The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 7 | Article ID 2469 | Jul 12, 2007

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Family, Friends and Furusato: "Home" in the Formation ofJapanese War Memories

Philip Seaton

Family, Friends and Furusato: “Home” inthe Formation of Japanese WarMemoriesBy Philip SeatonThis article examines how issues “closestto home”—family, friends and furusato(home town/area)—affect Japanese warmemories. It draws upon testimonyillustrating the importance of “home” andanalyzes how family and local identitiesimpinge on the evolution of culturalmemory and war commemoration.Examples are drawn from Hokkaido.IntroductionIn 1938, Ito Yoshimitsu enlisted in theSapporo Tsukisamu 25th regiment, part ofthe Seventh (Hokkaido) Division of theImperial Army. He saw action in Chinabefore transferring to the military police(kempei) in 1943. At the end of the warhe was stationed in Celebes in present-day Indonesia. There he was arrested bythe Dutch after the war and executed as aBC class war criminal on 4 October 1948.Ito had been convicted of serious torture,including beating, burning with cigarettesand force-feeding water to Indonesianprisoners. [1]Fig. 1: Map of Hokkaido and the Northern Territories

Before his execution, Ito sent a last willand testament (yuigon) to his family andfriends. In his final letter to his father hesaid that he would be vindicated byhistory. He had carried out his duties

during the war but these had beenconsidered in violation of international lawand labeled organized terror. He prayedthat his actions would not bring shame tohis parents. [2]Another recipient of a final letter from Itowas his childhood friend Kakiuchi Toshio.Ito wrote, “I will depart this world labeleda war criminal. But as I look back over myactions, I have nothing to be ashamed of.I am not going to write troublesomethings to you. I was a Japanese soldierand I just hope you will believe me.”Instead of details about his service, Itoreminisced in fleeting references topeople and events from their childhoods(such as teachers or a school sports day)that obviously held rich significance for Itoand his “unforgettable friend”. [3]Ito’s last words and letters form the basisof a book called Giving One’s Life to One’sCountry (1988), edited by Kakiuchi. In hiseditor’s afterword, Kakiuchi wrote, “WhenI first saw Ito’s will and testament Iimmediately dreamed that it would bepublished one day as a book. This book isthe realization of that dream.” Thesewords, written in his seventies from ahospital bed, may be considered part ofKakiuchi’s own last will and testament: “Inlife you should leave something for thegenerations that follow,” he remarks. [4]The death of his friend obviously affectedKakiuchi. For the book he collected

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documents, testimony and poetry fromIto’s friends, comrades and relatives; andthe introduction, written by the head ofthe Hokkaido Rengo Izokukai (Hokkaidobranch of the War Bereaved Association),laments how the hardships and bravery ofthe war generation are being forgottenforty years on.

Fig. 2: Hokureihi—The monument to over 33,000 soldiers

from Hokkaido who died in Okinawa and Southeast Asia.It is in a park in Itoman City, Okinawa, that contains

other prefectural memorials a few kilometers from the

Himeyuri memorial. It is maintained by the Hokkaido

Rengo Izokukai.Kakiuchi’s book is just one illustration ofthe important but often overlooked rolethat family, friends and furusato (hometown/area) have played in preserving andshaping Japanese memories of the Asia-Pacific War. The international media, andto some extent the academy, has tendedto focus on “official” and “controversial”topics. [5] While controversies such asofficial prime ministerial worship atYasukuni Shrine are undoubtedlyimportant, this article employs a socialrather than political or national historyapproach to examine how those things“closest to home”—particularly family,

friends and furusato—shape Japanesememories of the Asia-Pacific War,1937-45. It is a method that meritsapplication to wars and war memorieselsewhere, too.Six decades after their defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, the Japanese people have notyet achieved a consensus on how tonarrate and interpret that war, not onlybecause of a wide range of warexperiences, but also because Japan’scontested war memories are a product ofdivisions regarding the morality of Japan’swar aims and conduct. Opinion rangeswidely from progressives (who condemn awar of aggression and call upon theJapanese people and government toaccept war responsibility) through tonationalists (who argue that Japan foughta just war which resulted in the liberationof Asia from Western colonialism). [6]Explaining divisions and diversity withinJapanese historical consciousness is onlypossible by investigating beyond thenarrow confines of state-centric analysis(focusing on the Japanese governmentand “official history”) and nationalidentity. Focusing on the perspectives offamily, friends and furusato illustrateshow identities other than national identityimpact on historical consciousness inways that may resonate, clash with, oradd nuance to the various competingcultural narratives of war history andresponsibility within contemporaryJapanese society.Identification with Family, Friendsand Furusato in War GenerationTestimonyIdentity is a statement about how peopledefine themselves and the groups to

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which they feel they belong. Identities aremultilayered and situational: they aremultilayered because identities havemultiple co-existent forms—such asgender, religion, class andgeneration—and they are situationalbecause identities assume greater orlesser prominence according to thesituation and/or environment. Theassumption of different identitiesaccording to the situation is a more orless conscious decision to associate withor assert difference from another personor group. Within the “composure” of warmemories, the memories or narratives ofgroups that people belong (or aspire tobelong) to assume particular prominence,while the memories and narratives ofgroups with whom there is weakidentification may be marginalized orignored. [7]National identity plays a key role in WorldWar II memories since it was the largestand bloodiest “clash of nations” in history.But World War II history need not only beviewed in national terms. When memoriesare filtered through national and otherforms of identity without contradiction ordiscord, family, local and nationalidentities may be mutually reinforcing.This was evident in the story of ItoYoshimitsu: Kakiuchi’s book united family,friends, the local War BereavedAssociation and nation (the book’s titlewas Giving One’s Life to One’s Country) ina conservative-nationalist narrative thatlauded a soldier’s memory, despite hisconviction and execution for torture.Identification with Ito on a family orfriendship level allowed friends andrelatives to believe his protestations that

he had done nothing of which to beashamed. Japanese conservatives couldalso identify with Ito’s story on a moreideological level: he was another youngpatriot who had died in the service of hisnation.On other occasions, however, forms ofidentity other than national identity mayprovide a rationale for criticizing Japanesewar conduct. Gender identity hasassumed particular importance in thisregard since the eruption of the “comfortwomen” issue in 1992-3. [8] On hearingthe harrowing testimony of sexualviolence and enslavement suffered by“comfort women,” Japanese women haveoften empathized and identified with“fellow women’s sufferings” and adopteda critical stance towards the Japanesemilitary. Identities such as gender or arole-identity such as “feminist historian”may also be mutually reinforcing withother identities, such as family or regionalidentities. For example, the SapporoWomen’s History Research Group(Sapporo Joseishi Kenkyukai) hascombined women’s and local history toforge a critical historical consciousness ofWorld War II in its publications. This isepitomized by Nishida Hideko’s researchinto Korean women working as “laborercomfort women” (romu ianfu) in “comfortstations” set up to serve Korean menworking as forced laborers in Hokkaido’smines: a macabre “forced sexual labor forforced laborers” arrangement that pointsto multiple layers of victim and assailantacross gender, regional and nationalgroups. [9]Aspects of people’s multilayeredidentities, therefore, are used individually

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or in complex combinations according tothe situation to determine whose warexperiences are identified with and thenature of historical consciousness. Withinthis process, family, friendship group orfurusato identities are just three of themany identities that may be employed,but they are significant for being based onthe closest emotional, biological/socialand spatial bonds that human beingspossess.National identity is now often described asthe sense of identification with, inBenedict Anderson’s suggestive phrase,the “imagined community” of the nation.[10] By contrast, the closer one gets to“home” the less is “imagined”. Inparticular, the family is the ultimate“unimagined/real community” in thesense that it is built on intimateknowledge of the personalities and day-to-day and face-to-faceactions/experiences of relatives.Consequently, countless references tofamily, friends and furusato feature withinthe testimony of the Japanese wargeneration. For example, Miyamoto Natsumoved to Manchuria near to where hersister lived in 1941. She married thefollowing year and in 1945, at the time ofJapan’s defeat, had a 2-year-old baby,Harumi. Harumi caught measles duringthe long journey on foot and by train backto Beijing and then by boat home. With nodoctors and little food available,Miyamoto tried unsuccessfully to breast-feed Harumi, an experience she describesas deeply painful (kokoro kara kuyanda).When Harumi died, she continued herjourney with Harumi’s remains in a tincan. Miyamoto and her husband lived in

