Existential threats to Israel: learning from the ancient past

Steven R. David*

Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University

Israel is one of the only countries whose existence is openly called intoquestion. There are a number of contemporary threats that could bring an endto Israel as a Jewish democracy. They include ‘hard’ threats of nucleardestruction and conventional invasion and ‘soft’ threats of an emergingArab majority and elite actions to end Israel either as a Jewish state or asa democratic state. Israeli policymakers can learn how to cope with thesethreats by examining how Israel was destroyed in ancient times. Israel’sdestruction at the hands of the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romansreinforces Realist lessons for contemporary Israel. They include the dangersof relying on outside allies for support, the need to prevent adversaries fromgaining the capability to destroy you, the risks of an unfavourabledemographic balance, and how internal conflict can bring about one’sdemise. Although appeasement proved to be the preferred policy for some ofIsrael’s ancient forebears, the total threat posed by some of modern Israel’sadversaries and Israel’s contemporary ability to overpower its regional foesrequire substantial modification before such an approach should beconsidered today.

Keywords: ancient Israel; Jewish democracy; King Saul; King David;Assyrians, Babylonians; Romans; Babylonia; modern Israel

Israel is one of the only countries whose very existence is called into question.

Leaders of countries and groups openly seek its destruction. Whether by

conventional invasion, nuclear attack, or terrorism, many of Israel’s neighbours

seek to wipe it off the map. Israel’s existence as a Jewish democracy is also

challenged from within, by a growing Arab population, and by Israeli Jews, some

of whom believe the state’s commitment to liberal democracy makes it impossible

to have a Jewish state while others assert that the state’s commitment to Judaism

makes it impossible to have a democratic state. A great deal of attention has been

paid to assessing just how serious these threats are and what Israel can do to

address them. Impassioned scholars, pundits, and policymakers have put forth

a wide range of recommendations with no clear consensus emerging.

What these recommendations have in common is that they ignore the

experiences of ancient Israel as a guide to contemporary Israeli policy. This is

a critical omission because these experiences yield powerful insights into the

ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online

q 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2012.717386

http://www.tandfonline.com

*Email: sdavid@jhu.edu

Israel Affairs

Vol. 18, No. 4, October 2012, 503–525

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

dangers Israel faces today. Ancient Israel, it turns out, confronted remarkably

similar threats to those now confronting Israel. On several occasions, these

threats proved fatal, causing the demise of the Jewish state. By examining why

the Israel of thousands of years ago succumbed to threats, a better understanding

can be achieved as to how Israel can cope with the threats it faces today.

This article consists of three parts. It begins with an overview of the threats

facing present-day Israel. The heart of the essay then examines the reasons for the

destruction of ancient Israel by the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans.

It concludes by examining how lessons from Israel’s ancient history can guide

modern Israel’s leaders in meeting the threats that once again seek to destroy the

Jewish state.

Contemporary threats

Israel confronts two kinds of threats, both of which would bring about its end as

a Jewish state. The first would produce the physical annihilation of Israel. These

‘hard’ threats include the use of weapons of mass destruction, outside invasion, and

civil conflict. Regarding weapons of mass destruction, Israel’s neighbours have or

can make biological and chemical weapons, which could inflict horrific harm.1

Even more alarming are nuclear weapons. Israel’s population is so concentrated

that as few as three nuclear weapons could destroy 70% of its people, effectively

ending its existence as a Jewish state.2 Nuclear programmes exist throughout the

Middle East, notably in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Most frightening for Israel

is Iran, whose president, Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, famously declared his intention

to ‘wipe the occupying regime [Israel] off the map’.3 Iran is now enriching large

amounts of uranium, giving it the capability to carry out this threat.4

The conventional threat is only slightly less frightening. Israel inhabits a rough

region, filled with powerful, hostile neighbours. The country’s military forces of

some 176,000 regular troops and about 400,000 reserves are outnumbered by each

of the militaries of Egypt, Iran, and Syria.5 Israel’s adversaries taken together have

several times the number of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The Arab armies and Iran

are catching up with Israel qualitatively, especially as they are equipped with

newer precision-guided munitions such as surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank

weaponry that depend less on the skill of the operator. Syria and Iran do not

recognize Israel’s right to exist, and the viability of Egypt’s peace with Israel has

been thrown into doubt in the wake of Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow in a country

where Islamists have taken control of the government.

Israel is also threatened by the possibility of civil conflict among Israeli Jews.

If such conflict did break out, it would most likely stem from efforts by the Israeli

government to remove some of the 400,000 settlers now living in the West Bank.

In one sense, the situation is not terribly dire. Most Israeli Jews live in settlements

near the 1967 border that are likely to be retained by Israel in a peace agreement.

Others would probably leave peacefully, especially if they are given financial

incentives. Nevertheless, a significant minority may violently resist efforts to

S.R. David504

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

remove them, sparking major civil conflict. If civil conflict does break out, Israel

could be weakened militarily, thus inviting outside attack.6 In the wake of Jews

killing Jews, extremism may flourish internally, undermining the democratic

foundations of the state. Either way, Israel is likely to change in fundamental

ways, and may cease to exist at all.7

Israel can also be destroyed by ‘soft’ threats that leave the country and

its population physically intact, but end its existence as a Jewish democracy.

As a democracy, Israel grants the right to vote to each of its citizens. If Israel

holds on to the West Bank, over 2.5 million Palestinians will join the over

1 million Israeli Arabs to create a non-Jewish majority in Israel in just a few

years. The Israeli government would then face the dilemma of either granting the

Palestinians in the West Bank the right to vote, thus ending Israel as a Jewish

state, or it could continue the deny the Palestinians the right to vote, thus ending

Israel’s claim to be a democracy.8

Aside from the threat of a growing Arab majority, dangers are posed by

Israeli Jews (and others) who increasingly question the Zionist ideal of Israel as

a Jewish democracy. On the left are those who assert that in the world of the

twenty-first century, where distinct nations have given way to multicultural

identities, it is unacceptable to privilege one group over another. Since Israel is

a self-described Jewish state, with Jews afforded rights and responsibilities

denied to non-Jews (such as the Right of Return and the obligation to serve in the

military), Israel is seen as illegitimate.9 On the right, Israeli Jews are mounting

their own challenge to Israel as a Jewish democracy. Voices are increasingly

raised asserting that if Israel is to remain Jewish, it must curtail the freedoms that

define Israel as a liberal democracy. Efforts to restrict the role of the Israeli

Supreme Court, constrain the rights of Israeli Arabs to live in Jewish areas,

impose a loyalty oath on Israeli Arabs, limit the rights of non-governmental

organizations to criticize Israeli polices and growing extremism among some

Israeli settlers contribute to the sense that, for many, retaining Israel’s Jewish

character is more important than any commitment to liberal democracy. If the

commitment to Israel as a Jewish democracy is increasingly challenged by elites

on both the left and right, the long-term future of Israel cannot be secure. All the

more so as doubts about Israel’s viability are reflected in the international sphere

as well. Whether it be in lopsided United Nations votes against Israel, the extreme

anti-Israeli rhetoric at international conferences such as occurred in Durban

in 2001, or the growing movement against Israel by international NGOs, Israel

is increasingly seen as a global pariah.10

Israel then confronts a wide range of threats from outside and inside the

country. It has attempted to deal with these threats by seeking alliances with

major powers, relying on its own strength, and drawing support from the Jewish

community abroad. Powerful foes have been resisted and, more rarely, appeased.

Israel has used many of these same approaches to counter similar threats in the

hostile worlds of the ancient past. These policies proved ultimately unsuccessful

then, raising questions of whether they will work today.

