FINAL 10102CNA Officer Ship Report

8/2/2019 FINAL 10102CNA Officer Ship Report

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Kping Th edg:

Revitalizing Americas Military Ofcer Corps

Edited by Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton

Contributing Authors: Brian M. Burton; Dr. John A. Nagl;

Dr. Don M. Snider; Frank G. Hofman; Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN;

Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF
http://www.cnas.org/


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Cover Image

U.S. Army Col. Katherine Kasun brings her detail to attention before greeting President George Bush

during his arrival at the Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport in Virginia February 2007.

Kasun led a detail of nine active duty military personnel from US Joint Forces Command. Each member

that was selected to greet the President has recently deployed to Operations Iraqi or Enduring Freedom.

The President was in the area meeting with congressional Democrats in Williamsburg.

(STAFF SGT. JOE LAWS/USAF)

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank our colleagues at the Center or a New American Security or all o their assistance and supportduring this process. Dr. Kristin Lord and Garrett Mitchell provided excellent organizational and editing recommendationsduring the writing process. Liz Fontaine was invaluable in translating the drat text into a high-quality nal product. Webeneted tremendously rom the research support provided at all stages o the project by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ResearchIntern, National Security Interns Nick Masellis, Seth Rosen, Maile Yeats and Iranga Kahangama.

This report is the outcome o consultation and cooperation with numerous military ocers and other students o themilitary proession. We are very grateul or the generous support o the Smith Richardson Foundation, which madethis project possible. We especially thank the contributors to this monograph, Captain Mark Hagerott, USN; FrankHofman; Dr. Don M. Snider; and Col. Rod Zastrow, USAF. We also greatly appreciate the participation o numerous othersin our working groups, whose thoughtul discussion inormed our recommendations. Finally, we acknowledge the

helpul insights and comments on drat versions o this report provided by Col. Ross Brown, USA; Col. Joe Buche, USA;Commander Herb Carmen, USN; Lt. Col. Jefery Goodes, USMC; Vice Admiral (ret.) Kevin Green, USN; Lt. Col. Kelly Martin, USAF;Tom Ricks; Rear Admiral James Phil Wisecup, USN; Dr. Leonard Wong; Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, USA; and others.


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Keeg The Edge:

Revitalizing Americas Military Ofcer Corps

Eded b Dr. Jhn A. Nag and Bran M. Burn

Cnrbung Auhrs: Bran M. Burn; Dr. Jhn A. Nag;

Dr. Dn M. Snder; Frank G. Hfman; Caan Mark R. Hager, USN;

Cne Rderck C. Zasrw, USAF

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

Chapter 5: Strategic Leader Development

rom an Air Force Perspective

By Colonel Roderick C. Zastrow, USAF

Chapter 6: Revitalizing Americas Ocer Corps By Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton

T A B l E o F C o n T E n T s

Executive Summary 3

Chapter 1: The Future o the U.S. Military 9

Ocer Corps: Strategic Context

By Brian M. Burton and Dr. John A. NaglChapter 2: Developing a Corps o Proessionals 19

By Dr. Don M. Snider

Chapter 3: Embracing a Full Spectrum Proession 27

By Frank G. Hofman

Chapter 4: Rebalancing the Naval Ocer Corps 37

By Captain Mark R. Hagerott, USN


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About the Authors

Bra M. Burt is a Research Associate at CNAS.

Mark R. Hagertt is a Captain in the U.S. Navy currently serving as Director o the Commanding

Generals Strategic Action Group at NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command-

Aghanistan. At the time o writing, he was a aculty member in the History Department at the

U.S. Naval Academy.

Frak G. Hma is currently the Deputy Director o the Oce o Program Appraisal in the

Department o the Navy. At the time o writing, he was a national security afairs analyst andResearch Fellow at the Potomac Institute or Policy Studies.

Dr. Jh A. nag is President o CNAS.

Dr. D M. sder is Emeritus Proessor o Political Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point,

and Adjunct Research Proessor at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Rderck C. Zatr is a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force currently serving as a orce planner in the

Oce o the Secretary o Deense or Policy.

Disclaimer: None of the views expressed in this document by any of the contributors represent those of

the United States government or any of its departments or agencies.


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ExECUtivE SUMMARy


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E x E C U t i v E S U M M A R y The U.S. military o icer corps, the proessionalbody entrusted with preparing and training thearmed orces or war and peace, is at the ore-

ront o an ever-increasing array o challenges.

Indeed, America arguably relies on its armed

orces to perorm a wider variety o unctions

than any other nation in history. While the

military cannot shoulder the entire burden o

responding to complex international circum-

stances, it must prepare itsel better or the

inevitability o such challenges. Four trends in

particular are likely to alter the range o skillsand knowledge oicers will need: the increased

incidence o wars amongst the people; the

likelihood o humanitarian and peacekeeping

missions in parts o the world with which the

United States has litt le experience; widespread

access to highly destructive weapons; and the

24-hour global media environment.

To respond eectively to complex chal lenges, the

U.S. military must develop and maintain a high

degree o adaptability within the ocer corps.

Twenty-rst-century military ocers must learn

and embody enduring principles o warare and

leadership, but the teaching and training o ocers

must also change to meet the contemporary

demands and opportunities they are likely to ace.

In addition to demonstrating a high degree o

prociency in conventional warare, ocers must

also develop a broader knowledge o politics,

economics, and the use o inormation in modern

warare to cope with a more complicated and

rapidly evolving international environment.Emerging strategic trends and threats also high-

light the importance o some new attributes and

career development options. This will require

rethinking the balance between the need or

specialists and generalists at dierent ranks and

the specic responsibilities and requirements o

generals, eld-grade ocers, and company-grade

ocers. Service leadership must determine the


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proper balance between deep expertise in onesmall subset o requirements o ocership and the

broader strategic perspective that is necessary or

senior leadership o a branch or service.

REConsiDERinG TAlEnT DisTRiBUTion AnD CAREER TRACKs

Complex operations demand military ocers

who possess a comprehensive understanding o

the battle environment and the capacity to inte-

grate capabilities to achieve mission success. They

must understand the capabilities and mission o

their unit or platorm, as well as the role o orces

rom other services, allied military orces, civilian

government agencies, intergovernmental organiza-

tions (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs). The solution, however, cannot be as

simple as adding even more to the already-packed

training and proessional military education cur-

riculum or junior and intermediate-grade leaders.

Instead, the services should develop a balanced

distribution o talents across required knowledge

areas within segments o the services ocers

through more dierentiated career paths. There

is substantial tension in ocer training programs

between cultivating excellence in tactical and

technical competencies and developing the quali-

ties needed or operating in complex environments

in concert with multiple partners. A more holistic

ocer development program is required to coun-

teract a disproportionate ocus on tactical training

over strategic education. Strategy and warghting

are integrative tasks, requiring not only the ability

to operate specialized equipment or to command

a tactical unit, but also an understanding o howdierent pieces t together to ensure the achieve-

ment o national objectives.

AllowinG ADDiTionAl CAREER FlExiBiliTY

Encouraging the accession and retention o more

o the best available talent into the ocer corps

will require oering more diverse and fexible

career paths that encourage risk-taking and uncon-

ventional assignments. Current ocer career paths

were built or a very dierent military than the

one we have today. The diculty o maintain-ing a healthy amily lie amid reassignments and

deployments is now a commonly cited reason

or talented young ocers who decide to leave

the orce. These cultural changes aect military

careers more than any other American proession;

an ocer assignment system that ignores the act

o increased marriage rates and working spouses

wil l orce ocers to choose between career and

amily, and both will lose. Increased use o sabbati-

cal years particularly to pursue higher education

or gain additional experience in an unconventionalassignment while also allowing downtime rom

deployments or amilies would provide additional

career fexibility or uture generations o ocers.

Better recognition and employment o these outside

experiences and talents could allow the military to

attract or retain some o the most innovative and

dynamic talent in todays workplace.