Saitama after the war, but in a poignantillustration of the enduring depth of bothparent-child and furusato bonds, shebought a grave plot in Sapporo in theearly 1990s and erected a memorial stoneto Harumi. She moved back to Hokkaidoafter her husband died and in 2005 at age91 she told her story to the regionalnewspaper, Hokkaido Shinbun. [11]Miyamoto’s testimony was prefaced bythe comment, “The weak are the first tosuffer.” The “war is bad” and “this is howour family suffered” tone that infuses hertestimony is representative of the much-maligned phenomenon of Japanese“victim mentality” (higaisha ishiki).However, it is appropriate to distinguishbetween victim mentality as a response toindividual trauma and victim mentality asa denial mechanism regarding the extentof Japanese aggression. It is also worthnoting that such war memories mayprovide one foundation for the peaceconsciousness that has remained oneimportant Japanese response to war anddefeat ever since.As well as the biological and emotionalstrength of family bonds, a further keyreason why Japanese war memories start“closest to home” is that many familiesexperienced the horrors of war together.The war affected families as a unit in boththe homeland (particularly in theexperiences of air raids and mobilizationfor the war effort) and in Japan’s colonies(colonial settlers who were caught up infighting and/or experienced long painfuljourneys home). For example, aftergrowing up in the Tokachi region ofHokkaido, Maeda Takeshi was a sixteen-year-old flight school cadet in Gunma

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prefecture when in October 1944 his “firstlove” (hatsukoi) was shot through thehead as they ran away together from astrafing American fighter. “I was awayfrom my parents and K’s house was like asecond furusato for me,” Maedarecounted. He describes running in tearsto tell K’s parents of her death. [12] Suchshared narratives of suffering amongfamily, friends and local community maylead to powerful mutual reinforcementamong the surviving members of thegroup over time.But family stories from the home front arenot only of family or Japanese suffering.Some family stories are of Japaneseatrocities that underly critical stances onJapanese war conduct. For example,Azuma Haruko moved to Hokkaido afterher father, a successful rice farmer fromSaitama near Tokyo, was harassed by theSpecial Police (Tokko Keisatsu, thedomestic “thought police”). His “crime”was to have written a letter to theAgriculture Ministry criticizing wartimeagricultural policy. Fearing for their lives,they moved to Yubari, a center of theHokkaido coal industry. Her father hid hisbackground and got a job in the mines,eventually becoming a kitchen orderly. Onher way to school, Azuma sometimeswitnessed the brutal beatings of Koreanforced laborers, their mouths stuffed witha slipper made of conveyor belt materialto silence the screams as they werebeaten senseless. When the war ended,the Korean laborers formed a vigilantegroup to find the camp overseer. Theoverseer begged her father to hide him ina closet. Azuma shook with fear as shethought of what the Koreans would do if

they found him. As she recounted thisstory sixty years on, she broke down andconfessed she had never told this story toanyone, not even to her husband. It hadremained a shared yet unspoken familysecret, a powerful influence on herenduring image of the “arrogance” inJapan’s inhumane treatment of Koreansduring the war. [13]Family, friends and furusato featureprominently in military as well as civiliantestimony. Regional memories are aparticularly important feature of soldiermemoirs because the Japanese army wasorganized into regional battalions. In amanner similar to the “lost generation”(the concentration of war dead fromparticular social or geographical groups)created by the region- or profession-based “pals battalions” in the BritishArmy during World War I, Japanesesoldiers from the same prefecture foughtand died together in World War II. TheSeventh (Hokkaido) Division washeadquartered in Asahikawa (until 1944,when it moved to Obihiro to be nearer topotential invasion beaches in EasternHokkaido). Today, Asahikawa houses alarge SDF base and is also the location ofHokkaido Gokoku Jinja (“Nation ProtectingShrine,” the prefectural branch shrine ofYasukuni Shrine), which enshrines 63,141local soldiers and is the principalcommemoration site for fallen soldiersfrom Hokkaido and Sakhalin. [14] WithinHokkaido’s military past, the NomonhanIncident (a clash with Soviet troops on theMongolian border in 1939), the “banzaicharge” on the Aleutians (1943), andGuadalcanal are just some of the battlesin which soldiers from Hokkaido died en

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masse side-by-side.

Figs. 3 and 4: Hokkaido Gokoku Jinja (Nation Protecting

Shrine) in Asahikawa

The battle most deeply imprinted inHokkaido military history is the Battle forOkinawa in which 10,065 people fromHokkaido died, the largest number fromany prefecture after Okinawa. One soldierwho participated in the Battle for Okinawawas Ueno Seiji. His published diariesdocument his redeployment from China in1944, nearly dying of dysentery, air raidsand the fighting itself in brief butarresting entries. For example, oneundated entry (probably from May 1945)simply reads: “A baby strapped to itsmother’s back with an obi (kimono belt)

doesn’t know its mother is dead yet.” [15]Ueno also thinks of home and on a coupleof occasions expresses relief thatHokkaido was not caught up in suchfighting. [16]Ueno’s commentary on his diaries fiftyyears on (in 1995) provides anotherexample of how family, military unit andnational identity can combine to createpatriotic historical consciousness. Uenodedicates his diary to his fallen comrades(naki sen’yu) and comments:

The Pacific War continues to causea lot of problems. There is a lot ofharsh criticism from intellectuals,the public and even abroad.Whenever I hear this I feel sorryfor the war dead. The critics justfocus monotonously on thesuffering and damage. But lookingat it from a different perspective, Ithink the Japanese contributed tothe change from colonization toliberation of other colored racesaround the world. It is a fact thatNobel Peace Prize winners fromsouthern Asia have said that itwas thanks to Japan that theycould gain their independence.[17]

Ueno’s racial identification with liberated“colored races” (yushoku jinshu) and hisattempt to find meaning in his comrades’deaths underpin his nationalistic (perhapsalso anti-Western) “affirmative view” ofthe Greater East Asian War.

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Fig. 5: Like the Cornerstone for Peace in Okinawa, theOkinawa-sen Eirei Kinen no Hi (Monument to the Fallen inOkinawa) lists those from Hokkaido who died during theBattle for Okinawa. The monument is in Sapporo near theMt. Moiwa cable car base station.Among supporters of affirmative views ofJapanese war conduct, another form ofprivate document has assumed canonicalstatus: the final letters home of kamikazepilots before they flew their missions. ThePeace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots inChiran, Kyushu, has become the maincommemorative site for the kamikaze,and the pilots’ letters are prominentlydisplayed. [18] Despite the sometimesnationalistic and patriotic-soundingrhetoric in these letters, as Tanaka Yukihas observed, they are infused withreferences to family, friends and furusato.Many spoke of dying to protect theircountry. “However, as testimonies ofdead and surviving pilots clearly show,their idea of ‘country’ was far from thenationalistic notion of ‘nation-state.’ Formost of these young students, ‘country’meant their own ‘beautiful hometowns’where their beloved parents lived.” Otherkey motivations for flying includeddefending the honor of their mothers(who would be afforded respect as themother of a kamikaze), loyalty to flight-

mates and the desire not to be seen ascowardly. [19]Thirty-four pilots from Hokkaido flewmissions from the base at Chiran. Onewas Maeda Hiroshi, whose last letter to“Father” (in its most filial form, chichiue-sama) ended by saying there would be noneed for his grave plot but that he wantedhis soul to rest next to his dear departedmother. [20] With a banzai to the emperorand his unit, and a poem comparing hisdeath to falling cherry blossoms, Maedaflew to his death. [21] Maeda’s story willbe discussed again later as Kuriyama HighSchool (just north of Chitose) staged aplay about his life in 2005, on the sixtiethanniversary of his death.Inferring the kamikaze pilots’ real feelingsabout their impending deaths in suchletters home requires a measure ofreading between the lines: all final lettersto families had to pass the militarycensors. But further evidence of soldiers’thoughts for family, friends and furusatojust before they died is evident in thetestimony of Inomata Kiyoko. She was afourteen-year-old schoolgirl when herolder brother told her about hisexperiences in China while on homeleave. Recounting an incident when hehad cried as he held a dying comrade inhis arms, he said: “Y’know Kiyoko, whensoldiers die they don’t shout banzai to theemperor. They say their mothers’ andwives’ names.” [22] When he wasreassigned to the defense of the Aleutianshis parting words were, “Take care ofMother.” After his death in the banzaicharge on 29 May 1943, Kiyoko felt hurtwhenever people congratulated theirfamily on his “honorable death.” How to

