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Jessica Wagner

Dr. Recker

POLS 355

4 May 2015

Analyzing Mexico: A Closer Look at the PRI’s 2012 Victory

“In the Mexico we want, there is no room for corruption, for cover-ups, and least of all

for impunity. It’s time to break from the past.” Mexico’s current president Enrique Pena Nieto, a

member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), said these words in a meeting with party

leaders (Graham and Rama 2012). To those outside of Mexico, Pena Nieto may not have seemed

like the frontrunner, due to his party's corrupt past. Coming from the PRI was a red flag to most

of the world, but Nieto talked the talk and won over the Mexican people. After a twelve year

break, the notorious PRI is back in power by the will of the people. While this leaves a countless

number of questions unanswered, the biggest one is “how did this happen?” This paper will

analyze and explain why exactly the PRI was elected into power in the 2012 presidential election

after having twelve years of democratic rule in the country. Looking at voter turnout, party

strongholds, and the performance of the PAN, this paper will dissect how the PRI has come back

into power. Moreover, it will make a case that Mexico, by electing the PRI in 2012, Mexico has

consolidated democracy and completed its transition.

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was viewed as an authoritarian party due to

the monopolies it held in Mexico during its reign; however, the PRI being elected out of power

in 1998, prior to the 2000 Presidential election, puts Mexico on a stronger path toward

democratization (Klesner 1998). Looking at Mexico’s journey to democratization in 1998, one

would think the country was on the right path toward having a functioning democracy. Voting

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the PRI out of power was a bold move, and opened the door for democracy to flourish. After the

forming of the PRI, no other party had the chance to win the presidency and rule the country,

leading the authoritarian regime to develop in full swing. Corrupt as it was, the PRI was able to

achieve its own goals despite the civil unrest of those the party marginalized. Electing the PRI

out of power became, in a sense, a civil protest. The PRI continuously won, and on paper, their

victories looked democratic as they were consistently voted into power. The corrupt elections,

however, proved differently. This article is important because it sheds light on the narrow

window where democracy did work in Mexico. Taking the PRI out of power, and bringing in a

new regime was the first step to democratization, even though it ultimately failed to perform up

to Mexico’s standards.

Vicente Fox, the PAN member who ended the PRI’s presidential reign faced three broad

problems identified in the article that could have impacted the overall performance of democracy

in Mexico from the very beginning such as divided government, deep divides in the strongest

parties, and policy initiatives that seem too big to conquer (Klesner 2001). Even though the

PAN’s victory marked a pivotal moment in Mexican politics, the problems discussed are recipes

for the demise of democracy before it even fully developed in Mexico. The largest problem was

the fact that Fox ran on a platform that would get corruption out of government. This may cause

Fox to have to reopen criminal cases and prosecute former government actors for corruption,

which could hinder the further development of democracy in Mexico. Fox having to spend time

correcting the wrongs of the PRI could lead to a higher level of awareness in Mexico, but it

could also cause the new administration to have less opportunity to meet the goals of its agenda.

With so much time and money spent on the past regime, Fox’s regime was predisposed to

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struggle, which could explain one factor as to why the PRI would come back into power only a

few years later.

With Mexico only marking meager achievements in the twelve years without the PRI’s

rule, and a multitude of other influences, the PRI’s comeback was not surprising (Flores-Macias

2013). The PAN’s twelve years of rule in Mexico certainly helped to produce a stronger sense of

democracy throughout the country. While some electoral reforms incurred and an awareness of

corruption – both within the PRI and other parties – has grown, Mexican citizens still elected the

PRI into power. So, although Mexico may be slightly more democratic, that is not saying that the

PRI is. Twelve years was enough to give a slight taste of democracy to Mexico, but not enough

for a notoriously authoritarian party to undergo an entire reform. After seven decades of power,

the PRI is still going to have the same core values after sitting two terms out. The PRI’s election

could mean that Mexico’s progress toward democratization will be severely compromised, if not

undone. While there are a few directions in which the current state of the Mexican government

could go, the main concern is that a flourishing relationship between organized crime and the

government could lead to a government structure similar to Colombia.

