False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus - I....

8/10/2019 False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus - I. Smith

1/28

False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's "Cratylus"427 d1-431c3Author(s): Imogen SmithSource: Phronesis, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2008), pp. 125-151Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387952 .Accessed: 13/10/2014 11:40

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 192. 167.204.120 on Mon, 13 Oct 2 014 11:40:00 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40387952?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40387952?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap


2/28

I ?/ phronesisBRILL Phronesis3 (2008)125-151 www.brill.nl/phro

FalseNames,Demonstratives ndtheRefutation f LinguisticNaturalismn Plato's

Cratylus27 i Alc.1

ImogenmithSchoolfArchaeology,lassicsnd Egyptology,heUniversityfLiverpool,

12-14Abercrombyquare,Liverpool697WZ,UKImogen.mith liverpool.c.uk

AbstractThispaperoffers n interpretationf Plato'sCratylus27dl-431c3that upports readingof the dialogueas a whole asconcludingn favour f a conventionalistccount of naming.Whilemanyprevious nterpretationsote thevalueof this passages evidenceforPlatonicinvestigationsf falsepropositions,hispaperargues hat ts demonstrationhat here anbe false or incorrect) aming n turn refutes he naturalist ccount of naming;that s, itshows that naturalrelation etweenname and nominatums neither necessaryor asufficientonditionfor reference. ocrates ecures his outcomeby usingdemonstrativesand their oncomitants o show howanyputative atural mitativeinkbetweenname andobjectmaybe overridden.urthermore,ocrates' mploymentf demonstrativesnd con-text-dependenttatementsn his case-studiesf falsenaming peaksn favour f a readingof this passages primarily ocussingn namingrather hanon propositionsn general.

KeywordsPlato'sCratylus,ncient emantics, emonstratives,alsehood

I. IntroductionPlato'sCratylussostensiblydiscussionbouttherightwayto character-ise therelation etweenwords nd theworld.t pits woopposingccounts

0 Iwouldike othank r. Jamesoyle,rof. .M.McCabe,rof. alcolmchofieldand ananonymouseader t Phronesis or heirhelpful omments nd suggestionsn ear-lier drafts f this paper.All translations re the author's wn, based on thenewOxfordedition f the text 1995).KoninklijkerillNV,Leiden,008 DOI:10.1163/156852808X278703

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/28


4/28

I.SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 127

Socrates as a solution othis;however,his olution as seemed emark-ably mplausibleomany.Hesuggestshat t somepoint n ouranalysesofnameswe reach ertain ames,alledprimary r atomicnames,hat annolonger esubjectedoetymologicalnalysis,ndthatwe have oaccountforhowthesenamesrelate o theirnominatan a different ay.Therela-tionship hatholds betweentomic names and theirnominata, ocratessuggests,s a mimetic ne: the oundsorphonemeshatmakeup a nameimitate hequalitieshatgoto makeup theessencef the nominatum.

Soc:Wheneverewant ocommunicate)omethingith ur oices,onguesormouths,o wenot uccessfullyommunicateythesemeanswhenevernimitation)f nobjectriseshroughhem?

Her:Necessarily,t eems.Soc:So it'sikelyhat names an mitationn oundfthat bjectwhicht mitates;

and the one who imitates hatever e imitatesn sound s usingnames().

423b4-10

Soc:If omeonesableto mitate his ery hing,he usia feachobject,n ettersand yllables,illhebecommunicatingach hing, hat-it-is,r not?Her:Hewill, f ourse.

423e7-424al

Socratesereproposeshat name susedto communicater disclosenobjectto anotherbecauseit is an imitation f its object(or its objectsessentialroperties)nsound.Successfuleferenceith name, herefore,takes lacebecauseheres a mimeticelation,relation likeness,etweenthename nd itsnominatum.n effect,hemaker f namesworksnmuch

the amewayassomeonewhotries o representealityhrough ainting.Soc:[Wehave oknow] owtoapplyach etter ccordingo ts imilaritytothe

object]whethert s necessaryoapplyne etter oonething r t s necessaryto pplymanyetters hich ave een lendedogether:ust spaintersowhenthey ant o make nimitation.ometimeshey nly sered, ometimesheyuse ome ther igment,ndsometimesheymix ogether anyolours,uchas when hey redepictingmanor someother uch hing, suppose:heyemployach olours eachpictureemands.nthiswaywe hallpplyettersothings,singne etter or nething, hen hat eems ecessary,ndelsewhere

manyombined

ogether,orminghose

hingse call

yllables,ndthen om-

biningheseyllables,utofwhichndre reated.3424d6-425a2

5)I haveeft nd ntranslated,s thedistinctionocratess making



5/28

128 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

Allnames, ocrateslaims,reultimatelyerived rom rimary, r atomic,nameswhich recomposedofphonemeshat mitate certain haracter-istic r property. hese sound-imitationsf propertiesre then ombinedinvariouswaysntonames,which mitate hecomplexbjects hat om-bine thepropertiesoimitated.6

The mimetic hesis, hen,proposeshat namepicksout or refers oanobject n virtue f being ike t. Since ikeness s theonlyfactor n thereference-elation,twillturn ut that correct nd incorrect ,nd trueand

false ,s

theyre

appliedto names n this

dialogue,maybe assimi-

lated to like and unlike respectively.urthermore,ince referencesdetermined y ikeness,heonly ound combinations hatwillqualifysnames t all willbe those hat ualify s correct ames.Thus t shouldbeclearthat tomic namesmustbe ike heirnominataf the resultant om-poundname s tobe correct or, r true f, tsnominatum,nd toqualifyforbeing name t all,since heprinciplef ikeness xhaustshe ignrela-tion.So even atthe compoundevel,wherenamescan besubjectedoetymologicalnalysis,heprinciplef ikenesswhich willhenceforthallthemimetic elation r

mimesis)etermines hether

heyre the correct

names for heir bjects, nd furthermore, hether hey re thoseobjects'names t all.

OnceSocrateshas finishedxpoundingoHermogeneshe detailsofa naturalistccountof naming, hespotlights now turned n Cratylus,whoinitiallydvanced henaturalistlaimthat here xists certain atu-ralcorrectnessf names.Cratylusswholeheartedn hisendorsementf

betweenhe wo sunclear.eeFine1977)for ne nterpretationf he ignificancef hedistinction.t s not lear hat he istinction ade tSophist62al-12 whichs,roughly,adistinctionetweenpredicatendreferringerm)anbe mportednto heCratylus.t399a9-b3,merelyppearsomean short escriptivehrasehat anbecompressedinto n y onjoininghewords hat hephraseontains.uch translationouldfit he nterpretationere. t421d6-e4,gaineems o ndicatehraseshat ameshave een esolvednto fter tymologicalnalysis,nddoesnot hereforeeed odenoteapredicateerm.ee alsoSedley2003),p.162,who rguesnfavourf ranslatingas description.6)It isimportantostatewhat ounts s an objecthere.Briefly:lmostnyreferentfanywords

goingocount s an

objectnthe elevantense.herefore

bjectsill nclude

notonly hysicalbjects,utreferentsfpredicateerms,bstractions,ctionsnd,pre-sumably,nythinglsewemight lass shavingndependentxistencen Plato's iew:cf. 86d8-e8.



6/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 129

the ccount;however,ocrates ow claims hathe isnotsosure f his ownargumentsnd suggestshat hey eput to thetest.Much of the remain-derofthedialogue427d4-439bl0)appearso be anexercisensubjectingthetheory o a series fobjections,withCratylusaking p itsdefence.