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reconcile patriotism and bereavementwhen for many people the cause wasultimately futile and even discredited is adilemma that many bereaved Japanesefamilies have struggled with in theaftermath of the war.The majority of published and archivedtestimony thus far has focused on thesuffering of Japanese individuals, theirrelatives, friends and neighbors. But,many people have worked tirelessly toexpose Japanese atrocities. As I haveargued at length in the story of a weaponscientist’s niece who was exploring heruncle’s wartime record, exposing warcrimes within family history must run thegauntlet of family and local opinion: noteveryone in families (or alternativelyveterans groups or local communities) isappreciative of people digging upuncomfortable secrets. [23] Particularlyamong veterans there may be pressure(ranging from intimidation to deaththreats) from rightwing (uyoku) groups orfellow veterans to maintain silenceregarding atrocities. Nevertheless, anumber of ex-soldiers and conscientiousscholars, journalists and publishers haveworked bravely to present confessions ofthe Japanese military’s war crimes.One example of a local progressive groupin Hokkaido that has collectedconfessional testimony is the “Delvinginto our Hometown Sapporo” Society(Sapporo Kyodo wo Horu Kai). In one of aseries of books documenting the roles ofHokkaido people in Japan’s war, theSociety presents the testimony of TanifujiYoshio. He was a miner before beingdrafted into the Seventh Division in 1943and sent to China. The training was

merciless. Tanifuji describes a soldier,named only as M, from Sapporo who wasbeaten and insulted repeatedly by seniorofficers to the point where he committedsuicide. He also describes in chilling detailthe sanko sakusen (the “kill all, burn all,loot all” policy) which earned theJapanese army its infamous reputationthroughout China. He describes arbitrarykillings of prisoners, water torture (fillingpeople’s stomachs with water thenjumping on them), rape, burning housesand looting. “It was only natural that theChinese called us riben guizi [JapaneseDevils],” Tanifuji comments. [24] After thewar he was interned in Siberia and thenChina. “At first I denied everythingclaiming, ‘I followed orders. I am notresponsible.’ But, thereafter I startedthinking about the sadness and pain thevictims had suffered as human beings. Iunderstood the weight of my crimes andwas resigned to being executed forthem.” [25, emphasis added]As Linda Hoaglund’s commentary on thedocumentary film Japanese Devils (RibenGuizi) illustrates, such atrocities wereoften fuelled by an addictive, quasi-sexualgratification in killing. [26] The testimonyof another soldier, Azuma Shiro (whoadmits similar atrocities in China),indicates that when Japanese soldierswere indoctrinated during training to thinktheir lives were “as light as a feather,”they could only think of the lives of“Chinks” (chankoro), who they hadbeaten in the Sino-Japanese war and werebeating again, as even less consequentialthan their own. [27] But Tanifuji’s finalcomment about seeing the victims “ashuman beings” illustrates the important

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role that recognition of the family, friendsand furusato of others can play inbreaking the cycle of denial and findingthe conscience necessary to acknowledgesuch acts as barbaric war crimes.Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’simportant notion of “worthy and unworthyvictims” illustrates that the sufferings ofvictims with whom there is noidentification can be ignored or evendismissed as “deserved,” but when thereis identification with victims theirsufferings encourage a sense of outrageat the perpetrators responsible for theirsuffering. [28] As such, atrocity is greatlyfacilitated by the dehumanization ofvictims, particularly when virulentnationalism or racism makes foreignerothers “unworthy” or “subhuman,” as wasfrequently the case during the Asia-PacificWar. [29] Conversely, if there can beidentification with victims “as humanbeings,” perhaps through seeing thevictims as individuals with bonds of loveto family, friends and community, victimsare made “worthy” and humanized, andthe perpetrators of their sufferings can becondemned.Finally, a survey of testimony of peoplefrom Hokkaido would not be completewithout mention of the Ainu, theindigenous people of Hokkaido whoseland was seized and whose culture wasforced into decline by Japanese colonialpolicy following the Meiji Restoration(1868). Ainu people faced severediscrimination and bullying at school andin wider society, yet when they wereneeded for the war effort they wereexpected to be exemplary soldiers likeother Japanese. The testimony of one Ainu

member of the war generation, KayanoShigeru, neatly encapsulates all of thethemes presented thus far.In Our Land Was a Forest, Kayanorecounts how his oldest brother, Katsumi,died in 1941 of tuberculosis that he hadcontracted after serving in the SeventhDivision in China. He also describes hisown experiences in Muroran of navalbombardment and air raids on 14-15 July1945. [30] Kayano’s text offers a rich,multi-layered view of both the Ainu andJapanese war experience. On one level,he and his family were simply humanbeings experiencing the violence of warlike so many others. His family’sexperiences incorporate both civilian(home front) and overseas militaryexperiences, which suggests acomplicated combination of victimhoodand responsibility within family memories.On another level, as the “indigenouspeople” of Hokkaido, Ainu warexperiences emphasize the uniqueregional (Hokkaido) nature of some warexperiences. So too did Kayano’sexperience of naval bombardment.Muroran was bombarded because itcontained many heavy war industries butHokkaido was out of the range of B-29bombers based in Saipan. The navy wascalled upon to do what firebombing haddone elsewhere in Japan. Finally, onanother level, Ainu identity is a clearexample of how alternative identities toJapanese national identity may inform acritical assessment of Japanese warconduct.In sum, the testimony of Japanese peopleillustrates the complex and diverse waysin which identification with family, friends

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and furusato have underpinned orchallenged identification with the nation.On some levels, the testimony of peoplefrom Hokkaido is representative of peoplefrom across Japan. But at the same time,family and regional (Hokkaido) memoriespossess a measure of distinctiveness thatadds nuance to broader Japanese warmemories. Overall, within Japan’scontested war memories there is nosingle, dominant pattern in whichidentification with family, friends andfurusato is reconciled with identificationwith the nation.Family, Friends and Furusato withCollective Memory and WarCommemorationGiven the importance of family, friendsand furusato within the testimony of thewar generation, it follows that theseshould feature prominently in collectivememory, too. Testimony is the rawmaterial of cultural memory. As peoplenarrate their experiences to others,shared memories emerge among groups.These shared memories compete witheach other for attention and prominencewithin the public sphere. Gradually,shared narratives are incorporated intobroader regional and national culturalmemories through repeatedrepresentation within local and nationalmedia. Cultural memories are a “flattenedout version” of the most commonnarratives in a given group, region ornation. [31] Nevertheless the collectivememories elicit the identification of manyin the group, region or nation because thenarratives are broadly representative ofmany people’s experiences and/orbecause they offer an acceptable moral,

political or historical interpretation ofevents.Viewing war history from a localperspective illustrates that collectivememories may vary considerably fromfurusato to furusato. In Hokkaido’s case,the large number of forced laborers in themines (20 per cent of all Korean and 42per cent of all Chinese forced laborers inJapan were in Hokkaido [32]) have givennarratives of forced labor greaterprominence within local history than inother regions. The Soviet role in WorldWar II also features much moreprominently in Hokkaido memoriescompared to the rest of Japan, becausemany settlers from Manchuria andparticularly Sakhalin were repatriated toHokkaido, including many who spent timein Soviet camps. And the local campaignsto force Russia to return the NorthernTerritories (the island groups of Habomai,Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu), whichwere occupied after Japan’s surrender,are visible across Hokkaido on theplacards outside official buildings,especially in the eastern city of Nemuro.The Northern Territories issue and itseffects particularly on fishermen on CapeNosappu (which at its closest point is only3.7 kilometers from the Habomai islandgroup) is an example of how aspects andlegacies of war history that are ofmarginal importance in one region maybe of day-to-day significance in another.

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Fig. 6: A sign saying "Return the Northern Territories"outside a public building in NemuroAlso central to the development ofcollective memory is the transition fromthe war generation’s memories ofpersonal experience to the second-handmemories of the postwar generations. Theimportance of family, friends and furusatowithin collective memory can be seen inthe standard processes by which thepostwar generations today acquirehistorical consciousness. Awareness ofwar history among Japanese youth todayoften starts “closest to home” with agrandparent’s story from the war years(“When I was your age ...”). As part of ageneral survey into historicalconsciousness that I carried out amonguniversity students in Hokkaido in 2004and 2005, 436 respondents (51 per centmale, 49 per cent female, 236 of whomwere from Hokkaido) were asked if theyhad heard the war experiences of arelative (see Fig. 7 below). Of these 436students, 197 (45.2 percent) reportedhearing the war experiences of a relativedirectly from that relative, 42 (9.6 percent) had heard of a relative’sexperiences indirectly, 12 (2.8 per cent)had heard both directly and indirectly;152 (34.9 per cent) had not heard the war

experiences of a relative, and 33 (7.6 percent) gave no answer or had “no idea atall” about their family’s war history. Inother words, just over half reportedknowledge of their family’s war history.When asked what they had heard, theanswers provided a cross section of thevarious Japanese war experiences:“Grandfather was training to be akamikaze but the war ended before hecould fly,” “Grandmother worked in amunitions factory,” “Grandmotherexperienced the A-bomb in Hiroshima butis still alive today,” “Grandfather fought inChina.”

