The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 48 | Number 1 | Article ID 4227 | Nov 26, 2014

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Fifty Years of the Shinkansen 新幹線５０年

Vaclav Smil

Japan of 2014 is clearly a troubled nation -– andI will remind the reader about only a few keycomponents of its peculiar situation. Thecountry is still rich by any global standard butits national debt is far higher than that in anyother affluent country, and rising, and in 2014its economy has been chronically close to, oractually in, a deflationary recession. Japan isstill the world’s third largest economy, butafter decades of huge trade surpluses it is nowrunning substantial trade deficits. The cause ofthese deficits goes beyond the post-Fukushimaneed for higher imports of oil and gas:offshoring of Japan’s manufacturing has seenwidespread loss of capacities and jobs, andmany jobs have become part-time andtemporary. Japan is still home to famous globalbrands (Toyota , Honda , N ikon) butperformance of some of these companies hasbeen tainted by poor quality products andcorporate scandals (financial fraud by Olympus,massive recalls of Toyota cars, Takata’sdeficient airbags installed in millions ofvehicles) and some firms that were previouslypioneers of widely admired technical advancesand the envy of corporate managers (Sony,Panasonic, Fujitsu) now face chronicdifficulties, if they are not nearly bankrupt.

Japan’s life expectancy retains its globalprimacy but concerns about the future deliveryof affordable health care lead to bizarreattempts to robotize hospital tasks rather thanopen up the country to much neededimmigration of skilled labor to provide medicaland welfare support. Economic ties with its twomost important Asian neighbors, China andSouth Korea, have deepened during the pastgeneration -– but so have mutual recriminationsand accusations and, for the first time in

decades, fears of actual armed confrontation inthe case of China and Japan. And above it allhang the implications of the world’s fastest-aging and now also inexorably decliningpopulation, a demographic destiny that will notbe reversed by government appeals to marryearly, have two children and move out of Tokyo.

Amidst this deepening angst one 2014anniversary deserved much more attention, andconsiderably more praise, than it had received:on October 1, 1964 the first rapid train ofJapan’s new trunk line (shinkansen) left Tōkyōfor Ōsaka –- and the first fifty years of itsincreasingly more frequent and faster servicehave been completed without a single fatalaccident. Europeans, starting with the Frenchand their TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse) and theGermans with their InterCity Express,eventually began to copy Japan’s greatexample, and, most recently, rapidlymodernizing China became the world’s mostextensive builder of rapid trains while NorthAmer ica ’s passenger t ra ins remainembarrassingly old-fashioned, unreliable andslow. Why did Japan take the lead –- and has itscommitment to rapid trains paid off , or is it yetanother bottomless pit swallowing governmentsubsidies?

Engineering (and other) challenges

As I explained in a book that traced the keytechnical advances of the 20th century1, Japan’sfirst high-speed train was a perfect example ofa technical advance that did not require anynew fundamental inventions but that resultedin a truly transformative outcome. Cars withsteel wheels on steel rails represent a simplebut reliable combination that results in firm

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contact, steady guidance, minimized frictionand ability to carry large loads with low energycosts. These were a key component ofcommercial railway transportation from itsinception in the 1830s –- and the firstshinkansen had the same ballasted track(sleepers resting on a bed of crushed stones) asall previous rail links. Rapid trains rely onelectric motors, dependable and efficient primemovers that entered railway service before theend of the 19th century, and while shinkansen ispowered by alternating current rather than bydirect current used for the pioneering electrictrains, that option has been commerciallyavailable since the late 1930s. Pantographs totap electricity from the suspended wires, lightcar bodies, aerodynamic styl ing andregenerative brakes had to be redesigned,adapted and tested –- but none of them had tobe invented.

That is why Shima Hideo, Japan’s seniorrailway engineer who went to Washington in1960 to secure a World Bank loan for the newrail link, stressed “that shinkansen techniquesincluded no experimental factor but were anintegration of proven advances achieved underthe ‘Safety First’” principle2. As such it was aperfect accomplishment of transformativeengineering, a synergy of proven componentsthat creates a new admirable outcome.Unfortunately, the World Bank bureaucrats sawit initially as an excessively risky experimentineligible for funding.

