Executive Agencies and Public Accountability
description
Transcript of Executive Agencies and Public Accountability
ASSESSING PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY BY
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES TO THE PUBLIC IN TANZANIA
By
Hanif Tuwa
M.A. (Political Science and Public Administration) Dissertation
University of Dar es Salaam
June, 2009
i
i
ASSESSING PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY BY
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES TO THE PUBLIC IN TANZANIA
By
Hanif Tuwa
A Dissertation Submitted in (Partial) Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts (Political Science and Public Administration) of the
University of Dar es Salaam
University of Dar es Salaam
June, 2009
DEDICATION
For My Children, Thuraiya and Saleem
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgements
Abstract
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TANZANIAN PUBLIC
SERVICE …………………………………………………………………...……….1
1.1 Context and Background of the Problem …………………………...………..1
1.2 Research Problem ……..…………………………………………………..... 5
1.3 Objectives of the Study ………………………………………………………6
1.4 Research Questions …………………………………………………………..6
1.5 Justification of the Study ………………………………………………..……7
1.6 Organization of the Study ……………………………………………………7
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON “AGENCIFICATION”, ITS EFFECTS
ON AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY.......................................9
2.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………….……9
2.2. The Executive Agency Model ……………………………………………...10
2.3 Perspectives on ‗Agencification‘, its Effects on and Implications for
Accountability in the Public Sector …………………………...………….. 13
2.4 Conceptual Framework ………………………………………………….. 20
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..……………………….27
3.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………27
3.2 Qualitative Research Design ……………………………………………….27
3.3 Scope of the Study ………………………………………………………….29
3.4 Target Population and Characteristics of Respondents ……………………..29
3.5 Data Collection: Sources of Data and Methods of Collection ……………..31
3.6 Data Handling and Analysis ……………………………………………….32
3.7 Limitations and Challenges Encountered …………………………………..33
CHAPTER FOUR: FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND AUTONOMY
OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES UNDER
INVESTIGATION ………………………………………...34
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………....34
4.2. Institutional Characteristics of Executive Agencies under Investigation…..34
4.2.1 Case I: The National Housing and Building Research Agency (NHBRA)…34
4.2.2 Case II: The Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA)……….…….....36
4.2.3. Some Comparative Notes on the Two Agencies …………………………...38
4.3. Relative Autonomy of the Two Agencies …………………….…………….38
4.3.1. Financial Independence of the Two Agencies ……………………………...39
4.3.2. Operational Discretion of the Two Agencies ……………………………….42
4.3.3. Authority and Control over the Employees ………………………………...46
CHAPTER FIVE: STATUS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY …….…50
5.1. Introduction ……...……………………………………………………........50
5.2. Monitoring Performance of the Two Agencies ……………………………51
5.3. Performance Reporting by the Two Agencies …………………………….56
CHAPTER SIX: THE “AGENCY-PUBLIC” INTERFACE AND THE
STATUS OF HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY …...61
6.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………………61
6.2. Interface of the Two Agencies and the Public ……………………………...62
6.3. Extent of Agencies‘ Responsiveness to the Public ………………………....75
6.4. Potential of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable ………..….80
6.5. Propensity of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable …………83
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………….…...85
7.2. The Impact of ‗Agencification‘ on Performance Accountability ………..…85
7.3. Factors Affecting Levels of Accountability of the Agencies...88
7.4. Recommendations …………………………………………………………..90
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….92
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACEOs Agency Chief Executive Officers
ADDO Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet
CSRP Civil Service Reform Programme
DAP Director of Administration and Personnel
DFID Department for International Development
DUCE Dar es Salaam University College of Education
EAP Executive Agency Programme
ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation
GOT Government of Tanzania
MAB Ministerial Advisory Board
MDAs Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MLHSD Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development
MOHSW Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
NHBRA National Housing and Building Research Agency
NHBRU National Housing and Building Research Unit
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPRAS Open Performance Review Appraisal System
OPSR Office of the Public Service Reform
PO-PSM President‘s Office Public Service Management
PSRP Public Service Reform Programme
QMS Quality Management System(s)
TFDA Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency
URT United Republic of Tanzania
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
Table3.1: Respondents …………………………………………………….………. 30
Table.6.1: Information Delivery Channels of the Two Agencies…………………. 63
Table6.2: Feedback Mechanisms Available in the Two Agencies ……………..…. 69
Table6.3: Rate of Use of NHBRA‘s Construction and Consultancy Services ….. 72
Table6.4: Customers‘ Ranking of Service Delivery Improvements…………..…. 75
Table6.5: Customers‘ Satisfaction with Services of the Two Agencies……...……. 76
Table6.6: Customers‘ Satisfaction with Specific Attributes of Service Delivery by
the Two Agencies ……………………………………………..……….. 78
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure1.1: The Legal-Institutional Framework for Executive Agency Accountability
in Tanzania…....................................................................................... 25
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank my supervisor, Prof. Samuel S. Mushi, for his help to shape the raw ideas and
his confidence in my ability for independent thinking.
