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Explaining British Nuclear Modernisation Today “We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a bloody Union Jack on the top of it” (Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946) Writer: Supervisor: KL Søren Nordby Dr. Gary Schaub Royal Danish Defence Academy Centre for Military Studies Master 2011-2012

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Explaining British Nuclear Modernisation Today

“We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a bloody Union Jack on the top of it” (Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946) Writer: Supervisor: KL Søren Nordby Dr. Gary Schaub Royal Danish Defence Academy Centre for Military Studies Master 2011-2012

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Abstract

This thesis examines how security concerns, status concerns and bureaucratic

interests interacted to affect the United Kingdom’s recent decision to replace its

nuclear deterrent. It argues that the interstate security environment has become

more benign since the end of the Cold War and therefore status and bureaucratic

concerns have become more important considerations in influencing such decisions.

The thesis supplements Classical Realist concerns of the perceived level of threat

with Scott Sagan’s two additional explanations for why states pursue and obtain

nuclear weapons. Reputational considerations and bureaucratic interests are posited

to be intervening variables in the British government’s security decisions. The thesis

applies these models to two cases in British nuclear history - firstly the decision to

obtain Polaris-class submarines and SLBMs in 1962, and secondly the British

Government’s recent decision to keep the nuclear deterrent and procure a ‘like for

like’ replacement for the current Vanguard Class Trident system. The thesis

concludes that the British Government has not taken such decisions based solely on

the perceived level of threat but that additional factors such as maintaining their

identity as a great power and the influence of the nuclear defence industry have also

played a part to varying degrees.

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Précis

In December 2006 the UK Government took the decision to replace its nuclear

deterrent, the Vanguard Class Submarine armed with ICBMs, with a ‘like for like’

system, yet to be designed and procured. This decision was taken within the

contextual backdrop of the end of the Cold War, the existence of the Non

Proliferation Treaty (NPT), continued pressure from anti-nuclear groups and the

worldwide economic recession. This begs the question –

What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current, and the likely future international security environment?

In looking at the factors determining the 2006 decision it was useful to examine the

factors which influenced the initial procurement of the strategic nuclear weapon

system, Polaris, in 1962 to analyse similarities and differences over the period.

Using the Realist concerns of the perceived level of threat combined with Scott

Sagan’s two additional explanations for why states pursue and obtain nuclear

weapons, the two cases (1962 and 2006) were analysed. Sagan’s models deal with

security concerns (Security Model), status concerns (Norms Model) and bureaucratic

interests (Domestic Politics Model), as an alternative to pure security model theory.

After completing the initial analysis on both periods the conclusions from each year

were then compared by model with the aim of establishing the relevance of each

factor in the final case of 2006, thereby answering the thesis main question. Security

Model factors were based on the theory of strong and weak states, the perceived

threat and the security dilemma in relation to proliferation. The Domestic Politics

Model provides 3 types of actors; namely the military, the nuclear / defence industry

and politicians, examples of which were found in both cases. Finally on analysing

the cases using the Norms Model the significant factors were the UK’s identity and

the ‘Special Relationship’ it has with the USA.

Both cases provided valid arguments in all three models but there are significant

differences to their underlying factors and relative importance in each case. In the

case of the security model the background security situation has undergone a radical

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transformation between the post war years and the present day, from a bipolar to

multipolar security threat. In terms of bureaucratic interests within the nuclear

industry, the comparison between the fledgling being it represented in 1962 with

today’s thriving commercial industry is vast. Wide ranging financial support for the

industry also serves to widen the net of interested parties which can produce a

number of influential actors within the Domestic Politics Model.

In terms of status, what seems to have undergone the least change is the role of the

nuclear deterrent in underpinning the UK’s self-perception of its own identity and

status. The idea of the nuclear deterrent as a status symbol, used to portray the

United Kingdom’s place on the international stage has perhaps diminished slightly in

the wake of increasing non-proliferation pressure but it is undoubtedly still strong in

the minds of those who make the final decisions.

The thesis concludes that the British Government has not taken such decisions

based solely on the perceived level of threat but that additional factors such as

maintaining their identity as a great power and the influence of the nuclear defence

industry have also played a part to varying degrees.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………1

Précis …............................................................................................................2

TABLE OF CONTENT .............................................................................................3

1. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………….6

1.1. Introduction to the Problem….…………………………………………………...6

1.2. The Problem …………………………………………………………6

1.3. Theoretical Choice and Justification ………………………………………….8

1.4. Theory ………………………………………………………………………….9

1.5. Operationalization ……………………………………………………………9

1.6. Application of the Theory …………………………………………………...10

1.6.1. Validity …………………………………………………………………...10

1.6.2. Reliability ………………………………………………………………....11

1.7. Delineation of the Thesis …………………………………………………...11

1.8. Thesis Design ………………………………………………………………..12

2. THEORY ……………………………………………………………………………13

2.1. The Security Model: The level of perceived threat. ……………………...13

2.2. The Domestic Politics Model: Bureaucratic interests. …………………..15

2.3. The Norms Model: Nuclear symbols and state identity …………………17

2.3.1. Identity …………………………………………………………………..17

2.3.2. The Nuclear Myth. ……………………………………………………..18

2.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo. ……………………………………………………18

2.3.4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty. …………………………………………19

3. CASE 1962 – DECISION TO ACQUIRE THE POLARIS SLBM. …………….21

3.1. Security Model. ………………………………………………………………22

3.1.1. The increasing threat to the UK. …………………………………....22

3.1.2. A credible delivery vehicle. …………………………………………….22

3.1.3. The Nassau Summit and the Polaris system. ………………………….24

3.2. Domestic Politics Model. ……………………………………………………..25

3.2.1. The military as an actor. ………………………………………………….25

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3.2.2. The nuclear industry ……………………………………………………..26

3.2.3. The Prime Minister as the political actor ……………………………..27

3.3. Norms Model ……………………………………………………………………30

3.3.1. The UK’s identity as a great power ……………………………………..30

3.3.2. The myth of the ‘Special Relationship’ ………………………………….31

3.3.3. The Nassau Summit ………………………………………………………32

3.3.4. Countering American bureaucracy ………………………………………34

3.4. Part conclusion of the 1962 decision …………………………………………36

4. CASE 2006 – DECISION TO MODERNISE THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT …..38

4.1. Security Model ………………………………………………………………..38

4.1.1. Other nuclear states ……………………………………………………..38

4.1.2. Asymmetrical attack and 9/11 ……………………………………………40

4.2. Domestic Politics Model ………………………………………………………41

4.2.1. The military as an actor ……………………………………………………41

4.2.2. The (Civil and Military) Nuclear Industry ………………………………42

4.2.2.1. Nuclear weapons as a business ……………………………….42

4.2.2.2. Impact if the modernisation of the nuclear weapon is scrapped .43

4.2.2.3. Mutual interdependence …………………………………………44

4.2.2.4. Key figures in government ……………………………………….44

4.2.2.5. The Prime Ministers version ……………………………………….46

4.3. Norms Model …………………………………………………………………..48

4.3.1. The UK’s identity ………………………………………………………….48

4.3.2. The UK’s identity and the myth of the special relationship ……………49

4.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo and the Non-Proliferation Treaty …………………50

4.4. Part conclusion of the 2006 decision ………………………………………..54

5. SYNTHESIS ……………………………………………………………………………56

5.1. Security Model …………………………………………………………………56

5.2. Domestic Politics Model ………………………………………………………56

5.3. Norms Model …………………………………………………………………..57

6. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………….59

6.1. Implications for the future ……………………………………………………..64

7. LIST OF LITTERATURE …………………………………………………………….65

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction of the Problem. In October 2010 the Prime Minister of The United Kingdom, David Cameron,

presented the future plan for the UK Armed Forces to the Parliament in the form of a

National Security Strategy (NSS)1 and a Strategic Defence and Security Review

(SDSR)2

1.2. The Problem.

. The future plan for the UK Armed Forces was developed in a period

severely influenced by the impact of the economic recession which started in 2008.

This meant that the Government was facing big challenges on the state finances and

difficult priorities had to be made. The result of the SDSR was that the Armed

Forces will be required to make 17,000 military personnel redundant across the three

services. Furthermore whole capabilities were decommissioned such as the aircraft

carriers thus removing the UKs strike capability and severely limiting the UKs ability

to conduct amphibious operations. These capability reductions effectively limit the

UKs ability to act unilaterally. Despite public statements from the Prime Minister and

Defence Minister that all options were on the table in shaping the future British

Armed Forces the nuclear deterrent was never a part of the 2010 SDSR

contemplations. This can only mean that, despite the economic situation, it was

deliberately kept out of the SDSR and that the current Prime Minister was content

with the 2006 decision of renewing the nuclear deterrent.

The British Trident SSBN force is ageing and its useful service life is coming to an

end. The British Government estimates that it will cost £15-20 billion to acquire a

follow-on system and an estimated £750 million per annum to maintain3

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. The current

international security environment is such that great power conflicts of the type that

would require the threatened use of this nuclear capability are generally thought to

be very unlikely. Rather, low-intensity conflicts of the kind seen in Iraq and

Afghanistan will likely continue to dominate the security agenda. The British

http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy 26/11/2011-1433 2http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf page 37 26/11/2011-1451 3 http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf page 7 26/11/2011-1651

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Government, like most European governments, is facing dire fiscal constraints for

the foreseeable future. The nuclear deterrent is, according to the statement in the

SDSR, only to be used against other nuclear weapon states, which is

contradictionary to the Government now also linking the nuclear deterrent to their

activist foreign policy. Additionally the Governments NSS state that the primary risk

to the UK’s security and economy is poised by non-state actors such as terrorists,

cyber-attack, natural hazards and also state actors in conventional military crisis.

These security risks cannot be solved with nuclear weapons. Additionally a nuclear

attack on the UK is only deemed to be a “tier two” risk. These statements raise the

question; when and where does the UK expect to use nuclear weapons? And is it

worth the cost?

An additional aspect of the replacement of the nuclear deterrent is that in the future

the costs will be taken out of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) budget as opposed to

earlier where it was taken out of the overall HM Treasury Budget4. This means that

when the UK needs to start replacing the nuclear deterrent there will have to be

additional cuts made to the conventional forces if the MOD budget is to stay the

same5

. This is an interesting aspect because the UKs self-perception is that it is,

and it should remain a conventional major player to ensure a stabile world based on

western values.

The future is uncertain by nature and scenarios where the UK would need its

conventional power to exercise its activist foreign policy are not unlikely. However

the UK Government are now using the threat of biological and chemical weapons to

forces on operations far from the UK territory to justify the possession of the nuclear

deterrent. However, building on the experiences of the past, it is very unlikely that

these conflicts will be solved using nuclear weapons – so again, why is the nuclear

weapon capability, so important to the UK when it seems limited in its use?

The intention for this thesis is not to bring fuel to the fire for campaigners against

nuclear weapons but solely to investigate what factors led to the United Kingdom’s

4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10812825 27/11/2011-1414 5 http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4C4ED70C3F1F7 27/11/2011-1425

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decision to keep the nuclear deterrent in 2006. This lead to the main question of this

thesis:

What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current, and the likely future international security environment?

1.3. Theoretical Choice and Justification. The factors that affect the decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent are substantially

the same as the factors that affect the decision to keep a nuclear deterrent. The

understanding of why states acquire the nuclear deterrent provides many insights as

to why the UK wants to keep the nuclear deterrent. The major difference is, as the

thesis will show, that it is much easier for the politicians to argue a status quo

solution than to make a status changing decision.

Most studies of the nuclear weapon in international relations are situated within the

realist paradigm of international relations. These theories posit that states acquire

military capabilities in response to the level of threat perceived in the international

environment.6

These theories can provide a simple explanation of the UK’s decision

to acquire and modernise its nuclear capabilities in the period 1945-1990, when the

Soviet Union posed a threat to the survival of the nation. Yet, the explanation

provided by these theories seems problematic after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It would seem that variables other than the level of perceived threat are required to

fully explain the decision by the UK government to expend resources to replace its

aging Trident nuclear weapons systems. These variables are extended and

expanded by Scott D. Sagan7 in his article “Why Do States Build Nuclear weapons?:

Three Models in Search of a Bomb”8

6 Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

. In this article Sagan offers two additional

7 Scott D. Sagan is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a faculty associate of the Centre for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. He functions as advisor for the US Congress Commission of Strategic Posture and the US National Intelligence Council. 8 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

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models that have to be contemplated when explaining states incentives to acquire

the nuclear deterrent. Sagan posits that domestic bureaucratic interests and norms

can lead to nuclear proliferation. It is the intention for this thesis to apply Sagan’s

models on proliferation to the UK case. Proliferation is, in this thesis, interpreted as

keeping the nuclear deterrent.

1.4. Theory. The additional variables suggested by Scott D. Sagan to explain why states seek

and acquire nuclear weapons – Norms and bureaucratic interests – are used as

intervening variables to explain the UK’s decision to modernise the nuclear

deterrent.9

The level of perceived threat is presumed to affect these as well as to

have an independent and direct affect upon the decision. A model of these

relationships is illustrated in the following diagram:

1.5. Operationalization. The operationalization of the theory serves to identify the core of the applied theory

in order to be able to answer the main question as precisely as possible.

The three models that Sagan has suggested to answer why states are interested in

possessing nuclear weapons is the operationalization of three IR paradigms; the

‘Security model’ is operationalization of realism, the ‘Domestic politics model’ is

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 54 – 86. 9 Scott Sagan, ”Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, 3 (Winter 1996/97).