Fig. 7: "Have you heard the war experiences of yourrelatives?" Results of a survey conducted on 436 universitystudents in Hokkaido by the author in 2004 and 2005.Beyond the home, school is an importantplace to receive war history education.Debate over whether the war is taught“adequately” in Japanese schools hascontinued throughout the postwar, withcritics arguing that Japanese aggression ismarginalized while Japaneseconservatives bemoan the “masochistic”(“too much focus on Japaneseaggression”) nature of history education.The truth is somewhere in between andthere are marked variations in how muchany given child learns, from virtuallynothing through to significant war-history-related extra-curricular activities.Moreover, the balance has changed over

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time with revisions in textbooks andpublic debate of the issues as well as withgenerational changes. [33] The Japaneseschool system may not seem an idealplace to learn about family and localhistory, given the much-publicized natureof nationally-approved history textbooksand their screening by the Ministry ofEducation, but nevertheless, family andlocal history can feature in threeparticular forms within schooleducation—school trips, testimonymeetings at schools, and extra-curricular(club) activities—as part of the loosely-defined “peace education” programmewithin citizenship or moral education atsome schools.First, “peace education” at school oftencenters around a school trip to a localhistory or “peace” museum. In the early2000s, over a million Japanese children ayear visited a “peace museum,” mainlyon official school trips and mostly to themuseums in Hiroshima, Nagasaki orOkinawa. Japan has scores of othermuseums, both specialist peace/warmuseums and generic history museums,that narrate war history, many of themfrom an explicitly local perspective.One such museum is the HistoricalMuseum of Hokkaido, whose war exhibits“From Recession to World War II” startwith a brief explanation of “War andHokkaido”:

The army began to invade Chinawhich started a 15-year period ofwar. The development ofManchuria was given priority overHokkaido, and many emigrantswere sent to Manchuria. To makeup for the labor shortage in

mining and construction projectsin Hokkaido, Koreans, Chinese andprisoners of war from the AlliedPowers were forced to do heavylabor. Many lives were lost duringthis period. [34]

This explanation hints at an overallprogressivism: the term “15-year war” isthe name preferred by progressives(instead of “Pacific War” or thenationalistic-sounding “Greater East AsianWar”), the war in China is simply labeled“aggression” (the Japanese placard usesthe word shinryaku), and the mention offorced labor is supplemented by two fullpages in the 48-page guidebook(compared to one page on air raids). [35]The exhibits, however, exemplify thepredominant “social history display style”in Japanese war exhibits: they focus onthe Hokkaido front (including a videoabout the Hokkaido air raids) and containa significant family/household element.The artifacts on display include a flaginscribed with messages from friends orneighbors for a soldier to take to thefront, an imonbukuro (consolation bag) tobe filled with letters and presents tosoldiers, wartime clothing (includingmonpe, women’s work trousers, andprotective headgear for during air raids),household items such as a radio andcrockery, and a wartime propagandaposter exhorting people to give theirmetal for the war effort with the slogan:“Your household is a small mine.” Whilethe Historical Museum of Hokkaido doesnot have the testimony collections thatexist in some other museums, mostnotably at the Okinawa Prefectural PeaceMemorial Museum, there are a few letters

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of repatriates from Manchuria andSakhalin on display.Overall, the focus is on family, friends andfurusato rather than military history,politics or foreign victims. The HistoricalMuseum of Hokkaido had 425,023visitors, 2000-2006, of whom 133,387(31.4 per cent) were elementary andjunior high school students and 45,411(10.7 per cent) were high school students.In the period 2004-2006 (for which data isavailable) there were 874 school trips tothe museum, 56.6 per cent of which werefor 12-14 year olds (sixth gradeelementary and first grade junior high).[36] These students saw a representativeform of local and social history exhibitsabout the war as part of their schooleducation.

Figs. 8 and 9: “From Recession to World War II” exhibits inthe Historical Museum of HokkaidoThe second important form of extra-curricular war education for Japanesechildren is listening to the testimony of amember of the war generation. As in most“peace education,” the moral is “theterrible nature of war” and not a jingoisticdefense of Japanese actions. Thearchetypal testimony at schools that isreported in the Japanese media is civiliantestimony of air raids. For example, theHokkaido Shinbun reported on 14 July2006 that in Kushiro (one of the citiesaffected most by the Hokkaido air raids of14-15 July 1945), survivors of the air raidshad been speaking to children atelementary and junior high schools. [37].But testimony of other military andcivilian experiences can feature, too,provided that it fits within the school’sdefinition of “peace education.” In thesame university student surveymentioned above, 11.2 per cent of the436 students said that they had heardtestimony from a member of the wargeneration invited to speak at their juniorhigh school, while 18.6 per cent hadheard such testimony at senior highschool.

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Third, there can be significant wareducation within a Japanese child’sschooling through club activities. Suchclub activities may be atypical, but canalso become newsworthy and gain widersignificance through the local media. Forexample, the drama club at KuriyamaHigh School put on a play about MaedaHiroshi, the Hokkaido kamikaze pilotwhose last letter home was mentionedearlier. The play took its title from his lastpoem, Ore ga shindara, nannin nakube (“Iwonder how many will cry when I die”).Written by Sakurai Mikiji, a teacher atKuriyama High, it was performed at theMuroran Municipal Community Center(shimin kaikan).

Fig. 10: Super News reports the play about Maeda Hiroshiput on by Kuriyama High SchoolOn 15 August 2005, Super News on localtelevision station UHB (part of the FujiTelevision network) featured the playduring its sixtieth-anniversarycommemoration coverage. A seven-minute report included extracts from aperformance of the play, notably the finalscene, when Maeda explains his reasonsfor flying his mission: “I am not dying formy country. I am dying for the things Ilove. I am dying to protect my family and

furusato.” The monologue is delivered tothe audience, but Maeda’s mother islistening to him and interjects repeatedlywith the same line: “Don’t die” (Shindewa dame). Playwright Sakurai states thathis message in the play was theimportance of life and the need tomaintain peace. The interjections ofMaeda’s departed mother were a devicefor putting this message into the play. Theplay was a great success, bringing tearsto the eyes of many in the audience andcast. UHB’s report introduced the sectionfrom Maeda’s final letter cited earlier andincluded an interview with Maeda’s sister-in-law, who tends his memorial stone inthe family grave plot. The report closedwith a shot of the memorial stone and thecomment: “Maeda Hiroshi rests in peacehere with his family.”This news report is revealing on manylevels. The play exemplifies howtestimony and experiences of the wargeneration are reworked to fit themeanings of contemporary Japan. Thetheme of furusato runs through the story:in Maeda’s dramatized motivations forflying, in the fact that a school put on aplay about a “local Hokkaido boy” in amunicipal community center, and in alocal television station’s reporting of theevent. And as in so many news reportsand television documentaries on Japanesetelevision, interviews with relatives ormembers of the war generation featureprominently. Overall, this report and playillustrate how social history and themes offamily, friends and furusato can featureprominently in cultural and mediarepresentations of the war in Japan today.

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Figs. 11 and 12: In another example of family and regionalmemories in Japanese television, Kikuchi Teiko recountsduring an NHK documentary how her father was killed inthe naval bombardment of Muroran, while a graphic showsthe position of the family home in the area shelled by theAmerican navy. [38]Family, friends and furusato also play acentral role in official warcommemorations throughout Japan,particularly on the war-end anniversary,15 August. While the nationalcommemorations in Tokyo—particularlythe Ceremony of Remembrance for theWar Dead held at Budokan Hall in thepresence of the Emperor, Empress andleading politicians—attracts most nationalattention, there are a multitude of locallyorganized events. Television news, bothnational and local, will give round-ups in

their 15 August bulletins, and the majorlocal ceremonies make the regional press.For example, Kushiro has a 15 Augustmemorial ceremony organized by the citygovernment in the Sakaemachi PeacePark, mainly for the civilian victims of theKushiro air raids on 14-15 July 1945. On16 August 2006 the Hokkaido Shinbunreported that this ceremony was attendedby the mayor and 400 citizens.Meanwhile, a separate ceremony washeld on the same day at the small KushiroGokoku Jinja (“Nation Protecting Shrine”)that enshrines soldiers from the city. Thatceremony was attended by 600 officialsand bereaved relatives.[39]

Fig. 13: The memorial to civilian victims of the Kushiro airraids, 14-15 July 1945, and site for Kushiro's officialmunicipal commemorations. Sakaemachi Peace Park,Kushiro.Fig. 14: Kushiro Gokoku Jinja, a small "undesignated nation-