The Japanese were building on considerablefoundations of rapid train travel but they had toredefine, and they chose to recompose, some ofits key ingredients. Fast trains have a longhistory, with a mile a minute (96 km/hour) runachieved on a scheduled English servicealready in 1847, less than 20 years after thebeginning of railways.3 By 1900 speeds inexcess of 100 km/hour were common on manystraight sections in North America and Europeand new, powerful streamlined trains thatentered service during the 1930s could average

nearly 150 km/h on straight runs and reachmaxima of 180 or even 200 km/h.4

New post World War II developments in railwaytransportation were delayed until themid-1950s, after Japan and many Europeancountries regained their pre-war economicstanding; Japan did so, in absolute terms in1954, which means that in per capita terms itwas still poorer in 1954 than in 1940. But just afew months after the first post-war Japaneseexpert de legat ion at tended a majorinternational railway conference in Lille,France four of Japan’s leading companies(Hitachi, Toshiba, Fuji and Mitsubishi Electric)introduced electric motors suitable for rapidtrains, and in May 1956 Japan NationalRailways (JNR) began to study the feasibility ofa rapid train link between the capital andŌsaka.

They had a bit of infrastructural foundation tobuild on. A pre-war project to operate a bullettrain (dangan ressha) between Tōkyō andŌsaka (and then further west) had resulted inland expropriation and a partial layout of theroute and in the completion of a major tunnelbefore the work was abandoned in 1944, andthe shinkansen took advantage of thesefragmentary beginnings. But otherwise thesetting was hardly encouraging. The late 1950swere not the most opportune time to thinkabout new expensive railway links: inexpensivecrude oil from the Middle East enabled Europeand Japan to follow North America andembrace automobiles and buses; railways wereclearly on the way out in the US and stagnatingin Europe, and long-term choice of rapid trainsappeared to run against the emergingconsensus that the just-introduced jet-poweredflight (its commercial operations began in1958) would be preferable for rapid travel.

But the decision was made to go ahead with theproject and the construction of the Tōkaidōshinkansen began in April 1959: the first namewas an obvious reference to the ancient land

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route between Edo and Kyōto, the other one(new trunk line) was to distinguish the link, thecountry’s first with standard gauge (1,435 mm)from the old narrow-gauge (1,067 mm) railwaysbuilt in Japan since the first link between thecapital and Yokohama in 1872.5 As with manyother megaprojects, there were somequestionable cost estimates, inadequatefinancing and (what we know now are almostinevitable) cost overruns. In 1958 JNR put thecost at an unrealistically low ¥ 194.8 billion(equal to $ 541 billion in 1958 monies and to atleast $4.5 billion in 2014 $) in order to securethe government’s funding approval, and theWorld Bank’s eventual loan of just $ 80 millionwas on ly about 15% o f tha t gross l yunderestimated budget. The actual costreached ¥ 380 billion (just 5% short of doublingthe original estimate) and even before theproject was completed these large overruns ledSogo Shinji, the President of JNR, and ShimaHideo, the company’s VP for engineering, toresign in 1963. But the project was finished ontime on October 1, 1964, that is just in time forthe Tōkyō Olympics, after five years and fivemonths of construction.

Tōkaidō shinkansen launched at TokyoStation, 1964 (Photo Sankei

Archives/Getty Images)

Shinkansen since 1964

After Tōkaidō proved itself, the links wereexpanded both south- and north-ward. In 1972the Sanyō line was extended from Ōsaka toOkayama and in 1975 to Hakata in northernKyūshū . Tōhoku l i ne t o Mor ioka innorthwestern Honshū, and Jōetsu line toNiigata on the Sea of Japan entered service in1982 and in 1985 the lines were extended toTōkyō’s Ueno station. In 1987 deeply indebtedJNR was privatized and divided into sevenregional companies: Tōkaidō shinkansen nowbelongs to JR Central. In 1990 Japan’s bubbleeconomy began implode and although the1990s became known as the lost decade therewere no negative impacts on the shinkansen:new lines were opened, high standards ofoperation were maintained and technicalprogress continued.