EnHAnCinG oFFiCER EDUCATion

A lielong Proessional Mil itary Education

(PME) system would allow the military services

to design adaptable programs that balance

necessary warighting skills with a broader

exploration o similarly pertinent topics to

include language and cultura l studies. The pro-

gram should not be designed to produce experts

in non-military subjects but instead be geared

toward better equipping oicers to understand

the political and cultural complexities that will

aect their activities. While the current system

o proessional military education ocuses on the

tactical level o warare and on junior oicers,an increased ocus on cultivating the most tal-

ented strategists relatively early in their careers

would be beneicial. Most importantly, the PME

system should be redesigned with reerence to

the education o general and lag oicers, the

senior leaders o the institution and those most

responsible or strategic and enterprise leader-

ship. It is essential that the most senior oicers

be engaged in a progressive series o educational


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experiences and that perormance in thoseinstitutions o higher learning be actored into

promotion and slating decisions.

inCREAsinG oppoRTUniTiEs FoR EARliER JoinT,

inTERAGEnCY, inTERGovERnMEnTAl,

AnD MUlTinATionAl (JiiM) E xpERiEnCE

Because uture conficts are likely to involve opera-

tions with other services, agencies, and allied orces,

experience in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental,

and Multinational (JIIM) assignments is essential

to amiliarizing ocers with the various actors who

will play an important role in uture conficts. It willalso enhance an understanding o how those capa-

bilities can be leveraged to accomplish U.S. national

objectives. The ocer corps would benet i JIIM

tours were available earlier in careers, enabling more

junior leaders to take earlier advantage o these

experiences during their ormative years. An expan-

sion o exchange programs with other militaries,

particularly non-Western orces, would be benecial

because American ocers will oten operate with

local orces in uture conficts.

CUlTivATinG linGUisTiC AnD CUlTURAl KnowlEDGE

The process o building relationships o trust

with oreign orces and civilian populations,

oten critical to achieving successul outcomes in

operations in oreign countries, would be greatly

aided by an expansion o oreign linguistic and

cultural knowledge within the ocer corps.

Such capabilities have generally been relegated to

relatively small special operations, civil aairs, or

oreign area ocer contingents. It is unrealistic to

educate every ocer to some useul standard inevery oreign language he or she may need in the

course o a career, but the advantages o having a

broader base o linguistic and cultural awareness

in the corps, particularly among junior leaders in

the eld, should not be dismissed. Both language

training and cultural education take time, and

should start early and be reemphasized throughout

an ocers career. One solution is to increase the

institutional demand or these skil ls by expanding

ocer billets, such as the Armys Foreign AreaOcer specialty, that require these capabilities and

ensuring that these billets present clear and ample

promotion paths to positions o command or

sta responsibility. Another option is to require

linguistic and cultural training or prospective

oicers beore their careers begin. ROTC and

military academies can add language and cul-

tural education requirements early on, or at least

provide additional incentives or completing

such programs.

EnHAnCinG CoMMUniCATion sKills

The ability to compete in the battle o the narra-

tive in public domains is an essential task or which

more ocers will need to be educated and trained

in strategic communications, understanding

that their role in this endeavor may be as impor-

tant to the success or ai lure o American policy

as is their skil l with executing combined arms

operations against the enemy. Additional media

training during the course o pre-deployment

preparation that simulates the stresses o actual

operations should continue and be oered to

commanders and executive ocers during pre-

deployment training. Tactical level leaders will

have the most current knowledge about their

operations and will be best suited to respond to

developing situations that can shape the narra-

tive. They should be authorized to speak about

their operations and U.S. objectives in lay

language, and in place o central headquarters

public aairs ocers who are oten ar removed

rom theaters o action.pRoMoTinG THE RiGHT pEoplE wiTH THE RiGHT sKills

Ultimately, the most important actor in ensuring that

the proession o arms is able to meet the demands

o national security in this century will be the

people selected to lead the services. Currently,

promotion instructions avor some skill sets that

are relatively less useul than they were during

the Cold War, while neglecting to reward those

o greatest importance in the emerging security


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environment. Tactical excellence oten determineswho gets promoted, but this results in tacticians

being promoted to positions o strategic leadership

or which they are oten poorly suited by tempera-

ment, ability, or training and education. Future

selection boards will need clear instructions to

properly assess those holistic attributes in candi-

dates or promotion that will be most valuable or

anticipated uture conficts, and they should be

chaired by ocers cognizant o their responsibility

to shape the uture orce to prepare or and meet

those demands. Moreover, guidance and oversightor vital selections to the three- and our-star rank,

made without promotion board input by service

chies, must be closely examined.

The proession o ocership will continue to

require physical, moral, and mental excellence,

but the rapidly changing strategic environment o

the 21st century will place an increasing premium

on agility and fexibility. The emerging strategic

environment will provide both challenges and

opportunities to those who have the tools neces-

sary to handle the unexpected, and to do so with

honor and integrity.


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Chapter I:

tHE FUtURE oF tHE U.S. MilitARyoFFiCER CoRpS: StRAtEGiC CoNtExt

By Bra M. Burt ad Dr. Jh A. nag


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tHE FUt URE oF tHE U.S . M il i tA RyoFFiCER CoRpS: StRAtEGiC CoNtExt

B Bran M. Burn and Dr. Jhn A. Nag

Americas military is being taxed by sustainedcombat requirements in Aghanistan and Iraq,

which present the greatest challenges to its durabil-

ity since the Vietnam era. These wars, combined

with the United States global commitments, have

stretched the orce over a prolonged period and

compelled rapid and unexpected adaptations.

The U.S. military did not anticipate engaging in

large-scale armed nation-building missions in

two countries comprising some 50 million people.

But when the planned oensives to decapitate

the Taliban and Saddam Husseins regime ended,American orces were thrust into a wholly dierent

role or which they were not prepared. The arc o

the United States experience in Aghanistan and

Iraq is in many ways the story o how American

orces adapted under re to these unamiliar

situations.

These current conficts have put a spotlight on

the militarys expanding role in American oreign

policy, demonstrating how the United States relies

on its armed orces to perorm a wider variety o

unctions than any other nation in history. The

U.S. military operates some o the most sophisti-

cated technologies in the world, rom microchips

to nuclear reactors. It maintains a worldwide

presence, divvying up the globe into regional com-

mands whose commanders play the role ode acto

ambassadors. It is oten the rst-responder on the

rontlines o U.S. oreign policy initiatives rang-

ing rom providing humanitarian assistance in

Haiti, countering narcotics in Colombia, building

partner capacity in Arica, peacekeeping in theBalkans, countering terrorism in the Philippines,

and ensuring regional security in Japan and South

Korea.1 Ideally, diplomacy and development are

Americas tools o choice or many such crises.

However, these civilian assets have not been su-

ciently developed or resourced to succeed in these

contingencies.2 While the military cannot shoulder

the entire burden or responding to complex inter-

national circumstances, it must better organize


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and prepare itsel or the inevitability o such chal-

lenges. In a strategic environment in which a broad

array o security threats to the United States are

expected to emerge and Americas civilian capacity

remains limited, the military wil l have to continue

to adapt to new circumstances and perorm an

even wider variety o challenging tasks.

Conronting this reality is the U.S. military o-

cer corps, the proessional body entrusted with

preparing and training the armed orces or war

and peace, and a national resource critical to the

maintenance o American national security and

infuence around the world. The ocer corps isnot simply another bureaucracy or political con-

stituency, but a major executing arm o American

oreign policy. For these reasons, the nation

invests signicant time and unding to train, edu-

cate, and develop its ocers, but whether this has

kept pace with the salient changes in strategic and

domestic environments, and in the character o

21st century conficts is the central question this

series o papers aims to investigate.