I acknowledge the contribution of my colleague, Bruno Godfrey, for sharing with me
the agonies of academic life throughout the Masters‘ programme. I thank even more
deeply, my soul mate, Mwanahamisi Salimu for her love.
My appreciation is to the Head of Political Science and Public Administration
Department at the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE), Mr.
Frank Mateng‘e, for his patience and understanding of the need for thinking space
outside my work station, especially during the write-up stages.
I thank the Chief Executive Officers of the National Housing and Building Research
Agency (NHBRA) and the Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency (TFDA) for granting
the permission to interview their staff and access some of their documents and
publications. I recognize the facilitative roles by Mr. Mazanda (NHBRA), and Mr.
Usingizimali P. Matagi and Mr. James Ndege (both of TFDA). The same goes to the
officials from the Ministry of Lands and Ministry of Health for their cooperation.
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to all of the respondents who took time to
provide their views as requested by the researcher.
ABSTRACT
Despite the increased visibility of executive agencies in Tanzania, the key question
about their accountability to the public remains unanswered. To fill the gap, the study
assessed the extent to which agency autonomy has affected performance
accountability of two agencies, namely the National Housing and Building Research
Agency (NHBRA) and Tanzania Foods and Drugs Agency (TFDA), to the
Government and the public. Data was collected through documentary analysis, a
small survey of agencies‘ customers, and interviews with agency managers and staff,
as well as officials of the Ministries of Lands and Health.
This study established that the process of ―agencification‖ has increased autonomy of
the two agencies but it has not contributed to enhanced agencies‘ responsiveness to
their customers. Instead, ―agencification‖ has weakened ministerial control over the
agencies, attributable to faulty framework stipulated in the Executive Agencies Act
of 1997 and little interest shown by the Ministries to monitor the agencies
effectively, which also has not been reinforced by customers‘ (or public‘s)
willingness and ability to make the agencies responsive. The overall low levels of
performance accountability have been influenced by weak accountability framework,
commitment of agency leadership to make their organizations responsive, and
customers‘ dispositions towards exerting pressures for the agencies to perform.
It is recommended that incentives for agency performance and disincentives for
Ministries‘ disinterest in effective monitoring need to be devised; Parliament should
play a more active role in oversight of the agencies, and public disclosure of
information on agency performance should be made obligatory to all agencies.
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TANZANIAN
PUBLIC SERVICE
1.1. Context and Background of the Problem
The ways governments organize themselves to undertake their functions have always
been changing in response to changing needs and demands (Rugumyamheto,
2004:437). In the immediate post-independence period, the Government of Tanzania
(GOT) adopted reform measures that addressed three important needs: First, there
was need to create a machinery to handle new responsibilities occasioned by the
country‘s independent statehood, hence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry/Department of Defense. Second, the need for the Government to spearhead
socio-economic development in response to the citizens‘ expectations. This entailed
setting new organizational units at the centre and local levels as well as establishing
service delivery points. Third, the need to build from scratch a cadre of public
service personnel to occupy new and expanded functions so as to create an adequate
human resource capacity (Rugumyamheto, 2005:6).
During this period (1962 to early 1970s), the civil service was small, but efficient,
effective, and less vulnerable to administrative vices than today (Mukandala, 1990).
After the country adopted socialism in 1967 and state-controlled economy became a
strategy for its development, GOT became the key provider of social services and
actor in socio-economic development. As GOT over-stretched its capacity to provide
2
services free of charge or at subsidized prices, the quality of those services received
less attention than the broader goal of achieving equity among various groups in the
society. Eventually, by late 1970s, performance and integrity of the civil service had
begun to drastically degenerate partly due to dysfunctional accountability system
which allowed widespread embezzlement, corruption and other administrative vices
(Shelukindo and Baguma, 1993; Teskey and Hooper, 2003; Therkilsen, 2000).
