Exigent Circumstances

8/9/2019 Exigent Circumstances

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Exigent Circumstances"Denger uas in the air."t

when danger is looming-seriousand imminent danger-the rules underwhich officers must operate are instantly transformed. In fact, in a true

emergency situation there is really only one operable rule: Do what is reasonablynecessary.

There are, of course, all kinds of emergencies. But there is one type that is soserious that it will justify one of the most intrusive actions officers cin take: awarrantless, nonconsensual and forcible entry into a home. z This type of dangerhas its own designation under the law: It is called an "exigent circumstance."3

It is essential that officers know what makes a situation "exigent" and whatthey-may do in respo_nse. For one thing, a failure to take decisive action mayresult in loss of life, destruction of property or evidence, or the escape of adesperate and violent fugitive. on the other hand, misjudging a situition and

overreacting may cau,se physical or mental trauma for the occupants of the house,eng_ender disrespect for law enforcement, and result in the suppression of anyevidence discovered inside.+

As you will see, the law of exigent circumstances requires that officers maketwo basic and sometimes difficult determinations. First, they must determinewhether exigent circumstances exist or, at least, whether it ieasonably appearsthey do. This subject is covered in this article.

The second determination comes into play after officers have concluded theyare,-in fag!, facing an em,ergency: what should they do about it? should theycordon offthe house and wait for a warrant? Make a forcible entry? Conduct aprotective sweep, or maybe a full search? These questions and related issues arecovered in the accompanying article entitled "Exigent Responses."

l Peoplev. Coue (tS6+) zz8 Cal.App. zd 466,47t.2 See Payton v. -Atreru York (r98o) 44S US 579, 5BS ["physical entry of the home is the chief evilagainst which the wording of the Fourth Amendment was directed."l; Mincey v. Arizona (rSZg)437 US 385, 393-4 ["(W)arrants are generally required to search a person's liome or his o"i.o.tunless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that tnewarrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."l; people i. niaaU(rsz8) 83 cal.App.3d 569, 572 ["when emergency circumstances exist, formil, legal, andconstifutional requirements, such as the need for a warrant to arrest, for a warranlt to search. for awarrant to break into premises, for a demand before forcing entry, for a warrant to seize evidence,each may be excused because of overriding necessity."l.s See People v. Baird (rg8s) 168 Cal.App.3d 237 , 24r f"Among those exceptions fto the warrantrequirement] are entries and searches which occur under

so-called'exigent circ6mstances."];P,eople v. Ammons (rqSo) ro3 Cal.App.3d zo, zB ["Both state and federal courts follow the rulethat exigent circumstances may justifi' a warrantless search which might otherwise have beenunreasonable and thus illegal."l; Peoplev. osunq (rq86) rg7 cal.Appgd g45, g5r. NorE: The"exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement is aftb kno.rn'ur'th" ".-".g"rr"ydoctrine"andthe"necessilrdoctrine." seepeoplev.-smith(tgzz)zcal.sd,zgz,zg5-6;riopi"".Ammons (rSBo) ro3 Cal.App.3d zo, z9 peoplev. Riddle (ryZS) 83 Cal.App.3 d'SOS, Siz.+ see Thompsonv. Louisiana (ry84) 469 us 17,222; peoplev. Amaya t s1il si CaLl.pp.ga 4za,428.


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IS IT "EXIGENT?"Exigent circumstances have been variously defined as a "specially pressing orurgent law enforcement need,"s and a *"o*p.Uirrg

"""d fo, official action and notime to secure a warrant."6 But because these aefinitions are ratheruugrr.,-ih"courts usuallyjust saythat exigent circumstances

exist if one or more of followingdangers exist:o Imminent threat to lifeo Imminent and serious threat to propertyo Imminent escape of a suspecto Imminent destruction of evidencez

. At first glance, it might seem as if it should be easy to determine whether asituatio-n is exigent. And sometimes it is, in which"u."

th" only decision is how torespond.But more often than not, the situation is uncertain. Information may besketchy, unreliable, conflicting, or all of the uUo"". nrr"tt iltn"r. i, "f"".ii**"ort of danger it may be hard to telt if it's serio"r or i-*i"ent. ultimat"fv, it rifrbe a judgment call bage$ on

training, experienc", .o-*o'sense, and a goodworkingknowledge of the law of exi-genf cir.u..rrtur,."..Here's something to keep in mind: Exigent circumstances either exist or theydon't. There is no middle ground. There iJto,""n ihiil;, a..semi,,exigency. Ifit's exigent, officers can do what is reasonably;"";r;;#; deal with it. If not.they'll probably need to try something else, tit

",""t "o'.iil; ;;i; i;;"''warrant.

Later in this article we will discuss specific exigent circumstances that officersare most likely to encounter. But first, we are goin-g to look at the U6i" pri".ipf".that are applied in determining whether a situ"atioi i, ""[""t.Basic principles

determiningwhether exigent circumstances existed, the courts apply thefollowing principles.

spncrrrc FAcrs : There. must be specific facts-not,,unparticularizedsuspicions or hunches"s-that ."u.ottibly indicated an i-*"aiute warrantlessentry was necessary.e As the court of Appeal noted, ,,[I]n each case the

"rui- ors See lllinozs v. McArthur (z9or) 53r US _ [r+g L.Ed.zd ggg, g+Z].6 See Michisanv. Tyler (tsZB) 436 US +W io1; reontgyluotol'fiSos; zo3 Cal.App. gd, r5t7,t5zt; Peoplev. Baird (rs8s) 16g cal.Appg d.z3-7, z4r. NorE: Exigent circumstances have alsobeen defined as "an imminent and s"uJt'atitruiiti;"ii;iifq h;d,h:; property.,, see peoprev.Ammons (rg8o) ro3 Cal.App.3d zo, 3o.z see Peoplev' Ramey (976) t6 cal.3d z6g,276; peoprgv. c-am,Ieri(rggo) zzo car.App.3d rr99,rzo6; Peoplev' HuII (rgsilP1cal.App.4trn ++8, qsi; r"opti u. wiLk)ns (rqqs) 14 car.App.4th 76r,77t; Peoplev. williams (rs's)

as calgd nrz, trgS; ieoptiv. wharl,ior(rgsr) ss cal.3d s22, s77;eople v. Brown (rS8S) zro^Cal.App. Qd e+g,'S5j f"opte ". Ori; G;;5) 3z Cal.App .4th z86, zsr; e ople v. Koch (rS8S) zo9 Cal.App .Sa ZZ o,,' iez.B See Peoplev. Block(tgZr) 6 gal3a-239, 244; peop,lev. Duncan(r9g6) 4z Cal3dgr, g7_g.s see Peoplev. Mitcherl(rsgo) zzz cal-.epp.sd \39?, rgrg; peopritr. t+rcoowelr (rg8') 46 cal.3d551' 563; Peoplev. Osuno (198^6) r87 calApp gg glt !q;i p";-pi;rl.6rnron(rq86) 4z cal.3d 9r,98; Peoplev. Mack (rs8o) z7 car.gd t45, rjo. irso snE b:"p[;;. ];rdan e976)55 cal.App.3d965,968 ["The decisions-require that t]re o"ffi"".', reasons l" u.tt""iJr"-;;;th"tiil"],-u"'""'articulated by him with the precision and directness of a Fowle. or oi[.. specialist in Enelish


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an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to theofficers."ro

TnanNrr.lc, EXPERTENCE, AND coMMoN sENSE: Although the courts demandflcts, they will take into account the officers' common-s"nse interpretation ofthose facts in light of their training and experience.ll

HowDANGERous? without question, the circumstance that is mostimportant is the magnitude of the potential danger.rz It is safe to say that thegreater the potential danger, the more certain the situation is exigent, even if thedanger is not particularly imminent or if the information is incorrclusive. r3 Here'san example, although admittedly somewhat extreme.

shortly after midnight on June 5, 1968, Sirhan Sirhan assassinated Sen.Robert Kennedy in Los Angeles. About ten hours later, l,ApD officers went toSirhan's home and conducted a warrantless search for evidence of a conspiracy.Although the officers had no specific reason to believe that Sirhan was iniolved ina conspiracy to kill other political leaders, the California Supreme Court ruled theentry was justified because the potential threat was so serious. Said the court."Although the officers did not have reasonable

cause to believe that the housecontained evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate prominent political lead.ers, webelieve that the mere possibility that there might 6e such evidence in the housefully warranted the officers' actions."r+

How nnrrasln? If the determination that an emergency existed was basedon information from an anonymous or untested informant, officers mustordinarily have reason to believe the information was reliable.'s This does notmean that officers may never take immediate action if their information is ofquestionable reliability. Instead, the need for a showing of reliability decreases as

gla8e."l; Peoplev.Koch(rg8g)_zogcal.App.3d77o,78z;peoplev.Block(tgzr)6cal.3d 2sg,z44["As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer's conduct^is dependeni upon the eiste"n-ce offacts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would wairant a man ofreasonable caution in the beliefthat the action taken was appropriate."l; Peoplev. Ortiz (tggil SzCal.App.4th 286, z9g.10 Peoplev. Snead (tggr) r Cal.App.4tl,38o, 385.'1 see Peoplev. Messinq. (-1985) 165 cal.App.3d gs7, g42; peoplev. Ammons (rg8o) rogCal'App.3d 2.o, 30 ['A police officer with many years of experience acquires a certain feel forpeople and situations;'); People v. Higgins GSSD z6 Cal.App.4th 247,254 l,,(OXficers are entitledto use common sense when responding to perceived emergencies.,'].12 See Peoplev. Sirhan(tszz)z Cal.3d 7ro,7sg ["The crirne *u. on" of enormous gravity, and thegravity of the offense is an appropriate factor to take into consideration ."1; peopleT. naiigalryo(rggr) r cal.4tr' ros, r22; Peoplev. Mitchell (rggo) zzzcal.App.3d 13o6, t3rz; tr.s.v. soc"ey (D.c.cir. rg88) 846 F.zd L439, 14441" (T)he gravity of the underlyingoffensewill have a greatinflue_nce on the presence of exigent circumstance s."l; peopie vl Remiro (tszq ss c"al.app.3d8o9, 83r. COMPARE Peoplev. Higgins (rSgD z6 Cal.App.4th 247, z5z t,Tfih; .*pe.t"d ofT".rr"is extremely minor, a wanantless home entry

will almost inevitably be unreasonable under theFourth Amendment."l.,s See Welsh v. Wisconsin (rS8+) 466 US 74o,7SS ["(A)n important factor to be considered whendetermining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which thearrest is being made."); Minnesotav. olson (rggo) 4g5 us 91, 1oo i,(t)-n assessing the risk of93rc".t, the gravity of the crime and likelihood that the suspect is aimed should bJconsidered."l;Illinoisv. McArthur (zoor) gr US _ [r+8 L.Ed.zd B3B, B5o-t].4 Peoplev. Sirhan(tgZz) Z Cal.gd 7ro,73g.t5 See People v. Superior Court (Haflich) (tg86) r8o Cal.App. Sd7Sg,266-g.


