Fall 2015 Research Paper

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1

A Comparative Analysis of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Qaeda

in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Kristin M. Bethel

University of Massachusetts, Lowell


Abstract

This paper seeks to identify and compare six different aspects of three

terrorist organizations—Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—to include

leadership, financial networks, recruiting support, operating environment,

strategies and vulnerabilities. Effective counterterrorism policy is

significantly more potent when the threat is fully understood, recognized and

comprehended. How do we successfully cripple organizations? A key aspect

of successfully implementing counterterrorism strategies precedes any

written policy or guidelines. Governments must take the time to learn all

components of a terrorist organization starting with those in leadership to

the strategies and vulnerabilities of this group. The more comprehensive

intelligence on a known organization, the better agencies are able to

construct an effective counterterrorism policy. Christopher Faulkner and

David Gray write that, “It is obvious with hindsight that the international

community has failed in a number of situations to be proactive in defeating

terrorist threats. In large part however, this failure has come from incorrectly

assessing the threat posed by terrorist groups (knowing the enemy)—a

theme the US has seen continue to repeat itself over the last decade” (p. 2).

Along with fully understanding the capabilities and makeup of a terrorist

organization comes the more important aspect of knowing what drives and


motivates these groups.

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the United States of America (USA) as

well as countries all over the world, have vowed to avenge terrorism and all

actors involved. Since then, we have seen numerous terrorist attacks across

the country, most recently, in Paris and Beirut as well as Kenya and Lebanon.

After every attack, countries vow revenge on those held responsible. Nations

are crippled and families are destroyed. Those responsible send video

messages vowing more attacks and are seen rejoicing and praising the

successful attacks. Counterterrorism strategies are changed and modified to

allow intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies virtually free reign

to do what it takes to find these senseless perpetrators. Governments act

quickly so as not to seem weak and unable to stand strong in a time where

all hope seems to be lost. In a politically motivated time of existence,

terrorism seeks to cause feelings of despair and defeat. Terrorists want

victims and those effected to feel crushed and lose faith in government.

Terrorists want their actions to cause change or demands to be met. They


seek revenge on everyone who has impeded or blocked their politically

motivated agenda. Chaos and confusion drive terrorists to repeat and plan

more attacks until they are satisfied, but will they ever be satisfied?

Counterterrorism policies seek to provide systematic guidelines in

disseminating intelligence, information sharing and pinpointing locations and

heads of leadership. Drone attacks seek to destroy those in leadership as

well as infrastructures critical to terrorist networks, sometimes taking

innocent victims along with them. Radical extremists effected by counter

attacks are then driven to attack for revenge once again. This cycle

continues until an organization is dismantled, those in leadership are killed,

or finances decrease causing attacks to cease.

Religious violence, for example, is motivated by justification for one’s

actions due to eternal life or in the case of the Islamic State (IS), establishing

a religious caliphate. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), alongside

organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) seek to most importantly rid their

prospective countries of Western influence.

Leadership

ISIS, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or IS,

recently re-emerged as a strong force in 2013 amongst Syria and Iraq. After

its original leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006, ISIS was hit with

a series of attacks by “US-funded anti-al-Qaeda militias known as the Sahwa


or “Awakening” Groups (p. W. Andrew Terrill, p. 15). They only recently

emerged stronger than ever after rebuilding itself in Syria. However, their

ties with groups like Al-Qaeda were quickly severed as ISIS’ agenda became

much more of a violent contender. Organizations such as al-Qaeda and

Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, who have been challenged due

to the many different successes of ISIS, have denounced their allegiance with

ISIS due to their extreme violent agenda. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-

Qaeda since the death of Osama bin Laden, more recently repeated his

severed ties with ISIL after repeated conflicts between ISIS and al-Nusra. W.

Andrew Terrill, wrote that “On February 2, 2014, the problems, between al-

Qaeda and ISIL reached a crisis point when Zawahiri released a statement

disassociating his organization from ISIL, thus expelling the organization

from al-Qaeda” (p. 15-16). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been the leader since

2010 and under his reign, changed the name from ISIL to IS and according to

Terrill, “asserted that IS was now the only legitimate authority in the Muslim

world and its authority superseded and replaced the leadership of each

Muslim country” (p. 17). Under the leadership of Baghdadi, IS has achieved

success in holding territory in Iraq and Syria, and has also gained the

allegiance of multiple militant Islamist groups across the Middle East, North

Africa, and Asia. Most significantly, it has begun to expand into Egypt (the

Sinai peninsula), Libya, and Yemen” (Ezzeldeen Khalil, 2015). With an

increasing global network and strong recruiting base, under its current


leadership, IS will continue to emerge as the prime, global Islamic jihadist

organization.