In its attempt to reverse the deteriorating economic situation in the 1980s, GOT seen
an urgent need for wider institutional reforms to speed up the recovery process.
Reform of financial institutions, the public enterprise sector and the civil service
became a government priority (Ntukamazina, 2001). There emerged a ‗consensus‘
among Tanzania‘s development partners that the shift towards a free-market
economy, where the private sector was to serve as engine for growth, needed to be
reflected in the structure and size of the nation‘s public service. This consensus
informed the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) whose implementation
spanned the period 1993 to 1999 with the support from basket funding by
development partners. The CSRP focused on cost-containment, re-definition of
Government‘s role and functions, and restructuring of the Government.
Despite the achievements recorded under CSRP, it was realized that there was still a
need to translate the structural and institutional reforms into improved service
delivery to the people (World Bank, 1999). Three arguments were put forth for a
more comprehensive program which has longer-term perspective. First, the nature of
the problem changed because after downsizing and achieving macro-economic
3
stability, the need to impose further cost-containment lessened. Second, political
pluralism amplified citizens‘ demands for improved service delivery, which begged
for a broader focus. Third, as public expenditure collection increased, cost-cutting
became less relevant. These changes led to a need for a reform initiative that would
focus intensively on service delivery improvements (PO-PSM, 2008).
The Public Service Reform Programme‘s (2000-2011) strong focus on service
delivery improvement and emphasis on institutional pluralism in the delivery of
public service provided the basis for continued implementation of the Executive
Agencies Programme (EAP) which began as part of the restructuring initiative under
CSRP. The EAP aims to transform Government structures and role by placing its
non-core functions to semi-autonomous executive agencies within the ambit of the
Ministries. Implementation of the EAP began in 1996 with support from the
development partners, especially the United Kingdom Government‘s Department for
International Development (DFID) following the Cabinet‘s approval.
The Executive Agencies were given a mandate ―to act as means for the Government
to improve the delivery of public services which lead to better quality and greater
efficiency, more value for money and augmented capacity for continuous
improvement‖ (URT, 2001: 22). The formation of Executive Agencies was based on
the argument that it was effective for addressing perceived problems of democratic
accountability and increasing efficiency in delivery of public services. Politically, the
agencies are seen as one method for creating more flexible and responsive public
services in order to maintain popular support for the government. In policy terms,
4
agencies are viewed as rationalizing tools because they specify the goals and means
of policy implementation (Talbot, et al 2000).
Lessons drawn from many countries reveal that executive agencies raise serious
governance challenges. This is partly because there are often diverse motives
underpinning agency creation, and upon their establishment some significant changes
tend to occur to the traditional notion of accountability in the public service. Some
other motives include: the need by state leaders to create conditions for political
patronage outside the normal civil service rules (Varela, 1995), the desire by public
managers to escape political scrutiny by yielding more autonomy (Laking, 2002),
and to benefit from training opportunities and attractive remuneration packages that
comes with the agency status (ESRF, 2004:14).
On the one hand, these diverse motives for agency creation indicate potential risks
that can jeopardize the mission of achieving an efficient and effective public service,
especially when the system of accountability is inappropriate or dysfunctional. On
the other hand, the changes in accountability system have raised concerns, whether
they have positive or negative impact on government accountability to the public.
The GOT considers executive agencies as critical part of its efforts to reform the
Public Service because they are assumed to bring about clarity of roles and functions,
management of financial and human resources and lines of accountability. These
attributes are assumed to cause improved access to services, speedier delivery of
services than before, service with customer-focus, and participation of the public in
service improvement through feedback. The GOT anticipates executive agencies to
5
become a model for the rest of the public services in client orientation, result-
oriented management and public accountability.
However, the PSRP has so far produced mixed results. While service delivery levels
for many executive agencies are reported to have increased, the increase is only
moderate without adequate evidence of service quality improvement (PO-PSM,
2005a). Moreover, delays in service provision and low quality results are still very
prevalent and rate of citizens‘ dissatisfaction is relatively high. Ethical conduct
within the Public Service is ranked very low due to corruption and self-
interestedness of public servants (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006).
The Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) has delegated substantial authority
of Government Ministries to the executive agencies. This raises serious concern
given the risks involved such as rent-seeking, monopoly, abuse of power and so forth
(Posner, 2007). Thus far, there has not been an in-depth inquiry to assess the impact
of ―agencification‖ on public accountability in Tanzania. To fill this research gap,
this study analyzes the appropriateness of the legal and institutional frameworks in
facilitating accountability of the agencies, and explores the effect of autonomy on
accountability of two selected agencies charged with the responsibilities of
protecting and promoting public health (TFDA) and providing quality, low-cost
shelter (NHBRA).
1.2. The Research Problem
Despite the growing presence and importance of executive agencies in provision of
public services and regulation in Tanzania, whether and the extent to which these
6
agencies are accountable to the public remain not only unknown but also uncertain
due to the potential risks stated above. This study therefore sought to assess the
extent to which ―agencification‖ has improved the accountability of the Public
Service.
1.3. Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study was to investigate whether and to what extent the
executive agencies in Tanzania are accountable to the public.
More specifically, the aim was to:
1. Establish whether the governance frameworks of executive agencies in
Tanzania have facilitated performance accountability of the two agencies;
2. Assess how increased autonomy of the executive agencies has affected
performance accountability of the two agencies (whether positively or
negatively);
3. Explore salient factors that affect accountability of the agencies;
4. Recommend ways to improve public accountability of the executive agencies.
1.4. Research Questions
To achieve the objectives stated above, the following three questions guided the
inquiry:
1. What is the impact of increased autonomy on accountability?
2. What factors determine the levels of accountability of the agencies?
7
3. Do the existing legal and institutional frameworks facilitate or constrain
agencies‘ accountability?
1.5. Justification for the Study
In contemporary democracies, public administration is an essential tool for good
governance (Carlos, 2005). The importance of this study stems foremost from the
fact that it deals with accountability which is among the widely accepted principles
of effective public administration. The GOT has made numerous efforts to improve
governance in the past two decades, the most recent of those efforts being formation
of the executive agencies. Experiences from other countries have however revealed
variability of what the executive agency can or cannot achieve. These experiences do
not show conclusively that ―agencification‖ improves or does not improve
accountability of the public service. This study sheds more light on the
―agencification‖-accountability equation, at least in the Tanzanian context.
1.6. Organization of the Study
This dissertation has seven chapters. Chapter one has introduced the study by a way
of contextualizing the problem of deficit performance accountability in the
Tanzanian Public Service. It has also stated the research problem and provided study
questions. Chapter two presents the theoretical literature on the ―agencification‖-
accountability relationship. Chapter three discusses the methodology of the study.
Chapter four gives details on the formation and organizational characteristics of the
two case studies, and examines their relative autonomy. Chapter five analyzes the
legal and institutional frameworks, under which vertical accountability of the
8
agencies is examined. Chapter six examines the interface between the agencies and
their customers to determine its implication on horizontal accountability. Chapter
seven makes a conclusion of the main findings of the study and the factors that
affected the level of accountability of the two agencies, and recommends changes in
the legal and institutional framework in order to improve accountability of the
executive agencies in Tanzania.
9
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON “AGENCIFICATION”, ITS EFFECTS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
2.1 Introduction
The way governments conduct their business has witnessed radical changes in the
twenty-first century, with ‗agencification‘ increasingly becoming the most
fashionable alternative service delivery strategy (Talbot, 2000; Office of Public
Service Reform, OPSR, 2002). By mid-1990s, a number of European countries,
especially members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and North America, had opted for the agency model as the principal
organizational type for public service delivery (James, 2003; Laking, 2000; OECD,
1997). Many governments in the developing countries have also taken up this New
Public Management-type of reform initiative (Polidano, 1999). Despite the apparent
popularity of this new model, there is still a hot debate among scholars on whether
―agencification‖ enhances accountability.
Objectives of this chapter are twofold: first, to discuss the underpinning ideas of the
Executive Agency Model. Secondly, to discuss the two contending perspectives on
the impact of ―agencification‖ on accountability with a view to drawing a conceptual
guide for empirical analysis of the Tanzanian case studies. We shall first look at the
reasons for the entry of the executive agency model as a public service delivery tool.