Israel Affairs 505

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

Ancient Israel

The Jewish State of Israel (sometimes known as Judah or Judea) has died

three times in the past, in each case by the hands of a more powerful neighbour.11

In 722 BCE Israel was vanquished by the Assyrians, in 586 BCE by the

Babylonians, and in 70 CE (with the final coup de grace in 135 CE) by the

Romans. Israel disappeared from world maps for more than 100 years after its

first death, then for several centuries following the Babylonian onslaught, and for

nearly 2000 years after its destruction by Rome. The causes of each of Israel’s

deaths differ, but they all reflect some combination of weaknesses within Israel

itself and the unchecked power of its adversaries, a situation that eerily resembles

contemporary challenges to the Jewish state today. What follows is a brief

historical summary of the events surrounding Israel’s deaths highlighting the

principal causes.

Unification, the divided monarchy and demise: 1000 BCE to 722 BCE

Any study of ancient Israel needs to confront questions of reliability, especially

when the Bible is used as a source. Despite constant questioning, especially from

ideologically motivated detractors, most historians agree that from around

1000 BCE we can reconstruct the history of Israel to a reliable degree by

balancing the biblical account with archaeological evidence and written accounts

independent from the Hebrew Bible.12 It is with some confidence therefore that it

is believed that the various Hebrew tribes first became unified under King Saul

around 1050 BCE. Saul brought the tribes together so that they could better deal

with the external threat of the Philistines, Israel’s ancient enemy. Following

Saul’s death (by the Philistines) he was succeeded by David, who created the first

truly unified Jewish state.13 Under David’s leadership, the two separate kingdoms

of Judah and Israel were united, with Jerusalem established as their capital. David

took advantage of the relative weakness of the two neighbouring empires of

Egypt and Assyria to carve out a place for the new kingdom of Israel, establishing

it as a regional power in the southern Levant.14

Although David unified Judah and Israel, the two former territories never

gave up their distinct identities. Israel was much larger than Judah; more

urbanized; had a greater population and more fertile land than its southern

neighbour.15 Despite these advantages, Israel remained subservient to Judah in

the united kingdom. Israel resented Judah for interfering with its religious and

political traditions, taking up a disproportionate number of key governmental and

military positions, and forcing its citizens to serve in a common army. Egypt

exacerbated these resentments in an effort to prevent the emergence of a strong,

united state that would threaten its crucial trade routes.16 David overcame these

tensions through his charismatic leadership and deft policies. When David died,

however, his successors, Solomon and his sons, proved unable to keep the two

kingdoms together. In the 920s BCE, the northern tribes of Israel, angry at what

they perceived to be unfair treatment by Judah, bitter over heavy taxation, and

S.R. David506

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

stricken with internal unrest, revolted against the united kingdom, re-establishing

the Kingdom of Israel as a separate entity.17

The kingdoms of Judah and Israel went their separate ways, with Judah

turning out to be the more politically stable of the two. Judah had a relatively

homogeneous population, consisting of mostly one tribe with a leadership that

had the good fortune to descend from David, providing it with a strong sense of

legitimacy. Judah also had the advantage of retaining Jerusalem as its capital,

a powerful symbol of unity. Israel, on the other hand, was made up of 10 tribes,

forcing it to endure the conflicts that festered among them. Constant power

struggles among the ruling families plagued the Israelite leadership, with

dynasties rising and falling, often with the interference of outside powers anxious

to project their influence. Despite these difficulties, Israel dominated Judah,

which at times became Israel’s vassal. Their common Hebraic roots

notwithstanding, the two kingdoms often went to war with each other. These

conflicts proved especially costly because they prevented the emergence of a

united front at a time when rising empires threatened the security of both

kingdoms.

No threat loomed larger for Israel and Judah than the growing power of

Assyria. The Assyrian Empire had been expanding throughout the ninth century

BCE, and showed no signs of slowing down. The situation became even more

dire when the power-hungry Tiglath-Pileser III assumed leadership in 745 BCE

and promptly accelerated Assyria’s imperialist campaign. The strength of

Assyria under Tiglath-Pileser depended less on its own forces than on vassal

kings – leaders who would do its bidding without question. If a vassal did not

obey or refused to pay tribute, he would be removed. States that rebelled against

Assyria paid dearly. The indigenous population of conquered kingdoms would be

deported, usually to Assyrian lands, only to be replaced by Assyrian colonists.

The kingdom itself would vanish as an independent entity, absorbed by the

greater Assyrian empire. When Tiglath-Pileser turned his attention towards the

lucrative trade routes of the Near East upon which sat Israel and Judah, their

leaders recognized the common danger they confronted. Each, however, chose to

respond to the Assyrian threat differently.18

When confronted with Assyria’s might, Israel at first opted to appease,

agreeing to pay Assyria large amounts of tribute. This policy succeeded until

a revolt broke out in Israel, replacing the pro-Assyrian leadership with one

committed to resisting Assyrian power. The uprising most probably stemmed

from anger by the Israelites at the costs of the tribute they were forced to pay

Assyria. It is also likely that Syria, a rival to Assyria, fostered a revolt in Israel to

bring to power a leadership in Israel committed to resisting Assyrian expansion.

With both Syria and Israel now confronting Assyria, the two kingdoms turned

their attention to Judah, under King Ahaz, seeking to enlist his support in the

anti-Assyrian coalition. Ahaz, however, wanted no part of this alliance. Judah had

been living in relative peace and prosperity, not yet paying tribute to Assyria and

having no wish to provoke the menacing Tiglath-Pileser.19 Syria and Israel then

Israel Affairs 507

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

attacked Judah, seeking to force Ahaz to change its mind and join them in the

battle against Assyria. Their plan failed miserably. Facing an external invasion,

and having to deal with newly developing internal strife, Ahaz rejected Syrian

and Israelite entreaties to join with them, and instead turned to the power most

able to ensure his survival, Assyria. Ahaz offered to pay tribute to Assyria in

exchange for Assyria protecting it from Syria and Israel.20

Judah’s most pressing need was for Assyria to attack Israel, its greatest threat.

Assyria agreed to Judah’s request, both to secure Judah’s overall support and to

vanquish the Israelite enemy that threatened them both. Tiglath-Pileser began his

assault on Israel in 733–734 BCE. He won battle after battle, given Assyria’s

overwhelming power against an Israel weakened by domestic political and

religious strife. Tiglath-Pileser died in 727, but his successors pressed on,

eventually taking over most of Israel. With only a small part of Israel remaining,

its desperate leadership agreed to end their resistance and pay tribute to Assyria.

This bought Israel some time, but then, perhaps because the King of Israel

thought Egypt would come to his aid, Israel once again adopted a policy of

resistance and suspended tribute.21 Egypt sent no help and Assyria then ‘invaded

all the land’ including the capital of Samaria.22 After three years, in 722 BCE,

in what today would be called ethnic cleansing, the 10 tribes of Israel scattered,

some to Assyrian territory and others to the southern kingdom (thus preserving

their stories for the Hebrew Bible). In their place came Assyrian settlers as the

land of Israel was absorbed into four Assyrian provinces. The Kingdom of Israel,

a once mighty regional power, was no more.23

Judah did not perish, but its fate was hardly worthy of celebration. Judah

remained a loyal vassal of Assyria, paying large amounts of tribute and making

sure its policies did not interfere with Assyrian wishes. For a while, the

appeasement of King Ahaz (which famously earned the support of the prophet

Isaiah) kept Judah safe.24 When Ahaz died and was succeeded by his son,

Hezekiah, everything changed. Believing that a different Assyrian leadership and

the support of Egypt eroded the Assyrian threat to Judah, Hezekiah ended Judah’s

appeasement and initiated a policy of active resistance to Assyrian dominance.

He did so against the wishes of Isaiah, who counselled that security was found not

through military might or alliances with great powers, but in faith in God. Better

to let Assyria do what it wished and wait for divine retribution, than take matters

into one’s own hand.25 Hezekiah’s policy did indeed prove disastrous, as the

Assyrian leader, Sennacherib, launched a furious attack against the wayward

Judah and Egypt once again proved to be less an ally than a ‘broken reed’ that

provided no help to the beleaguered Judah.26 Assyria destroyed much of Judah

and would have conquered the entire kingdom but for being stopped at Jerusalem

in 701BCE. Exactly what halted the Assyrian advance is in some dispute. Some

credit Hezekiah’s efforts to protect Jerusalem with newly built walls and

developing an ingenious system to transport water into the city which enabled it

to survive the siege. Others argue that a sickness, probably bubonic plague,

ravaged the surrounding Assyrian army, thus sparing Jerusalem. In any event,

S.R. David508

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

Jerusalem survived, and so too did Judah, albeit as a vassal once again to

Assyria.27 Over the next century, the Assyrian empire, overextended and

burdened by internal rebellions, began to crumble. This enabled Judah to reassert

its independence, just in time to place it in confrontation with the new rising

empire of the Near East, Babylonia.