A ne strategc ErmetThere is an emerging consensus within the U.S.

oreign and security policy establishment that an

array o political, economic, social, demographic,

technological, and environmental trends will pro-

oundly change the global strategic environment.3

These broad global trends, rom environmental

actors like climate change to demographic actors,

like greater urbanization to technological actors like

the increased prolieration o advanced weapons, will

maniest themselves in the orm o new operational

challenges and constraints imposed on the employ-ment o American power, particularly military

power, abroad. The U.S. military has dominated the

conventional battleeld with its superior capabilities

since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, but adversar-

ies have managed to circumvent this strength by

adopting both high- and low-end asymmetric tactics

and methods. Insurgents in Iraq and Aghanistan,

or example, cannot match the U.S. military in

direct combat, so they avoid its strengths by hiding

among civilian populations and conducting tar-

geted ambushes specically designed to undermineU.S. political objectives and will. China remains ar

behind the United States in terms o conventional

capabilities, but increasingly is developing high-end

asymmetric capabilities intended to neutralize U.S.

advantages, notably in the areas o anti-access mis-

siles, anti-satellite weapons, and cyber warare.4

While the United States is unlikely to ace a true

existential threat in the oreseeable uture akin

to the Soviet Union and its thousands o nuclear

weapons, the wide distribution and asymmetricnature o new threats makes it harder to ocus

attention and resources. Meanwhile, there are

important domestic trends that put urther pres-

sure on military ocers. These trends combine

to create a ar more complicated confict environ-

ment that uture military ocers will have to be

prepared to conront and corresponding new

challenges or the ocer proession. As retired U.S.

Army Lieutenant General David Barno remarked

In a strategic environment

in which a broad array

o security threats to the

United States are expected

to emerge and Americas

civilian capacity remains

limited, the military willhave to continue to adapt

to new circumstances and

perorm an even wider

variety o challenging tasks.


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beore the House Armed Services Subcommitteeon Oversight and Investigations, Ocer leader-

ship in this era aces demands that may make the

relative intricacy o soldiering during the Cold War

simple in comparison.5

TREnDs in THE sTRATEGiC EnviRonMEnT

The strategic environment has always been

subject to change, but in recent years the rate o

change has increased dramatically, putting new

pressures on military ocers and providing a

new premium on the ability to adapt to change

as a key component o ocership in this century.

Four trends in particular are likely to alter the

range o skills and knowledge they will need to

address them: the increased incidence o what

Rupert Smith calls wars amongst the people;

the increased likelihood o humanitarian and

peacekeeping missions in parts o the world with

which the United States has little experience; the

widespread access to highly destructive weapons;

and the 24-hour global media environment. All

urther complicate the already dicult tasks o

military ocership.

Demographic and environmental pressures will

put increasing strains on existing governance

institutions tasked with maintaining order. Rapid

urbanization and youth population bulges in the

developing world will challenge already-ragile

economic and social inrastructures which lack the

resources and inrastructure to accommodate the

infux o young, jobless migrants. Future combat

is increasingly likely to occur within or in close

proximity to these densely populated areas, requir-ing special military consideration. As the National

Intelligence Council describes, Explosive urban-

ization will increase the likelihood o clashes

between [class, ethnic, or religious] groups As

these communities coalesce and become sel-gov-

erning or sometimes co-opted by organized crime

groups, state and local government will ace no-go

areas in many large cities as has already happened

in cities like Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.6

Even widely-agreed upon scientic projectionso the likely eects o climate change to say

nothing o worse scenarios indicate that in

many places these conditions will be urther

aggravated by sea level rise, drought, amine,

heat waves, loods and other natural disasters.

In some regions, this could result in increases in

humanitarian and reugee crises, or combine with

other drivers to ignite or exacerbate confict. No

country will be completely immune to the eects

o climate change. However, as the United States

has ar and away the greatest assets and capa-bilities or responding to disasters and crises, the

nations leaders will likely ace increasing demand

to respond to these contingencies, many o which

may arise in areas o the world where the U.S. mili-

tary has litt le experience.7

Meanwhile, existing and prospective American

oes continue to arm themselves with more

dangerous capabilities. This prolieration o arma-

ments will continue to be a major contributor

to global insecurity. WMD prolieration among

hostile states, and the possibility o their transer

to non-state actors is a very real concern, most

notably in the cases o Iran and North Korea today.

Improved communications and transportation

capabilities have made ssile nuclear material,

and the technical expertise necessary or weapon

construction, increasingly accessible.8 The NIC

predicts that without serious advances in counter-

prolieration eorts, by 2025 the diusion o

technologies and scientic knowledge will place

some o the worlds most dangerous capabilitieswithin reach o non-state groups.9 The knowledge

and materials necessary to produce chemical or

biological weapons are now available to individu-

als and sub-state organizations: Witness the Aum

Shinrikyo cults 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo

subway or the 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the

United States. These attacks were relatively unso-

phisticated and ailed to produce mass casualties,

but revealed the widespread disruption and panic


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that even a minor attack could cause. There is areal and growing possibility that a uture chemi-

cal or biological attack launched by a more capable

group or individual could cause ar greater dam-

age. Commanders will need to be prepared to

adapt to a wide range o increasingly lethal threats

launched by a broad array o hostile orces, rom

state actors to small groups. U.S. military orces

will have to be prepared to respond rapidly to

WMD incidents launched against them or civilian

populations by mitigating the immediate damage

caused by such attacks and maintaining order anddiscipline in their wake.

The prolieration o more advanced conventional

weapons has rendered what were once called low-

intensity conficts more lethal. The 2006 war

between Israel and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon

spurred increasing concern that non-state actors

now have military capabilities thought previously to

be the exclusive domain o state actors.10 Hezbollahs

use o rockets, anti-ship missiles, anti-tank guided

missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles made it a

more ormidable oe than the Israelis were prepared

to ace.11 Hezbollahs employment o advanced

technology in combination with guerrilla tactics

most notably its eorts to conceal itsel amongst the

civilian population oer a harbinger o a uture

in which non-state actors will no longer be at such a

distinct disadvantage in weaponry and technology.

This is a particularly troubling prospect given the

diculties U.S. orces have encountered in dealing

with relatively lightly equipped insurgents in Iraq

and Aghanistan. This trend toward hybrid warswill render governments around the world, espe-

cially the less wealthy and less well-established

ones, increasingly vulnerable to losing their

sovereign monopoly on violence to militia and

insurgent groups, contributing to urther sub-

state instability.12

Ongoing weapons prolieration trends increase the

array o options available to U.S. oes. Both state

and non-state enemies will seek to circumvent

American conventional military prowess by gain-ing a broad array o asymmetric capabilities, orcing

American orces to ght on terms in which tradi-

tional specializations and divisions o labor will be

challenged, much as they have been in the wars in

Iraq and Aghanistan. Commanders at the tacti-

cal, operational, and strategic levels will have to be

able to react quickly to enemies who will adapt and

constantly probe weaknesses with an increased level

o lethal sophistication.

All o these challenges occur amidst the unorgiv-

ing scrutiny o the constant global media cycle.

The ubiquity o media and inormation technology

is changing the way wars are waged. The battle

o the narrative, in which enemies attempt to

undermine the legitimacy o U.S. and allied actions

among the local population and global public

opinion, is already a major component o insur-

gent and terrorist strategy around the world. The

Aghan Taliban, or example, runs a sophisticated

propaganda apparatus that emphasizes the civil-

ian casualties resulting rom NATO operations, as

well as the corruption o the U.S.-backed Aghan

government.13 The inevitable media coverage sur-

rounding incidents o abuse or excessive orce, such

as those at Abu Ghraib and Haditha in Iraq, can

severely damage the credibility o American orces

in the eld and inuse the acts o even an individual

soldier with global strategic signicance, i they are

captured and rebroadcast around the world.

Even operations that are justied under the laws

o war and rules o engagement can be harmul

i they cause death and destruction that is seen asunwarranted, thus contributing to the enemys

narrative that American orces are brutal and

dismissive o the loss o civilian lie. As the Joint

Forces Command noted:

Joint orce commanders already wrestle with

how to deal with a pervasive media presence,

widespread blogging, almost instantaneous

posting o videos rom the battleeld, e-mail,


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and soldiers who can call home whenever theyreturn to base. In the uture they will be con-

ronted with a prousion o new media linked to

unimaginably ast transmission capabilities

Winning the [media] battle has always been

important, but in the pervasive and instanta-

neous communications environment expected

in uture decades, it will be absolutely crucial.