10
2.2.The Executive Agency Model
Civil Service has conventionally been a large, unified ministerial-type entity that
handles diverse governmental functions. The unified system, being so big and
diverse, imposed a serious handicap on the three ‗Es‘ of managerial efficacy, namely
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The strains noted by governments in Europe
during the 1970s include: work overload to ministers and top management staff;
insufficient attention given to delivery of services; a lack of clear lines of
responsibilities and accountability; and absence of sustained pressure to perform
(OECD, 1997). These structural weaknesses led these governments to reassess which
functions require to be undertaken directly within ministerial departments and which
could work better if hived-off and run by separate entities outside ministerial
structures, but subject to overall ministerial guidance.
From thence, executive agencies have been created to address those key weaknesses
in the delivery of public services. They are seen as tools of unbundling the
bureaucracy by separating policy from operations and then locating the latter in new
structures outside the ministerial structure. The Executive Agency Model has now
been adopted by many countries as strategy for public service delivery.
The Executive Agency Model is very flexible. Its main feature is autonomy:
provided agency managers work within the strategic direction set by ministers to
whom they are accountable for policy outcomes, the agency has adequate discretion
over its operations and flexibility in allocation and use of resources (Efficient Unit,
1988). It thus provides greater delegated authority to the Agency Chief Executive
11
Officers (ACEOs), who take ultimate responsibility for the working of the Agency.
Powers of the ACEOs include making input decisions, setting flexible rules and
standards of operations, and controlling and disciplining the staff of the agency.
Furthermore, the model gives the ACEO discretion in using resources and upgrading
the financial and management systems and skills available within the agency. Thus
the agency prepares its financial forecasts according to ‗generally accepted
accounting practice‘, and with an obligation to provide financial statements to the
minister at agreed intervals. In addition, the agency must produce and submit an
audited record of the agency‘s performance in accordance with its approved
corporate and annual business plans.
The model assumes that greater freedom and authority is indispensable to
accountability and improved outputs. The overall responsibility for performance rests
with the ACEO. It is assumed that the agency will be more customer-oriented than
the ministerial bureaucracy and that it will remain accountable to the minister
responsible for the service delivered (OPSR, 2002:5). The minister does not however
interfere in day-to-day running of the organization.
The model provides for ACEO‘s strategic engagement with the ministry so as to
facilitate a shared understanding of overall and cross-cutting objectives, and to
remove obstacles and restrictions on agency freedom to make effective choices for
improved performance. Ministers retain the right to alter the system and reorganize
the status of executive agencies, including power to abolish them (James, 2003).This
authority is supposed to be a disincentive for low performance by the ACEOs and
12
staff of their organizations. Operationally, the ACEO acts as a contracted officer and
the Permanent Secretary as the enforcer of performance agreement and reviewer of
performance. Performance agreements replace the conventional public service ethic
of trust, the failure to deliver the set outputs may lead to ACEO's removal. Staff
accountability for operational performance within the agency rests with the ACEO.
Separating the agency from the traditional ministerial structure is considered
important to allow specification and specialization of the government executive
tasks. It is held that service delivery is a distinct function from policy making, which
can be performed better if it does not compete for attention with policy issues (ADB,
2000). The agency can then focus on improving quality of outputs to meet public
expectations. The agency, therefore, becomes responsive to its customers and the
general public. The separation of policy from operational functions assumes two
conditions. The first is that the function of service delivery should not give rise to
policy issues that necessitate interventions from the government ministry. The
second is that the policy on service delivery must be specified in sufficient detail and
in terms that allow close monitoring of its implementation.
The executive agency model has at least three main weak points. First, it assumes a
clear-cut separation of policy and operations. Secondly, it overlooks the likelihood
that the separation could create a risk of agency capture by private interests, other
than politicians and public servants who are its allies. Whilst separation of policy and
operations can reduce the eminent risk of capture by public interest, it
simultaneously creates a risk of capture by private interests. For example, Kozak and
13
McCartney (1987) established the dominance of corporate interest groups in the
Congress policymaking, making most policies to be tailored to suit or accommodate
corporate interests which compromise broader public interests. Thirdly, arguments
behind the model are not well supported by hard evidence that multi-purpose
agencies perform less well or are less readily held to account than the single-purpose
agencies (ADB, 2000:191).
