Fillion - Foucault After Hypolite

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The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2005) Vol. XLIl l

Foucault after Hyppolite:Toward an A-Theistic TheodicyRdal FillionUniversityof Sudbury

Michel Foucaults most significant contribution is the way inwhich he ha s thoug ht confront i ts historically constit uteddiscursive conditions. In this, he can-and should-be seen asparticipating in a long-standing tradition of thinking that goesback t o Hegel. The importance of Hegel for twentieth-centuryFrench philosophy is well known (along with H usserl an dHeidegger). Although emphasis is usually placed on th e influ-ence of Alexandre Kojeves lectures, a recent work by BruceBaughl ha s both widened and sharpened the focus on Hegelsreception in France by privileging the impact of Jean Wahls L em a l h e u r d e l a c o n sc ie n ce d u n s la p h i l o s o p h i e d e H e g e L 2 IfKojeves reading of Hegel remains focused on the dialectic of themas ter and slave, Wahls readin g stress es the unhappy con-sciousness and the divided self. Baugh successfully shows howHegels description of how a reality divided against itselfcontinually passes from one opposed term to the other, withoutfinding repose o r reconciliation, constitutes a dominant themein French philosophy from the 1920s up to the p r e ~ e n t . ~hisemphasis on the unhappy consciousness is in effect a refusal ofthe dialectical synthesis t hat otherwise characterizes Hegelsthough t. What un ite s much of twentieth-century philosophy,according t o Baugh-from existentia lism an d surre al ism t opostmodernism-is an ant i-finalism, a denial of any ultimatet e l o s that would allow one to overcome divisions and to

Real Fi l l ion i s As s i s tan t Professor of phi loso phy a t th e Un ivers i tyof Sudb ury , Su dbur y , O ntar io , Can ada . H is research in teres t s inc ludeContemp orary French Phi losophy and His tor iography , the Phi losophyof H i s to r y a n d M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . R e c e n t p u b l i c a t io n s i n c l u d eFreedom, Resp onsib i l i ty , an d the Am erican Foucault (Philosophy &Social Criticism 20041, Lldee de l his toire che z M iche l Fo uca ult(Science et espirit 2003), F o u c au l t o n H i s to r y a n d t h e S e l f n a v a ltheologique et philosophique 1998).

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Real Fillionunder stan d them a s inte rrel ated moments of a fully realized t ~ t a l i t y . ~ne well recognizes Foucault here. If, like Hegel,Foucault is concerned with exploring philosophys relation tohistory, it i s not in order t o describe Spirits ultimate recon-ciliation with i tself, but ra th er to trace the d ispersa ls an ddeployments of systems of t h ~ u g h t . ~ne might even be temptedto see in Wahls development a distant image of Foucaults ownstruggle. Wahls initial claim was that the truth of Hegel is tobe found not in the E n c y c l o p e d i a s desiccated res ul ts of th edialectic, but in the striving and pathos of the dialectical move-ment itself, which corresponds t o consciousness se arch forreconciliation with i tse lf; however, a s Baugh notes, Wahlhimself later rejected as illusory the Hegelian attempt to recon-cile existence through speculative thought, and so turned awayfrom the mediation of the Begr i f f and the dialectic based on it.6One might read th e development of Foucaults archaeologicaland then genealogical approaches in a similar light.However, as Baugh also notes, Wahls influence on Foucaultwas indirect, passin g thro ugh Jea n Hyppolite. I t will be myclaim that th is passage via the work of Hyppolite is crucial ifwe ar e properly to un de rst an d Foucaults place within th edevelopment of French philosophy. Further, an appreciation ofFoucaults debt t o Hyppolite will help us better understand thenature of his own work t ak en on its own. I will arg ue th a tFoucaults work should be seen in the light of his own apprecia-tion of Hyppolites reading of the significance of Hegels thoughtfo r our understanding of the relation between philosophy andhistory, indeed, fo r our understanding of what is meant by th ephilosophy of history. Focusing on the relation between Foucaultand Hyppolite requires that we abandon the view that Foucaultis an e s s e n t i a l l y anti-Hegelian philosopher (in the way th a tDeleuze can be said t o be). Foucaults concern with history runstoo deep. Focusing on this relation, though, leads me to questionBaughs claim at the end of his work th at Foucault (a lbeitafter a long struggle th a t Baugh ably describes) has, with hisgenealogical inn ovatio ns, moved us beyond Hegel an d,togeth er wit h Deleuze, inau gur ate [d] a new conception ofhistorical reason, concerned with establishing the singularity ofevents, an d the limitatio ns and possibilities f o r historicallydetermined perspective^."^ Baugh of course is quite right t hatFoucault stru ggl ed with Hegels conceptions of teleologicaldevelopment, necessity, and dialectical synthesis, as well aswith the ideal of reconciliation. Bu t t his struggle, and th estakes of th e struggle, he learned from Hyppolite who himselfwas firmly engaged in it. And Foucault learned from Hyppolitethat this struggle was ongoing, ju st as history is ongoing. Thus,thi s paper sugg ests th at we tar ry a while longer with th isstruggle that attempts t o understand the place of history withinphilosophy and philosophys place within history and rather