The Norms Model

Security Model

Domestic Politics Model

Nuclear modernisation

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operationalization of liberalism, and the ‘Norms model’ is the operationalization of

constructivism. These three models are in the theory chapter explained with focus on

the ‘problem’ which is the main question of this thesis.

1.6. Application of the Theory. Sagan’s three models will be applied to two cases where the UK Government faced

the dilemma of either investing substantial resources to modernise its nuclear

capabilities or become a non-nuclear weapons state. In each case there will be a

descriptive analysis of the theory of the individual model applied to the case. Both

cases will end with a part conclusion. These two part conclusions will form the basis

for the synthesis, where the two cases will be compared model by model.

The two cases for the thesis are:

• The decision to acquire the RESOLUTION-class SSBN and the Polaris SLBM

system in 1962.

• The decision to acquire, a yet to be determined, follow-on system to replace

the VANGUARD-class SSBN operating the Trident system in 2006.

The first case in 1962 does not directly answer the main question of this thesis but

acts as a datum to give a basis for determining what factors are unchanged in 2006,

therefore deeply rooted in the UK’s incentives to possess the nuclear deterrent, and

what factors are new. This serves to highlight those that have changed due to new

factors that have emerged since 1962. The conclusion will be based on the findings

in the synthesis.

1.6.1. Validity. It is necessary to ensure that the chosen method will actually investigate what it is

supposed to investigate.10

10 Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabelige metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg. P.109.

This is ensured by making sure the sources are valid and

interoperable with the theory. There are three main types of source that have been

used in this thesis. The first type is peer reviewed articles and books which have

Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview, Kø-benhavn, Hans Reitzels Forlag p.223.

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been chosen on their relevance for the thesis, this type of source is deemed very

valid. The second type is the memoirs of the two Prime Ministers, these give insight

in their biased perception of the situation, or at least how they retrospectively justified

their actions. As the theory is about interests and normative aspects it is deemed

very relevant. Finally, various articles have been used but only to extract facts and

quotes. This extracted information is deemed valid as well. The collection of

information ended on 25 March 2012.

1.6.2. Reliability. Reliability is about how adequate the method is to investigate the ‘Problem’.11

1.7. Delineation of the thesis.

The

adequacy of the method is deemed high as it is based on the peer reviewed and

internationally highly regarded IR scholar Scott D. Sagan. Sagan’s method is

developed to answer why states’ acquire nuclear weapons and the ‘Problem’ of this

thesis is why the UK wants to keep the nuclear weapons. The thesis will describe

the subtle difference this means. The answer to the ‘Problem’ is shaped by the

chosen method, theory and sources. The wide range of validated information that

has formed the base for this thesis is deemed to give a solid foundation for the thesis

to deal with the ‘Problem’.

Albeit the formal decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was taken by a vote in

Parliament, the informal decision made by the Prime Minister Blair in December

2006 will be the object of the investigation in this thesis. The justification for this is

that the decision was, as the thesis will show, taken in a small enclosed circle and

forced through parliament by a ‘three line whip’.

Finally, the 2006 decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was not debated in the

SDSR in 2010. This thesis will not investigate why this didn’t happen but merely only

assume that the Government didn’t wish to debate the issue.

11 Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabelige metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg. P.109. Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview, Kø-benhavn, Hans Reitzels Forlag p.223.

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1.8. Thesis Design The structure of the thesis is shaped by the need to apply the theory with the three

models to two cases. The thesis is introduced in the first chapter. In chapter 2 the

theory is explained. Chapter 3 and 4 contain the application of the theory to the two

cases. Chapter 5 is the synthesis of the analysis in the two cases. Finally, chapter 6

contains the conclusion and implications for the future. A visual display of the model

for the thesis looks like this:

Chapter 6

Chapter 5

Chapter 4

Chapter 3

Chapter 2

Chapter 1

Theory

Descriptive analysis of the Security model 1962

2006

Part conclusion on the 1962 decision

Part conclusion on the 2006 decision

Synthesis

Conclusion

Descriptive analysis of the

Domestic Politics Model

Descriptive analysis of the Norms model

Descriptive analysis of the Security model

Descriptive analysis of the

Domestic Politics Model

Descriptive analysis of the Norms model

Introduction

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2. THEORY. 2.1. Security Model: The level of perceived threat. Sagan’s security model builds on the realism paradigm where all states exist in a

self-help system, and states must consequently safeguard their survival, and

protection of their interests and sovereignty.

The model divides states into two groups; strong states, capable of building a

credible deterrent, and weaker states, which cannot build a credible deterrent and

therefore needs to enter into alliances in the hope of being sheltered under the

umbrella of the extended deterrence guarantees that a nuclear weapon state can

offer.12 Sagan is questioning the value, for the weaker state, of such a nuclear

alliance by posing the question: “the policy inevitably raises the questions about the

credibility of extended deterrence guarantee, since the nuclear power would also

fear retaliation if it responded to an attack on its ally”13

The security model offers the following explanation as to why nuclear weapons

proliferate: Nuclear weapons affect the international system and force states to act

within a frame where it is paramount to maintain the balance of power and status

quo. The zero sum logic means that an increase in one states security will mean a

reduction of other states security. This means that if one state acquires nuclear

weapons the neighbouring state or other states who now feels threatened will be

forced to reconsider their own security policy and contemplate acquiring the nuclear

weapon too. This can cause a domino effect where the security dilemma starts a

chain reaction that will increase the arms race and thus escalate the chances of

conflict. Sagan frames this by quoting George Shultz: “Proliferation begets

proliferation.”

The fundamental question is;

can states trust their ally to protect them or do they need to be able to help them-

selves?

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12 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

The IR scholar John Mearsheimer argues that the uncertainty of the

intentions of other states makes cooperation to overcome the security dilemma very

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 13 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 14 George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.

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unlikely.15 “Whenever a new state is seen to be developing nuclear weapons, it is

likely that its rivals will consider preventive war under this ‘better now than later’

logic.”16

Sagan contemplates the effect the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT) has on states’ possibilities to overcome the collective action

problem. The NPT is the international institution, which can offer the transparency,

and control, that is essential to create trust between states which is in turn crucial in

reducing states’ motivation to acquire the nuclear deterrent. It is, however,

questionable how important this NPT provided transparency really is in promoting

the collective disarmament. Sagan does not have much faith in this “Each state

would prefer to become the only nuclear weapons power in its region, but since that

is an unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, it is willing to refrain from

proliferation, if and only if, its neighbours remain non-nuclear”17

The theory of the link between perceived threat and incentives to build nuclear

weapons works both ways in that the incentive to build a nuclear weapon increases

or decreases in tune with the perceived increased or decreased threat or security

challenge. The latter is Sagan’s way of explaining nuclear limitation with the Realism

paradigm.18 In short, from a realist’s perspective, nuclear restraint is caused by the

absence of the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation

decisions.19

15 John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 53. 16 Scott D. Sagen, in: Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 61. 17 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62. 18 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61. 19 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61.

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2.2. The Domestic Politics Model: Bureaucratic interests. Sagan argues in his domestic politics model that states’ decisions with respect to

nuclear armament or disarmament are not solely made in tune with the emerging or

diminishing threat to the state. The states’ internal struggle and political changes will

influence the decision as well.20

Sagan additionally highlights the importance of

sources of prestige for domestic actors. The argument is simple: Pro-nuclear

weapons actors gain additional influence if nuclear weapons represent a positive

symbol in the domestic debate. An example of positive symbols could be national

technological superiority and strong armed forces. Conversely, if nuclear weapons

represent a negative symbol these actors will use their influence to argue that the

nuclear weapons represent a challenge to their economy and therefore are not good

for the nation. An example of this is the French wine industry that still suffer from the

negative publicity the French nuclear test blast in the 1990s gave France abroad.

This has not caused France to disarm but it has effectively stopped nuclear tests.

There are three main actors in the domestic politics model who will seek to influence

a state’s decision to acquire the nuclear deterrent:

• The state’s nuclear energy establishment, including scientific institutions and

companies; (in this thesis referred to as: Nuclear defence industry actor)

• Influential bodies within the state’s military as a domestic bureaucratic actor; (in

this thesis referred to as: Military actor)

• Politicians who wish to use the theme of nuclear weapons for their own parochial

interests in the political party, or in shaping their personal profile to obtain public

support.21

It is important to monitor the public opinion within a country to

understand cases of nuclear proliferation or, in other cases, nuclear restraint. (in

this thesis referred to as: Political actor)

These actors will, according to ‘Domestic Politics Model’, seize all opportunities to

emphasise aspects of emerging or diminishing threats and use them in the domestic

20 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 69. 21 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 63 – 64.

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debate and link the nuclear weapon to the debate in order to create a window of

opportunity to pursue their own agenda.22

There is still no well-developed political theory that outlines the conditions under

which coalitions of bureaucratic actors can become powerful enough to affect the

decisions on nuclear proliferation and thereby produce their preferred outcome

23.

The social construction of technology related to military procurement during the Cold

War has, by Morton H. Halperin,24 been used to describe how the bureaucratic

actors have been affecting the decisions they preferred by exacerbating the

perception of the security threat to promote their own parochial agendas. The

‘Domestic Politics Model’ argues that scientists and their organisations will support

military development in order to secure a steady flow of funding to the research that

they find technically interesting and promotes their prestige. These scientists will

form a coalition with military bureaucratic actors who can see an advantage in

supporting the scientist cause by promoting their own military responsibilities and

favoured weapons systems.25 The coalition between the scientific sector and the

military will then build a broader coalition with politicians by shaping the politicians

cost benefit perception. The politicians will latch on to this conclusion either because

the politician will have to trust the expert in the field26

or because the public opinion

is in favour of the nuclear weapons program as argued above.

Sagan’s main arguments of the Domestic Politics Model are summed up in these

quotes: “nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to

international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are solutions

looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify their

existence.”27

22 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 23 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 64. 24 Morton H. Halperin with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 1974. 25 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 64. 26 Peter D. Feaver. 2003. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 27 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.

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“Security threats are therefore not the central cause of weapons decisions according

to this model: they are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial

interests can jump.”28

Background analysis of potential domestic politic actors is

required to reveal the parochial interests often hidden from public view under the

cover of the security argument.

2.3. The Norms Model: Nuclear symbols and state identity. 2.3.1. Identity. In the ‘Norms Model’ the key to proliferation or non-proliferation is the identity of the

actor and the interest that is attached to this identity. The ‘Norms Model’ further

suggests that nuclear weapons have more functions than purely to provide security.

Sagan posits that nuclear weapons are artefacts that serve important symbolic

functions, symbolic functions that simultaneously shape and reflect the states’

identity. Accordingly, a state’s normative behaviour is determined by “deeper norms

and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international

relations”29

The ‘Norms Model’ includes sociologists and political scientists work about myths in

a constructivist perspective. The ‘Norms Model’ applies the constructivist

perspective on the role norms play in proliferation by emphasising the influence of

institutional isomorphism where modern organisations and institutions tend to

become similar to each other

.

30

28 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

. According to the theory of institutional isomorphism,

organisations (in this paper organisations = states) tend to mimic each other –

especially when an organisation is in doubt of the onwards strategy the organisation

will emulate another perceived successful organisation. In this context Sagan points

towards that states do have “interests” but that these are “shaped by the social roles

actors are asked to play, are pursued according to habits and routines as much as

through reasoned decision”. This is caused by the interests being embedded in the

social environment which encourages certain behaviours as rational and legitimate.

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 29 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 30 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 74.

18

States will therefore choose their place in the international environment which

encourages certain actions as rational and legitimate and denigrate others as

irrational and primitive.

2.3.2. The Nuclear Myth. The nuclear myth is the narrative of symbolic meanings that nuclear weapons

symbolise to a state – symbolise in terms of identity and the desire / interest for

international status and international prestige - what Wendt calls the collective self-

esteem31. Sagan makes a historic link between pro-nuclear decisions and enhanced

international prestige, prestige in terms of influence on the international scene and

security. The ‘Norms Model’ states that the politics of nuclear weapons are

symbolising the international and national politics of a state because both pro and

anti-nuclear decisions will be “shaping and reflecting a state’s identity”32. Sagan

uses the example that nuclear states in the 1960s, when nuclear testing was still

perceived a legitimate act, were proud of these tests33. The nuclear states were

using these nuclear tests as a symbol to show the rest of the world, their

sophisticated level of development. “From the sociological perspective, military

organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions

similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what modern

states believe they have to possess to be a legitimate, modern state.”34

By this

Sagan points to the general perception in the early nuclear age that Great Powers

had to have nuclear weapons, in the same way that they had to have the other

above mentioned symbols.

2.3.3. The Nuclear Taboo. “The ‘nuclear taboo’ refers to a powerful de facto prohibition against the first use of

nuclear weapons.”35

31 Alexander Wendt, Cambridge University Press, Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, p236.

This quote from Nina Tannewald who is one of the leading IR

32 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 33 This was actually not the case for the UK, Macmillan did not want to test more than necessary as it was polluting the atmosphere. 34 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. 35 Nina Tannenwald, Cambridge University Press, The Nuclear Taboo, The United States and the non-use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, p10

19

scholars in the field of why the nuclear weapon has not been used since World War

II. The quote frames what the nuclear taboo is today, which is the opposite of the

nuclear myth.