For commanders not to recognize that act

could result in the risking o the lives o young

Americans to no purpose.14

The ability to counter the enemy narrative will depend

in large part on the ability o military ocers, particu-

larly those operating in the eld, to understand how

acts could be perceived or recast by others. They must

have the requisite communication and media skills to

promote the U.S. narrative and to engage eectively

with host-nation populations and the global media.

DoMEsTiC FACToRs

Perhaps less examined but just as important is the

act that the maintenance o American military

power aces signicant challenges at home. First, theincreased scal pressures resulting rom the com-

bination o rising entitlement costs and a weakened

U.S. economy will require trade-os between per-

sonnel and procurement in deense budget debates.

Burgeoning health care costs could have the eect

o squeezing out other deense investments over

time.15 Military health care costs make up about

almost one-tenth o the scal year 2010 deense bud-

get (47 billion dollars) and are expected to double

every decade.16 This dynamic will likely create sub-

stantial pressures within the Deense Department tocurtail or even roll back end-strength increases and

other personnel-related expenditures in the name o

preserving technological advantages, which in turn

would aect the ability o the military to develop and

maintain the broadest possible array o knowledge,

education, and experience within the ocer corps.

Another challenge is the ability to recruit and retain

sucient high-quality personnel or the ocer corps.

The military has always had to contend with thepull actor o its best ocers being drawn away

by better-compensated private sector opportunities.

That problem is compounded today by the push

actor o a high operational tempo, particularly

among the ground orces, that shows no signs o

abating. The prospect o requent deployments orces

many o the junior and eld-grade ocers to choose

between their military careers and their amily lives;

many capable ocers reluctantly choose to leave

the service.17 The potential or a bleed-out o com-

petent leaders may be mitigated by the current U.S.economic climate, but the pull-push dynamic is a

systemic challenge or an all-volunteer military, and

particularly its highly-educated and skilled ocers,

in a period o protracted combat deployments.

A nal troubling trend can be ound on the supply

side o the equation, with current research sug-

gesting that up to 75 percent o Americans aged

17 to 24 are ineligible to enlist, let alone receive

A nal troubling trend

can be ound on the supply

side o the equation, with

current research suggesting

that up to 75 percent o

Americans aged 17 to 24

are ineligible to enlist, letalone receive an ocers

commission, due to a

combination o obesity,

poor education, drug use

and criminal records.


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

16 |

an ocers commission, due to a combination oobesity, poor education, drug use and criminal

records.18 Maintaining high physical, mental, and

moral standards or ocer recruits is particularly

crucial in wartime and has become increasingly

dicult.19 Such troubling statistics point to the

importance o proper management and cultivation

o Americas ocer corps.

perecte the Future ofcerhTo respond eectively to these complex interna-

tional and domestic challenges, the U.S. military

must develop and maintain a high degree o

adaptability within the ocer corps. Twenty-rst-

century military ocers must learn and embody

enduring principles o warare and leadership,

but the teaching and training o ocers must

change to meet the contemporary demands and

opportunities they are likely to ace. In addition

to demonstrating a high degree o prociency in

conventional state-on-state warare, ocers must

also develop a broader skill set in politics, economics,

and the use o inormation in modern warare to

cope with a more complicated and rapidly evolv-

ing international environment. Determining the

proper balance between conventional competencies

and emerging requirements and the best means

to train and educate a corps o adaptive leaders

remains a contentious issue with no obvious

consensus solution.

This study is based on a ser ies o working group

meetings and collaborations with military ocers

and outside experts to gain a variety o perspectives

on the nature o ocership in a new strategicenvironment. This introduction is ollowed by

edited versions o our papers and a concluding

chapter on revitalizing Americas ocer corps. The

chapters provide an analysis o these issues rom

several inormed perspectives, while the con-

cluding chapter provides both a summary and a

series o suggestions to help America keep its edge

in mi litary ocership. Each author approaches

uture ocer development in a dierent way, butall arrive at similar, though not identical, conclu-

sions regarding the importance o providing a

broader range o educational and proessional

experiences essential components o training

agile minds how to think rather than what to

think and cultivating new skill sets that are

more relevant to the contemporary strategic

environment. Each o the authors is writing as an

individual and their views in no way represent the

views o the U.S. government, the Department o

Deense, or any other department or agency.

Dr. Don M. Snider, an expert on military proession-

alism at the U.S. Army War College, emphasizes

the importance o cultivating the ocer corps as

an expert proession which requires the possession

o specialized knowledge on the use o military

orce. Thus, personnel policy, training, and educa-

tion must preserve core proessional competencies,

but also develop a progressively deeper under-

standing o war and strategy.

Frank Homan establishes a ramework or howto think about the requirements or ocership in

a rapidly changing threat environment marked

by complex irregular warare or hybrid war.

He identies six primary leadership lines o

operation that must be pursued in order to

reach a ull-spectrum proession o military

ocership: proessional rigor, operational ocus,

ethical sensitivity, situational intelligence, orien-

tation to national rather than parochial needs,

and continuous learning. This ramework is

useul in highlighting an overall strategy to

achieve the goal o an ocer corps that can adapt

to changing circumstances while maintaining

core competencies.

Mark Hagerott, a U.S. Navy Captain, ormerly o

the U.S. Naval Academy, argues that the global

strategic environment will require more ocers

who have the ability to work across services

and government agencies, domestically and


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| 17

internationally. Hagerotts ocus is on the Navy,but his model or rebalancing the distribution o

technical-tactical and strategic-integrative unc-

tions in the ocer corps has broader applicability.

He argues that the Navy has ocused since the

beginning o the Cold War on developing ocers

as technical experts limited to their specic plat-

orms. He lays out a new ramework or thinking

about the portolio o capabilities needed or the

ocer corps, and recommends rebalancing it by

cultivating a new contingent o ocers who have

more early education and experience in Joint,Interagency, and Multinational operations.

Roderick Zastrow, a U.S. Air Force Colonel,

presents an Air Force perspective concerning the

development o senior strategic leaders. He argues

that eective strategic leaders must be cultivated

through more rigorous ocer education and joint

assignment processes to develop broader perspec-

tives regarding the use o orce to achieve national

objectives. And he posits that success should not be

dened simply as achievement in a single service,

but rather the attainment o broader strategic com-

petencies that permit uller coordination across the

services and agencies.

In the volumes conclusion, the editors recommend

steps to develop the current and probable uture

requirements or skilled, adaptive leaders o char-

acter that Americas armed orces will need to meet

the demands o the 21st century.

The U.S. military ocer corps aces proound

challenges. Addressing them will require vision,imagination and energy over a sustained period o

time. The issues raised in these papers are intended

to mark the beginning o a conversation about

those challenges and opportunities, recognizing

that eective reorm is an evolutionary and pro-

gressive process.


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

18 |

E N D N o t E S

1 For examinations o the increasingly expansive scope o the U.S. militarys role

in global aairs, see Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with

Americas Military (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial

Grunts: The American Military on the Ground(New York: Random House, 2005)

and Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military i n the Air, at Sea, and on

the Ground(New York: Random House, 2007).

2 See Dr. John A. Nagl, The Expeditionary Imperative, The Wilson Quarterly(2009).

3 For example, note the congruity in the assessments and posture statements

produced by the National Intelligence Council, Oice o the Secretary o

Deense, the Army, the Navy, U.S. Joint Forces Command. See National

Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transormed World(November

2008), http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_

Report.pd; Department o Deense, National Deense Strategy, June 2008: 2-5,

http://www.deenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20deense%20strategy.pd; Department o the Army, 2009 Army Posture Statement,

(May 2009): 1-3, http://www.army.mil/aps/09/2009_army_posture_

statement.pd; Department o the Navy, United States Marine Corps and United

States Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy or 21st Century Seapower,

(October 2007): 5-7, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pd;

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), The JOE: Joint Operating Environment

2008: Challenges and Implications or the Future Force (November 2008),

http://www.jcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pd.