However, lato'sverdict n the naturalist heory f naming swidelydisputed.Thedisputehas oftenbeenseen to turn on the conclusionsto what s often eferred o astheassage435b3-dl)wheretheapparent mbiguities,r equivocations,n what s said theremake t

difficultorhereadero discernwhether lato

optsfor naturalist ccount

ofnames, conventionalistccount, hybrid ccount, r ifhe leavesheentire iscussionsa real poria.7

In this paper, willarguethat an earlier assagen the dialogue,at427dl-431c3,containsn independentefutationf henaturalistccountofnames nd soissignificantor ur understandingf the verdict f thedialogues awhole. t ispossiblehat hispassage'sole n the refutationofnaturalismnnaming asgoneargelynnoticed ecauset s often eadas primarily oncerning alsepropositions:s such,its implicationsor

naturalismn naming re esswell-documented.donotbelievehatfalse

propositionsre the mainfocusof the passagealthought mayprovideinterestingnsightsntoPlato's hought n this ubject t the timeof thedialogue).Rather, hispassageeesSocratesttacking henaturalisthesisthat Cratyluss defending:hiscanbe formulateds the claimthat thepurported atural eferenceelation,hemimeticelation,etweennameandnominatumsa necessaryndsufficientondition or eference.ur-thermore,ocratesttacks henaturalisthesishrough areful seofcasestudies f realistic,f hypothetical,xamplesf successful,et ncorrect,

7)Givenhat he assaget435b3-dlsoneof hemajornterpretiveeysothe ialogue,it s understandablehat herere numberfdivergentiewsnthe oncludingositionof he ialogue.umberedmonghose ho ptfor he onventionalistnterpretationre:Bestor1980),Robinson1969),Schofield1982),Levin2001);for aturalismeeKahn(1973),Kretzmann1971),Sedley2003);for ome ompromiseraporeticositionseeAnagnostopoulos1971),Mackenzie1986).Discussionsf thepossibleositionsanbefoundnSedley2003),pp.143-151,chofield1982),pp.72-3andLevin2001),p.90.

SeealsoBaxter1992),e.g.p. 187,whoreadshe

dialogues

rejectingaturalismnd

Barney2001),pp.136-7,who scribes pessimismboutnamesoSocrateswhichsreducibleeitheronaturalismor oconventionalism;hought couldrguablyeseenasacombinationf he wo .



7/28

130 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

name use. These casestudies,n particular, elyon demonstrativesndotherextra-linguisticdentifierso override hemimetic inkbetweennameand nominatum. he attack s successful,nd the naturalist laimthat references constituted y mimesismusttherefore e thrown ut.Moreover,nyother haracterisationf the reference elation hatwouldsubstituteomeother on-conventionalinary elation etween ame ndnominatum ormimesisshouldone beavailable)would be refutedythesameargument.8

II. The Introduction f FalseNamingThe re-examinationf the naturalist hesisbeginswith Socrates skingCratyluswhether t is possibleto have better r worse names. Cratyluswishes odeny hatnamesvary nquality:hat ne namecanbe ofa worsequalityhan nother ndyet till e a name. t sostensiblyywayofrefut-ingCratylus'laimthatnames annotvary nqualityhat hepossibilityffalsehoodn namings introduced.

Socrates irstlicits ratylus' greementhat he reation f name s aninstance fartefact roduction,nd the peoplewho craft ames re a typeofcraftsman. hileCratylusoncedes hat heproducts fother rafts anvary n quality, e denies that he same is trueofnames, heproducts fthecraft f namegiving.

Soc: Names regivenare aid)for he ake f nstruction?Cra: Of course.Soc:And oshouldn't esay hat his s a skilltechn),ndhas tspractitioners?Cra: Yes.Soc:Who are hey?Cra:Theyre he nesyoumentionedt the eginningthe awgivers).Soc:Anddo wesay hat his kill rises n men n the amewaysany ther, rnot?

I mean,ome aintersrebetter,nd omereworse,ren't hey?Cra: Of course.Soc:And othebetter aintersomeupwith etter orks,heir aintings,ndthe

others omeupwith esserworks?nd, ikewise,omebuilders uildbetterhouses nd omeworse?

Cra: Yes.

8)By haracterisinghepoint ike his do not uggesthat ll semanticccountshatwemightonsider aturalisticacausalheoryf anguage,ay) re herebyefuted.



8/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 131

Soc:Consequently,on't ome awgiversroduceetter orks nd some produceworse?

Cra:Atthis oint, cease oagree.Soc: Soyoudon't hinkome aws rebetterndothers orse,hen?Cra:NoIdon't.Soc: Andhen,t eems,oudon't hink hat oth etterndworse ames aveeen

setdown?Cra: Indeedot.Soc:Then ll names re etdown orrectly?Cra:Insofarsthey renames t all.

428e4-429bll

Theargument f this passagean be formulateds follows:

51) Namegiving/lawgivings a techn.

Theres a hidden ssumption erewhichmustbemadefor he argumentto follow:

52) The samegenerallaims an be madeabout all technai.

Implicitn this assumptions the suppositionhatwhateverwe cansayaboutonespecificechnquatechn)wemustbe ableto sayaboutanyother peciesf techn. believe hat his s impliedbySocrates'uestionAnddowesaythat his kill rises n men n the samewayasanyother,

or not? nd s alsoapparentntheopening iscussion technx387dlO-390d8.

53) Wecansaythat, n thecaseof other echnai,hey an bepractisedwith greater r esser egree f competence.54) Theproducts f thesecraftsmen illvary n quality, omebeing

better nd somebeingworse.55) Consequently,e cansay he ame about thetechn f namegiving,

namelyhat tsproductsre better r worse.

Cratylus eniesS5),however: e statesn responsehat t s not possibleto give namebadly. shallcalltheclaim thatCratylusmakeshere Cl).

Cl) It is not possibleo seta name downbadly incorrectly):



9/28

132 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

Which can be reformulateds:

C1R)Either name swell correctly)et,or it s not set downat all.

Cratylus' ssertion hatnames must be uniformlyorrect n order o benamesat allprompts ocrates o ask whethert ispossibleo call some-thingbya namethat s not orrect or t. In the dramatic ontext f thedialoguehetransition rom hepossibilityf mperfect ames othepos-

sibilityf ncorrect ames s a smooth ne.

However,hilosophically,he

transition ppearsa little dd. AllSocrateswouldneedto do to refuteCratylus' resent osition sto demonstratehat here re degreesf cor-rectness, r degrees f likeness,with some namesbeingmore ike theirobjectsthan others. However,hediscussionhat immediatelyollowsseems ogobeyondwhat srequired:s theargument roceeds,t seems,we see that ocratessgoing oexplainhow t s possibleoget namethatis incorrect or and, on this account, alse of anafalseofbecauseit isunlike) particular bjecttoattach o that bjectnevertheless.f t canbeshown hat false ame

whichpresumablyttains hat

requisite egreeofdissimilarityoqualifysincorrectr false )ttaches oanobject hen,afortiori, ameswhichdo not achieveperfectikenesses,ut meet somelesser equirementf ikenessthat s to saythosewhich ttain requisitedegreef ikeness utwhich reneverthelessmperfect),an beassignedotheobjects hat hey onot mitate erfectly.