The nuclear taboo has grown over time from being almost non-existent in the

beginning of the nuclear era to have become almost ubiquitous in today’s nuclear

debate. The nuclear taboo has grown because the legitimacy of nuclear weapons

has changed over time. In the beginning there were no prohibitions or rules that

regulated the use of nuclear weapons. There are still no laws that explicitly outlaw

nuclear weapons, however their legality and use is disputed36

. The change in the

perception of the nuclear weapon has been formed by the same normative beliefs

that led to the ban of chemical weapons which were based on the fear that they

would be used again. The ghost of the First World War, where an incomprehensive

amount of people were killed by chemical weapons, was a strong driver to ban these

weapons as they were seen as inhumane and an inappropriate behaviour in the

modern world. The same pattern has led many states to oppose the development of

nuclear weapons simply due to the reaction to the bombings of Nagasaki and

Hiroshima creating an anti-nuclear demeanour in the general population.

2.3.4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is a tangible outcome of the nuclear taboo. The growing fear of a nuclear

war combined with the myopic interests of the super powers led to the inception of

the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The NPT is traditionally viewed to have

three pillars:

1. Non-proliferation,

2. disarmament, and

3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

In essence the NPT is a bargain and a child of the cold war where the non-nuclear

signatories would get the benefits of shared peaceful nuclear technology and a

promise by nuclear weapons states on ultimate disarmament in exchange for the

acceptance of foregoing the acquirement of nuclear weapons. The benefit for the

36 In an advisory opinion from 1996 The UN World Court found, “that the use or threat of nuclear weapons is ‘generally’ unlawful”. On the other hand it said that it could not definitively conclude if it would be unlawful to use nuclear weapons in self-defence if the continued survival of the state depended on it

20

nuclear signatories was that they would remain the only nuclear powers and that

they could avoid additional arms race while benefitting from unrestricted commercial

access to a lucrative market.

There are two problems with the NPT. The first problem is that nuclear material and

technology for peaceful purposes can also be used in the production of a nuclear

weapon. The second problem is that the nuclear signatories committed to ultimate

nuclear disarmament in article VI of the treaty. The first is a problem for obvious

reasons and the latter is a problem because the treaty is only effective as long as the

non-nuclear signatories trust the nuclear weapon states will to disarm.

Despite these two fundamental problems to the treaty, the NPT has, since its

inception in 1970, possibly been the strongest normative driver to change norms

relating to the status and legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons. Sagan

mentions Ukraine as an example of a state that has voluntarily relinquished the

entire inventory of nuclear weapons. Ukraine had incentives other than economy to

disarm, the added benefit of being perceived as a good “NPT state” far compensated

for the loss of a weapon that Ukraine could neither afford to maintain nor had any

likelihood of using kinetically. The risk of being perceived as a rogue state in the

international system and particularly the EU is likely to have had a decisive influence

on the decision to disarm. The motivation to keep or disarm nuclear weapons will

vary from state to state, but in the Ukraine case the ownership of nuclear weapons

was not associated with the prestige and status of a modern state.37

In Sagan’s view compliance with the NPT supports the non-proliferation norms and

since its inception in 1970 possession of nuclear weapons has become a matter of

questionable legitimacy.

38

The cases will show how the introduction/existence of the

NPT has affected the UK’s decision making with respect to nuclear weapons.

37 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76. 38 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76 and p. 83-84.

21

3. CASE 1962 - DECISION TO ACQUIRE THE POLARIS SLBM. Setting the scene for the 1962 case. The UK’s security concerns after the Second World War were dominated by the

country’s worldwide colonial obligations, commitments and interests combined with

the fear that the USA would return to the isolationist policy it employed after the First

World War. In the years between the Second World War and the founding of NATO,

the UK’s greatest worries were the fear of the toxic combination of a resurgent

Germany, the Soviet Union becoming increasingly more hostile and the USA

returning to an isolationist policy. These are the security concerns that most likely led

the UK to decide to develop a nuclear weapon.

The decision to develop a nuclear weapon was taken by Prime Minister Clement

Attlee in 1947. The decision was taken by a small board of politicians and advisors –

the full Cabinet was not included in the decision. The decision to build a nuclear

capability was announced to the House of Commons in May 1949, but neither the

cost of the program nor the budget details were disclosed to the members of

Parliament.39

In the early 1950s the nuclear capability changed from being a weapon of last resort

to being the primary means of Great Britain’s defence under a doctrine of

deterrence. When Winston Churchill returned to office as Prime Minister he slowed

down the spending on conventional forces to the benefit of nuclear weapons as the

nuclear capability was seen as the key to British security.

40

The UK’s first successful test of the nuclear weapon in 1957 was the important

milestone that UK had to achieve to be a credible nuclear partner for the USA and

make USA interested in re-engaging on nuclear cooperation. The result of the UK’s

efforts was that Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower concluded the

“Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence

Purposes” in 1958.

Great Britain’s primary

delivery system at the time was a fleet of strategic aircraft the so called V-bombers.

39 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34 40 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34

22

This agreement led to the USA and the UK pooling their designs for warheads and

the UK opting for the US design in order to benefit in terms of cost from the large

scale production of the hydrogen bomb rather than developing UK’s own design.41

3.1. Security Model. In this section the thesis will show how the increasing threat to the UK posed by the

Soviet Union drove the UK to build a credible independent nuclear deterrent. This

section will further show that the UK had very limited if any options but to seek help

from the USA to acquire the credible independent nuclear deterrent.

3.1.1. The increasing threat to the UK In the beginning of the 1960s there were 4 states with nuclear weapons capability.

In the west it was the USA, France and the UK and in the East it was the Soviet

Union. Furthermore China was believed to be close to having a nuclear weapon

which they indeed successfully tested in 1964.

The UK security situation leading up to the decision to acquire the Polaris system

was mainly focused on the Soviet Union who the UK could not match in either

conventional or unconventional strength. As the UK did not feel reassured that their

main ally, the USA, would not withdraw to the previous isolationist policy the UK had

no alternative but to develop their own independent nuclear deterrent in order to

counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union, in line with Sagan’s view on the

credibility of nuclear alliances42

.

3.1.2. A credible delivery vehicle. The problem for the UK in terms of the nuclear deterrent was not so much the

capability to produce the nuclear warhead but more capability to produce the

adequate delivery vehicles for the nuclear warhead. Before the acquisition of the

Polaris system the UK’s nuclear capability consisted of gravity bombs with nuclear

payload. Through the 1950s the manned bomber remained the UK’s only way to

deliver a nuclear bomb. These gravity bombs had to be dropped close to the target

41 Walter C. Ladwig III, Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50, p34 42 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57

23

which would mean flying deep into the Soviet Union. The introduction of surface to

air missiles in the late 1950s seriously upset the ability of a bomber to penetrate

Soviet airspace. Therefore the probability of an airstrike making it past the growing

Soviet air force was decreasing by the day, which constituted a fundamental

credibility problem for the UK nuclear deterrent.

The UK initially attempted to deal with these challenges with the Blue Steel air

launched stand off missile and Blue Streak IRBM. Neither of these weapons were

ideal; the Blue Steel was too short-ranged, and the Blue Streak was vulnerable to

Soviet attack because the UK’s territory does not have the size and thereby the

strategic depth to hide silo launched missiles.

Security wise, it was therefore of immense importance that the UK acquired the

capability to launch ballistic missiles to deliver the nuclear warheads before the

remaining credibility of the nuclear deterrent ceased to exist.

The air launched Skybolt appeared to be a better system for the UK. The Skybolt

combined the range of the Blue Streak with the mobility of the Blue Steel, it and was

possible to launch it from the Vulcan bomber that the UK already possessed.

Consequently Prime Minister Macmillan had, at Camp David in 1960, raised the

question of the UK’s options to take part in the development of the air launched

ballistic missile Skybolt to President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower had

committed to both Skybolt and the submarine launched Polaris systems.43 Prime

Minister Macmillan opted for the Skybolt “because it would seem to be the best way

for us to prolong the life of the bomber and utilise the advantages of its long

experience”44. The UK counter contribution was to give the USA access to the Holy

Loch near Glasgow for the US Polaris class submarines, which President

Eisenhower saw as an enormous enhancement of the range and capacity of the

submarine weapon.45 President Eisenhower assured Prime Minister Macmillan that

if necessary the UK could rely on the Polaris instead.46

When the USA’s Defence Minister McNamara unilaterally decided to cancel the

Skybolt project, ostensibly because of cost, it was seen by the UK as an enormous

43 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 44 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 45 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357 46 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357

24

blow to the UK’s security and prestige – the latter is discussed below in the norms

model.

In addition, the UK Prime Minister perceived the security situation in mainland

Europe to have become increasingly more alarming over the last part of 1961.47

The

Soviet pressure on Berlin took a new form with the building of the Berlin Wall

combined with increased coercive Soviet diplomacy in Eastern Europe.

3.1.3. The Nassau summit and the Polaris system. The worsening security situation combined with the cancelation of the Skybolt project

meant that when Prime Minister Macmillan travelled to the Nassau summit it was

with one overriding point at the agenda. The UK had to persuade the USA to

cooperate on the delivery system. The USA had to be convinced that it was for the

best for both the USA and the UK, if the UK obtained a credible operationally

independent nuclear deterrent. Prime Minister Macmillan knew that failure to get the

USA on side would mean an exposure of British vulnerability until the country could

build a national delivery system, which could take years.48

After a few days of heated negotiation (described under the norms model of this

case) between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan the USA agreed in

principle to sell the Polaris missiles to the UK. This decision was announced in the

statement of the results at the Anglo – American summit. The statement reads “the

President and the Prime Minister agreed that a decision on Polaris must be

considered in the widest context both of the future defence of the Atlantic Alliance

and of the safety of the whole free world”

49 and “Accordingly, the President and the

Prime Minister agreed that the United States will make available on a continuing

basis POLARIS missiles (less warheads) for British submarines.”50

The agreement was conditioned on the UK making the missiles available for NATO

and a multilateral nuclear defence force in defence of the western alliance “except

where her Majesty’s Government may decide that supreme national interests are at

stake”

51

47 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p142

. The last exception was Prime Minister Macmillan’s unconditional demand

48 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p363 49 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554 50 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554 51 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p554

25

in order to secure the UK a credible, operationally independent, nuclear deterrence.

This is a clear indication of the UK’s saw the need to be able to act unilaterally and

not be wholly dependent on an alliance.

3.2. Domestic Politics Model. In the following the thesis will show that it is most likely that the three bureaucratic

actors represented by; Sir William Penney, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

(UKAEA), the Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Louis Mountbatten and Prime

Minister Macmillan had made an informal coalition constituted by a mutual

understanding. This section provides evidence that by securing the nuclear deterrent

for the UK all three actors achieved goals within their own parochial interests.

3.2.1. The military as an actor. When looking for influential bodies in the military, as described in the ‘Domestic

Politics Model, it seems to be an obvious choice to look at the Chief of the Defence

Staff. As this case is about acquiring the submarine launched Polaris system, the

First Lord of the Admiralty is included as well.

Admiral Mountbatten was appointed as Chief of the Defence Staff in 1959 where he

inherited, among other challenges, the above mentioned failing UK projects of Blue

Streak and Blue Steel. Admiral Mountbatten was personally against the nuclear

deterrent, but he recognised that the security situation dictated the need for the UK

to acquire it. The question was where? And in what guise? In addition, for the UK

military, the prestige involved in having a nuclear deterrent was important in a similar

way to that of the government and the country as a whole. Once one of the largest

military forces in the world, the post World War II reductions were of grave concern

to senior military figures.

Armed Forces are traditionally often used to capacity or indeed overstretched in

commitments - by that they have a constant demand for increased resources.

Militaries in history are not known to voluntarily reduce in size or capability. The fact

that many in the military hierarchy were sceptical about the nuclear weapon and saw

limited tactical use for it did not mean that they would be willing to give it up or

26

surrender what many saw as the ‘balance of force’ required to maintain security in

the West52

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Selkirk, was in fact initially reticent in

pushing the Polaris case due to worries on the cuts in conventional forces that he

saw as an unavoidable consequence of the Royal Navy taking over the nuclear

deterrent

.

53. Once it was clear that the Blue Streak / Blue Steel programmes were

failing and, most importantly that the replacement system would not result in

conventional cuts, then the Royal Navy began lobbying strongly for Polaris. The

Royal Navy began to see the benefits of the increase in technology for submarines

and subsequently became strong actors in the debate54. The Chief of the Defence

Staff also began to see a tactical benefit for the Armed Forces to have the nuclear

deterrent at sea “where real estate is free” as the US Chief of the Naval Staff Arliegh

Burke phrased it in a letter to Admiral Mountbatten55

. The Admirals Burke and

Mountbatten were in agreement on the tactical benefits of placing the ballistic

missiles on a nuclear propelled submarine. The sea offered the ability to hide the

missiles in an environment where they could not be tracked and thereby became

almost invulnerable.