While scholars have argued that al-Qaeda is no longer a threat to

America’s homeland, the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliate groups such as

AQAP and AQIM have countered these arguments tremendously. According

to Faulkner and Gray, AQAP is “the result of a merger between two separate

al Qaeda operations—Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia (AQSA) and Al Qaeda in

Yemen (AQIY)” (p. 2).

The emergence of AQSA stemmed from two different leaders, with

two different agendas. Yusuf Al-Uyayri emerged in 1998 after his release

from prison with an agenda of “establishing an Islamic Jihadist group that

would threaten the Saudi regime and began recruitment efforts shortly after

his release” (Faulkner, p.2). He wanted to advance al-Qaeda’s strategic goal

by organizing five cells in Saudi Arabia in order to “ensure the continuation

of strategic goals should one cell be compromised” (p.3). Although very

seemingly thought out and quite promising, it would take time and effort to

achieve this. The main al-Qaeda group based out of Afghanistan and

Pakistan, known as Al Qaeda Core (AQC) wanted an agenda that was ready

to be carried out immediately. On the other hand, was Abd Al-Rahman Al-

Nashiri, who upon returning to Saudi Arabia, had developed an immediate

that would include attacks “against the Saudi regime, government targets,

and security forces in order to demonstrate Al Qaeda’s intent to not be fazed


by the war in Afghanistan (Faulkner, p. 3)”. This plot was much more

appealing to AQC, resulting in financial support of Nashiri. After the death of

Nashiri, and with AQC in need of a new al-Qaeda representation in Saudi

Arabia, it was al-Uyayri’s time to prove himself capable. He did momentarily

with a single attack in 2003, killing 34 and wounded 200. However, in the

midst of a powerful counter-strategy against AQSA, the organization was

crippled with the capture of a number of operatives as well as the killings of

many others, most notably, Al-Uyayri himself. Once again, AQSA appeared to

be weak and unable of withstanding counterterrorism campaigns against

them. Surprisingly, however, they were able to continue their existence due

to their utilization of a strong media campaign thereby bolstering

recruitment numbers. As AQSA continued to grow and thrive, so did the Al-

Qaeda presence in Yemen. After a major attack in Yemen on a US naval

warship, the USS Cole, the international community took a renewed attention

to the threat of Al-Qaeda. From a leadership standpoint, it was not until 2006

that major leadership over Al-Qaeda was assumed. Two important

individuals, —Nasser Al-Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi—escaped from prison

and assumed leadership in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. These two

groups merged together in 2009 and became AQAP, the current threat we

face today. As of the recent June 2015 death of Wahayshi, Qasim al-Raymi

now assumes current leadership over AQAP.

Another al-Qaeda affiliate group, AQIM or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic


Maghreb, is an Algerian based terrorist group renamed after the original

Groupe Salafiste de Predication et du Djihad, or GSPC. This group was

created in 1998 by Hassan Hattab, who sought a jihad against an Algerian

regime. What is interesting about this group however, was their apparent

fight against only Algeria, as opposed to other countries. After 9/11, two

individuals who would later become the eventual leaders of AQIM—Nabil

Sahraoui and Abdelmalek Droukdel—ousted Hattab, whose agenda was

strictly set in Algeria, and Droukdel became the eventual leader after

Sahraoui’s death in 2004. AQIM has furthered its operational reach outside of

Algeria and into the Sahel, or the “belt connecting North Africa and West

Africa and straddling ancient trade and migration routes” (J. Peter Pham, p.

18). This group has seen many of its leaders surrendering to Algerian forces

in the last six to seven years, thereby weakening its status as an effective

terrorist group in North Africa. The Algerian counterterrorism campaign has

been highly effective in this region.

