiser, USA, saw his divisionsliced in half, with his companiescut off or totally overrun, hisdefensive lines hustled backalmost to Yongsan, and enemyinfiltration in his rear. NeitherKeiser nor his three regimentalcommanders had ever led troopsin battle, and now the NKPA had

punched a hole six miles wide andeight miles deep into their division.Obong-ni Ridge, so dearly bought,was back in enemy hands.

Now Walker made up his mind:the new Naktong Bulge hadreturned as his priority threat.Blair’s book pointed out the logi-cal, but painful, next step: “Walkercame to a difficult and drastic deci-sion: Once again he would have tocall on Eddie Craig’s Marines forhelp. The decision was drasticboth because of the humiliation itwould again cause the Army, andbecause Craig’s Marines were avital element in the Inchon inva-sion plan.”

‘Fire Brigade’: Crisis Number Three

That was it. In the morning of 1September, the orders came for thebrigade, including the 11thMarines, to move by train andtruck back once more to theMiryang assembly area. The reac-tion of the men was predictable:going back to regain what theyhad already won once.

When Craig had set up his CP inMiryang, his brigade came underthe operational control of theArmy’s 2d Division. To old timersin the Marine Corps it surelybrought back vivid and ironicmemories of another time andplace, when a Marine brigade hadbeen teamed once before with the9th and 23d Infantry as a proudpart of the Army’s superb 2dDivision, 32 years earlier in France.

On 2 September, Craig had aconference with Keiser and theEighth Army’s Chief of Staff.General Shepherd later made acomment on this meeting whichrevealed the inherently graciousnature of Craig: “The Army divi-sion commander . . . went toEddie, who was a brigadier, andsaid, ‘General Craig, I’m horriblyembarrassed that you have to dothis. My men lost the ground thatyou took in a severe fight.’ AndEddie, in his very gallant manner,said, ‘General, it might have hap-pened to me.’ ”

The Army officers at the meetingfelt the situation was so desperatethat the brigade should immediate-ly be dribbled piecemeal intoaction, even though one of its bat-talions and its air control sectionhad not yet arrived. Craig, whoalso knew when to make a stand,later remembered, “This was theonly heated discussion I had inKorea with the Army.” His stub-born view that the whole brigadeshould go into action as a unifiedair-ground team was finally accept-ed. Its attack would be down theYongsan-Naktong road toward anall-too-familiar objective, Obong-niRidge. The 9th Infantry Regimentwould be on its right, and otherArmy units on its left. Now thebrigade, for the first time,appeared to have flanks that weresecure enough to allow it to attackwith two battalions abreast, Roise’s2d on the right and Newton’s 1st

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Photo by David Douglas Duncan The price of victory: a jeep takes two wounded men back to an aid station.

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on the left. Taplett’s 3d Battalionwould block any enemy pushalong the southwest approaches toYongsan.

Meanwhile, between 0300 and0430, 3 September, the 2d Battalionmoved into its forward assemblyarea north of Yongsan, with the 1stBattalion south of the town.

Opposite them, driving hard forYongsan, were the NKPA divisions

which had successfully advancedthis far in the new Naktong Bulge.Immediately in front of the brigadewas the 9th Division. This was nota seasoned, professional outfit,such as the one the brigade hadpreviously broken; rather, it hadup to now been doing guard dutyat Seoul. Behind it, in reserve,came a reconstituted 4th Division,filled with new recruits after the

massive casualties the brigade hadinflicted on it in the first battle ofthe Naktong.

The Marines Attack

The Marine attack was to belaunched early on the morning of3 September. There were problemsgetting things started. Movingthrough Yongsan, the Marineswere hit by small arms fire fromsnipers, but by 0630 they hadworked their way to the westernend of the town, and thought theywere then headed forward to theagreed-upon line of departure fortheir main attack. Not so! Duringthe night the Army troops on theridgeline had “collapsed” and hadbeen pushed back 1,000 yards. At0645 Roise called SecondLieutenant Robert M. Winter tobring his tanks forward and laydown fire to cover the withdrawalof the Army troops. The originalplanned line of departure thusbecame the first objective whenthe Marines attacked.

The 2d Battalion jumped off at0715, securing the right flank ofthe brigade’s attack. To soften uphis main objective, Roise calleddown a massive sheet of fire fromtanks, air, mortars, artillery, andmachine guns. The Marinespushed doggedly toward it wadingthrough a rice paddy. Now theenemy’s 9th Division quicklyfound its previous pattern ofsteady advances had ground to ascreeching halt.

Craig, as was his wont, came upto check on the action. His obser-vation post (OP) was between thetanks and Roise’s OP. Enemy firepounded the area, and Winter waswounded and had to be evacuat-ed—but not before he offeredCraig a bottle of whiskey from histank. Winter was later awarded aSilver Star Medal for his leadershipof his tank platoon that day.

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Meanwhile, the 1st Battalionalso moved out. Its attack routeforced the men knee-deep intotheir own huge rice paddy. Therethey came under fire, but theirsupporting arms searched out theenemy positions. In particular, theCorsairs were able to engulf theNKPA with balls of napalm fire. Atypical time of response was sevenminutes from a strike request toexecution.