Mount Fuji with Shinkansen and cherryblossoms. Photo Wikipedia Commons.

In 1992 Yamagata shinkansen connectedFukushima with Yamagata and in the sameyear the new 300 series Nozomi trains (capableof 270 km/hour) went into service. In 1997Akita shinkansen connected Morioka with Akitaon the coast of the Sea of Japan, Naganoshinkansen was completed to bring athletesand visitors for the Winter Olympics of 1998,and 500 series Nozomi (capable of 300km/hour) went into service. In 1999 Yamagata

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shinkansen reached Shinjō, in 2002 the Tōhokuline was extended to Hachinohe and in 2004Kyūshū shinkansen reached Kagoshima. Thelast two extensions took place in 2010 (Tōhokuline to Aomori) and 2011 (from Kagoshima toFukuoka). Planned extension will bringHokuriku shikansen to Kanazawa in 2015 andHokkaidō shinkansen should start runningbetween Aomori and Hakodate in 2016.Clearly, Japanese planners have been bothmethodical and relentless in extending rapidtrains even into the areas of (for Japan)relatively low population density.

Map of Shinkansen lines (2012) exceptH a k a t a - M i n a m i L i n e(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hakata-Minami_L ine ) and Ga la -Yuzawa L ine(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gala-Yuzawa_Line). Photo Wikipedia Commons.

The appearance of leading cars changed frombulbous noses of the original Shinkansenseries to more pointed design of the 100 seriesp r o d u c e d b e t w e e n 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 1

(exceptionally, its leading cars had no electricmotors) and then to curved wedge o 300 seriesintroduced in 1992. Then came the short-lived(built only between 1995 and 1998) 500 serieswith very long, needle-like noses, and finally,since 1999, ones with flatter duck-bill noses butcapable of the same speeds as the sleeker 500series. As the country’s population increasedand as its economy expanded, ridership anddaily frequency of trains on the busiest lineskept on increasing. Tōkaidō shinkansen nowcarries annually about 140 million people,slightly more than Japan’s total population, andall shinkansen lines are boarded by nearly 300million people a year. By comparison, FrenchTGV system carries about more than 100million people a year, and China’s new rapidtrains sti l l serve less than 50 mil l ionpassengers.

The frequency of trains on the Tōkaidō linewent from just 60 per day in 1964 to 285 in theyear 2000 and to more than 320 in 2014; thelatest JR Central timetable shows 225westbound trains a day with 145 trains leavingTōkyō, as many as eleven per hour during peakperiods, some at intervals of just three to fourminutes. In recent years on-time performancehas slipped somewhat but the numbers remainsafely within the admirable range: the latestreported average delay, based on more than150,000 trips made in a year, was 36 secondsin 20137 -– despite all those frequent typhoon-generated strong winds and heavy rains,Tōhoku’s snowfall and countrywide frequentearthquakes. And, most importantly, thisoperating precision under often inclementconditions has been achieved without a singlefatality.

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Shinkansen 0 series with Nozomi passing.Photo Wikipedia Commons.

Why it has been so safe

No shinkansen-related statistic is as impressiveas the fact that by the end of 2014 the

entire system moved nearly six billion people(equivalent to more than 80% of the entireglobal population) without a single fatality,without a single collision, and with only twoderailments caused not by human error or bymechanical or electronic failure but by naturaldisasters. The first derailment took placeduring an earthquake on October 23, 2004 aseight of ten cars of the Jōetsu shinkansen leftthe track near Nagaoka (with no injuries amongpassengers). The other one was on March 2,2012 when Akita shinkansen derailed in ablizzard (again, with no injuries to passengers).