2.3. Perspectives on „Agencification‟, its Effects and Implications for
Accountability in the Public Sector
―Agencification‖ implies substantial change in the framework and processes of
accountability within the public service. This is mainly attributed to the shifts of
control over operational matters from the ministry, which is left with responsibility
over policy formulation and takes on oversight role (―hands-off, eyes-on‖), for a
detached and increasingly autonomous agency. The model is built on theoretical
assumptions that accountability is possible despite its autonomy, but researchers log
horns when addressing the question whether after their formation executive agencies
become more accountable for their performance to their key stakeholders and the
general public.
Two perspectives have emerged, based on several arguments. The first asserts that
policy-operations separation increases transparency. The first argument is that under
the separation, tasks and responsibilities are clarified, which makes accountability
easier as political principals (ministers) can maintain pressure for improvement
(Efficient Unit, 1988). With the principals relieved from operational tasks, they can
14
more effectively monitor activities and performance and evaluate the outputs in the
light of policy outcomes they set. Performance monitoring mechanisms like
performance audits are said to be critical and helpful to ensure agencies do what they
are required promptly, efficiently and in accordance with acceptable standards. As
Cook (2003:14) asserts, a core aspect of the Agency Model, as practised in New
Zealand, is the strong focus on performance audits, which has made it possible to
hold agency managers accountable for the delivery of specified services.
The second argument is that separation of policy and operational functions reduces
the risk of public organizations being captured by self-interests of politicians and
bureaucrats, which is likely to happen when they exist within the same domain. By
making agencies separate and independently working entities, without any political
roles and ties with the ministries, save for general policy directions, public interests
would be secured (ADB, 2000).
The third argument is that creation of agencies can improve accountability through
performance contracting. The logic of performance contracting is that formal or
quasi-formal contracts based on clarified roles, responsibilities, and explicit key
performance targets allow the portfolio ministry to embed a results-oriented focus
that supplants the traditional bureaucratic emphasis on inputs and procedures. An
additional argument, drawn from institutional economics is that contracts make it
possible to specify agency results in terms of outputs or outcomes which permit the
portfolio ministry, the legislature and citizens themselves to look at the set
performance targets and determine easily the extent to which they were achieved.
15
The fourth argument is that decentralized management brings the service providers
and users within each other‘s easy reach (Kaul, 1997; OPSR, 2002). It provides
opportunity for consumers of public services to exert direct pressure on the agencies
towards increased responsiveness. The Service Quality Charters or Client Service
Charters are increasingly used to bridge the gap between agencies and consumers of
their services. Agencies' customer-focus orientation is made possible by consultative
engagement with the public, thereby providing greater public access to their
operations and performance. It gives agencies a chance to receive feedback through
formal complaints procedures which provide the basis for improvement. As feedback
increases, the agencies' responsiveness also increases.
The second perspective, in contrast with the previous one, sees organizational
separation from ministerial structures and increased autonomy to agency managers as
fragmenting the framework for their accountability to the Government and the
public. McKinlay (2000:219) argues against the policy-operations dichotomy,
stressing that it tends to disrupt feedback mechanism between policy makers and
policy implementers. When these, practically interlocking and preferably
complimentary activities are disaggregated into two separate domains, ‗a serious and
continuous‘ accountability gap in the public sector is created.
The separation is seen as giving policymakers a chance to avoid responsibilities and
find solace in blaming agency activities. As for agency managers, they may disregard
policies from central ministries, sound or otherwise, which creates risks of corruption
and other administrative vices. Segsworth (2003:6) illustrates this argument with a
16
concrete example from the United Kingdom (UK), where the Home Secretary
refused to accept responsibility for a number of prison breaks and prison suicides and
instead sacked the Director General of Her Majesty‘s Prison Service (an Agency).
The Minister, Michael Howard, argued that the appointed Director General should be
accountable for short-term operational matters while he, the Minister, should be held
responsible for longer-term policy.