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the magnitude of the potential emergency increases. As the U.S. Supreme Courtobserved in Floridav. J.L., "we do not say that a report of a person-carrying abomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a refort of a person"carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a friik."'o

How IMMINENT?tlthough

the courts routinely say that exigentcircumstances exist only if the threat is "imminent," the use of tf,e word"imminent" is misleading. It is not meant literally as something that is about tohappen. Instead, it means a situation in which officers r"uro.ru-bly believed theharm would occur if they delayed taking action until a search wairant could beissued. As the Court of Appeal explained:

Imminent essentially means it is reasonable to anticipate the threatenedinjury will occur in such a short time that it is not feasible to obtain asearch warrant. Thus it is not sufficient a reasonable officer would believea condition exists which could sometime seriously injure persons orPloPerty. Rather the reasonable officer would have to believe the injury islikely to occur before he could obtain a search warrant.lT

Like the need for reliable information, the requirementthat the threat beimminent becomes lessimportant as the magnitude of the potential emergency

increases. In other words, if the threat is extremely grave, tire fact that officerscould not be sure it was also imminent should nof affect ihe outcome.r8

"No rrME To OBTATNAWARRANT": The courts sometimes say that exigentcircumstances exist only if there was not enough time to obtain a warrant.is Thisis, of course, true in those rare cases in which officers actually know they haveplenty of time before the threat may materialize. But in -ori*r.r, they don'tknow how much time they have-there are too manyvariables and notLnoughsolid information. Besides, it can be difficult to predict how long it will take iowrite an affidavit and find a judge to review it."o

'0 (zooo) 529 US _lt+6 L.Ed.zd 254, z6zl.'z Peoplev. Dickson (rsSs) r44 cal.App.3d ro46, to65; peoplev. Blackuell (rsgs) r47 cat.App.3d646,652-4. ALso sEE leoplev. Koch (tg8g) zo9 cal.App.idzzo,z8z [..(I)n -ort .ii.,r-stancesthe element of urgency is an indiqpensable ingredient of any "-"rg"r"y. . . . Thus, thegovernment must establish that because of the urgency of the situition a waffant could not beobtained in time."l.18 NOTE: The courts have sometimes framed the issue in terms such as these: "[W]e might askourselves how the situation woril-d have appeared if the fleeing gunman armed with a shoigun hadshot.and possibly killed other officers or ciiizens while the offi"cErs were explaining the -u["r.o umagistrate." People v. Bradford (rszz) z8 cal.App.3 d,695,7o4.ALSo sEE^ pe oplJ v. cain egSg)z16 Cal.App. gd 966, 977.'s See Peoplev. Camilleri (rggo) zzo Cal.App.3d rrg9, rzo6.'?l ]vorE: How long does it take to obtain a warrant? The answer depends on a number ofthin-gs. For-example, how long will it take to write the affidavit? Can probable cause be establishedeasily, maybe in two or three pages? or will the affiant have

to u.r".r,il", interpret, u"a "*piui"uvariety of circumstances, review numerous reports and statements, or piovide"*p"tt

opinio.r, u,to the.meaning or significance of the circumstinces? Also relevant is wiether the affiani isexperienced in vwiting affidavits. After all, writing an affidavit can take much longer when theaffiant is new at it. Another consideration is howlong will it take to locate a magistrate who canfind time to review everything. Given the length andiomplexity of the affidavit"and the number ofattachments it contains, how long will it takJfor the magistrate to thoroughly review andlrnderstand everything? Will the affidavit and warrant bi ready for r".'ieoiduring nor-ui businesshours when magistrates are available? See Segurav. (Inited Siafes (t984) +Og IiS 796; pe:oplev.


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Consequently, the courts are not apt to get bogged down trlnng to figure out ifit was conceivable that officers could have obtained a warrant before some harmoccurred.

OrrrcnnsWERB DTLTcENT: Rather than focus on the amount of time itwould have taken to obtain a warrant, courts are more interested in whether theofficers were acting diligently under the circumstances. For example, in a case inwhich officers made an emergency entry into a home to arrest a murder suspect,the court noted, "The police did not idly sit by during a period in which a warrantcould have been obtained, but promptly gathered together a number of officersand went to the locations involved."zt

Juorcra]- SECoND-cuEssrNG: In many cases a judge may be able to figureout a way in which the emergency could have been eliminated quicker or by lessintrusive means. But because officers usually do not have the lulury of ponderingand analyzing the circumstances they confront,zz most judges will iesisi thetemptation to "second guess split-second decisions of officers faced withpotentially dangerous situations."zs

Ornrcnns'MorrvATroN: In the past the courts wouldroutinely inquire intothe officer's motivation for taking action in the face of exigent circumstinces.24

$amey GSZ6) 16 Cal.3d z69,276,; Peoplev. Bacigalupo (r99t) 1 Cal.4th 1o3, 121; peoplev. Osuna(t986) r87 Cal.App.3d 8+5, 853 ["We know not how quickly a magistrate may be found in Los4ngeles at 3:3o A.M."l. Or, will it be necessary to travel to the on-call magistr"ate's home? If so,how long will it take to get there and back? Can the warrant be submitted by means of telephone,fax or e-mail? If so, are officers and the magistrate familiar with the procedure? If not, it may notsave any time.21 In re Jessie L. (tg8z) r3r Cal.App.3 d zoz, zr4. ALSO SEE people v. AmaAa (rg7q.J ggcal.App.3d 424,4so. coMpARE peoplev. Ramey eg76) 16 cal.3d z69,zi6 t;1"'udaitio", a delayof some three hours occurred between the time the information was given to ithe detective] andthe arrest in defendant's home, during which no effort whatever was-made to-obtain a warrant."'l:P eople v. Ellers ( rg8o) ro8 Cal.App. 3d g 45, g So.22

see Tamborino v. superior court (tg&6) 4r cal.3d grg, g24 ["people could well die inemergencies if the police tried to act with the calm deliberation ursociuted with the judicialprocess." Quoting fromwayne v. Lr.s. (D.c. cir. 1963) 3rB F.zd zo5, zrz [conc. optr. Bo.g"r,c.J.ll.23 see united sfate.s v. s\arpe (rs8s) +zo rJS 675, 6g6-7 ["A creative judge engaged in post hocevaluation of police condrlcj qn almost always imagine some alternaii"" -"uir"ny which theobjectives of the police might have been accomplished."l; peoplev. osuna(r9g6) ia7 cat.app.3d845, 855 ["Of course, from the security of our lofty perspective, and despite our totai ]ack oi

^

practical experience in the-field, we might question whether or not those who physicallyconfronted the danger in this instance, selected the 'best' course of action arraiiable."l;ie ople v.Wilson Gssil sg Cal.App.4tt' ro53, ro63 f"Appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized ii isinappropriate for judges to second-guess on-the-spot decisions of officers in tne nela under these[exigent] circumstance s."); Tamborino v. superior court (rgg6) 4r cal.3d grg, g2s; u.s. v. iocey(D.c. cir. rg88) 8+6 F.zd 1439, 1446 ["This standard does not permit a court io judge thereasonableness of an officer's belief on the basis of hindsight."1.

COlf feRE, f eople i. Zll"rt(rg8o) ro8 Cal.App. 3d 943,95o [blatant judicial second-guessing].z+ See Peoplev. Dickson (rS8S) r44 Cal.App.3d ro46, ro6S ["(W)is this officer indeed motivatedprimarily by a desire to save lives and property?"1; peoplev. Blacktuell (rsgg) t47 cal.App.gd.646,65q; P_eoplev. osuna (1986) 187 cal.App.3d 845, 856; Tsmborinov. superior court (rggo) +t!a].sd grg, 923-4; People v. ccrin (ry8g) z16 cal.App.3d 366, g7z; reopte v. Boragno (iggi) ,s,Cal.App.3d 378, 386. BUTALSO SEE peoplev. naiid (ISBS) rOS Cut.epp. gd.zg7,"z44i,(Wj"gbject to lthe Drcksonl court's requirement that the officer's primary motivation must bedetermined, and question its apparent holding that it is the appellate court which must determine

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And if a court was somehow able to figure out that the officers were motivatedsolely or in large part by a desire to obtain evidence rather than save people orp,ropgrty, the entry or search might be invalidated. This happened a lot inclandestine drug lab cases in which narcotics officers entered a residence becauseof fears the chemicals posed a threat to the occupants and their neighbors.