Safety starts with the track: completelydedicated, with no other trains using it, with nolevel crossings and with appropriate barriersand multipurpose inspection trains (they runbetween midnight and 6 AM when theshinkansen does not operate), with continuouschecking of the state of the rails and the bed.Rails are continuously welded (they weigh 60kg/m) and they are mounted on reinforcedconcrete slabs. Original specification allowed

2.5 km for the radius of curves and themaximum gradient of 2%, but for new, fastertrains the minimum curve radius is 4 km andthe maximum slope is 1.67%. Electricity issupplied as 25 kV AC at 60 Hz and it is drawnfrom catenary wires made of copper or copper-clad steel. Unlike many other rapid trains,shinkansen trains do not have a locomotive (orlocomotives).7

Shinkansen track. Photo WikipediaCommons.

During the design stage in the late 1950sShima Hideo argued that multiple electricmotors placed in individual carriages are thebest way to limit axle loads, reduce stress ontracks and allow the motors to be used forregenerative braking.8 This design haspersisted, although some trains had one or twocars without any electric motors. The latestNozomi 700 series has 64 AC motors (four forevery car) rated at 275 kW and able to deliver13.2 MW of power, making it easier to performsudden accelerations and decelerations andprovide dynamic braking once the motorsbecome generators driven by the wheels andexert drag on the train (pneumatic brakes areused at speeds of less than 30 km/h and as abackup).

Most importantly, the centralized traffic control(CTC), automatic train control (ATC), andUrgent Earthquake Detection and AlarmSystem ensure the highest degree of safety.

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CTC oversees routes and train and crewscheduling, ATC maintains safe distancesbetween fast-travelling trains and it is designedto engage train brakes automatically as soon asthe speed exceeds the indicated limit. Theearthquake detection system is perhaps mostingenious as it senses the very first seismicwaves coming to the Earth’s surface, instantlydetermines the risk levels and it can halt, or atleast slow down, trains in the affected regionbefore the main earthquake shock arrives.9

These safety measures have made it possible toraise routine operating speeds and to cut traveltimes. The first trains traveling from Tōkyō atno more than 210 km/h took four hour to reachŌsaka; just a year later the trip was down tothree hours and ten minutes, and in 1992 newNozomi trains (travelling at the maximum of270 km/h) reduced the travel time between thecapital and Ōsaka to just two hours and 30minutes; a further 5 minutes was shaved by thelatest Nozomi version (N700). But these timesdo not reflect maximum possible speeds,because the fastest trains must reduce speed inmany sections in order to minimize noise wherethe line transects inhabited areas.

Nozomi 700 Series in November 2014.Photo V. Smil.

Although the aerodynamic design of trains (the16-car assembly is 400 m long) reduces high-speed drag, noise and vibration are much moredifficult to suppress. Because noise goes up inproportion to the 6th power of the speed itbecomes excessive at high speeds: at 300 km/hthe sound pressure level on the forward car ison the order of 100 dB.10 Because noise mustbe limited below 70-75 dB in residential andcommercial areas --and these add up to 86% ofthe 513 km between Tōkyō and Ōsaka –shinkansen trains must travel well below theirmaximum capability on most of the Tōkaidōline. Tōhoku shinkansen, travelling throughless populated areas, now reaches maxima of320 km/h.

Looking back

A half-century after the first shinkansen runJapan’s pioneering achievement remainsnotable for the boldness of the idea and for itsnear-flawless execution. Costs have been highbut a true account, as with any complexsystem, could be established only when takingother factors into consideration, and whenconsidering the cost of alternatives. Theshinkansen’s speed, safety and reliability havecombined to make a major, and lasting, positiveeconomic contributions to Japan’s moderndevelopment but, undoubtedly, capital andoperating costs of rapid trains are high andthey require government subsidies in allcountries that have built them.

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Modest 50th anniversary: small stickers inshinkansen cars in 2014. Photo V. Smil.

We take for granted that governments shouldbe involved in taking care of security andimproving the conditions for economicdevelopment. Both of these goals requireadequate investment in basic infrastructuresthat will provide decades-long benefits: inNorth America there is little argument thathighways belong to this category: just considerthe continuing economic, social and securitybenefits of the U.S. interstate system launchedunder Eisenhower and built with federalfinancing. This does not mean that there shouldbe an indiscriminate preference for rapidtrains. After all, it must be acknowledged thatJapan has the uncommon advantage ofconcentrated population (with daily passengerdensity per km of rail route almost six timeshigher than it is in France, and in the regionserved by Tōkaidō shinkansen about five times

the Japanese national mean) that makes itmuch easier to justify high capital cost of rapidtrain links.