4 See Abraham M. Denmark, Chinas Arrival: A Framework or a Global

Relationship, in Abraham Denmark and Nirav Patel, eds., Chinas Arrival:

A Strategic Framework or a Global Relationship (Washington, DC: Center or

a New American Security, September 2009): 163-65.

5 LTG (Retired) David Barno, Testimony beore the House Armed Ser vices

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (10 September 2009).

6 National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transormed World

(November 2008): 86.

7 Ibid. 51-57.

8 Oce o the Coordinator or Counter-Terrorism, U.S. State Department, Country

Reports on Terrorism 2008 (Washington, DC: 30 April 200 9).

9 NIC, Global Trends 2025: A Transormed World(November 2008): iv.

10 Greg Jae, Short 06 Lebanon War Stokes Pentagon Debate, Washington Post

(6 April 2009).11 See Andrew Exum, Hez bollah at War: A Military Assessment, Washington

Institute or Near East Policy, Policy Brie #63 (December 2006).

12 See Frank Homan, Conict in the 21st Century: the Rise o Hybrid Wars

(Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute or Policy Studies, December 2007); Frank

Homan, Janus Thinking or Hybrid Wars: Dening Todays Multiaceted

Conficts,Armed Forces Journal(October 2009): 14-18.

13 See International Crisis Group, Winning the War o Words? Taliban Propaganda

in Aghanistan, Asia Report No. 158 (24 July 2008).

14 Joint Forces Command, The JOE 2008, 4 0.

15 William Matthews, 2010 Budget: Men vs. Machines, Deense News

(2 March 2009).

16 Todd Harrison,Analysis o the FY2010 Deense Budget Request(Washington, DC :

Center or Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 20 09): 11.

17 Fred Kaplan, An Ocer and a Family Man,Slate (16 January 2008); John Rogers,

I Love It. But I Have to Leave It, Washington Post(16 March 2008).

18 Christian Davenport and Emma Brown, Girding or an Uphill Battle or Recruits:

Obesity, Poor Education Make Many Younger People Unt or Military,

Washington Post(5 November 2009).

19 Michael E. OHanlon, Who Will Fight or Us? Orbis (Summer 2009): 408-10.


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Chapter II:

DEvElopiNG A CoRpS oF pRoFESSioNAlS

By Dr. D M. sder


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0


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| 21

D E v E l o p i N G A C o R p So F p R o F E S S i o N A l S

B Dr. Dn M. Snder

War is quintessentially a human endeavor. Thevalue o other resources, such as applied technol-

ogy, strategic reach, and logistics should never be

underestimated. But neither should consideration

o those ever take primacy over the ocus on human

capital as the key resource o eective, inormation-

age militaries.1

The transition period between the Bush and

Obama administrations occasioned a spate

o studies on how to reorm the U.S. deense

establishment. The general thrust was to rec-

ognize that in an era o persistent conlict, new

and permanent demands have been placed on

the commissioned leadership o our services;

thus there is a need to determine how best to

adapt oicer development to meet the challenges

o this changed environment. However, in the

understandable urgency to ind a consensus

on what uture o icers must be able to do, it is

imperative that we not lose sight o the need or

oicers who know what it means to be a mili-

tary proessional and how to lead in an evolving

military proession.

In terms o organizational structure and culture,

each o the armed services is a mixture o three

orms o producing organizations ound within

American society: bureaucracy, business, and

proession. Two o these orms, bureaucracy and

proession, are constantly in tension within each

service culture. At any point in time, which o

these two cultures is most infuential on the eec-

tiveness o the service is largely determined by the

decisions o the previous strategic leaders o thatservice. These decisions establish the knowledge,

associated identity, and developmental processes

by which the human capital o the ocer corps

in each service is acquired, developed, and used.

Todays leaders must recognize that there is an

unremitting dierence between the capabilities

o a vocational proession and that o government


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

22 |

bureaucracy. To eectively ght uture conficts,America needs a military o expert proessionals

who set a new standard o proessionalism or

tomorrows ocers.

THE ARMED sERviCEs As pRoFEssions

Proessions are organizations wherein the individual

has the discretion to exercise initiative and judgment

in decision-making and execution that fows romtheir specialized knowledge, a knowledge typically

not shared by the clients those proessionals serve.2

The proessional decides what to do, how to do it

and leads in the execution by virtue o mastery o

the proessions knowledge. The client grants the

proession signicant autonomy to conduct the

expert work because over time the proession has

done the work eectively and has not exploited the

client in its institutional sel-interest.

American military proessions are, then, sel-

orming, sel-regulating, and sel-initiating in the

provision o expert work, living on the lie-blood

o relationships they establish and maintain with:

(1) their client, the American people, (2) the civil-

ian leadership elected and appointed over them,

and (3) the junior proessionals developing within

the institution who will later become the senior

stewards who keep the institution a proession into

the uture.

ExpERT KnowlEDGE oF Mi liTARY pRoFEssions

AnD THE iDEnTiTY oF oFFiCERs

The ocer corps claim to proessionalism rests

on acceptance o their expert knowledge their

corpus o doctrines as legitimate and eec-

tive. It also depends on the ability o the services

to cultivate strong shared identities to develop

the military proessionals in their ranks. These

identities are closely associated with the expert

knowledge o the proession.3 While ocers are

developed by three means education, training,

and service in operational assignments most o

this is sel-driven development regardless o the

environment within which it occurs.4 In the era o

the all-volunteer military it becomes particularly

important to encourage ocers to become com-

mitted to personally directed, lie-long learning,

and to ascertain that the military establishment is

committed to supporting them in those endeavors.

Priorities or ocer development must change.

In the past, junior ocers ocused early in their

career on the military-technical aspects o their

service, broadening later on into other elds oknowledge, including the political-cultural aspects

o the proession. Now, given the nature o hybrid

warare, that is insucient junior ocers must

be more knowledgeable about all areas o their ser-

vices expert knowledge, and must develop broad

proessional identities rom the outset. Future

ocer development systems, using all three modes

o development, must adapt to this necessity.

THE ExpERT woRK oF A MiliTARY pRoFEssionAl

The work o a military proessional is the repetitiveexercise o discretionary judgment.5 Picture an

ocer, even a junior grade ocer, serving in Iraq or

Aghanistan, and consider the requency with which

he or she will ace new, unamiliar situations, which

require a time-sensitive diagnosis or an action.

Ocers may well perorm this proessional prac-

tice many times daily, oten with many lives at risk,

dependent upon the accuracy and timeliness o their

discretionary judgments. As a consequence, the

In the era o the

all-volunteer military

it becomes particularly

important to encourageocers to become

committed to personally

directed, lie-long learning.


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| 23

desired outcome o ocer development is the abil-ity to exercise discretionary proessional judgments

based on expert knowledge adequate to the rank

and position in which they are employed.6

In turn, this means that ocers must assume

responsibility or constant inquiry into the

applicability o knowledge to practice, called

refection-in-action.7 Without such a disposi-

tion among the ocer corps, the tendency will

be or reication o conventional wisdom, which

breeds a the way things get done around here

mentality the antithesis o proessional practice

and a particularly inappropriate response in a time

o rapid strategic change.

where t Fcu r Future ofcerDeemet: s RecmmedatIn order to acilitate the development o a cohesive

culture o proessionalism in Americas ocer

corps, the collective principal stakeholders must

address several key questions:

Is the prevailing ocer personnel management

system supportive o a culture o proession-

alism? Are there appropriate and sucient

incentives and opportunities or continuing

proessional education and training?

Is behavior shaped more by a sel-policing

ethic among proessionals versus bureaucratic

incentives applied centrally?

Is proessional knowledge keeping pace with best

practices in ocer training and development?

And vice versa?

