Executive Politics: The Politics of a Dual Executive

Executive Politics: The

Politics of a Dual Executive Alvin A. Camba; Class 6-7 of Eurofor, First Semester of 2013-2014

[email protected]

Key Question: What is the relationship of the Council

and the Commission?

Outline

Argument

Executive Politics – Principal Agent Approach

Member States: Executive Politics, delegation,

and discretion

Government by the Commission

Conclusion

Argument

Executive responsibilities are shared between the Council and

the Commission

Institutionalized separation of powers, or ‘dual executive,’ can

sometimes lead to deadlock.

Consensus and stability exist through a division of labour; the

Council is more powerful in ‘big bang’ decisions (long term)

that could change the EU, while the Commission is more

powerful in everyday politics (short term)

I. Principal-Agent Approach Classic constitutional government: legislature

decides, executive enacts, and judiciary adjudicates

Government systems are highly complex

Principal-Agent Approach: Two issues – agents may be targeted by lobby groups; agents may want to increase their influence over the policy process

Principles: screening process (but it only works at a period of time)

Council (states) do not have the power all the time to ‘police the commission – shift of preference pertains to agential drift

Principals may limit

the drift:

fire alarm (other

agents of the

Council, or interest

groups); specifying

delegated task and

powers

Agents may have

information however

that limit the

principal’s power

and allow the agent

to implement the

policy in another

way

Franchino’s thesis: EU

legislators can rely on two

agents to implement EU

legislation: Commission and

national bureaucracies

Decision of Council depends

on the complexity of the

policy issue, as well as the

divergence in the policy

preference of the government

More complexity and unanimit

= National bureaucracies

Qualified majority (many rules

in the market) = Commission

In sum

Degree of autonomy that executive

agents are given by their principals

depends on the nature of the tasks in

question, the institutional rules under

which they operate, the degree of

policy disagreements between the

principals, as well as the amount of

information the principals have on the

likely actions of the agents

This is the relationship of the Council and

the Commission

II. Member States

IGC agrees on a least common

denominator and adds power to the

Commission. The task at hand is to know

which tasks to delegate to a common

agent and to strike a balance between

the need to ensure a common policy is

implemented across the EU.

Member states cannot delegate too

much and cannot delegate too little

Can be seen in the history of the EU

Treaty of Paris

• Signed in 1951 which

established the ECSC

• Common production and

distribution could have been

government through

intergovernmental meeting,

but the would be too high

because of procrastination,

indecision interest groups.

• Monnet Method –

intergovernmental

delegating to supranational

Treaty of Rome

• Signed in 1957 which established the European Economic Community and EURATOM

•Central issue: German common market and French interest in CAP

• Legislative procedure makes it easier for the Council to accept a proposal than to overturn it

•Created Agenda setting powers of the Commission

Single European Act (SEA)

• 1986 SEA pushed through

because of the failure to create a

functioning market, Japan’s rise,

perceived weakness of Europe vis-à-

vis the US and Japan

•Commission prepared treaty

reforms and policy leadership

• Commission powers were

upgraded: initiate legislation,

propose laws (environmental,

economic, health, etc.), draft a plan

for the EMU, QMV in the Council

•SEA introduced intergovernmental

cooperation in Foreign Policy

(European Political Cooperation)

Treaty of the European Union

•1991 institutionalized the Commission-brokered plan for EMU

• More funds were promised for cohesion policies, social policy, health, education, etc; introduced co-decision procedure

• Delegated to Commission legislation and managing these policies

• Council refused to delegate powers in two pillars: CFSP (former EPC) and JHA

Amsterdam treaty 1997

•Came to force in 1999,

transferred free movement

of persons to the EC,

member states accepted

the JHA provisions because

governments could not

agree

• Delegated policy

initiation rights in this area

to the commission

• Council delegated

monitoring of CFSP issues

into a new ‘task’ force’