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protecting shrine" that commemorates local servicemen.This separation of the commemoration ofcivilian and military victims is aconspicuous feature of Japanese warcommemorations. The commemoration of“passive (civilian) victims” creates littlecontroversy and is a cornerstone ofJapanese pacifism: local commemorationssuch as those in Kushiro are oftenaccompanied by municipal peace andanti-nuclear declarations. However, thecommemoration of “active (military)agents” has repeatedly createdcontroversy at home and abroad. Thecommemorations focus on the “sacrifice”of Japanese soldiers, and whenever localofficials attend ceremonies at prefecturalor municipal Gokoku shrines, it mayprecipitate controversies similar to thosethat surround prime ministerial worship atYasukuni Shrine. [40] For example,scholar Takahashi Tetsuya, one of themost eloquent critics of official Yasukuniworship, has called the attendance of themayor of Asahikawa and Self DefenseForces officials at the main HokkaidoGokoku Jinja festival (4 June is the shrine’sfoundation day; 5-6 June is when the wardead are commemorated) a “moreserious issue than [Prime MinisterKoizumi’s] Yasukuni worship.” First, theparticipation of leading SDF officials at theHokkaido Gokoku Jinja festival illustratesthe shrine’s continuing close links withthe Japanese military. Second, theattendance of the Asahikawa Mayor (andon previous occasions the governor ofHokkaido) constitutes officialcommemoration at a shrine doctrinallyequivalent to and associated withYasukuni Shrine. Whereas prime

ministerial worship at Yasukuni Shrinecauses great national and internationalcontroversy (including over theconstitutionality of official participation inreligious festivals), local civic oppositioncannot generate comparable oppositionalpressure, so such commemorations havebeen able to continue. [41]But while the commemorations of officialsand dignitaries feature prominently in theJapanese media, so too can the privatecommemorations of ordinary people. Herethe interface of commemoration and thefamily becomes clearer. Amid theheightened interest precipitated by PrimeMinister Koizumi’s worship at YasukuniShrine on 15 August 2006, a HokkaidoShinbun article about thecommemorations at Hokkaido GokokuJinja featured two individuals who hadcome to pray (sanpai). One was a doctorwho had brought his young son to starthis education about the importance ofpeace; another was a woman who hadbeen drafted to work in a factory that wasbombed during the war. She lost anumber of friends in the bombing andsaid she comes to pray for them everyyear. [42]The same article also described how acitizens’ group in Asahikawa handed out“draft papers” (akagami) to passers-by toremind people that during the warfamilies could be separated withoutwarning. This is an annual event thattakes place in a number of other citiesincluding Sapporo. One woman whoreceived an akagami commented, “I hadheard about receiving call up papers frommy parents, but actually seeing onebrings it home to you.” Her grandson,

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meanwhile, said “forcefully” that he neverwants to go to war. This thirteen-year-oldboy’s comments are indicative of the factthat, whatever the virtues or failings ofthe Japanese education system regardingthe teaching of war history, many childrenknow how to use the pervasive “war isbad” rhetoric from an early age.

Fig. 15: Members of a citizens group hand out draft papersin Sapporo on 15 August 2005.In summary, wherever one looksconcerning the topics of war memory andcommemoration in contemporary Japan,family, friends and furusato are to befound affecting the ways in whichJapanese people continue to look back onthe Asia-Pacific War. Education at school,the cultural representation of war(particularly in museums, the press andtelevision) and official commemorationsall have an important local dimension.Furthermore, whether hearing thetestimony of the war generation at schoolor in discussions between members of thepostwar generation (such as the doctorand his son at Hokkaido Gokoku Jinja), themorals of the war are frequently workedthrough in an explicitly family or localcontext.Dominant Narratives Versus

Contested War Memories: Contrastswith Allied NationsThe importance of family and localmemories is by no means unique toJapan. Nevertheless, there are variousreasons why social history focusing onfamilies, friends and furusato hasassumed a particularly prominent positionwithin Japanese public war discourses.These reasons are brought into sharpfocus through comparison with memoriesin Allied nations, particularly the UnitedKingdom and United States.In the US, UK and other Allied nations, avictorious war against nations that couldeasily be portrayed as aggressive hasproduced dominant cultural narratives ofa “good war” against the evils of fascism.Such a dominant cultural narrative allowswar history to play a prominent role in theformation of national identity through themedia, education system, museums andofficial sites or ceremonies ofcommemoration. People today are invitedto share the honor of the war generation(the “greatest generation”) as part oftheir shared national heritage.The effects of a dominant narrative onsurvivors have been illustrated by oralhistorian Alistair Thomson. Thomson’s“memory biographies” of ANZAC veteransfrom Gallipoli demonstrate how adominant cultural narrative reinforced bypatriotic official commemorations andpopular cultural forms (such as the 1981film Gallipoli) imposes pressure onsurvivors to compose and narrate theirmemories in a way that fits the dominantlegend: “stories and meanings that do notfit today’s public narrative are stillsilenced or marginalised, or at best

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resurface within a sympathetic particularpublic, such as a gathering of fellowradicals or an oral history interview.” [43]Such processes are also evident in WorldWar II memories. For both the war andpostwar generations in the UK and US,using family, local or other identities tochallenge national views of war history isrisky given the widely believed andmorally comfortable dominant legend. Inthis situation, family and local identitiestend to play a supporting role to thedominant legend in national discoursesand are used primarily to add nuance torather than challenge national history.The risk of challenging the dominantlegend is clarified by observing thedifficulty of portraying any Allied waractions as atrocity. In his arrestingmemoir, With the Old Breed, EugeneSledge describes a horrific incident inwhich an American marine slashes openthe cheeks of a wounded Japanese soldierso he can extract teeth as a souvenir.Eventually another marine shoots theJapanese soldier to “put him out of hismisery”. [44] Such brutally frank accountsof Allied atrocity are rare. Even rarer areoccasions when such admissions aremade for the specific purpose of assumingindividual and collective guilt, which isprecisely the motivation of most Japanesesoldiers who have described atrocitiesboth in public and private. This Americanatrocity is the equivalent of any individualact of barbarity committed by Japanesesoldiers, but Sledge merely comments,“Such was the incredible cruelty thatdecent men could commit when reducedto a brutish existence in their fight forsurvival amid the violent death, terror,

tension, fatigue, and filth that was theinfantryman’s war.” [45]“Decent men in a brutal situation” is thecatch-all opt-out for Allied war crimes andatrocities, from the act of an individual allthe way up to the most ethically suspectof Allied strategies, particularly fire- andatomic-bombing. The BBC HistoryMagazine gave another example in afeature article from its March 2007 issue,in which Patrick Bishop argued BomberCommand’s raids against German citieswere a case of “Good men doing an uglyjob”. [46] For those who challenge the“decency” in some Allied actions,veterans in particular have another aceup their sleeves: “people who were notthere cannot judge.” For example,renowned World War I scholar PaulFussell, himself a World War II veteran,wrote in his introduction to Sledge’s book,“If you are back only a couple of hundredyards behind anger and cruelty andhysteria and fear of death, you are too farback to understand, and that is one of thereasons Sledge has written this book.”[47]The authority to speak bestowed byfirsthand experience, particularly in thecontext of the dominant “good war”narrative, means that the postwargenerations in Allied nations have found itvery difficult to counter the views of thosewho were actually there. Nevertheless,the “good men doing an ugly job” view isproblematic on two important levels. First,the moral reasoning applied to “oneself”is not applied to “others.” Japaneseatrocities (or German bombing) are veryrarely, if ever, judged to be the acts of“good men doing an ugly job” in accounts

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published by American or Britishcommentators. In an analytical double-standard, while Allied atrocities are aresult of what war does to “decent men,”Japanese atrocities are typically treatedas an illustration of the barbarity ofJapanese soldiers consonant with thegoals and policies of the Japanese state.Second, following on from the previouspoint, if the moral reasoning of “goodmen doing an ugly job” is applied toJapanese soldiers, it becomes effectivelythe same moral logic used by Japanesenationalists, who wish to downplay ordismiss Japanese war guilt.Understanding the mechanisms of theAllied “good war” narrative, therefore, isactually very helpful for understandingJapanese nationalistic defenses of Japan’sseemingly indefensible war conduct.Japanese nationalists promote a “goodwar” narrative of the Greater East AsianWar based on the aim or achievement ofthe “liberation of Asia from Westerncolonialism.” According to nationalists,Japanese soldiers were good men indifficult circumstances and even if theiractions had been brutal, they were aninevitable result of the extremecircumstances, or, as in the case of ItoYoshimitsu whose story started this essay,their actions were misunderstood andunfairly judged following Japan’s defeat.As in Allied nations, within Japanesenationalist historical consciousness familyand local history are of value only insofaras they reinforce the “good war”narrative. Testimony that contradicts the“good war” narrative is a threat and anaffront to national honor. In Allied nationsthe strength of the dominant narrative is

usually sufficient to marginalizeoppositional voices, but with a significantsection of Japanese society accepting theview that Japan fought an aggressive war,nationalists in Japan must resort to crudertactics: discrediting witnesses, wagingcampaigns (such as the ongoing battlesfor more patriotic textbooks andeducation) or even intimidation ofconscientious Japanese.Despite the seductive nature of thenationalist narrative that assigns all guiltto the Western powers, for manyJapanese people the evidence of theJapanese military’s conduct and their ownsuffering both in battle and on the homefront precludes positive identification withthe wartime state. In this situation, thepolitical ideology, gender, or family andlocal identities that are marginalized indominant national narratives come to thefore because they offer people ways toseparate their own actions andexperiences from those of the wartimestate. The “self-other” dyad assumes thefollowing form: while the militarist/state“other” aggressed, the family/local “self”suffered, was coerced into compliance, orwas powerless to prevent Japan’saggression/fate. For those individualsbrave enough to issue public confessionsof guilt, a strong sense of moral orpolitical purpose is usually necessary toproffer such a bold challenge to nationalconduct and official obfuscations ofJapanese war responsibility.Overall, in Japan there is no dominantnational narrative to subsume the richvariety of individual and familyexperiences into a generic, flattened outcollective narrative. The government