Some scholars would argue that Mexico is on its way to becoming classified as a “failed

state” due to the increase in violence from the drug cartels that spiked while the PAN was in

office (Morton 2012). The sudden spike in violence from the cartels is a primary indicator as to

why the power shifted back into the hands of the PRI in the 2012 elections. With death rates

stemming from organized crime seeming to constantly be on the rise, the PAN becomes an easy

target for the Mexican citizens to pin their problems on, whether it truly is their fault or not.

When comparing the reign of the PRI to that of the PAN, drug crime seemed to be under control

before the PAN took office. The looming threat of democratization caused a spike in violence,

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which reflects poorly on the PAN. Facing being classified as a “failed state,” it was important for

the Mexican people to get their government “back on track” by electing the PRI the next chance

they had. After all, the violence was not an issue under the PRI’s rule.

Many more countries have taken a turn toward democratic rule in the third wave for a

multitude of reasons, but the key factors that drive a democratic regime to stick are lacking in

societies that have returned to authoritarian reign, or have not fully democratized (Diamond

2003). Cited in this article were contemporary drivers of democratization, two being economic

development and economic performance, both of which suffered under the PAN in Mexico. So,

although initially the mood was right for democracy, lack of growth and development in

comparison to other Latin American countries halted the growth of democracy. The third wave

of democratization has seen very few newly established democracies break down, and while

Mexico has not yet proven they have broken down, signs are pointing towards history repeating

itself. Democratically electing a notoriously authoritarian party back into power might be

Mexico’s quick fix, or the people know what they need in order to advance. Mexico has not seen

a full democratization yet, but with the right tools, and perhaps a few more terms with the PRI,

eventually a democracy could develop and hold in the country.

Although it is commonly thought that crime jeopardizes the state of democracy, certain

studies refute that statement (Malone 2013). Malone’s findings suggest that crime does not

actually jeopardize the state of democracy, but the findings she cites seem to be biased. Without

violence and crime in Mexico, would they still have elected an authoritarian party to handle it?

The citizens had watched the Mexican government fail them time and time again, and as

violence rose, a shift away from democracy began to take place. Again, it cannot be concluded

that Mexico has completely abandoned all forms of democracy, however, it can be inferred that

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the PRI has not had sufficient time to entirely reform their party platform in twelve years. It is

ignorant to think that the Mexican people have not suffered enough to see the bright side of an

authoritarian regime being put back in power. Nieto’s agenda for crime elimination could

potentially put Mexico back on track, but it could also perform as his own personal masquerade

as he funnels power back to the PRI, and the Mexican people are now at a state of mind where

this would be acceptable as long as people stop dying.

The PRI were predicted to capture not only the presidency, but the majority in both

chambers of the Mexican Congress; however, winning the majority across the board led to more

accusations of fraudulent election practices, and a new fear that corruption may once again be

ruling Mexico (Seelke 2012). After twelve years of rule from the National Action Party, it was

imperative to Mexicans and foreign governments alike that corruption remained detached from

the 2012 election. Although Pena Nieto won by a slim margin, the accusations of election fraud

were abundant from the opposition. With the investigations coming back with no evidence for

grounds of nulling the election, it brought back an essence of hope in Mexico. The main concern,

especially for governments with relationships with Mexico, was the fear that bringing the PRI

back into power would deteriorate the democratic progress of the recent years and bring about

another authoritarian era. The idea that the PRI won on their own merit without using behind the

scenes mechanisms to ensure a victory may be hard to digest at first glance, but it is surely an

indicator that Mexico is still on the path to democratization. It is this article that most closely

correlates to the idea that democracy has finally consolidated in Mexico and that the transition

period has finally ended.