located in the Council

Secretariat

Nice in 2001


aimed to reform the EU

institutions in preparation

for accession

• Defense was made an

EU competence for the first

time, creation of the

European Security Defense

Policy

• Policy initiation, agenda-

setting, decision-making,

implementation of defense

were kept away from the

Commission

Lisbon 2007


formalized policy

competences between

member states and the EU

in a catalogue of

competences

• Decision-making rules

within and between

governments and the

Commission, weighing of

votes in the council and

the two leadership offices

(permanent president of

the European Council and

High Representative for

Foreign and Security Policy

Member states evaluate trade-off • Member states experienced the day-to-day

implications of the SEA in the construction of the single

market

• Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, governments were

more reluctant to hand over agenda-setting powers in

new and highly sensitive policy areas

Story of Selective

Delegation of Power •Treaty reforms are a blunt

policy instruments

• States cannot predict

precise implications of treaty

provisions and new decision-

making rules

• Powers may create

unintended consequences;

they are hard to reform once

they’re given

Outcome of IGC

•Assume that all

member states are

equal

• Only strong member

states matter

• Expected difficulties

in the national

ratification process in some states than others

• Spatial models of

negotiations

B. Political Leadership and

Delegation

European Council (heads of governments) sets the guidelines and objectives for the Commission and implement the guidelines

European Council executes the CFSP, macroeconomic policies, agrees the multi-annual budget framework, and can adopt new policy frameworks of the EU

They also provide guidelines for the work of the Council of Ministers, invites Commission to develop policy initiatives in particular areas, and monitors the domestic policies of member states

B. Political Leadership and

Delegation

Lisbon treaty: created a separation between the Presidency of the Council (rotates on a six-month basis and has a legislative role, mainly) and the President of the European Union (elects through a two-and-a-half-year term)

Not clear if the president is meant to be the chief executive of the EU, or a silent consensus broker

President of the EC (European Council) may be more political focusing on resolving high-profile political disputes

President of the Council of Ministers will both have a political and administrative role.

C. Transposition of EU

legislation

Question again of delegation to national

bureaucracies leads to classic coordination problem,

where no member state implements the legislation.

Balancing process with delegating to the Commission

Commission may take EU countries to the ECJ for non-

compliance

The capacity of national administrators is the key

factor in explaining the varying transposition rates

among member states

Weaker states of Central and East Europe have

incorporated EU Law into national legislation

Deadlines often impact national administrations

C. Transposition of EU legislation

Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied find that policy conflict within

the Council may speed up the transposition process and

more freedom to set domestic policy rules

Konig and Luetgert find that conflict in the Council

increases the chances of infringement notification against a

member states; meanwhile, divergent policy preferences in

a coalition government in member states delays transposition

Jensen – oversight procedures that concentrate in the

hands of the national bureaucracy strengthen the ability of

member states to circumvent infringement cases, the same

thing happens to those who reduce their reliance on

interest groups

In Sum

When deciding how and when to implement a directive, the member governments weight the costs associated with correct implementation against the costs associated with failure or delays in the implementation process.

III. Government by Commission

When deciding how and when to implement a directive, the member governments weight the costs associated with correct implementation against the costs associated with failure or delays in the implementation process.

A Cabinet: Core EU Executive

• One Commissioner each for member states (treaty of Nice)

• President of Commission chairs the

meetings

•Consensus decision making in

practice, but majority voting when

pressed to vote (absences and abstain are negative)

• Bound by the principle of Collective Responsibility (toe to the party line)

• Allocation of each portfolio to the

Commissioner – Commission Vice Presidents and then to those who were

previous Commissioners


•Commission President is first among equals

•Decides which Commissioner gets the portfolio (after consulting with the states),

chairs meeting of the college, sets the agenda, in charge of the Secretariat

General

•In practice, member states hold agenda-setting powers since they

nominate their Commissioners

• Commission can exert pressure on member governments to nominate their most high profile and competent figures

•President can ask resignation from other commissioners


• Cabinets – filter interest group demands; serve as a political antennae; advisers in the directorates-general; mechanism for inter-commission coordination; supervisor of the work of directorates-general responsible to the Commission

• Cabinet meets together every week to prepare the agenda for the Commissioner

• Deals with the most important items in the agenda to leave the most important ones to the Commissioner

• They were handpicked fellow nationals of the Commissioners before, but the cabinets are no longer the same nationality as their commissioners


•Commission is a political body,

occupied by actors with background

in national politics

• Interest: Gap between the

preferences of the Commission and

governments, and the competence of

the Commission

•Much of the literature assumes

preference-divergence between

states and Commission

•Puzzling that member states would

select a Commission with outlying

preferences


• Commissioners have previously held political positions in parties that are in government at that time of their appointment to the commission

• Suggest a high-level preference similarity between the government and the commission

• Political competence of the official also matter in the nomination (since Com powers have increased, there is greater blowback)

Comitologies: Interface of the EU and dual executive

• Comitologies (officials of states) scrutinize the Commission’s implementation

• Established in June 1999 and July 2006.

