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The Failure of the Camp David Summit July 2000, Calev Bender - 1 -

The Failure of Camp David July 2000

Table of Contents

page

Introduction 2 Chapter 1 Domestic Constraints - Leaders being Led 10 Chapter 2 Different Frames of Reference - Inevitable Misunderstanding 17 Chapter 3 Trying to Bridge the Gap - Change of Perception and Discourse 29 Chapter 4 Redefinition of the Conflict – The Tension between Pragmatism and History 38 Conclusion The Failure of Camp David - The Return of Historical and Religious Argument 45 Bibliography 48


Introduction

Between July 11th and 24th, under the auspices of President Clinton,

Prime minister Barak and chairman Arafat met at the presidential

retreat of Camp David in an effort to reach a deal on a permanent

status agreement, putting an end to decades of conflict and achieving

a just and lasting peace. On the 25th July 2000, President of the

United States, Bill Clinton released a statement announcing the

failure of the Summit. "After 14 days of intensive negotiations between

Israelis and Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not

able to reach an agreement at this time1" The Summit had been seen

as signalling the onset of a historic reconciliation between Israelis and

Palestinians ending a one hundred year conflict. Israeli Prime minister

Ehud Barak had confidently predicted that his ‘far reaching

compromises’ would lead to a peace deal that would signal the end of

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the light of the summit’s conclusion

without agreement and the subsequent violence that has plagued the

region since September 2000, the negotiations at Camp David have

taken on added significance, with the general feeling that the two

sides came agonisingly close to brokering a deal and that any future

agreement will be close in nature to what was discussed at Camp

David. It is therefore of paramount importance that it is fully

understood and the reasons for its failure clearly articulated.

Based on the concept of ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’

there is no official transcript of the talks at Camp David nor any

official documentation of the negotiation positions of the two parties.

However, based on press reports and interviews with the negotiators

themselves it has been possible to recreate much of what went on

behind closed doors and to uncover the Israeli offers and Palestinian

1 Bill Clinton in Statement announcing the failure of the summit, 25/7/00 released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary on www.state.gov/www/regios.nea/000725_clinton_stmt.html on 11/11/01


replies2. The core issues dealt with were universally believed to be the

most difficult, both strategically and emotionally. They included

discussions on the future of territory for a Palestinian state,

settlements, Jerusalem and Palestinian Refugees.

With regard to territory for a future Palestinian state, Israel reportedly

offered the Palestinians control over 90% of the West Bank, all of the

Gaza strip and a land swap equivalent to 1% of the West Bank inside

Israel’s existing 1948 borders that would most probably have been

taken from land near the Gaza Strip. Included in the 10% of territory

to be annexed by Israel would be three settlement blocs in the

northern, central and southern parts of the West Bank in which 80%

of settlers already live and parts of the Jordan Valley in which Israel

wanted three early warning stations.

With regards to Jerusalem, heavy disagreement took place over Israeli

'creative' plans for the Temple Mount, (also called Har Habayit and

Haram al-Sharif by Israelis and Palestinians respectively.) Israel

suggested granting the Palestinians sovereignty over everything above-

ground on the Temple Mount site and retaining Israeli sovereignty

over everything located below-ground such as the Western Wall and

the area believed by Jews to be the site of their second temple.

Another Israeli idea included according ‘trustee’ status over the

Temple Mount to Palestinians, and leaving the ‘residual’ sovereignty

over the Mount in Israeli hands. With regard to sovereignty over the

Old city, sovereignty would go to Israel who would be responsible for

the municipal administration of the Jewish and Armenian quarters.

The Muslim and Christian quarters would come under the municipal

2 Negotiation positions taken from, Uri Horowitz, Camp David 2 and President Clinton’s bridging proposals – the Palestinian view www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n4p5.html on 30/11/01, The Camp David Papers, Akram Hanieh, Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS), vol. XXX no. 2 (Winter 2000) pp 75-97, Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) interview Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority) 28/7/01 and 29/07/01, on www.memri.org/sd/SP24901.html and www.memri.org/sd/SP25001.html both taken on 11/11/01


administration of the Palestinians and would be governed by a

Palestinian presidium. Housing quarters outside the Old City walls

such as Sheikh Jarrah, Sawana, Silwan and Abu Tor, would come

under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian municipal administration

while Palestinian neighbourhoods more remote from the Old City

would come under Palestinian sovereignty. Jewish neighbourhoods

would remain under Israeli sovereignty.

The Israeli position on refugees was that it remains a humanitarian

issue, and whilst willing to express its regret at the fate of the

refugees, Israel refused to recognise its moral and legal responsibility

for the refugee issue as demanded by the Palestinians and denied the

Palestinian 'Right of Return' to Israel, insisting instead that any return

be to the soon to be established Palestinian state. It did offer however,

to admit several hundred refugees annually under a family

reunification program over a period of ten years.

These positions were deemed by the Palestinians to be unacceptable.

Basing their claims on the Palestinian understanding of UN Security

Council Resolution 242 (UN 242) negotiators demanded a complete

withdrawal by Israel from (all) the territories captured during the June

war of 1967. However, Palestinian negotiators were prepared to agree

in principle to some settlements remaining under Israeli sovereignty

as long as these areas annexed by Israel did not exceed 2% of the

'territories' of the June 4th 1967 borders and land swaps from Israel

'proper' were symmetrical in quality and size. The idea of Israel

retaining settlement blocs were refused (contrary to reports at the time

that suggested the opposite). The negotiators' position on the future of

Jerusalem was that the whole of East Jerusalem (including the Old

City) is occupied land and must come under Palestinian sovereignty.

Whereas the Palestinians were prepared to 'take into consideration'

Israeli interests in East Jerusalem, and allow Israeli control over the

Jewish quarter and the Western Wall, overall Palestinian sovereignty


could not be compromised. On the refugee issue, Palestinians claimed

that Israel bears moral and legal responsibility for the Refugee

problem and, based on the Palestinian reading on UN General

Assembly Resolution 1943, Israel should guarantee the right of return

to anyone desiring it, compensating all those who do not wish to

return for their property, assets and suffering experienced. They also

wanted compensation to be paid to host countries where refugees

have been settled to offset the financial burden imposed upon them

over the last half century. It is clear then that, even after two weeks of

intense negotiations, Israeli and Palestinian positions remained far

apart on many issues.

Traditional Explanations for the Summit’s Failure

The post mortems into the death of the Summit have been numerous,

with experts suggesting a range of reasons for its unsuccessful end.

The initial account of the failure, held by many in the Western world

and Israel including a large part of the Israeli 'peace camp' was that

the Israeli 'generous' compromise was matched only by Palestinian

intransigence and coins the old Abba Eban adage that ‘the

Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.’ It

argues that the Palestinians did not negotiate in good faith to

conclude an agreement at Camp David and that Arafat was never

ready — mentally, personally, or historically, at Camp David or

afterwards — to conclude a deal4. It claims that he is a leader of a

national movement and not a statesman,5 unprepared to give up

3"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible" www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/goasp?MFAHcg10 on 15/3/02 4 From Oslo to Camp David to Taba - Setting the record Straight, Interview with Dennis Ross. With Margaret Warner and Jim Hoagland 8/8/2001 www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/340.html on 14/2/02 5 Gilead Sher, Special Policy Forum, The Brink of Peace? An inside look from Camp David to Taba April 16, 2001, address to The Washington Institute's Policy Forum. www.washigtominstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.html on


Palestinian mythology6, a liar who can not be trusted7, no longer a

peace partner for Israel and a burden to the entire peace process8. It

considers Barak's political courage to have been matched only by

Arafat's political passivity and lays the blame for the failure of the

Summit squarely with the Palestinian delegation. It concludes that

notwithstanding mistakes by all sides, the major structural obstacle

remains with the Palestinian leader9.

Recently, several commentators have challenged this view10 pointing

to faulty negotiating styles and poor management of the

implementation process by all the parties involved, resulting in

mutual and deeply entrenched suspicion which made agreement

harder to achieve. They discuss the press leak regarding the secret

alternative-track Stockholm talks that weakened Barak's coalition as

potential compromises were revealed, and the past history of

implementation (or non implementation) of Oslo agreements as well as

political circumstances in Israel and the 'territories' and the lack of a

personal relationship between Barak and Arafat as all compromising

the ability of the leaders to negotiate. They talk about Barak's

14/02/02, Ha'aretz (Israel) columnist Yoel Marcus 17/11/200 op ed. "The king of missed opportunities." www.memri.org/sd/SP15900.html on 6/3/02 6 Interview with Shlomo ben Ami, Maariv (Israel) 6/4/2001 from www.memri.org/sd/SP20701.html on 11/11/01 7 Interview with A.B Yehoshua ' I hate Arafat from the bottom of my heart', Kul al-Arab (Israeli Arab newspaper) 28/12/01 www.memri.org/sd/SP32602.html on 1/3/01: Haim Shur, An Intellectual Leader and Veteran of Israel's Left and Peace Camp 'Arafat is an Arch-Liar, an Arch-Murderer' Maariv 22/6/200 www.memri.org/sd/SP23501.html on 6/3/02 8 Gay Behor op. ed 'Arafat is no longer a partner', Yediot Acharonot (Israel) 18/10/2000 www.memri.org/sd/SP14400 on 1/3/02 9 Shlomo ben Ami's Camp David Diaries www.memri.org/sd/SP20701.html and www.memri.org/sd/SP20901.html both on 11/11/01, Camp David - An Exchange, Dennis Ross, Gidi Grinstein reply to Hussein Agha and Robert Malley New York Review of Books (NYR) 20/9/2001 pp 90-91 10 Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Camp David, A Tragedy of Errors, NYR

9/8/2001 pp 59-65, Deborah Sontag, And yet so Far; A Special Report, Quest for Middle East Peace How and Why it Failed, JPS vol. XXX no. 1 (Aut. 2001) pp 78-85, Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba What went Wrong? Survival Vol. 43 no.3 (Autumn 2001) on www.peres-center.org/downloads/survival.pdf on 15/3/02, Camp David Two, Assumptions and Consequences, Shibley Telhami, Current History January 2001 on www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/telhami/Chjanuary2001.htm on 15/3/02, all point to errors by both sides in differing degrees.


mistakes in the run up to the Summit, emphasising how the

continued building of settlements, the initial preference of the Syrian

track over negotiating with the Palestinians and his refusal to hand

over three villages near Jerusalem to the Palestinian authority (PA) as

promised, accumulated mistrust and the loss of faith with the

Palestinians.