The Babylonian conquest, 586 BCE

The demise of the Assyrian Empire at the end of the seventh century BCE

complicated life for Judah’s leaders. As long as Assyria dominated the Near East,

decisions for the leaders of Judah proved relatively simple: appease Assyria when

it was strong, resist its influence when it weakened. This formula, however, could

not work once Assyria left the scene. Instead of having to contend with one

hegemonic power, it now had to deal with two – Egypt in the west and Babylonia to

the east. The game of a resistance and appeasement, of balancing and

bandwagoning, would need to continue as Judah lacked the military might to

stand on its own.28 The decisions, however, became far more difficult with two

powers, both of which had the ability to destroy Judah and both of which were

adversaries of the other. Judah had to be sure that its efforts at resistance and

appeasement with one great empire did not unduly antagonize the other. Moreover,

it had to constantly gauge which great power posed the most immediate threat,

as a miscalculation could well prove fatal. Just as some today may feel some

nostalgia for the relative simplicity of the Cold War, it is not hard to imagine

Judah’s leaders longing for the time when they had to contend only with Assyria.29

Judah began with a policy of seeking to balance against Egypt’s power. This

approach did not last long as Egypt replaced Judah’s king with one who agreed to

serve as Egypt’s vassal. Judah was now safe from Egyptian designs, but only at

the price of appeasing Egyptian demands. Over time, the Egyptian threat to Judah

waned, as Egypt’s power began to decline, especially relative to the rising

Babylonian empire. In 605 BCE, Babylonia destroyed much of the Egyptian

army in the battle of Karchemish, enabling it to push into areas adjacent to Judah.

With Egypt weakened and Babylonia on its doorstep, the King of Judah,

Jehoiakim, recognized that the near enemy needed his immediate attention and he

began to pay Babylonia tribute, in effect appeasing Babylonia while leaving the

embrace of Egypt. This policy might have succeeded except for Babylonia’s

failed attempt to invade Egypt in 601/600 BCE. Babylonia’s defeat caused

Jehoiakim to rethink his decision to spurn Egypt. Believing that Babylonia was

now a spent power, heeding the cry of Judah’s extremists anxious for a showdown

with Babylonia, encouraged by domestic turmoil in Babylonia, and counting on

Egypt to back him, Jehoiakim decided to reverse his policy of appeasement to

Babylonia and turned once again to Egypt for support.30

The realignment of Judah proved disastrous. Babylonia’s leader, Nebuchad-

nezzar, attacked Judah, quickly taking over the Kingdom and capturing Jerusalem.

He then probably killed Jehoiakim, eventually replacing him with Zedekiah,

Israel Affairs 509

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

whom Nebuchadnezzar believed would be more beholden to Babylonia. While

Judah’s autonomy had been compromised, the situation was not hopeless.

Nebuchadnezzar treated Judah well and allowed life to go on pretty much as

before. Jerusalem and its inhabitants were spared and Zedekiah proved, at first,

to be a dutiful vassal.

Zedekiah, though, yearned to be free of Babylonian control. After

establishing an alliance with Egypt to protect him, he contemplated turning

against Babylonia. He did so against the passionate advice of the prophet

Jeremiah, who urged Zedekiah to appease Babylonia rather than incur the wrath

of such a powerful adversary. Zedekiah, however, spurned Jeremiah’s advice,

transforming his policy of appeasement to one of active resistance to Babylonian

control. It proved to be a fatal mistake. Not only was Zedekiah foolishly

confronting mighty Babylonia, he was placed in power precisely to follow

Nebuchadnezzar’s wishes. If a vassal like him could get away with such

insubordination, others would surely follow, ending the Babylonian Empire once

and for all. A furious Nebuchadnezzar again attacked Judah, prompting Egypt to

send forces to aid its ally. The Egyptian rescue, however, proved too little too

late, leaving Judah alone to suffer the wrath of Babylonia. This time,

Nebuchadnezzar showed Judah no mercy. The Kingdom of Judah was utterly

devastated by the Babylonian forces. The capital of Jerusalem was ravaged, with

its population dropping from 150,000 to only 3000 and the Holy Temple

destroyed. Temple officials, military commanders, and much of the noble class

were executed, with the survivors sent to exile in Babylonia. As for Zedkiah, the

renegade vassal, his sons were executed in front of his eyes, before he was

blinded and taken to Babylonia in chains. Judah, like Israel before it, had ceased

to exist, ending several centuries of Jewish sovereignty and David’s dynasty.31

Rome 77–135 CE32

The defeat of the Babylonian Empire in 539 BCE by the Persians ended the

Jewish exile as the Persian emperor, Cyrus, allowed the Jews to return to what

had been Judah, now the Persian province of Yehud or Judea. Many Jews decided

to remain in Babylonia, but a fair number accepted Cyrus’s invitation and

returned to Judea. Whether in Judea or in Babylonia, Jews continued to live as

a distinct people, practising their religion and culture, under the relatively

enlightened rule of the Persians.33 Although the Persian Empire fell to Alexander

the Great in 331 BCE, little changed for the Jews, who were able to continue

much as before, as Alexander proved as tolerant towards other faiths as the

Persians. The death of Alexander in 323 BCE, however, transformed the situation.

The Jews found themselves buffeted among several rival empires, seeking once

again to appease and resist their way towards preserving some semblance of an

independent existence. Their efforts came apart when the successors to

Alexander’s empire, the Seleucids, took over what had been Judea. Not content to

allow the Jews to go their own way, Seleucid leaders, particularly Antiochus IV,

S.R. David510

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

supported by powerful Jewish factions, embraced the Hellenization of Jewish

life, took money from the Temple Treasury to finance endless wars, and sought to

eliminate Jewish religious practices. This led to the famous Maccabee revolt

(168–142 BCE), an insurgency directed as much against Hellenized Jews as their

Seleucid overseers. Faced with a Jewish rebellion and having to deal with the

rising power of Rome, the Selecuids decided to cut their losses, and capitulated to

the Maccabees. They allowed the Maccabees to re-consecrate the defiled Holy

Temple, restore Jewish religious practices throughout Judea, and serve as leaders

of the Jewish population. In 142 BCE the Seleucids also accepted the emergence

of Judea as an independent state, freeing it from any obligation to pay tribute.

After over 400 years, the Jews once again had a country of their own, ruled by

what became known as the Hasmonean dynasty.

Under the Hasmoneans, Judea at first flourished. With the Seleucid Empire in

decline and the newly rising Roman Empire not yet strong enough to penetrate

into the Near East, Judea emerged as a major regional power, ruling over territory

roughly equivalent to contemporary Israel including the West Bank. One of the

Maccabee rulers, John Hyrcanus (ruled 134–104 BCE) was especially committed

to expansion, believing that it was God’s will that the Jewish people rule over

the entirety of the Holy Land as depicted in the Hebrew Bible. This growing

power of Judea alarmed Rome. It was one thing for Judea to exist as a small, weak

state with modest ambition, quite another for it to be driven by religious fervour to

seek seemingly limitless expansion. Moreover, Judea’s strategic position along

the caravan trade route proved to be of vital economic importance to Rome.