Financial Support

Parallel with strong leadership amongst an organization, comes the

crucial need for financial resources and support. Without financial means,

terrorist groups are unable to carry out attacks, train operatives in specific

skill set areas, educate operatives, and even limits travel to certain areas or

targets of attack. Finances are a crucial hinge that keeps terrorist

organizations intact and they gain financial support through successful


attacks and even through state-sponsored operations. Terrorist

organizations fund their operations through ties with organized crime groups,

state sponsors as well as self-financing. David Axe writes that “one self-

financing tactic is for extremist groups to recruit new fighters on the

Internet, and require them to pay a fee to join up” (2015). Another means of

avoiding detection is operating in a cash only environment. By operating in a

cost-effective manner, they are able to avoid a financial trail capable of

being tracked, as well as limit their expenses.

ISIS has emerged as a strong organization due to their successful

attacks, which in turn is attributed to their large funding base. Matthew

Levitt and Ryan Youkilis attribute much of ISIS’ financing to “territorial based

revenues, such as extortion, crime, "taxing" of the local populations, and, of

course, the sale of oil and antiquities” (2015). Their most recent conquest of

the city of Mosul allowed the terrorist organization to “freely loot banks, tax

trade, and extort residents” (Levitt & Youkilis, 2015). Financial and trade

sanctions have not stopped ISIS funding and the group continues to thrive in

spite of such sanctions. Janine di Giovanni, Leah Goodman and Damien

Sharkov mention that “highly localized and multiple revenue streams feed

the terrorist organization’s coffers—generating up to $6 million a day,

according to Masrour Barzani, head of Kurdish Intelligence and the Kurdistan

Regional Security Council” (p. 28). They go on to mention that “ISIS has

accepted funding from government or private sources in the oil-rich nations


of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait—and a large network of private donors,

including Persian Gulf royalty, businessmen and wealthy families” (p. 29).

ISIS has also instituted the use of “fake” humanitarian aid which is used as a

means of funneling money and using it to fund terrorist operations.

Cellphone applications such as WhatsApp and Kik allow GPS mapping to be

utilized in order to coordinate where to send money amongst terrorist

members. As mentioned earlier, ISIS also utilizes cash methods in an effort

to evade detection and largely in part due to the lack of adequate security in

Middle Eastern airports. Furthermore, the lack of border control allows

money to be freely moved across borders such as Turkey and Syria with little

to no impediments. Other forms of financial support comes from ISIS' selling

of ancient artifacts from looted archaeological sites as well as kidnapping for

ransom.

Although not as financially stable as ISIS, AQAP also receives money

from different sources. It is no secret that states are known for sponsoring

terrorism and David Cohen--the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial

Intelligence for the U.S. Treasury Department--in his speech at the Center for

a New American Security said that groups such like AQAP and AQIM also

receive money from terrorist financiers(U.S. Department of the Treasury,

2014). He goes on to note that "Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani is a Yemen-

based fundraiser who used his status in the charitable community as a cover

for funneling financial support to AQAP" (Cohen, 2014). Cohen goes on to


note that "apart from state sponsorship, KFR [kidnapping for ransom] is

today’s greatest source of terrorist funding and the most challenging

terrorist financing threat. Groups such as AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab

continue to collect tens of millions of dollars from ransoms" (2014). In order

to keep terrorist organizations from gaining revenue and finances, it is

important for governments and citizens to ensure their safety as well as

refuse negotiations with terrorists. The U.S. government has made clear that

it will not negotiate with terrorists and give in to their demands.

AQIM conducts large numbers of ransoms of both Europeans as well as

Algerians. These ransoms have garnered millions of dollars to this group as a

result. Richard Nessel writes that “AQIM acquired 12 million euros from

European hostage situations from 2009-2010” (p. 35).

Recruiting Networks

In the age of advanced technology, terrorist organizations are using

it as a strategic platform to spread propaganda and messages to a global

audience. Members are utilizing social media, forums even YouTube in order

to profess their anti-Western ideologies, plans and threats. They have

broadcasted beheadings and public murders of citizens from around the

world. More importantly, however, is their usage of technology as a means of

reaching out and recruiting new members to join in their fight, which poses a

significant risk. Social media utilizations of sites such as Facebook and

Twitter have allowed organizations to essentially mask themselves behind a


computer and effectively propagate ideologies and false promises in return

for joining the fight against targeted Western countries. These groups are

targeting citizens of all countries, ages and ethnicities, and even women.