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promotes a fragile and unconvincingcompromise that Japan did not, or did notintend, to fight an “aggressive war”,although it admits “aggressive acts” (thesignificance of this is discussed below).This stance is criticized internationally asinadequate, and domestically from boththe Japanese political right and politicalleft (either for being “masochistic” and“acknowledging Japanese aggression toomuch,” or for not going far enough toaddress war responsibility issues).Given Japan’s contested war memories,family and local narratives cannot berepressed in the public domain by adominant narrative (although otherfactors—such as guilty secrets, reluctanceto become embroiled in controversy orthe inability to articulate painfulmemories—are significant issues). AsPetra Buchholz has noted, Japan has aparticularly vibrant literature ofautobiography and self-history, and whilemuch of this is civilian testimony, theJapanese war literature is also noteworthyfor the proliferation of soldier memoirs.[48] The inability to settle on a dominantnarrative at a national level and thebenefits for many of framing war historyin terms other than national history is, Iwould argue, a key if not the key reasonfor the proliferation of testimony andmemories framed in family and localterms in contemporary Japan.The roles of family, friends (particularlyveterans’ groups, or sen’yu, literally “warfriends”) and furusato are also evident inthe most important forms of official warcommemoration. As was illustrated in theexample of Kushiro above, civilian victimsand the military war dead tend to be

commemorated separately. Overall,Japanese commemorations exhibit threeother key features. First, civilian victimstend to be commemorated locally;second, the main commemorations forthe military dead are national, but thereare also local commemorations; and third,it is bereaved relatives rather thanveterans who are the most politically-influential interest group in contemporaryJapan.Across the country most officialcommemorations of civilian victims areorganized at a local level, the events arerelatively low-profile, and they areattended by only a few dozen or fewhundred survivors and bereaved relatives.By contrast, the commemorations inHiroshima, Nagasaki and Okinawa haveassumed quasi-national status, arebroadcast on national television, and arenow routinely attended by seniorpoliticians.Most commemorations of civilians areorganized locally because officialcommemoration of civilian victims at anational level poses a dilemma. Giventhat the state failed to protect its civiliansin the homeland and colonies, thenational government might not beconsidered the ideal leader of officialmourning. National commemoration ofcivilian victims could easily drag the stateinto ritualized apologies to its own people,and thereby undermine the state’sauthority. The risk of this occurringbecomes more evident when oneconsiders that a number of victims’groups, from hibakusha (A-bomb victims)to zanryu koji (war orphans left behind inChina), have blamed the Japanese

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government for their plights and sued thegovernment for more assistance.A further reason for localcommemorations is the spiritual andpolitical significance of “sites of memory.”For example, holding the officialcommemorations of the A-bombs awayfrom the hypocenters (“ground zero”) inHiroshima and Nagasaki is unthinkable.With sites such as the Hiroshima museumand peace park funded by local taxes andadministered by local officials, localgovernment inevitably takes the leadingrole in any commemorations on thosesites.The fact that the ceremonies are localalso allows for more latitude in officialapologies and peace declarations. InHiroshima, for example, the localgovernment (unlike the military ornational government) can separate itselffrom responsibility for what happened on6 August 1945 and therefore lead localmourning. Furthermore, as issues of“Hiroshima’s war guilt” do notovershadow the ceremony (althoughHiroshima’s military role and the presenceof forced laborers is briefly acknowledgedin the Hiroshima Peace MemorialMuseum’s exhibits), the “state aggressed-local people suffered” framework can beand is employed by local officials.Consequently, local governments such asin Hiroshima and Nagasaki frequentlyoffer more forthright official apologies forJapanese aggression (or criticisms of keyallies such as the US over military/nuclearpolicy) than the national government. In1995, for example, the straightforward“official” apology to Asian nations fromHiroshima Mayor Hiraoka Takashi at the

peace ceremony on 6 August was inmarked contrast to the evasive andshambolic 9 June 1995 Diet Resolution tomark the fiftieth anniversary of the end ofthe war or Prime Minister Murayama’ssincere but “private” apology on 15August 1995 in the Murayamacommunique (danwa). [49]The significance of these regionalcommemorations of war victimhood inJapan are even more pronounced whenone considers their equivalents in the UKand US. Comparisons with the US inparticular are not easy given that fightingbarely came to the American homelands(Pearl Harbor comes under military notcivilian commemorations), but theLuftwaffe’s bombing campaigns duringthe Battle of Britain and throughout thewar that claimed the lives of around60,000 British civilians are notremembered using the somber rhetoric ofvictimhood and the preciousness ofpeace. In Britain’s case, the Blitz has beenremembered (with the help of muchmyth-making [50]) primarily as anexample of British pluck and courage inthe nation’s “darkest hour.” The moral isnot the terrible nature of war: Germany’sindiscriminate targeting of British civiliansforms part of the rationale for thenecessity of the “good war” to defeat NaziGermany.The second feature of Japanesecommemorations relates tocommemoration of the military war dead,which also offers different dilemmas forJapan in comparison to the UK and US.However problematic the conduct of theJapanese wartime state and military, thecontemporary Japanese state still feels

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obliged to at least thank and offercondolences to those that the state calledon to fight and die for their country.Herein lies the significance of the term“aggressive acts” (shinryaku koi) ratherthan “aggressive war” (shiryaku senso) inofficial apologies and statements aboutJapanese responsibility. “Aggressiveacts,” in other words atrocities, can beblamed on poor leadership, mistakes, theheat of battle, or simply the cruel natureof war. But “aggressive war” is a blanketcondemnation of Japan’s entire war andeven the foundations of the Japaneseempire. The state cannot admit that Japanfought an aggressive war withoutcriminalizing all Japanese war actions andthereby delegitimizing the “sacrifice” ofthe war dead. As long as the state feelsobliged to thank rather than apologize toits service personnel, references toaggressive war are anathema. This alsogoes a long way to explaining why theJapanese government has sought, wherepossible, to limit mentions of Japaneseaggression in Japanese textbooks throughits screening process.A group that has played a leading role inpressing the government to avoidadmitting an aggressive war is the WarBereaved Association (Nippon Izokukai).But as Franziska Seraphim’s recent andilluminating account of the history of theIzokukai reveals, the Izokukai’sconservative interpretation of war historywas never actively endorsed by allmembers of the organization. Manymembers appreciated more the“organized assistance for personalremembrance” (such as bus tours tocommemorative sites including Yasukuni

Shrine), the social network of people withsimilar experiences, and the benefits ofcollective bargaining over pension rightswith the government. [51] In particular,the issue of official prime ministerialworship divided the Izokukai after theenshrinement of 14 class A war criminalsin 1978. The Yasukuni issue led to thebreakaway of a number of local chaptersin the early 1980s and the formation ofthe National Association of the WarBereaved Families for Peace (HeiwaIzokukai Zenkoku Renrakukai) in 1986.In a further illustration of the importanceof local aspects in war-related politics, thebreakaway started with a local dispute inHokkaido. In 1982, the Asahikawa CityKamui District War Bereaved Associationleft the national organization following arequest by the Hokkaido Rengo Izokukaifor 12,000 yen from each householdreceiving a bereaved family pension tosupport the Izokukai’s campaigns forofficial Yasukuni Shrine worship. A disputeensued when the Kamui branch insistedthat such contributions should bevoluntary. The dispute was resolved bythe withdrawal of the Kamui branch fromthe national organization. The localbranch in Takikawa (on the main routebetween Asahikawa and Sapporo)followed suit, and after Prime MinisterNakasone’s official Yasukuni worship in1985, a number of other local chaptersacross Japan left in protest, too. [52] TheBereaved Families for Peace were criticalof Yasukuni worship and promoted criticalconsciousness of Japan’s aggressive war(shinryaku senso), but in severing theirties to the central organization they werenever able to achieve the political muscle

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of the national organization.Despite such fractions, the Izokukai hasremained a key interest group in war-related politics. It has supported the LDPthroughout the postwar, delivering asignificant bloc of votes during generalelections in return for welfare and pensionrights for veterans and bereaved familiesthat continue to this day. The activitiesand political muscle of the War BereavedAssociation illustrate the thirdconspicuous feature of Japanesecommemorations: whereas the mostpolitically powerful groups representingthe war generation in the UK and US tendto be veterans’ associations, in Japan theWar Bereaved Association plays this role.In the UK and US, officialcommemorations are patriotic occasionsto thank the war generation for theirsacrifice. Veterans have pride of place atthe key ceremonies on RemembranceSunday in the UK or Veterans’ Day in theUS. In Japan, by contrast, veterans play asmall or marginal role in official 15 Augustcommemorations. Walking aroundYasukuni Shrine on 15 August one can seemany groups of veterans bussed in topray for the souls of their fallen comrades,but the key state-sponsoredcommemorations take place across theroad in Budokan Hall. There, the centralrole of bereaved families can be seen inthe approximately six thousand otherparticipants, most of whom are relativesof soldiers who died in the war. Thecommemorations are somber and since1993 have also been the stage for a primeministerial acknowledgement of thedamage and suffering caused by theJapanese military throughout Asia.