Thepossibilityf ncorrect,r false, aminghas farmoredrastic onse-quencesfor he mimetic heory. he mimetic heory resented emandsthat he relation etween ame and nominatumonsist imply f mimesis.Thiswouldmeanthat mimesis ould bea

necessarynd sufficientondi-

tion for eferencend so would exhaust he ignrelation. owever,n thesection fthedialogueunder iscussionnthis aper, ocrates rawstten-tionto the many ther actors hat ome nto play na successfuleferringevent nd whichwouldoverrideny already-existing)utativemimeticconnectionetween ameandnominatum nd enable nameto attach oan objectthat t is unlike. A conventionalelationbetweenname andnominatumwillturn out to be sufficient orreferencen this account:thus ikeness,r mimesis,illnot be a necessaryondition.Moreover,ike-nesscannot venbe sufficientor

eference;inceconventionan override

anyalready-existingutativemimeticink, heremustbe a further ondi-tion for uccessful eference:ither here s a convention n placewhich



10/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 133

accordswith the natural elation f likeness r a supplementarynder-standing etween wo interlocutorsa convention)hatno convention sin placeat all. If one can usenames to refer o nominata hatthey reunlikebyagreeing pon the reference,hen one must also secure gree-ment to geta name to attachto an objectthat t is like rather han anobject t is dissimilaro.9n otherwords, t is the agreement,r conven-tion, hat name be a name ofagivennominatum hat s doingtheworkinsecuringeferenceanypurported imilarityetween ameand nomi-natum s neither ere nor there. t is

perhapsno

surprisehen that the

creator f namesreceives he ppellationa conventionetterearlyon in the dialogue(388el-5),strongly uggesting hatanygivenstring f phonemesrequires heassistance f convention o become aname:toenter nto thecommunalparlancendsuccessfullyefer.

IfSocratesan showthat he mimeticink an be overriddenyconven-tion n thiswayand soa namewhich s incorrect or n objectcan beusedto refer o thatobject, hen he mimetic heory,s a theory f refer-ence, s refuted.

III. The CaseStudiesand Socrates'Use ofDemonstrativesIn refuting ratylus' laim Cl) that t s not possibleo set a name downbadlyincorrectly),ocratesmploys seriesfexampletatementsoshowhim that t s, n fact, ossibleoapply nameto an objectthat t s incor-rect or.Wemight aythat hispassageonlyconstitutesn argumentn aloosesense,inceCl) seemsobedenying self-evidentact and denialsofself-evidentactsrenotoriouslyifficultoproduce rgumentsgainst.Socratesnsteadproducesclearer nd better-analysedxamplesof phe-nomenalmanifestationsf ncorrect, ut neverthelessuccessful,aminguntilCratylusscompelledoacceptthat, ontrary othe mplicationsfthe mimetic heory e endorses, sing nappropriatefalseor incorrect)names orefer o things spossible,nddoes occur.

Socrates'hoiceofexamples,owever,s thekey ounderstandinghispassagesconstitutingsuccessfulttack n the naturalistheoryfnaming.Whiletheexampleso notbelongto a singlekind f inguistic tterance,

9)Cf. Schofield1982),pp.78-9.



11/28

134 /. SmithPhronesis3(2008)125-151

they ll share one important eature:ll of thempoint to some extra-linguisticspectof namingwhichoverridesny otherconsiderationnsecuring eference.heyeither ontain ndexicals,r demonstratives,rimperativesndvocatives,r are accompaniedy dentifyingctions.10

In responseoCratylus' enial thatnamescanvary n quality, nd hisassertion hattheymust be correct n orderto qualify s namesat all,Socratesreturns o a claim thatHermogeneseported ratylus o havemade before hecommencement f the dialogue:that Hermogenessnot the name of the third nterlocutor.11

Soc: What hen? ow aboutwhatwe wereecentlyalkingbout:hallwesay hatthenamehasnotbeen etdown or urfriend ermogenesere),nd t only its im fhebelongsothe ace fHermes,rdo we ay hatthename asbeen etdown or im, nly ot orrectly?

Crat: n my pinion,ocrates,t has not been etdown or im: t only ppearso()ave een et own or im, ut ctuallyt s the namef omeonelse,whose aturehenamexpresses.

429bl2-c5

Cratylus' esponsean be broken ownas follows:

C2a) Hermogenes ppears o be the name of theother nterlocutor;however,t s not n facthis name.

C2b) Hermogeness thenameof ome furtherndividualwho has thenature hat hename describes.

AlthoughCratylus oes not makethisexplicit,we needto add a thirdclaim.

C2c) If no individualualifies orthe name Hermogenes hasthenature hat he name describes),hen he name Hermogenessnot a name at all,since t s not a name of anything.

TheexchangebetweenSocrates ndCratylushereclearlyndicates heextremeonsequencesf a theory f referencehat upposeshe ignrela-

10)By dentifying

ction, mean n action hatccompanies

statementhicherceptu-ally roundshe bject f he tatementnthe ntendedeferent.ctionsuch s ostensin

(pointing),rmerelyacingnaddresseeould e ncludedn this ategory.n) 383b6-7.



12/28

/. SmithPhronesis3(2008)125-151 135

tiontobeexhaustedy ikeness.We,asspeakers,ave no control ver hereferencef the words thatweuse. Wemight hink hat we aretalkingabout aparticular bject, ay, n orange,whenwe use the name orange ,but, f hefruit nquestions notcorrectlyamed, nd so not named t all,by he erm orange ut nstead hefruit hatwecustomarilyame appleis the nominatum hatthe name is correct or, henwewould,on thisaccount,be in facttalking bout the fruit normally nown as apple ,regardlessf our intentions. ratylus' osition eems to ignorepracticalsituationsuchas the case where

successfullyanageto

requesthat

someonehandmean orangemeaninghefruit consider t to name andsomebodyandsmethatfruit nderstandingorange o name the samekindoffruit. t would seem hat havemanagedosuccessfullyefer o theobject intendedorefer o n this ase.

We can alsoseefrom he passagehatCratylus,n inewith hemimetictheory f names, enies distinctionetweenheestablishmentfa nameandsubsequentseof a name. On the mimetic hesis, ither name iscorrect or ts nominatumandso true f t) andpicks t out,or incorrect

(andsofalse) nd failso

pickit

out, regardlessf whether t

appearsn

whatwe would understandsa useor establishmentontext.12hus,evenif someson ofZeushadbeenbaptised Hermogenes ,hatnamewouldnot be correct orhim and so wouldnot refer ohim,whereashe nameDiogeneswouldrefer o the son of Zeus- evenif he had neverbeen

calledthatbefore. ratylus' seof herebears ut this nterpretation,suggestinghat he pparent aptism atHermogenes'irth, ay didnotconstitute real or successful)aptism, r (more ccuratelyorCratylus)a successfulirst seof the name,becauseHermogeneswas anincorrect

nameforhim.However,s Cratylus uts t, thename s

really)he

nameof someoneelse- withno indication hatthe nameonlybecamethe nameof the otherperson s a result f a baptism vent.Becauseabaptismhasno effect n establishingname'sreferencen the mimeticaccount,t cannotbe consideredo bea distinctpeech ctover nd aboveordinary ame use.For thepurposesf discussinghispassagef the Cra-tylus, hen,wecan assumethat Cratylus oes notconsiderbaptisms ofiguren his semantic ccountand apparent aptisms re assimilated oordinaryasesofname use(reference).

12)Barney2001),ch.2 observeshat use/establishmentistinctionppearsnHermo-genes'nitialtatementfhis onventionalism.



13/28

136 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

Prima acie,Cratylus' istinction etween namesseemingobe cor-rect, ut actually eing ncorrect, ight llow forrecognitionf casesofincorrect, ut neverthelessuccessful,eference:hat s, we canget thewrongnamesto attach o things nd still uccessfullyommunicatewhatweintend o. Forexample,fwe both sawHermogenes ittingn a horse(alone)andI say Hermogenesssitting n a horse , ouwouldgrasp hecontent f what intended o communicate ven hough Hermogenessnot the correct ame for my ntendedreferent, ince we both holdthesame belief bout what

Hermogenesefers o.

