Figure 1. Maps of Israel with location of Ein Shemer · 1 Dear Mr. Aart Brouw 2 February 2010...

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1 Dear Mr. Aart Brouw 2 February 2010 Subject: A case of influenza H5N1 in a broiler breeder pullet flock in Ein Shemer Following is a description of the case and the measures we have taken up to this point: Avian Influenza H5N1 was detected in a 115 days old broiler breeder pullet flock in Ein Shemer (see location in Figure 1) which is in Haifa province in Hadera district. Figure 1. Maps of Israel with location of Ein Shemer Description of the farm: The flock was housed in a high biosecurity farm. The farm is enclosed by a fence and the only access is via a sanitary facility (shower and changing all clothes in and out). The distances from the sanitary facility to the entrances of the poultry houses are between 50 and 100 meters. The farm consists of three adjacent environmentally and light controlled poultry houses (Figure 2). Each poultry house is divided into four rooms. The disease was discovered only in the middle house and no disease was diagnosed in the two adjacent poultry houses until the time of culling.

Transcript of Figure 1. Maps of Israel with location of Ein Shemer · 1 Dear Mr. Aart Brouw 2 February 2010...

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Dear Mr. Aart Brouw 2 February 2010

Subject: A case of influenza H5N1 in a broiler breeder pullet flock in Ein Shemer

Following is a description of the case and the measures we have taken up to this point:

Avian Influenza H5N1 was detected in a 115 days old broiler breeder pullet flock in Ein Shemer (see

location in Figure 1) which is in Haifa province in Hadera district.

Figure 1. Maps of Israel with location of Ein Shemer

Description of the farm:

The flock was housed in a high biosecurity farm. The farm is enclosed by a fence and the only access

is via a sanitary facility (shower and changing all clothes in and out). The distances from the sanitary

facility to the entrances of the poultry houses are between 50 and 100 meters. The farm consists of

three adjacent environmentally and light controlled poultry houses (Figure 2). Each poultry house is

divided into four rooms. The disease was discovered only in the middle house and no disease was

diagnosed in the two adjacent poultry houses until the time of culling.

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Figure 2. Poultry farm where outbreak occurred.

The site of the farm is located outside the kibbutz and isolated (figure 3 and 4).

Figure 4 – Location of the farm south

of Kibbutz Ein Shemer

Figure 3- Aerial view of the poultry

house were the outbreak occurred

The location of the outbreak is 8.3 kilometers away from the last H5N1outbreak in Binyamina in 2008

(Figure 5). The outbreak in Binyamina occurred also in January.

Poultry houses

Sanitary facility

Gate

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Figure 5 – Aerial line between the two last outbreaks of H5N1 in Israel

Quarantine and surveillance

A protection zone of 3 km and a surveillance zone of 10 km have been applied (Figure 6) according to

the Israeli procedures based on Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community

measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC.

Binyamina

Ein Shemer

8.3 Km

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Figure 6 protection and surveillance zones

List of the villages with commercial or pet birds in the protection and surveillance zones:

Protection zone:

Barkay

Ein Iron

Ein Shemer

Gan Hashomron

Kefar Pines

Maanit

Metzer

Pardes Hanna – Karkur

Shaar Menashe

Surveillance zone:

Ahitov

Amatz

Aviel

Baka El Garbbya

10 km surveillance zone

3 km protection zone

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Binyamina

Ein Ahoresh

Gan Shmuel

Givat Haim Ihud

Givat Haim Meuhad

Hadera

Hamaapil

Harish

Katsir

Kfar Glikson

Lehavot Haviva

Magal

Maor

Mishmarot

Or Akiva

Regavim

Talmei Elazar

Diagnosis:

On the 17th of January due to a slight increase of mortality in the middle poultry house, tracheal and

cloacal swabs were submitted to the northern poultry health laboratory and tested by PCR and viral

isolation and were negative (these sample have been retested and were found negative).

On the 24th of January there was a high increase in mortality and further birds, tracheal and cloacal

samples were submitted to the northern laboratory and the Avian and fish division in the Kimron

Veterinary Institute. Samples from the chickens were positive to H5N1 virus by real time-PCR and

viral isolation. IVPI is pending.

Culling and disinfection

On January 27th, the birds in the diseased house were culled by foam. The remaining two houses

were culled by the morning of January 28th. Cleaning and disinfection was finished on February 2nd. It

was decided not to cull any other farms as the diseased farm and poultry house were high biosecurity

facilities as are all the farms within two kilometers.