• Advisory, management, regulatory, and regulatory committee with scrutiny

• Membership on committees depends on their roles: composed of national civil servants, monitor the implementation of legislation, temporary committees composed of representatives of private interests groups consider matters for which the Commission feels wider consultation is necessary; and scientist and experts give advice on technicalities

Comitologies: Procedures

• If the Comitology disagrees with the Commission’s opinion, the decision is referred to the Council and, for further information, to the European Parliament

• Within 3 months, the Council may agree or amend

• Regulatory procedures with scrutiny: Council and EP can carry out a check prior to the adoption of a measure and if there is a problem, the Commission cannot adopt the measure

• Adopted in animal, plant, food safety, environment and transport

• After Lisbon – Council and EP acting under the ordinary legislative procedure, need adopt a new set of rules to simply procedures

• 29 percent of all comitology procedures proposed by the Commission between 1987 and 1995 were under procedures where the Commission was weak

Comitologies: After Lisbon

• Can we expect more conflict given that there are different degrees of Commission power over policy areas?

• Only 29 percent of all Commission proposals between 1987 and 1995 were under procedures where the Commission was weak. Council still accepted 40% of proposals

• Commission is deeply implicated in the pattern of Council comitology preferment between the Commission and the committees in the operation of comitology,

• the figures might reflect the fact that the Commission is strategic in its choice of comitology procedures, and hence only proposes the advisory procedure in cases where it thinks it has a reasonable chance of getting past the council

Comitologies: Parliament’s Role

• European Parliament has been critical of comitology

• After the establishment of the system, the European Parliament argued that the system lacked transparency, due to the secretive nature of committee procedures

• Comitology does undermine the principle of the separation of powers between the legislative authority of the EU (Council and Commission) and the executive implementation authority (Commission)

• Parliament has been critical that procedures only allows for issues to be referred back to the Council, rather than both Council and EP.

• New procedure in 2006 was designed to address this concern

• Committees are more transparent with all documents public available in the register

Comitologies: In Sum

• Comitology system enables the Commission and national experts to solve policy issues in a non-hierarchical and deliberative policy style.

• Involvement of scientific experts and private interest in the process of implementation and regulation is a common feature of public administrative system.

• High-profile policy issues create conflict between Commission and National Experts, and between experts from different member states

European Parliament: Scrutiny and transparency

• Commission presents annual program to European Parliament

• Regularly give evidence to EP Committees, and certain committees have question time for the Commissioner of a policy area

• President-in-office of the Council presents the Council’s six-monthly work programme to the parliament

• Government ministers from the member state that holds Council Presidency often appear before the EP Committees, and President of the ECP, and heads of the EU Agencies appear before EP

• President of European Council is not accountable to the EP, but he does appear

European Parliament: Commission’s Culture

• No formal rules governing the behavior of Commissioners

• Individual C are often blamed for inconsistencies in the DG in their charge, or the lack of action in the policy area they cover

• Still no procedure for forcing Cs to resign

• Commission has not developed a culture in which a C would resign out of a sense of obligation, and the EP does not have the right to censure individual Commissioners.