As the result of a ry96 U.S. Supreme Court decision,zs however,lhe courtsnow look solely at the objective facts.26 Specifically, if a court concludes thatofficers acted reasonably under the circumstances, the entry or search wilt beupheld regardless of whether the officers were "properly" motivated.zz

Ber-eucrmc rEsr: The courts sometimes say that exigent circumstances existif the justification for the officers' action was outweighed by its intrusiveness.This is not, however, an accurate statement of the law. Theerrstence of an exigentcircumstance does not depend on what officers did in response to it. Exigentcircumstances either exist or they don't. If they exist, officers can do those thingsthat are reasonably necessary to abate them. If their actions were not reasonabiynecessary, the actions are unlaw{ul-not because exigent circumstances did notexist, but because th_ey exceeded the permissible scope

of the exigency.28Taving discussed the_basic principles that are applied in deteimining whethera police action is justified by exigent circumstances, we will now examini themost common types of exigencies officers must contend with.

Person in danger

- Tlrir is the quintessential exigent circumstance: imminent danger to thehealth or safety of a person."s The others are, of course, important. But as thewhattheofficerbelieved."f;Peoplev.Duncan(rq86)4zcal.3d gr,ro4; peoplev.HulI(tggflg4Cgl'App.4th t448, 1455-6 fcourt note that this holding in Dicksonwas abrogaied by propositlnBl.25 Whrenv. United States (rgg6) 5r7 US 8o6, 8r4. l"(T)he Fourth Amendment's concern with'reasonableness'

allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstance s, whateuer thesubjective intent."l.26 See Whrenv. United Stotes (tgg6) 5r7 US go6, Brr-4.'zsee ohio v. Robinette (rss6) 5r9 us s3, :B ["And there is no question that, in light of theadmitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, DeputyNewsome was obJectivelyjustified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjectivelhoughts notwithstanding."l; peoplev. Wilson (tssz) 59 Cal.App.4th to53, ro58 ["The United States siipreme Court has m"andated thatwe ap,ply an objective test to the constitutional evaluation of the aclions of Officer Vi dal."); peopleu-. HuIl (rsss) 34 cal.App.4th t448, 1456 ["An officer's motivation is no longer a part ofdeterminingwhether there is an unreasonable search of seizure . . . "1. NOTE: The Court inWhren noted that an officer's subjective intent remains a factor in vehicle inventory andadministrative searches becausethe validity ofthese searches does not depend on objectivereasonableness. Said the Court, "Not only have we never held, outside thelontext of inventorysearch or administrative inspection that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiablebehavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly

held and assertedihe contrary.,,Whrenv- United States (1996) 5r7 US 8o6, 8rz. Subjectlve intent is also a factor in vehiclecheckp-oints. see ciry of Indianapolisv. Edmond (zooo) 53r uS _ [r+g L.Ed.zd 33s, g46.,B See lllinoisv. McArthur (zoot) 53r US _ [r+8 L.Ed.zd SSB, gag].zs SeeThompsonv' Louisiana(1984) +6g US 17,2?; Peoplev. Boragno Qggr) zgzCal.App.3d378, 382-6; People v. Amaya (lozs) 93 cal.App.3 d 424, 4zg ["Nor ii a waiiant required wh6n,havils come upon the scene of a crime, officeri reasonably suspect a victim or victims might ileinside adwelling and in need of immediate aidj'l; people v. HiII OszD iz cal.3d rcl,7s4\,,Awarrantless entry of a dwelling is constitutionally permissible wheie the officeis' .o"a".i i.

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Court of Appeal noted, "The most pressing emergency of all is rescue of humanlife when time is of the essence."3o The following are the most common:

Assaulr rN pRocREss: officers reasonably believed a person inside wasbeing assaulted.sr

Srcr on TNJITRED pERsoN: officers reasonably believesomeone on thepremises needed immediate help because of sickness or injury.s" Examples:

tr At 4 A.M., a man broke into a woman's apartment, altempted to iape her,then fled. when officers arrived they heard TV sounds comi.rg from theapartment next door. concerned that the occupant may also have beenvictimi,zed, they knocked on the door. when no one answered, they entered.court: "[I]t was in the early-morning hours when most people are asleep, theofficers were aware of a recent brutal attack on a defenr"lesi elderly *oilu.tnext door, the search was close in time to the attack, and they relied on theirsubstantial experience in finding the situation unusual.,'sgE At rr p.M., officers responded to a report of a shooting at a residence. Noone met them when they arrived, there were two cars in the drivewav. thehouse was dark but the lights

outside were on. When no one utt.*..Ld th"door, they went in throrrgh a window. court: "[T]here were ample exigentcircumstances within the meaning of the preservinglife necessity excEptionto the warrant requirement to justify the officers, eitry.,'z+

prompted by the motive_oJ p-reserving life and reasonably appears to be necessary for thatpurpose."| People v. soldoff-(rg8o) rrz cal.App.3d r, 6-7; Piople v. Ray assqD it cal.4th 464,47o; Peoplev. Frye (rSS8) 18 Cal.4th 8g4, g$g.30 Peoplev.Riddle (rszs) 83 cal.App.3d569,57z.ALSo sEE}Iirandav.Arizona(rq66) 384 us436,5391- Illinoisv. Gares (1983) 462 uS 2r3,237.s'See Peoplev. Payne (ry2) 6S Cal.App.3d 679 lreliable informant said payne molested childrenin his bedroom which was in the garage of a home he shared with his mother. To make sure hismother didn't see him enter with children, he would have the child hide in his car. When palmewent inside, the child would go in the garage door. During a stakeout, officers saw these

"rr"nt,ranspire; child was 10-12 years old. Officers entered. Court: "The police officers reasonablybelieved that [the child] was in need of their assistance. The poteniial crimes for which appettantwas being investigated were p-articularly heinous and danger-ous."l; peoplev. Brown Gg)6) pcal.App.3d 6oo, 6o4-5; Peoplev. Lucero (rq88) 44 cal.3d ro o6,lory; i'eopte". uiggiii (iss+)z6 Cal.App.4th 247 lanonyrnous report of domestic violence at a house. Ofdcers rudi -ur,

- -

through the window Woman who answered the door appeared "extremely frightened," marks onhe-r face indicating she'd been hit. She said she'd fallenfdenied that a man was inside the house.Officers entered. Court: "Viewed objectively, these circumstances justified the officers' actions toensure lthe woman'sl safeV."].sz see Peoplev. snead (rggr) r cal.App.4th 38o, 3g5-6; Mincey v. Arizona (rszg) 437 us 3g5,392; Arizonav. Hicks (rs8z) 48o uS 32r, B2s; people v. zabelle (rss6) so cai.app.+tnndzitzST;People v. Ammons (rg8o) ro3 cal.App.3d zo, z8-g1; peoprev. Keenir rrsesl r4s bat.epp.3a 73,77; Peopleu_. stamper (rg8o) ro6 caLApp.3d

3o:., g95-6ipeoplev.

niggini (rggD 26 cur.ipp.J*?47,-251-5 [entry justified because officers reasonably believed u *o-ii hadjust been beat#byher husband even though she denied itl. NOTE: A person who is unconsciou"s may be searched.for ID. see Peoplev. Gomez (ry6+) zz9 cal.App. zdlu; peoplev. Gonzales (rqooi rsz cai.epp.zd276.33 People v. cqin (is8s) z16 cal.App.3d 366. ALso sEE people v. wharton (rggr) sg cal.3d 5zz;Peoplev. Coddington (eooo) zgCal.4tn 5zg.u Peoplev. soldoff(rg8o) rrz cal.App.3d r. ALSO sEE peoplev. HilI(tg74) tzcal.gd 73r,7ss;Tamborino v. Superior Court (ry86) 4r Cal.3d glg, g23.


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E Officers responded to a report of gunshots coming from inside a house. Noone answered the door when the officers knocked. Just then they heard anoise from inside. It sounded "like a shotgun being chambered.'; Theyentered. Court: "The officers reasonably concluded that an injured person inneed of prompt attention might be within the house."sstr An officer was walking by the open door of a hotel room when he saw aman "seated on the bed with his face lying on a dresser at the foot of the bed."The officer also saw "a broken, jagged piece of mirror" and "dark balls" whichappeared to be heroin. He entered. Court: "The circumstances justified theofficer's belief that defendant might have overdosed on heroin. Thus, hisentry into the room to check on defendant's condition was justified." s6

FrREs, Expl-osrvgs: The premises are on fire, or there are dangerouschemicals or explosives on the premises which pose an imminent and seriousdanger to persons or property.3T

Buncr-anv oR RoBBERv rN pRocREss: offi cers reasonably believed aresidential burglary or robbery was in progress or had just occurred.ss Thejustification for such an entry and sweep is based

on the need to arrest theperpetrators if they are still inside, the need to protect any occupants who mightbe inside, and the need to protect property from theft or destruction. Forexample, entries have been upheld based on the following indications of burglary:

l-Officers responded to a report that the front door of a home had been6penall day. Looking inside, they saw clothing and paper "strewn on the g.orrrrh,on the sofa. It was just a real mess inside; it looked like someone had gonethrough the house." No one responded to the officers'knocking.:str At ro:3o p.M._a woman phoned police and said she thought the apartmentabove hers was being burglarized. She said she heard the sound of Lreakingglass and footsteps, and she knew the occupant was not at home. when

sB People v. stamper (rg8o) ro6 cal.App.3d 3or. ALSO sEE people v. Galan (tggg) t6gCal.App.3d 786.s0 Peoplev. Zabelle (tSS6) 5o Cal.App.4th 1282, rz87-8.zz see Michiganv. Tyler GgzS) 436 us 4gg, sog ["A burning building clearly presents angxigelc]t of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless

"ntry'.eu.o-.rable.;'l; people v. Remiro(rgzq 8g cal.App.3d 8o9, 83o; cleauerv. superior court (r97g) z4 cal.3d zg7; eeoplev. Aualos

(1988) zo3 cal.App.3d r5r7, r5zt; people v. Ramsey (ts6g) z7z cd-App.za goz., g..i eeople v.superior court (Peebles) (tgzo) 6 cal.App.3d 37g, s82; peoplev. Meiiina (rqssiros cal.app.3d997,942-s; Peoplev. Duncan (rq86) 4z cal.gdgl, 1oo-5; peoplev. osuna (rqs6) rsi cat.epi,.'a845, 852; Peoplev. Baird (rS8S) 168 Cal.App.3d237,z45; peoplev.Aualos(i988) zo3cal.App.3d rsr7, rs23; Peoplev. stegman (rsSs) 164 cal.App.sd sso; peoplei. sin"ti og7il ggcal.App.3d 8zo, 828; Peoplev. Gurtenstein (tszil 6s cat.eplp.:a ++ r, 44$ Tgrou.'a, to i"ti"""upackage contained a bombl. Arso sF.F. peoplev. Baker (rg7oj rz cal.epp.ld 826, g4o [officersreasonably believed that_drugs and a gun, possibly loaded,

were inside u 6o*titrg aliey lockerutrder surveillance by officers who intended to arrest any person who opened th"e tockerl.sa see Peoplev. superior court (Haflich) (rg86) r8o car.App. sdzsg;rotrbery in progressl.COMPARE Peoplev. MorganGgSil 196 Cal.App.Sd 816 [insufficienteviden-ce oiUJrgtary inprogressl; Horackv. Superior Court (rg7o) 3 Cal.3d 7zo finsufficient evidence of burllary inprogressl.ss People v. Ray (tssq 21 cal.4th 464. ALSO sEE people v. Aylwin (tgzs) sr cal.App.3d 826;Peoplev. Pa.rca (tszs) go Cal.App.3d Tzgldoor open in business;

"ttfry1o1o"utep^hoie nn*b"r.

ofowner to have him respondl.

8


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officers arrived, they discovered that a small pane of glass on the front doorhad been broken, and glass was on the floor inside the apartment.4otr At rz:3o r.u., police received a phone call that a burglary "was in progressor had just occurred." When they arrived, they found that all the doors io thehouse were locked but that a back window was open. And on the groundunder the window was a box containing a TV set and other things.+'

Hovrrcron SCBNBS: Officers arriving at a house in which a homicide occurredwill seldom know for certain whether there are other victims inside, or whetherthe perpetrator or an accomplice is still there. consequently, the u.s. supremeCourt has ruled that officers may, as a matter of routine, enter a house tliat is ahomicide scene and conduct a protective sweep.+,- _fot example, in People v. Hillcs officers were notified that a shooting victimhad been driven by friends to a hospital where the victim died. The victlm'sfriends said the shooting occurred during a drug sale at the home of AmeliaHernandez. Officers immediately went there and saw fresh bloodstains on thefence, porch, and on a car parked outside. Looking through a window, they sawwhat appeared to be bloodstains on the floor. Ruling the

officers'subsequententry was lavr,{ul, the court pointed out:Although only one casualty had thus far been reported, others may havebeen injured and may have been abandoned on the premises. There wasno response when the officers knocked and announced themselves, andentering the premises was the only practical means of determiningwhether there was anyone inside in need of assistance.

Dnal BODY: There is no "dead body" exception to the warrant requirement.44As a practical matter, however, a warrantless entry is usuallyjustified if, as isusually the case, officers cannot eliminate the possibility of i homicide.+s

OrIInn CRIMB scENEs: A crime scene can constitute an exigent circumstancewhen the perpetrator or any accomplices may still be on the scene, or when avictim of the crime may be injured and

on thepremises.

There is, irowever, nosweeping "crime scene" exigent circumstance.a6 Instead, a house that is a crimescene may be entered and searched without a warrant or consent only if suchaction was based on one specific reason to believe an imminent threai exists.

+o Peoplev. Bradley (rg8z) r3z Cal.App.gdrc7.+1 Peoplev. Duncan (1986) 4z Cal.3d 9r.a2 see Mincey v. Arizona (rsz8) 437 us 385, 392 ["(w)hen the police come upon the scene of ahomicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if theie are other victimsor if a killer is still on the premises.".+s (tgz4) rz cal.3d 73r. ALSO sEE people v. Amaya (tszil 93 cal.App.3 d 424; people v. Justin(tS8g) r4o Cal.App. Sd 729, 735.++ See Peoplev. Foster (rg8o) roz Cal.App.3d B8z, BBB.cs see Mincea v. Arizona (rsz8) 437 us 38s, 392-3. pRosECUToRs NorE: rnevitablediscovery: In People v. Foster (rg8o) roz Cal.App.3d B8z, 888-9 the court ruled that evidenceconcerning the discovery-of a decaying body was admissible undei the inevitable discoveryd.oclring because "give1 the offensive smell which permeated the alley, the coroner wouldobviously have been called by someone, and he would have been obliged by law to investigate thedeath." ALSO SEE Health and Safety Code SS rozg5o, roz855, roz86lo.a6seeMinceyv.Arizona(rsz8)437us385,395; Thompsonv.Louisiana(rs8+)469uS 17,221.;Peoplev. Timms (rq86) r79 Cal.App.3d 86, 9r.


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"cHEcKTHEWELFARE" cALLS: "check the welfare" calls usually involve areport to the police from a friend, relative, neighbor, or employer saying thatsomeone is missing under suspicious circumstances or that someone isbelievedto be in danger. If the reporting person appears to be reliable, and thecircumstances support the belief that the person is in danger, a warrantless entryinto the missing person's residence may be justified.+z Examples:

E Anonymous report of domestic violence at a house. Officers saw a manthrough the window. The woman who answered the door appeared"extremely frightened." There were marks on her face indicating she'd beenhit. she said she'd fallen and denied that a man was inside the house.Because the officers had actually seen a man inside, they knew she was lytrg,so they entered. Court: "Viewed objectively, these circumstances justified theofficers'actions to ensure fthe woman's] safety."+Btr Report of two small children left alone in an apartment. No one answeredthe door when the officer knocked. Just then, a woman arrived, opened thedoor and started to walk inside. As she opened the door, the officer saw"considerable trash and dirty clothes strewn

about the kitchen area." Thewoman was drunk. The officer entered. court: "[T]he facts reasonablyindicating that an infant child may be unattended constitute such asubstantial threat, and that such risk is not dissipated by the return of acustodial parent in a state of obvious intoxication." +str Mr. and Mrs. Macioce were reported missing. Their friends told officersthe Macioce's had missed a church meeting which they ordinarily attendedreqularly, that no one had answered the door for days, and that Mr. Maciocehad missed an appointment for knee surgery. Mail was accumulating and acar was in the driveway. Officers entered Court: "Given that informaiion, *ethink fthe officer's] conduct was eminently reasonable.,'so

Officer safetyA threat to officer safety is, of course, an exigent circumstance that may justiSr

a warrantless entryinto a home.s' Specifically, if officers reasonably believe thereis a person inside who poses an immediate threat to them, thev mav enter the

a7 s9e Peoplev. wharton (rsgr) sg cal.3d 522,.577-8; peoplev. Ray (r99g) 2rcal. th 464; peoplev. Clqrk (1968) z6z Cal.App. zd 47r, 476; people v. Willis (tg8o) ro+ Ci[.epp. Sd +Si;5, +Ci'.+e Peoplev. Higgins (ISSD z6 Cal.App.4* 247.cg Peoplev. sutton(rsz6) 65 cal.App.3d 34r. ALSo sEE peoplev. Neighbours (r99o) zzgcal.App.3d 1115, 1123; In re Dawn o. (rgz6) 58 cal.App.3d 16o, 163; Feople". jwilei og:gq ogcal.App.4th rgo,rgg; Peoplev. Keener (rsss) r48

cal.App.sdzs,zi. coMpAREpeoplei.

imith(rgZz) Z Cal.3d z8z.so People v. Mqc[oce (rg8) r97 cal.App.3d z6z. ALSO sEE people v. Roberts (rss6) 47 cal.zd37 4; People v. Ammons (rg8o) ro3 Cal.App.3d zo.s'see Msrylandv. Buie (rgso) 494 us 32s,336 In re Elizaberh G. (zoor) gg cal.App.4th 496,5o7;_People v. Haugland (r98i) rrs Cal.App.3d z4B, 258 [officers reasonably believed u'g,r., *u,in a bri.efcase carried by a detaineel. coMpARE peoplev. Ramey Gsz6) 16 cal.3d z6g, iT6lcotrtnoted "there was no reason for [the officer] to assume the weapon was available for immediateuse"l

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house and search for him. This is true regardless of whether the threatmaterialized while the officers were inside or outside the house.s2

For example, exigent circumstances based on a threat to officers have beenfound as follows:

tr Officers arrested a robbery-murder suspect after he was orderedout of hisgirlfriend's house. The officers reasonably believed that someone inside

posed a danger because they were aware that the suspect worked withaccomplices.s:tr While standing at the open door of a house, officers became aware that afirearm was accessible to an occupant who was hostile to them, intoxicated.or otherwise unstable.s+tr FBI agents received information that a carjacker/serial bank robber wasstaying at a certain motel room with a certain woman. During surveillance,agents saw the wo,man drive up in a car taken in a carjacking. As the agentsapproached her, she yelled, "Run, Buddy!" Agents kicked in the door to themotel room and arrested "Buddy." sstr Responding to a report of screams

coming from inside a house, an officerknocked on the door. The man who opened the door "appeared to benervous, looked over his shoulder and-without explanition-moved towardthe bedroom in a seemingly hasty fashion." The officer went in after himbecause he was concerned for his safety and the safety of anyone else in thehouse.56