It is further argued that ‗agencification‘ weakens the system of political control
through the minister, as it compromises ministerial accountability to public
institutions like the legislature (Pollitt, 2001; McKinlay, 2000). For many scholars in
this perspective, clear separation of policy and operations is fictitious, and even when
achieved, it causes problems in coordination. In its Agency Policy Review, the UK‘s
Office of the Public Service Reform (OPSR) reported an increasing gap whereby the
operations of executive agencies had become disconnected from the aims of their
ministries (OPSR, 2002), thereby creating an accountability gap. Again, it is argued
that executive agencies tend to undermine public accountability because they gain
the upper hand while political principals like the legislature end up receiving vague
information from the ministry. The shift of control over operational matters and
information strengthens the agency managers to the extent of undermining the
system of public accountability (Sterick and Scheers, 2003; James, 2004; Moynihan,
2004).
Gains (2003:64-65) who focuses on resource exchange between the Ministries,
Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) supports this argument also. She argues that the
17
introduction of agencies has led to a huge transfer of financial, organizational and
informational resources to agencies and devolved statutory authority which makes
them very powerful in operational and resource allocation matters. Ministers, on the
other hand, have only political resources derived from elected office and authority
over policy goals and spending decisions. It is therefore possible for the two sides to
'struggle' for control of resources or for their principals (ACEOs, minister, principal
secretary and other senior ministerial officials) to agree to cooperate in actions which
are contrary to public interest (example rent-seeking behaviour).
The agency model is accused of strengthening the hands of agency management
which undermines public accountability, especially when political principals are kept
at the sidelines (Caulfield, 2003). Boston (1999) also criticises the logic of the
agency model and concurs with the second perspective‘s position after showing that
increased discretion encourages maladministration which puts the citizenry at a
disadvantage. As evidence, reference is made to a (then) sharp rise of citizens‘
complaints against autonomous public bodies in New Zealand, whereby the rate of
complaints against public managers submitted to the Ombudsman more than doubled
since introduction of executive agencies.
According to its report on the assessment conducted between 1997 and 2001, United
Kingdom‘s Select Committee on Public Administration revealed that public audit of
executive agencies (―Quangos‖) fell from 81% to 64% and public access to these
bodies remained low. They met only just a half of the accountability measures. More
18
strikingly, those advisory ―Quangos‖ dealing with public safety and the quality of
people‘s lives were found to be largely closed and secretive bodies.1
Other scholars (example Schick, 1996) have questioned the extent to which internal
control mechanisms are appropriate and adequate to ensure broad-based
accountability in these organizations. Effective implementation of these systems is
considered to be, technically, very difficult, and they contain inherent disincentives
to the managers and employees of the agency. McDavid (1998:6) argues that
performance measurement systems, for instance, make sense only at a general level
as tools for improving accountability, but they tend to fail in implementation.
Performance measures that were applied in Sweden hit the wall as the set
performance targets turned out to be vague rather than explicit and most often were
unrelated to results, of poor quality, or incomplete (Rexed, 2006). Flynn (2004)
argues with concrete cases that instituting performance management system is often
not translated into high satisfaction with public services.
Internal control systems that are devised and supposed to be operated by the agency
managers are discredited by some scholars who argue that it is often not in the best
interest of these managers to enforce accountability in an effective manner. For, there
is conflict between what the public value and what these managers see as important
for their entity to survive and secure of their interests. It is argued that, since
agencies often compete for government resources, they are less likely to institute
effective control system because exposition of poor performance jeopardizes
agency‘s potential success in getting resources. It is this conflict of interest that
1 see www.democraticaudit.com
19
belongs to the second line of thinking, which makes increased autonomy to the
agency managers unlikely to enhance accountability to external stakeholders like
members of the public.
Scholars whose ideas fall into the second perspective about ‗agencification‘ share the
idea that accountability is not a welcome idea among those who have to render the
account. These scholars are of the view that increased autonomy reduces propensity
of the agency managers to become transparent about their performance and related
matters. With resource transfers as explained by Gains (2003:65), agencies become
less dependent on the ministry, and wield much discretion which may likely
culminate into secrecy rather than transparency. As Cook (2003:26) found out,
ministers could not fulfil their oversight role because after the agency reforms in
New Zealand, the policy implementers (ACEOs) increasingly resorted to
withholding information on their performance.
The second perspective, therefore, sees the agency model as having a built-in
disincentive. With increased autonomy over their operations and decision-making
processes, agency managers are expected to consider transparency and complete
accountability to the public and ministerial political principals as curtailing their
freedom and are most likely to manipulate rather than strengthen those internal
control systems to their own advantage.