This kind of seamless coordina-tion in the Marine air-ground teamwas a source of great envy by theArmy commanders who saw itsdecisive results. As Colonel Paul L.Freeman, USA, commander of the23d Infantry (well off to the rightof the brigade), wrote to GeneralMatthew Ridgway in Washington:

The Marines on our leftwere a sight to behold. Notonly was their equipmentsuperior or equal to ours, butthey had squadrons of air indirect support. They used itlike artillery. It was, “Hey,Joe, this is Smitty, knock offthe left of that ridge in frontof Item Company.” They hadit day and night . . . General,we just have to have air sup-port like that, or we might aswell disband the Infantry andjoin the Marines.

By 1100 the 1st Battalion was atthe base of its ridgeline objective.Working its way upwards underthe protection of supporting 81mmmortar fire, Company A poised fora final charge. As soon as the firelifted, the men sprang forward,screaming, shouting, firing everyavailable weapon. To their amaze-ment, a whole company of NKPAsoldiers in front of them, shakenby the noise and the sight of charg-ing Marines, leaped in a panic outof their concealed foxholes on theforward slope and fled back

towards the crest of the hill. Thenthe long hours of practice on therifle range really paid off: Marinemarksmen coolly picked off mostof the enemy as they ran.Company A immediately rushed tothe crest. It was noon. In CompanyB, Fenton later observed:

The 1st Battalion was ableto move and seize the ridgeline without encounteringheavy opposition. I don’tbelieve the enemy realized

that we had a battalion to theleft of the road, because hewas prepared to take thathigh ground himself. We beathim there by a good 10 or 20minutes and caught him com-ing across another rice paddyfield. We really had a “turkeyshoot.”

Firing now from the heights, theMarine riflemen put on anotherdisplay of precise marksmanshipthat must have stunned the simple

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Photo by David Douglas Duncan

A distraught Cpl Leonard Hayworth pleads for more grenades, finds none, andmust return empty-handed to his hard-pressed men.

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peasant soldiers of the NKPA: the“yellow leggings” could kill withaimed fire at 400-500 yards. (Just asthe Marines in that earlier brigadein France had stunned theGermans at Belleau Wood withtrained rifle fire that killed at longrange.)

What the 1st Battalion did notfinish off, the 105s of the 11thMarines did. Those of the enemywho were left withdrew to Hill 117in front of the 2d Battalion, but anartillery barrage was called downon them in transit, and wreakedmore havoc.

In the 2d Battalion zone ofattack there were some hardmoments. When Company D wasgetting started in its assault, a trag-ic episode occurred. (Today, it iscalled “friendly fire” and results in

great publicity. Fifty years ago, inthe early days of the Korean War, itwas regarded as just one of thoseunfortunate things that happenedbecause close combat is alwaysunpredictable.) The official Marinehistory did not even mention it,but it was seared into the memoryof Private First Class Douglas Kochin Company D:

Down the road from thenorth rolled four or fiveAmerican tanks . . . . All of asudden a machine gunstitched a stream of fire acrossthe company’s rear. I rolledover on one elbow andlooked behind me. Someoneyelled, “God, they’re shootingat us.” Instead of firing on thetop of the hill, the tanks

chose to fire at the bottom ofthe hill. I saw a puff ofsmoke. Just that quick a shelllanded near me. It rolled meover into a little gully. I laydazed. God, I thought, we’regonna get done in by ourown goddamn outfit. While Ilay with my head down, threeor four more shells hit nearby. . . . A lot of men had beenhit.

Naturally, this kind of ghastlymistake was temporarily shatteringto the company, until the officersfinally got their men moving again.But Koch and the others went backto their attack “still in shock.”

This occurrence was, fortunate-ly, a rarity. Elsewhere that morningof 3 September, Marine tanks were

55

Capt “Ike” Fenton, caught by surprise, described the grimmoment: “We had been in one hell of a big battle. It was

raining. The radio had gone out and we were low onammunition.”

Photo by David Douglas Duncan

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doing yeoman’s work. They tookon NKPA antitank weapons, sur-prised three T-34 tanks and wipedthem out, then eliminated twomore in the afternoon. This clean-up enabled the M-26s to concen-trate their fire to good effect onenemy weapons and troop posi-tions confronting the riflemen.

Marine air was also very active.With the squadrons shuttling sothat one was always on hand tohelp, seven close air support mis-sions were flown for the twoassault battalions. Other Marineplanes, guided by OYs, strafed andbombed, knocking out, amongother things, 16 enemy gun andmortar positions.

Back on the ground, CompanyD’s first objective was Hill 116, totry to cut off the enemy reinforce-ments coming over from the 1stBattalion’s zone. Facing two NKPAbattalions, the company founditself in a bloody battle. It was

finally able to gain the crest of thenorthern spur of Hill 117, andthere it dug in, isolated, some 500yards from the rest of the 2dBattalion.