Does each service have a clear picture o and sub-

stantive prole or assessing ocer perormance and

suitability or promotion? Are the ocers accessed,

assessed, developed and certied at each proessional

level with clear ocus on their ability to exercise

sound discretionary judgments and then relate those

experiences to the proessions body o knowledge via

refection-in-action? Does each service have the

correct identity or uture ocer development?

To create ocer personal management systemsor uture military proessionals, Americas armed

services should:

1. Streamline the process o integrating ocers

rom the various service organizations by

creating a new lateral entry program a joint

military proession responsible or stang core

positions within the Joint Commands, task

orces, and agencies.8 Twenty-our years a ter

passage o the Goldwater-Nichols Act, these

entities are still ormed by pick-up teams o

ocers assigned or roughly two-and-a-hal

years beore returning to their service. By creat-

ing a new cadre o eld-grade ocers rom

each service who enter the joint service proes-

sion laterally and remain in it or the duration

o their career, the integrative capability o

Americas military orces and its institutional

knowledge would be greatly enhanced. This

would also require the establishment o a Joint

Personnel Command to assess, assign, promote,

and develop career joint proessionals.

2. Extend all commissioned careers, pending suc-

cessul certication, to thirty-six years with an

option or orty years, a practice which mirrors

private sector and NGO policies, and which

would keep highly qualied ocers in service

while they are stil l ully capable o being strong

leaders and important sources o knowledge.

3. Establish rigorous procedures or accession,

development, and advancement o ocers

within each service. Two metrics should havepriority: the repeated assessment o an ocers

aptitudes or discretionary decision-making at

successive levels o authority and responsibility,

and rigorous individual certication o practice

in the eld prior to advancement.9 Certications

are the premier orm o sel-policing within a pro-

ession, ensuring the successul linkage o expert

knowledge to practice.


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

24 |

4. Re-establish emphasis on a broad liberal artseducation as the pre-commissioning ounda-

tion or ocer development, regardless o

source o commission. In the inormation

age, the role o a baccalaureate education has

changed remarkably. In the industrial age such

a degree was the requisite preparation or entry

into the white collar workorces o government,

management, and entrepreneurship. Today,

however, given the explosion o knowledge,

success in those roles is better acilitated by

the individuals rst graduate degree. Thus,recognizing that all ocers will have gradu-

ate degrees, the proessions should encourage

a broader liberal undergraduate education

grounding the uture oicer in the ideals,

institutions, and people he or she will deend.

5. Mandate that in the careers o all ocers,

roughly two o the rst dozen years or so must

be served outside the boundaries o the military

proession in which they are commissioned.

The developmental benet is obvious: civilian

graduate school, oreign immersion, and busi-

ness experiences are the only opportunity in the

overcommitted lie o current ocers or the

essential refection and contextualization that

contributes so richly to a broadly gauged ocer

capable o sound discretionary judgments.

6. Reocus ocer development on individual moral

agency and judgment.10 The nature o hybrid

warare places an even greater emphasis on the

moral component o leadership, as maniested

in discretionary judgments that must be madequickly and sometimes without higher-level

guidance. This is an important developmen-

tal challenge because or the past decade the

services have not chosen to emphasize the moral

equation, with the Army stating that such is the

responsibility o the individual.11

Taken together, these recommendations areintended to increase the eectiveness and pro-

essionalism o our armed orces by explicitly

ocusing on the concept o a new joint military

proession, and on concrete steps to enhance the

quality o ocer training and development.


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| 25

1 For a recent restatement o this position see Stephen Biddle and Jerey A .

Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future o Warare: Implications or

Army and Deense Policy(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, September 2008).

2 See, T.O. Jacobs and Michael G. Sanders, Principles or Building the Proession:

The SOF Experience, chapter 20 in Dr. Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews, e ds.,

The Future o the Army Proession, 2nd Edition (Learning Solutions, 2005): 441-462.

3 See Sean T. Hannah, The Authentic High-Impact Leader, Chapter 2 in Douglas

Crandall (ed), Leadership Lessons rom West Point (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

2007): 88-109.

4 For a discussion o the debate over the ecac y o competency mapping in joint

and service educational development, see: George Reed, et .al.,Leadership

Development: Beyond Traits and Competencies, Chapter 27 in The Future o the Army Proession, 2nd Edition: 585-600.

5 See Dr. Don M. Snider, et.al., The Multiple Identities o the Proessional Army

Ocer, Chapter 6 in The Future o the Army Proession, 2nd Edition: 143.

6 See George B. Forsy the, et.al., Proessional Identity Development or 21st

Century Ocers, Chapter 8 in The Future o the Army Proession, 2nd Edition:

189-210.

7 See Christopher A. Paparone and George Reed, The Refective Military

Practioner: How Military Proessionals Think in Action,Military Review

(April-May 2008): 66 -76.

8 See Dr. Don M. Snider and Jerey D. Peterson, Opportunit y or the Army:

Deense Transormation and a New Joint Military Proession, Chapter 10 inThe Future o the Army Proession, 2nd Edition: 237-250.

9 See Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and Michael Colarusso, Talent: Implications or

a U.S. Army Ocer Corps (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies

Institute, November 2009).

10 See Sean T. Hannah and Patrick J. Sweeney, Frameworks or Moral

Development, in Dr. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds.), Forging the

Warriors Character: Moral Precepts rom the Cadet Prayer, 2nd Edition

(Mc-Graw Hill, 20 08): 65-90.

11 See Headquarters, Department o the Army Field Manual No 6-22,Army

Leadership (Washington, DC: 2008): 4-12.

E N D N o t E S


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Chapter III:

EMBRACiNG A FUll SpECtRUM pRoFESSioN

By Frak G. Hma


30/80


F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

Given the dramatic changes in the form and the origins of the threats that now confront

the United States, the intellectual challenges of the profession of arms will be even greater

than in the past.1


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| 29

E M B R A C i N G A F U l lS p E C t R U M p R o F E S S i o N

B Frank G. Hfman

The dynamic and ambiguous environ-ment o modern warare places both new

and enduring demands on todays mili-

tary proessional. In addition to his or her

traditional competencies, todays o icer

must be prepared or a broad array o tasks

not normally considered core missions.

The oicer must remain historically a nd

morally grounded in the proessional appli-

cation o violence on behal o society. He

or she must rapidly and cognitively adapt

to this new environment and master bothnew competencies and contexts. Oicers

must also remain the dei nitive moral

orce within their commands, establishing

and enorcing the moral compass or their

subordinates.

Further complicating the task o pre-

paring or the uture is the increasingly

complicated nature o the operational

environment. The most likely opera-

tional environment will be more densely

populated and urbanized. Operating in

these dense urban communities will pose

extraordinary challenges. As challenging

as the physical aspect o operations in this

environment will be, the human terrain

will be even more diicult to navigate.

Oicers must possess the ability to com-

prehend and eectively maneuver in the

cognitive and cultural d imension o the

modern battlespace.

Our nations global interests, the inter-national communitys need or stability,

and the range o missions that must be

ul illed create many demands on the

proession o arms, and par ticularly its

oicers. Our orces must be highly t rained

and educated to unction in both current

and emerging operational environments


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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 0

30 |

against adaptable and evolving oes. The nation

requires the most capable orce, covering the

greatest range o tasks, at an aordable cost that

can minimize the risks inherent in an unoresee-

able uture. They must be innovative thinkers,

possessing a wider variety o skills and an

unprecedented breadth o knowledge. The pro-

ession must be disciplined enough in its grasp o

the various domains o security to recognize that

weather, terrain, and the enemy still get a vote

in operations.

prea Framerk: leaderhle oerat lloThis paper summarizes signicant shits in the

military proession and the need to develop

new competencies required to conduct suc-

cessul operations in the emerging strategic

environment.2

The ocer corps needs to reassess and reor-mulate its identity, ethic and sense o purpose,

as well as expand its proessional domain. This

approach identies six Leadership Lines o

Operations (LLOs in military terminology) as

refected in Figure 1. It suggests that Americas

ocer corps must be:

pRoFEssionAllY RiG oRoUs

During the past several decades, the U.S. military

has developed an unequaled expertise in conven-

tional warare, codied in a comprehensive body

o doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

While U.S. orces have improved dramatically in

their ability to conduct irregular warare, irregular

oes will continue to pose signicant challenges

or the oreseeable uture. U.S orces will require

the same level o expertise in irregular warare

that they have developed or conventional warare.