However,t the same

time,Cratyluswantsto saythat realnamingssomething ifferent romthis.Thiswouldallowcopefor istinguishingetweenorrectnessnd suc-cessfuleference.owever,s thediscussionroceeds,we seethatCratyluscannothavesucha distinctionn mind. He seemseven to denythat uc-cessfuleferenceo with name that s incorrect or spossible even ftwo nterlocutorsnderstandhename n question o refer o x.

Socratesoesonto teaseoutthe mplicationsf Cratylus' iew.

Soc: Andwhen omeoneays

hat he sHermogenes

),she not ven peakingalsely?orperhapshis snot ven ossible:osay hatthis s Hermogenes ),fhe sn't?

Crat:Whatdoyoumean?429c6-10

It isby wayofclarifyingratylus' osition hat ocrates ntroducesomeparticular ypes f propositions:

1) 429c6-7)2) 429c7-8)

Cratylus assuggestedn thepreviousxchangehat ither ne usesthename oftheobject t s appropriateor nd namesthat bjectupon usingit, oronefails o nameanythingt all ifnoobjectqualifiesor hatname.Thismeans,as I have saidabove,onemightbe intending o nameonething the third nterlocutor) ut in factbe naming and referringo)somethinglse(theprogeny f Hermes)withoutrealisingt. However,Socrates'ntroductionf statementsontaininghe demonstrative

and the ndexical useddemonstrativelyere) eems o be awayofexcludinghepossibilityhat omeunknown, r unperceived, bject atthe time ofstating) ould be thenominatum f the name or subject f a



14/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 137

proposition.13he demonstrativeicksout an objectin a waythat anunindexedssertion oes not. Both nd re meansof denti-fying hesubject o whichthename is intended oapply:they reverbalostensions,r pointings , hichground hestatementsontaining hename Hermogeneserceptuallyntheman nquestion.14hesepronounstogether ith he copulativeis and thename Hermogenesxcludehepossibilityhat Hermogenes ould really in Cratylus'words)refer oanything ther than the subjectof the pronounsthat they re intendedto

applyto.15

Cratyluslaimsnotto understand ocrates'uestion, [Is this]not evenpossible:osay hat his sHermogenes),if he isn't? .However,ocrates'reformulationf the questionseems toconceala move from he possibilityf attaching nappropriate amestoobjectso thepossibilityf false peechngeneral.

Soc: Well, mean syour oint hat peakingalselysaltogethermpossible?fterall, herereverymany eoplewho ay his, othnow nd nthepast.

13)Onemight bject hat s anaphoric,atherhan true emonstrativen thisexample.owevert clearly ust avedemonstrativeorce.When ocratesays',on painof begginghequestion gainst ratylus, e cannot e envisaginghe nameHermogenessfixinghereferencef the tem nquestion.orthis easonbelievet

shoulde treateds a true emonstrative.14) hefact hat hesexamplesrereportedpeechhould ot omplicatehematter.hedemonstrativeslearlyave he elevantorce ere ithernreportedrdirectpeech,incethe eferentf he eportedpeechnd he ubjectf he tatementhichsreported ouldbe the ame.15)t snotnecessaryodiscusst ength ow he eferenceixingfdemonstrativess actu-ally ccomplished.llthat snecessaryeres afairlyooseand, newouldhope, ncon-troversial)laim:amelyhat tatementsontainingemonstrativesnly averopositionalcontent hen onjoinedith n extra-linguisticontext, hetherhe eferences aid obesecuredy a visual)resentationf local bject ypointing ,Kaplan1989),p.490),typicallyirectedy speaker'sntentionopoint t a perceivedndividualnwhom e

hasfocused ,ibid., . 582)or determinedythe uesthat competentndattentiveaddresseeould easonablyake he peakero beexplicatingWettstein1991),p.80),and, gnoringroblemsrisingromhe peaker'sntentionseingmisunderstood.wishthereader oconcentraten the

following:1)That he

peakermust ave n intention,

(2)that ntention ust eexternalised,r made lear,nsomeway,3)that he ddresseemust ave herequisiteompetenceorecognisehe peaker'sntentionnorder or uc-cessfulommunicationo take lace.



15/28

138 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

Cra: Yes, ocrates;ecauseowcananyonewhosays hatwhich esays,ay hatwhichsnot?Or isn't hatwhat t sto speak alsely:ospeakhatwhichsnot?

429dl-d6

There s an equivocationere:while the nference rom he mpossibilityof falsenaming o the mpossibilityf the particularype f false roposi-tion namely this sx ) is quite possiblyegitimate,he same cannotbesaid for nferringhe mpossibilityf false ropositionsout ourt rom he

impossibilityf false ropositionsf thekindmentioned ere.The introduction f the paradoxthat t is impossibleospeakfalselyseems stretch iven he ontext, nd one shouldwonderwhether ocratesintends odealwiththisquestionn earnest ere.Recentnterpretationshave focussedn this xchangend it has been shownthat Socrates lti-mately ails o solvethe falsehood aradoxn thisdialogue.16owever,ounderstandheargument'srimary imasattemptingo accountfor hisis a mistake.f Socrateswereprimarilyoncernedwith he truth-valuefpropositionsather han reference ere,wemight ssumethathewould

choose lessproblematicxamplesforhis case studies. uitableexampleswouldbe alongthe linesof the EleaticStranger'sxample tatementnthe discussionf falsehoodn the Sophist,Theaetetusits ,whichhasapropositionalontent nd a meaning ndependentlyf its utterance.17Socrates'xamplesere requitedifferentrom he xamplen theSophistallmanifestcontext-dependencessociatedwith emonstrativesalthoughnot all are clear casesof demonstrativese).Socrates'useof suchstate-ments, ll of whichmustbeaccompaniedycertain xtra-linguisticden-tifying ctions n orderto havepropositionalontent and therefore

truth-value)t all,and his use of certain peechacts thathave no truth-conditions,uggest hat he is not concernedwith falsepropositionsssuch,but is rather ntending oshow that the successfulpplicationf a

16)See, .g.,Denyer1991),pp.79-82.17)Sophist63a2.The xamplef he alse ropositionTheaetetus,ho amtalkingo tthemoment,sflying ,Sophist63a8)sslightly ore omplicated:t s stronglyndexed

tothe ontext t hand. suspecthat ocratesoes his oavoidhe esponsehat he en-tencemay e true f different eferentf Theaetetus,hohappensobeflying,ndnotthe tranger'surrentnterlocutor.



16/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 139

name to an object n anygiven ituation s determined y factors therthan any purported natural r correct elationbetweenname andnominatum.

WereSocrates o makeuseof these xamplesn a discussion f thepos-sibility f falsepropositions,emightbe taking n much more than hebargainedor: n exampleike this sHermogenesooks more ikely obegrist oCratylus'mill than n adequatetool of refutation or ocrates.Considerthe following: man walks nto an empty lassroom nd seeswritten n the blackboard here this s a

dog .He walksnto a second

empty lassroom nd seeswritten n theblackboard allbachelors remar-ried . n the econdcase,whilewewouldsaythat he entencesfalse ndevencontradictory,e wouldconcede that t is clearlymeaningful.hesentencen the blackboardn the first lassroom owever, hile t seemsto saysomething,oesnot haveanypropositionalontent.Perhapshissentences- in a senseCratyluswouldbehappyforus to believe mean-ingless.Wecertainlyannotascribe truth-valueothe sentence n thisblackboard.