Many academics would argue that voting the PRI out of power in 2000 was Mexico’s

first step toward democracy. It was necessary to vote out the authoritarian regime that had been

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governing for so many years, and when they successfully brought the National Action Party

(PAN) to power, Mexico began their transition. This time period in Mexican history is an

extremely important one to discuss. This is the time frame that the Mexican citizens were first

able to have an election without the PRI fixing the election. The corruption, for the most part,

had ceased. Focusing on the events leading up to the 2000 Presidential Election, especially

voting patterns, it is easy to see how the PRI was defeated in the race for the presidency. In 1997,

the PRI suffered their greatest defeat in that they were ruling Mexico with a divided government

(Klesner, 2000). With their stronghold shattering, the PRI seemed as though they could finally be

defeated. In 1997, for the parliamentary election, 57.69% of the voting-age population voted

(IDEA 2015). While this was the first chip away at the PRI, the 2000 Presidential election got

even more traffic, 63.96% of the voting age population (IDEA 2015). Moreover, around 43% of

those voters stated in an exit poll that they were there to vote for change (Klesner 2000). All of

these numbers point to the fact that Mexico was ready for a change of pace in 2000. Paired with

a few other factors, this allowed Vicente Fox, a member of the PAN party, to be elected into the

Presidency in 2000.

The fall of the PRI in 2000 was certainly a step in the right direction, but in the following

twelve years, things changed to make the PRI the attractive option once more. In 2012, Enrique

Pena Nieto was elected President of Mexico as a member of the PRI. The conditions were

favorable and the time was right, but the presumed rules of democracy would argue that the PRI

was still an authoritarian party. Was twelve years really enough time for the PRI to clean up their

act and come into power through democratic means? The transition period (2000-2012) may

have led to consolidation of democracy, in that the PRI were democratically elected, but does

that automatically ensure that Mexico would remain a democracy after Nieto took office?

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In 2006, a decrease in voter turnout occurred. The PAN was still able to hold onto power,

but only 58.55% of voting-aged citizens voted in the election (IDEA 2015). In 2012, however,

the voter turnout jumped to 63.14% of the voting-age population (IDEA 2015). This could mean

a heightened interest in getting the PAN out, or it could also allude to the idea of corrupt ways

returning to the elections, seeing as the PRI won. It is important to note that this election year set

a record in Mexico as the highest voter turnout it had seen – highlighting the importance of this

race. In 2012, the PRI also won a majority of seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of

Deputies and a plurality of the gubernatorial elections in Chiapas, Jalisco, and Yucatan (Seelke

2012). Although there were policy achievements that occurred for the PAN in the time from

2000-2012, it is often overshadowed by an economic crisis in 2009 and a security crisis, making

for an unhappy Mexico. Due to these events under the PAN’s watch, it can be hypothesized that

the high voter turnout was motivated by an overall dissatisfied Mexico. In order to bring about

change, especially where economic growth and national security are concerned, the people

needed to band together behind a different party – one known for its ability to get things done.

While at the time Mexicans and analysts alike were skeptical as to how the PRI’s return to power

would impact the democratization of Mexico, it was apparent that the Mexican people were in

desperate need of a change. All three candidates for the 2012 Presidential seat were stressing the

importance of job creation to both boost the economy by hindering the impact of criminals and to

create security, the PRI seemed best fit for the job. Pena Nieto had widespread support across the

country, whereas the other parties seemed to have centralized areas of support (Seelke 2012).

This widespread support, along with a few allegations on election day, caused both the

PAN and the PRD to challenge the election results as they were concerned the PRI partook in

fraudulent campaign practices, such as vote-buying, campaign spending violations, receiving

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excess of allotted radio and television ad times, and the use of illicit funds to support Pena

Nieto’s campaign (Seelke 2012). The investigation conducted returned no evidence of fraudulent

activity from the PRI in the election, thus it could be concluded that this was a free and fair

election. It is important to note the challenging of the election results coupled with no evidence

found against the PRI because it shows that the process of transitioning is over. Consolidation in

Mexico took place in the 2012 Presidential Election because the people had their choice. It was

argued in 1998 that “the president can no longer a virtual dictator; the PRI is no longer a

hegemonic party; and the regime can no longer be considered simply authoritarian” (Klesner

1998), so simply electing the PRI back into power would not disrupt this process of

democratization. Had evidence been found to support the claims of unfair play during the

elections, perhaps all the theories of consolidation would be wrong. However, such was not the

case. The PRI came into power by winning a plurality of the vote and having widespread support

across the country. The Mexican citizens chose to have Pena Nieto as their President, thus

consolidating democracy in the process.