But every major economy would benefit byusing rapid trains to link large cities that are300-900 km apart, distances that can becovered between one (or one and one half) andfour hours and where rapid trains have a cleartime-saving advantage compared to air travel.In North America rapid trains will never makesense as links between Toronto and Vancouveror between Minneapolis and Seattle: distancesare too long, population densities are too low.But they are the superior solution for movingpeople between any pair of large cities that arenow connected by frequent shuttle flights thatlast 60-90 minutes: the four obvious NorthAmerican choices include the northeasternmegalopolis (Boston-New York-Philadelphia-Washington), Houston-Dallas, San Francisco-Los Angeles, and Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal.

Convenience is an obvious advantage: writingas both a frequent flyer and a frequent rider ofrapid trains, I cannot imagine how anybodycould argue that getting to distant airports,being subject to pre-boarding securitygauntlets, waiting for luggage on arrival andgetting somehow to downtown to connect withother transportation links (a sequence that caneasily add up to three hour for an hour-longflight) is preferable to comfortable downtown-to-downtown rides in rapid trains. But there arealso unmatched energy and environmentaladvantages that are often ignored by those wholook strictly at the financial cost of auto, airand high speed train.

No other form of land transport consumes lessenergy per passenger and hence has a lowerenvironmental impact than do high-speedtrains. Tōkaidō shinkansen requires 80% lessenergy per passenger-kilometer than drivingbetween the country’s two largest cities, andthat is assuming actual driving time, not thetime now habitually spent idling on Japan’s

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congested highways. And in the age concernedabout carbon emissions and global climate nocomparison is more persuasive than the factthat carbon dioxide emissions per seat averagejust 4.2 kg on the Tōkyō-Ōsaka trip, comparedto about 50 kg when flying the same distance ina commercial jetliner by JAL or ANA fromHaneda to Itami.

Shinkansen as a model

Half a century after the first Tōkaidō ride, rapidtrains connect the Japanese capital with eventhe most distant regions on the main island,Honshū, and also go to Kyūshū, Japan’ssouthernmost island. Europe, the birthplace oftrains, hesitated for a while but it eventuallybecame an enthusiastic builder of rapid trains,most notably France, whose TGV beganoperating on the Paris-Lyon route in September1981, TGV Atlantique to Brittany came in 1989and to Bordeaux in 1990 (this was the world’sfirst line to see scheduled speeds of up to 300km/h), TGV Nord to Calais was added in 1993and to the Channel Tunnel a year later, and thelink to Belgium (Thalys) started in 1997.

Meanwhile the first German ICE (IntercityExpress) started in 1991, as did the firstSpanish AVE (Alta Velocidad Española), fromMadrid to Seville. Later came links toBarcelona (2008) and Valencia (2010), andItaly’s ETR 500 (Elettro Treno Rapido(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElettroTreno) 500)came in 1993, followed by Frecciarossa (RedArrow). In Asia, South Korea began its KTX(Korea Train eXpress) in 2004, Taiwan’s rapidtrains came in 2007 as did China’s first linkbetween Qinhuangdao and Shenyang (Chinanow has the world’s longest network of rapidtrains, about 11,000 km, or twice the distanceacross the United States, which also includesthe longest, nearly 2,300 km, direct linkbetween Beijing and Guangzhou). In contrast,the United States and Canada are notable fortheir lack of rapid trains. Acela’s pitifulperformance between Boston and Washington

DC does not make it a real rapid train: althoughit can go up to 240 km/h, its average speed(including stops) is just 116 km/h, less than halfthe normal operating speed of true rapid trains.

The conclusion is obvious: all major affluenteconomies outside of North America, as well asChina and soon, with China’s help, Russia,count rapid trains among essential moderninfrastructures that deserve governmentsupport and continuing improvement. Most ofthe technical solutions developed by thedesigners of the shinkansen have not beensimply copied by other countries that built theirrapid trains (for a variety of reasons rangingfrom the preference for supporting domesticindustries to China’s chronic Japanophobia) –-but the importance of the path-breakingexample of Japan’s bold experiment and itslong-term operational success cannot bedenied.