As the enemy troops filtered intothe zone of the 2d Battalion, themen of the 1st Battalion were ableto make good progress in the after-noon, with Company B reachingits part of Objective 2, a peakacross the MSR from Hill 117.Company A, using a fancy tripleenvelopment seized its part, Hill91, by 1630, and so all hands pre-pared for the usual night counter-attack. Well they might. The 1stBattalion’s right flank was danglingin air; it was trying to cover a frontof nearly a mile; and its two riflecompanies were 200 yards apart.The 2d Battalion was in an equallydangerous position, stretched overa 2,000-yard front, bent in a rightangle, with Company D complete-ly isolated.

Three things saved the Marines’precarious position. First, a bevy oftheir engineers moved in to sow abelt of antipersonnel mines, wiredhand grenades, and blocks of TNTalong the flanks. Secondly,VMF(N)-513 came on station withits F4U-5N Corsair and F7FTigercat night fighters. Equippedwith sophisticated radar, it was theonly squadron to fly single-engineplanes over Korea at night. Flyingmore than 2,000 hours of nightmissions in one month, it deliveredthis particular night six close airsupport strikes controlled from thetwo infantry battalions. Thirdly, adeluge of rain, accompanied by icywinds, further hindered any plansthe battered NKPA troops mighthave contemplated for a counterat-tack.

As the Marines waited thoughthe miserable, rainy night, eventhough they had driven two victo-rious miles west of Yongsan, their

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thoughts must have turned to thecasualties of the past day: 34 killedand 157 wounded. Muetzel in the1st Battalion later voiced whatmust have been a common senti-ment after almost a month ofgrinding combat:

[Men] came, were killed,and were carried away . . . .I knew this couldn’t keep up. . . . We, me, all of us wereeventually going to get it; itwas just a matter of whenand how bad . . . . It was justa god-awful mess—inade-quate replacements, insuffi-cient ammo, worn-out clothesand boots. No one much gavea rap about anything. Outsidediscipline was no longer athreat. What could the brassdo to us that was worse thanwhat we were doing? Each ofus withdrew into our family—

the squad, the platoon, thecompany, the regiment, thebrigade, the Corps. Everyoneelse, bug off!

This same day, 3 September,witnessed a final showdown in theTokyo planning meetings. A com-promise solution to the deadlockemerged. Walker would get Armyreinforcements and could tem-porarily use the Marine Brigade tomeet his Naktong crisis. But itwould have to be withdrawn bymidnight 5 September to join the1st Marine Division for the Inchonlanding.

Continuing the Assault

Back with troops, in order tokeep the pressure on the nextmorning (4 September), Murrayhad ordered Taplett’s 3d Battalionto pass through the depleted 2d

Battalion and resume the attack at0800 with the 1st Battalion on itsleft. In 20 minutes, Taplett’s menreached their first objective, thenquickly took Hill 116 with almostno enemy resistance. Next, the bat-talion’s main objective, Hill 117,was overrun by a pincer move-ment of Companies G and H.Incredibly, it was all over by 0840.No real enemy resistance hadturned into a withdrawal, and nowthere were signs that was turninginto a disorderly rout—a weirdcontrast to the bruising encountersthe Marines had had the daybefore.

The 1st Battalion was simultane-ously moving with equal rapidity.Shortly after starting, it occupiedwhat appeared to have been a CPof the NKPA 9th Division. Tentswere still up, equipment wasstrewn around, and two aban-doned T-34 tanks in perfect oper-

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Marines meet almost no opposition as they top this hill in the Naktong River area on 4 September 1950Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A8175

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ating condition were captured (thefirst such to be taken and turnedover to U.S. Army Ordnance forexamination). The men in the bat-talion’s steady advance saw thebodies of many dead NKPA sol-diers and piles of abandoned ordestroyed equipment, souvenirs oflow-flying Corsair strikes and accu-rate fire from the 11th Marinespoured on the retreating enemy.Among the litter were capturedAmerican guns, tanks, mortars, andvehicles which were returned tothe 2d Division. The official Marinehistory described “a picture of dev-astation unequaled even by theearlier defeat of the NKPA 4thDivision.” This time it was the 9thDivision’s turn to be hammered bythe brigade.

By 1515 Newton’s companiesstood atop their first objectives,now less than 2,000 yards from theold killing ground on Obong-niRidge. Moving in coordinated tan-dem with them were Taplett’scompanies, which had pivoted tothe west after seizing Hill 117.

Learning of the Marines’progress, Keiser gave Craig the go-ahead to have his brigade push onfurther toward Objective Two.Moving aggressively, using airstrikes when held up, the 1stBattalion worked its way to thedesignated area (between Hill 125and Observation Hill), securingCloverleaf Hill by 1800.

Thus the brigade had advanced3,000 yards and gained its objec-tives. Hoyt summarized the strate-gic importance of this: “TheMarines had stopped the enemy’sadvance, saved Yongsan and the[MSR] road beyond [it], and put theNorth Korean 9th Division intoretreat.”

As the Marine battalions dug infor the night they were in exposedpositions similar to the precedingevening. Newton’s men were 1,000yards in front on the left, stretched

paper-thin along a line almost amile long. Taplett’s men were nobetter off. Out of contact with the1st Battalion on their left and theArmy’s 9th Infantry on their right,they curled up in a perimeterdefense.