It could not allow Judea to be so powerful as to put a halt to this trade or so

wracked by internal discord that the caravans would be unable to get through.34

Rome’s growing hostility was reinforced by one of the earliest manifestations

of anti-Semitism. Roman leaders portrayed Jews as spreading hatred and

perversion through their teachings, which were seen as ‘primitive and barbaric’.35

The refusal of the Jews to assimilate angered the Romans, who resented Jewish

demands to retain their identity as a separate people. The Romans saw the Jews as

being especially dangerous, with a religion and culture that posed a threat to

Roman existence far greater than that posed by other groups. The hatred of the

Jews became so great that the Romans proposed destroying the Jewish people

to end their threat once and for all. For the Romans, then, the Jews were not

simply another barbarian people, but an existential threat requiring (at times)

a genocidal response.36

While Rome seethed, Judea became wracked with internal discord. Religious

disputes between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and political struggles among

competing groups, threatened to plunge Judea into civil war. Events reached

a fever pitch when two brothers of the Hasmonean dynasty, Hyrcanus II and

Aristobulus II, fought each other over who would succeed their mother in power.

Instead of a united front against Rome, Judea found itself severely weakened

from within.37 As fighting raged throughout Judea, Hyrcanus’s minister,

Antipater, feared that a full-scale civil war would undermine his privileged

Israel Affairs 511

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

position, and so cut a deal with the Romans. In exchange for protection and

a guarantee of his remaining in power, Antipater would deliver Judea to Rome.

The Romans, already engaged in hostilities with Judea, agreed to his offer.

Antipater surrendered to the Roman general Pompey in 63 BCE, causing Judea to

lose its independence and become a client of Rome. Judea became even more

entrenched in the Roman Empire when Antipater’s son, Herod, assumed power

around 40 BCE. A Jewish independent state had again been snuffed out, this time

with the active cooperation of the Jews themselves.38

Although Judea’s formal independence ended, a vigorous Jewish life persisted

under Roman rule. Jews continued to pray at the Holy Temple and were free

to follow a wide range of Jewish practices. Nevertheless, many Jews never

accepted Roman rule and violently resisted the encroachment of Roman culture,

seeing it as a threat to the Jewish way of life. Herod’s death worsened matters as

his sons (and successors) proved to be ineffective rulers, creating instability

throughout Judea. Rome tried to quell the unrest by instituting direct rule over

Judea through the dispatch of procurators, but this proved wholly unsuccessful.

Jews resented not being able to govern themselves; the favouritism showed by the

Romans to the Greek inhabitants of Judea, and the ruinous rule of the Roman

governors and mad Roman emperors such as Caligula. Making matters worse,

the procurators periodically raided the Holy Temple’s Treasury to finance

the occupation, enraging the Jewish populace. Jews increasingly came to the

conclusion that the only way they could ensure the sanctity of the Temple and lead

a Jewish life was to expel the Romans and replace them with Jewish leaders.39

Radical Jewish groups, opposed to Roman rule and angered by growing

inequality among the Jews, were the first to act. Some of these groups believed

that they were living at the end of times and sought militant action to hasten the

arrival of the Messiah. One Jewish faction, the Zealots, opposed to Roman rule

and losing patience with what it saw as the collaboration of the Jewish upper

classes, took matters into its own hands and massacred a Roman garrison in

66 BCE. The rebellion gained the support of other Jewish groups, including some

of the aristocracy who resented their increasing marginalization by Roman rulers.

Jews elsewhere in the Roman Empire, in the Diaspora, are also believed to have

provided assistance to the rebels.40 Despite this cooperation, most Jewish groups

remained hostile to one another, precluding a united front against the Romans.

Nevertheless, the revolt unfolded, perhaps encouraged by the belief that Roman

efforts against Judea would be diverted by their having to fight in the east, most

notably against Parthia, which had earlier gone to war with Rome.41

The Romans recognized that if they allowed this uprising to succeed they

faced not only the loss of Judea, but the collapse of their empire, as it would be

a signal to all of its captive lands that Rome could be successfully challenged.

Rome responded with a massive campaign to eradicate the revolt. Given the

overwhelming power of Rome and divisions among the Jews, the outcome was

never in any doubt, and what became known as the Jewish War ended in a total

Roman victory in 70 CE. The Holy Temple was destroyed, perhaps by accident,

S.R. David512

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

depriving the Jews of their central place of worship. The arch erected celebrating

the victory remains standing today, complete with the depiction of the Jewish

religious objects seized from the Temple.42

The failed revolt devastated Jewish life in what had been Judea, but it did not

end it. Jerusalem was left in ruins, the Temple was not rebuilt, and much of the

land was laid to waste. The Romans issued harsh measures against the Jews,

instilling a special tax and spreading anti-Semitic rants throughout their empire.43

Nevertheless, Jewish life survived as the land came back to life and the

population replenished, with Jews continuing to constitute a majority of the

people.44 Jews were able to continue their religious practices, aided by the growth

of institutions such as the synagogue that had been developed during the exile in

Babylonia. Under the direction of several prominent rabbis, Jewish worship and

scholarship flourished. As in the past, however, the (relatively) good times did not

last. Things came to a head under the Roman Emperor Hadrian (ruled 128–132

CE), who adopted a policy of intense hostility to anything Jewish. He forbade

circumcision and sought to transform Jerusalem into a pagan city, complete with

the construction of a Roman temple at the site of the Jewish Temple. This proved

unacceptable to the vast majority of Jews. Under the leadership of Simon Bar

Kokhba, the Jews once again revolted against the might of Rome, only this time

they were united. The revolt began in 132 CE and initially succeeded in wresting

control of the entirety of Judea, including Jerusalem, from the Romans. Coins

bearing the inscription ‘the redemption of Israel’ were struck as Jewish authority

replaced the Romans throughout the land.45 The return of the independent state of

Judea, however, did not last long. Over time, the might of Rome could not be

denied, even by a united Jewish society led by a charismatic leader. In the

summer of 135 CE, the revolt ended with the fall of the city of Betar and the death

of Bar Kokhba.

Unlike their victory in 70 CE, the Romans were in no mood for mercy.

As many as 1 million Jews were killed or sold into slavery – some 90% of the

population. Jerusalem was rebuilt as a pagan Roman city renamed Aelia

Capitolina, with Jews allowed to visit only one day a year. To completely sever

the link between Judaism and Judea, Hadrian renamed the land Syria-Palestina,

the land of the Philistines (later shortened to Palestine). The few Jews left faced

harsh persecution, with many scholars brutally executed. While elements of

Jewish life survived, particularly in Galilee, an independent Jewish existence had

ended, not to be restored until the creation of the modern state of Israel, nearly

2000 years later.46

Lessons from Ancient Israel

The perilous world of ancient Israel is not fundamentally different from the

situation confronting Israel today. Ancient Israel, like contemporary Israel, lived

in a world similar to that described by Realist theorists in which states, living in

an environment of international anarchy, are responsible for their own security in

Israel Affairs 513

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

a global system dominated by the threat of war. Both ancient and modern Israel

have lived in rough neighbourhoods surrounded by predatory states seeking their

destruction. Neither ancient nor modern Israel has been able to rely on world

opinion or international organizations to protect them from their neighbours.

Instead, they have depended on a self-help approach to navigate their way

through a dangerous world of powerful adversaries.47 Both ancient and modern

Israel have also attracted the wrath of outsiders because they are Jewish states,

with seemingly peculiar practices and beliefs. Precisely because the

fundamentals of Israel’s plight have not changed for over 4000 years, lessons

gained from its ancient experience are relevant today. Some of the principal

lessons are considered below.