The ocer corps must embrace the reality o theull spectrum o warare, and not merely devote its

considerable talents to a preerred operating mode.

It must become a ull service proession or the ull

spectrum o confict possibilities and enemies.3

The proessional orientation o the U.S. military

will have to adapt to and accept an orientation

that seeks to employ military capabilities within a

political, social and economic context a method

o operation compatible with the comprehensive or

whole o government approach that is essential

to eectively counter irregular threats.4

A component o this LLO is the recognition that the

military proession will engage with other disciplines

and proessions. Leaders must be able to work with

members o other services, government agencies, and

NGOs, as well as with military and civilian personnel

rom partner countries. They must be able to eec-

tively interact with host nation civilians who may

have limited reason to trust in their goodwill, and

to win the contest o narratives and imagery in the

minds o adversaries and target populations.5

opERATionAllY FoCUsED AnD CoMpETEnT

The Capstone Concept or Joint Operations

contains another important implication: That

the armed services develop senior leaders who

are experts in commanding at the operational

level, at which campaigns and major operations

are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve

The nation requires

the most capable orce,

covering the greatest range

o tasks, at an aordable

cost that can minimize

the risks inherent in an

unoreseeable uture.


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| 31

strategic objectives within theaters or otheroperational areas.6 Given the growing complexity

o operating environments, these commands wil l

become more chal lenging, requiring the integra-

tion o diverse military capabilities as well as the

coordination o these capabilities with those o

interagency and international partners.

These oicers must be expert in arranging and

balancing combat, security, engagement, and

relie and reconstruction activities, and must

create a command climate that inspires coopera-

tion and trust. Additionally, they must seek out

opportunities or synergy in the relationships

among the components o the joint orce and

with interagency and international partners.

ETHiCAllY sEnsiTivE AnD MoRAllY BEYonD REpRoACH

Our nation holds its servicemembers to a high

moral and ethical standard. The American people

expect ethical conduct rom military proessionals

because o shared Constitutional values, standards

set by national and international laws, and the mili-

tarys oaths o ealty and service. Because the nature

o confict presents constant moral challenges with

the added burden o lie and death implications,

leaders must maintain an ethical climate in their

units. This is a particular challenge in irregular war-

are, where troops are oten obligated to choose theriskier course o action in order to minimize harm

to noncombatants.7 Central to this charge is the

warrior ethos, which distinguishes the honorable

warrior rom the mere ghter or criminal.

pRoFEssionAloFFiCERs in THEsERviCE oFTHE nATion

Sag Codos: Ed Sae:

pHYsiCAllY AnDMoRAllY soUnD

lEADERsHip linEs oF opERATions (llo)

21St CEntury OiCErShip

pressna

r grus

Oerana

Fcused

ehca

Sense

S uana

Inegen

Orened

Nans needs

a was

Learnng

Figure 1


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Military leaders provide a visible example o ethi-cal standards, translating cherished values into

esteemed military virtues by their actions and

decisions, and by creating operating procedures

that serve as controls against violations. The values

o the nation and the proession are not negotiable:

Violations are not mistakes, they are ailures in the

undamentals o the proession.

siTUATionAllY inTElliGEnT AnD CUlTURAllY AwARE

Todays operational context demands a markedly

improved set o language and cultural capabili-

ties and capacities. Greater language and cultural

prociency is predicated upon the need or close

interaction with oreign governments, inter-

national organizations, and indigenous orces.

Similarly, increased emphasis on security, engage-

ment, and relie and reconstruction activities

implies extensive interaction with indigenous

agencies and populations. In certain ways, the

uture will be dened less by technology and more

by culture-centric warare where knowledge gained

through the humanities and social sciences will be

o great importance.8

oRiEnTED on THE nATions nEEDs

Civilian control o the military is the hallmark o

democratic societies, and military proessionals

operate with that knowledge and commitment.

Recent scholarship suggests that some ocers donot share this perspective. In one survey, nearly 35

percent o military ocers agreed with the state-

ment that, Members o the military should be

allowed to publicly express their political views

just like any other citizen. Nearly 65 percent

believed strongly or somewhat strongly with the

statement that, It is proper or the military to

advocate publicly the military policies it believes

are in the best interest o the United States.9

Some ocers believe that military advisors should

go beyond advising and seek advocacy roles, insideand outside the ocial policy channels, on matters

o military orce including rules o engagement,

political and military goals, what kinds and num-

bers o units are employed, and determining an

exit strategy.10

U.S. military culture should hold ast to the

Marshall ideal by ull ling its obligation to

provide proessional advice, but not to engage

in policy debates beyond its legitimate role.

Advocacy by military ocials weakens the pro-

ession by creating the perception o sel-interest

vis--vis the national interest. When the ocer

corps orgets this or loses sight o its proper role

and the underlying ethic, it unwittingly cedes its

legitimate authority and precious credibility.

AlwAYs lEARninG

In a recent document issued by the Joint Forces

Command about the uture operating environ-

ment, this observation was made:

The ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt

during wars requires institutional and individualagility. This agility is the product o rigorous

education, appropriate applications o technol-

ogy and a rich understanding o the social and

political context in which military operations are

conducted. But above all, innovation and adapta-

tion require imagination and the ability to ask

the right questions.11

U.S. military culture

should hold ast to the

Marshall ideal by ullling

its obligation to provide

proessional advice, but not

to engage in policy debates

beyond its legitimate role.


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However, American ocers do not have a particu-larly rich history o embracing a rigorous study o

history or identiying enduring themes o human

interaction in confict. Even within the military,

the ocus on technology oten trumps consider-

ation o the human dimension o confict. Far too

oten we have envisioned the conduct o uture

confict without consideration or a thinking

adversary whose culture and national mindset are

oten the most important considerations in devel-

oping strategy a atal faw in modern modes o

irregular warare.

The current operating environment imposes new

demands on leaders that require careul atten-

tion to individual and unit adaptability, actors

enhanced through mental simulation and ormal

education, which create the cognitive accumula-

tion o long-term experiences.

ofcerh Ctet: pertetirreguar warareLeadership in persistent irregular warare is par-

ticularly demanding, owing to the presence o anactive insurgency amongst a host population. The

existence o an active insurgency implies a very

ragile government or the breakdown o civic order.

It also implies a social system that cannot adequately

meet the needs o its populace. The environmental

conditions ocers ace include numerous leader-

ship, political-military and situational ambiguities,

as well as the traditional moral challenges posed by

the threat or use o lethal means. It also includes

greater interaction with oreign populations, and

more decentralized (and less supervised) activities.These conditions can be corrosive to some military

discipline and ethical decision making. Positive

action must be taken to counter these eects beore

rustration leads some to orget the principles or

which they are ghting.12

Typically, counterinsurgency operations require

highly decentralized leadership, with small unit

leaders operating within the intent o but with-out direct supervision rom a physically remote

commander. This places a premium on eective

small unit leadership because these units are oten

the point o contact between U.S. orces and the

local population. As result, they must exercise

interpersonal skills that enable them to organize

varied entities which are not under their authority.

Predictably these operations sometimes encoun-

ter unexpected violence, which requires deviating

rom rules governing security operations to those

o traditional combat. Leaders who nd themselvesengaged in ruthless combat, on complex terrain,

and against enemies who melt back into the popu-

lation must demonstrate signicant mental and

emotional fexibility and physical stamina to main-

tain ocus on desired outcomes. In these sudden

transitions rom static deensive posture or routine

patrols to intense bursts o combat, the capability

to preserve unit cohesiveness is at a premium.