Expecting the usual NKPA nightcounterattack, the Marines againhad their engineers put out a pro-tective shell of mines, booby traps,and trip flares. There was heavyincoming shelling during the night,but that slacked off after a visitfrom the night fighter planes ofVMF(N)-513. The rain poureddown, but the enemy infantryapparently had been hit too hardduring the day, and there was noassault.

When men are under heavypressure in close combat littlethings can loom large in theirminds. Fenton gave an example:“It had been raining all night, andthe battalion had managed to getsome hot coffee up to us, but justwhen the coffee arrived, we gotthe word to move out. We weren’table to distribute any of the coffee.This turn of events didn’t do themorale any good. The men weresoaking wet.”

A more fundamental event tookplace that same night. Reluctantlyfollowing instructions from Mac-Arthur, Walker issued an order thatthe Eighth Army would have torelease all of its Marines at the endof the following day.

The Final Day

To finish off what the brigadehad so successfully begun, Craigordered both battalions to moveout in a final attack the morning of5 September. Before the 1stBattalion could get started, therewas an unpleasant moment. TwoU.S. Air Force F-51 fighters camescreaming in over the Marines,strafing them. Miraculously, only

one man was wounded.The 3d Battalion started the day

by showering a rain of fire from itshigh ground down on an NKPAattack on the 9th Infantry off to itsright flank and rear. The 105s fromthe 11th Marines joined in, and theattack was shattered.

Now both battalions were readyto charge. And they did. The 1stBattalion jumped off at 0820 withthe objective of capturing Hill 125and Observation Hill, the brigade’ssegment of Phase Line Two.Obong-ni Ridge was then to be aspecial objective. Moving fastagainst light resistance, Newtonhad his men on his two target hillsby 1100, and there Murray haltedthem until the 9th Infantry couldcome up to tie in on their right.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion wasalso moving ahead. Bohn had sug-gested that Company H, now com-manded by Captain Patrick E.Wildman, serve as a base of fire topin down the enemy, while hetook Company G around theextreme left flank in an envelopingmaneuver. “It worked beautifully,”as he later reported, but then:

As we were coming up,getting assembled . . . theNorth Koreans picked up onwhat we were doing. Theyhad one of those old Russian[Maxim] wheeled machineguns, and I could see theirofficer. He was wheeling it upwith his people. Jones sawhim at the same time and heblew it up with the first roundof 75 recoilless . . . . It wassheer luck.

As soon as that happened,of course, we went smokingup, got over the top, andonce we got to the top . . . wejust rolled them up. It wasoutstanding.

So it was, that Company G was

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in good shape on Hill 91, expect-ing to race ahead. Not so. Ordersfrom Taplett at 1230 directed it towithdraw to Observation Hill andhold up there. The convergence ofthe 1st Battalion and the 9thInfantry had pinched out the 3dBattalion’s area, so Company Hjoined in a sideslip behind the 1stBattalion to put the 3d Battalion onthe left flank of the 1st, preparato-ry to a combined attack on Obong-ni Ridge. It, too, was told to stay inplace; there would be a delaybefore any assault on Obong-ni.

With the heavy rain and ensuingfog Marine close air support wasgrounded, and this gave the NKPAan opportunity to launch a viciousdaylight counterattack on the 1stBattalion. Company B, after an

advance of 3,000 yards, was nowlocated on a ridge line of Hill 125,parallel to and only 400 yards fromObong-ni. At 1420 an avalanche ofenemy fire hit it. It was enfiladefire, mortars and machine guns,smothering both the reverse slopeand the forward slope of the com-pany’s position. Fenton’s commentwas curt: “We were pinned down,and we couldn’t move.”

At 1430 the enemy infantrycame on, some 300 strong. Fentonneeded help, supporting fire andlots of it, but at this precisemoment of peril all five of hisradios, as well as the battalion’stactical radio, went dead in thedownpour of rain. An enlisted run-ner, 22-year-old Private First ClassWilliam A. Wilson, was rushed off

to the 9th Infantry, which had nowcome abreast on Company B’sright flank. His message wasurgent: “We need maximum sup-porting fire from your artillery, andwe need it right now!” Meeting upwith the adjacent Army companycommander, Wilson was pointingout the target areas when the Armyofficer was struck down bymachine gun fire and had to beevacuated. So the Marine coollypicked up his radio and directedthe Army artillery fire to plasterObong-ni and the adjoining enemytargets.

A runner had also been sentdown to the MSR to warn theMarine tanks there that three NKPAT-34 tanks supporting the attackwere coming towards them around

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Marines assist wounded North Korean prisoners into jeep which took them to medical aid on 4 September 1950Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2130

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the same bend that had been thescene of the previous tank battletwo weeks earlier. The messagewas not in time. The lead enemytank surprised the first Marine tankwith its gun aimed left at Obong-ni. Several 85mm rounds knockedout the Marine tank. Its mate, try-ing to edge around the first tank,was also knocked out.