3.2.2. The nuclear industry. Using Sagan’s model the second actor in a potential coalition is the nuclear industry

and in this case in 1961 this was personified by Sir William Penney who was the

UK’s leading personality in the UK’s endeavours of research in the nuclear field. He

was sent during World War II to the USA to participate in the ‘Manhattan project’56

52 Louis Mountbatten, A Military Commander Surveys the Nuclear Arms Race, International Security, Vol 4, No3 (1979-1980), p3-p5.

where, after a few weeks, he was selected on his merits to be part of the core group

who made the central decisions. In this core group he worked alongside

personalities such as Robert Oppenheimer. The Americans considered Penney to be

53 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p14. 54 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p16. 55 Andrew Priest, “Kennedy, Johnson and NATO – Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68”, Routledge, p16. 56 Code name for the development of the first nuclear bomb

27

among the five most distinguished British contributors to the work57. Penney followed

the project to the end and was one of very few who monitored the bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the air and was later one of the first to evaluate the

effects of the bomb on site. After World War II Penney returned to the UK to be the

Chief Superintendent Armament Research (CSAR) and later the Chairman of the

UKAEA at the behest of the UK Government, with the task from the then Defence

Minister Macmillan to develop the first UK hydrogen bomb. However, through the

course of the late 1940s and 1950s Penney also maintained links with the USA’s

nuclear research programme including playing a vital part in the Bikini Atoll test

blasts.58

All of the above proves Penney’s credentials in the scientific field but in order to be

thought of as a serious actor in a potential coalition he must have the trust of the

other two actors and principally that of the Politician, in this case Macmillan.

Macmillan’s trust and admiration for Penney is reflected in the way he describes

Penney at the Nassau Summit. “the Americans fielded a large and distinguished

team of experts who produced a massive series of papers, most of which were to me

unintelligible. Sir William Penney was more than a match for them all.”

Penney was furthermore instrumental in restoring the exchange of nuclear

technology between the UK and the USA in 1958 after it had been stopped by the

US MacMahon Act in 1946.

59

3.2.3. The Prime Minister as the political actor. The third actor in the potential coalition, Macmillan, became the Conservative PM in

1957, taking over from Eden and before him the enormous presence that was Sir

Winston Churchill. The British Empire was falling apart in the aftermath of World

War II and this constituted a difficult situation for Prime Minister Macmillan. Serving

his apprentice in government as Churchill’s Defence Minister from 1954 - 1955 he

would have been influenced by the nations desire to remain a great power and was

cognisant of the UK public’s need to be seen as such. Stepping out from the

shadow of Churchill, it is likely that Macmillan wanted to make his mark in the post

war strategic political environment. The summit at Nassau was a personal triumph

57 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 58 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 59 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p146

28

for Macmillan in raising his personal profile and role as a world statesmen and this

triumph was in some large part due to the input of Penney who was a member of the

party that escorted Macmillan at the Nassau Summit.

Evidence points towards an informal coalition between the three actors of the

‘domestic politics model’ and there is a strong case to argue that they all satisfied

their parochial interests with the decision to acquire the Polaris system.

To the UK Armed Forces the benefit of the Polaris decision was that they maintained

the status quo as a force with a nuclear capability. The Royal Navy in particular

gained advantages in form of a new capability with strategic influence and a huge

uplift in technology that would significantly improve the fleet of hunter killer

submarines as well. The senior military advisor to the Prime Minister is the Chief of

the Defence Staff who at the time was the Royal Navy Admiral, Louis Mountbatten.

Although in general Chiefs of the Defence Staff act in the interest of all three armed

services it is likely that he would have a natural bias towards the Royal Naval

Service. The transfer of the responsibility of the nuclear deterrent from the Royal Air

Force, without cuts to conventional forces, would be seen in the Naval hierarchy as a

huge achievement.

The benefits for Sir William Penney as the head of the UKAEA were at least two fold.

First of all the decision secured a sustained funding for the continued development of

nuclear warheads that he had been working on for years already. Secondly as a side

benefit, he could also look forward to new funding to start a research programme for

nuclear propulsion for placing ballistic missiles at sea and thereby increase the

UKAEA footprint. This would in turn raise Penney’s personal profile and prestige as

well as the UKAEA’s. The area of nuclear propulsion was of considerable interest to

Admiral Mountbatten and it is posited that this common ground would point towards

a potential coalition between Penney and Mountbatten in arguing against continuing

with Skybolt. By being a member of the Nassau Summit party Penney was very well

placed to influence the decision to opt for the promising Polaris project rather than

the failing Skybolt Project.

29

For Prime Minister Macmillan the acquisition of the nuclear deterrent gave him

personal credibility in the UK’s population as the successful statesman who could

deliver in securing the UK’s status as a great power. It is important to note here that

in every case of nuclear decision making the Prime Minister has played a far more

personal / autonomous role than in other political fields in that the full cabinet was

not consulted and consequently Macmillan could pursue his own agenda. As an

aside Macmillan also had a personal interest in the continued development of the

hydrogen bomb, which he himself as defence minister had initiated.

The events leading up the Nassau Summit and the underlying threat that the UK

could be pushed out of the ‘nuclear club’ caused him a great deal of anxiety not only

for the UK (within the norms model) but importantly for the ‘domestic politics model’

for his own prestige and position and the public’s perception of him as a leader /

statesman. For Macmillan the nuclear weapon was a bit of a panacea in terms of a

means to secure the UK’s status as a great power because the nuclear deterrent

could both deter the Soviet Union and it would keep the UK in the league of

technologically sophisticated nations. The alternative, that of giving up on the

nuclear deterrent, would mean that the UK would be significantly reduced in military

credibility and the UK’s position as a leading nation in Europe would be threatened.

30

4.3. Norms Model. This section will describe the ‘Norms Model’ influences on the UK’s decision to

acquire the Polaris System, based on two main themes. Firstly, the UK’s self-

perception as a Great Power on the world stage and secondly, its ties to the Super

Power of the USA through the ‘Special Relationship’. This thesis posits that the

possession of the independent nuclear deterrent is a vital part of both of these

themes. The Nassau Summit is discussed in some detail here as it reveals, through

the loaded language used by the politicians involved, how the UK’s identity was

strongly tied up with the possession of the nuclear deterrent and the myth of the

special relationship with the USA.

3.3.1. The UK’s identity as a great power. “We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs…we have got to have a

bloody Union Jack on the top of it”60

This quote has been used by historians to indicate that the decision to acquire

nuclear weapons in the first place was dominated by UK’s aspiration to maintain

international political influence and to maintain status as a Great Power. The sheer

cost of nuclear weapons is alone a witness of how important this symbol “the Union

Jack on top of it” was to the UK at the time.

After the end of World War II, the UK underwent an enormous change. The country

was nearly bankrupt after the war. Churchill, the Conservative Prime Minister during

the war was, voted out of office and the incoming Labour government nationalised a

great part of the industry. The British Empire was falling apart and the UK was

struggling to find its new role in the international society because the UK had not yet

formed its new identity. The nation who used to rule over a quarter of the world’s

population was now barely coping with handling the territory of the British Iles which

is a 1/600 of the world’s landmass. This was naturally a deep blow to the UK’s

collective self-esteem61

In order for the UK not to lose what could be called the collective self-understanding

and all of the collective self-esteem of previous times of greatness it was crucial for

.

60 Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, 1946. 61 Alexander Wendt, Cambridge University Press, Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, p236.

31

the UK to remain a great power. Two symbols seemed to be of utmost importance in

the efforts of remaining identity as a great power. These two symbols were;

acquisition of an operationally independent nuclear deterrent, and the maintenance

of the special relationship with the United States of America. These two symbols will

at first sight appear to be unconnected, but the thesis will show that the UK needed

the nuclear weapon to be a credible military ally in order to maintain the special

relationship with the United States and that the UK would have struggled to acquire

an operationally independent nuclear deterrent without the special relationship with

the USA. As the acquisition of the operationally independent nuclear deterrent under

the ‘Security Model’ has already been described this thesis will now turn to the

‘special relationship’ and expand this side of the identity.

3.3.2. The myth of the “special relationship”. The phrase “special relationship” is a phrase Winston Churchill used in a speech in

194662

The links, mutual understanding and trust that were formed during the two world

wars persist today. It would seem, however, that UK leaders acknowledged from an

early point that, the special relationship is more important to the UK than it is to the

United States and if the UK was to benefit from the special relationship, it would

require a constant personal engagement. The UKs approach has always been

diligent and followed two overall lines i.e. incorporating strong personal support to

the President as well as rendering military and political aid where possible. These

two lines have worked side by side from the beginning. With the personal

engagement being an important part it is unsurprising that the best relationships

between the USA and the UK have been when the UK Prime Ministers and US

. Ever since this speech many leaders over time have used this phrase to

describe what ostensibly seems to be an unusually close relation between the USA

and the UK. The special relationship refers to the close ties the USA and the UK

have in terms of cooperation within political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military

and historical matters. The two countries have close relations with other countries

with respect to these matters but the relationship between the USA and the UK

seems unparalleled in these areas.

62 'Sinews of Peace Address' Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946

32

Presidents have followed shared goals. It seems obvious why the UK will benefit

from a special relationship with a significantly bigger ally and Super Power, but why

is the special relation important for the USA? The answer would seem to be that,

with the special relationship the USA has now and historically has had a strong ally

to influence Europe. Furthermore a strong ideological ally in form of a ‘permanent 5’

is important for the USA when pursuing USA’s agenda abroad. Another great power

supporting the USA’s stance in power politics enhances the USA’s legitimacy in

international relations.

To the UK the special relationship also means that they have the ear of the President

of the USA and will be discussed in the next paragraph, looking at the critical turning

point in the Polaris acquisition.

3.3.3. The Nassau Summit.

When Prime Minister Macmillan was interviewed on television in 1958 he made clear

the reason the UK was working on acquiring nuclear weapons. Macmillan said about

the nuclear programme;

“the independent contribution (British nuclear weapons)...puts us where we ought to

be, in the position of a great power.”63

It was with this mindset that Prime Minister Macmillan flew to the Anglo – American

summit in Nassau, Bahamas in December 1961. In his memoirs Prime Minister

Macmillan describes the meeting with President Kennedy and the discussions, that

led to the agreement on the sale of Polaris missiles to the UK. The national pride and

sensitivity is clearly felt when, in his argument with Kennedy, Macmillan reiterates

the historical background to the nuclear weapon initially called “tube alloys”; in doing

so Macmillan highlights that the nuclear bomb was originally – in his opinion - a

British invention. Macmillan states that when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed during

World War II that further development of the nuclear bomb should be done in the

USA, that this agreement was because of “convenience and safety”

64

63

. In other words

it could, in Prime Minister Macmillan’s view, just as well have been Great Britain that

had retained the nuclear expertise and associated research development.

http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1673 04/03/2012-1213 64 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p356

33

Macmillan is here playing on the fact that the UK trusted the USA and the USA

should respect that fact and trust the UK as well.

Macmillan furthermore states that he had already brokered an agreement with

President Eisenhower at Camp David in 1960 saying that the UK could buy 144

Skybolt missiles. President Eisenhower had assured Macmillan that if Skybolt were

to fail the UK would be offered the Polaris instead.

Prime Minister Macmillan knew that he had no power instruments in terms of

economy or military to assist him in persuading the Americans to cooperate on the

military side of the nuclear development. With his hands tied Prime Minister

Macmillan said to President Kennedy:

“If the difficulties arising from the development of Skybolt, were used, or seemed to

be used, as a method of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity, the

results would be very serious indeed. It would be deeply resented both by those of

our people who favoured an independent nuclear capability and by those who

opposed it. It would offend the national pride and would be resisted by every means

in our power”.65

Kennedy was caught between a rock and a hard place as he had to balance the

needs of the UK and at the same time not upset the French President De Gaulle. De

Gaulle was avidly against the Anglo – American nuclear cooperation which De

Gaulle saw as secretive and an attempt to alienate France in the western alliance.

At the same time Kennedy had to accommodate the needs of a staunch ally that

would perceive it as an unacceptable failure if the UK didn’t remain an independent

nuclear power.

According to Macmillan Kennedy was “somewhat taken aback” by

this.

Both Kennedy and Macmillan used the term ‘interdependence’ but they used it in

different ways. Macmillan viewed interdependence as a form of partnership – a

special relationship - in which both countries would aim to pool their efforts more

effectively and consistently, particularly in the field of defence.66

65 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p357

To Kennedy the

term meant more effective central control, and hence American control of western

66 Nigel John Ashton, “Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: the irony of interdependence”, 2002, p152

34

defence efforts. The difference in this perception of the term can explain the

conundrum Kennedy had to solve. On the one hand Kennedy was veering towards

establishing a centralised Multilateral Nuclear Defence in which France would be an

equal partner and the prestige sensitivities of the French identity would thereby be

met. On the other hand De Gaulle would perceive the resuscitation of the Anglo –

American nuclear weapons development as the USA favouring the UK. If the USA

chose not to sell the Polaris it would most likely mean the end to UK nuclear

deterrence and this would mean that France would be the only remaining nuclear

power in Europe. Macmillan describes in his memoir how painful this would be to

the UK. “America must realise that the nations of Europe, with their different histories

and varying responsibilities, would demand a reasonably degree of dignity and

security. Certainly Britain with her world-wide commitments must continue, for the

present at any rate, to have some independent nuclear force.”67

3.3.4. Countering American bureaucracy Only 10 months after the Nassau meeting when Prime Minister Macmillan retired

President Kennedy declared “In nearly three years of cooperation, we have worked

together on great and small issues, and we have never had a failure of

understanding or of mutual trust.”68 President Kennedy’s and Prime Minister

Macmillan’s feelings of trust in each other were mutual as the then retired Macmillan

told President Kennedy’s widow Jacqueline Kennedy “He (President Kennedy)

seemed to trust me—and for those of us who have had to play the so-called game of

politics—national and international—this is something very rare but very precious”69

The special relationship on the personal level between President Kennedy and

Prime Minister Macmillan was not echoed in the entire US administration. George

Ball the US under-secretary of state at the time of the Anglo – American Nassau

meeting saw the result of the meeting as a mistake and a self-inflicted wound when

he reflected on the meeting “it encouraged Britain to continue thinking of herself as a

67 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p359 68 John Dickie, Special No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1994), p. 105. 69 Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 304

35

great power, and deflected her from coming to terms with her European destiny”.70

empire

Dean Acheson a former Secretary of State expressed his view on the special

relationship in a speech given at West Point “Great Britain has lost an and

has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role—that is, a role

apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States, a

role based on being the head of a ‘Commonwealth’ which has no political structure,

or unity, or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious economic relationship—this

role is about played out” 71

Philip of Spain

Macmillan’s response to the speech reveals that he is hurt on his national pride and

prestige but he has no contemporary arguments to disprove Acheson’s accusations

so he reverts to historical examples of British resolution and will “In so far as he

appeared to denigrate the resolution and will of Britain and the British people, Mr.