To backtrack slightly to the 2000 Presidential election in Mexico, seeing the goals set by

the PAN’s candidate (and then President) Vicente Fox was tell-tale of the issues that Mexico

would face during the PAN’s rule. Fox ran on the platform to rid the Mexican government of the

PRI’s corrupt ways and institute a democratic reform of the government (Klesner 2001).

Running on this platform eventually hurt Fox, as he had to spend time reopening criminal cases

that tainted the government during the PRI’s rule in the past, rather than spending time and

energy on the present (Klesner 2001). This platform that promised big change and essentially a

cleansing of the government led people to have high hopes for the future, but caused the PAN to

focus on the past for too long in their early years of rule. Missing out on those milestone years

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for policy change and economic reform, the PAN was already behind and letting their

constituents down.

Looking again at the popular vote and the voter turnout in the 2012 election, the numbers

show the support behind Pena Nieto’s (and the PRI’s) win and the desire for change. The PAN

was certainly not living up to the expectations it had set for itself in 2000, and after twelve years,

the struggle needed to end. One of the most blatant issues that plagued Mexico during the rule of

the PAN was the lack of profound economic development. The early focus on resolving past

issues hindered the PAN’s ability to enforce widespread change, and the economic state of

Mexico suffered from this. With such an inspired regime change in 2000, there was an idea that

democracy was taking over and that Mexico would be better off. When looked at in comparison

to other Latin American countries’ 3.5% economic growth, Mexico fell behind with only a 2%

growth rate under the PAN’s watch (Flores-Macias 2013). While the overall economic

development lagged during the PAN’s rule, Mexico was also a victim of the 2009 recession. The

recession wiped out much of the economic progress made in Mexico, resulting in it trailing

Paraguay and Haiti in terms of financial gains that year (Flores-Macias 2013). After a democratic

transition took place, and the Mexican people finally feeling free of the authoritarianism that had

plagued them for decades, it is extremely disheartening to see that the economy under the regime

chosen to change Mexico and bring about democracy was lagging and not delivering what was

promised.

Many factors work together to bring about political change, but there is a strong

correlation between economic crises and a shift in political ideals. While dramatic changes in

economic condition may not directly bring about a regime change, economics influences the

timing and terms of these democratic changes (Haggard, Kaufman 1997). Haggard and

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Kaufman’s article stresses the changing from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments,

but in Mexico’s unique situation, the same theories are applicable here. While an authoritarian

regime may have more leverage and loyalty in times of economic growth, the great lows they

experience during economic crisis are the same lows felt in democratic governments. With

Mexico being in a time of transition during its economic crisis, the vast lows in economic growth

quickly made waves throughout the government in terms of support. Haggard and Kaufman are

quick to point out that economic crises undermine the authoritarian regimes, but what about the

new democracies? Countries that have hope and dreams set on a new outlook, a bright future,

and no authoritarian rulers suffering from an economic crisis are just as quickly to be

undermined as the established authoritarian regimes. Mexico’s new democracy made them

vulnerable. When the economic crisis hit, there was nowhere to turn but back. The constituents

had to distance themselves from a government that seemed to be hurting them and their futures,

and in order to do that, they had to elect the PRI in 2012. The PRI brought them economic

growth and security (to an extent). The PAN was crippling under the pressures of the 2009

recession. So, while authoritarian regimes are quickly fragmented in times of crisis, so are the

new democracies.