Due to the—in this case—thousands of ISIS supported Twitter accounts, it is

very difficult to track, manage and even shut down these accounts allowing

members to speak freely and openly to potential recruits. They have

garnered support from all over the world at virtually no cost to anyone.

Through these sites, organizations are able to employ professionally scripted

videos and learned to navigate through impediments seeking to block their

means of a voice.

ISIS, in particular is known for broadcasting attacks as well as

threats across the globe. As it relates to recruitment, Heather Vitale and

James Keague write that "arguably, ISIS makes the largest impact on Twitter.

It holds about a dozen accounts from central leadership, all focused on

different aspects: official messages from leaders, recruitment, networking,

intimidation, or religious themes" (p. 7). Using social media also has a

personal effect to it. Instead of just reading ideologies or pamphlets as a

means of recruitment, terrorists who actually are a part of the fight are able

to reach out to troubled youth or individuals who are looking for a sense of

self-worth and purpose. Vitale and Keague add that "it enables the

recruitment to be more sincere and the message to be richer as it comes

from mujahedeen on the battlefield instead of an isolated leader" (p. 7).


There is little to no monitoring of these sites except for when extremely

grotesque or offensive images are posted. Along with Twitter, ISIS is

infamous for using Instagram as a platform for visually disseminating photos

of a wonderful life as a jihadist that comes with promising benefits such as

money, women and recognition. ISIS has even gone so far as to construct

professional videos depicting the need for Western recruits as well as images

and video of buildings being destroyed and people being killed. Vitale and

Keague add on to this aspect in noting that "these repeated images do

nothing but glorify ISIS’s brutal acts, helping to make the group more

appealing to younger people through the shine of editing and production" (p.

9). These means of recruitment being utilized by ISIS are attracting

individuals from all over and serve as a continual grave threat to our country.

Lone wolf attacks are rising all over the world and they are by far the biggest

threat to America.

AQAP although not as big as ISIS, still has a strong foreign fighter

base in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. They are a much more localized group with

grievances both inside their country as well as towards Western culture and

influence. Additionally, due to their high poverty rates, Yemen serves as a

hotspot for terrorist organizations to operate and thrive in. It is important to

identify the grievances related to that area so as to understand the broader

spectrum of what attracts individuals in those areas to join AQAP. According

to Alistair Harris, "Muslims are suffering at the hands of a CrusaderZionist


alliance that props up illegitimate and corrupt local regimes that have failed

to provide for their citizens. AQAP’s diagnostic framework skillfully weaves

local grievances into this wider narrative of persecution, marginalization, and

threat" (p. 6). AQAP's demographic consists of mainly young males who want

to promote violence against the West. Like ISIS, AQAP's main focus "remains

on ridding the Arabian Peninsula of all non-Muslims, the establishment of a

local emirate, and the liberation of Palestine en route to the establishment of

a global caliphate" (Harris, 2010). AQAP has used the already known

grievances amongst its poverty stricken people in order to ignite the need to

wage war against all non-Muslims. Because of the socioeconomic grievances

as well as the risk of civilian casualties in a small area, it is important that

counterterrorism efforts are aimed at preventing civilian casualties so as not

to allow these extremists to use civilian casualties as a grievance against the

Western military and law enforcement entities. Due to the small dynamics of

AQAP and their geographical location, they—unlike ISIS—are not as

technological savvy as other terrorist organizations. Being able to reach out

to potential recruits by understanding what AQAP's message is, is likely to

have a reverse effect on those who may want to join. Unlike ISIS, AQIM

stemmed from jihadi fights against Algerian government.

AQIM presently serves as the most active terrorist group in North

Africa. They are involved heavily in the illicit crime environment and

therefore attract members with criminal records in crimes such as drug


trafficking and petty theft. Richard Nessel writes that "an inordinate number

of AQIM’s suicide bombers had served previous prison terms for crimes

unrelated to AQIM or the jihad (drugs and petty crime)" (p. 34). Their

organizations is made up of mostly local Yemenis and Saudi Arabians as well

as individuals in the Sahara-Sahel region, consisting of the countries of Niger,

Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.