Then, out of the blue, a 3.5-inchrocket team, dispatched by Fenton,arrived at the carnage, soon joinedby the battalion rocket team. Inshort order, they destroyed the firsttwo enemy tanks, and then thethird attacker, which turned out tobe an armored personnel carrier.This made a total of eight steel

hulks littering “The Bend.”While this dramatic tank con-

frontation was taking place,Fenton’s infantry confrontationwas also reaching a climax. Helater described the tense situation:

I found it necessary toplace every man I had in thecompany on line. Rocketmen, corpsmen, mortarmen,every available man went online to stop this counterattack.To make matters worse, Ibegan running low on ammu-nition. I was practically out ofhand grenades, and thingsdidn’t look too rosy for us.

Just at this time LtCol

George Newton, my battalioncommander, who had proba-bly guessed my situation, senta much-welcome platoonfrom A Company with fiveboxes of hand grenades. Theenemy had closed so rapidlythat we just took the handgrenades out of the case andtossed them to the men onthe line. They would pull thepins and throw them. Theenemy closed to less than 100yards.

Adding to the intense pressure,the radios had not been function-ing. Finally, at this crucial juncture,one radio was coaxed into service.

60

Marines examine two Soviet-made T-34 tanks destroyed by3.5-inch rocket teams of the 1st Battalion 5th Marines, at“The Bend.” The enemy tanks had supported the vicious

North Korean daylight counterattack to blunt the battalion’sassault on Obong-ni Ridge.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

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Fenton quickly gave it to his for-ward observer for the 81mm mor-tars who called for immediate “firefor effect.” When the mortars hadfinished deluging the NKPA attack-ers, there were only 18 rounds ofammunition left.

Duncan was with Company Bduring its wild battle and sawMaster Sergeant Leonard R. Youngpositioning the men along thecrest. (The later citation for a SilverStar described Young as “exposedto withering fire, [he] walkedupright back and forth . . . placingmen.”) Then, Duncan wrote:

He was shot. A machinegun bullet went right throughhis chest, knocking him intothe mud. But not before hehad given Ike Fenton the bestthat an old sergeant couldgive his company comman-der. He was still alive whenthey dragged him in acrossthe slope.

When they placed himupon a rough poncho-litterhe looked up at Fenton, whostood with his hand touchingthe dripping canvas, andwhispered, “God, I’m sorryCaptain! I’m really sorry! Butdon’t let them fall back!Please don’t let them fallback.” Fenton still had notsaid a word when the litter-bearers disappeared into therain, and out of sight downthe hill.

A crucial factor in the final, suc-cessful outcome of this strugglewere reinforcements which cameover from Company A: two pla-toons of riflemen, plus machinegunners, and mortarmen. Togetherwith the combination of Armyartillery fire and Marine 81mmmortar fire (which finally camewithin 50 yards of Company B),this broke the back of the NKPA

attack, and secured the Marinepositions.

Now, from their vantage point,the Marines could see the NKPAwithdrawing from Obong-ni. Itwas an obvious signal that theenemy was thoroughly defeated,and the door was open for a quickand easy push all the way throughto the Naktong River.

But the withdrawal deadline dic-tated by MacArthur had nearlyarrived. All units were held up inposition. The brigade counted upits casualties for that final day ofbattle, 5 September: 35 killed, 91wounded, and, proudly, nonemissing in action.

At 1600 the battalion comman-ders all met with Murray to get theofficial word. Craig’s directive wasconcise: “Commencing at 2400 5September Brig moves by rail andmotor to staging area Pusan forfurther operations against theenemy.”

Relief and withdrawal at nightfrom enemy contact is not as easyin practice as it is on paper. Hoursafter they were due, two Armylieutenants finally showed up torelieve the two companies of the1st Battalion. Each had only ahandful of men and very fewweapons. As Muetzel recalled:

An Army first lieutenantappeared with about 30 menwho’d been scraped togetherfrom a headquarters unit . . . .I took the lieutenant to thevery crest of the hill and hadhim dig in in a circle. Heasked me to leave him ourammo for a 57mm recoillessrifle he had. Marines didn’thave 57s, so he had a weaponand no ammo. He asked hissergeant to bring up their onemachine gun. The sergeanttold him it had been left backat the CP. I left behind aboutfour cases of hand grenades.

So the battle-worn Marinesslogged wearily through the mudand driving rain for three and ahalf miles to the rear. West ofYongsan, they finally boardedtrucks, and by dawn 6 Septemberthey were on their way to Pusan,bone-tired but glad finally to leavethose cruel hills of the Perimeterbehind them.

Operational Results

As the truck riders’ thoughtsturned to their fellow Marines, theymourned the loss of good men andclose friends. Those hills had costthe brigade 148 killed in action, 15died of wounds, 9 missing inaction (7 of these were later foundto have been killed in action), and730 wounded in action, for a casu-alty total of 902. Included in thistotal was a special category of menwho had moved side by side withthe Marines in combat, earningtheir undying admiration: the Navycorpsmen who had 22 casualties.

Looking back at what they hadachieved in one short month, how-ever, the men of the brigade couldlegitimately feel a sense of pride.They had traveled some 380 milesand mounted three difficult opera-tions, each time facing and over-whelming heretofore successfulenemy forces who had numericalsuperiority.

The initial brigade drive toSachon had represented the firstcrisis in which a unit of the EighthArmy had been able to stop coldand then push back an enemyoffensive: 26 miles in four days.Enemy casualties: 1,900.