Drug labs

- The presence of an illegal drug lab inside a residence or business can pose athreatto the occupants, their neighbors, and the homes and other prop".ty in theimmediate vicinity. still, an illegal drug lab is not, in and of itself, an exigentcircumstance that will justifiz a warrantless entry. Instead, it becomes an exigent

sz see Peoplev. Maier (r99r) zz6 cal.App.3d t67o, t675 ["An accomplice on another floor issurely no more dangerous than one on the other side of a window, oi a door."l; Marylandv. Buie(rgso) 494 us 32s,937; Guidiv. superior court (rg7}) ro cal.3d r, g; peopliv. nlolckugzr) 6cal.3d 2s9: 24s, People v. Baldwin (tsz6) 6z cal.App.3 d 727,742-g; peopie v. schmel itsTil s+Cal.App.3d 46. 5t-z; COMPARE z DiIIonv. Superioi Court (rg7z) Z Cil.ia3os, 31453 Peoplev. Maier (t99t) zz6 cal.App.3d 167o. ALSO sEE peoplev.. nreietiltggo) rrzCal.App.3d 65,73; Gueuarav. Superior Court (rg7o) 7 Cal.App.3d 58t, 535.s+ Peoplev. wilson(tsg7) .s9 cal.App.4tt' ro53, ro6r. Arso sE-E eeoplei.-byke (rg9o) zz4Cal.App'3d 648,66o ["(T)he presence of a handgun in a dwelling, in and of Itseli olr.iously doesnot constitute an exigent circumstance justif ing entry. Howevei, the evidence is that the offi""r,reasonably believed fthat the fugitive] was secreted inside and was aware of the reason for theirpresence. They were not obliged to wait and see if he or Dyke would reach for the handgun orotherwise tryto escape;'f; Peoplev. Mitchell (rsgo) zzz ial.App.3d 13o6, tg:f;; reopliv. Kizzee(rgzq

94Cal.App.3 d gz7

, 935 ["Thefront door of

theresidence

was sianding wide open. Theywere told that a woman was still inside and they knew that a woman had par{icipated in the crimefin which a gun was usedll; Peoplev. Keener (rs8s) r4B cal.App. sdzg,zz; u.s. v. nailey (9th cir.zoor) 263 F.3d rozz, ro33.ss [/.s. v. ReiIIy (9* cir. zooo) zz4F.gdg86, ggt ["The officers reasonably suspected thatdangerous weapons might be on the premises. Furthermore, Lange's unexpected and vocalreaction to being taken into custody could have tipped Reilly offto the agents'presence and givenhim adequate time to arm himself or attempt to escape."].so People v. Frazier (ry2) Zt Cal.App.3d 6$o,694.

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circumstance if officers were aware of facts that reasonably indicated the labpresented an imminent threat.sz

PCP aNn METH r-ABS: An imminent threat almost always exists if officersreasonably believe the lab is currently being used to make pcp ormethamphetamine. This is because, as the California Supreme Court observed,"The extremely volatile nature of chemicals, including ether, involved in theproduction of drugs such as PCP and methamphetamine creates a dangerousenviro_nment, especially when handled unprofessionally by residentialmanufacturers of illicit drugs."ss

Jusr BTHER: Because ether is highly volatile and therefore dangerous, animminent and serious threat may be based on the detection of an odor of etheremanating from a home if the odor was so strong as to indicate a high-andtherefore dangerous-concentration of the chemical in the house.se

For example, in People v. stegman6o a man phoned the Riverside countysheriffs Department at about 1 A.M., reporting in odor of ether coming from aneighbor's home. when deputies arrived, they confirmed the odor was comingfrom the neighbor's house; that it was, in fact, ether;

and that the odor *ur rostrong it could be detected two houses away. Because the deputies were awarethat "ether was a volatile substance, and that there was a danger of explosion andfire," they immediately notified the fire department, requestel backup, andevacuated the occupants of nearby homes.

when backup arrived, deputies approached the house from which the odorwas emanating. on the back patio they saw "plastic vats with a chemicalsubstance in them." Then, looking through a window of the house, they saw,,avacuum pump, more vats with chemicals, and glass beakers." They could also

sz see People v. Duncan (rq86) 4z calgd 91, 1o3 ["(T)here is no absolute rule that canaccommodate every warrantless entry into premises housing a drug laboratory. It is manifest thatthe emergency nature of each situation must be evaluated ott ltr ovir facts."l; beople u. Osuna(t986)r87Cal.App.3d845,85z; peoplev.petterson(tSZil94Cal.App.3d,+SO,+ZS_+;peoplev.Messina (rsSs) 165 cal.App.3dgQ7t9-45; pecplev. Remiro (tgzil 89 Oal.App 3 d.sog, sgri neoplev. superior court (Peebles).(t97o) 6 cal.App.3d g7g, 382; people v. Baird (ryBd ros ca'i.epp.3^a237, 245; People v. Aualos,(rg8_8)- zo-3 Cal.App.3d LSL7, rS23 [meth lab in house that

"augtrifi."1.

sl leoplev. Duncctn(t986)-+z cal.3d 91, 1o5. ALSO sEE peoplev. stegman(rgg5) 164cal'App.3d 986,944; Peoplev. Messina (rsSs) 165 car.App.3dssz,s4st"(I)i is abundantly clearIha! lhe types of chemicals used to manufacture methampletaminesare extremely hazardous tohealth."l.ss_see Peoplev. stegman (rs8s) 164 cal-App.sd sg6; peoplev. Duncan (rqg6) 4z cal.gd91, 1o3[disapprovingacontraryrulinginpeoplev.Dickson(rs83)r44cal.App.sdro+b]; peiplev'.Baird(rs8s) 168 cal.App.gdz3-7,.244; peoplev. Blacktuell (rsss) r+z cal.eirp.ia o4o lstroni tumesassociated with PCP inside homel. NorE: rn peoplev. Dicksotn frqg3-ira+ cal.epp.3jro4o,to57-8, one of the most verbose opinions in the history of California jurisprudence, tle courtopined that ether is not really dangerous in the amounts

commonly usedio manufacturepCp.

see, especially, pp.ro67-8. The "logic" behind the Dickson court's conclusions has beenthoroughly repudiated to the point that Dfckson is not citable for much of anything except,perhaps, the degree to which_some people have too much time on their handi. fn iry

"rreni,ickson has routinely been distinguished, ignored, or disapproved. See people v. Dincan (iqg6)4z cal.3d gr, ro3-4; People v. osuna (rq86) r87 cal.App.3d g+s, 85r; peoptev. Beird(rqsii168cal'App.3d 237,244; Peoplev. stegman (rs8s) 164 cal.App.gd ss6,

'944;reoplev. abLiriq8sl

r74Cal.App.3d796,8o8; peoplev.Messina(ISSS)rO5Cil.epp.3d.9g7,944,-fn.z6o (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 936.

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hear a motor running inside the house. A deputy then knocked on the door andannounced, "sheriffs deputy, open the door." In response, people inside thehouse began running. The deputies then entered and arrestid the occupants.

In ruling the circumstances reasonably indicated an immediate entry wasnecessary, the court pointed out the smell of ether

could be detected two housesaway. Said the court, "Ether at such high levels of concentration would be highlydangerous regardless of purpose, thus constituting an exigent circumstance.i

Trrn Nnno FoR DrLrcENcE: In the past, the courts would occasionallyinvalidate warrantless entries into drug labs if it appeared the officers weremotivated by a desire to obtain evidence or make arrests rather than save lives orproperty. As noted, however, the courts no longer look to the officers' motivation.Instead, if the circumstances were such that it was objectively reasonable forthem to immediately enter, their motivation for doing do is immaterial.

Still, if officers were not diligent in responding to the situation, a court mightconclude the officers'actions proved there was no emergency, or at least therewas time to obtain a warrant.6r If this happens, the entry may be invalidated.

Destruction of evidenceProbably the most common type of exigent circumstance is the imminent

destruction of evidence. This is because most types of evidence can be destroyedquickly and easily, and the destruction of evidence is a top priority for mostcriminals, especially when they have reason to believe the police ire closing in.o,

As we will now discuss, there are two requirements that must be met foi thisexigent circumstance to exist:

(r) Evidence is present: There must be probable cause that destructibleevidence in the home.6s(z) rmpending destruction: officers must have reason to believe theevidence might be destroyed if they delayed taking action until a warrant wasissued.o+

EvronNcn rs PRBSENT: In the absence of direct evidence, an officer's beliefthat destructible evidence is on the premises may be based on reasonableinference. This often occurs when officers have probable cause to believe asuspect committed a certain crime. If perpetrators of such a crime typically utilizea certain type of instrumentality it may be reasonable to infer that tle suspect6, See P e ople v. B aird (ISBS) 168 Cal.App. gd zg7, 245.az See United Sfotes v. Santana. OSZ6) 4z7IJS 38, 43 f"Once Santana saw the police, there waslikewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in the destruction oi evidenc e."l; In reJessie L. (rqSz) r3r calApp.3 d zoz, zt4. Also sEE pe ople v. superior court (Dai-Re) (rqso)ro4 Cal.App.3d 86, 9o [court notes that the preservation of evidence is "of great socialimportance."].6s See lllinois v. McArthur (zoor)

53r US _ [r+B L.Ed.zd 838, 848].6+ see-Ferdinu. superior court (rg74) 36 cal.App.3d774,7gz [..of course, mere probable causefor officers to believe that contraband is within a home will notlustify a warrantless search."l;People v. cemilleri (rsso) zzo cal.App.3d rrg9, rzog ["Mere fear or-apprehension alone thatevidence will be destroyed will not justifii a warrantless entry of a private home. Instead, theremust exist specific and articulable facts which, taken together witli rational inferences, supportthe warrantless intrusion."l. COMPARE vale v. Louisiinq Ggzo) s99 us 30, 34 t,,(B)y thlir ownaccount the-arresting officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in th" honr" wiren theyfirst entered the premises."l.