They also mention Palestinian mistakes citing lack of internal

cohesion and apprehension towards a future leadership struggle as

stifling any potentially compromising positions. Arafat's reticence to

win over the Israeli public and stem anti-Israel incitement is also seen

as a factor in the breakdown of peace talks. American mistakes such

as forcing Arafat into the Summit against his wishes and the

administration's insensitivity to Palestinian fears are also revealed.

These commentators explain how American actions disillusioned

Arafat's highly influential number two, Ahmad Queri (aka Abu Ala)

who, after a disagreement with Clinton on the fourth day over

territory, took only a peripheral part in the negotiations.

All these analysts agree with the fact that it was tactical failures (in

varying degrees) that contributed to the summit's failure. Pundak,

writes that "the opportunity for peace did in fact exist, but it was

squandered due to.....faulty implementation and management of the

entire process11" while Malley and Agha conclude that the Summit

ended without agreement "less by design than by mistake more

through miscalculation than through mischief12" With correct

preparation and confidence building measures, the argument follows,

a historic reconciliation between these two peoples could well have

been achieved. This view is echoed by the United Nations envoy, Terje

11 Pundak, From Oslo to Taba, p1 12 Malley and Agha, Tragedy of Errors, p65


Larsen who, discussing the failure of the summit, stated, "It was a

failure of psychology and of process, not so much of substance"13

But the ongoing crisis among Israelis and Palestinians is neither

primarily a result of Arafat's intransigence nor tactical

mismanagement. This dissertation will argue that explaining the

failure of the Summit by referring solely to one sides' negotiating

stance or tactical and strategic mistakes before the Summit is only a

superficial reading of events. The true reasons for the failure go to the

heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reflect how these two

nations understand their conflicting history, identity and national

consciousness.

The dissertation will concentrate on reasons why proposals were

perceived to be fair or unfair and examine how conceptions of justice

are influenced by understanding of history and identity. It will explain

reasons for the Summit's failure by investigating the basis for a peace

agreement, the domestic moods of the two parties and the viability of

settling a historic conflict through political means and the creation of

shared narratives. The Focauldian understanding of language as

inherently power saturated, is aptly demonstrated in the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, with choice of words often reflecting political bias.

Whether the territories incorporating the West Bank and Gaza Strip

are considered as 'Judea and Samaria', 'occupied', 'disputed'

'liberated' 'administered' or 'Palestinian' or whether the 1948 war was

one of 'independence' or 'catastrophe' greatly depends on the political

opinion of those involved. This dissertation will therefore attempt to

evade this trap, using what are considered to be 'neutral terms' and

employing these 'power laden' phrases only to demonstrate how

specific constituencies view certain issues14.

13 Sontag, How and Why it Failed p81 14 When referring to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the term 'territories' will hereafter be used. Wars will be referred to by the year they took place and the


This dissertation will initially study the domestic constituencies of the

two sides, examining the room for political manoeuvre both leaders

had and demonstrating how public opinion is highly influenced by

conflicting historical frames of reference. It will evaluate how much

room for negotiated compromise the two peoples actually allowed their

leaders and indicate the difficulty in concluding a peace agreement

against the backdrop of domestic opposition to perceived

compromises.

It will further discuss how frames of reference can be bridged,

examining whether this is indeed possible in the Israeli-Palestinian

case. It will debate how conflict resolution can take place between

nations with such sharply divided conceptions of each other and the

past suggesting two different ways. The first, that interpersonal

relations between people can help change perceptions and national

discourse and aid abilities to compromise, and the second that

historical claims should be made subservient to the practical, present

day reality.

It will conclude by discussing the appropriateness of using either of

these to solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and offer advice on how

future negotiations may be more successful.

English terms for places and events will be utilised as opposed to Hebrew and Palestinian translations.


Chapter 1

Domestic Constraints; Leaders being Led

Israeli Domestic Constraints

That Ehud Barak declared on the eve of the Camp David Summit that

he was prepared to make 'painful compromises' is not doubted.

However, even if the Israeli prime minister wanted to astonish the

world by abandoning long held positions to achieve peace, it is by no

means certain that he was in a position to do so domestically. Barak

left for the negotiations with his coalition government on the brink of

collapse with the latest public opinion polls showing him trailing ex

prime minister and right winger Benjamin Netanyahu. As Ariel Sharon

termed the background to Barak’s departure, "Ehud Barak is going to

Camp David without the Knesset or the country behind him15" It was

not an understatement. The week that Barak left for the summit on

10th July, his coalition was barely surviving. He lost two no confidence

motions in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) in which members of his

coalition, Natan Sharansky (head of a Russian Immigration Party,

Yisrael Ba'Aliyah) Shas (the ultra orthodox Sephardi party) and the

National Religious Party all voted against him. The government was

further weakened by two other parties, (the secular Shinui party and

the Ultra Orthodox, United Torah Judaism,) arguing bitterly about the

Tal Commission stipulating military service for ultra orthodox youths.

Barak's perceived autocratic style of leadership further added to his

problems by creating tension among the coalition partners who felt

left out of the decision-making process;

However, even though domestic disagreement in Israel has always

been rife and although there had been much disagreement over how

an 'end of conflict' situation would look, there was a basic consensus

within the political establishment of Israel concerning the ultimate

15 Ariel Sharon, in In Search of a Fix - editorial Middle East International (MEI) 14/7/2000 p117


objective of a negotiated peace with the Palestinians and was reflected

in the Beilin-Eitan16 Plan. The Plan stipulated that the West bank and

Gaza would be partitioned between a Palestinian state and territories

that would be annexed to Israel. No percentages of land were

expressly stipulated but territories where 80-90% of settlers lived

would be annexed to Israel. Municipal Jerusalem would remain under

Israeli sovereignty whilst Palestinians would establish a capital of

their own in the suburb of Abu Dis which would be renamed Al Quds

(Jerusalem) The near universal support for Jerusalem remaining

united and undivided under Israeli sovereignty is reflected in the

Government of Israel's basic Guidelines set out after the elections. It

states with regard to Jerusalem that, "Jerusalem 3.1 - Greater

Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel will remain united and complete

under the sovereignty of Israel17 The mantra of a united Jerusalem had

been one of the few issues that enjoyed bipartisan support in the

Knesset. Barak himself testified to the national mood on talks with the

Palestinians when, in his election victory address, he spelt out his

plan for negotiations "we will move for separation with the Palestinians

in accordance with four red lines. Jerusalem united our sovereignty for

eternity. Period. There will be no return under any circumstances to the

1967 borders. There will be no foreign army West of the river Jordan.

And the majority of the settlers in Judea and Samaria will be in

settlement blocs under our sovereignty18" Elsewhere in an interview

with Hannah Kim, Barak described how he foresaw an end of conflict

situation with the Palestinians looking like, arguing that he saw no

contradiction between making peace with the Palestinians and

keeping many settlements, even some like Bet El near big Palestinian

population centres.

16 Yossi Beilin is considered to be one of the most dovish members of the Labour Party. Michael Eitan is considered right of centre politically and is a member of the Likud Party. This information was taken from 'Reflections on Recent Elections JPS Vol. XXIX no. 1 (Aut 1999) pp 58-65 17 Government of Israel basic Guidelines, 6/7/99, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHof7h0 on 15/3/02 18 Barak's election victory address 17/5/99 in JPS Vol. XXIX no. 1 (Aut 99) pp 58-65


Barak thus set out for the summit with a mandate by the Israeli

people based on his four red lines. As explained, he saw no reason

why peace should not be agreed upon on this basis. Anything further,

however, and a coalition crisis was likely and Barak’s mandate under

question.