The second crisis was a call forthe “Fire Brigade” to stem theNKPA’s dangerous breakthrough inthe Naktong Bulge. There it literal-ly destroyed the enemy’s 4thDivision, with the Marine air andartillery arms contributing greatlyto the slaughter. In addition, large

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quantities of captured U.S. Armyweapons were seized andreturned. MacArthur spoke of theenemy division as “decisivelydefeated . . . suffering very heavylosses in both personnel andequipment.”

In the third crisis, the SecondBattle of the Naktong, the brigadehad again been rushed in to meetthe swift advance of the NKPA 9thand (a reconstituted) 4th Divisions.When its counterattack smashedthe enemy units in a mere threedays, in conjunction with impor-tant U.S. Army attacks, the officialArmy history quoted prisoners assaying that this was “one of thebloodiest and most terrifying deba-cles of the war for a North Koreandivision.” As a result, “the 9th and4th enemy divisions were not ableto resume the offensive.”

Over the period of that singlemonth, the enemy had paid a dev-astating price, an estimated 9,900total casualties, and massive lossesof equipment at the hands of theMarines.

The achievements of the brigadewent far beyond dramatic tacticalvictories in the Pusan Perimeter. Ithad demonstrated in its mobiliza-tion a remarkable ability to pulltogether and ship out a largeMarine combat unit in a pressure-laden, short time frame (six days).

It had also demonstrated a vari-ety of other lessons in Korea: thecrucial efforts of previous combattraining on noncommissioned offi-cers and officers; the value of theintangible, psychological factor ofMarine esprit de corps; and the daz-zling effectiveness of a tightly inte-grated aviation component. Called“the best close air support in thehistory of the Marine Corps,” theoperational statistics of MAG-33showed a total of 1,511 sortiesflown by the three squadrons, with995 missions being close air sup-port not only for the brigade, but

also for U.S. Army and SouthKorean units. In addition, the OYlight planes and the Sikorsky HO3Shelicopters of VMO-6 had tallied318 and 580 flights respectively injust the month of August.Moreover, the helicopters’ success-ful first combat role had proventhe certainty of their large scale usein the years to come.

An evaluation of all these factorsled the official Marine history tosummarize the overall, operationalresults of the brigade: “A carefulexamination of any of these opera-tions in which Marines engageddiscloses that a single failurewould have a profound effectupon the entire UN effort.”

The individual unit commanderswho had led the brigade in its bat-tles had a more forceful convic-tion. They felt that they had “savedthe beachhead.”

From Pusan to Inchon

The final chapter in the story ofthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadeis one that is less dramatic than itsbattles, but one which illustrates itsorganizational flexibility and skill.Again, as at Camp Pendleton pre-viously, it had too much to do intoo little time. Arriving in Pusan on7 September with over-tired men,worn-out equipment, and under-strength from casualties, thebrigade had to cope with a thou-sand details to get ready to moveout in a very few days for its nextdemanding combat assignment.

Sleeping in the open on thedocks, the men ate on board thetransports upon which they soonwould sail. (Although Craig and hisofficers later recalled the troopssleeping in the adjoining ware-houses.) Bohn remembered thehuman side of this return to “civi-lization.” The ship that hadbrought him and his men to Pusanwas once again there at dockside.

The Navy officers came ashore andinvited Bohn and all his officersand men to come on board, andthen welcomed them with “steaks,hot food” and “all the PX stuff” theMarines had not seen in a longtime and badly needed now.

Bohn went on to describeanother way that their deficiencieswere remedied:

I’m probably not being suf-ficiently critical of the MarineCorps supply system because,if it hadn’t been for the Army,we’d have been in trouble.We stole everything, includ-ing jeeps . . . . We saw somerail cars on the siding. MyMarines just went in there andlooked. Whatever the hellthey wanted, they took. TheArmy didn’t seem to mindthat. Stole beer, too. And itworked.

It worked to such a degree thatall the jeep trailers in another bat-talion were emptied, then stackedfull with beer on ice—perfect forthe hot, humid, summer weather.First, a big party for its own men,then for the sailors on the shipupon which they would embark,the Henrico. Then, however,things sort of got out of hand.Muetzel saw a jeep driven by twoMarines race by, closely pursuedby two MPs. The jeep went off theend of the dock into the water.

Then two other Marines, whohad climbed over the fence aroundthe dock area, returned in impres-sive style. They were driving ahuge Brockway bridge transporterwhich they had “acquired.” Theyquickly abandoned it at the MPcheckpoint—leaving it nicely plug-ging the entrance to the dock untila qualified driver was later found.Muetzel went on to say:

While we were waiting to

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board the Henrico, we wererequired to turn in all the cap-tured vehicles we were dri-ving . . . . This left us unac-ceptably short of motor trans-portation. Consequently,vehicles were purloined fromthe Army. The worst offense Isaw was the theft of the MPcompany commander’s jeep.After a fast coat of green paintand phony numbers wereslapped on, it was presentedto Lieutenant Colonel George

Newton, our battalion CO.