Condolences are offered to all victims ofthe war across Asia, a custom thatcomplicates any moves to incorporate agreater role for veterans at thesecommemorations.Overall, the prominence of bereavedrelatives rather than veterans in Japan’smajor state-sponsored annualcommemorations, the somber rather thanjingoistic nature of commemorations, andthe need to proffer some form ofacknowledgement of sufferings in othercountries all speak volumes for thelegacies of defeat and war responsibility.So does the fallout from any attempts byJapanese officials to move towards Anglo-American-style patriotic celebrations ofveterans and the war dead. The keycommemorative sites for fallen soldiersare Yasukuni Shrine and its “branchshrines,” the Gokoku (“Nation Protecting”)Shrines that exist in every prefecture(described in note [14]). Yasukuni Shrineenshrines 2.46 million individuals whodied in the service of Japan since 1868(86.5 per cent of whom died during the“Greater East Asian War”, 1941-5) andpresents a “good war,” unapologetic warnarrative in its museum, Yushukan. Since1985, however, any visits by Japaneseprime ministers, whether “private” or“official”, have precipitated a furiousreaction in neighboring countries, notablyChina and South Korea, and dividedJapanese public opinion almost down themiddle.In sum, even at the national or officiallevels of war memories andcommemoration, family, friends andfurusato have their role to play.Commemorations of civilian victims are

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managed primarily at the local level,while bereaved families have taken centerstage at military commemorations. TheWar Bereaved Association representingfamilies of the war dead is a particularlypowerful lobby group, but it has beendivided and even faced breakaways bylocal chapters over issues of warresponsibility and Yasukuni Shrineworship. These issues are all brought intosharp contrast with the equivalentsituations in the UK and US and revealjust how deeply issues of warresponsibility continue to ensure theongoing importance of family, friends andfurusato within official commemorationsin Japan today. The comparative approachreveals that the more contested the warmemories are within a nation, the morethat family, friends and furusato assumeimportance within the processes ofcultural remembering and officialcommemoration.ConclusionsThis article has focused on the oftenoverlooked point that a deepunderstanding of war memories, Japaneseor others’, requires incorporating allaspects of people’s identities. In Japan’scase, whether in the testimony of the wargeneration, the development of collectivenarratives or the practices of national andofficial commemorations, family, friendsand furusato all play important roles. Theyare not the only powerful sources ofidentity pertinent to Japanese wardebates and this essay could equally havebeen written with regard to gendered,political or generation identities. The keyconclusion, however, is that only byexamining all aspects of Japanese

people’s multilayered and situationalidentities can the diversity ofinterpretations of war history withinJapan’s contested war memories beexplained.But perhaps more importantly, focusingon the issues “closest to home” revealsthe “human side” of us all. Given thatstereotypes in peacetime and atrocities inwartime are in part the product of thedehumanization and arbitrarycategorizations of others whipped up byself-righteous nationalism, the attempt inthis essay to shift the focus of attentionfrom simply “people as members of anation” to people as diverse individualswith families, friends and hometowns aswell as nationalities can contribute topromoting peace and reconciliation withinAsia and beyond. While the focus of thisessay has been on understandingJapanese views, and in particular theviews of people from Hokkaido, thecentral lessons apply to all nations. The“history issue” in Asia would take a largestep towards being resolved if Chinese,Koreans and others could be seen moreby the Japanese not simply as Chinese orKorean “others” but as individuals,members of families, friends andmembers of local communities that allhave their own often harrowing stories totell of how the Japanese military affectedtheir lives during World War II. Similarly,can we envisage a day when Chinese,Koreans and other victims of Japanesecolonialism and war recognize themultiple wartime experiences of theJapanese people, including those ofassailants, but also victims?Acknowledgements:

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This essay is part of a project called “Warand Memory in Hokkaido: a case study inthe regional remembering of World WarII,” which is supported by a grant from theJapanese Ministry of Education. Thisarticle was written for Japan Focus andposted on July 10, 2007. I would like tothank Mark Selden, Richard Minear andSabine Fruhstuck for their invaluablecomments on earlier drafts of the paper.Philip Seaton is an Associate Professor inthe Research Faculty of Media andCommunication, Hokkaido University. Heis the author of the recently publishedJapan’s Contested War Memories: The‘Memory Rifts’ in Historical Consciousnessof World War II. His webpage iswww.philipseaton.net, and he may becontacted at seaton@ilcs.hokudai.ac.jp.References[1] Kakiuchi Toshio, Sokoku ni inochisasagete (Giving One’s Life to One’sCountry), (Kyobunsha 1988), p. 135.[2] Ibid. p.21. Ito’s last will and testamentis representative of a number of B and Cclass war criminals whose last words werecollected in Testaments of the Century.See John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japanin the Wake of World War II (W.W. Norton& Co. 1999), pp. 508-21.[3] Kakiuchi, Sokoku, pp. 57-8.[4] Ibid. 337-8.[5] For development of my critiques of the“orthodoxy” within the English-languagemedia and academy, see Philip Seaton,Japan’s Contested War Memories: The‘Memory Rifts’ in Historical Consciousnessof World War II (Routledge 2007),especially the Introduction and Appendix.See also “Reporting the 2001 textbookand Yasukuni Shrine controversies:

Japanese war memory andcommemoration in the British media”,Japan Forum (2005) Vol. 17.3, pp.287-309.[6] Seaton, Japan’s Contested WarMemories, pp. 20-28.[7] Ibid., pp. 17-18. My use of the term“composure” is informed by AlistairThomson: “‘Composure’ is an aptlyambiguous term to describe the processof memory making. In one sense wecompose or construct memories using thepublic languages and meanings of ourculture. In another sense we composememories that help us to feel relativelycomfortable with our lives and identities,that give us a feeling of composure.”Alistair Thomson, ANZAC Memories: Livingwith the Legend (Oxford University Press1994), p. 8.[8] Philip Seaton, “Reporting the ‘comfortwomen’ issue, 1992-3: Japan’s contestedwar memories in the national press”,Japanese Studies (2006) Vol. 26.1, pp.99-112.[9] Nishida Hideko, “Senjika Hokkaido niokeru chosenjin ‘romu ianfu’ no seiritsu tojitsuno” (“‘Laborer comfort women’ fromKorea in wartime Hokkaido”), Joseishikenkyu Hokkaido, (August 2003), pp.16-36. There were about 100 Koreanwomen working in the sex industry inHokkaido at the beginning of 1938. Theestablishment of “comfort stations” nearmines was officially intended to “preventlaborers running away” but it was also ameans to control sexually transmitteddisease. Korean women also worked incafes and bars, although the local police’sinsistence on health checks for workersindicates that such establishments were

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viewed as “dens of sexually transmitteddisease.” Nishida’s survey, based oncompany documents and the nationalsurvey in 1940 (as yet no survivors havecome forward to testify), revealed that333 Korean women, some as young as 14,worked in the entertainment industry inHokkaido, while around 90 worked in 17“comfort stations” attached to coal mines.Nishida concludes their experiencesexemplify the state’s “double policy ofoppression” against both Koreans andwomen.[10] Benedict Anderson, ImaginedCommunities: Reflections on the Originand Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1983).[11] Hokkaido Shinbun (ed) Senka nokioku: sengo rokuju nen, hyaku-nin noshogen (Memories of the War: 100People’s Testimony 60 Years On),(Hokkaido Shinbunsha 2005), pp. 267-8.This book is available online (includingphotographs of the people who told theirstories). Miyamoto's testimony is here.[12] Ibid. pp. 230-1. Available online.[13] Ibid. pp. 198-201. Available online.[14] Following the Meiji Restoration, thegovernment ordered the establishment ofShokonjo or Shokonsha (“place/shrine toinvite the souls of the dead”) tocommemorate those who had given theirlives for the state. Tokyo Shokonshabecame Yasukuni Shrine in 1879. In 1939Shokonsha were renamed Gokoku Jinja(“nation protecting shrine”) and at leastone was officially designated in eachprefecture to commemorate soldiers fromthat prefecture. Hokkaido has threedesignated Gokoku Jinja: in Asahikawa,Sapporo and Hakodate. Other non-designated Gokoku Jinja exist, including in