Palestinian Domestic Constraints

Arafat also approached the summit with certain, non negotiable red

lines. The PLO Central Council that met in Gaza between the 2nd-3rd

July laid down a consensus on the outline of what Palestinians

considered a just solution to the conflict. It's communiqué included a

Right of Return for refugees and adequate compensation paid to them

and their host countries, a complete Israeli withdrawal to June 1967

borders, the removal of Israeli settlements and the establishment of a

Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. As Hasan Asfur, a

negotiator in the back-channel Stockholm talks said regarding the

Palestinian position, "Our position remains unchanged and is still

based on UN 242 and 338 as well as [General Assembly] Resolution

194 pertaining to the Refugees flight."19

Arafat's room to manoeuvre was very small. Caught between the

Americans urging compromise on one side and Hamas and other

Palestinian rejectionist groups on the other, Arafat went to Camp

David trying to weave his way between conflicting and often

contradictory positions and demands. The impracticability of

compromise on the communiqué’s 'national constants' by any

Palestinian leader was clarified by Marwan Barghouti, who in a

television debate claimed that "no Palestinian, leader or otherwise, will

dare to or be able to compromise Palestinian national constants.....And

19 Khalid Amayreh, Nothing of Substance MEI 26/6/00 p110


if he does, Fatah and the Palestinian people will stand against him"20

Before going to Camp David Arafat had been warned about the

Palestinian street and its propensity for violence if an agreement did

not satisfy minimum Palestinian demands and this is certain to have

been a factor in his negotiating stance. This was most clearly reflected

in Arafat's reported 'intransigence' over Jerusalem in which, in a

heated exchange with Clinton, Arafat told the President that if he

compromised on Jerusalem he would be assassinated. Arafat seems to

have been successful in this weaving between two poles. An editorial

by Khader Khader in the Palestine Report of June 28 expressed

approval of Arafat’s position, saying it “has the support of the

Palestinian masses and all PLO factions and Islamic movements in

Palestine, as well as the support and solidarity of Arab countries and

political parties.” But Khader’s words carried the implicit warning

that Arafat dare not weaken his demands. A group of prominent

Palestinians, including Edward Said, Ibrahim Abu Lughod, Haidar

Abdel Shafi and Khalil Barhoum, recently launched a worldwide

campaign on behalf of the Palestinian refugees’ right to return home.

In a document signed by a thousand academics and political figures

and sent to concerned international organisations and heads of state,

the signers declare their “absolute refusal to recognise any treaty,

permanent or interim, which compromises Palestinian rights,” and

reject any solution to the refugee problem other than repatriation. The

statement is as much a warning to Palestinian negotiators as to Israel

that the refugees’ right to repatriation may not be bargained away. It

also acutely expresses the potential for any future agreement based on

popular demand.

Opinion after the Summit

Public opinion polls taken after the Summit reinforce the view that

Palestinians and Israelis were unwilling to compromise over what they

20 Marwan Barghouti, debate on Quatar's Al Jazeera channel 26/05/00, taken from Nothing of Substance, Khalid Amayreh MEI 2/6/00 p102


see as their 'red lines' and reflect a huge difference between the

expectations of the two sides. Not only was Barak's purported good

will to reach an agreement not enough to forge a deal with the

Palestinians, but even his final negotiating positions at Camp David

were seen by the majority of Israelis as too much of a compromise and

these, coupled with the subsequent outbreak of violence, ultimately

led to a resounding election defeat the following year. Similarly,

although Arafat came back from the Summit with his reputation

intact, what was seen in the West as 'uncompromising positions' were

viewed by many in the Palestinian street as bowing to external

pressure. In a poll conducted by The Palestinian Centre for Policy and

Survey Research (PSR) 21 in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman

Institute for the Advancement of Peace at Hebrew University,22 the gap

between the two sides was clearly reflected. 68% of Palestinians

respondents replied that they considered Arafat's overall position at

the Summit to be 'just right' whilst 56.5% judged Barak's proposals to

be 'too much of a compromise'.

With regards to most specific issues, both sides felt their leaders had

compromised too much. The suggestion that Arafat may have been

willing to accept a deal on Jerusalem that would have allowed Israel to

annex the settlements of Maaleh Adumim, Givat Ze'ev and Gush

Etzion, as well as the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter in return

for full Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighbourhoods and holy

places in east Jerusalem, was considered to be 'too much of a

compromise' by a majority of 57% of Palestinians. On the other side,

21 PSR Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll 1 Camp David Summit, Chances for reconciliation and Lasting Peace, Violence and Confrontations, Hierarchies of Priorities and Domestic Policies, 27-29th July 2000. The total sample size of the poll is 1259 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 786 in the West Bank and 473 in the Gaza strip. The margin of error is 3% and the non response rate is 3%. To be found on www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/p1a.html on 7/01/02 22 PSR Survey Reset Unit, Press Release, Israelis and Palestinians support the Peace Process and Reconciliation but are Less Willing to Pay the Price than their Leaders. Israeli poll supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir. A representative sample of 525 Israeli were interviewed by telephone (sampling error 4.5%) between 27-31st July 2000 to be found on www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/p1ejoint.html on 7/01/02


55.7%. of Israelis viewed this offer by Barak as 'too much of a

compromise.' And even though all of Barak's proposals on security,

borders, settlements and a future Palestinian state were viewed by a

majority of the Israeli populace to be 'too much of a compromise', a

majority of 55% of Palestinians found the reported acceptance of a

Israel annexing settlement blocs in return for the Palestinians

receiving territory from Israel and a corridor linking the West Bank

and Gaza as 'too much of a compromise'. A state recognised by Israel

on 96% of the West Bank and a territorial exchange involving the

remaining 4% (where most settlers live) with unspecified Israeli

territory was also seen as 'too much of a compromise by 51% of

Palestinian respondents.

The issue over which the two sides were furthest apart was that of

refugees and their 'right' to return to their old homes inside Israel's

pre 1967 borders. Arafat's demand that Israel recognise Resolution

194, accept the political, legal and moral responsibility for the refugee

crisis and show willingness to absorb hundreds of thousands of

refugees is supported by 68% of Palestinians. By contrast, Barak's

outright refusal to admit moral responsibility for the refugee issue,

but his willingness to recognise the 'suffering of the refugees' and

allow several thousand refugees back to Israel under family

reunification and humanitarian consideration was met with

widespread disapproval by 64.2% of Israelis polled.

Conflicting Constituencies

From the figures and the public statements, the clear conclusion to be

drawn is that not only were the domestic constituencies of both

parties far apart in their expectations for a final deal, but even their

purported 'red lines' were irreconcilable with one another and a basic

understanding of the other's minimum demands was lacking. In this

sense, both leaders were restricted by their constituencies and this

affected their ability to negotiate and compromise. It is also true that


both leaders seemed to have a basic misunderstanding of what would

be the minimum that the other would be prepared to accept.

But why were the two constituencies so far apart with regards to their

views on the peace process and reconciliation? Had the Oslo

agreements not set in motion a process of reconciliation by which

these constituencies would begin to accept the identity of the 'other'

and his basic rights? Did the process not help influence a change in

perception over how a final status arrangement might look?

The answer to the differing expectations that tied the hands of the

leaders lies not only in an inherent fault in the Oslo agreements, but

also in the two very different frames of reference in which Israel and

the Palestinians view themselves, their history, the (Palestinian/

occupied/disputed) 'territories' and each other. These differences are

reflected in the way, that Israelis and Palestinians view the issues

being negotiated.


Chapter 2

Different Frames of Reference – Inevitable Misunderstanding

Israeli frame of reference - Settlements and Territory

Israelis see the territories that the Palestinians claim as their own not

as occupied but as disputed and this is reflected in domestic dispute

as to their future. Disagreement in Israel over ceding these territories

is based on one of two factors, the religious emotional attachment to

the land and the security argument. In religious terms, the heartland

of the West Bank is seen by many in Israel as the cradle of the Jewish

people and integral parts of the land that God promised His elect. The

near-messianic fever that swept the nation in the aftermath of what

many regarded as a miraculous deliverance from Israel's enemies

during the 6 day war of 1967 must be seen in the context of these new

'liberated' territories that reflected so much of Jewish biblical history.

Hebron, Nablus and Bet El (near Ramallah) were considered to be the

Jewish people's historic possession and ancestral home, thus making

them innately holy.

This feeling of ‘belonging’ to the land is most aptly explained by

Anthony Smith's and his description of ethnoscope. Smith explains

how a terrain is invested with ethnic significance and how a

development of historical memories associated with landscapes and

territory help shape the 'personality' and 'character' of a nation23.

Smith's theory was demonstrated most tangibly by the movement

Gush Emunim (bloc of the faithful), who believed that settling Eretz

Yisrael Shelema (the entire land of Israel) was a divine commandment

and would hasten the onset of the messiah. Based on the teachings of

their late spiritual leader, Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaCohen Kook,

and his son Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda, many in the national religious camp

in Israel believe this land to be the Muslim equivalent of a waqf, a

23 Anthony D Smith, Sacred Territories and National conflict - Israel Affairs vol. 5

no.4 (Summer 1999) pp 13-31


religious endowment, impossible to compromise on. The land is part of

the character of the Jewish people, and has influenced their spiritual

make up. Ceding parts of the land is thus comparable to removing

parts of the anecdotal national body.

Settlements were also constructed in these territories on security

grounds. Believing the 1949 armistice borders to be, as Abba Eban

commented, 'Auschwitz borders' consecutive Israeli governments

encouraged settlement in areas with sparse Palestinian population,

most notably in the Jordan Valley. This was the idea behind the Allon

Plan that called for the annexation of the Jordan Valley to Israel and

the creation of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation in the remaining

land. Settlements were also seen as a fulfilment of the Zionist dream

of 'settling the land.' Both these ideas (security and Zionist ideology)

are reflected in the Guidelines of the Government of Israel (Likkud) on

settlement in 1996 which states that “Settlement in the Negev, the

Galilee, the Golan heights, the Jordan valley and in Judea, Samaria

and Gaza is of national importance to Israel's defence and an

expression of a Zionist fulfilment"24 Settlement in the territories is

compared to that of 'Israel proper' and this reflects how a large part of

the Israeli population view the settlements.

All in all, there is a clear emotional attachment in Israel towards the

settlement enterprise and as of yet, no settlements have been

evacuated25 From this perspective, Barak's offer of dismantling over

70 settlements really was revolutionary from an Israeli perspective

and caused domestic criticism.

24 Guidelines of the Government of Israel (Likud) 16/6/96 www.likud.nl/govern02.html on 15/3/02 25 After Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein killed 30 Muslim worshippers in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, then prime minister Yitzchak Rabin had the opportunity to evacuate the settlement of Hebron, home to about 400 Jewish settlers. The fact that he felt incapable, even then after such an atrocity, of dismantling the settlement is testimony to the political clout the settler movement has in Israeli politics.


Jerusalem

On Jerusalem, the "application of Israeli law, jurisdiction and

administration26" in East Jerusalem on June 27th 1967 was met with

widespread support on both sides of the political spectrum. Jews have

always considered Jerusalem to hold a unique status in their

consciousness. For two thousand years, religious Jews had thrice

daily ask God to "return in mercy to Your city, Jerusalem"27 and the

city was felt to symbolise both the spiritual and national revival of the

Jewish people. The city symbolises both spiritual and national revival

and Israel’s national anthem, Hatikva, naturally refers to a two

thousand year yearning for Zion and Jerusalem.

The capture of Jerusalem was especially sweet as Jews could now visit

and pray at the Western Wall which was believed to be the last wall of

the Jewish temple, destroyed in 70 AD by the Romans. It was viewed

in contrast to the years under Jordanian control when Jews had been

prevented from praying at the Wall. This feeling of emotion at the

'liberation' of Jerusalem was felt by both religious and secular alike.

The mantra of 'united Jerusalem forever under Israeli sovereignty' has

been the slogan of both left and right wing in Israel for decades. As a

testimony to its importance across the political spectrum, Shimon

Peres lost the 1996 elections partly on the fear by many that 'Peres

will divide Jerusalem28' Barak’s proposal to offer the Palestinians

sovereignty on some parts of Jerusalem and to discuss solutions

regarding the Old City therefore broke many taboos in Israel and put

his political life on the line.

26 Jerusalem Law 27/6/67 in The Coming Battle for Jerusalem, Marshall J Berger in Middle East Quarterly December 1994 www.meforum.org/meq/dec94/breger.shtml on 22/2/02 27 Artscroll Prayer book p101 28 The slogan 'Peres will divide Jerusalem’ was coined by the right wing in the lead up to the elections. It is certain to have made people think twice about voting for this well known dovish Labour candidate.


Refugees

The Israeli offer on refugees can be understood through the prism of

how Israel historically sees the episode. The official Israeli version of

events before and during the 1948 war in the early years of the state,

shunned any responsibility for the plight of the Palestinian refugees

who fled the country, before and during the fighting. It claimed that

encouraged by external Arab leadership and a self assured message of

imminent return after a devastating victory over the nascent Jewish

state, many Palestinians left their homes.

This explanation is clearly reflected in David Ben-Gurion’s speech in

the Knesset on October 11th 1961. He emphasises the ‘domino effect’

theory, claiming that once the first wave of refugees left between

October 1947 and March 1948, others followed suit. “The Arab’s exit

from Palestine…began immediately after the UN resolution, from the

areas earmarked for the Jewish state. And we have explicit documents

testifying that they left Palestine following instructions from Arab

leaders, with the Mufti at their head, under the assumption that the

invasion of the Arab armies at the expiration of the Mandate will

destroy the Jewish state and push all the Jews into the sea, dead or

alive29”

In recent years, Israel's official view on the refugee problem evolved

slightly, thanks in part to the onset of 'new historians' such as Morris,

Pappe and Shlaim30. However, the Zionist discourse remains that

responsibility for the plight of the refugees should not be borne by

Israel alone and was an inescapable result of a war initiated by the

Arab armies. Israel sees the refugee issue as an inevitable result of a

29 Quoted from ‘Were they Expelled?, The History, Historiography and Relevance of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, Ilan Pappe in The Palestinian Exodus 1948-98, ed. Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, Ithaca Press Reading 1999 p39 30 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Cambridge University

Press) Avi Shlaim, Collusion across the Jordan, King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine. (Columbia University Press 1988) and Ilan Pappe, The making of the Arab Israeli conflict 1947-51, (Taurus 1994) have all questioned Israeli actions during the 1948 war.


war between two peoples in which only one could emerge victorious

and renounces any individual responsibility for the humanitarian

tragedy.; "The Palestinian refugee problem was born as the land was

bisected by sword, not by design Jewish or Arab. It was largely the

inevitable by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and the protracted bitter

fighting"31

Ehud Barak, following in the footsteps of all governments before him,

has consistently claimed that no refugees will return to Israel and that

Israel have neither the legal nor the moral responsibility for their

welfare. After a report in Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz suggested that he

had changed his stance to allow a quota of refugees to return, Barak

categorically denied it, stating "We have made it clear many

times...that we don't think Israel can accept either moral or legal

responsibility for the refugees"32 It should also be noted that any influx

of Palestinian refugees would threaten Israel’s demographic character,

something no Israeli government is prepared to concdede.

Palestinian Frame of reference- Territory and Settlements

As can be imagined, Palestinians see these issues in a very different

light. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the acceptance of Israel's

right to exist within the 1948 borders and confining their own state to

areas controlled by Israel since 1967 was the last and final

compromise. Accepting UN 242 and the Oslo accords thus conceding

78% of mandatory Palestine was, to Arafat and the Palestinian

population as a whole, a painful historic concession33.

31 Shlomo ben-Ami opening remarks, official presentation by the Israeli delegation to the Refugees working group at the Middle East peace talks, Ottawa, Canada 11/11/92 mimeo p3 in Palestinian Refugees and Peace, JPS Vol. XXIV no.1 (Aut 94) Elia Zureik p6 32 Ha'aretz (Israel) 17th July. quoted in Ghada Karmi, Giving up the Right of Return, in MEI 28/7/00 p118 33 Al Ayyam (PA) 8/7/2000 from Palestinian Strategies at the Camp David Summit www.memri.org/ia/IA3000.html on 1/3/02


As acting Israeli foreign minister Shlomo ben Ami explained in an

interview, this perspective that 'Oslo' was the ultimate and final

Palestinian compromise was not clearly understood by the Israelis.

"The Palestinian perspective was that Oslo was a compromise, and it

was the last compromise. We were not aware of this. We all thought

that somewhere down the road there would be another compromise

which would then be final."34 He further explains that, "When Arafat

signed the Oslo Agreement in 1993, his understanding was that he

would eventually get all of his demands. This is the whole story in a

nutshell"35

This perspective on the finality of Oslo explains Arafat's difficulty in

moving towards Israeli positions at the summit. As Abu Mazen said

regarding an Israeli claim that they were looking for 'some flexibility'

from the Palestinian side at Camp David, "I don't understand what he

means by 'some flexibility!' When we gave up the [1947] Partition

Resolution and accepted Resolution 242 - wasn't that flexibility?! We

conceded half the lands that had been given to us in the Partition

Plan....We took a historic step when we accepted resolution 242."36 In

an interview with Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, Abu Mazen reiterated

the lack of room for manoeuvre that the Palestinians had. "We made

clear to the American and Israeli sides several times that the

Palestinian side is unable to make concessions on anything, since this

is the minimum that it is willing to accept....and will not agree to

anything to anything short of Resolution 242 and 338, together with

Resolution 194."

The concept of flexibility is inherently subjective and is very much

dependent on what is deemed to be acceptable. The Palestinian

34 Leslie Susser, Israel's Ben-Ami, Disillusion from Day One, Jerusalem Report 16/7/2001 p14 35 Interview with Shlomo ben Ami in Maariv (Israel) 6/4/2001 from www.memri.org/sd/SP20701.html on 11/11/01 36 Abu Mazen in Kul Al-Arab 8/8/2000 from www.memri/org/sd/SP12200.html on 11/11/01


position was based on the belief that the whole of mandatory Palestine

was theirs. Accepting 22% of their former homeland was viewed as

flexibility enough.

Even this position was seen by many to be unacceptable, accepting

the reality of the Israeli state only on pragmatic grounds. Hamas, a

rejectionist Palestinian group highly popular in the territories, even

considers acceptance of Israel's right to exist to be a compromise. This

view is reflected clearly in an interview with one of the founding

members of Hamas, Ismail Abu Shanab who describes Hams' position

towards Israel and a future peace. "We know that the land which is

now occupied by Israel and on which they are building their state is our

land. They took it by force and they forced us to leave. No one among

the Palestinians, not the Sheikh [Yassin] nor Arafat doubts that this

land belongs to us....if the Israelis withdraw from the territories they've

occupied since 1967, he [the sheikh] will agree to a cease-fire.........if we

had the force to get our land back, I think he would do it. After all, if you

were in our position, you would do it as well....."37

Acceptance of an Israeli presence on Palestinian land is thus

something that has to be tolerated not celebrated for a large segment

of Palestinians. With regards to Israeli settlements built on land

occupied after 1967, Palestinians consider them to be illegal under

international law, and demand their dismantlement under a final

settlement. The report that at Camp David Arafat was prepared to

accept that some settlements in the Ariel, Jerusalem and Etzion areas

could remain under Israeli sovereignty was thus a major compromise.

Jerusalem

The Palestinian position on Jerusalem is not only based on it being

part of East Jerusalem (and therefore occupied) but also on its

37 Interview with Ismail Abu Shanab, Middle East Policy (MEP) Vol. VI no. 1 (June 1998) pp 117-18


holiness to Islam. Jerusalem is known as al-Quds al-Sharif, the Noble

Holy Place and even during the British mandate period, it was

considered to be the geographical, spiritual political and

administrative centre of Palestine. Under Ottoman rule, Jerusalem

was significant as the centre of education and press and other aspects

of Palestinian intellectual and cultural life. With regards to the Old

City, the section of the wall that Jews consider to be holy (the Western

Wall) is considered by Muslims to be the site that Mohammed tethered

his winged steed al-Buraq on the journey “from the Masjid al-Haram

[in Mecca] to the Masjid al-Aqsa[in Jerusalem]” about which the Koran

relates that this spot holds special significance for Muslims.

Ghada Talhami explains the sanctity of Jerusalem for Islam

commenting, that this derives from the Islamic definition of holiness

which prohibits the transfer of religious properties to non believers38.

The physical space associated with divine revelation becomes a

religious trust and the occupants its guardians. Jerusalem is thus

considered to be a waqf which can not change ownership nor be

negotiated over. It is thus unsurprising given the religious dimensions

of Jerusalem to Muslims that the secretary general of the Arab

League, Dr. 'Ismat Abd Al-Maguid stated that "no Arab leader is

allowed to relinquish Jerusalem39" Arafat similarly told President

Clinton that " the Arab who would give up Jerusalem has not yet been

born"40 That Arafat reportedly ceded the Jewish neighbourhoods in

East Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall are in this

respect, "very significant concessions"41 according to Khalil Shikaki,

director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research in

Ramallah.

38 Ghada Hashem Talhami, The Modern History of Jerusalem; Academic Myths and Propaganda MEP (Feb 2000) pp113-29 39, Saut Al-Haqq Wa Al-Hurriya (Israeli weekly) 18/8/2000 from www.memri.org/sd/Sp12100.html on 11/11/01 40 Al Quds 20/7/2000 ibid. 41 Isabel Kershner, The PA's Abu Ala, 'I warned of Catastrophe' Jerusalem Report 16/7/2001 p15


Refugees

Arafat's insistence on Israel accepting the moral and legal

responsibility for the refugee crisis is based on the Palestinian

understanding of history, most specifically, the events of 1947 and

1948. These years, encompassing partition and what the Israelis call

the ‘War of Independence’ signalling national revival after the traumas

of the Holocaust, are simultaneously viewed by the Palestinians as the

focus for national mourning and termed al Nakba, ‘the catastrophe.’ It

describes a process by which by hundreds of thousands of

Palestinians became refugees42. By the end of the conflict in 1949,

more than four hundred cities, towns, and villages in Galilee, the

coastal region, the area between Jaffa and Jerusalem and the south of

the country had been depopulated and settled by Israelis43.

The Palestinian narrative of events in 1948 understands the mass

Palestinian exodus as evidence of state funded ethnic cleansing. Nur

Masalha argues that integral to Zionist thinking during the mandate

period was the compulsory transfer of the Palestinian population as

the only way to settle the so called ‘Arab problem. 44’ Masalha also

includes all types of other actions that actively encouraged the

Palestinians to leave, citing psychological warfare, the cutting of food

and water supplies as well as undermining the Palestinian’s economic

infrastructure. Similarly Walid Khalidi claims that the Zionists had in

their possession a master plan (Plan Dalet or D) for the expulsion of

the Palestinians45.

42 Arab estimates vary between 750, 000 and 1,000,000. The Israelis claim 520,000 while the British propose that between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinians left the territory that became Israel. 43 This process is chronicled in Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem (Cambridge University Press), Walid Khalidi, ed. All that remains; The Palestinian Villages Occupied and destroyed by Israel in 1948 (Washington, Institute for Palestine studies 1992) and Tom Segev 1949: The First Israelis (New York 1986) 44 Nur Masalha Debate on the 1948 Exodus, , The Journal of Palestine studies, Vol. XXI no. 1 (Aut 1991) pp 90-97 45 Plan Dalet, Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine, JPS, vol. XVIII no.1 (Aut 1988) pp 4-20


Although there have been some signs that Palestinian leaders are

beginning to consider some sort of compromise solutions on the Right

of Return46 the mainstream position is still that reflected by Arafat at

Camp David, namely that Israel should recognise its political, legal

and moral responsibility for the tragedy of the refugees as well as

recognising the innate right of all refugees to return to their homes. As

Nabil Sha'ath leader of negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba

declared, "The Israelis can say whatever they want, but the starting

point of all discussions is the refugees' absolute and sacred Right of

Return."47

Conflicting Attitudes Towards a Final Deal

The argument that one side compromised more than the other is thus

denied by investigating the very different perspectives that both sides

had during the summit. What is viewed as a compromise by one side

is seen as a inherent right by the other and vice versa. In fact, the

Summit demonstrated most acutely the conflicting Israeli and

Palestinian attitudes towards a final settlement and clarified the

difficulty in bringing the two sides together.

While Israel believed it was negotiating the future of the West Bank

and Gaza Strip, and expected a Palestinian territorial compromise, the

Palestinians believed Oslo was about the future of historic Palestine

and that they had already made their compromise in 1993 by

purporting to recognise Israel within the Green Line. For the Israelis,

the frame of reference was how much more territory to concede

beyond the status quo. For the Palestinians, the frame of reference

was Israel's borders before the June 1967 war, with slight

46 The Jerusalem Post on the 19th July reported that Jibril Rajoub had said that all Palestinians seek was a symbolic gesture of return. Khalid Salam, speaking for the Palestinian Authority demanded $40bn payment for 'resettlement' not 'return' and more recently Sari Nusseibeh, holding the PA portfolio for Jerusalem has claimed that the Palestinians will have to give up their right of return saying it is not pragmatic and will not happen. 47 Nabil Sha'ath, Al Quds 26/01/2001 from www.memri.org/sd/SP18401.html on 11/11/01


modifications to accommodate each other's needs. While Israel were

negotiating viewing events through the prism of 1967, Palestinians

looked further back basing many claims to events surrounding Israel’s

birth in1948.

The Oslo accords and UN242, universally viewed as the two

cornerstones of building peace in the region, must take some of the

blame for the failure of the two sides to bridge their perspectives due

to their vagueness surrounding final status issues. The United

Nations resolution, adopted on 22nd November, demands that Israel

withdraw from 'territories occupied in the recent conflict' It also

expresses the 'right of every country in the region to live in peace

within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of

force.48' The resolution, "a masterpiece of deliberate British

ambiguity"49 has been interpreted differently ever since. The French

and Arabic translations include the definite article 'the' thus

drastically changing the meaning of the resolution. Arab states have

consistently stated that they understand the resolution as demanding

unconditional complete withdrawal from all territories occupied in the

1967 war. Israel, on the other hand, understands the resolution as

demanding only partial withdrawal.

-

Ambiguities in Oslo also emphasised the difference between the sides.

The problem with the accords was that emotional issues such as

settlements, Jerusalem and refugees were postponed to the end of the

process thus leaving open potential solutions for a settlement. Oslo’s

‘unambiguous ambiguity50’ never forced either Israelis or Palestinians

to alter their dreams and expectations of a final settlement and did

not prepare them for the inevitable compromises that were to follow.

48 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 on

www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00 15/3/02 49 Avi Shlaim, An Iron Wall (New York, WW Norton and Co., 2000) p260 50 Nadav Morag, Unambiguous Ambiguity, The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,

Israel Affairs vol. 6 nos. 3+4 (Spring/Summer 2000) pp 200-220


Whereas Rabin reassured his constituency that he had not strayed

from the Allon plan, Arafat reported that the basic components of a

final solution would involve, “the dismantlement of occupation and the

complete withdrawal of occupation troops from our land, our holy places

and holy Jerusalem”51 While Israelis believed Jerusalem would remain

the undivided capital of their state, Palestinians expected all their

refugees to return to Israel. As Avi Shlaim commented, “the two sides

could march forward together because they were intent on marching in

different directions”52 For an accord that hoped for ultimate

reconciliation, this marching in different directions was to prove costly

when the veil of ambiguity was finally lifted at Camp David only for

the parties to find that seven years of marching in different directions

had led to their positions being as far apart as ever.

How can peace be made between two sets of people that not only

disagree about how the future should look, but also have many

discrepancies about events of the past? Can these two frames of

reference be bridged, and if not are there any other solutions to

reconciliation? The next section will examine whether Israelis and

Palestinians can come to any sort of agreement about the past and

whether a creation of a shared narrative will facilitate moving towards

a common future.

51 in Burhan Dajani, The September 1993 Israeli-PLO documents; A Textual analysis, JPS Vol. XXIV no. 3 (Spring 1994) p20 52 Avi Shlaim, The Oslo Accord, JPS, vol. XXIV (Spring 1994) p38


Chapter 3

Trying to Bridge the Gap - Change of Perception and Discourse

Ideas about the changing of perceptions between enemies is often

based on building inter-personal relations between the two sets of

people and was put into practice both during the Oslo period and

Camp David itself. This view on conflict resolution accords with the

philosophy of Raymond Cohen who emphasises the importance of the

individual interaction between leaders. He argues that the quality of

communication between leaders is critical to the diplomatic process as

it can allow for actual or potential areas of agreement to be identified

or created. Incomprehension, not malice, lies at the root of many

troubled relationships.53 Similar to this is Samuel Huntington’s recent

work on inter-civilisational conflict. Huntington suggests that

international stability can be advanced by nations discovering and

developing a greater intercultural understanding and appreciation of

each other54.

The need for a change in perception of the ‘other’ was realised by

Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at Oslo. Uri Savir and his

Palestinian counterpart, Abu Ala both agreed that prevailing Israeli

and Palestinian discourses would have to be changed before any

reconciliation could take place. " 'You know', I warned Abu Ala, 'as far

as most Israelis are concerned, you're just a gang of terrorists' 'And as

far as most Palestinians are concerned', [he replied] 'you are a nation of

cruel oppressors, robbing us of our lands.' "55 They both realised that

for a significant social and cultural change transformation to occur, a

change must initially happen in the discourse through which events

are framed and assigned meaning.

53 Raymond Cohen, Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations. A Dialogue of the Deaf, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990 54 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster 1996 p320 55 Uri Savir The Process; 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East; (New York 1998) p21


As Senator George Mitchell concluded in his report on how to get the

peace process back on track, "peace and political stability can not be

achieved in sharply divided societies or where there is historical

conflict, unless there is a genuine willingness to understand the other

point of view and to enter into principled compromise"56 The senator

seems to be suggesting that only by understanding the narrative of

the 'other', by trying to empathise with his suffering can true

reconciliation be reached.

Herbert Kelman also writes about the necessity of mutual recognition

and the nationhood of the other for reconciliation. Arguing that this

creates a favourable environment for negotiation, Kelman discusses

ways in which an acceptance of the identity of the other would not

threaten or undermine the identity of the former57. This concept of

presenting the self image of the ‘other’ is reflected in a joint working

group on the future Israeli-Palestinian relations which argues that

attitude change and stereotype reduction can take place, even in

sharply divided societies58. It concludes that by presenting the self

image and national narrative of the other in a personal descriptive,

analytical and non polemical way, it can help each side to gain an

understanding of the perspective of the other and perhaps discover

that affirmation of one's own identity does not necessarily imply

negating the identity of the other.

During the Oslo years, there were a large variety of efforts to promote

Israeli-Palestinian ‘people to people’ efforts directed towards changing

the negative perception that both peoples had towards the other. This

56 Senator George J. Mitchell, , Sadat Peace Lecture, Negotiating Hard Cases, MEP Vol. viii no. 3 (Sept 2001) p46 57 Herbert C. Kelman, Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood, How to Create a momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, JPS vol. XXII no.1 (Aut. 1992) pp 18-38 58 The Future Israeli-Palestinian Relationship ed. Herbert C. Kelman prepared by a joint working group on Israeli-Palestinian relations at the program of International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Weatherland centre for International Affairs, Harvard University in MEP vol. vii no. 2 (Feb 2000) p106-107


emphasis on inter-culture and inter-faith meetings and discussion

was due to the belief that once commonalties between two cultures

were uncovered, a new atmosphere would develop, in which the more

divisive issues could be discussed in a different and more positive

atmosphere. This was also the reason behind the postponement of the

final status issues. After years of confidence building measures, in

which the two sides would enjoy a better personal relationship, these

issues would hopefully be less intractable.

This was also the thinking behind the American concept at Camp

David emphasising informality. Suits were off limits and the 'relaxed'

atmosphere at the Summit would make negotiators amenable to

compromise. It is certainly true that the personal relationship between

the negotiators was good. As President Clinton, comparing Israeli-

Palestinian negotiators favourably with those in Ireland, Bosnia and

Kosovo, commented "Of all the peace groups I have ever worked with,

these people know each other, they know the names of each other's

children, they know how many grandchildren the grandparents have,

they know their life stories, they have genuine respect and

understanding for each other. It is truly extraordinary and unique in my

experience in almost eight years of dealing with it"59

However, even with all these good feelings, agreement at Camp David

was ultimately elusive. Why was this? Why did the personal relations

not seep through to the level of negotiations? Why did the two sides

find it impossible to produce joint narratives of events or to affirm the

identity of the other to such an extent as to lead to agreement?

Impossibility of joint narratives

The answer lies with the erroneous basis for negotiating that the Oslo

agreements set in place. Personal relationships are helpful in

59Bill Clinton 25/7/00 on www.state.gov/www/regios.nea/000725_clinton_stmt.html on 11/11/01


negotiating. However, when it comes to what is considered the core

issues of a nation’s identity, these things are irrelevant. As Abu

Mazen commented, "..the human relations and the formal relations

were completely different. Meaning our relationship with them was

excellent, but this does not mean that...I will make concessions to him

[Barak]…..the issue is [one of] our homeland.60" Mazen's reply reflects

the limits of friendship. Clinton may be correct in terms of peripheral

issues. When it comes to those of ‘homeland’, they are largely

immaterial.

Central to the analysis of power relations is the concept of discourse.

It was this that the personal relations attempted to change. Based on

Foucault, discourse refers to the practices through which we produce

what we take to be knowledge61. Discourse provides us with the ways

in which we produce the meanings that we ascribe to the people and

things we encounter. It "defines and produces the objects of our

knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully be

talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put

into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others. Just as a

discourse 'rules in' certain ways of talking about a topic, defining it as

acceptable and intelligible way to talk, write or conduct oneself, so also,

by definition, it 'rules out'. Limits and restricts other ways of talking"62

Hall's definition of discourse raises the concept of inclusion and

exclusion. Discourse both legitimises and delegitimises. By 'ruling in'

certain things in a country's narrative, it automatically 'rules out'

other things. The Zionist and Palestinian narratives are inevitably

highly different. The question is whether the Zionist discourse and

Palestinian discourse are in any way reconcilable or whether they

mutually rule each other out.

60 Abu Mazen interview in Al-Ayyam 28/7/2001 www.memri.org/sd/SP25001 on 11/11/01 61 Foucault Michel, Madness and Civilisation, (New York Vintage Books 1973) 62 Stuart Hall, Modernity, an Introduction to Modern Societies, Oxford Blackwell 1996 p44


The reason for the success of intercultural groups is based on the

possibility of some discourses and perceptions being reconcilable and

changed over time and it is here that Kelman et al are correct in their

suggestions. Cultural divides can be crossed and discourses can be

refined to some extent.

One such example of discourse change is brought by Yaacov Yadgar,

who claims that a shift in Israeli society and discourse has taken

place over the last 30 years. He discusses the change in emphasis

from more restricted ethno-centric nationalistic narrative of 'us and

them' present in the Israeli mainstream press to more universal,

humanistic principles based on inclusivism and peace in the region63.

Not only can some discourses be changed but also much of Israeli and

Palestinian discourse can live by side. Israelis and Palestinians can

mutually accept the nationhood of the other with all the ramifications

that go with such an acceptance. They can accept the historic link

that the other has with the land without actively impinging on their

own self identity.

However, affirmation of the ‘other’ and his narrative is only possible

when it does not actively deny your own. But whereas national

discourse can survive the acceptance of the other’s identity, it can not

withstand the acceptance of the other’s historical narrative. Whereas

the Israeli affirmation of Palestinian nationhood or Palestinian

acceptance of Jewish rights in Jerusalem do not adversely affect the

ways these two peoples see themselves, the narrative on the

establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 and the Palestinian refugee

problem creates a ‘zero sum game of narratives’.

63 Yaacov Yadgar, National Narratives in Israel's Mainstream press, Nations and

Nationalism vol. 8 part 1 Jan 2002 pp 55-72


The Palestinian demand that Israel accept moral responsibility for the

Refugee crisis and that it is a country born in sin is central to the

Palestinians understanding of their history. The idea of return has

been central to the Palestinian national narrative of a struggle against

overwhelming odds, of expulsion and dispersion from their ancestral

home and ultimately of national reconstitution. This feeling of victim

hood is however, inimical to Israel’s understanding of its role in the

world as a national home for the Jewish people reflecting their

legitimate ethnic right to self determination64. No matter how much

mutual understanding of the ‘other’ there is, or how many inter-

cultural groups meet, this fact remains the same. The mutual

discourses of Israelis and Palestinian over 1948 are mutually

exclusive. Affirming one automatically denies the other.

The possibility of Deconstructing Narratives

The intractable nature of mutually exclusive narratives remains the

same even when the post-structuralist critique of nations and their

history is taken into account. Ernst Gellner, in his book Nations and

Nationalism explains that national identity is not necessarily based on

historical fact but is often constructed. He writes that “nations as a

natural God given way of classifying men, as an inherent…political

destiny are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing

cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and

often obliterates pre-existing cultures, that is the reality65” For Gellner,

nations and their created identity are a pure construct. Collective

64 Although in recent years a school of 'new historians' have questioned Israeli actions during the 1948 war and without doubt this has influence the Israeli psyche to some extent regarding the past, all these historians stop short of assigning full moral and legal responsibility for the refugee crisis to Israel. Although in Israeli schools, the 1948 war is discussed giving emphasis to Palestinian suffering and that many Israelis see Israel as partly responsible for the humanitarian tragedy, there is no doubt that Israeli discourse has no room for a narrative that assigns full moral blame for the crisis on Israel and claims that Israel has was born in sin as the Palestinians suggest.( Debate on the 1948 Exodus, Nur Masalha, JPS Vol. XXI no.1 (Autumn 1991) pp 90-97 and The Palestinian Exodus 1948-98, ed. Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, Ithaca Press Reading 1999) 65 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1983) pp 1-7


memory is often only indirectly related to historical fact. History is

replaced by 'felt history', what a nation thinks or feels its history to be.

Similar to Gellner is Benedict Anderson66 who argues that creative

imagination forms a basic part in the production of a nation or

‘imagined community’ or as Eric Hobsbawm more cynically states, "no

serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed

political nationalist...Nationalism requires too much belief in what is

patently not so"67 All these thinkers reject the essentialist concept of

nations. They insist instead that nations are culturally constructed

and historically contingent and that rather than discovering or

uncovering the truth of past events, historians create events from the

innumerable information that they find at their disposal. Because

national history is constructed, it may be possible to deconstruct it,

thus changing a nations consciousness. It is this deconstruction that

Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, combining ideas drawn from the writings of

Edward Said, Foucault and Walter Benjamin advocates, using a

historical approach in which the past is explored not to uncover what

happened, but rather as a basis for changing the consciousness of the

present. The question that concerns him is not what actually

happened but how the images of the past influence the present reality

in which we read that past68. If these images of the past manipulate

reality in a negative way which precludes agreement and

reconciliation, perhaps other images can be emphasised instead, thus

slowly altering a nation’s consciousness in ways more susceptible to

concurrence.

However, merely because national discourse or narrative often tells us

more about power than about truth, this does not necessarily mean

66 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origins and Spread

of Nationalism, (London 1983) 67 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Programme, Myth, Reality Cambridge 1990 p12 68 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin 'Exile in the Midst of Sovereignty; A critique of 'Shelilat HaGalut' in Israel Culture Theory and Criticism 4 (Fall) p49


that 'felt history' is not important or can be ignored. Collective group

memory often takes primacy over historical facts. Social construction,

even when not based on factual evidence has a specific ontology which

is reified over time. Lack of historical veracity does not make it not

real. National myths serve important function in societies in

explaining the past and making sense of the future.

In contrast to Gellner and other post structuralists who would

perhaps suggest deconstruction of the past as a means to change the

present day national consciousness, what is important to emphasise

is that, regardless of the truth, the conflicting narratives have become

deeply embedded into the national consciousness’ of the two sides,

and go some way to creating their national identities. Myth is

something more subtle than merely an erroneous belief held against

all historical evidence. As Michael Ignatieff, in a recent commentary on

Croats, Serbs and Muslims remarked, “The truth that matters to people

is not factual truth but moral truth; not a narrative that tells what

happened but a narrative that explains why it happened and who is

responsible” Truth according to Ignatieff is related to identity, “what

you believe to be true depends, in some measure, on who you believe

yourself to be”69

Both Palestinians and Israeli have their own national discourse, a

narrative that they feel explains the past, structures their

characteristics as an collective body and actively shapes their self

identity. Although some parts of the discourse may change over time

to deal with new realities, the central tenets to a nation’s self

understanding must remain steadfast. The events leading to the

establishment of the State of Israel, the War of Independence/al

Nakba and the plight of the Palestinian refugees are so central to the

discourses of both sides that any appeal to change is likely to lead to

the breakdown of society. Both discourses remain integral to each

69 Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, Harper’s Magazine (March 1997) p15


nation's self understanding. Any appeal to deconstruct or change

them will only fall on deaf ears.

Because of the near impossibility in changing perceptions of the other

to the extent of being able to create a shared narrative discourse of the

past, the only other possibility was thought to be the de-emphasising

of history in negotiations. If discourses can not be shared, they must

be ignored. This idea was started at Oslo and continued throughout

the years leading to the Camp David summit..


Chapter 4

Redefinition of the Conflict

– The Tension between Pragmatism and History

Initial agreement at Oslo could only be made by suspending any

reference to history and by the willingness of both parties to draw 'a

new road map'. According to Uri Savir, one of the main architects of

the accords, central to this new mapping, was separating the events of

the past from the realities of the present and the hopes and promises

of the future70. To move forward, according to Oslo, references to the

past had to be suspended. As Abu Ala said, "let us not compete on

who was right and who was wrong in the past and let us not compete

about who can be more clever in the present. Let us see what we can do

in the future71" The letters of mutual recognition sent immediately

after Oslo by Rabin and Arafat recognising the nationhood of the other

fulfilled this priority and redefined the dispute in political terms.

Making the history of the conflict and religious claims less significant

vis a vis a practical, realistic solution for the future, allowed the

conflict to be framed in a political framework as opposed to a

historical one. National dispositions, whether historical or

psychological leave very little room for mutual accommodation,

grinding any reasonable discourse to a halt. They were thus viewed as

a source of cognitive dissonance between the parties and seen as a

matter of unwelcome complexity that largely fell outside the resolution

of the conflict’s scope. The result of this definition was that, through

territorial compromise, an outcome whereby a Palestinian State

representing Palestinian nationalism could live peacefully side by side

with a secure Israel was envisioned.

70 Uri Savir The Process; 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East; (New York 1998) 71 Abu Ala from Amos Elon, 'The Peacemakers' New Yorker 20/12/93 p81


Negotiating on political levels and issues was deemed to be easy.

Discussions over territory or water allowances could be bridged, even

if there would inevitably be bitter disagreement over details. Analysis

of history and narratives, (however important) would only lead in

stalemate. This mood is reflected in Faisal Husseini’s comment on the

importance of history in solving the conflict. “to keep the history of our

people, to keep the dreams of our people, to keep all this in our mind, [it]

is so important to tell us who we are. But to reach to a solution, it [the

ideal] will not work. Being pragmatic, you can reach a solution. So one

for the identity is important, and to be pragmatic, to bring all of those

people from the one identity to find a solution for their case, it is

important72.” History is essential in understanding identity, it is

however, unhelpful in finding pragmatic solutions.

The Return of Religious and Historical language.

It was this thinking that had permeated Israeli-Palestinian negotiation

over the Oslo years. During the Camp David summit however, the

framework of the conflict slowly moved from being national/political to

being historical/religious. This was seen most starkly in the

negotiations over Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees.

In discussions over Jerusalem, Israel presented its demand for

sovereignty over the Temple Mount on the basis of its holiness to

Judaism, as the site of the first and second temples. On this basis, it

raised the demand to establish a small synagogue in part of the Al-

Haram complex. When this was refused, Israel offered shared

sovereignty, (vertically divided sovereignty in which Palestinians would

control the ground level and the Israelis would control the area below

the surface) on the basis that Israel would retain control over the

Western Wall and have some say in digging excavations under their

72 A dialogue on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process with Yossi Beilin and Faisal

Husseini by Harry Kreisler 15/9/98 http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/BeilinHusseini/dialog04.html on 15/3/02


holy site. This was also refused by the Palestinians who referred to all

Israeli ideas for solving the problem as 'ridiculous and offensive'73.

The religious emphasis that the Israelis brought up shocked the

Palestinians, who saw it as a dangerous bombshell liable to move the

region into war. Suddenly, according to Akram Haniyeh74, secular

Israelis were using the language of hard line religious extremists and

the Palestinians rejected this out of hand.

The Palestinians replied with religious arguments of their own. The

Palestinians not only based their claims to sovereignty over the

Temple Mount on its being part of East Jerusalem but also on its

holiness to Islam. Time and again, they repeated that the Muslim holy

places are in the status of an Islamic Waqf. Arafat reminded Clinton

that he represents all Muslims and that he serves as permanent

deputy chairman of the Islamic conference organisation75

Furthermore, Akram Haniyeh recounts how Arafat would tell Clinton

"Jerusalem is not only a Palestinian city. It is also an Arab, Islamic and

Christian city. If I am going to make a decision on Jerusalem, I have to

consult with the Sunnis and the Shi'a and all the Arab countries. I have

to consult with many countries starting with Iran and Pakistan, passing

by Indonesia and Bangladesh, and ending with Nigeria. Do you really

believe that any of these countries or groups would agree to give

legitimacy to Israel's pretensions, to give up Jerusalem and the Haram

al-Sharif."76

The Palestinian position remained that the Western Wall is a holy

Islamic site and Waqf. Although free access for Jews was promised by

the Palestinians, full sovereignty had to be Palestinian. As Sheikh

Ikrima Sabri, PA Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine stated "granting

73 Abu Mazen, Al-Ayyam (PA) 28/7/2001 www.memri.org.sd/SP25001 on 11/11/01 74 Akram Haniyeh, The Camp David Papers, JPS vol. XXX no. 2 (winter 2001) p92 75 Al Ayyam (PA) 10/8/2000 in www.memri.org/sd/SP12100.html on 11/11/01 76 Akram Haniyeh, The Camp David Papers, JPS vol. XXX no. 2 (winter 2001) p86


free access to the wall does not mean the Wall will belong to them. The

Wall is ours"77. Ultimately, Palestinian claims over Jerusalem are

reflected in the Islamic Awqaf Council's statement that, "The Al-Aqsa

Mosque belongs to the Muslims alone, according to divine decision and

is part of the Muslim faith. Prayer in it by non Muslims is forbidden by

[religious] law. Any attempt to harm its holiness or the site itself, or to

desecrate it would injure Muslims all over the world"78

This emphasis by Arafat and others on the religious dimension to

Jerusalem and the inclusion of the 'Islam factor' was seen by Shlomo

ben Ami as being one of the main factors precluding agreement. In an

interview about Camp David's failure he stressed the mistake of

placing the Muslim agenda before the national Palestinian agenda

commenting "Your national agenda is held hostage in the hands of the

Muslim agenda and you will pay a heavy price for this"79and arguing

that Arafat’s truth is that of the Islamic Ethos which is absolute and

cannot be negotiated with.

With regards to refugees, the talks were blighted by historical

intonations, focussing on the apportioning of blame to Israel for the

refugee crisis. The centrality of victim-hood in the Palestinian

narrative80 means the Palestinians viewed it as essential that Israeli's

admit moral and legal responsibility for the crisis. As Rashid Khalidi

explains, “As with similarly emotionally fraught and complex issues,

such as those involving Japanese actions in East Asia during the

second World War, or Switzerland and ‘Nazi Gold’, the key requirement

for a solution is not so much compensation….as acceptance of

77 Kul Al-Arab 16/8/2000 in www.memri.org/sd/SP12100.html on 11/11/01 78 Islamic Awqaf Council in Jerusalem, Al Quds 15/8/2000 in www.memri.org/sd/SP12100.html on 11/11/01 79 Interview with Shlomo ben Ami, in Maariv from www.memri.org/sd/SP20701.html on 11/11/01 80 Yossi Klein HaLevi in ‘The Asymmetry of Pity’, The National Interest, no.65 (Fall

2001) pp37-44 argues that it is precisely this view of victimhood that precludes agreement. Halevi asserts that because the Palestinian side see themselves as having a monopoly on pity and take no responsibility for having helped cause the conflict, they see no reason to make concessions to end it.


responsibility and some form of moral atonement81” However, this goes

against the Oslo idea of defining the conflict in political boundaries,

especially as a flooding of Israel by Palestinian refugees would alter

the demographic reality of Israel thus making the concept of the two

state solution an anathema82.

Believing that history is essentially part of the problem, however,

Palestinians had difficulty preventing the use of historical language in

which to clothe their arguments. As Hanan Ashrawi, a leading

spokesperson in the Palestinian delegation said regarding Israeli

proposals to repatriate Palestinian refugees in the Palestinian state-to-

be, "they [the Israelis] cannot wipe the slate clean and say 'Now we will

deal with history in another way. The political process is a new process

and must not be taken back'"83 The Palestinian position regarding

refugees is that history must be looked in the eye before a solution

can be found. It was because of this issue that negotiations over

refugees remained unsuccessful.

Transformation of the Conflict

The terms of reference in discussions over Jerusalem at Camp David

were clothed in religious language and this transformed the conflict

into a religious-ethnic dispute that can not be solved.

Israel's suggestion of sovereignty over the Temple Mount was not

based on security needs or international legitimacy but simply

because it was important religiously for Jews. Meanwhile, the

Palestinian definition of Jerusalem as a religious Waqf that can not be

81 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Elements of a Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Issue, Rashid Khalidi, in The Palestinian Exodus 1948-98, ed Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, (Ithaca Press Reading 1999) p222 82 As Yossi Beilin commented, "anyone seeking to establish two states, one alongside the other, needs to be very wary of anything approaching bi-nationality in either of them" from Touching Peace, From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement, (Weidenfield and Nicholson, London 1999) 83 Hanan Ashrawi in 'Were the Palestinians expelled' Efraim Karsh, Commentary

July-August 2000 in www.britannica.com/magazine/article?content_id=27044&query=hajj on 15/3/02


compromised on also brought religion into the negotiating discourse.

The onset of religious language moved the discussion from an Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, to a Jewish-Muslim religious ethnic problem.

Similarly, discussions on responsibility for the refugee crisis redefined

the framework for negotiations into a historical, or some would say

existential environment, in the sense that it touched on the central

narratives of both parties. It was for these reasons that negotiations

over Jerusalem and refugees precluded agreement.

The shaping of the conflict in a political framework remains the only

workable one. Its thinking is heavily reflected in President Clinton's

bridging proposals made in December 200084 in an attempt to find the

middle ground between the two opposing positions.

On the topic of Jerusalem, Clinton suggested the proposal of 'what is

Arab should be Palestinian, and what is Jewish should be Israeli.'

This would apply to the Old City as well. The parties would work on

maps that would ensure maximum territorial continuity for both

sides. He also proposed Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple

Mount and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall in addition to

shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the

Haram or behind the Wall. On refugees, Clinton suggested that Israel

should be prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering

caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war, and that

it recognises the need to assist the international community's efforts

in addressing the problem. Clinton suggested that both sides

recognise the Palestinian refugees' right to return to historic Palestine

and that both sides recognise the refugees' right to return to their

homeland but that the agreement would define the implementation of

this general right in a way consistent with the two state solution.

Some refugees would return to Israel (in accordance with its sovereign

84 Uri Horowitz, Camp David 2 and President Clinton’s bridging proposals – the Palestinian view www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n4p5.html on 30/11/01


decision), some to areas of present day Israel being transferred to

Palestinian sovereignty and others to the West Bank and Gaza. The

rest of the refugees would either be rehabilitated in their host

countries or would be resettled in third countries.

Clinton's bridging proposals reflect the realistic solutions to a conflict

that is plagued by history and religion. His suggestions do not dwell

on blame for the refugee crisis, nor include either side's discourse on

the events of the past. It does not mention religious arguments over

Jerusalem but simply puts self determination into practice on a micro

scale. The proposals are in the spirit of how both Savir and Abu Ala

viewed the Oslo accords and are an attempt to bring the conflict back

into the realms of the political. They represent the only hope for future

peace.


Conclusion - The Failure of Camp David

It is not doubted that there were "miscalculations, missteps and

mismatched timetables85 by all sides before and during the Camp

David Summit and that these were unhelpful factors in a resolution to

the one hundred year conflict. However, it was not solely or

predominantly due to these 'tragedies of errors' that the Summit

failed. The planning could have been flawless, Palestinian negotiators

could have been in unison and prepared for risks and Barak's

coalition could have been stable yet the Summit may still have failed.

Rather, highly divergent domestic constituencies and public opinion

(which in turn reflected the huge differences between the two very

distinct societies with divergent views of the past) tied the hands of

the leaders to compromise. The differing frames of reference causing

this were found to be unbridgeable, even with the help of intercultural

activities and good relations between the negotiators.

Even though interpersonal relations and changing perceptions were

successful in breaking down some boundaries and changing some

peripheral discourses, central parts of Israeli and Palestinian

discourses over events of 1948 are mutually exclusive and emotionally

unchangeable. Furthermore, when in comes to negotiations over

central issues that touch on the heart of the conflict, interpersonal

relations and understanding of the 'other' are largely considered

peripheral in making decisions. Personal relations go some way to

making agreement, but they do not allow someone to compromise over

what is seen as a central part of his identity. Some things are seen as

non negotiable, and in these situations friendship is irrelevant.

85 Robert Malley and Hussein Agha reply to Dennis Ross and Gidi Grinstein, NYR 9/8/ 2001 p91


In this situation, the one hope for success came in the emphasising of

pragmatic, realistic solutions based on the facts created over the last

50 years as envisaged by Savir, Abu Ala and, after the summit by

Clinton. Unfortunately, the discussions on Jerusalem and refugees

dealt with historical and religious claims as well as demands of

responsibility for past wrongs, and moved the conflict into an

historical framework, which inevitably led to heavy disagreement and

ultimately to Camp David's failure.

Whether inescapable or not, it was the reappearance of history and

religion back into the Israeli-Palestinian equation that put the death

knolls into the Camp David summit. The suggestion of Shibley

Telhami that "the priority must be preserving the nationalist framework

of the conflict and separating the religious status from the issue of

political sovereignty86" as opposed to emphasising historical or

existential issues is essential. It has proved to be the basis for the

Oslo accords and kept the peace process on track for years (however

shakily).

Undoubtedly history and religion do play a very important part in how

both Israelis and Palestinians define themselves and that it would be

very difficult to conduct negotiations without these claims. Religious

narrative and sentiments are grounded in historical consciousness

and both religion and history play a major role in the constitution of

memory. However, if the process is to succeed, these beliefs must

ultimately be made subservient to pragmatic ideas.

86 Shibley Telhami, Camp David Two, Assumptions and Consequences, Current History Jan 2001 www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/telhami/Chjanuary2001/htm on 15/3/02


It may be that ultimately "the question of historical interpretation is a

crucial issue in regard to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict"87 or that it is

impossible to resolve this conflict without emphasising religious

arguments88. It may be that this is a 'historic conflict' and that any

agreement that ignores this element will ultimately fail89 or that true

reconciliation can not be reached without recourse to history. It may

be that the Oslo accord could afford to pay lip service to the political

framing of the conflict as it was only an interim solution and did not

have to deal with the complicated, emotionally fraught (and potentially

historical and existential?) issues that were yet to come. This remains

to be seen. However, Yossi Beilin’s comment that “[We] should not

ignore anything, but should be very strong and very courageous in

detaching and separating between all this knowledge (our history) and

the current negotiations.”90 still rings true.

In the Israel-Palestine paradigm, with all the emotion that is

inherently present in discussions over many issues, the best way

towards agreement and stopping the bloodshed is understanding and

accepting that history is something best left to the past. It remains to

be seen if this is in any way feasible.

87 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, A Peace without Arabs; The Discourse of Peace and Limits

of Israeli Consciousness in After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems ed. George Giacmen and Dag Jorund Lonning (Chicago 1998)p68 88 Roni Milo, a self declared secularist in the Israeli government resigned after hearing of Barak's plans to relinquish sovereignty over the Temple Mount saying that “a nation that denies its past endangers its future” www.jpost/Editions/2001/01/15/News/News.19414.html on 15/3/02. Similarly, Amr Sabet in ‘The Peace Process and the Politics of Conflict Resolution’ JPS XXVII no.4 (summer 98) pp5-19 explains that religious convictions in the conflict remain fixed parameters and can not be externalised as determining components and reduced to culturally alterable variables. Unless the resolution parameters incorporate a sense of justice, Sabet claims the process will ultimately collapse. 89 Referring to the Refugee issue, Rashid Khalidi claims that “History can not be declared irrelevant and set aside in the interests of an expedient solution which corresponds to the unequal balance of forces between Palestinians and Israelis” (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Elements of a Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Issue, Rashid Khalidi, in The Palestinian Exodus 1948-98, ed. Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, Ithaca Press Reading 1999 p224) 90 Yossi Beilin, a dialogue on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process with Yossi Beilin and Faisal Husseini by Harry Kreisler 15/9/98 on http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/BeilinHusseini/dialog04.html 15/3/02


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