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also possesses such an instrumentality6s-and that it is located in his home.66 Forexample, if may be reasonable to believe there are drugs and sales paraphernaliaqn tlre suspect's home when there is probable cause to believe he isb drugdealer.6z

IupnNorNGDESTRUcrroN: The mere presence of evidence in a home is notan exigent circumstance. Instead, it becomes so if officers reasonably believe itwould be destroyed or become useless if they waited for a warrant._ For example, in Mincey v. Arizona68officers made a warrantless entry into ahome in which an undercover officer had just been murdered. The entry-was, ofcourse, lan{ul. But after the scene was secured and the perpetrator arrested, theofficers conducted an extensive search of the house. In iuling the search wasunlawful, the U.S. Supreme Court noted, "There was no indication that evidencewould be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a searchwarrant. . . . we decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense underinvestigation itself creates exigent circumstances . . . .,,

What circumstances tend to show a suspect is about to destroy evidence?Here are some of the most common:

A SHorrrnn WARNING: If officers have probable cause to believe there isevidence inside a house, it may be reasonable to believe its destruction isimminent if, rpon a-rrival, they hear someone inside or outside shouting awarning that the police are here.6sFrusnnvc TOILETS: If there is probable cause to believe there are drugs on thepremises, the sound of a toilet flushing that coincides with the officei's arrivalis a classic indication of destruction of drugs.zoFnawrrc Acrrvrry: After officers knock on the door or arrive outside. anvy_elling, running, or fr-a_ntic activity is an indication that evidence is beingdestroyed or soon will be. zr

6s

see People v. Bennett (tgg9) rz cal.4th g7g, ggg; people v. Frank (rsgs) 3g cal.3d 7u, 7zg;Peoplev. Meyer (rq86) r83 cal.App.3d u5o, r:.6z; peoplev. Koch (rqeq) zoq cal:Ap;,p.id,77o,78o; People v. Tuadles (1992) 7 !al.App.4th 1777; people v. sanchez (rgso rio cal.eppgd'72o,727; Peoplev. Aho (1985) 166 CalApp. Sd g84, gg2-3; peoplev. CIeIen'd (rSSo) zzS iut.ipp.Sa388' 392-3; In re christopher R. (rg8g) z16 cal.App.3d 9or, go5; people v. Freeny (tszd siCal.App.3d 20,29; Peoplev. Gonzalez (tgSo) Sr Cli.Sd rr7g, tzo6.66 see People v. Miller (rsz9) 85 cal.App.3 d tg4, zo4 [' A number of california cases haverecognized that from the nature of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate can reasonablyconclude that a suspecfs residence is a logical place to look for specific in"criminating items.",.ar See Peoplev. Senkir (rg,7z) z6 Cal.App.3d 4rr,42o-L; Peoplei. Superior Court (Itiarcil) (rgzz)z7 Cal.App.3 d 4o4, 4t3 ["Numerous cases have upheld sea..h *u..urt, on the theory tttui on"who sells narcotics may have more at his residence or place of operations ."); people u. CoId",(t97r) zo Cal.App.3d zLr, zr-8-g (dis. opn. of Kaus. "1.) ["we have all handled enough narcoticscases and thus gained knowledge of the habits of peddlers, that we may perhaps r&sonablysuspect that such a person who deals a small amount of merchandise

from his home, has morewhere it came from."].68 (1978) 437 US 385, 394.os See U.S. v. Reilly (9tn Cir. zooo) zz4 F.3d 9g6, 99r.zo See Peoplev. Clark (tq68) z6z Cal.App. zd 47r,475l"Therepeated flushing of the toilet behindthe locked door of the bathroom in premlses where mirijuana is being kept alnd ttre police are atthe threshold is almost a commonplace signal of the desiruction of eridence."l; feopleul. Alani"(ts86) r8z Cal.App.3d 2o3, 9_o6 f"Keenly aware of appellant's penchant for Rustrinf toilets evenwhen nature did not call . . . ".l.

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DRUGS, sroLEN pRopERTy rN pr,arN vrEw: If officers see contraband or otherevidence in plain view in the suspect's home, and if they reasonably believethe-suspect was aware they had seen it, they can usually infer that ihe suspectwill attempt to destroy it if he is given the opportunity.zz

AccolrprrcE ARRESTED: If a suspect's accomplice has been arrested, andifthere is reason to believe the suspect has learned about it or soon will, it may

be reasonable to believe the suspect will soon start destro)tng any destructibteevidence in his home.7g The following are circumstances thatlend to show thesuspect has learned about his accomplice's arrest and will start destro)angevidence:

AccovrprrcEARREsrBD oursrDE HoME; suspEcrrNsrDE: If officers havejust arrested the suspect's accomplice outside the home, it is usuallyreasonable to believe the suspect saw the arrest and will destroy evidenceif given the opportunity. Examples:

Robbery: A drug store in Modesto had just been robbed of drugs andmoney. The getaway car was traced to a house in the city. Whenofficers arrived, they saw the car in the driveway

and arrested one ofthe suspects who was standing outside. When they saw two menlooking out of a window in the house, the officers entered and arrestedthem. court: "The officer saw two males looking out the front windowof the residenceobserving the detention of ftheir accomplice]. SergeantPuthuffreasonably could conclude evidence might be deitroyed withinthe house."z+Drug case: while conducting surveillance of a motel room in whichcocaine was being sold, officers saw one of the suspects walk outsideand drop a package in the trash; the package looked rike the package inwhich cocaine was transported. Based on this, the officers "feared thatdestruction or movement of the cocaine was occurring or wasimminent and that the suspects

werepreparing

to flee.,,So theyimmediately arrested the man. Because they thought the others insidethe motel room might have seen the arrest occur, officers entered the

z' See People v. Seaton (zoor) 26 Cal.4ttt 5g8, 69z f"for five to ten minutes, during which time ftheofficersl heard noises that-sounded like objects being moved. Based on these circirmstances, theofficers could reasonably fear that unless they entered, persons in the house would destroyevidence."l; Peoplev.FreenyGgzDsz cal.App.3d zo,z6 [afterofficersatthefrontdooridentified and demanded entry, they heard "shrill female sounds emanating from within thehouseandthesoundoffootstepsrunningawayfromthedoor."l; Peoplev.baryiUo(tg66)6+Cal. zd 587, 592; P eople v. Ab e s (rS8S) r74 Cal.App.3 d 7 96, 8o7.z'see Peoplev. Robinson-(r986) r85 cal.App.3d 528, 532; peoplev. ortiz (tgg5) 3z cal.App.4th286,293-4; Peoplev. HuIl (t99) 34 Cal.App.4rh t448, 1456; peoplev.

Curley(t97o)

tzCal.App.3d 732,744.zs See Peoplev' Freeny GSZD 37 Cal.App.3d zo, 33 l"No reasonable man could conciude otherthan that Mrs' Freeny would destroy evidence of her guilt, which was equal to that of appellant, ifshe learned of his arrest . . . ."1. COMPARE Dillon v. superior court egTz) z cal.sd sos,3r4l"There is, of course, always the possibility that some additional person may be fo"rid i" uhouse outside of which an arrest took place. But the mere possibility of additional persons in thehouse, without more, is not enough . . ."1; peoplev. Broui(rs8s) iro cal.App.3d^g49, g56.z+ Peoplev. Daughhetee (rqBS) 165 Cal.App.3 d SZ4, S7B.

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room and secured it, pending issuance of a warrant. Court: Theofficers' fear that the cocaine would be destroyed was reasonable.Ts

AccolrprrcE ARRESTED AwAyFRoM HoME; suspEcr \t'rLL sooN pANIC:A variation of the "Accomplice Arrested outside" exigency is the situationin which officers arrest the accomplice some distance from the house

inwhich the evidence and the suspect are located. Depending on thecircumstances, it may be reasonable for officers to figure that the suspectwill panic and destroy evidence when his accomplicofails to return ontime.

Murder case: Shortly after a drive-by shooting, the driver droppedoffa passenger at the passenger's home. The driver was arrested

-

shortly thereafter, not far from the house. court: It was reasonable forofficers to believe the passenger would learn of the arrest and destroythe guns used in the shooting, or at least wipe them clean offingerprints.z6Drug cases officers arrested a drug seller's middleman after he sold akilogram of cocaine to an undercover

officer for $36,ooo. Havingdetermined that the seller was at home, they immediately went to hishouse, entered it, and secured it pending isiuance ofa search warrant.They did this because they figured the suspect "would be expecting thepayment for the kilo very soon after it had left the residence, and whenthat money did not arrive the fsuspect] would know something waswrong," that he would "get nervous about an unexplained delay inpa5..rnent and might either flee or destroy evidence. court: The officers'fears were reasonable; the entry was lawful based on exigentcircumstan ces.77

AccouprrcE oR spousE rs coopERATrNc wrrH pol-rcE: A suspect wholearns that an accomplice or his estranged spouse is now

"oopeiatingwith

police may also immediatelydestroy evidence.Drug case: A woman asked officers to stand by while she removed her

clothing from the trailer she shared with her estranged husband. As shewalked outside with her things, she told officers thal her husband hadjust "slid some dope underneath the couch." when the husband cameoutside, an officer told him he could not go back inside until a warrant

zs U.S.v. Parra(tsth Cir. 1993) z F.3d to58.z6 In re Elizabeth G. (zoot) 88 Cal.App.4th 496, So7.n leoplev. camilleri (rsgo) zzo cal.App.3d rr99. ALSO sEE Ferdinv. superior court (tgzl) z6Cal.App.3d 774,782 ["But the combination of circumstances present here: the probable cause toarrest Ferdin and the danger that the miscarriage of the lmiddleman's] mission would becomeknown to Ferdin with consequent destruction

of contraband,justified

ihe actions, less thansearch, of entry and monitoring the occupants."l; Inre Jessie-L (r9gz) r3r cal.App.3 d.zoz, zr4["The police could reasonably conclude that there was no time to g"t u *urrurrt and that theremaining suspects must be promptly arrested because they mighi flee or destroy evidence uponword getting out that David C. was in custody and had made statements to the police."l; eeople v.Thompson(tgzz) zs cal.App.3d rs2, r4o-r [reasonable to berieve a person who shippedmarijuana to the defendant would notify the defendant when the pa"kage was due io arrive; if itdidn't arrive on time, defendant might not pick up the packagel. iontpAnn people v. Rodr:iguez(r98r) rz3 Cal.App.3d z69, z7z.