There are enormous pressures to do otherwise and

to take the most expedient actions, but this is where

ocers must maintain the ethical climate o their

units and prevent subordinates rom giving in to

emotions. Constant reminders that expedient acts are

too oten short-term solutions that generate greater

harm over the long haul are critical, and the most

eective commanders are those who can show great

empathy or their troops while being stern enorcers

o ethical guidelines and rules o engagement.

Operational adaptation is todays imperative.13

Irregular opponents test or seams in institutional

paradigms and mental models, and will exploitany lapses or gaps. These non-traditional conficts

are tests o will and competitions in learning and

agility. I there is one institutional and individual

advantage to be sought over uture opponents, it is

winning the learning and adaptation competition

inherent to irregular wars.


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imcatFrom initial screening through senior proes-

sional military education, rom Ocer Candidate

School through senior leader development, the U.S.

military must continue to build thinking, decisive,

innovative ocers. They must be imbued with ini-

tiative and empowered to act within the construct

o commanders intent and in the ace o poten-

tially chaotic situations. Currently, however, the

U.S. military does not have the supporting person-

nel management systems to create and retain this

level o proessionalism: I we expect to developand sustain a military that operates at a higher

level o strategic and operational understanding,

then the time has come to address the recruiting,

education, training, and promotion systems so that

they are consistent with the intellectual require-

ments or the uture joint orce.14 Our training

and education programs must accurately refect the

situations, environments and peoples that Service

members will ace and interact with.

New and complex operational environments createan imperative or more eective junior ocers who

must be properly trained to make the right decisions

in ambiguous and demanding situations where

ailure to act properly can have ar-reaching strategic

consequences. These ocers must be prepared or

complex conditions, and must have the tactical

acumen to develop and assess these conditions.

The highly diverse range o situations anticipated

or joint orces will put a premium on leaders who

can respond quickly and fexibly to the unex-

pected, regardless o operational requirements.

Leaders at every level must become comortable

with ambiguity, capable o acting on their own

authority, and have an appreciation or the broader

implications o their actions.

The militarys longstanding rhetorical commit-

ment to mission command must incorporate

commitments to inormation-sharing through

all ranks, granting discretion to subordinates,and encouraging a culture more tolerant o errors

o commission than errors o omission. Services

should recruit men and women who show promise

in these attributes, and reward leaders who acquire

and demonstrate these skills. And proessional

military education (PME) must provide high qual-

ity training and education that acilitates fexible

and creative problem solving.

On the increasingly decentralized and lethal bat-

tleelds that characterize irregular confict, leaders

cannot be developed in a single two- to three-year

operational tour. Rather, services should extend

initial tours or those who demonstrate the great-

est potential to serve in small unit leadership roles

and ensure that incentives are provided to these

combat leaders to return to service in operational

billets in subsequent tours. This will require tailor-

ing our training programs, courses, and exercises

to develop cohesive units led by ocers capable

o critical reasoning and ethical decision making.

Personnel assignment, training, and education

policies must support the imperative o creating

and sustaining these leaders.15

This will also require a signiicant investment in

education, which should increasingly come rom

outside the ormal PME system. The beneits o

civilian graduate school are o relatively greater

importance in this environment. As General

Petraeus has argued, todays oicers would

greatly beneit rom getting beyond their com-

ort zones and out o the proessional cloister in

graduate school:[G]raduate school inevitably helps U.S. military

ocers improve their critical thinking skills.

This is, o course, not just a result o specic

courses designed to develop research and ana-

lytical abilities. Students learn not only rom

books and proessors; they also learn rom each

other. That is also why the intellectual develop-

ment o our ocers is best acilitated by graduate


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programs that do not have too many members othe military in them. Ocers should be repeat-

edly challenged, and they must develop their

own intellectual arguments and positions.16

CcuThe military proessional o the 21st century is

challenged by complex operating environments,

the intelligence o adaptive enemies, and the con-

vergence o threats, contexts and capabilities. The

United States must improve its knowledge o and

capabilities or waging irregular warare because

it is likely to be a major mode o warare or the

oreseeable uture. And in order to accomplish

that objective, the ocer corps must improve

its competencies to plan and execute security,

engagement, relie and reconstruction activities

in dynamic circumstances the ull spectrum o

military operations as central imperatives or

the 21st-century military.


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E N D N o t E S

1 General Charles E. Wilhelm, LtGen Wallace C. Gregson, LtGen Bruce Knutson,

Paul K. Van Riper, Andrew Krepinevich and Williamson Murray, U.S. Marine Corps

Ocer Proessional Military Education 2006 Study(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps

University, 2006): 10.

2 Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5,

Counterinsurgency(Washington, DC: Department o the Army, December 2006).

3 For critical background on the nature o ocership and military proessionalism

see Dr. Don M. Snider, Ocership: The Proessional Practice,Military Review

(January-February. 2003): 3-8; Richard Swain, Refection on an Ethic o

Ocership, Parameters (2007): 4-20.

4 David R. Gray, New Age Military Progressives: U.S. Army Ocer P roessionalism

in the Inormation Age, in William Murray, ed., The Army and Transormation

(Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2001).

5 Robert H. Scales, The Past and Present as Prologue: Future Warare through the

Lens o Contemporary Conicts (Washington, DC: Center or a New American

Security, April 2009).

6 Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, Capstone Concept or Joint Operations, Version 3.0

(Washington, DC: 15 January 2009).

7 Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warghting Publication 3-33.5,

Counterinsurgency(Washington, DC: Department o the Army, December 2006).

8 Robert H. Scales, Culture- centric Warare, Proceedings , (October 2004); On

humanistic education see Jacob Shuord, Reeducation or the 21st Century

Warrior, Proceedings (April 2009): 14-19.

9 Ole R. Hostli, O Chasms and Convergence: Attitudes and Belies o Civilians and

Military Elites at the Start o a New Millennium, in Peter D. Feaver and Richard

D. Kohn, eds.,Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National

Security(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001): 83.

10 Ibid. 86-87.

11 Joint Forces Command, The JOE 2008, 51.

12 For an overview o the challenges o modern irregular warare see David Kilcullen,

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst o a Big One (New York:

Oxord University Press, 2009).

13 Dr. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knie: Counterinsurgency Lessons rom

Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University o Chicago Press, 2005).

14 Joint Forces Command, The JOE 2008, 50.

15 Leonard Wong, Stifed Innovation? Developing Tomorrows Leaders Today,

(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, (April 2002);

Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience o

Operation Iraqi Freedom, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army

War College (July 2004); John Tillson, Waldo Freeman, William Burns, John

Michel, Jack LeCuyer, Robert H. Scales and Robert Worley, Learning to Adapt to

Asymmetric Threats (Alexandria, VA: Institute or Deense Analyses, 2005).

16 David H. Petraeus, Beyond the Cloister, The American Interest(July/August 2007),

http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cm?Id=290&MId=1.


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Chapter IV:

REBAlANCiNG tHE NAvAl oFFiCER CoRpS

By Cata Mark R. Hagertt, Usn


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REBA lA NCiNG tHE NA vA lo F F i C E R C o R p S

Caan Mark R. Hager, USN

At the dawn o the second decade o the 21stcentury, the challenges or national security have

become more complex. New threats and missions

have emerged, and new geographical regions have

ascended in importance. Yet traditional orms

o warare persist. To eectively ace these threat

categories, the naval ocer corps must broaden

the range o skills and knowledge among its mem-

bers. At the same time, there is a persistent need

to ensure an integrated unity o eort across this

increasingly divergent spectrum o operations. And

that places a premium on a call or ocers whocan acilitate greater intra-service, inter-service,

interagency, and international cooperation.1

In response to this evolving environment, the

Navy has upgraded its educational and personnel

systems, although the responsiveness o ocer

development training has been uneven. While

highly specialized single platorm training is

consistently rst rate, the training o linguists,

oreign area experts, and cyber operations special-

ists is moving slowly. Additionally, the supply o

ocers who can integrate and cooperate across

organizati

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