Acheson has fallen into an error which has been made by quite a lot of people in the

course of the last four hundred years, including , Louis XIV, Napoleon,

the Kaiser and Hitler.”72 Hitler was of course contemporary but the UK would most

likely not have been able to defeat Nazi-Germany without the help from the USA.

Macmillan is arguing against the perceived underestimation of the commonwealth,

simply by saying that “He (Acheson) also seems to misunderstand the role of the

Commonwealth in world affairs.”73

70 Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1, p7-30, p9 71 Alistair Horne, Macmillan: Volume II of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 429 72 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p339 73 Harold Macmillan, Macmillan London LTD, At the end of the day, 1973, p339

36

3.4. Part conclusion of the 1962 decision. The UK was not strong enough conventionally to counter the Soviet Union which

explains the UK’s actions in 1962. The UK consequently had to evaluate if the

NATO alliance was a strong enough alliance not in military might but in will. The UK

saw the USA’s full committed participation in the alliance as NATO’s Centre of

Gravity. As the UK had doubts whether they could count on the USA’s nuclear

security guarantees, the UK had from a security point of view no other option than to

acquire an operationally independent nuclear deterrent.74

The security issues were, however, not the only drivers that led the UK to buy the

Polaris system. The three bureaucratic actors all had incentives to promote the

purchase of the Polaris system as well. The bureaucratic actors all had a shared

goal in that they wanted the UK to rise within the nuclear field albeit they had very

different parochial motives to get there. Sir William Penney was interested in

securing additional funding to the atomic energy sector, the Chief of the Defence

Staff Admiral Mountbatten was interested in securing the ‘senior service’ an

important asset to be able to operate on the grand strategic level. And finally the

Prime Minister Macmillan was interested in cementing his political base by being

seen to be the one who kept the UK at the top table.

The special relationship was severely tested at the Skybolt crisis in 1962 when

President Kennedy initially reneged on the promise President Eisenhower had made

to the UK. Prime Minister Macmillan who had no instruments of power to lever the

agreement descended to using the emotional well of shared Anglo – American

sacrifice and common nuclear history, which proved to be the decisive argument that

won the day75

74 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

despite the severe friction in the US administration - the UK would be

supplied with the Polaris missile. It can be concluded that it was not due to domestic

and or foreign political interest that the USA chose to sell the Polaris to the UK.

Actually Kennedy chose to sell the Polaris to the UK in spite of domestic and to

some degree foreign political issues. Kennedy’s reasons to sell the Polaris to the UK

were partly and only partly because of the perceived threat as the UK contribution

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57 75 Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1, p7-30, p9

37

was only a limited enhancement in western capacity. It would seem that the special

relationship was indeed the most compelling argument. This justifies the UK’s

emphasis on the special relationship with the USA as a part of the UK identity.

To sum up the 1962 case the nuclear deterrent was the most advanced weapon at

the time and it was seen to be the means to re-forge the special relationship with the

USA, defend the UK against future threats and thereby cement the UK’s status in the

world as a great power. The thesis has described how all three models contributed

significantly to the UK’s decision to buy the Polaris system. It is difficult to measure

which one of the models gives the most causal weight to explain the decision of the

Polaris purchase. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction – this

argues that the invention of the nuclear bomb with the subsequent shift in the

balance of power was the catalyst to drive the UK to need to acquire the nuclear

deterrent for security reasons. Due to the clear and present danger posed by the

Soviet Union the bureaucratic interests of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ and status

concerns of the ‘Norms Model’ may have been just secondary to the Security Model.

However, the two other models do carry significant causal weight in that the

acquisition of the nuclear deterrent had three significant impacts:

1. It cemented the UK’s status within NATO, denied France the status as the only

European nuclear power, and it stipulated the UK’s independence of action.

2. It took the UK back to the super league in Europe and gave the UK significant

leverage in world affairs – in other words a statement to say that the UK was not

just a puppet controlled by USA.

3. It showed the USA that the UK was willing to own up to the special relationship

by sharing the burden and liability of Europe’s defence and thereby giving the

USA an incentive to fortify the pledge to Europe.

38

4. CASE 2006 – DECISION TO MODERNISE THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT: In this chapter the thesis will show the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and

the lobbying of a, in relative terms, huge nuclear defence industry. Contrary to the

first case, this chapter will show the tangible effect of the nuclear taboo and the

inception of the of Non-Proliferation treaty.

4.1. Security Model.

In the Foreword to the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear

Deterrent” Prime Minister Blair argues that the security of the nation over the last 50

years has rested on the ultimate assurance the Nuclear Deterrent has provided. The

security situation in Britain in December 2006 was, however, very different than how

it had been during the Cold War where the previous decision had been taken.

During the Cold War years the role of the nuclear deterrent was always clear. The

situation in December 2006 was dominated by the threat from other present and

future nuclear states and terrorism. The country’s territorial integrity was more

secure than it had been for a long time. The threats to the UK that are relevant for

this thesis are threats from other nuclear states and from generic terrorists with

weapons of mass destruction capability. The thesis will now turn to the nuclear

threats that existed in 2006 as far as the UK was concerned.

4.1.1. Other nuclear states. In December 2006 Russia, the old enemy from the Cold War, no longer had a

posture that threatened the UK. By the action of dissolving the Soviet Union, Russia

had relegated itself from being a super power to being on level with the UK, i.e. both

countries were trying hard to maintain status as a great power. Russia was no

longer on a confrontational course with the UK, but to the contrary more on a course

to establish cooperation with the EU albeit whilst maintaining national dignity, which

had slowed the cooperation.

Pakistan had become a state in possession of a nuclear weapons capability in 1998

as a consequence of the India – Pakistan conflict. This was, again, a result of a

chain reaction because India had developed their nuclear weapon as a consequence

39

of the India – China conflict. In other words a textbook example of “proliferation

begets proliferation”76

North Korea had proved to the world that they were now a nuclear state when they

detonated a test bomb in October 2006. Furthermore Iran, a neighbour country to

Pakistan and an ideologically fierce enemy of Israel, had for some years been

suspected of developing a nuclear weapons programme which was aggravated by

Iran denying inspectors of the UN access to the ostensible nuclear power plants.

.

As argued above the nuclear threat was different in December 2006 to the last time

the UK had to decide on keeping the nuclear deterrent during the Cold War in 1980,

although some of the realities of the Cold War persisted. The countries with large

nuclear arsenals still remained nuclear states (exempt Ukraine) and some were even

modernising these weapons.77 The threat from the other nuclear states was not an

imminent threat to the UK, but as Prime Minister Blair stated: “With this development

we cannot predict the way the world will look in 30 or 50 years’ time”78 Furthermore

Prime Minister Blair stipulates that “none of the present recognised nuclear weapons

states intends to renounce the nuclear weapons”79 This is interpreted by the

government as the UK cannot be sure that a major nuclear threat will not emerge

over the longer term and this is echoed by Foreign Secretary David Miliband: "We

reject unilateral nuclear disarmament for ourselves precisely because the world

cannot end up in a situation where responsible powers get rid of their weapons, but

the danger of nuclear proliferation by other powers remains."80 In his memoirs Prime

Minister Tony Blair deemed giving up the nuclear deterrent too big a risk for the

defence of the country in an uncertain world.81

76 George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a

The Prime Minister and the Foreign

Secretary are here looking at the nuclear question through the realism perspective

where they acknowledge that they cannot trust other states and the only way to act

Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57. 77 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 78 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 79 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006 80 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8270092.stm 04/03/2012-1422 81 Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636

40

is in a self-helping way. In other words they argue that the UK needs to keep the

nuclear deterrent, if for nothing else then as an insurance policy to cover the future

nuclear threats.

4.1.2. Asymmetrical attack and 9/11. The new threat on the security agenda was terrorism. Terrorism per se was not a

new phenomenon but the attacks on 11 September 2001 on the United States were

a change in paradigm. These attacks forced the Ministry of Defence to issue an

addition to the 1998 Strategic Defence and Security Review a so called ‘New

Chapter’. The then Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, explained the necessity of the

addition by stating that the attacks on the only remaining super power demonstrated

that the adversaries had the potential for using “asymmetric action to achieve

strategic effect”82 In the ‘New Chapter’ the UK Government specifically mentions that

the UK need to deter countries that in the future would “seek to sponsor nuclear

terrorism from their soil”83

82 Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Foreword to the “The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter”, p4.

. The extreme interpretation of this would be that this

means the UK would retaliate with nuclear means on a country where a few

disturbed people engaged in terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. This

doesn’t seem to chime with the policy of ‘no first use’ which is understood to be

aggression from nuclear powers or with the proportionality principle in the

international laws of war. Modern terrorism is a threat to the UK, and to many values

within western democracies, but terrorism does not constitute a threat to the UK’s

territorial integrity. The war against Al Qaida in Afghanistan has shown that the

world society generally, with a few myopic countries as the exception, accept very

aggressive and forceful means to fight terrorism. However international society

would be unlikely to accept a retaliation which is not targeting the culprits directly

with a minimum amount of collateral damage. It is implausible that the world society

would accept a collective punishment on huge numbers of innocent people in order

to retaliate a weapons of mass destruction attack on the UK. There is very little to

suggest that the UK could use the nuclear weapon on a tactical level to counter

terrorism.

83 Tony Blair, Foreword to the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006

41

4.2. Domestic Politics Model. In the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ we look at the three actors; the military actor, the

nuclear industry actor and the political actor. The following will show that the armed

forces were interested in improving the footprint of the nuclear deterrent, the nuclear

defence industry had huge economic incentives to influence the Government on the

decision to renew the nuclear deterrent and finally, the politicians had their own

interests in the modernisation. Just as in the 1962 it gives evidence of an informal

“alliance” between these actors and it is demontrated that they all benefitted one way

or another by the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent.

4.2.1 The Military as an actor. In the lead up to Prime Minister Blair making the decision to renew the nuclear

deterrent the Royal Navy and the UK’s Armed Forces did not see the renewal of the

nuclear deterrent as a procurement that would have an impact on the conventional

forces. The funding of the nuclear deterrent had historically been borne by the

Treasury and there was no discussion on this issue before Prime Minister Blair’s

decision in December 2006. The Royal Air Force’s nuclear capability was

decommissioned in the 1998 SDSR, consequently leaving the Royal Navy as the

single nuclear weapons service. This meant that there was no inter service rivalry

surrounding the nuclear capability leading up to December 2006. As described

under the 1962 case, armed forces are big organisations with an inherent imperative

to expand resources to meet their core mission, which means that they are very

unlikely to suggest a reduction of size or a capability. As a case in point in 2006 the

Royal Navy and the Chief of the Defence Staff lobbied for 5 submarines to replace

the 4 VANGUARD-Class just as they had done at the previous decision when the

replacement of the RESOLUTION-class carrying the Polaris System was debated.84

84 Tanya Ogilvie-White, IISS, On Nuclear Deterrence – the correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan, p225

The Royal Navy argued that 5 submarines would ensure that the Royal Navy would

be able to keep 2 submarines on patrol at all times. The Royal Navy promoted it by

stating that with the cost of one extra submarine the Royal Navy could effectively

double the operational capability. There seems to be a lack of reasoned objective

security argument for the requirement to double the capacity in 2006, which indicates

parochial interest, promoted by exaggerating the threat, rather than objective

42

national interests. The decision on the future number of submarines to replace the

VANGUARD-class is still debated as the previous and current government are more

inclined to reduce the number of submarines to three to keep the cost down.

4.2.2. The (Civil and Military) Nuclear Industry 4.2.2.1. Nuclear weapons as a business. The following paragraph contains facts and figures about the UK defence industry

with emphasis on the provision of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in order to

show the scale of this sector and the impact on government decisions.