Thisscenarioan,

ofcourse,

be related o theverypeculiar

nature fdemonstratives:sentence ontaining demonstrative eeds a context(partly eterminedythe ntention f the peaker)ocompletet: to giveit propositionalontent. n order or uccessfulommunicationf a state-ment ontaining demonstrativeotakeplace,thereferentither eeds obe identified xtra-linguistically,y ostensinpointing, r some otherconventionally-contrivedubstitute),r t needs o havetherequisitenvi-ronmentalalienceor hehearer oknowwhat he peakerntends oreferto. In short, hesesentences ausefar too manyproblems o serve as

effectivexamplesor ocratesn a

generalreatmentf falsehood.

However,fusedsimplyo show hat he uccessfulpplicationf ncor-rect or false)names spossible,entencesontaining emonstrativesrevery seful especiallyince themeaningnd correct se of demonstra-tives re never ontested y Cratylus.

Socrates'extmove eems oconfirmhis nterpretation:fter ratylusendorsesthe claim that all false speechis impossible,ocratesswiftlyreturns o the more specific ase of namingand related peechacts.This shouldindicate othe reader hat the limited aseof incorrect or

false)naming s of primary oncern o Socrates.Thepossibilityf sometypes f falseogoi,n thesenseof statements ithpropositionalontent,maybea consequenceof the discussionhere,but it is to allintents nd



17/28

1 0 /. SmithPhronesis3(2008)125-151

purposesmerely bonusarising ut of anyrefutationf the mpossibilityoffalsenaming.

Soc: Yourrgumentstoosophisticatedormeatmy ge,my riend. evertheless,tellme thismuch: oyouthink hat t's notpossibleospeak) false-hoodbutpossibleo dechre)ne?

Cra: I don't hinkt's ossibleo peakrdeclarene.Soc: What bout elling) ne, r ddressing)omeonealsely?

429d7-e3

Cratylus enies hat peaking) alsehooddefinedssayingwhat snot) is possible.Socrateshen,rather uriously, romptsCratylusntoassertinghefollowingelated laims:t is not possibleto declare alse-hoods);t s not possibleo tellfalsehoods);t s not possibleto address omeonefalsely).rimafacie, t is unclearwhatdistinctionanbe madebetweenmost f hesewords,nd whether ocratesintends ach to correspondwith a genuinely istinct ypeof linguisticutterance. hesewordsmay imply esynonyms;f o,therepetitioneems

laboured.However,heremaybegoodreasonfor ocrates' pparent ed-antry ere.First, y forcing ratylus o assert hat nymeaningfultteranceon-

structed ut of inguistic omponentshat urn ut to be false s impossi-ble,he can rule out a specialsense for, ay, s speakingruly ;Cratylusmight aveotherwise eenpreparedocountenanceertain alsephrases s possiblef categorisednder a different erbof speaking,ay.18ratylus' ssertion hatfalse peechs impossiblen anyunder-standing f what it means to speakconfirmshathe will not have this

recourse.Secondly,whiletheremaybe littledifferenceetweenmanyof theseapparent ynonyms,t is clear thatbyocratesdoes haveinmind a veryparticular peechact that most concerns heapplicationfnamesto objectsnd isnarrowinghescopeof the discussiono focus n

18)N.B.BinderndLiesenborghs1976),pp.452-4,who eproducepapyrusragmentf

Didymusheblind,

ecordinghat [Prodicus]

quated ith.t must

also benoted hat interpret ere smuch ooserhan heEnglish speakingfalsely ,amely nyutterancehat ailso meet herequisiteuccessonditions,hichwouldovermore han hemodern otion f truth ondition .



18/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 1 1

this.19hemention f somany types f speakingacksCratylusntotheright orner: xposingn assumptionn hispartthat ll utterances avethe samecharacter, amely hatthey re all assertions r declarations.fSocrates anprovethe possibilityf falsehoodn the case of statementsassociatedwithaddressingomeone),he will havedisprovedthe claimthatfalsehood simpossibleout ourt, ndwillhaveproved hepossibilityf successful eferenceith n incorrect ame. Socratesoesonto illustrate hathe hasin mindby addressing).

Soc: Forxample,f omeonemetyouwhile ouwereravellingbroad, nd, akingyouby hehand, aid, Hello,Athenianriend, ermogenesonofSmikrion(, ,),ould e besayinghesethingsr peakinghesehingsr tellinghesehingsr ddressinghesehingsnot oyou, ut oHermogenesere, r to no-one?

Cra: I think ewould earticulatingoundsna differentay, ocrates.Soc: But even his swelcome. ecausewe can askwouldhe bearticulatingrue

soundsrfalse ounds? r would art f tbe true nd part f t be false? venthiswouldeenough.

Cra: I woulday hat hemanwouldustbemakingnoisen this ase,motioninginvain,ust s f omeone ereangingn a brass ot. 429e2-430a7

Socrates'xampleere hows hat is onceptionf ddressing)sharesmportant eatures ith , heexampletate-ment t 429c8-9.In bothcases,the act of addressingnvolvesdentifyingthesubject f the statement y omemeans ther han hename.BytakingCratylus ythehand,anddirectinghewords ohim,theforeignerndi-catesextra-linguisticallyho he intends he name Hermogeneson of

Smicrion oapply o.Thepresentxamples agreeting,ndconsequentlyspeechct.Althoughwemight ay t has felicity-conditionsr success-conditions,ewouldnotattribute ruth onditions o it.20 urthermore, hile truth-valuessim-plybivalenta propositionseither rue r false),he criteriamarking he

19)C.f.Sedley(2003),p.l34.20)At eastwewouldnot ttribute hatwewould nderstando be truth onditions.hemimeticheoryf names ntails conceptionf true s true f cf. .g.Fine1978),p.296).But hen, rantedhis lternativeonceptionf ruth,uch speechct ught otto bepossiblefmimesiss a sufficientonditionor eference.



19/28

1 2 /. SmithPhronesis3(2008)125-151

success rfailure f a speechct do not all seem to be: success ouldbeamatter f degree.Thusa non-assertoricpeechact does not have to beperfectlyerformedndcanbe consideredmore r ess uccessful.eyondthis, heremaybe a pointat whicha speechactdoesnot succeedto therequiredtandards,ut s successfulnoughfor bservers nd audienceounderstand he ntentions ehind uchan act.21

Inthis xample,he greeting peechct,wefind hat he xtra-linguis-tic dentificationf the addressees even moreapparent han n the firsttwo

examples.1)Theword

learlymplieshatthe

speechuttered s directed owards he ntended ddressee.) Thedescriptionfthe physicalct of taking he addresseey the hand further nforms headdresseehat he addresserntendshim/her s the object.3) Theuseofthevocatives,, ,andeven,egardlessfwhatthenamenames,nform he ddressee hat he ddressersengagedn theprocess f addressingnd that he/she s the objectof that ddress sincevocatives reonlyused n these ontexts);heuse ofthe mperative,averbal nalogueof the vocative,as the ame effect.