The economic downturn in Mexico under the PAN’s watch would be enough alone to

inspire a regime change, but that was not the end of the problems Mexico faced during those

twelve years. In 2006, Mexico saw a dramatic spike in violence; considering that the trends in

violence had gone down in the preceding ten years, with the number of homicides per 100,000

people reaching as low as 8.4 (Flores-Macias 2013). With the homicide rate so low, it seems as

though any increase would be noticeable and alarming. However, between 2006 and 2011,

deaths related to drug trafficking alone spiked to an estimated 60,000, and the incidence of

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homicide skyrocketed to a shocking 24 per 100,000 people according to August 2012 figures

from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) (Flores Macias 2013). With the

violent crime rates on such a sharp incline in a very limited time period, security needed to

become a priority. Pena Nieto was elected to replace the PAN in 2012, which immediately

follows this horrific period of Mexican security. Wanting to institute a legislative democracy

ended up crippling the PAN’s response time to these dire situations, making the party look

incapable of ruling in the eyes of its constituents. These statistics, especially when dealing with

the crimes related to drug trafficking, show the shift in the Mexican people since the PAN took

over in 2000. When Felipe Calderon took over in 2006 as another PAN President, it was the

PAN’s second chance at governing. With the spike in drug crime, it is easily hypothesized that

even with the change in Presidents, the PAN was still not a regime to be feared or obeyed by

members of the drug trade.

After taking office in 2006, Calderon militarized the efforts to combat drug-trafficking.

With these warlike tactics being enforced, it disrupted the overall peace of Mexico – a peace that

had once been in place when the PRI was in power (Flores-Macias 2013). “According to a

March 2012 survey, four-fifths of the public supports the military’s anti-drug efforts, but only 28

percent deem them successful while 43 percent think that they have failed. More than half of

respondents (52 percent) said that organized crime was winning, while only 19 percent said that

about the government” (Flores-Macias 2012). This widespread realization that organized crime

was stronger than the government’s actions directly correlates to the PRI’s 2012 victory, as the

peaceful times of Mexico’s history was under their rule. Mexico’s government was losing their

clout in many prominent regions, such as Baja California and Guerrero, where the military had

taken over law enforcement to fight crime. The regions where the military has taken over have

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seen extremely high spikes in violent crimes, and “during Calderón’s six-year term, the rate of

kidnappings and extortion more than doubled nationwide” (Flores-Macias 2012). These statistics

confirm that democracy was not working in favor of the people during the PAN’s rule. The

democratic process was simply not working fast enough to ensure the safety of the citizens.

When Malone looked at crime and its threat to democracy in “Does Crime Undermine

Public Support for Democracy? Findings from the Case of Mexico,” she illustrated that the

findings are inconsistent across countries. What she failed to directly assess, however, was the

fact that Mexico is different from its neighbors entirely. The political system in Mexico, the new

democratic process, is most certainly undermined by crime because crime was not at large during

the PRI’s time in power. While drug trafficking has been a constant issue in the country, the

spike in violent crime occurred during the PAN’s time in power. Mexico should not be directly

compared to other countries in hopes of finding an answer to the problem because Mexico is a

very unique case study requiring its own attention.

This paper emphasizes the importance of Mexico’s unique situation in order to illustrate

the most important point. While the PRI came back into power under democratic means, it does

not ensure that the government will continue to operate democratically, which works for Mexico

and is necessary for the country’s autonomy. Simply because the democratic process has been

consolidated in Mexico, it does not mean that democracy is the best choice for the country to

continue to grow and flourish. To further illustrate the point, it is imperative to understand how

this paper defines democracy. Larry Diamond defined democracy as “a system of government in

which the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair

elections” (2002). Using this definition, this paper concludes that Mexico has consolidated its

democratic process. However, due to the unique situation and needs of the country, it has chosen

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to revert back to an authoritarian party in order to ensure that progress, both economic and in the

fight against crime, will continue to be made in the country’s future. Even though the PRI is

notorious for its corrupt actions, it does not mean that Mexico will be doomed. In fact, all

statistics point to a stronger Mexico emerging because the PRI has taken control. Mexico

consolidated their democracy because they freely and fairly elected Pena Nieto as their President.

There have not been prominent signs of corruption or foul play in Pena Nieto’s term thus far,

suggesting that the PRI really has attempted to distance itself from the past.