A recent global report published by ICAN in 201285 stated that, currently, worldwide

there are over 300 financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds

etc.) financing companies that manufacture, upgrade and maintain nuclear weapons

and their relevant delivery vehicles. The UK comes second only to USA in the

number of financial companies supporting this industry (41 companies listed out of

the 300). It is a large percentage of the total number and is significantly larger than

the next on the list India (19). Major British financial institutions listed in the report

include Aviva Insurance, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Prudential and

The Royal Bank of Scotland. The report details 20 major nuclear weapons producers

of which 5 are UK owned. These are Babcock International, BAE Systems, Redhall

Group, Rolls-Royce and Serco Group. A close look will show that these companies

have significant portfolios in the civilian nuclear sector as well as the military nuclear

sector, which is unsurprising given the close historic connections between the civilian

and military side nuclear development. Indeed historically, for the nuclear weapons

states, commercial nuclear power was a spinoff from the nuclear weapons

programmes86

All 5 companies are, or have been, involved directly or indirectly with the current

VANGUARD-class submarine from design and build through to maintenance. To

show the scale of these contracts an example is that Rolls-Royce have a 10 year

85 ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb: The Global Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers published by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) March 2012 http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/about-the-report/ 04/03/2012-1620 86 Nuclear Industry Subsidies Part III: The Military Connection Blog: http://theenergycollective.com/charlesbarton/60336/nuclear-industry-subsidies-part-iii-military-connection 04/03/2012-1522

43

non-revocable maintenance contract worth £1 billion to maintain the nuclear

propulsion. Of these companies the following three BAE Systems, Babcock Marine

and Rolls-Royce form a triumvirate responsible for the successor of the

VANGUARD-class so far simply called the ‘Successor’.

4.2.2.2. Impact if the modernisation of the nuclear deterrent is scrapped. As the 2006/2007 case is a case where the UK maintains status quo on the nuclear

deterrent as opposed to the 1962 case where the UK de facto acquired a new

capability it is relevant to consider what would suffer if the nuclear capability was

decommissioned.

The 5 companies that are directly involved in the maintenance and modernising of

the nuclear deterrent generated a net profit in the last financial year of £1.9 billion.87

It is estimated that the defence industry supports around 300,000 jobs across the

country and generates around £35 billion a year for the economy, while defence

exports are worth somewhere between £5-7 billion a year. Britain is Europe’s

number one exporter and, in global terms, is second only to the USA.

According to an independent commissions investigation four local economies are

vulnerable to a cancellation of the modernising of the nuclear deterrent.

“A replacement will possibly support some 26,000 jobs some of which are located in

high unemployment areas (e.g. Barrow-in-Furness). Cancellation also means job

losses with some high unemployment areas at risk. The worst case scenario for

submarine-related jobs assumes that after 2052, the United Kingdom will withdraw

completely from the operation of nuclear-powered submarines. The result would be

the loss of 9,200 jobs after 2037 followed by the loss of a further 21,700 jobs after

2052: a total of almost 31,000 jobs being lost”.88

The direct impact on the defence industry if the modernisation of the nuclear

deterrent is scrapped is of course the loss of ‘Successor’ manufacturing revenue as

well as the maintenance / running revenue estimated to be £15-20 billion plus £750

87 The figures for the financial year of 2006 has not been accessible 88 BASIC Trident Commission Discussion Paper 2 An independent, cross-party commission to examine UK nuclear weapons policy

44

million in maintenance per year. Second order losses could include a reduction in

numbers of the new hunter killer submarines of the ASTUTE-class, which is currently

budgeted at £3.9 billion for the first 2 out of seven. Furthermore there is a probable

capability loss in the nuclear submarine building industry as a consequence of small

production numbers resulting in prolonged gaps in production therefore causing

problems retaining the required specialist knowledge and skillsets.

4.2.2.3. Mutual interdependence. The MOD set out its strategy in the ‘Defence Industrial Strategy” from 200589

Close connections between the military, politicians and defence industry are vital in

the UK to safeguard the national industries as well as national security, none more

so than in the area of nuclear submarines and the nuclear deterrent. UK’s

determination to maintain some level of autonomy and maintain the secrecy required

for national security renders the companies producing nuclear propelled and nuclear

armed submarines a monopoly.

. This

strategy describes the ‘strategic assurance’ requiring national Research and

Development and national production on national security-sensitive equipment and

services. In the 2006 white paper it says “It would be our intention to build the new

SSBNs in the UK, for reasons of national sovereignty, nuclear regulation, operational

effectiveness and safety, and maintenance of key skills.”

This government self-inflicted dual facetted monopoly (one customer one seller)

means that the government and the nuclear defence industry have to live in a

symbiosis to survive. This suggests that the MOD is no longer entirely capable of

making unbiased recommendations.

4.2.3. Key figures in Government. A few named persons are interesting for the ‘Domestic Politic Model’:

The first is the former First Sea Lord Admiral Alan West who in 2006 was the chair of

QinetiQ which is a British global defence technology company, and a former UK

government agency. The retired Admiral West undoubtedly had strong personal

89Defence White Paper: ‘Defence Industrial Strategy’ http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/f530ed6c-f80c-4f24-8438-0b587cc4bf4d/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf 17/03/2012-1252

45

connections to the top of the Labour Party as he became the minister for Security

and Counter terrorism 6 months later when Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair.

Considering West’s previous career and his position at the time it is assessed that he

applied pressure and used his personal relationship to affect the decision on whether

or not to modernise the nuclear deterrent.

John Hutton, MP for Barrow-in Furness (where the UK’s submarines are build) and a

member of Blair’s cabinet. Hutton was openly a strong supporter of Tony Blair, and

he was made a life peer on his retirement for work as an MP. Hutton saw it as his

duty to support the modernising of the nuclear deterrent for the sake of his

constituency where unemployment was, and still is, high. In fact he is recorded as

voting ‘very strongly’ for the Trident replacement.90

““It is a bold person who believes the UK will face a threat to its territorial integrity

from another state in the next 50 years. But it’s a reckless one who rules it out. And I

am not prepared to be reckless with our nation’s security.”

He was quoted as saying:

91

Exactly as Sagan

predicts Hutton is using a security argument as a window of opportunity to promote

his parochial interests. Unsurprisingly he is strongly pro-nuclear and in fact in June

2011 Hutton took over as Chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association

Prime Minister Tony Blair himself was known for being a strong supporter of some of

the UK’s largest defence companies. Most notably in 2006 it is claimed he

persuaded the then Attorney General Lord Goldmsith to abandon the inquiry into

corrupt and fraudulent dealing by BAE Systems with respect to ‘kick back’s’ to

prominent figures in the UAE in order to gain contracts. Prime Minister Blair said he

took full responsibility for the decision. A former Labour minister Peter Kilfoyle was

quoted as saying “I certainly think there is now an argument to be made for an

independent judicial inquiry into the whole affair. This raises serious questions on

what [Blair's] motivation was in intervening in the [al-Yamamah investigation in the

90 Report on MPs voting decision, http://www.theyworkforyou.com/peer/lord_hutton_of_furness#votingrecord 16/03/2012-1555 91 Northwest Evening Mail (Local newspaper) Report June 2009 http://www.nwemail.co.uk/news/trident_replacement_still_on__says_hutton__despite_call_to_delay_decision_1_563475?referrerPath=home 17/03/2012-2022

46

UK] and what influences were brought to bear on him." 92

Systems had over the Prime Minister. This can be extrapolated to BAE Systems

influencing the renewal of the nuclear deterrence. Prime Minister Blair’s motives and

sensitivity to influence becomes particularly significant in the light of the fact that the

decision to renew the nuclear deterrent in 2006 was taken by the Prime Minister and

a small group of advisers and not the whole cabinet

The Liberal Democrats'

deputy leader, Vince Cable, said "The British government was up to its neck in this

whole business. Government ministers were almost certainly fully aware of what was

happening." It would seem that this example is a strong indicator of the symbiosis

that exists between the government, the MOD and the defence industry. Of

significance in Peter Kilfoyle’s quote is the insinuation of the level of influence BAE

93

.

4.2.3.1. The Prime Ministers version. Prime Minister Tony Blair does not use many words in his memoir ‘A Journey’ to

explain his decision to keep the nuclear deterrent. Blair does not offer much

granularity to the factors of the deliberations he must have had prior to his decision.

He simply argues that there were perfectly good arguments for both keeping the

nuclear deterrent and to give it up. He gives a very few carefully selected reasons to

keep the nuclear deterrent, some related to security and some related to status of

the nation – these reasons are discussed under the ‘security model’ and the ‘norm

model’ above and below.

There are two strong indicators of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ to be found in Tony

Blair’s memoirs. The first is when Blair narrates “So, after some genuine

consideration, and reconsideration, I opted to renew it (the nuclear deterrent). But

the contrary decision would not have been stupid. I had a perfectly good discussion

about it with Gordon (Brown), who was similarly torn. In the end we both agreed, as

I said to him: Imagine standing up in the House of Commons and saying I’ve decided

to scrap it. We’re not going to say that, are we? In this case caution costly as it was,

won the day.”94

92 The Guardian newspaper Investigations /

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/01/bae.saudiarabia 17/03/2012-2213 93 Tony Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636 94 Tony Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636

47

In other words Prime Minister Blair admits that he decided to keep the nuclear

deterrent mainly because he didn’t have the courage to take, what would most likely

be an irreversible decision, to disarm the nuclear deterrent and neither did his

designated successor Gordon Brown.

Prime Minister Blair was often accused of being more interested in being in the lime

light on the international arena than to be the Prime Minister of the UK. This, in

conjunction with Prime Minister Blair’s crusade for engaging UK forces as a ‘force for

good’, with or without UN support, can give additional explanation to why Prime

Minister Blair did not want to disarm95

The second indicator of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is what follows when he

describes the following approval in the cabinet in October 2006. Blair describes how

he and the Cabinet agreed on the forward policy which they called “Pathways to the

future”. Blair makes clear that the purpose of this policy was to create the perception

of unity and “to meld together the Blair and Brown teams, and to allow Gordon’s

assumption of leadership to be defined as continuity as well as change, and above

all as New Labour.”

. Simple vanity in the form of a desire to be a

significant figure on the international scene with his finger on the nuclear trigger

could be the reason.

96 Especially the last part about ‘New Labour’ is important as the

‘Old Labour’ with their opposition to the nuclear deterrent had made the party

unelectable in the 1980s.97 It would seem that Blair and the Cabinet were

determined to stay with the line that the ‘new Labour’ had committed to in the

election of 1997 and the Security and Defence Review in 1998, where they

abandoned the previous opposition to the nuclear deterrent. A contemporary

independent public opinion survey found that more than 70% of the British

population favoured the retention of UK nuclear weapons in all or some

circumstances.98

95 Richard Little,Mark Wickham-Jones,

These two examples are evidence, if circumstantial, that these

politicians have adopted the view of the majority of the population simply to stay in

power. This is what Sagan refers to when he says that “Nuclear weapons programs

Manchester University Press , New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?, p. 16.

96 Blair, A Journey, Hutchinson London, 2010, p636 97 Michael Clarke (2004), International Affairs 80, 1, p49-62, P54 98 Michael Clarke (2004), International Affairs 80, 1, p49-62, P54

48

are solutions looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify

their existence”99

4.3. Norms Model.

In this section the Norms Model is analysed in a similar fashion to that in chapter 4

for the 1962 case. Here the twin propositions of the UK’s desire to still be

considered a great power and having a special relationship with the USA will be

revisited again with respect to the role the nuclear deterrent plays. In addition,

looking at the 2006 case the significant change in the international society’s

perception of the use of nuclear weapons, especially in light of the changed security

situation as described earlier in this chapter, will be further explored under the

heading ‘the nuclear taboo and the NPT’

4.3.1. The UK’s identity. Has the UK’s role on the international stage changed significantly from that in 1962?

Many of the great symbols still remain whether it is a nationally named (albeit

privatised) airline, the Union Flag’s appearance on Commonwealth nations’ flags or

indeed ‘The Bomb’. The old colonial obligations have morphed into such things as

the necessity to play a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security

and the promotion of western values. In analysing the position of the UK in the

international society one has only to look at such things as holding a permanent seat

on the United Nations Security Council, membership of the G8 and having the 4th

largest defence budget in the world. This identity is reflected in the words of Prime

Minister Tony Blair “Britain can and should play a crucial role, no longer as a global

power, but as a pivotal power”100

The UK’s perception is that international reactions to future conflicts must be based

on western values of justice, liberty and democracy. These values and security can

only be upheld “through active defence and promotion of these values”

101

99 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International

The UK’s

readiness and ability to intervene in conflicts is shaped by a feeling of duty to uphold

Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65. 100 Tony Blair, speech on foreign affairs, 15 DEC 1998, London 101 Tony Blair, speech,texas 7 april 2002, Bush Presidential Library.

49

western values and international security. Prime Minister Tony Blair argued in March

2006 that the alternative to an activist foreign policy would be an isolationist one,

which in his judgement would only lead to more insecurity. Consequently in Prime

Minister Blair’s view the UK needs to stay ready to apply hard power and use military

force to intervene where it is necessary in the world. In order to be this “force for

good” the UK needs to keep a military force with global reach.

After the end of the cold war one of the new raison d’être for the nuclear weapon has

become the ‘insurance policy’ for the UK’s actions of intervention. The rationale is

that the UK can only intervene in conflicts where there is a threat of weapons of

mass destruction be it chemical or biological, if the actors in the conflict are

effectively deterred from using these weapons. Prime Minister Tony Blair argues in

the foreword to the MOD’s ‘The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent’ that the UK

“needs¨ to stay ¨at the ¨forefront of ¨the global¨ ¨war on ¨terrorism ¨and ¨must ¨remain a

¨nuclear weapons state to¨ ensure that¨ our capacity¨ and ability to act ¨would not be

¨constrained by nuclear black mail”. ¨

Under the UK’s official layer of perceived rational justification to keep the nuclear

deterrent there is a deeper feeling that the UK should have nuclear weapons in the

military inventory to remain a ‘Pivotal power’. The UK’s history and influence in the

international society gives in the UK’s self-perception, the obligation to maintain

peace and security. This leads to the UK identity being of an interventionist nature

and in the UK’s own perception it is a ‘force for good’ with the possession of an

independent nuclear deterrent supporting the UK’s desire to be a ‘pivotal power’.