A critical lesson from ancient times relates to the precariousness of reliance

on outside powers to ensure one’s survival. Weak states have traditionally turned

to strong powers to protect them from powerful adversaries. Israel and Judah were

no exception, constantly looking to other states to counterbalance more pressing

foes. Their strategies often proved successful, enabling them to navigate their way

through a thicket of hostile empires. Israel and Judah’s reliance on outside powers

to save them, however, often proved disastrous. The major reason that ancient

Israel chose to break with Judah and fight against Assyria was its belief that with

Egyptian support, it could successfully resist Assyrian power. Egypt showed itself

to be no more sturdy than a ‘broken reed’, leaving Israel to confront the fury of

Assyria alone, resulting in its destruction. With a healthy scepticism of what allies

would and could accomplish, Judah chose the path of becoming a vassal of

Assyria, enabling it to survive. Judah’s caution regarding the value of outside

support proved short-lived, much to its detriment. At the time when Babylonia

moved into the Near East, threatening Judah, the Jewish kingdom prudently

accommodated itself to its demands. Later, however, Judah (much to the

displeasure of Jeremiah) changed its appeasement policy to one of seeking to

counter Babylonian threats when once again the promise of Egyptian help gave

rise to the notion that Babylonia could be successfully resisted. When Egyptian

assistance proved hopelessly inadequate, Babylonia vented its anger against

weak, isolated Judah, ending its existence. At the beginning of the revolts against

Rome in 66 CE and 132 CE, the Jews could not count on any outside power

coming to their assistance. They may have been encouraged, however, by the

belief that Rome would be weakened by wars with other states. In particular,

Jewish groups may have hoped that the Roman wars with Parthia, a major power

to the east, would divert Roman efforts to the point where the revolt could succeed.

Such beliefs, if they did exist, proved unfounded, as Rome settled its disputes with

Parthia, enabling it to focus its full wrath on the Judean insurgency. Yet again,

hope for outside assistance, be it direct or indirect, proved unfounded.48

It should be easy for contemporary Israel to embrace the lesson of not placing

its trust in outside powers given its history of failed alliances. Post-1948 Israel

came into existence due in large part to the efforts of the Soviet Union, its first

major arms supplier (via Czechoslovakia). Soon thereafter, Moscow became

S.R. David514

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

a major adversary of Israel, providing the principal support to its Arab foes in

several wars. In the first decade of Israel’s existence, France served as its

principal ally. Following the 1967 war, however, French support of Israel ended,

replaced with a policy that became overtly pro-Arab. None of these early allies

could be relied upon to defend Israel today.

The United States, of course, is another matter. America has been a strong

supporter of Israel since its birth, dramatically increasing its assistance since

1970. The pillars of that support – shared values, strategic benefits, and powerful

domestic lobbies – remain strong and show little sign of diminishing.49

Nevertheless, the lessons of the recent past and ancient Israel must be heeded.

Allies come and go. Accept American support while it lasts, but do not assume it

will last forever. America is a good friend, but so, at one time, were Assyria,

Babylonia, Ancient Egypt, and the Roman Empire. As far as Israel is concerned,

the lessons of Realism serve as a useful guide. It is a brutal world out there, filled

with shifting alignments and interests. In the end, you have only yourself to

depend upon.

If Israel cannot depend on allies to ensure its security, it must do so on its own,

which means that it has no choice but to acquire nuclear weapons. With a modest

population (around 7.5 million) and small size (roughly the area of New Jersey),

modern Israel – like its ancient counterparts – can never aspire to become a great

power. Unlike its ancient predecessors, however, present-day Israel can protect

itself without outside help by deploying a nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons give

Israel a life insurance policy, letting its adversaries know that they cannot destroy

the Jewish state without bringing about their own destruction as well. It is highly

unlikely that Assyria, Babylonia, or Rome would have destroyed Israel if they

knew that to do so would have meant committing suicide. Israel recognizes the

critical role nuclear weapons play in ensuring its survival. Using a French

supplied reactor, Israel is believed to have developed nuclear weapons in the late

1960s.50 Its arsenal today consists of land-based ballistic missiles, submarine

launched cruise missiles, and long-range bombers that would survive an attack

from any of its conceivable adversaries.51 Although it continues to resist publicly

announcing its nuclear status for fear of offending the United States and

provoking its regional foes, there is no doubt that Israel possesses large numbers

of nuclear arms. Israel, of course, continues to cherish its alliance with the United

States, but heeding the lessons of modern and ancient history, it recognizes that

in the final analysis it can only depend on itself to ensure its security, which in turn

requires the maintenance of a robust nuclear arsenal.

A second lesson from the ancient experience for Israel is never to allow itself

to be put in a situation where its survival is dependent on the decisions of others.

Even when confronting a seemingly reasonable outside power, Israel must

remember that policies can change in an instant. Benign leaders such as Cyrus

and Alexander gave way to malevolent ones or simply switched their policies.

Relying on the hope that leaders will behave reasonably has proved catastrophic

for Israel. Assyria and Babylonia at times pursued relatively moderate policies

Israel Affairs 515

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

that accommodated a measure of autonomy for Israel and Judah. Under the

leadership of Tiglath-Pileser and Nebuchadnezzar those policies changed – in

part due to provocations from Israel and Judah – resulting in the death of the

Jewish states. Rome’s treatment of the Jews was wholly dependent on who

exercised power. The comfort of enlightened leaders who allowed Jewish life to

continue unmolested stood in contrast to leaders who did their best to destroy any

element of Jewish existence. Some Roman leaders, such as Hadrian, began as

tolerant and sympathetic leaders, only to turn against the Jews with unbridled

fury for reasons lost in time. Relying on the kindness of strangers has historically

been a risky approach. For ancient Israel, it proved to be a fatal mistake.

If Israel wants to ensure that its survival is not dependent on the whims of

other leaders, it must ensure that none of its adversaries acquire a nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear weapons offer Israel’s enemies the ability to destroy the Jewish state in

an instant. It is the most likely ‘hard’ way that Israel would be destroyed. Only by

preventing its enemies from getting nuclear weapons in the first place can Israel

heed the ancient lesson of not placing its survival in the hands of others. Israel

appears to have learned this lesson well, launching air attacks that destroyed an

Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and a Syrian reactor in 2007. Israel is believed to be

mounting a vigorous campaign against Iran to prevent it from developing

a nuclear weapons capability, including the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists

and the development of a computer worm (Stuxnet) that has slowed down the

production of fuel necessary to make nuclear bombs.52 If these efforts prove

insufficient to stop Iranian nuclear developments, the lessons of the ancient past

suggest that Israel must take more extreme actions, including a military attack

on Iranian nuclear installations, despite the massive costs.

The notion that deterrence, dissuading someone from doing something that

they can accomplish by threatening them with unacceptable punishment, can

protect Israel is belied by both ancient and modern history. Enemies such as

Tiglath-Pileser and Caligula demonstrate that relying on the rationality of leaders

to ensure your survival is too risky. In more contemporary times, the emergence of

leaders like Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Osama Bin Laden support the

notion that it is far too dangerous for Israel to depend on the self-restraint of others.

Defensive means such as Israel’s anti-ballistic missile system are worth pursuing

but are far from adequate, given the difficulty of destroying missiles in flight and

the ease with which nuclear weapons can be delivered by other means (aircraft,

cruise missiles, smuggling).53 The only sure way to protect Israel’s existence in

a nuclear world is to make certain that those who wish it harm are not able to

acquire the capability to do what they threaten. Israel’s neighbours, therefore,

cannot be allowed to follow Israel’s path in developing nuclear weapons.

A third lesson from ancient times is that internal strife can be as dangerous

as outside enemies in bringing about national demise. The united kingdom under

King David constituted a formidable regional power. When Israel split from

Judah, both kingdoms’ military capabilities were dramatically weakened, making

them vulnerable to external pressures. Their plight worsened when Israel went to

S.R. David516

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

war with Judah, beginning a process that eventually led to Israel’s destruction.

Judah’s efforts to convince Babylonia not to invade were hampered by divisions

between extremists seeking confrontation and moderates willing to accept

Babylonian influence as well as a growing gap between the rich and the poor.54

These divisions contributed to Judah’s changing and inconsistent policies

towards Babylonia that eventually led to its demise. Although many see the revolt

of the Maccabees as a battle against the Seleucids, it was first and foremost a civil

war among Jews, with radically different views about the role of Jewish practice

and governance. Internal divisions also brought about the destruction of Judea

under the Roman Empire. The end of Judea as an independent state in 63 CE

came less from an invasion than from an invitation from one warring brother

to the Romans to enlist their support against the other warring brother. Rome

was simply the arbiter of a Jewish family fight, one that ended a century of

independent (albeit nasty) Jewish rule. Intra-Jewish strife continued under

Roman domination eventually precipitating a revolt against a far stronger foe.