Operating Environment

ISIS operates mainly out of Iraq and Syria. ISIS has gone on a spree of

city takeovers amongst heavy retaliation from different countries around the

world, most notably Russia and the U.S. Jessica McFate writes that "the

Islamic State’s summer and early autumn 2015 campaign in Iraq and Syria

demonstrated that the group can pursue its objectives conservatively,

surviving under pressure and holding its own while balancing against its

losses" (2015). In 2015 alone, the Islamic State has held off defensive forces

in the cities of Aleppo as well as Mosul and Ramadi. They have also targeted

Baiji for its oil as well as Fallujah. McFate notes that "the group still boasts

strong defenses in northern Aleppo, in the vicinity of Deir ez Zour, in outer

Anbar, and in the Zaab triangle north of Hawija" (2015). ISIS has also

targeted cities in Syria in their continual efforts to establish an Islamic

caliphate amongst all Muslims.

AQAP operates mainly in Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the

Middle East. Socioeconomic conditions that incorporate weak states and


dismantled government give this terrorist organization the opportunity to

thrive and operate without much interference. During and after the collapse

of the Saleh presidency, formerly known as the Arab Spring, AQAP used this

discord to become a thriving terrorist group. They have targeted military

officials, police officials as well as senior security officials. W. Andrew Terrill

writes that "AQAP functioned primarily as a terrorist organization prior to

2010, but it later expanded its operations to include efforts to capture, hold,

and rule territory in areas where the Yemeni government had only a limited

ability to maintain security" (p. 35). Their main operations are directed

towards those in Yemen and AQAP utilizes suicide bombings and

assassinations as a major means of attack. Yemeni security forces have

made increasing efforts to thwart and defeat AQAP, however, there is much

more to be done.

As mentioned in the leadership section of this paper, the leader of

AQIM is Abdelmalek Droukdel. His command is supported by the People of

Authority council which is divided into two councils known as the Council of

Notable and a Shura Council. (Nassel, p. 25). The leadership is comprised of

predominantly Algerian individuals. According to Nassel, "AQIM conducts

operations with centralized command and decentralized execution. The

centralized command structure of the headquarters element (Supreme

Commander, Council of Notables and Shura Council) task or approve targets

and campaign plans for the zone commanders" (p. 30-31). AQIM has a very


loose reign on the commanders in its surrounding regions as it relates to

operations and plans. If an attack is possible, then it is up to the "zone

commander" to plan, execute, finance and carry it out. The central command

regime tasks its commanders in the surrounding areas with financing and

equipping their recruits, thereby regulating and conserving finances. AQIM's

main operations are based in Algeria with a number of footholds in the Sahel

region consisting of Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. From a geographical

standpoint, the Sahelian region of Africa provides a great breeding ground

for jihadist organizations. Their weak states, relaxed border control and

economic conditions allow opportunities for drug and weapons smuggling as

well. AQIM has thrived in this area due to these regional conditions and

continues to make alliances with other groups in the region. The Algerian

government must take swift action in order to prevent further turmoil in

North Africa. Unlike ISIS, AQIM is more of a regional threat as opposed to

global. However all strategies remain similar with an Islamic caliphate being

the end goal.

Strategies

ISIS's strategy is one that is global, spanning across countries with

multiple goals. Their main strategy or goal is to establish and expand their

caliphate across the world. In order to do this, Harleen Gambhir makes a

very detailed description of three rings that are dear to ISIS's campaign.

They are the Interior ring (Iraq and Syria), the Near Abroad ring (Jordan,


Lebanon and Israel-Palestine) and the Far Abroad ring (Europe, U.S., Asia)

(July, 2015). For each ring, Gambhir gives a mission. For the interior ring, the

mission is "aggressive defense" (July 2015, p. 10). For the Near Abroad ring,

the mission is "expansion through the creation of regional affiliates" (p.11).

Lastly, the mission of the Far Abroad ring is "disruption and preparation of

the battlefield" (p. 12). In countries like Iraq, ISIS seeks to wreak havoc

amongst a failed state all while spreading their radical propaganda. In

neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon, ISIS seeks to boost recruits

and encourage membership into ISIS, all while going up against ideological

enemies, Al-Qaeda and the al-Nusra front. In countries such as Europe and

the Americas, ISIS seeks to maintain an existing presence in these countries

as well as ignite cells to launch terrorist attacks in their home countries. ISIS

is very strategic in their methods and, according to Gambhir, “ISIS’s global

operations allow it to place stress on multiple states and international

alliances at once" (July, 2015). Cohesively, ISIS is "conducting simultaneous

campaigns to defend its existing territory within Iraq and Syria, to foster

affiliates in the Middle East and North Africa region, and to launch polarizing

attacks in the rest of the world" (Gambhir, May 2015, p. 2). ISIS has emerged

from having a regional strategy to a global strategy that is aimed at

destroying Western culture and presence in order to establish a completely

Muslim caliphate.