The nuclear weapon has consequently become a part of the UK’s identity.

4.3.2. The UK’s identity and the myth of the special relationship. There is a mutual trust between the UK and the USA which has facilitated extended

military and intelligence cooperation. Of significant importance for this thesis is the

cooperation within military procurement and especially the cooperation with nuclear

weapons development.

The UK’s identity as an interventionist power is linked to the special relationship the

UK have with the USA. The two nations shared history and values have meant that

the UK has aligned its foreign policy with the USA since the end of the World War II.

The UK’s political interest is to keep this close relation to the USA. Prime Minister

50

Tony Blair stated that “New Labour’s primary ¨foreign policy principle is to remain the

closest ally of the USA, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their

agenda”102

Just as in the 1962 case the UK’s interest in the special relationship is to avoid that

the USA becomes isolationist rather than staying engaged in the world and bridging

the Atlantic between the USA and Europe. Furthermore the UK shows full

commitment to the values of the USA that the UK sees as their own and the UK is

willing to defend these values by force by supporting USA’s national security goals

e.g. the UK’s full commitment after 9/11. It is well known that there was a strong

personal and ideological connection between Blair and Clinton. Blair had to “work”

harder to gain Bush’s trust and friendship. This was probably why Tony Blair was

the first to support the USA after 9/11 in 2001 and he was on one of the first flights to

Washington to show personal as well as British compassion with the American

people and commitment to fight for common values.

This side of the UK’s identity demands that the UK can fully contribute to the USA’s

operations with credible and interoperable forces. The nuclear capability serves two

purposes in this framework. During the cold war and still today the nuclear deterrent

serves a role in sharing the burden of defending NATO and Europe as the French

deterrent is not a part of the NATO cooperation. Perhaps more importantly for the

UK the nuclear deterrent serves to give the UK credibility in Washington as it is an

USA-UK interoperable asset that can project substantial power. The link to the USA

is therefore central to the UK’s identity and security strategy. The nuclear deterrent is

therefore also central to this special relationship with the USA and a sign of the UK’s

military strength.

4.3.3. Nuclear taboo and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 1994 the UK made a formal agreement with the Russian federation that the two

nations would not pre-programme their weapons with destinations inside the other

country as a matter of course. This was introduced as a means to minimise chances

of a genuine mistake leading to abhorrent consequences.

102 ¨Tony ¨Blair, Speech¨ at the ¨Foreign ¨Office, ¨London, Jan¨ 2003

51

In tune with the demise of the ghost of the Soviet Union the UK gave up the strategy

of ‘first use’ of the nuclear weapon as formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence

Review.103

The UK has opted for a solution where the successive governments claimed that the

UK only maintain a “Credible minimum deterrent”

Furthermore the UK has removed smaller payload tactical nuclear

capabilities from the Army and the Royal Air Force leaving only the submarine

launched strategic system. In addition, since the inception of the NPT, on every

review of the nuclear deterrent the UK has reduced the number of nuclear warheads

held. The submarines are now officially only armed with 16 missiles with up to 48

strategic and sub strategic warheads. This is all to accommodate the new norms

that the NPT has invoked since its inception in 1970.

104

In 2006 the UK announced a 20 per cent cut to the number of warheads which

brought the UK possession of warheads down to fewer than 160

Compared to the height of the

Cold War where the UK possessed more than 400 nuclear warheads distributed over

all three services the UK government can with some justification claim that today’s

deterrent consisting of 4 submarines carrying a minimum load of warheads is

actually a minimum in order to be capable of strategic nuclear deterrence.

105

Unlike Russia, China and the USA the UK does not have a nuclear triad where

warheads can be delivered by land, sea and air as a guarantee mutually assured

destruction. Even Israel is believed to have a nuclear triad with the submarine part

being based on sub launched harpoons and India and Pakistan have two of the three

capabilities in a nuclear triad. When the UK has opted for only basing the nuclear

deterrent on submarines it because it is the cheapest way to keep a credible nuclear

deterrent while also keeping it at a minimum. With the words of Prime Minister Tony

Blair this “means Britain continues to set an example for others to follow in our

commitment to work towards a peaceful, fairer and safer world without nuclear

which is less

than 1 per cent of what is believed to be the world’s total number (16.945).

Furthermore it is significantly less than the majority of other nuclear nations, with

only North Korea, Pakistan and India having fewer.

103 Strategic Defence Review (London HMSO, July 1998, p. 25 104 HMG, Stategic Defence and Security Review, 1998, para 60-61 105 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5.

52

weapons.”106 And he continues “Our decision to maintain the deterrent is fully

compatible with all our international obligations”107

the obligations Prime Minister

Blair refers to are the obligations laid down in the NPT.

It is a basis for disagreement whether the article VI of the NPT means that the UK

cannot renew the nuclear deterrent. One side of the argument is that the nuclear

states promised ultimate disarmament and the renewal is contra to this policy. The

other side of the argument is that there is no time limit on the NPT article VI. The

fact is that the arms race stopped several years ago and all the western nuclear

powers have reduced their inventory of nuclear weapons significantly since the

inception of the NPT. In line with other nations, the UK has contributed to this

reduction and today it possibly holds the smallest stock of nuclear warheads (as

described above) and also the least varied capability of the five original nuclear

signatories to the NPT. The status concerns and the security concerns are here

battling with the norms of the NPT. While keeping the nuclear deterrent the Blair

government tried to accommodate the nuclear taboo, and the principles in the NPT,

by making “further significant reductions from Cold War levels, both in the number of

weapons and in our day to day operating posture”108

The NPT and the nuclear taboo is a powerful tool in the hands of the domestic

opposing actors in a country like the UK. This can be part of the explanation to why

. The decision to cut the number

of nuclear warheads by 20 per cent was indeed another step in the direction of

ultimate disarmament. Not as big a step as the campaigners against nuclear

weapons would prefer, but it is a step closer none the less. The realities are that the

regulations in the NPT would mean that the UK would be prohibited from re-

acquiring the nuclear deterrent again in the future, if the UK were to disarm. The

government declares that it is still committed to ultimate disarmament, but it has to

do it in small steps as the other nuclear states are not showing any sign of

disarming. To the contrary the old nuclear powers are all in fact modernising their

nuclear weapons. The UK has announced that it would be willing to disarm if all

other nations do as well.

106 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5. 107 HMG, White paper, Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ December 2006, p.5. 108 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, p17

53

UK decreased the number of war heads in 1980, 1998 and in 2006 but ultimately the

nuclear taboo is not strong enough to counter pro deterrent argument in order to

encourage the UK to unilaterally disarm.

54

4.4. Part conclusion of the 2006 decision. In 2006 the UK is, by the ‘security model’ definition, a strong state with an

independent nuclear capability as well as being a member of the strongest alliance in

the world’s history. In addition there is no major threat to the UK’s territorial integrity.

In practical terms the UK is safer today than at any previous point in history. This

therefore makes the security model justification for retention of the nuclear deterrent

a weak argument apart from the maintenance of the status quo. That said, the UK

government continues use the security model argument to justify retention of the

nuclear deterrent albeit with emphasis on an ‘insurance policy’. This policy is

deemed to be protection against an uncertain future and also as the ultimate

contingency plan when intervening in conflicts where there is a potential threat of

biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. The UK Government now

linking the nuclear deterrent to their activist foreign policy is a text book example of

Sagan’s prediction of “nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable

solutions to international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are

solutions looking for a problem to which to attach them-selves so as to justify their

existence.”109

In December 2006 the fact that the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was

again made by a small enclosed circle enhances the effect of ‘Domestic Politics

Model’ as only a few people need to be influenced by actors within the Armed Forces

and the nuclear industry to give the desired effect.

This ties the ‘Security model’ in with the ‘Domestic politics model’.

For the Armed Forces it is estimated that the evaluation of threat to the UK was not

the driving factor in the Armed Forces lobbying for the renewal of the ageing

VANGUARD-class. It is assessed that the real incentive is to be found in the

argument of not wishing to reduce or lose a capability with the possibility of this

having repercussions on the fleet of hunter killer submarines as well.

The nuclear industry as well as the financial world had huge financial incentives to

lobby for the modernisation of the nuclear deterrent. The finances involved in the

nuclear industry both civil and military are of a magnitude that could affect the UK’s

total economy not in a threatening way but enough to be uncomfortable.

109 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.

55

The BAE corruption scandal in the UAE showed that Prime Minister Blair was

interested in the well-being of the defence industry for one reason or another. This

finding compared with the decision being forced through parliament with a ‘three line

whip’ is a strong indication that the informal alliance of the first two actors in the

‘Domestic Politics Model’ had had a successful effect on the last of the three actors.

The trinity of the Influential bodies within the Armed Forces, the nuclear industry and

the politicians on the deciding level have all affected the perception of the threat level

and emphasised the uncertainty of the future in order to secure the renewal of the

nuclear deterrent. By doing so they all promoted their own parochial causes and

interests. This gives evidence of the ‘Domestic Politics model’ in the 2006 decision.

The thesis can therefore conclude that there are very strong indicators of the

‘Domestic Politics Model’ being a part of the 2006 decision

It may be that the great power term is no longer synonymous with the UK’s identity

but is clear that the country still has influence on the international arena. Prime

Minister Blair has introduced ‘pivotal power’ as a term to describe the UK’s position

and, along with the term ‘force for good’, uses it to justify the activist foreign policy.

The UK’s perceived role in world politics as a protector of the western values justifies

to the country’s psyche that ownership of the nuclear deterrent is the UK’s right

In conjunction with the argument that the nuclear deterrent is linked to the UK’s

identity it also is a defining factor in the UK’s special relationship with the USA. The

special relationship is based on shared history and common values and a sense of

responsibility for international peace and security. The UK’s possession of the

nuclear deterrent symbolises their commitment to that shared responsibility.

All of the positive symbols of nuclear ownership above are lessened in the face of

the NPT and the nuclear taboo. Whilst it is clear that being a signatory to the NPT

has influenced the UK to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, it is not sufficiently

strong to counter the argument to renew the nuclear deterrent nor is it close to

persuading the UK to unilaterally disarm.

56

5. SYNTHESIS In the previous two chapters Sagan’s three models have been analysed for each

case. In order to determine the causal weight of the three models each individual

model will be compared over the two periods. The advantages of this is that it maps

the changes between the cases in order to determine what factors are unchanged in

2006 and therefore deeply rooted in the UK’s incentives to possess the nuclear

deterrent, and what conditions are new which serves to highlight those that have

changed due to new conditions that has emerged since 1962. 5.1. Security model.

The decision to keep the nuclear deterrent in December 2006 distinguishes itself

from the decisions in the previous case with the fact that the Cold War had ended a

decade and a half ago. Russia was a shadow of its former might both in terms of

economy but not least in military capability, if still the largest nuclear weapons

holder. However, the terrorist attacks in the United States on 9 September 2001 had

turned the security focus to asymmetric attacks from terrorists, and the UK was at

the time heavily involved in the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition

Pakistan and North Korea had become nuclear states. None the less the direct

threat from the Soviet Union was the strongest driver for the UK to acquire the

nuclear deterrent in the first place – so it is argued that the demise of the Soviet

Union should have a major impact on the decision whether or not to keep the nuclear

deterrent. The argument to counter this is stated to be the fear of an uncertain future

in the face of continued proliferation.

Consequently the sense of vulnerability in the UK has decreased significantly from

the 1962 case to the 2006 case. In the earlier case there was a genuine fear that

the UK could be left without an independent deterrent and reliant on an alliance that

had not yet reached maturity. The causal weight of the ‘Security Model’ in 1962 was

therefore high. Compare that with the situation in 2006 where the sense of national

security is strong and the NATO alliance was stronger than any in history. With this

change in threat and vulnerability the likely kinetic use of nuclear weapons has

reduced to almost zero.

In sum: When the threat increases, the positive influence on the decision to

proliferate will increase as well. When own strength increases it has a negative

57

influence on the decision to proliferate. This has been mapped in the diagram below

which gives the causal weight of the argument in the ‘Security model’ of 2006. By

plotting both factors it becomes obvious that the strength of argument, and causal

weight provided by the ‘Security model’ is significantly less in 2006 than in 1962.

(the greater the strength the lower the value on the Y-axis)

5.2. Domestic Politics Model.

The level of incentives for the military actor to influence the decision of nuclear

deterrent has remained high in the two cases and possibly increased slightly. The

underlying reasons have changed in that in the 1962 case the military actor strove to

gain a new asset with considerably improved defence capability and political impact.

In the 2006 case the military feared losing this prestige-loaded asset with the

additional potential further loss of capability. It is estimated that the military on both

occasions participated proactively in the informal alliance to influence the decision

and contributed to exaggerate the perception of the threat to the UK to gain their own

parochial interests.

The causal weight of the military actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is therefore

assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased slightly from 1962 to 2006.