While the Jews had little hope against the Romans under any circumstances, their

religious and political divisions, the conflicts between the aristocracy and the

common people, the ‘baseless hatred’, prevented the united front necessary to

give them a fighting chance of carving out a measure of autonomy.55

The perils of internal strife that so plagued ancient Israel are all too relevant

today. As a vibrant democracy, it is to be expected and welcomed that Israelis

will passionately disagree over a very wide range of issues. When those

disagreements cut to the heart of Israel as a Jewish democracy, however, the

lessons of the past become frighteningly appropriate. In particular, the issues

highlighted by the prophets Isaiah, Ezekiel, and Jeremiah that purported to

explain the destruction of ancient Israel have resurfaced in contemporary Israel.

The prophets argued that the devastation of Israel was due, in part, to the lack of

faith and commitment to Jewish practices, particularly by the elite. On the left,

secular Israeli intellectuals, many of whom have been labelled ‘post-Zionists’,

seemingly have ignored this lesson. For many post-Zionists the demands of

liberal democracy trump those of Jewish practice, calling into question whether

one can have a Jewish state without a commitment to Judaism.56 The extreme

Israeli right presents perhaps an even greater challenge to the warnings of

the prophets. Their actions to curtail individual freedoms, restrict the rights of

the Arab citizens, and (for the most extreme) to employ violence against the state

in support of illegal settlements ignores the lesson of the prophets that a Jewish

state cannot survive without social justice and tolerance.57 If the radicals in either

camp triumph, Israel as a Jewish democracy will be finished. In the meantime,

those extremists who call into question Israel as a Jewish state or a democracy

are eroding the foundations of both.

Another critical warning from the ancient past highlights the importance of

demography as a threat to Jewish people. Israel’s enemies recognized the

centrality of demography in their dealings with the Jews. Each of Israel’s foes

believed that to thoroughly destroy the Jewish state, they had to transform its

Israel Affairs 517

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

demographic make-up by eliminating the Jewish majority. Following Assyria’s

conquest of Israel in 722 BCE, one of its first acts was to cast the 10 tribes into exile

while repopulating the territory with non-Jews. Following Babylonia’s defeat of

Judah in 586 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar lost no time in deporting the majority of the

Jewish population into Babylonia, replacing them with non-Jews. The most

extreme form of ethnic cleansing occurred following the failure of the Bar Kokhba

revolt in which Rome slaughtered much of the Jewish population, emptying

the land of a significant Jewish presence. To make the state disappear, you made

the people disappear – or at least ensure they were a minority presence.

What Israel’s ancient enemies did by force, Israel’s governments are doing

willingly, namely diluting the Jewish character of the state through the

incorporation of large numbers of non-Jews by continuing to occupy the West

Bank. The notion that Jews may become a minority in Israel is frightening enough;

that such a prospect may come about due to the decisions (or indecision) of a Jewish

government flies against the experience of the ancients. Moreover, unlike the

heads of Assyria, Babylonia, and Rome, the leaders of contemporary Israel cannot

simply expel an unwanted populace. An Israeli action to eject the Palestinians from

the West Bank would inflame Israeli public opinion, make Israel into an even

bigger international pariah, and risk losing American support. Ancient Israel’s

conquerors knew that to destroy Israel as a Jewish state required ending a majority

Jewish presence. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon embraced this lesson, prompting his

2005 withdrawal from Gaza. Whether Israel’s present leaders also recognize the

demographic lessons of the ancient past remains to be seen.

A fifth lesson is not to rely on divine intervention to ensure state survival.58

The prophet Isaiah’s message of trusting in God rather than weaponry, of ‘beating

swords into ploughshares’, resonates even today, but when confronting an enemy

like Assyria, better to have swords at the ready. Hezekiah’s belief in divine

intervention, in part, encouraged him to attack the much stronger Assyrian

empire. Although the Bible treats him well, his actions resulted in the death of

Judah, when a policy not relying on the intercession of God could have produced

a more accommodating approach, such as followed by King Ahaz, that at least

would have kept Judah alive.59 Similarly, the prophet Jeremiah’s proclamations

not to resist Babylonia, that in fact, Babylonia was the instrument of God’s anger

that must be embraced, could not help but have weakened Judah’s resolve to cope

with the threatened invasion.60 Relying on divine intervention proved most costly

in the decision to revolt against the Romans. The belief that the end of times had

come convinced groups to take up arms against the mighty Roman Empire in

a hopeless cause. Moreover, the decision of some of the Temple’s defenders to

destroy scarce food and weaponry in an effort to hasten the arrival of the Messiah

proved predictably disastrous. Faith in God has done much to keep the Jewish

nation alive, but when confronted with outside invasion, better to rely on the

strength of one’s earthly arms.

Israeli policy must be driven by the national interest and not interpretations

of divine mandate for the Jewish people. As a Jewish state, it is to be expected and

S.R. David518

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

welcomed that Jewish values, ethics and philosophy will play a role in Israeli

policy. The Prophets were right to decry the absence of Jewish belief and

behaviour in Judah and Israel. Ancient history warns us, however, that problems

develop when beliefs about God are used to determine policy. It is not likely that

modern Israel would embrace Isaiah’s vision and entrust the country’s security to

divine intervention rather than the Israeli Defence Forces. Nor is it probable that,

faced with an overwhelming attack, the IDF would emulate the Zealots and

destroy its remaining arms to quicken the arrival of the Messiah. Pursuing

a Greater Israel policy according to which the borders of Israel are determined by

the Bible presents a more plausible danger. Such a policy, it should be

remembered, was followed by Israel under the later Maccabees, creating

problems with the Roman Empire, an approach that did not end well. Today, the

pursuit of a Greater Israel would likely inflame relations with Israel’s neighbours,

foment domestic discord, endanger its relationship with the United States, and

hasten the explosion of a demographic time bomb. Faith in God has helped keep

the Jewish people together over these millennia. Misplaced faith in God should

not be allowed to once again guide Israeli policy to a self-destructive end.

Unlike the other lessons from the ancient world, the lesson of the value of

appeasement requires substantial modification. Throughout history, weaker states

have struggled to endure by adopting policies of appeasing or resisting threats.

Both approaches carry risks as resistance may prove insufficient to deter an

aggressor, thus inviting attack; and appeasement leaves you at the mercy of a

stronger adversary who may not wish you well.61 Although outcomes are difficult

to predict for any state following either strategy, the experience of ancient Israel

(and Judah) overwhelmingly supports appeasement to ensure survival. When one

cannot defeat a more powerful adversary, it is far better for the weaker power to

accommodate its wishes. Against Assyria, both Israel and Judah initially sought

appeasement. Israel, however, abandoned that approach, in the belief that

aligning with Egypt would give it the power to resist Assyria, preserving its

security without incurring the political and economic costs that submitting to

Assyria entailed. Judah stuck to its policy of appeasement, preferring to avoid

provoking Assyria, even if that meant becoming its vassal. Israel paid with its life

by seeking to resist Assyria, while Judah survived, albeit with its autonomy

compromised and territory reduced. Judah failed to learn the value of

appeasement when, more than a century later, it believed that it could count on

Egypt’s help to balance against the rising power of Babylonia. Babylonia reacted

to Judah’s switch from an appeasement to a resistant strategy by brutally ending

Judah’s independent existence. The value of appeasement was again ignored by

the Jews under the Roman Empire. Life was hardly idyllic for Jews as a Roman

province, but a vibrant Jewish presence endured and, at times, flourished. Over

time, however, the Jews refused to acquiesce to Roman rule, initiating a hopeless

revolt against a much more powerful foe, resulting in the end of Jewish statehood,

this time for two millennia. Just war theory argues that there needs to be

a reasonable prospect for success before engaging in hostilities, a view ignored by

Israel Affairs 519

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

the Jewish rebels.62 Appeasement is rarely a popular policy and few wish to live

under the heel of foreign rule. Nevertheless, time and again, independent Jewish

states died because they chose doomed resistance over limited autonomy, a choice

that does not look so wise in retrospect.