Immediate surveillance

105 farms in 30 villages are located in the 10 kilometers radius. Nine farms in the protection zone (0-3

kilometers) and 24 farms in the surveillance zone (3-10 kilometers) were empty.

In the protection zone there are three hatcheries.

Immediate surveillance was carried out on all poultry farms and backyard flocks in this radius as

detailed in the following table:

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Poultry type Protection zone Surveillance zone

Meat turkeys 1 12

Breeding turkeys 0 3

Broiler chickens 4 3

Table egg pullets 6 2

Table egg layers 7 3

Broiler breeder pullets 5 2

Broiler breeders 7 5

Egg breeder pullets 1 0

Backyard flocks 6 1

Total - 68 37 31

Tracheal and cloacal swabs from all these flocks were tested in the Northern Poultry Diseases Laboratory

by PCR for H5N1 and found negative.

These samples and blood samples were saved for future viral isolation and serology if necessary.

Continuing surveillance

All movements of poultry and/or eggs out of the protection and surveillance zones are preceded by

PCR and clinical testing of all houses on the farm according to the following protocols.

1. Marketing of table eggs: Four egg sorting plants, located in the vicinity of the zones are authorized

to receive eggs from the zones. The farmers were informed in writing as to which plants they could

market their eggs. The vehicles that collect the eggs from the farms operate only in the protection and

the surveillance zones. The eggs are transferred to the egg sorting plant marked with the name of the

farm of origin and date of collection from the farm. These eggs are stored in a quarantine area. A

veterinarian visits each of the farms twice a week and clinically examines the birds. If any disease will

be suspected, appropriate samples will be obtained and sent to the laboratory. The veterinarian

informs a government poultry officer that the flocks are healthy and he, in turn, issues a permit to

release to the market eggs that had been collected from the farm at least 3 days prior to the

inspection.

2. Marketing of broilers and meat turkeys for slaughter or pullets to other farms: three poultry

slaughter houses, all located within or in the vicinity of the surveillance zone, are authorized to

slaughter and process broilers or turkeys from the zones. During the pre-slaughter inspection on the

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farm the clinical veterinarian samples tracheal and cloacal swabs by house, from all houses to be

marketed. These samples are sent to the Kimron Veterinary institute for Real Time PCR testing for

Influenza. Upon receiving a negative result a government poultry officer issues a permit to market the

birds. These permits are valid for 72 hours after sampling. In a similar fashion table egg layer pullets

and turkey poults are tested before being moved out of the zones.

3. Hatching eggs: The farmer samples tracheal and cloacal swabs by house, from all the houses on

the farm. These samples are sent to the Kimron Veterinary institute for Real Time PCR testing for

Influenza. Upon receiving a negative result a government poultry officer issues a permit to market the

hatching eggs to a hatchery. These permits are valid for 72 hours after sampling.

4. As of this date, none of the farms tested in the protection and surveillance zones have been found

to be infected with HPAI H5N1.

Monitoring activities of sick and dead wild birds in the zones has been stepped up.

Epidemiological investigation

The epidemiologic investigation revealed that no birds were introduced into the farm since the chicks

were placed and that no birds were moved out of the farm. The two workers on the farm had no

contact with other birds since the chicks were placed. Movements of the vaccinating crew and the

treating veterinarian have been investigated and three contact farms were identified. These three

farms are located with the surveillance zone and therefore are under the surveillance procedures.

Follow up (final) report to the OIE sent on 02/02/2010 is attached.

Feed was delivered to the poultry houses from outside the fence by underground feed pipes.

The epidemiological report did not revealed any specific reason concerning the introduction of the

virus into the affected poultry house. One possible scenario is the introduction of the virus by stepping

on infected droppings in the area between the sanitary facilities (where clothes and shoe changing

and showering take place) and the entrance to the poultry house. No foot baths were used at the

entrance to the houses. Within several kilometers of the farm there are fish ponds and sewage

treatment ponds which attract a high number of wild birds in general and water fowls specifically.

During the investigation, wild ducks, cormorants and aigrettes were seen flying over the farm.

Restriction zone

We would suggest setting up a restricted area around the outbreak. This restricted zone will be similar

to the ten kilometer radius but will be adjusted to follow roads and natural topographical boundaries

that the Member States can be sure to understand and will be able to check on. As shown on the

accompanying map (Figure 7) the restricted zone will be defined as follows:

On the west - road number 4.