The best engineering designs are those wherethe users can form spontaneous positiveimpressions and bestow well-deservedadmiration. That is why I can offer no betterending than the summary of my impressionswritten a decade ago when I was markingshinkansen’s 40th anniversary:11

I have traveled in the comfort ofthe first class Green cars as well asstanding in packed compartmentsat the end of obon holidays,catching the first train from thecapital as well as arriving justbefore the serv ices end bymidnight. All of these trips haveone thing in common: this is travelas an event because even when therapidly receding scenery is hidden,e v e n w h e n s t a n d i n g i n anonreserved crowded carriage, youknow that on the same track andjust three minutes and 45 secondsbehind you is another sleekassembly of 16 cars with 64

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asynchronous motors moving inthe same direction at 300 km/h --and that when you arrive after ajourney of hundreds of kilometersthe most likely delay will be 24seconds!

Vaclav Smil is a Distinguished ProfessorEmeritus at the University of Manitoba inWinnipeg, Canada. He is the author of 37 booksand more than 400 papers on many aspects ofenergy, environment, food, population,technical advances, including developments inmodern Japan. Major recent books includeMaking the Modern World: Materials andD e m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1119942535/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) and Prime Movers ofGlobalization: The History and Impact of DieselE n g i n e s a n d G a s T u r b i n e s(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0262518767/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20);

This paper draws on the following threepublications by the author:

Smi l , V . 2004. Omedeto goza imasu!( C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s ! )(http://vaclavsmil.com/wp-content/uploads/docs/smil-article-2004-tcs-tech-shinkansen.pdf).Tech Central Station, October 1, 2004.

Smil, V. 2006. Transforming the TwentiethCentury: Technical Innovations and TheirConsequences. Oxford University Press, NewYork, x + 358 pp.

S m i l , V . 2 0 1 4 . D o t h e l o c o m o t i v e .(http://www.vaclavsmil.com/wp-content/uploads/smil-article-do-the-locomotive-20141004.pdf)The American, October 4, 2014.

For a typical Japanese anniversary write-upsee: Nippon.com. 2014. The Shinkansen turns50: The history and future of Japan’s high-S p e e d t r a i n .(http://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00078/)

Recommended citation: Vaclav Smil, "FiftyYears of the Shinkansen", The Asia-PacificJournal, Vol. 12, Issue 48, No. 1, Dec. 1, 2014.

Notes

1 Smil, V. 2006. Transforming the TwentiethCentury: Technical Innovations and TheirConsequences. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, New York.

2 Shima, H. 1994. Birth of the Shinkansen – Amemoir. Japan Railway & Transport Review3:45-48.

3 O'Brien, P., ed. 1983. Railways and EconomicDevelopment of Western Europe, 1830-1914.New York: St. Martin’s Press.

4 Ellis, C.H. 1983. The Lore of the Train. NewYork: Crescent Books.

5 Aoki, E. et al. 2000. A History of JapaneseRailways, 1872-1999. Tokyo: East JapanRailway Culture Foundation.

6 J R C e n t r a l .(http://english.jr-central.co.jp/about/reliability.html) 2014. 0.6 minutes/train annual averagedelay.

7 In contrast, French TGV has two power cars(locomotives) in every trainset, each with themass of 68 t and power rating of 4.4 MW.

8 Shima, op. cit.

9 Noguchi, T. and T. Fujii. 2000. Minimizingthe effect of natural disasters. Japan Railway &Transport Review 9:52-59.

10 Mellet, C. et al. 2006. High speed train noiseemission: Latest investigation of theaerodynamic/rolling noise contribution. Journalof Sound and Vibration 293: 535–546.

11 Smil, V. 2004. Omedeto gozaimasu!

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( C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s ! )(http://vaclavsmil.com/wp-content/uploads/docs

/smil-article-2004-tcs-tech-shinkansen.pdf).Tech Central Station, October 1, 2004.