All of these ndicate theobject

of the address ostrongly

hatanyaddresseewhograsped his much about the speechact,and understood

none of the names,would be able to understandhat he peakerntendedtoaddress im.Twoofthe dentificationsreextra-linguistic1and2);thethird a grammaticaloint) ndicates he addresseen a manner hatnei-therhas beenaccountedfornor could be accountedforbythe mimetictheory f naming ut forward.Wemay hereforeupposehat ustasinglecomponentnserted nto the addressn errorwouldnot cause thespeechact to be infelicitous. oreover,t islikely hat greetingct suchas theone underdiscussionwould attain

degreef success ven f the names

werenonsensical. heagent n this asehasnot failed o accomplishny-thing t all: the externaldentifyingactors aveclearly verridden herequirementor he correct ame to be usedin enablingheaddresseeounderstand he ntentions f the speaker. headdresseenderstandshatthe peakerntends oaddress imand so thereferenttheaddresseeim-self)hasbeensecured.Wewouldconsequentlyejustifiedn saying hat

21)For xample,f choked t the oint f ayingIdo atmywedding,his ouldbe saidtobeanunsuccessfulerformance,ut he ongregationouldpresumablyave goodideaofmy ntentions.



20/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 1 3

the peakerwho meetsCratylus assuccessfullyanagedocommunicatethathe isgreeting ratylushis ntention)ndsodoessuccessfullyefer oCratylus ith hepartiallyncorrecteries f referringerms ,.

Socrates has hereexposeda significant eficiencyn the naturalistmimetic hesishe hasexpoundedn the preceding art of the dialogue.The contextn which communication akesplace, ts related peechactsand thephysicalresencend absencef the tems o be discussed lter he

degreef successof reference

yetall of thesefactors re excluded

bya

theorywhichmaintains hat ikeness xhausts hesign-relation.y fore-groundinghe ontext-dependentature f communication,ocratesow-erfully emonstrateshat hekindofexplanationrovided ythe mimetictheory annotdothe obofexplainingownamesrefer othings.22

This interpretations at odds with Williamssexplanationof theexchange.He suggestshatCratylus enies thata significanttatementhasbeen madein this ase,becausethe two conditions hat hebelieves)Cratylus equiresormeaningfulpeechto have occurredhavenot been

satisfied.[Cratylus]anreasonablyay hat heres aspeechct,whichmay ecalled address-ing omeoneyname uch hat here re wo eparateonditionsf ts being ruethat addressesbyname,

(i)addressesspeakso,directs ords oetc)y;(ii) n the ourse f i) uses namewhich s thename fy.23

Williams conditionii)can be inferred rom he texthere; hat s to say,

onCratylus'iew, mustuse a namewhich s thenameofyfor he peechact to be successful.owever,heresnothing n the text oindicate hatCratyluss committed o(i).It isfarmoreplausiblehatCratylus enies

22)N.B. Thexample roperame hat ocratesseshere eemsodeliberatelyamenei-therHermogenes,orCratylus.ermogenes,sSocratesotes t the beginningf thedialogue,as he atronymicHipponicus .emightupposehat SmicrionsCratylus'patronymic,utthat s not clear o us from hedialogue.hishas beenremarkedponmanyimes:.g.Williams1983),p.86n.2,Kahn1973),p.161n.l,Baxter1992),p.10.

Presumablyavinghename

nly alf-rightor

Hermogeness ntendedo

preventraty-lus from laiminghat he tranger ould ctuallyeaddressingermogeneswhoeverthat urns ut o be- althoughhe trangerppearsobeaddressingim.23>Williams1983),p. 87.



21/28

144 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

thatmeaningfulpeechhasoccurred ecausethe name Hermogenesonof Smicrion oesnot name an individual, ince,presumably,ratylusbelieves hatthere s no individualhatqualifiesorthe name. In fact,in the originalquestion,Socratesseems to anticipatethe possibilitythat, houldan individualualify or he name n question,yet hat ndi-vidual not be present t the addressing, ratylusmight laimthat theaddresswould nevertheless e to that ndividual: wouldhe be sayingthese hings r speakinghese hings r telling hese hings r addressingthese

hingsot to

you,butto

Hermogenesere,r to no-one?

429e7).24Had Socratesnserted nameofsomeonewhomerelywas notpresent tthe addressingvent, ather han the name of a non-existent ndividual,Cratylusould havesserted hat he bsent ndividual asbeing ddressed.

Cratylus'response I think he would be articulatingoundsin adifferent ay,Socrates. )s surelymoreeasilyread as resulting rom henon-existencef thereferentf HermogenesonofSmicrion atherhanfrom ny non-identity etween heobjectof an address nd the name ofthat object.Cratylus' arlier laim that Hermogenesis the name of

another,hosenature hename

expresses ,upportshe

scriptionohim

of a belief hat references a fixed elation etween name and itsobjectregardlessf the context f ts utterance r the ntentions f tsutterer.

Thebelief hat hemimetic rinciplexhaustshe ignrelation reventsCratylus rom onsideringnyotherfactors t all (for xample,hat isdirecting ords oy).Ifmimesislone determines hether namequalifiesas aname ofanygiven bject, hen ntentions r extra-linguisticdentify-ingmechanismssuchasgraspingnother's and,orpointing)wouldhaveno affect n the ignrelation.t is,then,Cratylus' ailureoacknowledge,in this

ase,thatWilliamscondition

i)is

necessaryor uccessfulom-

munication hat eadshimto deny hepossibilityf successfullypplyinga name toanobject ncorrectly.is onlyresponsean be that he soundsthat are producedin the hypotheticalddressby the foreigneracksignificance,ince no objectexists hatqualifiesorthe name Hermo-genes onof Smicrion : ence hesays, I wouldsaythat he man wouldjustbemaking noise n this ase,motioningn vain, ustasif omeonewerebanging n a brasspot 430a4-5).

Sofar,Cratylus' trict dherence o the restrictive mplicationsf themimetic

heoryesultsnhiscontinued enialofwhat s

evidentlyhe ase

24)Note thatHermogeneswould not be withCratylusn thehypotheticaloreignocation.



22/28

/. Smith Phronesis3(2008)125-151 145

in languageuse,for hereasons havesetout above.In the face of this,Socrateseturns o the analogywithpictures, hichheemployedn con-structinghemimetic heory424d6-e3),in a further, oredetailed llus-tration f ncorrect aming.

Soc: Let'sfind ut,Cratylus,fwe cannot omehow ereconciled. ouldn'touagreehat name s onething,ndthe hinghat henamenames sanother?

Cra: I would.Soc:And oyou lso greehat name s an mage)f thing?Cra: Absolutely.Soc:Andyou ay hat icturesre lso magesf hings,lbeitna differentay?Cra: Yes.Soc: Comeonthen, or erhapsdon't nderstandxactlyhat oumean,ndyou

may eright:s t possibleoassign)ndapply oth heseypesfimages paintingsnd names to the things hich hey re magesf,ornot?

Cra: It spossible.Soc: Think bout his irst hen: omeone ouldgive likenessf man o a man,

anda likenessf a woman o a woman,nd do the amewith ther hings,couldhey ot?

Cra: Ofcourse.Soc:And,ncontrast,heyouldgiven magef man o a woman nd n mage

of woman o a man?Cra: That'sight.Soc:And reboth f hese ssignationsorrect,r ust neof hem?Cra: Just neof hem.Soc: Theone, think, hichpplieshe ppropriatend imilarmage.Cra: Inmy pinion,es.Soc: Just o westop rguinghen, ou nd , sincewe're riends,cceptmy tate-

ment. call his ind f ssignment,nboth nstancesf magespicturesnd

names correct,ndadditionally,nthe aseofnames,orrectnd true. heother ind f ssignment,hichssignsheunlikemage,callncorrect,ndfalsenthe ase fnames.