Although appeasement was a wise policy for ancient Israel (and Judah) to

follow, enabling them to survive in a hostile world of more powerful states,

modern Israel needs to follow a different approach. Contemporary Israel emerged

in a Middle East surrounded by countries that openly seek its destruction.

Although some countries have seemingly softened this aim over time,

as evidenced by peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, others such as Syria and

Iran have kept their dream of destroying the Jewish state. Israel cannot appease

those who seek its annihilation. Appeasing Assyria allowed Israel to live.

Appeasing the present regime in Iran could well mean the end of Israel.

Fortunately for Israel, it does not have to appease its intractable foes, because

today it can overpower them. Ancient Israel had no hope of countering the

Assyrian, Babylonian and Roman empires that threatened it. Modern Israel, on the

other hand, can maintain the military might to counter threats by any conceivable

combination of its neighbours. Doing this in the face of an Arab and Iranian

military build-up will not be easy or cheap and will require many sacrifices. But

if Israel is to avoid the fate of its ancient predecessors, maintaining military

superiority over its neighbours so that they are not even tempted to attack must

remain a priority. While appeasement made sense for Israel in ancient times,

it is neither prudent nor necessary for the threats confronting Israel today.

This is not to say that offering concessions to foes has no role to play for Israel

at the present time. Appeasement has achieved a pejorative connotation since the

1938 Munich accords, but it was not always viewed unfavourably. If appeasement

is seen as giving in to the demands of an adversary by a just sacrifice – i.e. giving

up something that should be given up for peace rather than giving in to the

demands of an adversary out of fear – there is room for Israel to adopt such an

approach,63 especially so long as it will be operating from a position of strength.

As the political scientist Charles Kupchan has noted,64 peace is often achieved

when the stronger power makes concessions, which demonstrate benign motives

and reassure the targeted state that it is safe to accept the overture. Ancient Israel

and Judah appeased their foes from a position of weakness, enabling them to

survive, but only for a limited time. Modern Israel can accommodate its foes from

a position of strength, a far better approach for ensuring its long-term survival.

The lessons of the ancient past point in different directions for modern Israel.

Developing its own nuclear arms while denying them to others, limiting reliance

on allies, and not allowing religious beliefs to dictate security policy reinforce

existing practices. Other lessons, such as exploring where compromise and

accommodation may prove beneficial and being even more sensitive to

demographic shifts and elite discontent may push Israel to rethink some of its

present policies. There is no uniform, linear message from the ancient past for

Israel to be either tougher or more accommodating. Some policies, such as

S.R. David520

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

preventing an Iranian nuclear capability at all costs are more hard-line, while

others, like doing more to persuade the Palestinians of accepting a two-state

solution are more dovish. If there is one overriding lesson, it is that the destruction

of Israel, having happened before, can happen again. Should this happen, it would

almost certainly come about through a combination of internal weaknesses and

outside threats. It is therefore incumbent on Israel to act now to mitigate these

threats so as not to suffer the fate of its predecessors.

Conclusion

At 63 years, Israel may feel old, but it has been in existence less time than any of

the Jewish states that preceded it. Like its ancient antecedents, present-day Israel

lives in an anarchic world surrounded by hostile foes while confronting domestic

challenges to its right to live as a free, Jewish state. The similarities with its

ancient history are remarkable and alarming, given the fate of the early Jewish

kingdoms. Israel, however, also has some advantages that its ancient brethren did

not share, including a strong military and the ability to destroy any adversary that

is foolhardy enough to try to bring about its demise. The Israel of today can also

benefit by learning from its mistakes of long ago, not allowing any outside power

to become so strong as to threaten its existence and by ensuring that the great

majority of its citizens are committed to the ideals that make Jewish democracy

work. By studying its own ancient history and gleaning lessons from it, modern

Israel stands a good chance of demonstrating that the past need not be prophecy.

Notes on contributor

Steven R. David is a Professor at the Department of Political Science, Johns HopkinsUniversity.

Notes

1. On biological weapons, see Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From theInvention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York:Columbia University Press, 2005); on chemical weapons, see Jonathan B. Tucker,Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Pantheon, 2006).

2. Leonard Weiss, “Israel’s Future and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Middle East PolicyXVI, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 82.

3. Ralph Sanders, “Israel and the Realities of Mutual Deterrence,” Israel Affairs 15,no. 1 (January 2009): 82.

4. For an insightful treatment of Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, see DavidAlbright and Jacqueline Shire, “Iran’s Growing Weapons Capability and Its Impacton Negotiations,” http://www.armscontrol.org/act2009_AlbrightShire.

5. For numbers on forces and equipment, see The Military Balance 2011 (London:Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011), chap. 7.

6. See for example, Chaim Levinson, “Israeli Court Sends Right-wing ActivistsCharged with Tracking IDF to House Arrest,” Haaretz.com, January 8, 2012; thearticle details the activities of right-wing settlers to harass the IDF, includingorchestrating an attack on an IDF base.

Israel Affairs 521

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

7. One of the best (though a bit dated) examinations of the potential for civil conflictamong Israeli Jews is, Ehud Spinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence andExtremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York:Free Press, 1999).

8. For a view highlighting the demographic crisis in Israel, see Evgenia Bystrovand Arnon Soffer, “Israel: Demography and Density 2007–2020,” http://geo.haifa.ac.il/ , ch-strategy); For a dissenting view arguing that Palestinian numbers areoverstated, see Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, TheMillion Person Gap: the Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza, MideastSecurity and Policy Studies No. 65 (Ramat-Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center forStrategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, February 2006).

9. See for example, Tony Judt, “Israel: The Alternative,” New York Review of Books,October 23, 2003; Avraham Burg, The Holocaust is Over: We Must Rise From ItsAshes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Burg, a member of a distinguishedZionist family, advocates the end of the Law of Return, which gives every Jew theright to citizenship in Israel (ibid., 236, 237).

10. Once countries are seen as illegitimate, their prospects for long-term survivaldiminish. See David Strang, “Anomaly and Commonplace in European PoliticalExpansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts,” International Organization 45, no. 2(Spring 1991): 143–62.

11. I use the term ‘Israel’ here as a catch-all term rather than referring simply to theNorthern Kingdom. Moreover, when I refer to the death of the state of Israel, thisdoes not mean that Israel as a people ceased to exist. There is persuasive evidencethat even when the state apparatus of Israel ended, Israelites still continued to inhabitthe land. For more on this, see Oded Lipschits and Joseph Blenkinsopp, Judeans inthe Neo-Babylonian Period (New York: Eisenbrauns: 2003), part 1.

12. Andre Lemaire, “The United Monarchy: Saul, David and Solomon,” in AncientIsrael: From Abraham to the Roman Destruction of the Temple, ed. Hershel Shanks,3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Biblical Archaeology Society, 2011), 96, 97.

13. By ‘state’ I refer to entities that had armies, leaders, and bureaucracies controllinga set territory. Clearly, ancient states differ from their modern counterparts, yet retainenough similarities to justify calling them states. See Stuart J. Kaufman and WilliamC. Wohlforth, “Balancing and Balancing Failure in Biblical Times: Assyria and theAncient Middle Eastern System, 900–600 BCE,” in The Balance of Power in WorldHistory, ed. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William Wohlforth (New York:Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007), 24.

14. Simon Dubnov, History of the Jews (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1967), 109–10;Lemaire, “The United Monarchy,” 106. There are some voices in biblical studies thatchallenge the notion of any state in David and Solomon’s times. See, for example,Keith Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel (London: Routledge, 1997). Fora more balanced treatment, see Israel Finkelstein, Amihay Mazar, and BrianB. Schmidt, The Quest for the Historical Israel: Debating Archaeology and theHistory of Early Israel, Invited Lectures Delivered at the Sixth Biennial Colloquiumof the International Institute for Secular Humanistic Judaism, Detroit, October 2005,Society of Biblical Literature Archaeology and Biblical Studies 17 (Leiden, Boston:Brill, 2007).