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was issued. court: "[T]he police had good reason to fear that, unlessrestrained, fthe husband] would destroy the drugs before they couldreturn with a warrant. They reasonably might have thought that fthehusbandl realized that his wife knew about his marijuana stash;observed that she was angry or frightened enough

toask

thepolice

toaccompany her; saw that after leaving the trailer she had spoken withthe police . . . . They reasonably could have concluded that fthehusband], consequently suspecting an imminent search, would, if giventhe chance, get rid of the drugs fast."z8

Imminent Escape:"Hot" and "Fresh" Pursuits

In the context of exigent circumstances, there are two types of imminentescapes: "hot" and "fresh." Either one will justify a warrantless entry and a sweepof the premises. The problem for officers is knowing whether they are actuallyinvolved in a "hot" or "fresh" pursuit, or whether it's some lesser kind of chas-ethat does not constitute an exigent

circumstance."flor" PuRsurrs-: A "hot" pursuit occurs if officers attempt to arrest a suspectin a public place but he runs into a house or other private place.zs In such cases,the suspect's escape is more than "imminent"-it's "in progress.',

There are four requirements for a warrantless entry based on "hot" pursuit.They are:

(r) Probable cause to arrest: There was probable cause to arrest thesuspect for a felony or misdemeanor.8o(e) Attempt to arrest outside: Officers attempted to arrest the suspect ina public place.(g) suspectruns inside: The suspect attempted to escape by running intoa house or other private place.8t(+)

officers follow him in: Immediately, or shortly thereafter,sz officerswent in after him.SgFor example,inunited statesv. santana,8+ officers went to santana's house

to arrest her because she hadjust sold drugs to an undercover officer. As the

ze Illinoisv. McArthur (zoor) 53r US _ lr+B L.Ed.zd 8381.zs NOTE: If the suspect runs into somebody else's house, he will probably not have stand"ing tochallenge the officers'warrantless entry and search. See Rakos v. Illinois (tg7}) 4Sg US rz8] r48;Hudsonv.Palmer (tSS+)+68US Sr7,S2S["TheapplicabilityoftheFourthAmendmentturnsonwhether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimateexpectation ofprivary that has been invaded by governmental action."l80 See Peoplev. White (rg86) rB3 Cal.App.3d r.i99, rzo5.st See LI.S. v. Johnson (9th Cir. zoot) 256 F.3d 895, 9o5 fnot a "hot" pursuit because officers hadmerely a "gut feeling" the suspect

fled onto theproperby

that was seirchedl. NorB: It isunsettled whether officers must have probable cause or merely reasonable suspicion to believe thesuspect went into the private place. See people v. white Ggg6) rB3 cal.App.3d rr99, rzo5-g.B, See Peoplev. Bradford (972) z8 Cal.App.3d 695,7o3.sz see Peoplev. Abes (rsSs) 174cal.App.gd796,8o6; peoplev. McDotueII (rq88) 46 cal.3d 55r,562; People v. Mack (tgSo) z7 Ca73d r45. NOTE: Knock-notice: Officers in "hot p.rtsuit"i.enot required to comply with the knock-notice requirements unless there were othercircumstances that made an unannounced entry unreasonable. See I4li/son v. Arkansas (rgSS) Sr+US 927,936-7; Peoplev. Patino (tSZil 95 Cal.App.3d rr, zr.

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officers pulled up in front of the house, they saw santana standing at thedoorway. She saw them, too, and ran inside. The officers followed her in, arrestedher, and inthe process discovered evidence in plain view. Their entry, ruid th.court, was lan{ul because it was a "true hot pursuit." Said the court: "[A] suspectmay not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by

theexpedient of escaping to a private place."A pursuit may be "hot" even though it occurred long after the crime was

committed so long as the four requirements listed above are met. For example, inPeoplev. Patinogs I-{PD officers ran after a man who had just burglarized a bar.Although they lost him, they spotted him about an hour later and resumed thechase. The man ran into an apartment and the officers went in and arrested him.The court ruled that even though the officers lost the suspect for about an hour,their pursuit became a "hot" one when they saw him again and chased him intothe apartment.

^ Ngte that a pursuit may be "hot" regardless of whether the suspect is wantedfor a_felony or misdemeanor. For example, in People v. Lloyd un dffi"". chasedthe driver of a car who had driven through a red

light. The driver eventuallystopped in front of a house and went inside with officers in pursuit. In rulingtheir entry was law{ul, the court said:

Where the pursuit into the home was based on an arrest set in motion ina public place, the fact that the offenses justifiiing the initial detention orarrest were misdemeanors is of no significance in determining thevalidity of the entry without a warrant.B6

"FRESH" puRsurrs: unlike "hot" pursuits, "fresh" pursuits do not involve aphysical chase. Instead, the officer's belief that the suspect's escape is imminentis based on circumstantial evidence.

Sometimes the circumstantial evidence is quite strong. For example, in onecase officers learned that a murder suspect was staying ai u motel, una inutmoney would soon

be delivered to him so he could flee to Texas.sz In anothercase, an officer's belief that a murderer was fleeing, or soon would be, was basedon the discovery of a fresh trail of blood leading frbm a murder scene to thesuspect's house.88 The theory here was that the suspect would start running assoon as he realized he had left a trail of blood.

In most cases, however, an officer's belief that a suspect's escape is imminentis based mainly on reasonable inference. The most comhon infer6nce is that aperson who has committed a serious felony, and who is now inside his home orthe home of a friend or relative, will quickly leave the house and go into activeflight if he has reason to believe that officers have learned his identiw or wereotherwise closing in.

8-1 (1976)427

us98, 49.ALSO

sEE people v.superior court

(euinn)(rsz8) 83 cal.App.3d 6o9,b1b.

8s (rgZil gS Cal.App.3d rr. ALSO SEE People v. Ngaue GSgz) 8 Cal.App.4th 896, 9o3; people v.Bradford (rgZ z) z8 Cal.App.3d 69 S, 7 o3.86 (tg_Bg) z16 cal.App.3d 1425, r43o. ALSo sEE rn re Lauoyne M. (rggo) zzr cal.App. sdrs4,r59;Peoplev.Abes (rsSs) r74cal.App.gd796,8o7;peopliv.white(ig86)ra3calap!.siitgg,r2o3-4.ez Peoplev. Lopez(rSZil 99 Cal.App.3d754,766.88 Peoplev. McDotaell (rq88) 46 Cal.3d 55r.

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Because situations such as these are potentially dangerous and call for quickaction, the courts permit a warrantless entry into the home to arrest a suspect iffour circumstances exist.

(r) serious felony: officers must have had probable cause to arrest thesuspect for a serious felony, usually a serious and violent felony.ss(z) Diligence: Officers must have been diligent in their investigation.eo(g) Suspect in house: Officers must have reasonably believed the suspectwas now inside the house.el(4) Circumstantial evidence of flight: Officers were aware ofcircumstances indicating the suspect was in active flight or soon would be.What facts are sufficient? The following are examples:

rntensive investigation in progress: when a person commits aserious felony that he knows or believes was reported to the police, he willexpect an immediate, all-out effort to identifii and apprehend him. Thelength of such an effort will vary depending on the seiiousness of the crimeand the number of leads. In any event, if during this time officersreasonably believe the perpetrator is inside his home,

a warrantless entrymight be justified under the "fresh" pursuit doctrine. Examples:D At 8 a.u., Hayden robbed a cab company at gunpoint. Two cabdrivers followed him to his home nearby and nbtified police. whenofficers arrived, they entered and arrested him. court: "The policewere informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that thesuspect had entered [his house] less than five minutes before theyreached it. They acted reasonably when they entered the hous. undbegan to search for a man of the description they had been given."eztr The body of a young woman was discovered at 5:2o A.M. ilong uroad in Placer county. She had been raped, robbed, and murdered.sheriffs detectives quickly identified the woman and developedprobable cause to believe

that Williams was the perpetrator. The nextday, they found the victim's stolen car near the apartment of Williams'girlfriend. They entered the apartment and arrested him. In ruling thearrest was lalrful under the "fresh" pursuit doctrine, the court notedthe investigation proceeded steadily and diligently from the time thebody was discovered, adding, "The proximity of the victim's car clearly

s_s See People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.zd 77g,7g7; people v. Amaya (tgZq gS Cal.App.3d 424, 4zg["Thus, officers need not secure a warrant to enter a dwelling in f.esn pu.s"it of a fleel-ng suspectbelieved to have committed a grave offense and who therefoie may coirstitute a danger toothers."l; InreJessieL.(tg8z) r3rcal.App.3dzoz,zr4["Immediateflightwasareisonablepossibility in light of the seriousness of the crime involved,

murder."l;p"eoplev.