430a8-d7

Cratylusccepts hat 1) bothnames andpictures re types f mitations(),ndthat 2)a correctssignmentnvolvesttribution)of a picture o theobjectthat t s like.Healso here ccepts hat 3) incor-rect ssignmentnvolves he ttribution f picture o anobjectt sunlikeand, mportantly,eacceptshat 4) incorrectssignmentsf picturesantakeplace.However,estubbornlyefuses oacknowledgehatnames anbeincorrectlyssignedn the ameway.



23/28

146 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

Cra: But ncorrectssignmentay epossiblenthe ases fpictures,utnot nthecase fnames, heret s necessaryhat ll assignmentse correct.

430d8-e2

Socratesespondswithyet nother ecisivexamplefarealisticituation.He proposesheexampleof handing omeonean inappropriate icture,and thenrepeatsheprocedure,ut this ime,nstead f pictures, eusesnames.

Soc: Whatdoyoumean?Howarethey ifferent?s it not possibleoapproachman nd ay, thissyour icture nd how im, erchance,likenessfhim-self r,perchance,likenessf woman? ndby show mean obring helikenessefore is ensef ight.

Cra: Well, es.Soc: Whathen? anI not gain pproachheman nd ay o him this )s

your ame ?mean, name san mitationust s apictures;can not ay ohim thissyour ame nd then ring efore is ense f hearing )erhapsn mitationfhimself,ayinge sa man, r an imitationf the female f the human ace,ayinghathe isawoman? rdoestnot eem o

youobe

possiblendto

occasionallyappen?Cra: I amwillingo concede hat ou reright, ocrates.430e3-431a6

Socratesuggestshat,ustaspresenting personwith picture ccompa-niedbya statementssociatinghatpersonwith picturessufficientuc-cessfullyo attachthat picture o the person n question,regardlessfwhether hatpicture s correct orhimor not,presentingn unlikenametosomeonewith herelevantccompanyingtatementsalso sufficientorassigninghatname to thatperson, lbeit ncorrectly.

Thissthemost owerfulemonstrationf xtra-linguisticdentificationsecuringeferencenddisclosinghe ntentionsf the peaker.t is mpor-tant o notethat his xampledoes not makeuseofpropositionst all;itconcernsmerelyhe ct of applying name to an object.We canseethoseextra-linguisticactors hat ocrates nvisionseing nvolvednsecuringreferent:

1) : movementoward heindividualwho is to be therecipientf the name.

2) Bringinghename ntohisperception:hus hename sperceptuallyanchored n the individualn question: .



24/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)1 5-151 1 7

3) Thepresentationf the name isaccompaniedbya statement on-taining demonstrative withdeictic uffix i)whichdirectlyrefers o the perceptuallyvailableobject the name-sound)nd a2nd person possessiveronoun,tying he name to the addresseewithout heuseofanyfurther ames. This thenfurther ndicates othe ddressee hat he peakermeans oapply he name to him.25

Allof thesefactors ontribute o the success fattaching name,evenanincorrect

ame,to an

object:so influential re

theyn

informinghe

addresseef the ntentionsf the peaker.Socrateshere, herefore,rrefutablyhows thestrength f these extra-

linguisticactorsn overridinghe ikeness ondition equiredor nameto refer n Cratylus'ccount.But f uchextra-linguisticactors an over-ride hepurportedmimeticinkbetweenwordandobject, hen t followsthat heprinciplef ikeness snot necessaryr a sufficientondition orsuccessfuleference.t is not necessaryecause canapplya name toanobjectwhere o mimetic elation oldsbetween he wo;t s not sufficient

because canapplyname whichnamesone

objectto a different

bject,so overriding and breakingat leasttemporarily) the mimetic inkbetween name and theobjectthat t s putativelyorrect or.

IV. The ConclusionoftheArgument: alseNamesandFalselogoi.Socratesoncludesthe discussionby returning o the problemof falselogoi.

Soc: If this s how t s,then t's oodfor outo concedet. Forweneednotfightaboutt ny onger.oif his ind f ssignmentakeslace,wewill all he nekind peakinghe ruth,ndthe ther ind peakingalsely.nd f his sright,and t's ossibleoassignames)ncorrectlyndnot oapplywhat sappropriateoeachhing,ut ometimeshats nappropriate,twouldlsobepossibleodothe amehing ith . nd fwe cando thiswith ames

25)t might eworth otinghat here re parallelsetween ocrates'cenario ere ndmodern ausalccounts fname-givingordubbing)vents:articularlynrespectf he

strongerceptualroundingfnamesnobjectshat oth xhibit.f.Devitt ndSterelney(1993),pp.67-68.WhileSocrates,s not,ofcourse,nitiating dubbing vent, e ismanifestlywaref he mportancefperceptuallyroundingnamen ts bject or ver-ridingnoriginalameevenf nly or veryhort eriod).



25/28

1 8 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

and, e must ecessarilye able odoitwith ogoi.or ogoi,think,are ombinationsf hesewo.Or whatwouldyou ay, ratylus?

Cra: Allright hen. ou eem o bemakingense ome.431a7-c3

Socrates, hen,claims to haveshown twothings: 1) that t is possibleto attach nappropriateincorrect) ames toobjectsnd consequentlylso(2) that false ogoirepossible.n otherwords,false peakings possiblebecause t isnecessarilyntailedby the possibilityf falsenaming. t is

worth emarkingn Socrates' laimshere, ince haventerpretedhepas-sageas primarily oncerningn explanationf our apparent bility oattachnames oobjectshey re false f,rather han he problem f mean-ingful alse ropositions.

There regrounds or upposinghat he mpossibilityf false roposi-tions follows rom heassumptionhatnames all words)refer n virtuetheir ikeness o their bjects.Thepoint ftenmade aboutthebroad xten-sionoftheGreek erm must e returned ohere; ppears,in thisdialogueat least, o covernearly ll categoriesf words:not ustpropernames andnouns,but alsoanyreferringerm, djective,dverb,verband anyotherpredicate erm.Furthermore, e have no reasontobelieve hat ocratesoesnotholdproperties,ctions tc. to be real bjects(infact very easonobelieve heopposite),ndsowe must lsoacknowl-edgethathehas no reason oholdthat hey re not namedby exactlyhesame mechanism sare the objectsof other eferringerms. n short, hehomogenousntology roposedbySocrates t the beginningf the dia-logue386e-387b)suggests,nd themimeticheory f names ntails hatthere s no differencen function etween predicatendareferringerm:

both pickout their bjectsby being ike them.And since theimitate heir bjects, sentence,s a complexf whichpickouttheir bjectsby mitation, illpickout ts omplexf objectsby mitatingthem.26o themimetic heoryeavesus with wopossibleutcomes orsentence either t imitatesis like)a complexetof objectsor stateofaffairs)ndpicksout that tate f affairs,r it does not mitate complexset of objectsnddoes notpickthem ut.

26)ocrates'iew f,t422c7-dl, mplieshatogoi ill ecomposedfofuniformunction,llpickinguttheir bjectsy mitatinghem.



26/28

/. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151 1 9

Thepassageunderdiscussionn thispaper, hen,mayprovidenvalu-able evidenceor n early latonic ccountof how one canattach falsepropositiono a portionof the worldby means of demonstrativesndextra-linguisticactors; he account of falsepropositionsmooted herewouldbe a by-productf the discussionf falsenaming.A discussion fthisfurther oint sbeyond hescopeof this paper.However,f thepur-poseofthe rgument as to showfalsepeecho bepossible,hen ocratesissurprisinglyrief nbothhistreatment f the ssue nd histriumph. he

brevityf the

conclusion,nd Socrates'

pparent nwillingnesso

gointo

thedetail f his nference,s,bycontrast, nderstandable,f t s not reallythe questionof false-speakinghat s at issuehere.So,regardlessf theargument potential ontributiono ancientdebates oncerninghepos-sibility f false ogoUwe caninfer hat hiswas not Plato primary iminincludingt.