15. Nadav Na’aman, “Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers – You,Judah, Pay the Tribute and Hope for the Best: The Foreign Policy of the Kings ofJudah in the Ninth-Eighth Centuries BCE,” in Isaiah’s Vision of Peace in Biblicaland Modern International Relations, ed. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 55.

S.R. David522

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

16. Tal Dingott Alkopher, “Is Isaiah a Social Constructivist?,” in Isaiah’s Vision of

Peace (see note 15), 128, 131.17. John Bright, A History of Israel, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981),

231.18. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook, “Introduction: The World of Isaiah,” in

Isaiah’s Vision of Peace (see note 15), 4.19. Siegfried H. Horn and P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., “The Divided Monarchy: the Kingdoms

of Judah and Israel,” in Ancient Israel (see note 12), 170–72; Bright, History of

Israel, 272–3.20. Abraham Malamat, “Origins and the Formative Period,” in A History of the Jewish

People, ed. H.H. Ben-Sasson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976),

134, 135.21. Ibid., 136.22. Bright, A History of Israel, 275.23. Scott M. Thomas, “Isaiah’s Vision of Human Security,” in Isaiah’s Vision of Peace

(see note 15), 174, 175, 180.24. Na’aman, “Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers,” 63.25. Theodore J. Lewis, “You Have Heard What the Kings of Assyria Have Done,”

in Isaiah’s Vision of Peace (see note 15), 92; Frederick Mario Fales, “On Pax

Assyriaca in the Eighth-Seventh Centuries BCE and its Implications,” Isaiah’s

Vision of Peace (see note 15), 31, 32.26. Isaiah 36:627. Isaiah:33–38; 2 Kings 19:32–37. It should be noted that the Biblical passage says

nothing specific about a “bubonic plague” but rather that divine intervention will

save Jerusalem. The notion of a plague is simply a possible reason for the rapid

deaths of 185,000 of Sennacherib’s troops on the outskirts of the city.28. The most comprehensive treatment of balancing and bandwagoning in the modern

era can be found in Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1987). For an examination of balancing in the ancient world (that is

critical of some elements of balance of power theory) see Kaufman and Wohlforth,

“Balancing and Balancing Failure in Biblical Times,” 22–47.29. Horn and McCarter, “The Divided Monarchy,” 205–7. See also Abraham Malamat,

“The Kingdom of Judah Between Egypt and Babylon: A Small State within a Great

Power Confrontation,” Studia Theologica, 44 (1960): 65–77.30. Martin Noth, The History of Israel (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 264; Horn

and McCarter, “The Divided Monarchy,” 207; Malamat, “The Kingdom of Judah,”

155; Dubnov, History, 296.31. Eric M. Meyers with the assistance of Sean Burt, “Exile and Return: From the

Babylonian Destruction to the Beginnings of Hellenism,” in Ancient Israel

(see note 12), 209, 211. See also the Book of Jeremiah (especially chapters 34, 35)

in the Hebrew Bible, which vividly recounts this episode.32. Much of the information we have from this period comes from Flavius Josephus,

who was a Jewish general in the Great Revolt, but then went over to the Roman side.

He wrote two books, The Jewish War (in the early 1980s) and Jewish Antiquities

(in the 1990s), covering the revolt against the Romans and the scope of Jewish

history. Because of his desire to please his Roman captors and the politics of the

time, much of what he has written is of doubtful validity causing historians to search

for archaeological and other confirming evidence before accepting Josephus’s views.

See also Shaye J.D. Cohen, “Roman Domination: The Jewish Revolt and the

Destruction of the Second Temple,” in Ancient Israel (see note 12), esp. 290.

Israel Affairs 523

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

33. Meyers, “Exile and Return,” 220. Nevertheless, there was still a problem with

assimilation and intermarriage as seen in numerous Biblical texts such as Ezra 10;

Nehemiah 13:23–30; and Ezekiel 20:40–43.34. I am grateful to Kyle McCarter for this point.35. Levine, “The Age of Hellenism,” 255–6.36. Peter Schafer, Judeophobia: Attitudes toward the Jews in the Ancient World

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 201, 207, 210.37. Levine, “The Age of Hellenism,” 283.38. Josephus gives a vivid account of Antipater’s cooperation with Rome. See

The Complete Works of Flavius Josephus, trans. William Whitson (Philadelphia,

PA: Kregel Publications, 2008), book 14, chap. 9, 297–8.39. According to the Jewish historian, Josephus, the last of the procurators, Gessius

Flourus, ‘was so wicked, and so violent in his use of authority’ that he precipitated

the revolt on his own. Complete Works of Josephus, book 20, chap. 11, 426. See also

Cohen, “Roman Domination,” 300.40. Cohen, “Roman Domination,” 319.41. Malamat, “The Kingdom of Judah,” 298. Although Rome had made peace with

Parthia before the Great Revolt occurred, the Jews may have hoped for a renewal of

hostilities to divert attention away from them.42. Noth, The History of Israel, 443.43. Cohen, “Roman Domination,” 319: Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews (New York:

Harper and Row, 1987), 140.44. Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International

Politics, (Chappaqua, NY: Rossel Books, 1983), 18.45. Malamat, “The Kingdom of Judah,” 332.46. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, esp. 45–53. Harkabi argues that the revolt was

the worst calamity that befell the Jews until the Holocaust (48).47. Two fundamental works of Realism that advance these themes are: Hans

J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston:

McGraw-Hill Education, 2006); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great

Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).48. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, 58.49. One of the best accounts, if somewhat dated, on the history and origins of American

backing for Israel can be found in, Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981). One of the most notorious challenges of that

support can be found in John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and

U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007). The support this

book received from many quarters suggests that the US-Israeli alliance might not be

as ironclad as many believe.50. The best account of Israeli nuclear development can be found in, Avner Cohen,

Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).51. Ralph Sanders, “Israel and the Realities of Mutual Deterrence,” Israel Affairs 15,

no. 1 (January 2009): 87.52. Scott Shane, “Iran Adversaries Said to Step Up Covert Actions,” New York Times,

January 12, 2012, A1. At least five scientists connected to the Iranian nuclear

programme have been killed since 2007.53. One consequence of the spread of ballistic missile defense systems is the

proliferation of cruise missiles, which are largely immune to such measures. See

Dennis M. Gormley, “Missile Contagion,” Survival 50, no. 4 (2008): 133–54.54. Malamat, “The Kingdom of Judah,” 152.

S.R. David524

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13

55. This is a major theme of Josephus. Even taking into account the skepticism his workengenders, he makes a persuasive point that the Great Revolt began and was doomedbecause of intra-Jewish strife. See Complete Works of Josephus.

56. See, for example, Ephraim Nimni, ed., The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternativesto Israeli Fundamentalist Politics (London: Zed Books, 2003). For a somewhatwhimsical but insightful look at a post-Zionist position, see Tom Segev, Elvisin Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel (New York: HenryHolt, 2001).

57. See for example, Isaiah 1:24–31; 10:1–11 (chapter 11 links justice with tranquilityespecially in verse 54). Jeremiah chapter 5: 21:11–14; See also Amos 2:6ff; 4:1ff;f:7ff. I am grateful to Stuart Cohen of Bar Ilan University for this point.

58. The theme of relying on divine intervention rather than one’s own military mightis clearly expressed by Lewis, “You Have Heard What the Kings of Assyria HaveDone.”

59. Nadav Na’aman, “Let Other Kingdoms Struggle with the Great Powers,” 70.60. Malamat, “The Kingdom of Judah,” 154.61. This is a major theme of Walt, The Origins of Alliances.62. Harkabi, The Bar Kokhba Syndrome, 65.63. One of the best treatments of ‘good’ appeasement versus ‘bad’ appeasement is

found in Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1970).

64. Charles A. Kupchan, How Empires Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 40, 41.

Israel Affairs 525

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Yes

hiva

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

- C

ardo

zo -

Ein

stei

n -

YU

] a

t 11:

39 1

1 Ja

nuar

y 20

13