Unlike ISIS, much of AQAP's strategy lies within appealing to the


local Yemeni population. AQAP has a much bigger focus on the Arabian

Peninsula and disrupting the political agenda of the area. In 2009, in AQAP's

magazine, Sada al-Malahim, voiced their main goal as "to unseat the regime

in Saudi Arabia, noting that Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s grasp on

power was weakening: 'We concentrate on Saudi Arabia because the

government of Ali Abdullah Saleh is on the verge of collapse [and he is about

to] flee the land of Yemen' "(p. 3). Due to its weak condition as a state, it

gives AQAP full opportunity to achieve this goal as well as push out anything

or anyone preventing them from doing so. By using their strategy of

appealing to the people, AQAP is able to muster up recruits who want to fight

for a cause. Additionally, AQAP has, according to Nicholas Hedberg "worked

carefully to cultivate ties to the local population" (p. 33). By doing this, AQAP

is able to achieve two goals: 1) recruit locals and 2) to gain support of the

locals. The organization has even married into the local tribes to become

more intertwined and involved with the Yemeni local tribes. By using outlets

such as merging with the local tribes as well as offering support and efforts

to a very poor community, they can potentially garner support as well as

turn Yemenis away from the government. Their messages of government

neglect and abandonment can potentially resonate with the local population

causing them to want to revolt against the government. Nicholas Hedberg

writes that "through their shared experiences, marrying into the tribes, and

political and ideological messages resonating with Yemeni tribes, AQAP is


creating a sphere of influence where the Yemeni government has no control"

(p. 35). As this exploitation of the Yemeni citizens as well as the local tribes

continue, it will continue to provide free roaming operational territory and

continue to pose a threat to the region as well as to the Western countries as

their goal, like ISIS, is to repel "foreigners from Muslim lands and establishing

an Islamic Caliphate" (p. 32). Counterterrorism strategy must continue to see

AQAP as a potential threat so as not to continue to let Yemen serve as a

potential safe haven for Al-Qaeda leaders.

AQIM has a history of operating strictly within the Algerian borders

but after an operational transformation, they have broadened their borders

to the North African region known as the Sahelian region. Their growing

operational capacity has allowed to conduct numerous kidnapping-for-

ransom attacks as well as the increased use of suicide bombings. Their

targets have remained tourists and military members along with attempted

assassination attempts. Their strategy consist of occupying and taking

advantage of regions with little to no control. Additionally, similar to AQAP,

AQIM has "utilized local community integration in order to gradually deepen

its roots, grow its resource base, and develop its operational strength"

(Modibo Goita, p. 3). AQIM has exploited government response that resulted

in loss of civilian life in order to, according to Goita, “further drive a wedge

between local Sahelian communities and their national government" (p. 5).

Due to the location and lack of economic resources in the Sahelian region, as


well as the close-knit makeup of AQIM, a large, comprehensive military

response will not be as successful as a centralized, remote attack that will

avoid large loss of life. It is absolutely imperative and necessary that

counterterrorism seek out and exploit the vulnerabilities of these

organizations so that they are able to construct effective counterterrorism

policy against these terror groups.

Vulnerabilities

ISIS has proven itself to be a high-profile, successful terrorist

organization, not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in Europe and the United

States. With the recent attacks in Paris in January by lone wolf actors, as well

as the subsequent attacks in Paris in November—all being linked to ISIS

affiliates—,it is very clear that ISIS has no plan to back down or give in.

Counterterrorism policies should be geared towards capitalizing on the

vulnerabilities amongst ISIS and using them to our advantage. Because ISIS

is a very visible threat as well as very violent and unreasonably in their

operations, it causes some local Iraqis and Syrians to want nothing to do with

them. While they are trying to establish an Islamic caliphate as well as

overthrow the current government, they have no regard for human life as

well as innocent civilians. By using their high visibility and presence to our

advantage, governments can pinpoint destinations, training facilities as well

as storage holds and destroy them. Anthony Celso explains that "IS’

apocalyptic ideology and its fixation on fighting Western troops in a


predestined battle of Dabiq makes it vulnerable to open confrontation” (p.