• In 1999, EP announced it would hold separate votes of no confidence on two Cs: Edit Cresson and Manuel Marin, who were charged with corruption and nepotism

• Media and government pressure were used

European Parliament: Commission promoting transparency

• 1994 Package allows the European Parliament and the Council time to debate the draft before the final adoption of the full legislative programme in January

• Initiation of legislation of the Commission now makes more use of green and white papers, public hearings, information seminars, and consultation exercises

• Commission’s new code of conduct commits it to make internal documents public, with the exception of its minutes, briefing notes, and personal opinion

• Commission submits draft legislation to national parliaments so that their committees on EU affairs can scrutinize the legislation before their government minister address it

European Parliament: Council Supports Openness in EU decision-making

• Commission and EP accused Council of hypocrisy:

• Majority of member states have opposed Com’s efforts to allow public access to EU documents

• Council has proved reluctant to expose itself to public scrutiny (EU Treaty, Article 207)

• Article 207 has protected Council, but it changed partially due to Lisbon (limits Council’s legislative powers under procedures and requires Council to be more open)

European Parliament: Council Supports Openness in EU decision-making

Council has been scrutinized by and in national

parliaments - EU Special Affairs Committee of

national parliaments)

Depends on the preference divergence of

executive and legislative branches of a state

Single majority governments tend to be less involved

in EU affairs than states with mixed coalitions

Recent delegation of more powers to EU Institutions

have led the decline of the ability of the parliament

to scrutinize the executive branch

Lisbon requires six weeks to offer a reasoned opinion

on the Commission's proposal, whether it violates

subsidiarity and proportionality – if it’s a vote of 1/3

against, then the Commission has to review. During

the review, Commission can withdraw, amend, or

not do anything about the proposal

Selection and Censure of the Commission

• Questions the legitimacy of the Commission

• Commission President regarded as a secretariat of

an IO rather than choosing a ‘first among equals’

• Maastricht Treaty Innovation – term of the

Commission the same as the European Parliament

• EP now considers nomination of member

governments, and can vote on it as well.

• Procedure called Commissioner hearings, where

the nominees needs to give evidence to the EP

committee covering portfolios (modeled on the US

Senate hearings of the nominees of the US President)

• After hearing, a second vote takes place.

• Amsterdam treaty institutionalizes the EP’s power

on vetoing nominees.

Right to Censure

• QMV in the Council for the nomination of the C

President and the C as a whole. Lisbon requires the

European Council to take into account EP election

results when nominating a Commission President

• Parliament has used investiture procedure to exact

concessions from governments (October 2004, EP

refused to back Barroso because of Rocco

Buttiglione, which was replaced by Franco Frattini;

Bulgaria’s Rumia Jelava in 2009)

• EP’s right to censure – absolute majority of MEPs

and two-thirds of the votes cast. They have this

power, but it has never been used before. EP fears

throwing Commission under the bus would endanger

the institution

• Aside from that, nothing would stop the states from

appointing the same Commissioners

• It requires a large majority, almost impossible to

fulfill

Right to Censure

• Since 1998, the EP has been more confident –

failure to handle the BSE crisis in 1999, EP demanded

that Commission looked at mismanagement and

nepotism

• At the eve of censure vote, C President Santer

promised to act on the matters by creating new

policies. censure vote was narrowly defeated (232

MPEs in favour and 293 against)

• In 1999, EP put C on probation until the committee

set up by EP reported on the allegations. Pauline

Green informed Santer that they would be voting for

censure

• At the eve of the censure, Santer called for an

emergency meeting of the Commissioners, who

agreed they should resign en masse.

• Incoming Prodi Commission was much more

sensitive to the EP’s concerns; Prodi even promised

he would sack individual Commissioners.

Hybridity

• Procedures for selecting and deselecting

Commission have become a hybrid mix of

parliamentary and presidency models.

• The requirements of EP’s majority support and EC’s

QMV are similar to a parliamentary government’s

bicameralism

• However, in selecting Commission President, the

member states are like individual electoral college,

over which the EP can only exercise a veto.

• The EP cannot nominate, and once invested, the

Commission does not really required the working

majority of the EP

• Right to censure a safety valve in extreme

situations of the Commission’s failure.

• Alternative modes lf classic parliament and

presidential models were proposed, but not

acceptable to the member states

Conclusion

Executive responsibilities are shared between the

Council and the Commission

Institutionalized separation of powers, or ‘dual

executive,’ can sometimes lead to deadlock.

Consensus and stability exist through a division of

labour; the Council is more powerful in ‘big bang’

decisions (long term) that could change the EU,

while the Commission is more powerful in

everyday politics (short term)

Executive Politics: The Politics of a Dual Executive

Documents

Transcript of Executive Politics: The Politics of a Dual Executive