Escudero (1SZS)z3-Cal.3d 8oo. 8rr [nighttime residential burglary]; Peoplev. Superior Coirt (Dai-re) (rggo) loa!_1l.epp.3d 86, 9o fnighttime commercial burglary]. coMpARE l,treIshv. wision i"(ry8a,1 iooU574o,753.so see People v. williams (rs8s) 48 cal.3d rrr2, rr3g ["There was no unjustified delay by theinvestigating officers during which time an arrest warrant for the homicide could have beenobtained."l."s, See Peoplev. White (rq86) r83 Cal.App.3d tr99, r2o7-g.e2 Wardenv. Hayden (rS6Z) 387 US 294,298.

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suggested defend_ant's presence in the apartment, and also made flighta realistic possibility." s:tr Gilbert shot and killed an Alhambra police officer during a botchedbank robbery. Gilbert and one of his accomplices, King, got away but,unknown to them, a third accomplice named weaver

waiquickty

captured. weaver identified Gilbert as the shooter and told officerswhere he lived. while en route to the apartment, officers learned thatKing had just left the apartment. Figuring that Gilbert might be inside,they forcibly entered. Although Gilbert wis not there, offiiers foundsome evidence in plain view. In ruling the entry was lanful under the"f-resh" pursuit doctrine, the california Supreme court noted that theofficers learned of Gilbert's address less thin two hours after therobbery and murder and that it was reasonable for them to believe hehad returned to his house. said the court, "presumably fGilbert] wasinthe apartment. since the officers were in fresh pursuit of tworobbers who escaped in the same automobile, lthe assumption thatGilbert was inside the apartment] was

not unreasonable.'inowrrNnss coulD rD: "Fresh" pursuit may also occur if the perpetrator of aserious-felony was aware that his victim or witnesses couldidetrtiry rri*.Examples:

tr A man who had killeq two people while robbing a jewelry store,attempted to kill a third person who escaped. rhe third peison knewthe killer's name. when officers identified the suspect u fer" hourslater, they immediately went to his apartment, eniered, and arrestedhim.rtD A woman who had been kidnapped and raped by a man in a motelroom was able to escape when the man fell asleep. she immediatelynotified police who entered the room and arrested him. court: ,,ThLpolice could well have

believed that the victim's absence upondefendant's arousal would sound an alarm for him to flee . . . .,'nutr Lanfrey stabbed another man in a bar. witnesses provided officerswith leads concerning_the perpetrator's name and telnporaryresidence. Almost six hours after the stabbing, officers enteredLanfrey's motel room and arrested him. couri: "It is true that at thetime defendant Lanfrey was arrested in his motel room, approximatelyfive and a half hours-had-elapsed since the stabbing i"cia""t. howeverlduring that period, the officers had been engaged ii an ongoing fieldinvestigation leading them to Lanfrey. There does not uppeu, t6 havepeqn 11v unjustified delayby the officers during which piobable causehad jelled and a warrant could have been obtairied.,,s,

gz Peoplev. Williams (tS8S) 48 Cal.3d rnz.s+ Peoplev. Gilbert (1965) 63 cal.zd 69o. ALSo sEE In re ElizabethG. (zoor) 88 cal.App.4rh 496;People v. Superior Court (Peebles) (rgZo) 6 Cal.App.3d 379.gs See People v. Bacigalupo (tggt) 1 Cal.4ttr 1oB, r2r-2.e6 Peoplev. Kilpatrick (rq8o) ro5 Cal.App.3d 4or, 4ro.sz Peoplev. Lanfrey (rq88) zo4 Cal.App.3d 49r, 5o9.

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PnnpnrnanoR DRoppEo rD: A perpetrator can be expected to flee as soonas he realizes he left ID of some sort, such as a wallet, at or near the crimescene. Examples:

f At rz:4o A.M., a man caught Escudero burglarizing a home nearsacramento. Escudero sped away in a car and the man followed himuntil Escudero stopped the car and ran offon foot. The man removedthe vehicle registration from the car and notified sheriffs deputies.Deputies immediately went to the address listed on the registrationand arrested Escudero inside his home. court: "Throughout the eventsin question the police were pursuing a man whom they suspected ofhaving broken into an occupied private home in the middle of thenight to commit a burglary; this is a serious crime, with an ever-present potential for exploding into violent confrontation. The need toprevent the imminent escape of such an offender is clearly an exigentcircumstance."ss

AcconrprrcE ARRESTno: If an accomplice of the perpetrator was arrested,and if there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator

learned of thearrest, it may be reasonable to believe the perpetrator has figured that hisaccomplice will probably identify him and will immediately flee.Examples:

tr Four juveniles on a robbery spree killed a young man and fled. oneof the juveniles, David c., was arrested two days liter at 5 A.M. By 6:3oe.y., he had given officers the address of one of his accomplices.-officers immediately went to the house, forcibly entered and arrestedhim. court: "The police could reasonably conclude that there was notime to get a warrant and that the remaining suspects must bepromptly arrested_because they might flee or destroy evidence uponword getting out that David C. was in custody and had madestatements to the police."ser A live-in maid named szabo reported to LApD officers that burglarsbroke into her employers'house, tied her up, and stole TV's, stere-os,and other things. It turned out that a patrol officer had written downthe license number of a suspicious van parked in front of the houseearlier that evening. officers traced the car to the home of Mr. andMrs. csemers who had some of the stolen property and were arrested.when officers saw_a photograph of szabo in the csemers'home, theyconcluded (corre_ctly) that Szabo was an accomplice. They immediatllywent back to szabo's house and arrested her. court: "A telephone call

eB Peoplev. Escudero (tSZil z3 Cal.3d 8oo. 8ro-r. ALSO SEE Peoplev. Superior Court (Dai-re)(t98o) ro4 Cal.App.3d 86, 9r falthough no direct evidence that anyone sa*the defendantsramming a car through a clothing store which they then burglarized, the court seemed to inferthat the existence of witnesses: "fThe burglarsl must have knornm that they would attractattention, even at 4 A.M."].es In re Jessie L. (tg9z) r3r cal.App.3 d zo2, zr3-4. ALSO sEE people v. smith (1966) 63 cal.zd779,797.

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from Mr. or Mrs. csemers after they were booked in jail warning[Szabo] of her r,ulnerability was not unlikely.",oo

"Do-it-yourself ' exigenciesThe term "do-it-yourself exigency" is used to describe an exigent circumstance

that was intentionally created by officers to justify a warrantless entry orssnl'g[.tor Although a do-it-yourself exigency may, in fact, constitute a trueexigent circumstance, the courts will ordinarily suppress evidence discovered asthe result of one because they don't want officers golng around manufacturingemergencies in order to conduct warrantless searches.

In fact, even if officers did not specifically intend to create an emergency, anentry or search may be invalidated if a court finds that officers intentionallv andunnecessarily engaged in conduct they knew or should have known would iesultin an emergency situation._ For example, in People v. Bellizzito2 officers received a tip that a suspecteddrug dealer was staying in a certain hotel in South San Francisco. In o.d", to getthe suspect to open the door so they could talk with

him, they arranged to have ahousekeeper knock on the door and identify herself while they rema]ned out ofsight. When the suspect,Bellizzi, opened the door and lookedoutside, he saw oneof the plainclothes officers holding a gun. Bellizzi immediately tried to close thedoor but the officers rushed in, detained him, and seized evidlnce in plain view.

- Although the officers reasonably believed that Bellizzi posed a threat to themwhen they entered, the court ruled the threat was intentionally or negligentlycreated by the officers and was, therefore, of the "do-it-yourseif'vari6ty. Saia tnecourt:

The officers resorted to a ruse with a hotel employee in order to get thedoor open, then observed appellant go into a panic at the sight olanarmed stranger in plain clothes, rather than the employee tre naaexpected. while the officers

might at that point have justifiably fearedappellant might attempt to defend himself, with a gun or otherwise, thisexigency was created by the officers themselves.

Although, as Bellizzi illustrates, a "do-it-yourself'exigency may result even ifofficers did not actually intend to create one, the courts uie not upi to invalidatean entry or search on these grounds merely because there were "6etter,, ways ofhandling the situation or even if the officers actions were "ill advised."'os as theU.S. Court of Appeals put it, "As long as police measures are not deliberately

1oo Peoplev. Szabo (r98o) to7 Cal.App .gd 4tg, 4zg.1o1 See Peoplev. Mendoza (rq86) 176 cal.App.3 d ttz7, rr3r; Lr.s. v. socey (D.c. cir. rggg) g46F.zd 1439, r.448 ["It is true that police officers cannot deliberately

create exigent circumstances tojustify a wanantless entry into a private dwelling."l; people v. Daughhetee (igss) 165 Cal.App.3ds74, s78-9; Peoplev. Freeny (rszi 37cal.App.3 dzo, gz peoplei. superior'court (Hutbe;i('SZZ)Z+Cal.App.3d4o7,418-9;peoplev.Robinson(rS86)rS5Cal.App.3d5zB; Ferdinv.Strperior Court GgZ4) 36 Cal.App.3 d774,78t; peoplev. Kizzee (rgZgi g+-C"l.1.iof.dg27,935_6.'o, (1995) 34 Cal.App.4.h 1849.rog see u.s. v. socey (D.c. cir. rgBS) 8+6 F.zd t439, L44B-g ["perhaps lthe officer] could havepursued a different course, less likely to expose the police presence io the occupanis in the house.But this calculation, made in hindsight, is not relevant to our inquiry."].

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designed to invent exigent circumstances, we will not second-guess theireffectiveness."ro4

to+ [/.S. v. Socey (D.C. Cir. rq88) 8+6 F.zdr4g9,r44g.

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Exigent Circumstances

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