V. Conclusions

In thispaper have made a number f relatednterpretativelaimscon-cerning owCratylus27dl-431c3shouldberead.

I have uggestedhat ocrates sattacking versionf inguisticatural-ismthatCratylusefends; amely,he hesishat ikeness s bothnecessaryand sufficientornaming.Cratylussserts t the beginningf thedialoguethat a namewhich s incorrect or n objectcannot bea name forthatobjectat all. It followsrom he mimetic heory f referencehat ocratesexpoundsndCratylusndorseshat namemustbe correct or n object,in the senseof being ike t, n order o pickout,or refer o thatobject.Thustherelation f ikeness etween ame andnominatum s understoodto be both necessarynd sufficientondition or eferencen this ccount.On Cratylus' iew,mimesisxhaustshe ign-relation.

I have alsoshown hat ocrates' rgument ependsona certain eatureof real anguages,amely emonstratives,nd employshem nd relateddeviceso overridenyputativemimeticnatural) elation etween nameand itsobject.Socrates' oncentrationn exampletatementsontainingthese features trongly uggests hat t is falsenamingrather han falsepropositionshat re his mainconcern ere.Allof the examplesregearedtowardsnvestigatinghat onstitutes necessarynd sufficientonditionfor etting amescorrectndtrue, r ncorrectnd falsenSocrates'erms)to attachto things.However,we cannotsaythat the examplesikewise



27/28

150 /. SmithPhronesis3 (2008)125-151

elucidate heproblemsonnectedwith hepossibilityf false ropositions.Noneofthe statementsn Socrates'xamplesouldbe counted shavingpropositionalontent nqualifiedly.peechacts uchas those xemplifiedat (429e2-6)and(430e8-431a6)do nothavetruth onditions. ncontex-tualised tatementsontainingemonstrativesuch s those ited t 429c7)and (429c9)areincompletend so cannothave a truth alue or truth-conditions ntilcontextualised.f coursePlatodid not have the ogicaldistinctionsohand that re available o modern hinkers. ut it isplau-sibleto

supposethathehadsome awareness hathis

exampleswere

pecu-liar ases,nd that hese xampleswould be usefulnaninvestigationntoquestions oncerning eference,ut far moreproblematicorquestionsconcerninghepossibilityf false ropositions.

Finally,t shouldbe clear hat ocrates' ttack s successful:hroughheintroduction f particularypes f propositionwhichrely n the contextof their tterance nd extra-linguisticndication f their peaker inten-tions, ocrates orcesratylus o concede hat t spossibleo use anametorefer o an objectthat t is unlike,or incorrect or. Sincethe putativemimetic inkbetween ame and

objectcan be

overridden,henmimesiss

neither necessaryorsufficientondition orreference.t follows romthis hat hereferenceelation snot constituted y ikeness.urthermore,bythe ameargument, o other atural inary elation illbenecessaryrsufficientorreferenceince theconventionallyontrived eatures f an-guagethat Socrateshas introducedn thisdiscussionwould overridenyproposednatural elation etween ameand nominatum.

It mustbe pointedout that the possibilityhatatomic names haveamimetic alue are ike certain eaturesf the universe)s never uledout

bythisdiscussion. fter

ll,the

picturef the woman

ncorrectlyssignedto a man s neverthelesspicture f woman.Theargumentsnot ntendedtodiscredithe dea thatnameshave a mimetic alue.However,he rgu-menthasshownthat, egardlessf whether ames do, in fact,have suchmimetic alues,mimesiss neither ufficient, or necessaryorreference(andthus he ignrelation annotbeconstitutedy ikeness). namemayhaveto be as like tsobjectaspossibleo be a correct ame,but t doesnot have to be like tsobjectto function s a namefor hat object.Andoncethis as been ccepted,ne has towonderwhat ignificantolemimesisor

nyother atural eUtion can

playnan account f reference.



28/28

/. SmithPhronesis3(2008)125-151 151

WorksCited

Anagnostopoulos,. 1971/1972.PlatosCratylus:heTwoTheoriesf heCorrectnessfNames.'ReviewfMetaphysics5,691-736.

Annas,.1982.KnowledgendLanguagen the TheaetetusndtheCratylus'nLanguageandLogos,ds.M.SchofieldndM.Nussbaum.ambridge,5-114.

Austin,.L.1954.HowtoDoThingsithWords.xford.Barney,. 2001. NamesndNaturen Plato'sratylus.ewYork ndLondon.Baxter,.M.S.1992.The ratylus:htosCritiquefNaming.eiden.Bestor,.W.1980.Plato'semanticsndPlato'sratylus:hronesis5,306-330.

Binder,. andLiesenbourghs,. 1966.EineZuweisunger entenz anProdikosonKeos.'nSophistik,d.C.J.Classen.armstadt,52-462.Denyer, . 1991.Language, houghtndFalsehoodnAncientreekhilosophy.ondon.Devitt,M.,Sterelney,. 1999.LanguagendReality.xford.Fine,G.M.1977.Plato nNaming.'hilosophicaluarterly7,289-301.Goldschmidt,.1940.Essai ur eCratyle.aris.Kahn, .H.1973.LanguagendOntologyntheCratylus.'nExegesisndArgument,ds.

E.N.Lee,A.P.D.MourelatosndR.M.Rorty. ewYork, 52-176.Kahn, .H. 1986.LesMots t esFormes anse Cratyle ePlaton.'nPhilosophieu

Langaget GrammaireansAntiquitCahiersePhilosophiencienne).BrusselsandGrenoble,1-103.

Kaplan,. 1989.DemonstrativesndAfterthoughts.n Themesrom aplan,ds.J. lmog,J.PerryndS. Wettstein.xford,81-614.

Keller,. 2000.AnnterpretationfPlato'sratylus:hronesis0,284-305.Ketchum,J. 1979.Names, orms,onventionalism:ratylus83-395.Phronesis4,

133-147.Kretzmann,. 1971.Plato n theCorrectnessf Names. mericanhilosophicaluar-

terly, 126-138.Levin,.B.2001.The ncientuarreletweenhilosophyndPoetryevisited.lato ndthe

Literaryradition.xford.Mackenzie,.M.A.1986.PuttingheCratylusn ts lace.'Classicaluarterly6,124-150.

Reeve,.D.C.1999.Plato, ratylus:ransktedithntroductionndNotes.ndianapolis/Cambridge.Robinson,. 1955. Criticismf Plato'sCratylus.1n Essaysn Greekhilosophy,d.

R. Robinson.xford, 18-138.Schofield,. 1982.The Dnouementf the Cratylus.'n Languagend Logos,ds.

M. SchofieldndM.Nussbaum.ambridge,1-81.Sedley,. 2003.Platosratylus.ambridge.Silverman,. 1992.PlatosCratylus'.heNamingfNature ndtheNature r Naming.

OxfordtudiesnAncienthilosophy0,25-72.Wettstein,. 1991.How toBridgeheGapbetween eaningnd Reference.'n Has

SemanticsestedonMistake?,d.H.Wettstein.tanford,9-95.White, .P.1968.Plato nKnowledgendReality.ndianapolisWilliams,. 1982.Cratylus'heoryfNames nd tsRefutation.'nLanguagendLogos,

eds.M. SchofieldndM. Nussbaum.ambridge,3-93.

False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus - I....

Documents

Transcript of False Names, Demonstratives and the Refutation of Linguistic Naturalism in Plato's Cratylus - I....