The discussion of consolidation is relevant to Mexico, as they seemed to undergo an

extremely rough transition period, only to come full circle to where the country started in the

1920s. Larry Diamond argues that democracy can develop anywhere, but it will only prosper if it

brings about a more prosperous, just, and decent society (2003). In the case of Mexico, it is

evident that democracy, in the strict sense, did not bring about positive societal changes. In 2012,

however, the democratic process brought about a change that gave the PRI a second chance to

govern and abandon its authoritarian history while creating a brighter future for Mexico. While

democracy may have let down Mexico with the PAN’s rule, it is what essentially brought back

the authoritarian government. The free and fair election showed the preference for the PRI and

their ability to protect the country from economic crises and violence. Although authoritarian in

nature, the PRI shows that not every country is going to play by the same rules of

democratization. The twelve years of the PAN were an exceptional learning experience for

Mexico. These years allowed the Mexican citizens to finally experience the democratic process

and feel the freedom to choose when electing their presidents. The priorities of Mexico are

different from that of many other democracies and democratizing countries. As a MINT country,

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Mexico is expected to grow, expand, and become more of a global force. The country was in dire

need of a strong leader, no matter the party’s past, and found that in the PRI in 2012.

As shocking as it may be to outsiders to bring the PRI back into power, it illustrates why

not every democracy will be exactly alike. The PRI came back into power because they

presented the most capable candidate and platform to fix the issues that occurred under the PAN.

While some scholars question whether or not this has consolidated democracy in Mexico, this

paper argues that it most certainly has. Simply because their formula and process looks different

from that of the United States or other democratizing countries, it does not mean that the process

has not consolidated. Perhaps some definitions of democracy are too rigid or critical of what is

not understood. Using Diamond’s minimal definition of democracy sets clear grounds for

determining which countries are democracies and which are still struggling to be liberated. In

conclusion, the PRI coming back into power occurred because of a dramatic downward spiral

during the PAN’s rule in both economic progress and successes against violent crimes, but that is

not to say that the process of democratization has been hindered because of these events.

The economic state of Mexico from 2000-2011 along with the dramatic spike in crime

rates led to the PRI’s victory in 2012. These factors worked together to promote the correct

environment for the PRI to place a strong candidate in the race and almost guarantee a win. The

political change should not be viewed as a step backward for Mexico, but rather a step forward.

When looking at data along with theoretical explanations of democratization, it is evident that

democracy was surely consolidated in the 2012 presidential election, which is what this paper

had hypothesized. With the conditions being as perfect as they were from the tumultuous 12

years of the PAN, Enrique Pena Nieto was given the perfect opportunity to rise to power. This is

not to say that Mexico chose an authoritarian regime over a democracy, but rather, used

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democracy to ensure a strong government and strong leader would bring security, strength, and

sanguinity back to Mexico.

Works Cited

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Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status

of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance.” Stanford Univeristy.

Diamond, Larry. 2003. “Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development

and International Policies.” Center for the Study of Democracy 1-34.

Flores-Macias, Gustavo. 2013. “Mexico’s 2012 Elections: The Return of the PRI.” Journal of

Democracy 24:128-41.

Graham, Dave, and Anahi Rama. 2012. "Enrique Pena Nieto, the New Face of Mexico's Old

Rulers." Reuters. July 2. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-mexico-election-

penanieto-idUSBRE8610TT20120702

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions."

Comparative Politics 29.3 (1997): 263. JSTOR. Web.

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Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 30:477-98.

Klesner, Joseph L. 2001. “The End of Mexico’s One-Party Regime.” PS: Political Science and

Politics 34:107-14.

Malone, Mary Fran T. 2013. “Does Crime Undermine Public Support for Democracy? Findings

from the Case of Mexico.” The Latin Americanist 57:17-44.

Morton, Adam David. 2012. “The War on Drugs in Mexico: A Failed State?” Third World

Quarterly 33:1631-45.

Seelke, Claire Ribando. 2012. “Mexico’s 2012 Elections.” Congressional Research Service.

"Voter Turnout Data for Mexico (Parliamentary, Presidential)." IDEA. International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2014.