The nuclear and defence industries have both grown considerably in size in the

intermediate time between the two cases. This is a direct result of the decision in

1962 where a part of the decision to acquire the Polaris system was the decision that

the UK should build their nuclear warheads and nuclear propelled submarines with

UK national industry.

In 1962, Sir William Penney was fighting for an idea of a project that to him meant

intellectual pride and prestige. This differs from 2006 in that Penney’s project was

Threat to the UK territory UK and NATO Strength

1962 2006

Positive Influence on the decision

58

effectively nice to have whereas in second case to some extent there a fight for

survival for the nuclear side of the defence industry. It is generally accepted that the

fight for survival is fiercer than that of an idea. Albeit Penney is deemed to have

been a very influential actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ in 1962, the influence of

the nuclear defence industry seems to have become even greater. Indeed the

multibillion pound nuclear defence industry has proved to have a very powerful

lobby, with the ability to influence at all levels of the political spectrum, and it is even

suggested that less honourable means have been used to affect the Prime Minister.

Additionally, where the 1962 case is essentially a case where everybody gained from

the decision it cannot be documented that any of the actors would de facto have lost

from the opposite decision. The 2006 case is of a different nature as the decision of

remaining status quo meant modernisation which was a benefit to all actors. For all

actors a decision to disarm would almost only have had a negative result. That is

certainly the case for the military and the nuclear defence industry. With regards to

the Prime Minister he could have had the benefit of being the moral winner in the

eyes of the anti-nuclear campaigners. However for the Prime Minister there were

more to be lost in the public eyes by the huge impact on economy and the livelihood

of 26000 people who would lose their job.

The causal weight of the nuclear defence industry actor in the ‘Domestic politics

model’ is therefore assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased

significantly from 1962 to 2006.

With regards to the Prime Minister there are a great deal of similarities between

Macmillan and Blair in that the decision on the nuclear deterrent served to promote

them nationally and internationally as successful statesmen. Blair seems to have

been primarily interested in securing that he was not seen to be a Prime Minister

without ‘The big trigger’ although national concerns such as the wellbeing of the

defence industry had substantial effect on him as well. Additionally to Macmillan it

was an enormous triumph that he was able to re-forge the military and in particular

the nuclear cooperation with the USA.

In terms of personal prestige for the Prime Minister, the equality of the two cases is,

that they were both very sensitive, to the effect a potential weakening of the

relationship with the USA would mean to them.

59

The causal weight of the political actor in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ is therefore

assessed to have been high in 1962 and have increased slightly from 1962 to 2006.

When mapping the assessed change in level of influence of the three actors in the

‘Domestic Politics Model’ from the 1962 case to the 2006 case it is obvious that there

has been a significant overall increase in the influence of the ‘Domestic Politics

Model’.

5.3. Norms Model. The UK’s desire to play a significant role in international politics has by and large

remained the same from the 1962 case to the 2006 case. The UK’s former colonial

identity engendered a deep feeling that the UK should be a great power in 1962. By

2006 the UK Prime Minister had changed the term to ‘pivotal power’ but in essence it

covered the same deep feeling that the UK should be a leading nation and it should

be the promoter of western values. In 1962 the decision to purchase the Polaris

system was to protect not only the UK but also the ‘free world’ i.e. Western Europe.

In 2006 the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent was also based on the

values of protection but this time it was to expand the western values to the rest of

the world in cooperation with the USA. The difference in this approach to protection

is that in 1962 protection had a slightly selfish connotation in that it meant protection

of the UK and its allies, whereas in 2006 protection means creating a better world

which is seen to be an altruistic cause and therefore the right cause.

In both cases the special relationship with the USA was a vital part of the UK’s

identity as it facilitated the role that the UK wanted to play. A role that possibly would

have been unrealistic without this special relationship.

1962 2006

Military Actor

Nuclear Industry Actor Political Actor

Positive Influence on the decision

60

The NPT, which was introduced in the intermediate time between the two cases, has

had the greatest effect in the change of norms concerning the possession of a

nuclear deterrent. The NPT has undermined the legitimacy of the nuclear deterrent

but it has however, not been a strong enough normative driver to make the UK

disarm. It has, on the other hand, encouraged the UK to reduce the nuclear inventory

every time the UK has had to decide on a future nuclear deterrent since its inception

in 1970.

When looking at the factors in the Norms Model and comparing them in causal

weight it is assessed that the level of influence was high in 1962 and despite the

significant effect of the NPT the level of influence of the Norms model is still high in

2006. It is assessed that the deeper feeling of doing the right thing and having the

right cause as a minimum balances the effect of the NPT. The Norms Model is

assessed to be at the same level in the two cases.

1962 2006

Identity Special relationship Force for good NPT

Positive Influence on the decision

61

6. CONCLUSION As discussed in the introduction the level of perceived threat seen through the realist

perspective can provide a simple explanation of the UK’s decision to acquire and

modernize its nuclear capabilities in 1962 and in 2006. The simple explanation the

realist theories offer becomes problematic especially after the collapse of the Soviet

Union. In order to give the needed additional explanation to the ‘Problem’ the thesis

has used Scott D. Sagan’s two additional theories of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’

and the ‘Norms Model’ which have proved suitable to answer the main question of

this thesis:

What factors were behind the UK Government’s decision to spend substantial amounts of funds modernising its nuclear weapons when they are unlikely to be used (kinetically) in the current and the likely future international security environment?

The decisions to acquire and modernise the nuclear deterrent in 1962 and 2006

have formed the basis for two cases where the three models have been applied in

order to establish the relevance of each factor in the final case of 2006.

What are the findings then when looking at these three models?

The synthesis showed that in the 1962 case the level of influence, that the three

models had on the decision to acquire the Polaris system, was almost the same.

However, with the security model being slightly more important than the two other

models. This is illustrated in this diagram:

The synthesis also showed, that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the

perceived threat to the UK has reduced significantly and the UK is possibly safer

Influence on the decision

1962

Security Model

Domestic Pol. Model

Norms Model

62

than ever before in modern history. This means that the causal weight of the

‘Security Model’ to explain the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in

December 2006 has decreased significantly. The amount of influence the ‘Security

Model’ has lost has consequently been shifted to the other models.

Comparing the influence of the three actors in the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ over the

two cases showed that all three actors had increased their incentives to push for

modernisation of the nuclear deterrent. It is furthermore proved that the influence

from especially the nuclear defence industry has increased significantly in tune with

the MOD becoming more biased as a result of mutual interdependence. It is

concluded that the causal weight of the ‘Domestic Politics Model’ has increased

significantly in explaining the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in

December 2006.

UK’s nuclear deterrent has achieved important political objectives. Despite public

statements to the contrary the role of the nuclear deterrent has, to the UK, been a

solid symbol of Great Britain’s claim to continue to have status as a great power.

The nuclear deterrent has also been the UK’s central means to maintain a special

relationship with USA. The latter has been, and still is, so important a justification

that nurturing of this special relationship has become the goal where the nuclear

deterrent works as a means to achieve this goal. Comparing the variables of the

‘Norms Model’ showed that there has not been a shift in the causal weight to explain

the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent in December 2006.

On the basis that the causal weight of the ‘Norms Model’ has stayed high and the

causal weight of the ‘Security Model’ has shifted significantly towards the ‘Domestic

Politics Model’ it is concluded that the distribution of the causal weight in 2006 is as

follows;

Security model: LOW

Domestic Politics Model: VERY HIGH

Norms model: HIGH

63

This is illustrated in this diagram:

The answer to the main question is consequently:

The UK chose to modernise the nuclear deterrent primarily due to the bureaucratic

interests by a coalition formed of the Ministry of Defence, the nuclear defence

industry and Prime Minister Blair. The symbiosis between the MOD and the nuclear

defence industry has grown over the decades. This is caused by the desire for

“security assurance”, as stated in the defence industry strategy, which has rendered

the government almost incapable of taking decisions solely in the interest of national

security without factoring in the commercial / financial and employment

consequences of a major decision within this field.

The UK’s perceived role as great power and a crusader for western values combined

with the desire to have a ‘special relationship’ with the USA also played a significant

role. The need for an ‘insurance policy’ for an uncertain future had some impact on

the decision to modernise the nuclear deterrent albeit to a much lesser degree.

Security Model

Domestic Pol. Model

Norms Model 2006

Influence on the decision

64

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The NPT and nuclear taboo will keep the UK Government under pressure to disarm

as it would seem that the UK cannot reduce the capability further without

contemplating the next logic step of disarming completely. This thesis has, however,

shown that unless there is a substantial change of paradigm the UK will keep their

nuclear deterrent until all other states’ holding weapons of mass destruction disarm

their’s. This will not be in the foreseeable future due to the reasons argued in the

‘Security Model’ therefore the only likely driver for the UK to disarm is if nuclear

weapons are rendered useless by impossibility of delivery e.g. by construction of a

‘missile shield’.

It is believed unlikely that the UK will disarm in the near future for two reasons. Firstly

the world has not yet seen a permanent member of the United Nations Security

Council disarm its nuclear weapons. Secondly it would be unwilling to make a

decision that would have unpredictable ramifications to the special relationship that

the UK has with the USA.

The recently suggested Anglo – French cooperation on nuclear deterrent raises

questions on whether the UK and France, in the future, could join efforts. The

answer to this depends on what this cooperation would entail. The possible range

goes from practical coordination of patrol zones over knowledge sharing to the other

end of the continuum which is a true combined deterrent force. The latter seems

unlikely as it would mean that the two countries would share the burden of patrols at

sea and not have a national independent continued deterrent. The UK has, since

the beginning, always used exactly that argument to keep the nuclear deterrent.

65

7. LIST OF LITTERATURE

Books, articles and documents:

• Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip, (1999), “Essence of Decision” (second

edition), Longman.

• Andersen, Ib, (1997). Den skinbarlige virkelighed – om valg af samfundsvidenskabeli-ge metoder, Samfundslitteratur, Frederiksberg.

• Baylis, John, Wirtz, James J., Gray, Colin S. & Cohen, Eliot (Eds.), Strategy in

the Contemporary World – An Introduction to Strategic Studies, 2nd Edition,

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Blair, Tony, (2010), “A Journey”, Hutchinson London.

• Brooks, Stephen G., (1997): ”Dueling Realisms”, International Organization, Vol.

51, No. 3, Summer

• Christopher, Layne, (1997): ”From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing”,

International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1

• Dale, Walton, C. & Gray, Colin S., (2007): “The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear

Weapons in the Twenty-First Century”,

• Gray, Colin S., (1999): ”Inescapable Geography”, Chapter 9, i Colin S. Gray &

Geoffrey Sloan (Eds.), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, London: Frank

Cass,

• Halperin, Morton H., (1974), “Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy”, The

Brookings Institution.

• Horne, Alistair,(1989), Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography,

London: Macmillan.

• Jackson, Robert & Sørensen, Georg (2007):”Social Constructivism”, Introduction

to International Relations – Theories and Approaches, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

• Kvale, S. (1997). Interview – En introduktion til det kvalitative forskningsinterview,

København, Hans Reitzels Forlag

• Luttwak, Edward N., (2001): “Armed Suasion”, Chapter 14, i Strategy – The Logic

of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition, London: The Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press

66

• Macmillan, Harold, (1973), At the End of the Day, Macmillan London.

• Mearsheimer, John J.,( 2001) ,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton

& Company.

• Ogilvie-White, Tanya, (2011), “On Nuclear Deterrence – The correspondence of

Sir Michael Quinlan”, Routledge.

• Tannenwald, Nina, (2007), “The Nuclear Taboo – The United States and the non-

use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945”, Cambridge University Press.

• Waltz N., (Eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,

Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

• Wendt, Alexander, (1992): “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social

Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring.

• Young Hugo, (1989), “One of Us”, A biography of Margaret Thatcher, Macmillan

London.

Articles:

• Larsen, Jeffrey A., Ph.D., “The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

and Implications for NATO Drifting Toward the Foreseeable

Future” http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf

• Ladwig III, Walter C., Strategic Insights, Vol 6, No 1(January 2007), pp 31-50.

• T Milne, H Beach, J L Finney, R S Pease, J Rotblat, British Pugwash Group, “An

End to UK Nuclear Weapons”

• Matthew Harries, Britain and France as Nuclear Partners, Survival, vol 54 no. 1,

p7-30

• ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb: The Global Financing of Nuclear Weapons Producers published by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) March 2012 http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/about-the-report/

• Nuclear Industry Subsidies Part III: The Military Connection

Blog: http://theenergycollective.com/charlesbarton/60336/nuclear-industry-subsidies-

part-iii-military-connection

• BBC NEWS (unknown journalist), 4 December 2006 “UK nuclear weapons plan

unveiled”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6205174.stm

67

• Hopkins, Nick, The Guardian, 18 May 2011, “The military gamble at the heart of

UK defence cuts” http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/defence-and-security-

blog/2011/may/18/uk-defence-cuts

Documents:

• HM Government, 2010, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National

Security Strategy. http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191639.pdf?CID=PDF&PLA=furl&CRE=nationalsecuritystrategy

• HM Government, 2010, Strategic Defence and Security Review, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf

• HM Government, 2006, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent. http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b03c092f/0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf

• HM Government, 2002, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter. • HM Government, 2005, Defence White Paper: ‘Defence Industrial Strategy’

http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/f530ed6c-f80c-4f24-8438-0b587cc4bf4d/0/def_industrial_strategy_wp_cm6697.pdf