Exploring Emotet, an elaborate everyday enigma · 2019-10-08 · History of Emotet May, 2014 V1...

Luca Nagy

Threat Researcher, SophosLabs

Oct 2019

Exploring Emotet, an elaborate everyday enigma

History of Emotet

May, 2014

V1First sample seen by Sophos

Nov, 2014

V2 - modular structure

Targeting German and Austrian banks

Jan, 2015

V3• anti-VM techniques • social engineering tricks

Targeting Swiss banks No significant campaign

Delivering by Rig EK

Dec, 2016

Apr, 2017

V4 - targeting UK• no banking module• network spreading capabilities• delivery service for other malware

Arriving to USA

Auto-updating the binary

Dropping Dridex, IcedID

Dropping ZeusPanda, Trickbot, Qbot

Email harvesting module

Oct, 2018

May, 2017 May, 2019

Email conversation chains in spam messages

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After long break, it reappeared

Aug, 2019

Unique binaries and downloaders on daily basis

70

1763

New binaries

New downloaders

(2019)

(2019)

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Delivery method - Spam messages

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Anti-analysis techniques: Anti-VM techniques, process injection

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Anti-VM techniques

• Checking process list locally, using fake IP list

• Detecting VM, AV related files, folders

• Detecting sandbox environment

• Sending process list

Process injection

• Wrapper modules

• Heaven’s Gate

Anti-analysis techniques: Injecting into 64 bit process - Heaven’s Gate

32 bit disassembler 64 bit disassembler

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Anti-analysis techniques: Custom packer

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Main functions of the binary

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C2 server communication

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IP address count used to reach the C2

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Observed in the first 4 months of 2019

Downloaded Modules: Wrapper modules

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Inject into:

• /System32/alg.exe

• New instance of itself

Wrapper modules - Injected NirSoft executables

WebBrowserPassView

Mail PassView

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Wrapper modules - Injected proprietary executables

Email contact extractor

Email content harvester

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Regular modules: Network spreading module

• Enumerating SMB, null session connection

• Brute-forcing the connections (~10 000 passwords)

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Regular modules: UPNP module

• Port-forwarding

Port numbers set by the module:

20, 21, 22, 53, 80, 143, 443, 465, 990, 993, 995, 7080, 8080, 8090, 8443, 50000

(Same as the port numbers used to reach the C2 – hardcoded in the binary)

• Bypassing firewall rules

• Verifying the settings

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Regular modules: Spam bot module

• SMTP message sent by the spam bot module

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sender = victim Areceiver = target A

hijacked account = victim B

template

Delivered malware

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• Directly: Banking Trojans (e.g.: Trickbot, Qbot, Dridex, Ursnif, IcedID,…)

• Secondly: Ransomware (e.g.: Ryuk, BitPaymer, MegaCortex)

• Attack-chains:

• Emotet – TrickBot – Ryuk

• Emotet – Dridex – BitPaymer

• Emotet – Qbot – MegaCortex

Sum up

• Information, credentials from browser

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Sum up


• Spreading through LAN

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Sum up



• Email address books

From: victim A’s name <victim B’s account>To: target A

target A = victim A’s acquaintance

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Sum up




• Email account settings

From: victim B’s name <victim A’s account>To: target B

target B = victim B’s acquaintance

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Sum up





• Email conversation threads

From: victim A’s name <victim’s B account>Sub: RE:To: target A

target A = victim A’s acquaintance

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Body: victim A’s email domain/…/...zip

Sum up






• Spamming

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Sum up






• Spamming

• Proxy

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Sum up






• Spamming

• Proxy

• Deliver malware

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?

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Thank you!

Also thanks for:Gábor SzappanosFerenc László NagyDorka PalotaySophosLabs

@luca_nagy_

Exploring Emotet, an elaborate everyday enigma · 2019-10-08 · History of Emotet May, 2014 V1...

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