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Foucault after Hyppolitethan follow Baugh and place Foucault beyond Hegel, we willconsider the place he created for himself after Hyppolite.

Foucault expressed his indebtedness to Hyppolite on a numberof occasions, the most notable of which was surely his inaugurallecture a t th e College de France on December 2, 1970. Indeed,the Chair of th e History of Systems of Thought was created t oreplace the vacancy left by Hyppolites death. Foucault beginsth at lecture in wha t is the premier intellectual institution ofFrance by suggesting th at ra ther th an begin a new discoursehe would have preferred t o slip into a discourse already underway, pronounced by a nameless voice, allowing Foucault simplyto enmesh myself in i t , takin g u p its cadence, an d t o lodgemyself, when no one was looking, in its interstices as if it hadpaused a n inst ant , in suspense, t o beckon me.*At the end ofhis elocution, he r eturns to this idea, this voice, at th e begin-ning nameless, t ha t he now acknowledges as being the voice ofHyppolite.Hyppolite was the teacher responsible fo r bringing Foucaultto philo~ ophy ,~nd this encounter with philosophy was in effectan encounter with t he philosophy of history. I t is within t hi scontext, that of the possibility and need for the philosophy ofhistory, that Foucaults work can most fruitfully be read. And Iam taking here the idea of philosophy of history in its originalVoltairian sense as a con tras t to a ll theological un der -standings of history. That is, if a theological interpretation ofhistory is concerned with how our actions in this world relate t oGods ul tim ate plan f o r us, a philosophical inte rpr eta tion ofhistory is concerned with whether o r not ther e is any dis-cernible plan or meaning in what we accomplish in this world.Indeed, the development of a concern for a philosophy of historyfrom th e eighteenth century onwards was precisely a concernwith the importance and significance, with the in te l l ig ib i l i ty , ofour experience of th e lived world. I t expressed a concern withwhat was perceived to be the mo vemen t of this lived world, withi ts development. The philosophy of history wanted to under-sta nd tha t movement, and i t was motivated to do so out of itscommitment to rationality, to seeing in the actions of hum anbeings more than what Kant called the idiotic course of thingshuman, th at is, the pa st seen as everything in the largewoven together from folly, childish vanity, even from childishmalice and destructiveness.1In other words, it is my suggestion th at it is important toread Foucault as struggling with the figure of Hegel, wrestlingwith hi s vision of Reason and History and, in t he end, a sattempting to continue the transformation already under wayin Hyppolites readings of Hegels works. I will characterize thistransformation a s one th at can perhaps best be understood as

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Real Fillionthe a ttempt ed art icula tion of a n a-theistic theodicy. A theodicybecause, as will be discussed fu rthe r below, th is is how Hegelultimately describes th e project of th e philosophy of history,which t rac es th e recognition of th e process of developmentwhich th e Idea ha s passed through in realiz ing itself-i.e. th eIdea of Freedom, whose reali ty is the consciousness of Freedoman d not hing sho rt of it. However, much more explicitly ( o rmuch less ambiguously) th an in Hegel, such a theodicy must beunderstood a-theistically (not atheistically; we a re not con-cerned with denying the exis tence of God, not even withaffirming his nonexistence-but only recognizing th e aff irma-tion tha t God is dead) , tha t is, it is a theodicy t ha t does notmake reference t o the plenitude afforded by the notion of Godand is intent on avoiding all eschatological temptations whencontemplating ( o r attempting t o comprehend) th is best of allpossible worlds (i.e., the actual world).