Kushiro (mentioned later in the essay).These shrines, like Yasukuni Shrine inTokyo, commemorate those that died inthe service of the Japanese military(gunjin) or those attached to the military(gunzoku), such as nurses. People may becommemorated simultaneously atYasukuni Shrine and their local GokokuJinja. Similar to Yasukuni, the shrinesbecame autonomous religiousorganizations after Japan’s defeat. Theyhave annual festivals specifically tocommemorate the war dead but alsobecome a focal point for commemorationson 15 August. While officially separateorganizations, the Gokoku Jinja are all partof the Association of Shinto Shrines (JinjaHoncho), and the head priest of HokkaidoGokoku Jinja, Shionoya Tsuneya, told meduring an interview (1 March 2007) thathe attended annual gatherings with otherhead priests of Gokoku Jinja at YasukuniShrine. See John Nelson, “Social Memoryas Ritual Practice: Commemorating Spiritsof the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shrine”,The Journal of Asian Studies (2003), Vol.62.2, pp. 443-467.See also the Hokkaido Gokoku Jinjawebpage.[15] Itoman City (eds), Itoman-shi ni okeruOkinawasen no taikenkishu (A Collectionof Testimony about the Battle for Okinawain Itoman City), (Itoman City 1995), p.149.[16] Ibid. 156, 159.[17] Ibid. 160.[18] The museum has a webpage.[19] Tanaka Yuki, “Japan’s KamikazePilots and Contemporary SuicideBombers: War and Terror”, Japan Focus.[20] Families in Japan often own a plot of

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land where the remains of familymembers are buried and memorial stonesare erected to deceased family members.Maeda would not need to be buried therebecause his body would be lost in thekamikaze attack, but in the same waythat soldiers would say “Let’s meet againat Yasukuni” (referring to their souls beingenshrined together at Yasukuni Shrine),Maeda’s soul could rest with his mother’sin the family grave. As the television newsreport (discussed later) about the playbased on Maeda’s life illustrated, hisfamily did erect a memorial stone to himwhere relatives continue to pray for hissoul.[21] Muranaga Kaoru (ed), ChiranTokubetsu Kogekitai (The Kamikaze ofChiran), (Japuran 1989), pp.58-9.[22] Hokkaido Shinbun, Senka no Kioku, p.210. Available online.[23] Philip Seaton, “Do you really want toknow what your uncle did? Coming toterms with relatives’ war actions inJapan”, Oral History (2006) Vol. 43.1, pp.53-60.[24] Sapporo Kyodo wo Horu Kai, Sensowo horu: Shogen, kagai to higai, Chugokukara tonan Ajia e (Unearthing the War:Perpetrator and Victim Testimony fromChina to Southeast Asia), (Sapporo Kyodowo Horu Kai 1995), pp. 246-7.[25] Ibid. p. 251. Tanifuji’s testimonycontains all the hallmarks of members ofthe Chinese Returnees Association(Chukiren). Chukiren members wereinterned at Fushun prison in China until1956 before returning home andbecoming one of the most active groupsof Japanese soldiers confessing toatrocities. However, Tanifuji does not

explicitly state that he is a member of thisgroup.[26] Linda Hoaglund, “Stubborn Legaciesof War: Japanese Devils in Sarajevo”,Japan Focus[27] Kurahashi Ayako, Kempei datta chichino nokoshita mono (What my MilitaryPoliceman Father Left Me), (Kobunken2002), p. 109. Azuma’s story is also toldin Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt, Memoriesof War in Germany and Japan (Vintage1995), pp. 129-34.[28] Edward S. Herman and NoamChomsky, Manufacturing Consent: ThePolitical Economy of the Mass Media(Vintage 1994), Chapter 2.[29] For themes of racism in World War IIatrocities, see John Dower, War WithoutMercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War(Pantheon Books 1986).[30] Kayano Shigeru (trans. Kyoko Seldenand Lili Selden), Our Land Was a Forest:An Ainu Memoir (Westview Press 1994),pp. 79-86.[31] Thomson, ANZAC Memories, p. 12.The full citation is: “My argument is thatan official or dominant legend works notby excluding contradictory versions ofexperience, but by representing them inways that fit the legend and flatten outthe contradictions, but which are stillresonant for a wide variety of people.”[32] Hokkaido Shinbun, Senka no kioku, p.222.[33] There is a vast literature on thetextbook issue throughout the postwar.Two essays that give a good overview ofthe twists and turns are: Caroline Rose,“The Battle for Hearts and Minds: PatrioticEducation in Japan in the 1990s andBeyond” in Naoko Shimazu (ed)

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Nationalisms in Japan (Routledge 2006);and Nozaki Yoshiko and InokuchiHiromitsu, “Japanese Education,Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’sTextbook Lawsuits” in Laura Hein andMark Selden (eds) Censoring History:Citizenship and Memory in Japan,Germany, and the United States (M.E.Sharpe 2000).[34] Historical Museum of Hokkaido (seewebpage). The English is an accuratetranslation of the Japanese panel, barringthe last sentence, which in the originalJapanese makes it much clearer that thelives lost were of forced laborers.[35] Historical Museum of Hokkaido, FromRecession to World War II (Sixth ExhibitionHall Guidebook), (HMH 2000). Forcedlabor is on pages 42 and 44, air raids areon page 48.[36] I am grateful to Ikeda Takao of theHistorical Museum of Hokkaido forcompiling this data.[37] Hokkaido Shinbun, “Heiwa no imi,kosei ni” (Explaining the meaning ofpeace to future generations), 14 July 2006(Kushiro/Nemuro morning edition).[38] NHK, “Hokkaido Close-up: Machi nihodan ga uchikomareta: shogen Murorankanpo shageki” (When shells fell on thetown: testimony of the navalbombardment of Muroran), broadcast 29July 2005.[39] Hokkaido Shinbun, “Senka nai sekaiwo” (Create a world without war), 16August 2006 (Kushiro/Nemuro morningedition).[40] For discussion of domestic Japanesedebate over official Yasukuni Shrineworship, see Philip Seaton, “PledgeFulfilled: Prime Minister Koizumi’s

Yasukuni Worship and the JapaneseMedia, 2001-6” in John Breen (ed)Yasukuni: Contested Meanings (Hurst &Co., forthcoming).[41] Hokkaido Shinbun, “Gokoku jinjareitaisai, shicho no sanretsu hihan,Asahikawa de seikyo bunri shukai”(Gokoku Shrine festival, Mayor’sattendance criticized, meeting inAsahikawa about the constitutionalseparation of religion and the state), 7June 2005. Takahashi Tetsuya, personalcorrespondence, 30 June 2007.[42] Hokkaido Shinbun, “Heiwa no totosahishihishi” (The Preciousness of Peace),16 August 2006 (Asahikawa morningedition).[43] Thomson, ANZAC Memories, p. 215.[44] E.B. Sledge, With the Old Breed atPeleliu and Okinawa (Oxford UniversityPress 1990), p. 120.[45] Ibid.[46] Patrick Bishop, “Bomber Boys”, BBCHistory Magazine March 2007, pp. 14-19.[47] Paul Fussell, “Introduction” in Sledge,With the Old Breed, p. xvi.[48] Petra Buchholz, “Tales of War:autobiographies and private memories inJapan and Germany”, online.[49] Seaton, Japan’s Contested WarMemories, pp. 57, 94-6.[50] See Angus Calder, The Myth of theBlitz (Pimlico 1991). Rather than focusingsolely on the “courage and pluck” of theBritish people, Calder’s account alsodocuments conscientious objectors toBritain’s war against Germany, classenmity between evacuated Londonersand their rural hosts, and the booing ofChurchill and the royal family.[51] Franziska Seraphim, War Memory

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and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005,(Harvard University Press 2007), Chapter2, especially p. 84. Regarding pensionrights secured by the Izokukai, GavanMcCormack states that in the early 1990sthe Japanese government was payingmore money per year in pensions toveterans and their survivors than had

been paid in total to neighboringcountries as compensation. TheEmptiness of Japanese Affluence (M.E.Sharpe 1996), p. 245.[52] Tanaka Nobumasa, Tanaka Hiroshi &Hata Nagami, Izoku to sengo (BereavedFamilies and the Postwar) (IwanamiShinsho 1995), pp. 152-5.