These shenanigans were, ofcourse, only a counterpoint to theserious business at hand. To fill thegaps in the rifle unit, a large batchof replacements was on hand.These 1,135 officers and menwould provide the manpower togive each battalion the third com-pany which had been so sorelymissed in the past battles. Now, forthe first time in Korea, the 5thMarines reached full strength: 3,611

men. Although the fresh replace-ments’ shiny new utility uniformscontrasted sharply with the bedrag-gled veterans, they soon fit in.Craig later commented that thenew men “were integrated into thebattalions without difficulty.” Someof them were regular Marines andsome were trained reservists, andCraig went on to say:

Their [future] performanceof duty was comparable inmany ways, outside of, per-

63

After an all-night ride from the front lines, over-tired Marinemortar crews assemble at the Pusan docks and prepare toboard a U.S. Navy transport. In a matter of days they would

linkup with the 1st Marine Division for the upcomingassault on Inchon.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-GR-A2193

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haps, their weapons trainingand their tactical training inthe field . . . . It speaks verywell for the type of trainingand the adaptability of theMarines, both as individualsand as units, that such com-panies could be formed in theUnited States, join an activebattalion just before landing,take part in that landing, andoperate efficiently throughoutthe following campaigns.

In addition, a complete fourthregiment was attached to thebrigade at this time. This was the1st Korean Marine Regiment, 3,000strong. The manpower was wel-come, but there was just one prob-lem. Craig explained: “TheseKorean Marines had never beenissued arms, although they hadbeen trained in their nomenclatureand upkeep. They were, however,well drilled and had good disci-pline and spirit . . . arms wereimmediately issued.”

For the brigade’s well-used sup-porting arms, there was an inten-sive drive to clean up and serviceall the heavy equipment—tanks,trucks, and artillery pieces. For theinfantry battalions, one criticalneed was new weapons. Manyrifles, BARs, and particularlymachine guns had been fired somuch that the barrels were burnedout, so replacements had to beissued.

Clothing was a disaster. Dung-arees were rotted all the waythrough from rain and sweat, withthe camouflage design faded out.Boots were “falling apart.”

This kind of urgent need ledMuetzel to strong measures. Hebadly wanted a new pair of boots,for the ones he wore had two bul-let holes in the uppers and solescompletely worn through. Withnone available from Marine sup-plies, he headed for the Eighth

Army quartermaster. There hefound a group of “scruffy” Marinesbeing sharply told off for beggingby an immaculate (rear echelon)Army major. The Marine groupgave up and left, but Muetzel,looking like a “refugee” he admit-ted, persisted.

When the neatly-dressed majorturned to go back to his office,Muetzel pushed into the buildingwearing his steel helmet, a dunga-ree jacket and pants with gapingholes, and tattered boots, and car-rying a submachine gun and a .45pistol on his hip. Now standingface to face, the major saw the lieu-tenant’s bars on Muetzel’s collar,glanced at his disreputable uni-form, and started to say that hecould not issue any boots. That didit! Muetzel burst out:

I told him, simply, that Iwas just off the line, I wasgoing right back onto the line,I was an infantry platoonleader, I didn’t have a hell ofa lot to lose, and I wanted apair of boots right then andthere! When he looked at myboots and noticed the bulletholes, he went right back intohis stock and brought out anew pair of Army parachutejump boots . . . . I was readyto fight for those boots andthat major knew it.

All during this time, the seniorofficers were involved in a differ-ent type of activity. They werecloseted, preparing the after actionreports, organizing the issue ofsupplies for re-equipment, thrash-ing out an embarkation plan, andfamiliarizing themselves with everyplanned detail that pertained totheir unit’s role in the forthcominglanding. Craig pushed them hardand soon—all too soon—the fewdays allotted had rushed by, and itwas time to ship out. Starting the

afternoon of 11 September, thetroops began filing on board ship.The next day, the convoy sailed.Then, at 0001, 13 September, thebrigade was deactivated andbecame part of the 1st MarineDivision, bound for the historicamphibious assault at Inchon.

The brigade was now gone, butnot forgotten. There was formalrecognition of its achievements bytwo governments. The first was aKorean Presidential Unit Citationwhich recorded “outstanding andheroic performance of duty on thefield of battle.” Referring to theNaktong victories, the citation said:“The brigade attacked with suchdetermination and skill as to earnthe admiration of all . . . . The gal-lant Marine forces were instrumen-tal in preventing the enemy fromcapturing their objective and cut-ting the north-south lines of com-munication. . . .”

The second award was a U.S.Presidential Unit Citation. This wasa lengthy paean of praise for boththe ground forces and the aviationunits. It commended “extraordinaryheroism in action . . . relentlessdetermination . . . sheer resolutionand esprit de corps . . . the brilliantrecord achieved. . . .” The awardcovered not only the brigade’sground units, but also MAG-33 andits squadrons.

They were fitting tributes to aspecial group of men who hadtruly earned a remarkable series oftriumphs.

It would be a long war for theMarines in Korea, and there wouldbe other much more famous battlesto come, but the die was cast inthose crucial first weeks of combatin August and September 1950. TheMarine Corps had again decisivelydemonstrated that it was truly a“force in readiness,” and that itsrugged training and traditionalesprit de corps could lead it to vic-tory in “every clime and place.”