*Hyppolites primary concern, Foucault tel ls us, and in this he issurel y ri ght, is ou r rela tion to Hegels philosophy. Wh at ismeant here by our relation is contemporary philosophy o r thepossibility of philosophy today. What is meant by philosophytoday is , I will sugg est, not a part icular discipl ine but theat tempt t o comprehend the world. I t is in thi s sense th at forHyppolite, according t o Foucault, the relationship with Hegelwas th e scene of a n experiment, of a confrontation in which itwas neve r certai n t hat philosophy would come out on top. Henever saw the Hegelian system a s a reassuring universe; hesaw in it the field in which philosophy took the ultimate risk.12But why should the at tempt to comprehend the worldphilosophically be considered a n ulti ma te risk? A risk forwhat? For philosophy? Or for reason? If Hegels attempt fails,does that signal the end of philosophy a s a relevant and fruitfulente rprise? Or more radically, does it announce th e fad ing ofany hope of having reason rule the world?Hyppolites work brings out th e fund amen tal pat hos a t theh e a r t of Hegels philosophical achievem ent by tra cki ng i tsambiguities, and he does this, according to Foucault , byshifting the senses or directions tha t Hegel himself seems t ohave given his work, which results i n what Foucault calls theinversion of five themes running through Hegels work.First theme: rathe r th an a tot al comprehension, philosophybecomes for Hyppolites Hegel a n u nend ing t u s k against thebackground of a n infinite horizon. Philosophys work is nevercomplete and always begins anew given over to th e forms ofparadoxes and repetitions.3

Second theme: given this background, the them e of a nachieved, completed, or accomplished self-consciousness becomest ha t of a repeated interrogation that constantly draws philos-82


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Foucault after Hyppolitetoo, Foucault comes aft er H yppo lite who, according toFoucault, did not see himself as a historian of philosophy butspoke rather of the history of philosophical thought , adistinction wherein one can find the singularity and scope ofhis e n d e a v o ~ r . ~ ~y insisting on this notion of philosophicalthought, Hyppolite was insi sting on th at which, within anysystem-no matt er how complete in appearance-overflowsfrom it , exceeds it , and pu ts i t in a relation of both exchangean d default with philosophy itself; philosophical though t wasnot for Hyppolite th e intuition of a system, its unformulatedintimacy; it was its incompleteness, the debt he could neverrepay, the space his propositions could never fill; that which,in i t s pursui t , a lways remains despi te being taken up byp h i l o ~ o p h y . ~ ~nd thus, within t hi s philosophical thought orphilosophical thi nki ng which Hyppolite would tr ace an doutline and explore, one realizes through Hyppolite, philos-ophy itself is never actualized or present in any discourse ortext; tha t, in fact, philosophy does not ex ist; ra th er it hollowsout through it s perpetual absence all philosophies, it installswithin them the lack th at they incessantly pursue, continue,disappear, follow and remain fo r th e historian suspended andto be taken up.25Foucault , th en , through Hyppolite, continues this ques-tioning of philosophy, of the very presence of philosophy in andthrough the writing of history, which, in effect, describesphilosophys very condition of possibility, th at is, those systemsof thought th at reveal thoughts machinery, its discontinuoussystematicities26and trace a t the very root of thought theelements of chance, discontinuity, and material it^.^^ Foucault,afte r Hyppolite, radicalizes thoughts rela tion t o itself byradicalizing its relation to its historical manifestations.This is not, however, merely historicism. Nor does it lenditself to the sociology of knowledge. This is not about man andhis activities. Foucault does not abandon philosophy in favor ofsome other project. Recall above, in connection with Disciplineand Punish and his discussion with historians, th at he saw hiswork as producing philosophical fragments, th a t is, we cannow see, fragments of philosophy within systems of thoughtwhose ordering and deployment go beyond the synthesizingefforts of any single mind, even Hegels.But like Hegel, and like Hyppolite, Foucault knows thatphilosophy, if i t is to continue philosophizing (and if philosophyis anything i t is the effort to continue philosophizing as Socratesand Nietzsche have shown us), it must confront th e history th atis i ts very condition of possibility. Foucault, in his own work,exemplifies Hyppolites second Hegelian theme, that of trans-forming, through philosophical effort, any achieved or completeself-consciousness into a repeated interrogation. This interroga-tion takes on many forms throughout his career but situates

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Real Fillioni tself fair ly clear ly and consis tent ly at a cer tain l eve l ofdiscourse that Foucault cal ls k n o w l e d g e ( s a u o i r ) which issituated between opinion and scientific knowledge (connaissancesc ien t i f iq u e) . In the document he submitted for the position atth e College de France, Foucault gives a brief description of theobject of investigation tha t gradually took sha pe through hisspecific concern with the interes ting and seemingly paradoxicalquestion of how we might have formulated the project ofknowing madness (which culminated of course in his M a d n e s sa n d C i v i l i z a t i o n ) . Through his concrete investigations of howthe mad were recognized, isolated, excluded from society,interned and tr eated ; which institu tions were destined t o houseand retain them-sometimes to care for them; which authoritiespronounced the m mad and according t o what criteria; whichmethods were adopted for constraining them, punishing t hem,or heal ing the m, Foucault gradually came t o discern thedel ineation of wha t would become his object of investigation:the networks ( r e s e a u x ) of knowledge in ves ted in complexinstitu tional systems.28But if th is descr ibes (a t th a t point ) h is object ofinvestigation, and t he level of discourse at which he situat edhimself, it is his p h i l o s o p h i c a l quest ionin g of it th a t b ringshim back t o Hyppolite-and Hegel. We will recal l t h e fir stinversion Hyppolite effects with rega rd t o Hegels a tt em pt toconceive philosophy as a totali ty capable of thinking itself, theidea of though t thinking itself through its very movement is tohave thought or philosophy conceive itself as a n unending taskset against an infinite horizon. It is within this context th atone must under stand Foucaults claim th at he has i n his workproduced p h i lo s o p h ic a l f r a g m e n t s put t o work in a historicalf i e ld of problems. That is, I want to suggest th at Foucault hastaken up Hyppolites-and Hegels-challenge of making senseof history, of having this as philosophys princ ipal ta sk withthe proviso t ha t philosophy unders tand itself as a task and nota result. Philosophys purpose is not to describe or to under-stand an independently existing reality, nor is it t o attempt toconstruct o r constitute th at reality; rather, it m ust make senseof it s unfolding. Of course, for Foucau lt, th at unfolding doesnot reveal o r display o r signa l a n in creas ing self-conscious-ness; rathe r , he refuses thi s par t icul ar speculat ive move.Foucault, like Hegel, is concerned with tho ught, but un likeHegel, he is not concerned with Spi rit. (Indeed, his rejection ofHegel is largely a rejection of the idea of spirit and not arejection of philosophys task of making sense of history.)Foucault comes aft er Hyppolite, but he also comes af ter Marxan d Nietzsche. After Marx, life de termines consciousness an dnot th e oth er way aroun d, and after Nietzsche, life mus t belived without God.

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Foucault after Hyppolite*

I am suggest ing th at Foucaults insis te nt a nd creat iveattemp ts to m a k e s e n se of history, that is, to render our worldin te l l ig ib le through an examination of it s historical unfolding(or systematicite s) should be se en as a continuation ratherth an a rejection of the Hegelian attempt t o inhabit a reason-able world. Indeed, I have suggested th at we could, with profit,appr eciate Foucaults various projects a s an a ttem pte d a -theis t ic theod icy in t hat, like all theodicies, they refuse to giveup t he world t o senselessness, to see it as without purpose anddirection. Of course, Foucaults theodicy is a- theis t ic in that i tmak es no claim to an u l t i m a t e purpose or direction for theworld (hence Foucaults phi losophical f r a g m e n t s 1. How ever,despite th e dea th of God, th e world does not sink in to mean-inglessness an d purposelessness. On the contrary, wh at h ashappened is th at meaning and purpose have been re lea sedfrom the dictates of any ul t i mate guarantor . What we a refaced with is a proliferation of purposes and meanings with noclear way of evaluating them. It is t h i s situation th at we needt o mak e sen se of-a world wit h proliferating meanings an dpurposes, not one that lacks meaning or purpose. This is th eworld that Foucaults thought tackles by trying t o render itnot meaningful ( i t i s a l ready rent wi th meaning) butintelligible.29In other words, we need to see Foucaults efforts as fittingsquarely within what Leonard Lawlor has recently described asthe H y p p ol it e m i d d l e , th at is , the investigat ive space asdelimited by Foucault between a phenomenology of pre-discur-sive experience and an epistemology of philosophicalwhich, following Hyppolites Logic a n d E ~ i s t e n c e , ~ ~s intent onkee pin g th e focus on working ou t a logic of sen se whe reimmanence is ~o rn pl et e. ~ ~nd for Foucault, like Hegel, com-prehending immanence as complete is comprehending history.Throughout his oeuvre , Foucault demonstrates th is compre-hension of history. However, for many, his essay Nietzsche,Genealogy, History provides the most succinct expression of hisdistinct understanding of history. What is less often noted isthat the text was included in a volume entitled H o m m a g e hJ e a n H y p p ~ l i t e , ~ ~nd one cannot help but think t ha t the choiceof its tit le is a wink t o wh at Deleuze, ano ther of Hyppolitesstudents, describes as the way their teacher rhythmically beatout Hegelian tr iad s with his fist, hang ing his words on thebeat....34 And indeed, it is the third and final note tha t isdecisive-history. To be su re , Foucault take s us the re viaNietzsche and th e concept of genealogy, but in this hommage,it is Hyppolites reworking of fund am enta l Hegelian t hemesth at fuels Foucaults efforts a t questioning the actuality of the

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Real FillionIt is this questioning of the actuality of the world through anexamination and articulation of its historicality that allows ust o think of Foucaults work as an attempted a-theistic theodicy.I do not suggest this term out of oxymoronic mischief butbecause I believe it captures something of the movement ofFoucaults thought as i t ma kes use of history and historio-graphy. Indeed, associating t he idea of theodicy with history,which is basic to Hegels thought, is already to move theodicy inan a-theistic direction. Traditionally (and still today in analyticphilosophy), theodicies concern themselves with the justificationof evil in a world purportedly created by a benevolent and all-powerful God. (If there is evil, then God is perhaps good but notall-powerful, o r all-powerful bu t not good.) However if, likeHegel, one thinks about what is manifest in th e world withoutreference to a personal God (i.e., th e personal at tr ib ut es of

goodness and potency), then wha t needs justification is not s omuch evil as it is senselessness. That is, sense must be made ofthat which appears senseless. Hence, Hegel calls his philosophyof history th e tru e theodicy. The sensele ssness th a t consi-deration of the world reveals, that slaughterbench on which thehappiness of peoples, the wisdom of states and th e vir tue ofindividuals were sacrificed36 for Hegel is redeemed, notthrough passive contemplation from a divine standpoint, butthrough the active exercise of reason-of making sense-thathistory can also reveal when the passions t ha t feed history a retra nsfi gur ed by philosophy int o th e contem plation of th eprocess of development of th e Idea of Freedom. The complaintsth at his view of history is too abstract and schematic miss thepoint of working out a philosophy of history whose ta sk is t ohelp us make sense of the world and not merely submit to it.He tells us ( t o complete a quote introduced earli er) th at :Philosophy concerns itself only with the glory of the Ideamirroring itself in t he History of the World. Philosophy escapesfrom the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface ofsociety into the calm region of contemplat ion; th at whichin te rests it is th e recognition of the process of developmentwhich th e Idea ha s passed through in realizing itself-ie. th eIdea of Freedom, whose reality is the consciousness of Freedomand nothing short of it.37Clearly, Foucaults work does not seek to celebrate thegrandeur of Hegels vision. However, I am arguing tha t he doesnot in fact abandon it , o r seek to replace it. Rather, he continuesits inflexion, star ted by Hyppolite, by refusing the speculativepresumption of Philosophy with a capital P of escaping fromthe weary strife of passions t ha t agitate the surface of societyinto the calm region of contemplation in order to havephilosophy confront more directly history and the strife thatcharacterizes i t . I think this is how we need to understandFoucaults contribution to the Hommage a Je an Hyppolite: he

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Foucault after Hyppolitehas taken up a figure of philosophical thought-a practice dearto his teacher3* in this case, Nietzsche, and demonstrates howthis figures concept of genealogy can contribute t o the task ofhaving philosophy confront the weary strife of history ra th erthan escape from it by showing th a t his tory has a moreimpor tant task than t o be a handmaiden t o philosophy torecount th e necessary bir th of t ru th and values ; i t shouldbecome a differential knowledge ( co n n a i ssa n ce)of energies andfailings, heights and degenerations, poisons and antidotes. Itstask is to become a curative science.39One sees immediatelyFoucaults own forays into such historical fields of problems asinspired by these genealogical considerations. But we will recallth a t h is works a re not simply historical treatises, even ifgenealogically conceived, but are in fact philosophical frag-ments,, that is, pieces of p h i lo so p h y , which following Hyppolite(following Hegel), attempt to comprehend immanence ascomplete. In other words, I read Foucaults work as a continua-tion of Hegels work by other means. His also is a finite attemptt o make sense of history as a n infinitely unfolding process.However, the difference with Hegel is that Foucault placeshimself more squarely w i t h i n that process as opposed t osituating himself a t it s end. (Of course, we are always in somesense at the end of history because the future forever liesahead of us.)But Foucaults work can be seen as a continuation ofHyppoliteEIegel even more precisely insofar a s it is also (partly)motivated, like Hegels philosophy, by the desire to make senseof th e idea of freedom. Th at is, ra th er t han merely affirm o rdeny freedom, either trea ting it as a postulate or an illusion, hiswork shows how it is revealed t h r o u g h the working out of th eintelligible structures of th e world as they manifest themselveshistorically (i.e., both continuously and discontinuously). This isespecially evident in his use of the notion of power-re la t ions . I tis the notion of power-relations that will ( f o r a time) mediatethe endless task of mak ing sen se of thi s world as i t is setagainst its infinite horizon. It is within the notion of power-relations that the unfolding of history is to be renderedintelligible. By understanding our attempts to make sense ofthe world within power-relations, Foucault i s trying to si tuat eour freedom in terms as concrete as the world as we experienceit and struggle with it. Here, too, Foucault is following (but alsosubverting) the Hegelian understanding of history. Th at is,because Foucault is not concerned with Philosophy with acapital P, and because he is not concerned with t he relation ofconsciousness to Spirit, his account of freedom and the recog-nition of freedom take on a different form. Through thisconcept, he means t o place the recognition of th e possibility offreedom w i t h i n the weary strife of history. Th at i s th e point ofcharacterizing our relations as power-relations. A power

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NotesBruce Baugh, Frertch Hege l: From Su rre al i s m to Pos tm odernismJe an Wahl, Le m a l h e u r d e l a c o ns ci en c e d a n s l a p h il o s o p h ie d eBaugh, French Hegel , 2.Ibid., 6.We will recall th at t he Chair th at Foucault held a t the College deFranc e was given t he ti tle of Chair of th e Histo ry of Systems ofThought.

(New York: Routledge, 2003).

Hegel (Paris: Rieder, 1929).

t Baugh, French Hegel , 24.Ibid., 172.Michel Foucaul t, The Discourse on Language in The Arc hae o-logy of Knowle dge , tr ans. A. M. Sheridon Sm ith (New York: Har pe r &Row, 19761, 215.According to his biographer, D. Eribon, a young eighteen-year-oldFoucault freshly arrived in Par is would have fallen under th e spell ofHyppolite and philosophy because of their ability to make sense ofhistory. Cf. D. Eribon, Michel Foucault (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 34.

lo Immanuel Kant, O n Hi s tory, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrll, 1963), 12.I G. W. F. Hegel, Th e Ph i losophy of His tory , t rans . J. Sibree (NewYork: Dover, 19561, 457. And in th e l as t p aragraph Hegel says: th is isthe true Theodicea, the justification of God in History.l2 Foucault, The Discourse on Language, 236.l 3 Ibid.l4 Ibid.Ibid., my emphasis.l6 Ibid., my emphasis.Ibid., 7.On Foucaults impact on historical writing, cf. Paul Veyne,Foucault Revolutionizes History, tra ns . Ca therine Porter in Foucaul ta n d h i s In t e r l o c u t o r s, ed. Arnold Davidson (Chicago: Uni ver sit y ofChicago Press, 1997).l9 Essent ia l Works of Michel F oucaul t, 1954 -1984, vol. 3 (New York:The New Press, 20001, 224.2o Cf. Frangois Fure t, I n t he W ork shop of His tory , t rans . JonathanMandelbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).21 Je an Hyppolite, In t ro duc t ion t o Hegel s Ph i losophy of H i s t o r y ,

trans. B. Harris and J. B. Spurlock (Gainesville: University Pre ss ofFlorida, 1996),49.22 Ibid. , 43. Cf. als o Je a n Hyppolite, The Concept of Life andConsciousness of Life in Hegels J en a Philosophy, in S t u d i e s i n M a r xand Hegel (New York: Basic Books, 19691, 3-21.23 Michel Foucault, Jean Hyppolite, 1907-1968,Dits et ecrits, vol. 1(Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 780, my trans lation.24 Ibid. ... ce qui da ns tou t systeme-aussi acheve quil paraisse-le deborde, lexcede, e t le met da ns un rapport a la fois dkchange e t dedefaut avec la philosophie elle-m6me ; la pensee philosophique, cenetait pas, pour lui, lintuition premiere dun systeme, son intim iteinformulee; cetait son inachevement, la dette quil ne parvient ja ma is

a acquitter, le blanc quaucune de se s propositions ne pourra ja ma iscouvrir; ce pa r quoi, auss i loin quil se poursuive, il demeure en reste

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Real Fillionpa r rapport a l a philosophie.

25 Ibid. .. la philosophie nest jam ais actualisee ni presente da nsauc un discours ni a ucu n texte; qua vra i dir e la philosophie nexistepas ; quelle creuse plut8t de sa perpetuelle absence toutes lesphilosophies, quelle inscr it en elles le m anque ou san s cesse elles sepoursuivent, s e continuent, disparaissent, se succedent, et demeurentpour lhistorien dans un suspens ou il lui faut les reprendre.

26 Foucault, Discourse on Language.27 Thi s i s especially evid ent in Foucaults Nietzsche, Genealogy,History, revised trans lation in Essential Works of Michel Foucault,1954-1984,vol. 2 (New York: Th e New Press, 1998), 367-91. We will

return to thi s essay below.2H Foucault, T itres et travaux, Dits et ecrits, vol. 1,p. 842.29 An a-theistic theodicy also suggests th at , although we cannot beconcerned wit h Gods jus tic e ( which of cours e is t he etymologicalsignificance of th e word theodicy), th e concern with jus tic e does notautomatically devolve to Manor human justice. R ather the concernis with the s t ruc tura l and sys temat ic deployment of jus t icesunderstood historically. As Foucaul t puts it: Huma nit y does not

gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universalreciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanityinstalls each of it s violences in a system of rules a nd t hu s proceedsfrom domination to domination (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 378).30 Leonard Lawlor, Thi nki ng Through French Philosophy: The Being

of the Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20031, 12.3 1 Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, tra nsl ate d by L. Lawlor an d A.Sen (New York: St at e University of New York Press, 1997).32 Lawlor, Thin king Through French Philosophy, 12; Hyppolite,

Logic and Existence, 176. Such a focus, according to Lawlor, charac-teriz es all of what he calls the great Fr ench philosophy from th eSixties (Foucault, Derr ida, Deleuze), wit h as it s principal problem:how to conceive, within immanence , the difference between logic andexistence (th e Logos a nd ti me), str uct ure a nd genesis, thoug ht a ndexperience, the said an d th e un sai d, monument an d soul, philosophyan d non-philosophy (Lawlor, Th ink ing Through French Philosophy,12).33 Foucault , ed. , Hommage a Jean Hyppol i te (Par is : Pressesuniversitaires de France, 1971).34 G. Deleuze a nd Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinsonan d Barb ara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987),

12; quoted i n Baugh, French Hegel (London: Routledge, 20031, 188 n45.35 For an excellent discussion of this essay as i t rela tes to Hyppolitean d to Fre nch philosophy generally, cf. Lawlors Thinking ThroughFrench Philosophy, especially th e section enti tle d Foucaults Thr eeGrea t Concepts: Metaphysics, th e Actual, an d Genealogy, 15-20.36 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, as quoted in Joseph McCarney,Hegel on History (London: Routledge, 2000), 199. McCarney provides agood discussion of Hegels theodicy in th e final chap ter of thi s work,195-220.37 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 457.3R In th e same year of the Hommage, a two-volume collection of

Hyppolites studies of various thin ker s was published under th e titleFigures de la penske philosophiq ue (Paris: Presses universitaires deFrance, 1971).

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Foucault af ter Hyppolite39 Foucaul t, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 382.40 The Subject an d Power in Essent ia l Works of Michel Foucault ,1954-1984, vol. 3 (New York:The New Press, 2000),340.41 Ibid., 342.42 Ibid.43 Truth and Power in Essent ia l Works of Michel Foucault , 1954-1984 , 116.

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