On the south - road number 5812 connecting to road number 5815.

On the east – the security fence until road number 6513.

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On the north - road number 6513 until the junction with road 65. From this point in a straight

line to the entrance of Givat Nili and from there in a straight line to the junction of roads 652

and 4.

Figure 7. Restriction zone

Borders of restricted zone

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In addition to the villages listed in the protection and surveillance zones, the following four

additional villages are included in the restriction zone:

Reihan

Hibat Tzyion

Herev Laet

Elyachin

No hatching eggs, day old chicks or poultry products originating from the restricted zone will

be exported.

In view of the above, we will appreciate if you would approve the above zoning and permit

export to the EU from farms which are not under restrictions.

Thank you for your constant assistance and cooperation,

Sincerely yours

Dr. Moshe Chaimovitz

Director of Veterinary Services and Animal Health

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Final report submitted to the OIE Save the data and move to next page.

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Follow-up report No. 1: Report Details Outbreak Details Control and Epi Review and Submit Confirmation Reason Reoccurrence of a listed disease | Disease: Highly pathogenic avian influenza | Creating: Follow up report

Review Report

Please carefully review the report to make sure all the information is correct. You can print a copy using the link on the right.

Then answer the questions at the bottom of the page.

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(XML format)

Report Summary

Disease Highly pathogenic avian influenza Animal type Terrestrial

Causal Agent Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus Serotype(s) H5N1

Clinical Signs Yes Reason Reoccurrence of a listed disease

Date of first confirmation of the event

26/01/2010 Date of Start of Event 24/01/2010

Date of report 02/02/2010 Date Submitted To OIE

Diagnosis Suspicion, Clinical, Laboratory (basic), Laboratory (advanced), Necropsy

Date Of Last Occurrence 04/01/2008

Number Of Reported Outbreaks Submitted= 1, Draft= 0 Name of Sender of

the report Dr Michel Bellaiche

Address post office box 12 BEIT DAGAN 50250 Position Epidemiologist

Telephone +972(3)9681761 Fax +972(3)9681761 Email [email protected] Entered by Dr Michel Bellaiche Outbreak (other report - submitted) ( EN SHEMER HPAI ) Province District Unit Type Location Latitude Longitude Start date End DateHAIFA HADERA Farm EN SHEMER 32,4627779682 35,0053129119 24/01/2010 02/02/2010 Species Measuring units Susceptible Cases Deaths Destroyed SlaughteredBirds Animals 43000 1000 592 42408 0

Affected Population

The farm has three poultry houses that contain 43,000 heavy breeder pullets aged 16 weeks. These poultry houses are in a farm under extremely high biosecurity. Clinical signs occurred in only one house.

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Outbreak summary: Total outbreaks = 1 (Submitted) Species Susceptible Cases Deaths Destroyed SlaughteredBirds 43000 1000 592 42408 0Epidemiology

Epidemiological comments

All the birds have been culled until 29/09/2010. The epidemiological investigation suspects contact with wild bird droppings outside the affected poultry house.

Source of the outbreak(s) or origin of infection

• Unknown or inconclusive

Control Measures

Applied

• Stamping out • Quarantine • Movement control

inside the country • Screening • Zoning • Disinfection of infected

premises/establishment(s)

To be applied • No Planned Control

Measures

Animals treated No Vaccination Prohibited Yes

Country / Zone Country or zone the whole country Diagnostic test results Laboratory Type Name of Laboratory Species Test Type Date Results

Provided Result

National laboratory

Kimron Veterinary Institute, Avian and Fish Diseases Laboratory Birds real-time PCR 26/01/2010 Positive

Local laboratory

Northern Poultry Diseases Laboratory Birds polymerase chain

reaction (PCR) 26/01/2010 Positive

Local laboratory

Northern Poultry Diseases Laboratory Birds pathogen isolation by

egg inoculation 26/01/2010 Positive

Outbreak maps

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Final report

Future Reporting What further reports will be submitted in relation to this event?

The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.

The event is continuing. Weekly follow-up reports will be submitted.

The event is unlikely to be contained and is now considered to be endemic. No more follow-up reports will be made, but instead, information about this disease will be included in the future six-monthly reports.

Submit OIE reports Are you ready to officially submit this report to OIE? Yes. The report is ready for submission

No. Save the report as a draft for future editing and submission.

Save