9). In other words, luring ISIS fighters out into open battle instead of just

focusing on targeted air strikes will place them in a weak spot and no match

for our military weapons. However, with President Obama’s refusal to place

ground troops in Syria, that strategy will be hard to enforce. Celso also

pinpoints the local Sunni tribes as being the Islamic State’s “Achilles heel” (p.

9). Additionally, ISIS has made many jihadi extremist enemies as a result of

their radical ways to include local tribes allowing this to serve as a major

vulnerability as these tribes and other radical groups could potentially

increase their counterattack against ISIS and successfully weaken them.

Unlike AQAP and AQIM, targeting ISIS vulnerabilities will be a much more

challenging feat as they are greater in size, they cross different country

borders and have the interest of thousands of individuals around the world.

The important aspect of weakening ISIS is to decrease recruit numbers,

social media propaganda and then work to effectively target local command

centers and other support structures in the Middle East.

AQAP has grievances both internally in Yemen as well as against

Western states. Because of that, they have an advantage over the

government due to the government’s lack of economic and financial

assistance to its own people. AQAP is using these such grievances to turn

Yemenis as well as local Yemeni tribes against the government and it has

been successful thus far. If Yemen is able to prevent itself from turning in to


a failed state and being further thrust into the hands of AQAP, it will cause

recruiting numbers to decrease and people to return their faith in the local

government. Secondly, by strengthening local Yemeni security forces, AQAP

will have to strengthen their efforts to fight back. If Yemeni forces are able to

combat them successfully, it will cause the organization to weaken. By

targeting leadership first and foremost, and taking out decision makers,

AQAP will continue to spiral into discord and chaos, confusion and possible

departure from the organization by members.

Targeting AQIM’s vulnerabilities involves targeting internal conflicts

amongst the group. Common counterterrorism knowledge teaches that

targeting a terrorist group’s core leadership is an effective means of

weakening an organization. AQIM has a history of internal conflict amongst

its group, most recently the conflict between him and Mohktar Belmokhtar as

well as with the inner Shura Council, a core cadre of religious leaders.

Belmohktar, according to Richard Nessel, “a popular AQIM sub-commander in

the southern region of the GSPC, who voiced his displeasure with Droukdel’s

climb to power and subsequent expansion of operations into the Sahel” (p.

43). This has caused a rift between the two as Droukdel is very power hungry

and willing to do whatever it takes to bolster his organization as successful.

The other internal rift is between Droukdel and the Shura Council of religious

leaders. This conflict stems from conflating statements made by the Council

as well as Droukdel, which in turn “seemed to corroborate the claim that


Droukdel had begun deferring to AQ-Central for its guidance, minimizing the

role of AQIM’s own Shura Council” (p. 44). Droukdel is a very important

figure and his death would be a major blow to AQIM and open the door for

increased internal conflict in selecting a new leader. Because this

organization is so hierarchy based with a centralized leadership, it stands as

their biggest vulnerability.

The most imperative aspect of a successful counterterrorism

strategy is to know all about your organization. Knowing strengths,

operations, leadership, vulnerabilities, as well as what keeps these

organizations running are crucial aspects that can be used to a government’s

advantage. For example, the Islamic State operates on a considerably higher

platform than AQAP and AQIM. This is in part due to their location, their

tactical successes in Western countries as well as their very successful social

media propaganda platform. Weak states such as Yemen and Algeria located

in remote parts of the world are susceptible to local conflicts as well as

socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, their members stem from these

areas and are more likely to be uneducated and illiterate. ISIS has the

financial means to educate, train and send its fighters all over the world. ISIS

has unified thousands of fighters and taught them from a very young age

that the West is bad and jihad is good. Their ideologies are being mentally

nailed into the minds of recruits causing them to only know fighting.

Intelligence agencies must continue to gain information and study these


groups in order to stay abreast of changes in leadership, track financial

funding as well as target and destroy critical command centers of these

groups. As a result, counterterrorism policies will allow governments to

target these groups more precisely and decrease and mitigate the threat of

attacks against respective countries.

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Fall 2015 Research Paper

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