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SourcesThere are two basic official sources

for the story of these early days in thePusan Perimeter. For the Marine Corps,Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A.Canzona, USMC, The Pusan Perimeter,vol. 1 of U.S. Marine Operations inKorea (Washington: Historical Branch,G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954). For theArmy, Roy E. Appleman, South to theNaktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), United States Army inThe Korean War (Washington: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1961).

Also published officially is: LtColGary W. Parker, USMC, and Maj Frank M.Batha, Jr., USMC, A History of MarineObservation Squadron Six (Washington:History and Museums Division, HQMC,1982).

Three articles that are very helpfuland share a common publisher are:Ernest H. Giusti, “Marine Air Over thePusan Perimeter,” Marine Corps Gazette,May 1952; Lynn Montross, “The PusanPerimeter: Fight for a Foothold,” MarineCorps Gazette, June 1951; Col NicholasA. Canzona, USMCR, “Marines Land atPusan, Korea-August 1950,” MarineCorps Gazette, August 1985; and MajFrancis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC, “ChangallonValley,” Marine Corps Gazette,November 1951.

There is a wide range of commercial-

ly published books. Among those thatcontained useful material are: JohnToland, In Mortal Combat-Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow andCompany, 1991); Lynn Montross,Cavalry of the Sky-The Story of U.S.Marine Helicopters (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1954); Edwin P. Hoyt, ThePusan Perimeter-Korea 1950 (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1984); DavidDouglas Duncan, This Is War! A Photo-Narrative in Three Parts (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1950-51); ClayBlair, The Forgotten War (New York:Times Books, 1987); Max Hastings, TheKorean War (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1987); T. R. Fehrenbach, ThisKind of War (New York: Macmillan,1963); Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: TheUntold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982); Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,Soldiers of the Sea: The United StatesMarine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis:United States Naval Institute, 1962); andRobert Leckie, Conflict (New York:Putman, 1962).

A recent publication is by BGen UzalW. Ent, USA (Ret), Fighting On TheBrink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter(Paducah, Ky: Turner PublishingCompany, 1996).

Particular acknowledgment is madeof the valuable quotations in DonaldKnox, The Korean War-Pusan to Chosin-An Oral History (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1985) and AndrewGeer, The New Breed-The Story of the

U.S. Marines in Korea (Nashville: TheBattery Press, 1989).

In a different category is a bookwhich the author affirms is based onactual Chinese sources: Russell Spurr,Enter the Dragon-China’s UndeclaredWar Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51(New York: Henry Holt, 1988).

Personal interviews were helpful inmeetings with: MajGen Robert D. Bohn,USMC (Ret); MajGen Charles D. Mize,USMC (Ret); and Col Robert D. Taplett,USMC (Ret).

Information also was contributed byMajGen Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret),and Col Francis I. Fenton, Jr., USMC(Ret), who kindly furnished postwarcopies of The Guidon, a newsletter of BCompany, with personal memoirs ofcombat.

The oral history transcripts at theMarine Corps Historical Center focusmainly on later events in Korea, but dohave some observations by Craig,Murray, Bohn, Stewart, Sivert, Lucy, andLtCol Charles H. Brush, Jr., USMC, relat-ing to the early days. In the PersonalPapers Collection [now located at theMarine Corps University] there is a longmemoir by PFC Herbert R. Luster whowas a BAR-man in Company A (#1918-1A44). The files of the Reference Sectioncontain much information pertinent toindividual biographies and unit histories.Acknowledgement also is made to ColDavid Douglas Duncan, USMCR (Ret),for the use of his dramatic images.

About the Author

Captain John C. Chapin earned abachelor of arts degree with hon-

ors in history from Yale University in1942 and was commissioned later thatyear. He served as a rifle-platoonleader in the 24th Marines, 4th MarineDivision, and was wounded in actionin World War II during assault land-ings on Roi-Namur and Saipan.

Transferred to duty at theHistorical Division, HeadquartersMarine Corps, he wrote the first official histories of the 4th and 5thMarine Divisions. Moving to Reserve status at the end of the war,he earned a master’s degree in history at George WashingtonUniversity with a thesis on “The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922.”

Now a captain in retired status, he served for many years, start-ing in 1983, as a volunteer at the Marine Corps Historical Center.During that time he wrote the history of Marine Fighter-Attack(VMFA) Squadron 115. With support from the Historical Centerand the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, he then spent someyears researching and interviewing for the writing of a new book,Uncommon Men—The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps. Thiswas published in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.

As part of the Historical Center’s series of pamphlets commem-orating the 50th anniversary of World War II, Captain Chapinwrote accounts of Marine operations in the Marshall Islands, onSaipan and Bougainville, and Marine aviation in the Philippines.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe Korean War era, is published for the education and training ofMarines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defenseobservance of the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have beendefrayed in part by a gift from Chief Warrant Officer 4 Bertram Z. Lee,USMCR (Ret), in honor of his son, Sergeant Joshua Lee.

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,

KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Charles R. Smith

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor

W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-50402000

PCN 190 00315 00

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Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series

FIRE BRIGADEU.S. Marines in thePusan Perimeterby Captain John C. Chapin

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired