Facilitating Communication

8/6/2019 Facilitating Communication

1/19


2/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1 March2001

F a c i l i t a t i n g Communication a c r o s s L i n e s o f P o l i t i c a l D i f f e r e n c e :T h e R o l e o f M a s s M e d i aDIANA C. MUTZ The Ohio StateUniversityPAUL S. MARTIN Universityf OklahomaW e usenationalurveyata oexamineheextent o which ariousourcesfpoliticalnformationexpose eopleto dissimilaroliticalviews.Wehypothesizehat heindividual'sbility nd desireto exercise electiveexposures a keyfactor in determiningwhether givensourceproducesexposure o dissimilarviews.Althougha lack of diverseperspectivess a commoncomplaintagainstAmericannewsmedia,we ind that ndividualsreexposedofar moredissimilar oliticalviewsvianewsmedia than through nterpersonaloliticaldiscussants.The media advantages rootedin the relativedifficultyf selectively xposing neself o thosesourcesof information,s wellas the lesserdesire o do so,giventheimpersonal atureof massmedia.

he extenttowhichpeopleareexposedto cross-cutting political viewpointshas become of in-creasingconcernto observersof Americanpol-itics.Advocatesof deliberativedemocracy elieve suchexposureis essential in order for alternatives o becontrastedeffectively Fishkin1991).Others considerexposureto dissimilarviews indispensablen formingvalid opinionsand in learningto appreciate he per-spectivesof others(Arendt1968;Benhabib1992).Stillotherspoint to the value of exposureto cross-cuttingviews for purposesof establishingpolitical egitimacy.Exposureto cross-cutting iews ensures "that no onecould see the end result as arbitraryrather thanreasonableandjustifiable,even if not what he or shehappened o see as mostjustifiable" Fearon1998, 62,emphasis n original).Exposureto conflictingviews is deemed a centralelement-if not the sine qua non-of the kind ofpolitical dialogue needed to maintaina democraticcitizenry e.g., Barber1984;Bellahet al. 1985;Haber-mas 1989). In contrast,politicaltalk that centersonreinforcing sharedviewpointdoes little to encouragedeliberation on multiple perspectivesor promote apublic sphere (Calhoun 1988, 220; Schudson1995).According o the most often cited proponentof com-municationacross ines of difference, ohn StuartMill,"if the opinion is right, [people] are deprivedof theopportunityof exchangingerror for truth;if wrong,theylose what is almostas greata benefit,the clearerperceptionand ivelier mpression f truthproducedbyits collisionwith error"(Mill [1859] 1956,21). Mill'sstatementpointsto two potentialbenefits of exposureto oppositionalviews,the opportunityo changeone'smind and adopt a normativelybetter viewpoint,andthe deeper understanding f one's own position ac-quired throughconfrontingdifferentperspectives.Athirdbenefit is legitimationof an undesiredoutcome.

To the extent that people are at least exposed torationales or views with.which heydisagree,even anoutcometheydo not like acquiresgreater egitimacy.For example, the literature on political tolerancearguesthat education s importantbecauseit "putsapersonin touch withpeoplewhose deasand valuesarediferentromone's own"(Stouffer1955,127,emphasisin original).Likewise,differencesn tolerancebetweenmen and women and between urban and ruralresi-dents have been attributedto the more parochialcontactsof women and ruraldwellers Nunn,Crockett,and Williams 1978; Sullivan,Piereson, and Marcus1982). Along similarlines, authoritarianisms nega-tively related to diversityof experience (Altemeyer1996;Marcuset al. 1995),andpoliticallydiverseper-sonal networks increase awareness of oppositionalviewpointsandpoliticaltolerance(Mutz1999).In short,bothin political heoryandempiricalwork,there is near unanimousagreementthat exposuretodiverse political views is good for democracyandshould be encouraged.Most social scientists concurthat political attitudes and opinions are formedthrough social interaction,political discussion,andpersonalreflection,andtheseprocessesareof a higherqualitywhenpeopleareexposedto dissimilar erspec-tives.Nonetheless, hereis littleempiricalworkon thecontexts nwhich suchexposureoccurs.Moreover, herecent trendtowardresidentialbalkanization ased onshared ifestylesheightensconcernsaboutcommunica-tion across lines of politicaldifference n the UnitedStates.To the extent thatpeople live amonghomoge-neous others nself-selectedenclaves, heirexposure odissimilarviewsmaybe limited.Some theoristsproposethatthe futureof communi-cation across lines of politicaldifference ies in tech-nologiesthattranscendgeographic pace.As Calhoun(1988, 225) argues,"inmodernsocieties,most of theinformationwe haveaboutpeople different romour-selves comes not throughanydirectrelationships,venthe casualones formedconstantlyn urbanstreets andshops. Rather it comes throughprint and electronicmedia."Yet, muchof whatis knownaboutthe struc-ture andnewsgatheringpracticesof Americanmediasuggests hattheyareunlikely oplayaveryusefulrole.The goal of this study s to evaluateconflicting laims

DianaC. Mutz s Professorof PoliticalScienceandJournalism ndCommunication, hioStateUniversity,Columbus,OH 43210-1373.PaulS. Martin s AssistantProfessor f PoliticalScience,Universityof Oklahoma,Norman,OK 73019.This researchwassupported ya grant o Mutz rom theSpencerFoundation ndbytheCenter orAdvancedStudy n the BehavioralSciences.We aregrateful o the editorandanonymouseviewers orimprovinghismanuscript.

97


3/19

FacilitatingCommunication crossLines of PoliticalDifference March2001regardingthe media's contribution to cross-cuttingpolitical exposure.We begin by reviewingrelevant researchon inter-personalcommunication nd the massmedia.We thenuse two national urveyso testthepropositionhatthemedia make a greatercontributionhaninterpersonalnetworks o Americans' xposure o dissimilar oliticalviews.Drawingon surveydata acrossdifferentmediaenvironments,we examinethree independent ests ofwhether selective exposure explains our finding ofgreater exposureto cross-cutting iews throughnewsmedia.The resultssuggest hatthe structure f Amer-icans' informationenvironmentsplaces an extraordi-nary burden on the mass media to bring diverseperspectives o public attention,a burdenthe newsmediamaybe increasinglyll-equipped o shoulder.INTERPERSONAL XPOSURETODISSIMILAR OLITICAL IEWSThe verdictwith respectto Americans' nterpersonalinformation environmentshas become increasinglybleakin the lastfew decades.The kindof peoplewithwhomanygivenindividualdiscussespolitics s a func-tion of two factors: he availability f discussionpart-ners in one's immediateenvironment nd the amountof selectivity xercised nthe choice of partners Huck-feldt andSprague1995a).Researchsuggests hat bothfactors now operateprimarilyo produce greaterho-mogeneity n interpersonalnteractions.Withrespectto availability,esidentialpatterns uggest ncreasinglyspatially segregated iving even within the heteroge-neouspopulationsof largecities,thuspromptingmanyto argue that Americans are increasingly eparatedfromthose withpoliticalviewsdifferentromtheir own(e.g., Calhoun1988).1Residentialbalkanizationdoesnot necessarilymean that hordes of Americans arechoosing o liveamongpeoplewho share heirpoliticalviewsbecauseof those views.Indeed,few Americansassignpoliticssuch a centralrole in their ives.De factoselectivity is far more likely (Freedmanand Sears1965),thatis, people maychoose a particularocationbecause it is convenient to local co-ops, or a golfcourse, or the schools they want their children toattend, and they find themselvesamong others whobased selection on similar considerations.The initialgoal maynot have been politically ike-mindedneigh-bors, but that is achieved to the extent that lifestyleconsiderations orrelatewithpoliticalperspectives.Exposure o dissimilar iews also is inhibitedby thetendencyfor people to select politically ike-mindeddiscussionpartnersHuckfeldtandSprague1995a).An

ongoingobstacleto the formationof a publicsphere sthe persistent rade-offbetween amountof interactionand heterogeneityof interaction.Strongties and fre-quentcontact endto characterize omogeneousnter-actions,whichdo not bringnew viewsto one's atten-tion (Granovetter 1973). Quantitativeevidence ofselectiveexposure n interpersonal oliticalcommuni-cation is buttressedby qualitativeaccounts of thecouragerequiredto speak up among heterogeneousothers(e.g., Mansbridge 980;Schudson1984),aswellas the lengths o whichpeoplesometimesgoinorder oavoid discussingpolitics (Eliasoph 1998). Selectivityappears to play a significantrole in the kinds ofconversationspeople choose to have and, thus, thekinds of political networksthey form. If residentialchoices increasinglyacilitate de facto selectiveexpo-sure,andif people activelydodgeanypoliticalconflictthat enters their lives, then the prospectsfor cross-cuttinginterpersonalnteractionsappearquite bleakindeed.

THE MEDIACONTRIBUTION OCROSS-CUTTINGEXPOSUREFew conceptshaveplayedas importanta role in thehistory of researchon mass communicationas thenotion that people selectivelyexpose themselvestolike-mindedmedia content (Katz 1981). Beginningwith the Erie Countyelection study (Lazarsfeld,Ber-elson,andGaudet1944),thisassumption ecamepartof the conventionalview that the media have limitedeffects on political attitudes (Klapper 1960). Thattradition is now consideredpass6, but the issue ofwhether and to what extent people may selectivelyexpose themselves to media content has never beenfully resolved(e.g., Freedman and Sears 1965;Frey1986;Katz1968;SweeneyandGruber1984;Zillmannand Bryant1985).Findingshavebeen so inconsistentas to discouragemuch research,althoughstudies ofselectiveattention and bias in informationprocessinghave continued apace. Moreover,even if the manystudies of selective exposure had converged on acentral finding,they might not apply today, due tochanges n the U.S. media environment.Evidenceof selectiveexposuren interpersonalela-tionsis incontrovertible,ut it is lessclearwithrespectto the news media.Laboratory xperiments hat givepeople a choice of exposureto pro- or counterattitu-dinalmediamessageshaveyieldedmixedresults(seeFrey1986for a review).Furthermore,uch studiesareverylimitedin whattheycan reveal aboutlife outsidethe laboratory,where people do not alwayshave achoice, are not always orewarnedaboutthe politicalcontentof a messagebeforeexposure,andtend to usea particularmediumhabitually ather han on a story-by-storybasis. Particularlyn light of residentialbal-kanization,hisquestion s worthreopening.Althoughthe media are often criticized for presentinga verybiased(e.g.,Schiller1986)or at leastverynarrow angeof opinionsandarguments npublic ssues(e.g.,Hallin1986),it is doubtful hatinterpersonal ommunication

1Because these trends have been documented strictlyfor residentialcontexts, they do not necessarily point to greater homogeneity ofpolitical views in people's larger social network. For example,encounters in the workplace provide far more exposure to dissimilarpolitical views than do contacts with neighbors (see, e.g., Mutz andMondak 1998). Nonetheless, place of residence has become more ofa lifestyle choice (Katznelson and Weir 1986), and increasing resi-dential segregation has been noted according to race (Harrison andBennett 1995), education (Frey 1995), age (Frey 1995), and income(Levy 1995).

98


4/19

AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1environments reanyless parochialor providegreaterdiversity.The idea that themediamayserveas anextensionofa geographically efinedsocial context has been sug-gested before, but typicallythe emphasisis on howmassmediaexposurediffers romface-to-faceconver-sation (e.g., Sennett [1977] 1992).An obviousdiffer-ence is the extent to which they allow interactivity.Nonetheless, f we allowthatdespitetheirnoninterac-tivenaturemediamayhave the capacity o accomplishsomeof whatMill andothersconsiderbeneficialaboutcross-cutting ommunication,henexposure o dissim-ilarviews via the mediadeservesattention.It is worthnotingthatallthree of theprimary enefitsof exposurethatMilloutlined-persuasionto a normatively etterview,deeperunderstandingf one's ownviews,andtheenhancedlegitimacyof politicaldecisions-are possi-ble withoutface-to-face nteraction.We do not meanto suggest hatinteractivitys of no value;rather,evenwithout t, the mediamaymakea significant ontribu-tion. It is possible to separatethe broaderissue ofwhether interpersonalor mass communicationdoesmore to advance the causes of democracy rom thequestionof whichkindsof channelsbest servetheneedfor exposure o cross-cutting oliticalperspectives.Wefocus on thisadmittedlyimitedbutnonethelessessen-tial componentof politicalcommunication.IMPLICATIONS F AVAILABILITYNDSELECTIVITYWe hypothesize that mainstreamnews media willsurpass nterpersonal ommunicationn theircapacityto exposepeople to cross-cutting oliticalperspectivesfor two reasons.First,thereis a greateravailability fdissimilarviews in Americans'media environmentsthan n theirphysical nvironments. econd,comparedto personalinteractions,people have less abilityanddesire to exercise selective exposureto news mediacontent. With respectto the availability f dissimilarviews,the mediaclearlyhave an advantageoverface-to-facecommunication.Mainstreameportersaregen-erally encouragedto illustratestories with frequentreferences o people or groupswho expressconflictingviews, n the typicalpoint-counterpointormat,and asan appealto largeaudiencestend to cover a rangeofopinions(e.g., Zaller 1992).As businesses,Americannewsmedia are certainlynot insulated rompressuresto reflectpublicopinion,butnationalpoliticalnews inlocal newspaperstends not to reflect local opinion(Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt1998). In other words,the news media are not subjectto the more narrowgeographicconstraintsof face-to-face relationships,andtheydo not reflectthe structurally ictatedhomo-geneityof immediateneighborhoods r communities.With respect to selective exposure, it is easier toavoidexposure o the views of personalacquaintancesthan to views expressed n nationalnews. With dailynewspapersand most national television news, theability o exercisechoice on the basis of partisanshipsseverely imited.Fewcommunitieshavemore than onedailynewspaper romwhichto choose;moreover, ew

newspapershavereadilyrecognizedpoliticalcomplex-ions that facilitateselective exposureto like-mindedpoliticalviews.Likewise, he politicaltone of nationaltelevision news is very similar across channels. Ofcourse, hesame cannotbe said aboutnewsmagazines,talkshows,andpoliticalweb sites. In morespecializedmedia,peoplemaywellbe ableto selecta newssourcethat sharestheirpoliticalbent.Asidefrom he ability o choose,mediamayproduceless of a desire to exerciseselectiveexposureas well.People often refrain from political discussionswithheterogeneousothersto avoidnormativesocial pres-sure or the discomfortof publicdisagreement Ben-nett, Fisher,and Resnick1994;Ulbigand Funk1999).These same people may be willing to expose them-selves to media presentations,however,preciselybe-causethere is no personal nteraction.To summarize,we hypothesize hatpeoplearemorelikely to expose themselves to dissonant opinionsthroughmediatedrather haninterpersonal ommuni-cation, argelybecauseof the lack of selectiveexposureinvolved.Afterdescribing ur researchdesign,we willevaluatecontributions f the media and interpersonalcommunicationo cross-cutting xposureandpresentresultsfromthreetests of our generalthesis.

RESEARCHDESIGNWe used data froma representative ational elephonesurvey sponsored by the Spencer Foundation andexecutedbythe University f WisconsinSurveyCenterin fall 1996,immediatelybefore the presidentialelec-tion. This survey included a battery of items thattappedthe frequencywith which respondents alkedabout politics with up to three political discussants,plus five separate tems assessingthe extent to whichthey agreedwith the viewsof each discussantnamed(see AppendixA). Thesefiveitemswere combinedntoan additivescale that measuredthe extent to whichpeople'snetworks xposethemto politicalviewsunliketheir own.2The sampleof 780 respondentsprovidedinformation n morethan1,700discussants.To obtaininformationabout social contexts in which weak tiesare especially ikely,we asked respondents he samefive questions with respect to people they knowthroughworkandvoluntary ssociations,whichyieldedtwo similar ndicesof exposure o politicaldifferencenthesecontexts.Finally, hesamebatterywasaskedwithreference to the views respondents encounteredthroughreadingnewspapers,watching elevisionnews,readingnews magazines,andwatchingor listeningtotalkshows,after nitialscreening oruse of aparticularmedium.32 Eachof the five temswasstandardizedndthencombinedntoanadditive ndexfor each discussantand for each media source.Tofacilitatecomparisonsacross information ources, they were alsostandardizedwith respectto the grandmean across all potentialsources of exposure to dissimilarviews. For the three primarypoliticaldiscussants, ronbach'slpha ndicated hatthese five temsscaledrelativelywell: 78, .81,and.81 for the first, econd,andthirddiscussant, espectively.3Again, hese itemsscaledacceptably: lphasof .73,.73, 69,and 81

99


5/19

FacilitatingCommunication cross Lines of PoliticalDifference March2001Although he sample s relatively mall,the Spencersurvey providesa great depth of informationaboutexposure o politicaldisagreementhroughboth massand interpersonal hannels.Moreover,multipleindi-catorsof the dependentvariablemake it possibletocreate indices that offer morereliablemeasuresof theextent to which a given source providesexposuretooppositionalviews, as well as the extent to which it

provides dissonantcontact independentof the fre-quencyof that contact.The surveyresults were supplementedwith datafrom the Americanand British componentsof theCross-NationalElection Project (CNEP), obtainedduring he 1992 elections(for detailson these studies,see Beck, Dalton, and Huckfeldt1992;Heath et al.1992). Although the CNEP data provide only onecomparable ingle-itemmeasureof the extent of expo-sureto disagreementhroughmediaandinterpersonalchannels,they allow us to replicateand extend ourinitial indingsusingdata thatcapturebothperceptionsof information sources' views (those of up to fivediscussants, lusnewspapers ndtelevision)and inde-pendentassessments f the extentof politicaldisagree-ment, which were made possible by a "snowball"sample of respondents'discussants,plus a contentanalysisof respondents'newspapers.Aside from the single-item (based on choice ofpresidentialcandidate)measure of politicaldisagree-ment,the CNEPdiffers romthe Spencer urveyn oneotherrespect.The CNEPaskedrespondentso volun-teer the names of four people with whom they dis-cussed"importantmatters,"whereasthe Spencersur-vey asked for people with whom they talked about"government,elections and politics." For the fifthdiscussantin the CNEP questionnaire,respondentswere asked with whom they talked most "abouttheevents of the recent presidentialelection campaign,"whichgenerateda more explicitlypoliticaldiscussionpartner.Research on name generatorssuggeststhatthe explicitlypoliticalframe will producemore non-relativesanddiscussantswithwhomthere are weak ties(Huckfeldtand Sprague 1995b). Thus, the Spencersurvey s more likelyto generatediscussantswho willbe politicallydissimilaro the respondent.SOURCESOF EXPOSURETOCROSS-CUTTINGPOLITICAL IEWSFigure 1, whichis based on the combined ndexcon-structed romthesefiveparallelmeasures, ummarizesoveralllevels of exposureto dissimilarpoliticalviewsby mass and interpersonal information sources.Whether the items are consideredseparatelyor insummaryform, the findings are highly robust. Ashypothesized, mainstream news media, especiallynewspapersand television,occupythe highestend ofthe disagreement ontinuum,ollowedclosely by newsmagazinesand more distantly by talk shows. Thispatternmakesa greatdealof sense in lightof people's

relativeability o exercise electiveexposure o each ofthese media. It is more surprisinghat all the mediasources, includingnews magazinesand talk shows,surpass nterpersonal ourcesin the extent to whichrespondentsperceive them to involve views substan-tiallydifferent rom their own.4The degree of intimacybetween mainrespondentsand theirdiscussantsollows a highlypredictablepat-tern: Closeness is inverselyrelated to exposure toconflictingpoliticalviews.Exposure o dissonantviewsis most likelywith casualacquaintancesmean expo-sure to dissimilarviews = .12), followed by friends(mean = -.24), close friends (mean = -1.11), andspousesor relatives(mean = -1.76). This significantlinear trend indicatesthat cross-cutting xposurede-pends criticallyon contact with people who are notclose friends or family (F = 18.35, p < .001).Moreover, as found in previous studies, the mostfrequent interactionstend to occur with the mostpolitically homogeneous discussionpartners (Huck-feldt andSprague1995a).Even items that askedin very generalterms aboutthe people with whom respondentsdiscusspolitics-those knownthroughworkor a voluntaryassociation(ratherthan a named discussant)-did not generatelevels of dissimilarity s high as those for mediatedsources.These general items purposelydirected re-spondents' ttention o potentiallyweaktiesthatwouldhavethegreatestprobability f putting hemin contactwith dissimilar iews,but the responsesstill suggestedthat these sourceswere relativelyhomogeneouscom-pared o themedia.Likewise,an indexof disagreementdrawnstrictly rom nonrelativediscussants onfirmedthat both newspapersand television expose respon-dents to significantlygreater political disagreementthan do interpersonaldiscussants.The pairedt-tests in the note to Figure 1 make itclearthatthese meandifferences annot be explainedby political or demographicdifferencesamong theusersof various nformation ources; n eachcase, theusersof anytwo sourcesare compared o themselves.In all possible comparisonsof media sources anddiscussants,he discussantswere less likelyto exposerespondents o dissimilarpoliticalviews.Paired comparisonsmaximizethe sample size foreachof thetests,buttheyareinappropriateorhypoth-esis testingbecause they do not adjustthe observedsignificanceevels for the fact that so many compari-sons arebeingmade.Thus,to test our mainhypothe-sis-that mainstreammediaprovidemoreexposure odissimilar iews thanface-to-facecommunication-weused a repeated measuresanalysisof variance;the

for newspapers, national television news, news magazines, and talkshows, respectively.

4 Given the progressive decline in concord with sequentially nameddiscussants shown in Figure 1, it is possible that a fourth, fifth, orsixth discussant would have even more heterogeneous views, but itappears that few people can name that many political discussants. Inour sample only 31%of respondents named a thirdperson. In studiesthat ask for five political discussants, the proportion who do notname a fourth and fifth increases sharply (e.g., Huckfeldt andSprague 1995b), thus making it unlikely that asking about additionaldiscussants could overcome the large difference that we have ob-served.

100


6/19


7/19

FacilitatingCommunication cross Linesof PoliticalDifference March2001

FIGURE. Exposure o DissimilarPoliticalViewsby Source and PartisanshipUAveragenameddiscussant3.5- U Voluntaryssociation> 3.0-- Workplace3.0 tztsstttt-O E]Television

2.5 -- MNewspapers0

0 2.0

0)......... . . . . . .O o

. . . . . . .o 0.0-0)0) -0.5 -

0)

a

x -1.0 - --)

R iI-10dte.5-t

t--~

Republicans Independents DemocratsSource:Spencersurvey,1996.Note: Within ach of the threesubgroups,allcomparisonsbetween mediasources (television rnewspapers)andinterpersonalources (averagenameddiscussant,workplacediscussants,orvoluntary ssociationdiscussants)weresignificantly ifferent nd in the hypothesizeddirection p < .05).

was especiallypronouncedn particular ubsets of thepopulation.The observedgap persistedin all cases,although partisanshipwas a particularly nfluentialcovariate.As Figure2 illustrates, here are importantdiffer-ences by party:Democrats tend to find mainstreamnews sources more agreeable,whereas Republicanshave significantlymore homogeneous interpersonalnetworks.These two tendencies combine to increasethe size of the gap between media and interpersonalexposure o dissimilar iewsamongRepublicans, ut itis bothsizableandstatistically ignificant mongDem-ocratsand independentsas well.5 In otherwords,thefundamental dvantage f media n exposingpeopletodissonant nformationranscendspartisanship.The differences etween extent of exposure o polit-ical dissonance hroughmainstreamnews media andthrough interpersonalnetworksare clearly large, ro-bust, and statistically ignificant,but one might ques-tion whether the pattern observedin these data is

"real"or largelyperceptual.6Unlikesnowball amples,which ask named discussantsabout their politicalviews, or content analysesof media messages, ourmeasures examined thus far do not tap the actualsimilarityor dissimilarityof views but respondents'perceptions.These perceptionsare subjectto distor-

5 A repeated measures analysisof variance strictly among Democratsthat simultaneously compared the interpersonal discussant averagewith exposure to difference through television and newspapersproduced very strong findings (omnibus F = 51.68; contrast be-tween personal network and TV: F = 62.39; contrast betweenpersonal network and newspapers:F = 77.06; all p < .001).

6 Another possible challenge to our interpretation is that, for peoplewhose views are outside the mainstream, measures of disagreementconstructed from party or candidate preference questions may notadequately operationalize exposure to disagreement. Many critics ofthe press highlight not so much an imbalance in presenting main-stream Republican or Democratic views as a dearth of more radicalperspectives on either side of the spectrum. It should be noted,however, that three items in the index make no reference to partiesor candidates, and the pattern of findings is virtually identical usingan index comprised of only these three items. Thus,we do not believethat the components of the index addressing only mainstreampolitical views account for the findings.It is also possible that, even though the indices are comprised ofidentical items for media and interpersonal communication, a wordsuch as "often" means something very different when applied tomedia versus interpersonal political communication (Schaeffer1991). Relative frequency is involved in only one of the five items inthe index. In addition, this argument should work against ourhypothesis, because phrases indicatingrelative frequencywill tend tomean larger absolute frequencies when the activityis more frequent,and interpersonal exposure to political news is less frequent thanmediated exposure.

102


8/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1

TABLE . Accuracyof RespondentPerceptionsIndependentAssessment by Respondents Perceive Discussants to Respondents Perceive Newspaper toActual Discussant or Newspaper Favor FavorCoders Bush Clinton Perot No One Bush Clinton Perot No One

A. Perceived versusIndependentlyAssessedAgreementand DisagreementBush 83% 7% 12% 43% 0% 0% 0% 0%Clinton 7 81 19 35 71 72 67 61Perot 9 9 63 14 4 1 0 2No one 2 4 6 8 25 27 33 37Percentage 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Numberof cases (400) (458) (186) (65) (112) (364) (3) (367)B. Accuracyand InaccuracybyRespondents' ViewsInaccurate/strongprojection 8% 4%Inaccurate/weakprojection 4% 17%Accurateperceptions 78% 48%Inaccurate/weak ontrast 4% 27%Inaccurate/strong ontrast 5% 4%

Percentage 99% 100%Numberof cases (1,036) (788)Source: Cross-NationalElectionProject,American omponent (Beck,Dalton,and Huckfeldt, 992).Note:ForPartA,the unitof analysison the left s the totalpoolof dyadsfor which nformation as availablerombothmainrespondentand discussantinterviews; n the right he pool is allmainrespondentswho readnewspapers orwhichcontentanalyseswere available see AppendixB).ForPartB,the unit of analysisis the same but samplesizes areslightly ower because the perceptionsof respondentswithinaccurateperceptionswho did notexpress a preference ouldnotbe categorizedas contrastorprojection.nPartB,we code a perceptionas projectionwhen a respondentmisperceivesthe newspaper/discussanto agreewithhis/herown views butindependent ssessments suggest thattheydo notagree.We characterizehisas strongwhen the respondent prefersone candidatebut the newspaper/discussantactuallyprefersa completelydifferent andidate,and weak when therespondentmisperceivesa neutral ewspaper/discussanto favorhis/herownpreferredandidate.We code a perception s contrastwhen a respondentmisperceivesa newspaper/discussanto disagreewhen independentassessments suggest thattheyagree.Wecharacterizehis as strongwhentheyfavorthe same candidate but the respondentperceives the newspaper/discussanto favora different andidate,and weak when the respondentmisperceivesa neutralnewspaper/discussant o favora different andidate fromhis/herown preference.Percentages may not add to 100 due torounding.

tion and inaccuracy; or example, a great deal ofinterpersonal disagreement goes unrecognized,anderrors sometimes occur in recognizingagreementaswell (Huckfeldtet al. 1995).For our purposes,we considerperceptualmeasuresof disagreementmore appropriate han actual mea-sures.In orderfor disagreemento stimulate he kindof thoughtprocessesand reevaluation itedbyMill andothers, it must be perceived as such. If people somisperceiveothers'viewsas to consider hemto be inagreement, hen theywill not be prompted o recon-sidertheiropinions,broaden heirperspectives, nd soforth. Likewise, if people perceive that others dis-agree-even if this is not the case-then the samebenefitsmay derivedespite the lack of objectivedis-agreement.Thus, in one importantsense, it may bemeaninglessto ask whether people are "really"ex-posedto views different romtheirown.If discussantsare hesitant o maketheirdifference f opinionknownto friends,or if people persistently gnoredifferencesthat are communicatedo them,then such interactionscontribute ittle to the kinds of benefitspoliticaltheo-ristshaveproposed.Moreover,HuckfeldtandSprague(1995a)found thatrespondentswere influencedexclu-sively by the viewsthey perceived heir discussants ohave,not by their actualviews.Nevertheless,havewe observedanythingmorethana conglomeration f systematicperceptualdistortions?

The question is importantbecause research in twoareashighlightshe systematic istortionn thepercep-tions of others' views that can result from strongpartisaneanings.False consensusstudiessuggestthatpeoplewill overestimatehe extentof theiragreementwithothers,and studiesof the hostile mediaphenom-enon indicate hatpeople sometimesoverestimate heextentof their truedisagreementwith the mass media(Giner-Sorolla nd Chaiken1994;Vallone,Ross, andLepper 1985). Separatelyor in combination,theseperceptualdistortionsmayaccount for our findingofgreaterexposureto perceived political disagreementthroughthe mass media than through interpersonalcommunication.

Drawingon the CNEPdata,Table1shows hat mostperceptionsof interpersonal greementare accurate;overall, for all respondent-discussantyads,respon-dentscorrectlynamed the politicalviews of over 70%of their discussants.We sorted basedon whether thedistortionwas inthe directionof the mainrespondent'sview (projection)or awayfrom it (contrast).We thenclassified these cases as strong,if the misperceptionwas the oppositeof the discussant'sruepreference,orweak,for example,when a true independentor unde-cided discussantwas perceivedas a Democrat by aDemocraticrespondent.As the bottom eft panelof Table1Bshows,roughly12%of respondents rred n the directionof their own

103


9/19

FacilitatingCommunication cross Lines of PoliticalDifference March2001

FIGURE . Perceived and Independently Measured Exposure to Dissimilar Political Views bySource2.00 --1.80 MPerceiveddisagreement1.60-(. 1 Independentassessment

iu 1.40

CO

Q 0.80-00.20 -0

0Cx 0.40--0.20--0.00 Discussant Discussant Discussant Discussant Political Television Newspapers1 2 3 4 Discussant News

Source:Cross-NationalElectionProject,American omponent (Beck,Dalton,and Huckfeldt 992).Note: No independentassessment of televisionnews contentwas available.

views, and 9% in the direction opposite their ownviews. The resultssuggest significantprojection(t =2.72, p < .01), consistentwith much of the psycho-logical literature on this topic (e.g., FabrigarandKrosnick1995;Kruegerand Clement1994).7 n otherwords,systematicallymore errors occurred n the di-rection of perceivinggreater nterpersonal greement(projection)hanwasactually he case,justas the falseconsensushypothesispredicts.The bottomline is thatpeople are exposed to more interpersonaldisagree-ment than they recognize,but because they fail torecognize t, it probablyhas little capacity o producethe beneficialeffectsof cross-cutting xposure.Con-versely,as shown n Table1A for newspapers,here isa tendency o perceivegreaterdisagreementcontrast)with the media thancontentanalyses uggests o be thecase.8For newspapers,21% of respondentsshowedsigns of projection,and a significantlygreater 31%showedsignsof contrast(t = 3.56, p < .001).

InFigure3, the CNEPU.S. dataseemto confirm hepatternobserved n the Spencersurvey,n thatpeopleperceivemedia to exposethem to more oppositionalviews thando theirpersonalnetworks.As shownbythesolid bars, this is true across the four "importantmatters"discussants s well as for the explicitly"polit-ical"discussant.The stripedbars n Figure3 representindependentassessmentsprovidedby discussantsanddrawn romindependent odingof respondents'news-papers.9Figure 3 suggests that the true extent ofexposureto oppositional iewsmaybe slightlyoveres-timated in the case of newspapersand somewhatunderestimatedn the case of interpersonal elations.But most important, ven if one uses the "real"mea-suresbased on discussant eportsand contentanalyses,newspapers till providesignificantly reaterexposureto viewsdifferentromtherespondents' wn(t = 5.74,p < .001). In other words, the advantageof newsmediaoverinterpersonalhannels n relayingpolitical7To test whether he errorswere randomor systematicallyn thedirection f respondents'wnviews,we assigned aluesof -2 to +2to the contrast ndprojectioncores,withaccurate erceptions qualto 0. We then tested the hypothesishat the meanwasequalto 0.8 Weusenewspapersor thiscomparison ecausecontentanalysissavailable.

9 Whethera publicationavoredone candidateor none was estab-lishedby runninga repeated-measures nalysisof varianceon thearticles coded for each newspaper o see whether there was astatistically ignificantdifference n favorability nd, if so, in whatdirection. f no statisticallyignificant ifference merged, he news-paperwas coded as favoringno one.

104


10/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1

disagreements real,not simplya matterof perceptualdistortion.Althoughthe Spencerdata do not include ndepen-dentmeasuresof exposure o disagreementbysource,the resultsare consistentwith the CNEPfindingthatthe relativemediaadvantages not simplya functionofperceptualdistortion.The perceptualdistortion nher-ent in both false consensusand hostilemedia effects sdriven by partisanship;n the former case, it leadspeople to perceivegreatersupport or their ownviewsthantrulyexists n theirenvironment, nd in the lattercase, it leads them to perceive greater opposition.Anotherwayto graspthe extentof partisandistortionin the perceptualdatais to examinewhether he samerelativeadvantageof news media over interpersonalsources existsamongpoliticalmoderatesor nonparti-sans.'0Figure2 illustrated hateven independents orthosewithout deological eanings), hatis,peoplewithlittle or no partisan predispositionto distort theirimpressions f conflictandconsensus,believe the newsmedia expose them to dissimilarpoliticalviews morethaninterpersonalources(newspapers: = 6.97,p


11/19

FacilitatingCommunication crossLinesof PoliticalDifference March2001

FIGURE . Perceived Dissimilarityof Views by Source and Strength of Partisanship35- MediaSources3.02.5 1 %%6Talk Shows

S. (R2=0.73)2.0 --

oi1.5o *go **. A4- Newspapers1 + (R2= 0.82)xW 0.5 TelevisionNewsS+ - -,,(R2 =0.95)-o 0.0--?-?

-0.5-

-1.0+-1.5

-2.0 I IStrong Independents StrongRepublicans DemocratsX Newspapers *Television News + TalkShows

AverageDiscussant 0 Voluntary ssociation + Workplace3.53.0

_g2.5_Interpersonal SourcesS2.01.5

so5 Workplace

0.0

1.0

-1. - (R2=0.99)Average ::/ :'-.1.5 Discussant.

(R2 = 0.94) ,2.0 IStrong Independents StrongRepublicans Democrats

106


12/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1ment that mayexist.Politicaldiversity s clearlynot agoal in socialrelationshipsor mostAmericans; eopletend to cultivatehomogeneousnterpersonal etworks,and thosewithstrongpartisanattitudesareparticularlylikelyto be surroundedby similarothers.In compari-son, the mainstreammedia expose people to morepolitical disagreement,regardlessof partisanshiporthe exremityof theirviews.

EXPLAININGHEMEDIAADVANTAGEWhat s it about mediathatenables these communica-tion channels to more successfullyexpose people tocross-cutting political viewpoints?We suggest thatpeople often seek politicalreinforcement rom theirinformationsources,whether mass or interpersonal,but that the extent to which people are exposed todissimilarviewsthrougha givensourcereflectsvaria-tion in theirmotivations o exerciseselectiveexposureand the ease with which it is possibleto do so. Thishypothesiscan be tested in three differentwayswiththe Spencer data. First, choice should facilitate lessexposure to dissonantviews. Therefore, one wouldexpectpeoplewitha choiceof localdailynewspaperoagreemorewiththe viewsin the one selected than dothose withno choice.Second,ourtheoryalso impliesthatfindings houlddependuponthemediacultureof a particularimeandplace.One wouldexpect, orexample, hat ourfindingswouldbe time-bound ven in the UnitedStates; n theera of the partisanpress it is unlikelythat peoplereceived much except partisan reinforcement fromtheirdailypapers Schudson1981).Newspapers f thatperiodwould not have faredany better than face-to-face communicationn exposingpeople to cross-cut-tingviews.While we have no suitablehistoricaldatatotest this hypothesis,we can approximate uch a com-parisonbycomparinghe contemporaryUnited Statesto a countrywhere the press is more closely alignedwithpartiesandpoliticalviews.Drawingon the Britishcomponent of the CNEP, we compare exposure tocross-cuttingviews in American and Britishnewspa-persandinterpersonal etworks.We expectthatselec-tive exposure is much easier when the media areovertlypartisan,and Britishnewspapers houldplayaless importantrole thanthe Americanpressin expos-ing people to dissimilarpoliticalviews.Third,we examine individualdifferences n the ex-tent to whichpeople arecomfortablewith face-to-faceconflictandthusaredifferentiallymotivated o exerciseselectiveexposure.Althoughpeople in generaldislikeconflict, hereare individual ariationsn howstronglypeople are motivated to avoid it (Ulbig and Funk1999).We hypothesize hat the media will be respon-sible for a particularlyarge proportionof a person'stotal exposure to dissonant views if he or she isuncomfortablewith face-to-facedisagreement.

TABLE . TheEffectof AvailabilityfMultipleLocalNewspaperson Exposure oDissimilarViewsinthe UnitedStatesCoefficient(s.e.) t-valueMorethan one newspaperavailable n area -.43* (.20) 2.20RepublicanPartyidentification -.07 (.22) .30DemocraticPartyidentification -.72** (.22) 3.25Education -.01 (.04) .26Age .00 (.01) .49Sex -.25 (.19) 1.34Race .37 (.28) 1.34Income .01 (.01) 1.80Constant 1.56* (.71) 2.19

R2 .06(n) (460)Source:Spencersurvey,1996.Note:Availabilitys coded 1 forzipcode areaswithonlyone newspaper,2 for areas with more than one. Entriesare ordinary east-squaresregressioncoefficients,withstandarderrors n parentheses. *p < .05,**p < .01.

Local News OptionsIf the motivation o selectivelyexposeone's self influ-ences politicalinformationconsumption despite thedifficultyn fully realizingthis goal), then those wholive in areas with a choice of local dailynewspapersshouldbe exposedto fewerdissonantviews in the onetheychoose. Of course,the difference n politicalslantbetween local newspaperscan be very subtle, butnonetheless the population in multiple newspapertowns has some degreeof choice. To test our hypoth-esis, respondentsn the Spencersurveywere matchedwith informationaboutthe circulationof dailynews-papers in their zip code area, as obtained from theAudit Bureauof Circulation.Zip code areaswithonlyone dailywere coded1;those with more thanone werecoded2. Becausecorrelates uch asincome,education,or partisanshipmight producea spuriousrelationshipor mask a significant elationshipbetweenexposure odissimilarviews and access to multiple newspapers,controlvariableswereincluded.For example,marketswith multiple newspapersare likelyto be better edu-cated and urban,and these demographic haracteris-tics maybe associatedwith the likelihoodof exposureto diverseviewpoints.As shown n Table2, respondentsnareaswith morethan one newspaperreportedsignificantlyess expo-sure to dissimilar iewsthrough heirdailynewspaper,even aftercontrolling or partisanship ndother vari-ables,although he model as a whole accounts orverylittlevariance n exposure o disagreement.Giventheoften subtle differencesn the political complexionofnewspaperswithin a locale, the modest size of theeffectis not surprising.

107


13/19

FacilitatingCommunication crossLines of PoliticalDifference March2001

TABLE . Influenceof Partisanshipon Exposure o DissimilarViewsby Source andCountryExposure o DissimilarPoliticalViewsUnited States GreatBritain

ThroughInterpersonalDiscussionsRepublican/Conservative -.34*** (.04) -.27*** (.05)Democrat/Labour -.43*** (.04) -.25*** (.05)Frequencyof discussion .01 (.06) -.08* (.03)Political nterest .04 (.04) .00 (.03)Education -.01 (.01) .04* (.02)Age -.00 (.00) .00 (.00)Gender -.08 (.07) -.09 (.07)Initialog-likelihood -1556.77 -1436.15Final og-likelihood -1477.30 -1408.56158.95*** 55.1***(n) (998) (1,074)

ThroughNewspapersRepublican/Conservative .14***.04) -.28***(.04)Democrat/Labour -.27*** (.04) -.10** (.04)Frequencyof reading .04 (.02) -.02 (.05)Political interest -.04 (.05) -.07** (.03)Education -.01 (.01) -.03* (.02)Age -.01** (.00) -.00 (.00)Gender .03 (.07) -.01 (.06)Initialog-likelihood -1048.27 -1586.51Final og-likelihood -991.84 -1542.03X2 112.86*** 88.94***(n) (1,033) (1,687)

Source:Cross-NationalElectionProject,British nd American omponents,1992.Note: Forinterpersonal iscussion,the dependentvariable s the averageexposureto dissimilar iews throughall the respondent'sdiscussants;fornewspapers, t is the extentof exposureto dissimilar olitical iewsthroughhe respondent'smostoften readnewspaperon the same scale. Entries reorderedprobitcoefficients,with standarderrors nparentheses.Cutpointsare not shown. *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p .001.

A Partisan Media EnvironmentA mediaenvironmentwith moresharplydefinedpolit-ical differencesbetweennewspapersprovidesa bettertest of whetherselective exposureis exercisedwhenconditionsmake it easier to do so. Britishvoters arewell awareof the partisanslant in their newspapers,and there are manycompetingproductsfrom whichthey can choose (Curtice,Schmitt-Beck,and Schrott1998,12).If we arecorrect hat the largelynonpartisanU.S. press makes it difficult or people to selectivelyexpose themselvesto media content, then we wouldexpect a markedlydifferentpattern among Britishrespondents.Because Britishpartisansshouldfind itrelatively asyto exerciseselectiveexposure, he rela-tionshipbetweenpartisanship ndexposure o dissim-ilarviewsshould ake the same curvilinearhapeas forinterpersonalources, hatis, strongpartisans n bothsides should be less exposed to dissimilarpoliticalviews.Table3 examines he relationshipbetweenstrengthof partisanshipand exposure to dissimilar viewsthroughthe media and interpersonal ommunicationforBritishandAmericanrespondents.nthetop panelwe find in both samplesthe same patternshown inFigure4 for interpersonaldiscussantsn the Spencersurvey.As the significantly egativecoefficientsn thetop two rowsof Table3 indicate,partisanshipn bothcountries educes he amountof cross-cuttingnterper-sonalexposure hatpeople experience.In the bottom

panel,thehypothesized ifference etween he amountof selectiveexposureexercised n the two news envi-ronments s confirmed.As anticipated,Britishparti-sans on both sides are significantlyess likely thanAmericans o be exposed n theirnewspaperso polit-ical views with which they disagree.In other words,theycanand do findnews sources hatmeshwith theirpoliticalpredispositions.ustaswith face-to-face xpo-sure, strongpartisanshipn Britainpromotes greaterselectiveexposure.In contrast, the American case reveals a simplelinearpattern:compared o nonpartisans,Democratsare less likely to encounterdissimilarviews in theirnewspapershanarenonpartisans,utRepublicans remorelikelythan arenonpartisanso do so. To confirma general pattern of selective exposure,both partycoefficientsneed to be significant ndnegative,butthecoefficient or Republicanss significantand positive.In other words, given the opportunityto exerciseselectiveexposure hrough heir choice of newspaper,respondents oulddo so in the highlypartisanBritishnewsenvironment, utfewer coulddo so in the Amer-ican case. The differingresults can be seen in themarginals for these dependent variables as well.Among newspaperreaders, 51% in Britain read apaper that shares their political leanings,but in theUnited States the figure s only 16%.Conversely, 5%in the United States read a paperthat explicitlydis-agreeswith their politicalleanings,whereasthe com-

108


14/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1parable igure n Britain s only20%.Inbothcountriesthere is more cross-cutting xposure hroughnewspa-pers than through interpersonalnetworks,but thedifferencebetween he extentto whichnewspapers ndinterpersonal ommunication rovideexposure o dis-similarviewsis significantlyarger or Americans t =4.58, p < .001). Selective exposureclearly occursunder the right real world conditions;when peoplehave a choice, they tend to use it to reduce theirexposure o cross-cutting oliticalviews.Comfort with Face-to-Face ControversyIn additionto limitedopportunities o exerciseselec-tive exposure, he mediaadvantageoverinterpersonalsources may be due to its impersonalnature,whichcircumventshe discomfort f face-to-facecontroversy.Beyondfeweropportunitieso exerciseselectiveexpo-sure,Americansmayhave ess motivationo dosowithmassmedia.We hypothesize hatpeoplewill obtainalarger relativeproportionof their total exposuretodissimilarviews from interpersonal ommunicationfthey are comfortablewith face-to-faceconflict.As atest we used two survey tems designedto assess thecommunicationpatternsencouragedduringearlypo-litical socialization n the family(see AppendixA forquestionwordingandMcLeodandChaffee1972for areviewof the literature).For our purposes, t matterslittlewhetherthese itemstapaccuraterecollectionsofparentalbehavioror reflect current attitudes towardcontroversy. n eithercase, we anticipate hat peoplewho are uncomfortablewith face-to-face conflictarelikelyto get moreof theirdissonant nformation romthe media relative o peoplewho are comfortablewithinterpersonal onflict.

We compared the average level of exposure todisagreement n respondents' nterpersonalnetworkswith the average evel for televisionand newspapers,subtractinghe former romthe latter.A highscoreonthis measure ndicatesgreatermediaexposure o dis-sonance, and a low score indicatesgreater interper-sonalexposure.Because these differencemeasuresarenotindependent f overallexposureevels,we includeda control or thetotalamount, hat s,thesumof mediaand interpersonalexposure.This allowedus to esti-mate the relative mportanceof the media,controllingfor the effect of overall exposurelevels. Due to theobvious role of general political nterest n motivatingexposure, t was also included.As shown nTable4, thetotal amountof exposure odissimilarviews positivelypredictsthe importanceofmedia relative to interpersonal ources. The relativeimportanceof media is especiallygreat for Republi-cans,who havesignificantlymorehomogeneous nter-personalnetworks hanDemocrats. n contrast,a highlevel of education makes the media less importantvis-a-visnterpersonalources.Mostimportantor ourhypothesisaboutwhy people turn to the media is thecontroversy cale, which is a significantnegative pre-dictorof the relative mportance f the media.Inotherwords,as expected,people who are comfortablewithface-to-face conflictget a relatively argeramountof

TABLE. RelativeImportanceof the Mediain Exposure o DissimilarViewsby ComfortwithControversy Coefficient(s.e.) t-valueComfortwithface-to-facecontroversy -.37* (.16) 2.35Totalexposure todissimilarviews (mediaaverage +interpersonal verage) .47***.05) 9.21Political nterest(high) .35 (.34) 1.02RepublicanPartyidentification 3.74***.70) 5.33DemocraticPartyidentification .58 (.66) .89Education -.26* (.13) 2.06Age .01 (.02) .40Income .01* (.00) 2.30Race - .65 (.82) .79Gender -.67 (.56) 1.19Constant 5.59* (2.36) 2.37R2 .38(n) (305)Source:Spencersurvey,1996.Note:The dependentvariable s the relative mportanceof the media(averaged evel)comparedto interpersonal etwork averaged level).Entries reordinaryeast-squaresregression oefficients,with tandarderrors n parentheses.*p < .05, ***p< .001.

their dissonant nformationnterpersonallyather hanfrom the media. The oppositeis true for people whofindcontroversy npleasant;heyare morelikelyto beexposed to dissimilarviews throughthe media. Thisfinding supportsour propositionthat impersonalityhelpsexplain he mediaadvantage.Variabilityn selec-tive exposurereflectsnot onlythe availability f parti-saninformationources,asshown n tables2 and3, butalso individualdifferencesn the desireto avoidinter-personalconflict.DISCUSSIONCommunication cross lines of politicaldifference sessentialto the socialpsychological asis of a pluralistsociety. Pluralismrequiresthat a society be able toendureongoingpoliticaland moraldisagreemente.g.,Berlin 1969).Furthermore, ccording o most demo-cratic theorists,the expressionof opposingpoliticalviews is integralto the democraticprocess.Yet, thedesire for harmony in interpersonal relationshipsmakespoliticaldisagreement othrelatively nfrequentand particularlydifficult to convey successfully.Inaddition,residentialbalkanizationn the United Statesis decreasing he likelihoodof heterogeneous ace-to-face interaction.These factors make it all the moreimportant o understand he avenuesthroughwhichpeople obtain exposureto dissimilarpoliticalviews.Ourfindings uggest hatmediaarefarmore mportantthan interpersonalnetworks in exposing people toviewsunliketheir own. As a result,the media have thepotential o makeanextremelymportant ontribution

109


15/19

FacilitatingCommunication crossLines of PoliticalDifference March2001to awarenessof diversepoliticalperspectivesandthusto nationalpolitical ntegration.12Ourfindings lsohave mplicationsormanydebatesregardinghe media andpublicopinionin the UnitedStates. On the one hand, the stereotypesthat Lipp-mann(1922)fearedcapableof eliminating xposure odissonantviewpointsaltogetherappearto be potentbut limitedforces. Selectiveexposure s exercisedwithrespectto interpersonal ontacts n the contemporaryUnited States,to be sure,but at least as of the 1990s,the structure f mainstreammediamakes t difficultorpeople to screen out large amountsof oppositionalinformation.On the otherhand,cross-cuttingxposureandintrapersonalwareness f oppositional iewsdoesnot necessarily ranslate nto the kind of face-to-facedeliberation hat theorists uchasDewey(1927)hadinmind. Nonetheless, traditional news media such asnewspapers nd televisionnews hold the potentialforcreatinggreaterawarenessof cross-cutting iews.Many heorists, ikeDewey,havesuggested hatonlyface-to-face deliberationcan bringaboutthe kind ofdemocraticends implied by the notion of a publicsphere (e.g., Barber1984;Fishkin1991).Othersem-phasizethat,"inmodernsocieties,publicdeliberationis (and probablymust be) largely mediated"(Page1996).The usual rationale s thatthe massmediamaybe fine for relaying nformation,but theyare not veryuseful for fostering public discourse and collectiveaction,becausetheyareessentiallyone-waycommuni-cation to people in spatiallydispersedand privatizedsettings(Carey1987).13This argumentmakesconsid-erablesenseif collectiveactionorconsensus-buildingsthe outcome of interest.But if one focuses insteadonthe importance f exposure o politicalperspectivesnorder to promote awareness of diverse viewpoints,politicaltolerance,and benefitsof this kind,then theinherent limitationson the media's contributions reless obvious.The sheer idea that massmediamightserve to thebenefitof the publicspherestrikesmost as heretical.But, in assessingmedia'scontribution,here is a ten-dencyto relyon an ideal standarddrawn rom inter-personal communication, ypicallyakin to the ideal

speech situation(Habermas1989) in whicheveryonehas an equalopportunityo participate, veryone is-tens to and carefullyconsiders others'views, and soforth (e.g., Fishkin1991;Knightand Johnson1994).This "conversationaldeal" is not drawnfrom real-worldexperience,but it is often used as the standardagainstwhich media are judged and found wanting:"We are not really interested in what face-to-facecommunication s like: rather,we have developedanotionthatall communicationhouldbe like a certainmodel of conversation,whether hatmodelreallyexistsor not"(Schudson1982, 43, emphasis n original).Instead, if we comparethe realityof face-to-facepoliticalcommunicationwith the realityof mediapo-liticalcommunication, ehave a moresolidfoundationon which to base conclusionsaboutthe contributionsthat both formsmaymaketo a publicsphere.Thereisa disappointingendency owardhomogeneityn face-to-face political communication,whereas the mediacan transcend interpersonalgeographyand exposepeople to views unliketheir own. Regardlessof one'sviews on whether the mediapresenta broadenoughrangeof perspectives,t is clear thatfor manyAmeri-cans they are the main source of exposureto cross-cutting politicalviews. Comparedto most interper-sonal networks,they are hotbeds of diversity,notbecause the media are doing such an exemplaryobpursuingdiversity,but because individualsare doingsuch a poorone, in partbecauseof the desire to avoidconflict in interpersonal ituations.The media sendmultiple conflictingmessages,and in so doing theyadvancean importantaspect of the democraticpro-cess.Of course, the patternswe have observed couldsimplybe interpretedas evidenceof the media's im-ited influenceon politicalattitudes.That is, if homo-geneous interpersonalchannels persuadepeople tohold certain views, and the media are not equallypersuasive, hen the mediawill, as a result,appeartoprovidemoreexposure o dissimilar iews.Evenif thiswere the case, it still couldbe arguedthatmediaplayan important ole in furthering ross-cuttingxposurein a way that interpersonal ommunicationdoes notandperhapscannot.Previousstudieshavefoundlim-itedsupport or the socialcohesionview of the effectofpoliticaldiscussantscf. HuckfeldtandSprague1995a;Kenny1994), that is, that the cohesiveness of socialrelationshipsdetermines heirpersuasiveness.But re-gardlessof the relativepowerone attributes o massorinterpersonalcommunication o persuadepeople tochange heirmind,anyexposure o differing iewsthatdoes not produce nstantaneous ompliance s a valu-ablecomponentof publicopinion ormationandof theprocessof legitimizing iffering iewswithina pluralistsystem.In the contemporaryUnitedStates,the majorprob-lem with looking to media to fulfill this role is thecurrent trend towardhighly specializedratherthanmasschannels.The breakupof the networkbroadcastmonopoly, he proliferation f Internetnewssources,and the potential heyofferfor tailoringnews to one'sown interestsandprejudices reonlya fewsignsof this

12Our findingsare consistent across two data sets and two presiden-tial elections, but this could be a function of similarities between the1992 and 1996 elections. For example, the perception among Repub-licans and Democrats of media favoritism toward Clinton may be afunction of his front-runner status in both cases. Nonetheless, ourfindings are consistent with many previous studies in suggesting thatAmericans perceive media content as to the left of their positionsand consider journalists more liberal than the general population(Weaver and Wilhoit 1996). This does not necessarily mean that thecontent journalistsproduce favors one side, but the perception is thatthe mainstream media lean left if they lean at all (Watts et al.).13Much has been made of the importance of direct interpersonalrelationships in nurturinga sphere of politically oriented discourse,but a growing number of perspectives challenge that idea. Sanders(1997), for example, points out that the formal standards for thedeliberative ideal are seldom, if ever, met. As usually practiced,face-to-face deliberative decision making may essentially perpetuateand exacerbate social inequalities. Schudson (1997) disputes theconversational ideal that pervades current writing on the quality ofpublic life, arguing that democracy has little to do with the kind ofintimacy and community that characterize this romanticizedview offace-to-face interaction.

110


16/19

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1trend. As the number of potential news sources multi-plies, consumers must choose among them, and thatexercise of choice may lead to less diversity of politicalexposure. Although media observers have long la-mented the lack of choice in news sources, the prolif-eration of choice creates new problems. Advertisersand media firms are now working together to create"electronic equivalents of gated communities" (Turow1997, 2). The market segments they identify often arenot based explicitly on political views, but "lifestyle"categories are hardly independent of political leanings.Turow (1997, 3) argues that "segment-making me-dia," those which "encourage small slices of society totalk to themselves," are on the rise, whereas "society-making media," which "have the potential to get allthose segments to talk to each other," are on thedecline. This leaves the future of the mass audience inquestion (cf. Neuman 1991). These developments ob-viously do not bode well for the future of communica-tion across lines of political difference. In addition toreducing the amount of direct exposure to dissonantviews, specialized media and fragmented audiencesmay have secondary negative effects on interpersonalcommunication, since shared viewing or reading mayencourage conversations across partisan lines (Katz1996).Ironically, the mass media's greatest strength maynot be facilitation of the "Great Community" of soli-darity envisioned in the early twentieth century bymedia philosophers such as Cooley and Dewey (Simon-son 1996). Instead, media's greatest potential lies in itsimpersonal exposure of audiences to cross-cuttingviews, an essential form of communication in a highlypluralistic society. In order to sustain this benefit,however, news media must be structured so as to limitthe public's capacity for selective exposure.APPENDIX . THESPENCER URVEYDesignThisnational elephonesurveywas conductedbythe Univer-sity of Wisconsin Survey Center from September 1996throughelection eve usingrandomdigitdialing.Eachnum-ber was screened to verify that it was associated with ahousehold.The personselected for the interviewwas ran-domlychosen from amonghousehold membersat least 18yearsold, with no substitutions llowed.The responseratewas 47%,calculatedas the proportionof completed nter-views divided by total sample (which includes those whonever answered and all other nonresponsesand refusals)minus the nonsamplenumbers.This is virtuallydentical othe rateobtained n the CNEPsurvey. nterviews veraged 5minutes.A maximum f 30 calls were made to each nonan-sweringor otherwiseunresolved elephonenumber.

Discussant Generator"Fromtime to time, people discussgovernment, lections,and politicswith other people. We'd like to know the firstnamesorjustthe initialsof people you talkwith aboutthesematters.Thesepeople mightbe fromyourfamily, romwork,from the neighborhood,rom some other organization ou

belongto, or theymightbe fromsomewhere lse. Who is theperson you'vetalked with most aboutpolitics? [Discussant#1] Aside fromthisperson,who is the personyou'vetalkedwith most aboutpolitics? Discussant 2] Asidefromanyoneyou'vealreadymentioned, s thereanyoneelse you'vetalkedwith about politics?[Discussant#3]" If at any point therespondent ouldnot givea name:"Well hen,canyou givethe firstname of the personwith whomyouweremostlikelyto have informal onversations uring he course of the pastfew months?"Media Source GeneratorsNewspapers:Duringhepastweek,didyoureadone or morenewspapers?Whichnewspaperwas that?"Television ews:"Duringhe pastweek,didyouwatchanynationalnews programson television?Whatnationalnewsshowwas it thatyouwatched?Whichnewsprogramdo youwatch most often [if respondentnamesmore thanone]?"NewsMagazines: During he pastweek,didyou readanynews or current ventsmagazines, uch as U.S. News,Time,Newsweek, r some other newsmagazine?Whichmagazinewas that?"Political Talk Shows: "Duringthe past week, did youhappen o see a talk showon televisionorhear a talkshowonthe radiothatincluded ome discussion f politicalor socialissues?What talk show was that?"VoluntaryAssociations and WorkplaceGeneratorsRespondentswere firstaskedaboutmembership ndpartic-ipation n a list of typesof voluntary ssociations, imilar othoseused in the GeneralSocialSurvey.Peoplewhoclaimedmembershipn more than one such groupwere randomlyassigned o one of the groups or a follow-up equence,whichaskedidenticallywordedquestions parallelto those askedabout the politicaldiscussants.These same five itemswerealsoaskedwith reference o coworkers, lients,orcustomersthat employed respondentsencountered n the workplace.The fiveitemsaskingaboutvoluntary ssociationsproducedanalphaof .74,andthe same temsreferringo theworkplacescaledat .72.Five-Item ndexof Exposureto DissimilarViews1. "Comparedwith[nameddiscussant,mediaoutlet,volun-taryassociation,or workplace],wouldyou say thatyourpoliticalviews are muchthe same [low],somewhatdiffer-ent, or verydifferent high]?"2. "Do you think [named discussant, media outlet, voluntary

association, rworkplace] ormallyavorsRepublicans rDemocrats, rboth,or neither?" coring: ame asrespon-dent'spartisanshiplow),different romrespondent's ar-tisanship high),or neither.3. "Whichpresidential andidate, f any,does [nameddis-cussant,mediaoutlet,voluntary ssociation, rworkplace]favor?Clinton, Dole, Perot, or some other candidate?"Scoring: ame as respondent's reference low),differentfromrespondent's reference high),or neither.4. "Overall,do you feel [nameddiscussant,media outlet,voluntaryassociation,or workplace] hares most of yourviews on politicalissues [low], opposes them [high],ordoesn't[it/person's ame]do either one?"5. Mediaversion:"Howoften do you disagreewithpoliticalviews you [read/hear]about in/on the [media outlet]?

111


17/19

FacilitatingCommunication cross Lines of PoliticalDifference March2001Often [high],sometimes,rarely,or never[low]?"Discus-sant version: "Whenyou discuss politics with [nameddiscussant,voluntaryassociation,or workplace],do youdisagreeoften [high],sometimes,rarelyor never[low]?"

Closeness of Relationship"Is [named discussant] close friend,just a friend,or justsomeone hatyou regularlyome ntocontactwith?"Spousesand relativeswere codedinto a fourthcategory.Frequency of Political DiscussionDiscussantVersion: Whenyoutalkwith[nameddiscussant],do you discusspoliticsa lot, some,a little,or very rarely?"Media Version:"When you read/watch[named mediaoutlet],do you read/watchtories aboutpoliticsa lot, some,a little,or not at all?"

Partisanship"Generally peaking,do youconsideryourselfa Republican,Democrat, ndependent, r what?"Political Interest"Somepeopleseem to followwhat'sgoingon in governmentand public affairs most of the time, whether there's anelectiongoingon or not. Othersaren't hat nterested.Wouldyou sayyoufollowwhat'sgoingon in government ndpublicaffairsmost of the time,some of the time,onlynow andthen,or hardlyat all?"Comfort with Controversy"Whenyou were growingup, about how often did your[parentsor guardians] ake the positionthat certaintopicsare better left undiscussed?Often, sometimes,rarely,ornever?" Scoring: 1 = often... 4 = never."How often did theyhavespiriteddiscussions n contro-versial matters ike politicsor religion?Often, sometimes,rarely,or never?"Scoring:1 = never... 4 = often.Thescale basedon these two measures anged rom2 to 8.APPENDIXB. CROSS-NATIONAL LECTIONPROJECTSURVEY:AMERICANANDBRITISHCOMPONENTSDesignThe American omponentof the CNEPcombineda nationalsurveywith a surveyof discussantsnamedby main respon-dents and a content analysisof 40 newspapersconductedduring he 1992presidential lection(fordetailsand reliabil-ity of content measures,see Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt1998;Dalton et al. 1998). The nationalsurveywas drawnfrom40 countyclustersaround he United States(48 states),and the major newspaper ead by residents n each of thecountieswas selectedfor contentanalysis.The British urveycomponentwas includedas a module n the BritishGeneralElection Cross-Section urveyof 1992. Full details of thesurveydesignand administration regivenin Beck,Dalton,and Huckfeldt 1992)for the American urvey,and Heathetal. (1992)for the British urvey.The newspaper amplingwas done everythird day andeverySunday rom LaborDay to ElectionDay;a maximum

of 27 days were coded for each paper, dependingon itscirculation attern.On eachcodingdayall storiesthat dealtdirectlywith hepresidentialampaign nd/or andidates ndthat appeared n the firsthalf of the firstnewssection werecoded, as well as any specialelectionpagesand campaign-related torieson theeditorialpages.Coderswereinstructedas follows: "Code the overall content of the article thatinvolves Bush, Quayle, or the Bush/Quaylecampaign nterms of its favorability r unfavorabilityo the Bush cam-paign.Evaluate he article romthe perspective f the Bushcampaignand assess the content of the article from thisperspective. n otherwords,wouldthe Bushcampaign ikeseeing this article in print?" Dalton,Beck, and Huckfeldt1992).The same instructions ppliedfor Clinton/Goreandfor Perot.Weaggregated crossallarticlesn a newspaperoobtain an average avorability/unfavorabilitycore for eachcandidate.Newspaperswere codedas favoring candidatefhisscorewashigher hanthatof the other wocandidates ndthe differenceswere statistically ignificantat the p < .05level.

Discussant Generator"Now et's shiftour attention o anotherarea.Fromtime totime, most people discuss importantmatters with otherpeople. Lookingback over the last six months,I'd like toknow the people you talked with about mattersthat areimportant o you. Can you think of anyone?What is thisperson's irstname?Is thereanyoneelseyou talkwithaboutmatters hat are important o you?"Up to four names areaccepted, hen:"Asidefromanyoneyou havealreadymen-tioned,who is the person you talked with most about theevents of the recentpresidential lectioncampaign?"

Perceived Disagreement with the MediaRespondentswereasked:"In hepresidential lection,whichone of the candidates idyouprefer?"Theyalso wereasked:"Whichpresidential andidatedo youthink[the newspaper]favoredduringthe campaign,or didn'tit favorany candi-date?"The tworesponseswerecompared, ndscoringwas asfollows:0 = absoluteagreement respondent ndnewspaperconcur), 1 = mixed (either respondentor newspaper sindependent/neutral), nd 2 = disagreement respondentandnewspaper isagree).Televisionnewsmagazine ndtalkshowscoringwas the same.For the British sample, similar items were used withrespect o the ConservativerLabourParty,andscoringwasthe same.

Perceived Disagreement with DiscussantA comparisonwas made between self-reportedcandidatesupportand theperceived upportof Clinton,Bush,orPerotby the nameddiscussants: Whichcandidatedo you think[discussant]upportedn thepresidential lectionthisyear?"Scoring: = absoluteagreement respondent nd discussantconcur), 1 = mixed (either respondentor discussantisindependent/neutral), nd 2 = disagreement respondentand discussantdisagree).A similar scale with respect to the ConservativeandLabourpartieswasused for the Britishsample,andscoringwasthe same.To comparea single ndicator f interpersonalexposure o disagreement, erceiveddisagreementwas aver-aged acrosshowevermanydiscussants respondentnamed.

112


18/19

AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 95, No. 1IndependentlyAssessedAgreement/DisagreementFor newspapers, ssessment s based on the candidate hatthe respondent upportedand the favorabilitycorefor therelevantnewspaperas determinedby contentanalysis.Scor-ing: 0 = absolute agreement (respondentand newspaperconcur), 1 = mixed (either respondentor newspaper sindependent/neutral), nd 2 = disagreement respondentand newspaper disagree). For discussants,assessment isbased on the respondent's self-report and the named discus-sants' self-reports, scored on the same three-point scale.

Accuracy,Projection,and ContrastAccuracy,projection,and contrastwere measuredby theabilityof mainrespondentso identify orrectlyhecandidatesupportedby either their nameddiscussantsas revealed nthe discussantsurvey)or by their local newspaper as re-vealed in content analysis).If the perceptionsof the mainrespondentmatchedthe independentassessmentby codersor discussants, then they were scored as accurate. If therespondent judged the discussant or newspaper to be in moreagreement than was the case, the respondent was scored asprojecting. If the respondent judged the discussant or news-paper to be in less agreement than was the case, therespondent was scored as contrasting.AmericanPartisanship(1) "Manypeople leantowarda particular oliticalparty ora long time, although they may occasionallyvote for adifferentparty.Do you generally ean towarda particularparty?" (2) "Ifyou had to choose, do you think of yourself ascloser to the Republican or the Democratic party?" (3)"Taken altogether, how strongly or weakly do you leantoward the [Republican, Democratic] party? Would you sayvery strongly, airly strongly,moderately, airlyweakly,orvery weakly?"BritishPartisanshipForm A: "Generally speaking, what do you think of yourselfas [names of political parties]? Do you think of yourself ascloser to one party? Which? How strong [name party] areyou?" Form B: "Generally speaking, what do you think ofyourself as?" "Which of the following parties do you feel alittle closer to?" "How strong [name party] are you?"

REFERENCESAltemeyer,Bob. 1996.TheAuthoritarianpecter.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Arendt,Hannah.1968.BetweenPastand Future:EightExercisesnPoliticalThought.New York:VikingPress.Barber,Benjamin. 984.StrongDemocracy:articipatoryoliticsoraNewAge.Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress.Beck, PaulAllen, Russell J. Dalton, and Robert Huckfeldt.1992.Cross-NationallectionStudies:United tatesStudy, 992(comput-er file) (Study#6541). 2d ICPSRversion.Columbus,OH: PaulA.Beck, Ohio State University/Irvine, A: RussellJ. Dalton,Uni-versityof California/Bloomington,N: RobertHuckfeldt, ndianaUniversity[producers],1993. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-universityConsortiumor PoliticalandSocialResearch distributor],995.Bellah, Robert N., RichardMadsen,William M. Sullivan,AnnSwidler,andStevenM.Tipton.1985.Habitsof the Heart: ndivid-ualismandCommitmentnAmericanLife.Berkeley:University fCaliforniaPress.

Benhabib,Seyla.1992.SituatingheSelf.New York:Routledge.Bennett,Stephen,BonnieFisher,and DavidResnick.1994."Speak-ingof Politics n the UnitedStates:WhoTalks o Whom,Why,andWhyNot."Paperpresentedat the annualmeetingof theMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago.Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. Four Essayson Liberty.New York: OxfordUniversityPress.Calhoun,Craig.1988."PopulistPolitics,CommunicationMediaandLargeScale SocietalIntegration."ociologicalTheory (3): 219-41.Carey,JamesW. 1987. "ThePress andthe PublicDiscourse."TheCenterMagazine 0 (2):4-32.Curtice,John,RiidigerSchmitt-Beck,nd PeterSchrott.1998."Dothe MediaMatter?" aperpresentedat the annualmeetingof theMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago.Dalton, RussellJ., Paul Allen Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt.1992.CNEP-USACommonCoreMediaCodebook.Typescript.Dalton, RussellJ., Paul Allen Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt.1998."PartisanCues and the Media: InformationFlows in the 1992Presidential Election."AmericanPolitical Science Review 92(March):111-26.Dalton,RussellJ., PaulAllenBeck,RobertHuckfeldt, ndWilliamKoetzle.1998."A Testof Media-Centered gendaSetting:News-paper Contentand Public Interestin a PresidentialElection."PoliticalCommunication5 (November): 63-81.Dewey,John.1927. ThePublicand ItsProblems.New York:Henry

Holt.Eliasoph,Nina. 1998.AvoidingPolitics:How AmericansProduceApathy n Everyday ife.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.Fabrigar,LeandreR., and Jon A. Krosnick. 995."Attitude mpor-tance and the False ConsensusEffect."Personality& SocialPsychology ulletin21 (5): 468-79.Fearon,James. 1998."Deliberation s Discussion." n DeliberativeDemocracy,ed. Jon Elster. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress.Pp.44-68.Fishkin, amesS. 1991.Democracy ndDeliberation: ewDirectionsfor DemocraticReform.New Haven,CT:Yale UniversityPress.Freedman,JonathanL., and David O. Sears. 1965. "SelectiveExposure."nAdvances n ExperimentalocialPsychology,ol. 2,ed. LeonardBerkowitz.New York:AcademicPress.Pp.58-98.Frey, Dieter. 1986. "Recent Researchon Selective ExposuretoInformation."nAdvances n ExperimentalocialPsychology,ol.19,ed. LeonardBerkowitz.New York:AcademicPress.Pp.41-80.Frey,WilliamH. 1995."The New Geography f PopulationShifts:TrendsTowardBalkanization."n Stateof the Union:America nthe1990s,vol.2, ed. ReynoldsFarley.NewYork:RussellSage.Pp.271-336.Giner-Sorolla,Roger, and ShellyChaiken.1994. "The Causes ofHostileMediaJudgments."ournal fExperimentalocialPsychol-ogy30 (2): 165-80.Granovetter,Mark.1973."TheStrengthof Weak Ties."AmericanJournal f Sociology 8 (May):1360-80.Habermas, iurgen. 989.TheStructural ransformationf thePublicSphere.Cambridge.MA: MITPress.Hallin, Daniel C. 1986. The "UncensoredWar":The Media andVietnam.New York:OxfordUniversityPress.Harrison,RoderickJ., andClaudetteE. Bennett. 1995."RacialandEthnicDiversity."n Stateof the Union:American the1990s,vol.2, ed. ReynoldsFarley.New York:RussellSage. Pp. 141-210.Heath,Anthony,RodgerJowell,JohnCurtice,JackA. Brand,andJames C. Mitchell. 1992. BritishGeneralElectionCross-SectionSurvey,1992 (computer file) (Study #6453). ICPSR version.London, England:Social and CommunityPlanningResearch[producer].Colchester,England:ESRCDataArchive/AnnArbor,MI:Inter-universityonsortium orPoliticaland SocialResearch[distributors],996.Huckfeldt,Robert,Paul Allen Beck,Russell J. Dalton,andJeffreyLevine. 1995."PoliticalEnvironments,Cohesive Social Groups,andthe Communication f PublicOpinion."American ournal fPoliticalScience39 (4): 1025-54.Huckfeldt,Robert,and JohnSprague.1995a.Citizens, olitics,andSocialCommunication:nformationnd Influencen an ElectionCampaign.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.Huckfeldt,Robert,and JohnSprague.1995b."Political nformationandCommunicationmongCitizens:HumanCapital n an Elec-

113


19/19

FacilitatingCommunication crossLines of PoliticalDifference March2001tion Campaign."Proposal submittedto the National ScienceFoundation.Katz,Elihu. 1968."On Reopeningthe Questionof Selectivity nExposureto Mass Communications."n Theoriesof CognitiveConsistency:A Sourcebook,ed. Robert P. Abelson, Elliot Aronson,WilliamMcGuire,TheodoreNewcomb,MiltonRosenberg,andPercyTannenbaum. hicago:Rand-McNally. p.788-96.Katz,Elihu. 1981."Publicitynd Pluralisticgnorance:Notes on theSpiral of Silence." In Public Opinion and Social Change: ForElisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed. Horst Baler, Hans Mathias Kep-plinger, ndKurtReuman.Weisbaden:Westdeutscher erlag.Pp.28-38.Katz,Elihu. 1996."AndDeliver Us fromSegmentation."nnalsoftheAmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science 546: 22-33.Katznelson, ra,andMargaretWeir. 1986."Working-Classorma-tion: ConstructingCases and Comparisons."n WorkingClassFormation, d. Ira Katznelsonand AristideZolberg.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity.Pp.3-41.Kenny,ChristopherB. 1994. "TheMicroenvironmentf AttitudeChange."Journalof Politics 56 (August): 715-28.Klapper, Joseph T. 1960. The Effects of Mass Communications.Glencoe,IL:Free Press.Knight,Jack,and JamesJohnson.1994."Aggregation nd Deliber-ation: On the Possibilityof DemocraticLegitimacy." oliticalTheory22 (May): 277-96.Krueger, oachim,and RussellW. Clement.1994."TheTrulyFalseConsensusEffect:An Ineradicable ndEgocentricBiasin SocialPerception." Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology67 (4):596-610.Lazarsfeld, aulF.,BernardBerelson,and HazelGaudet.1944.ThePeople'sChoice.New York:Duell, Sloan andPearce.Levy,Frank.1995."Incomes nd IncomeInequality."nStateof theUnion:America in the 1990s, vol. 1:Economic Trends,ed. ReynoldsFarley.New York:RussellSage. Pp. 1-58.Lippmann,Walter.1922.PublicOpinion.New York:Free Press.Marcus,GeorgeE., John L. Sullivan,ElisabethTheiss-Morse, ndSandra L. Wood. 1995. With Malice Toward Some: How PeopleMake CivilLibertiesJudgments.New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1980. BeyondAdversaryDemocracy. New York:BasicBooks.McLeod,JackM., andStevenH. Chaffee.1972."TheConstructionof Social Reality." In The Social Influence Process, ed. JamesTedeschi.Chicago:Aldine-Atherton. p.50-99.Mill,John Stuart. 1859]1956. On Liberty,d. C.V. Shields.India-napolis:Bobbs-Merril.Mutz, Diana C. 1999. "Cross-Cutting ocial Networks:TestingDemocraticTheory n Practice."Paperpresentedat the annualmeetingof the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago.Mutz,DianaC.,andJeffery . Mondak.1998."Democracy t Work:Contributionsf the WorkplaceTowarda PublicSphere."Paperpresentedat the annualmeetingof the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago.Neuman, W. Russell. 1991. The Futureof the Mass Audience. NewYork:Cambridge.Nunn, Clyde Z., HarryJ. Crockett,and J. Allen Williams.1978.Tolerance or Nonconformity.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Page, Benjamin I. 1996. Who Deliberates?Mass Media in ModemDemocracy.Chicago:University f ChicagoPress.Sanders,LynnM. 1977."AgainstDeliberation." oliticalTheory 5(3): 347-76.Schaeffer,Nora Cate. 1991. "HardlyEver or Constantly?GroupComparisons sing VagueQuantifiers."ublicOpinionQuarterly55 (Fall):395-423.Schiller, Herbert I. 1986. Informationand the CrisisEconomy. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Schudson,Michael. 1981.Discoveringhe News. New York:BasicBooks.Schudson,Michael.1982."The dealof ConversationntheStudyofMass Media." In Inter/Media:InterpersonalCommunication in aMediaWorld,d. GaryGumpert ndRobertCathcart.New York:Oxford.Pp.41-8.Schudson,Michael. 1984."Embarrassmentnd ErvingGoffman'sIdea of HumanNature."TheoryndSociety 3(October): 33-48.Schudson,Michael. 1995. The Powerof News. Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Schudson,Michael. 1997. "WhyConversation s Not the Soul ofDemocracy." Critical Studies in Mass Communication 14 (4):297-309.Sennett,Richard. 1977]1992.TheFall of PublicMan. New York:AlfredA. Knopf.Sherif,Muzafer, nd CarlI. Hovland.1961.SocialJudgment:ssim-ilation and ContrastEffects n Communication and AttitudeChange.New Haven,CT:Yale UniversityPress.Simonson,Peter.1996."Dreams f DemocraticTogetherness: om-municationHope fromCooleyto Katz."Critical tudiesn MassCommunication 13 (4): 324-42.Stouffer,Samuel. 1955. Communism,Conformity,and CivilLiberties.New York:Doubleday.Sullivan,John L., JamesPiereson,and George E. Marcus.1982.Political Toleranceand American Democracy. Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress.Sweeney,PaulD., andKathyL. Gruber.1984."SelectiveExposure:VoterInformation references ndtheWatergateAffair."ournalof Personalityand Social Psychology46 (6): 1208-21.Turow,Joseph.1997.BreakingUpAmerica.Chicago:University fChicagoPress.Ulbig, StacyG., and CaryL. Funk. 1999."ConflictAvoidanceandPolitical Participation."Political Behavior 21 (3): 265-82.Vallone, Robert P., Lee Ross, and MarkR. Lepper.1985. "TheHostileMediaPhenomenon: iasedPerception ndPerception fMedia Bias in Coverageof the Beirut Massacre." ournalofPersonalityand Social Psychology 49 (3): 577-85.Weaver,DavidH., and G. ClevelandWilhoit. 1996. TheAmericanJournalist in the 1990s: U.S. News People at the End of an Era.Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum.Watts,MarkD., DavidDomke,DhavanV. Shah,andDavidP. Fan.1999. "Elite Cues and Media Bias in PresidentialCampaigns:Explaining ublicPerceptions f a LiberalPress."CommunicationResearch26 (2): 144-75.Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Originsof Mass Opinion. NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Zillmann,Dolf, and JenningsBryant.1985. SelectiveExposure oCommunication. illsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum.

Facilitating Communication

Documents

Transcript of Facilitating Communication