Notwithstanding their different perspectives on the impact of ‗agencification‘ on
accountability, these scholars agree on certain things which are necessary for an
effective system of accountability. Cook (2003) and Segsworth (2003) explain that
20
disclosure of information through various ways of dissemination is necessary to
support governance of executive agencies. But this is achievable where the
consumers of agency services have a 'voice' to make high-sounding demands (Paul,
1991; Flynn, 2004). For Sterick and Scheers (2003), and Rexed (2006), what matters
more than having clearly-defined role is the principals‘ capacity to exert pressure
through close monitoring and detailed evaluation of agency performance.
Pollitt (2005) uses experiences from Sweden, Finland, and Netherlands to
demonstrate that success of effective accountability is determined by the attitude of
those responsible for oversight of executive agencies. In these countries, though
there was clarity of tasks and lines of accountability, ministers showed little interest
in their oversight role. They limited their intervention to setting targets, without
subjecting agency performance reports to scrutiny or pushing them hard to improve
performance.
In the debate on reforms of public service, a widely-agreed idea is that political and
institutional setting of a given country has a significant influence on the New Public
Management-type reform initiatives. Thus, the various differing arguments about the
impacts of executive agencies on accountability are considered ‗theoretical‘ in the
sense that they need validation in the political and institutional context within which
‗agencification‘ has actually taken place.
2.4. A Conceptual Framework
The idea of ‗agencification‘, as used in this study, is borrowed from a work by Colin
Talbot, Christopher Pollitt, Karen Bathgate, Janice Caulfield, Adrian Reilly, and
21
Amanda Smullen. These researchers have explored the idea in a context that
perfectly matches our own, as ―the idea of creating autonomous, or semi-
autonomous, agencies within the public sector, in order to improve, in some way,
how government works‖ (Talbot et al, 2000:2). This definition of ‗agencification‘
points to a conceptual link between disaggregation and increased ‗autonomy‘, which
is the core of the whole process of ‗agencification‘. As large-scale bureaucratic,
ministerial-type organizations are disaggregated into agencies, they tend to acquire
freedom and discretion in their operations and managerial affairs.
Agency ‗autonomy‘, refers to a situation where the organization has discretionary
authority, and enjoys a range of freedoms from the usual ministerial interventions in its
day-to-day operations. To put the concept in more operational terms, we identify its
three dimensions; institutional, managerial, and financial autonomy.
The basis for institutional autonomy of an agency is the process of disaggregation,
whereby large, ministerial-type organization is broken-down into separate entities with
their own governance structures. A body fulfilling executive functions needs to be able to
lead a separate existence (OECD, 2007), without sharing its governance structure with
the previous structures.
Upon acquiring the agency status, the executive agency shifts its focus to performance
and operates like a business entity which requires maximum discretion to allow for
greater flexibility in decision making and putting its own plans and strategies into action.
It is at this point that the agency needs its managerial autonomy, that is, to have high
degree of latitude in making decisions and implementing its action plans and strategies
22
based on independently-set operational targets. This dimension embodies sufficient
control over personnel resources, because they are core to agency operations.
The third financial dimension of agency autonomy is certainly the most complicated. As
a public organization, usually an agency receives subvention from the Government to
add to its own sources for its operations and development activities. This inter-
governmental transfer of financial resources makes financial autonomy restricted to the
relative latitude to prepare (determine) its own budget and decide on efficient ways to
allocate and use financial resources towards achieving its performance targets. Though
this autonomy is very relative to the parent ministry and other institutions, especially the
Ministry of Finance, it requires the agency to be able to withstand undue political
interference which might be exerted through budgetary pressures.
‗Accountability‘, on the other hand, is a broad, ever-expanding concept (Mulgan,
2000) which makes it far more complex. Typical of a broad concept, accountability
has been defined as being called upon to account for your actions to someone, but the
definition is not uniformly agreed across or even within disciplines and even same
organizations (see Bovens, 2005; Ayeni, 1998; Brinkerhoff, 2001; Lawson and
Rakner, 2005). Besides the controversy, such a broad and vague definition makes the
concept less amenable to empirical analysis and thus not useful to achieve the aim of
this research.
In this study, we understand accountability as a relationship in which one party,
having the obligation to inform, explains and justifies its conduct to another party,
the holder of accountability, who is expected to investigate or scrutinise the actor‘s
23
actions with possibility of invoking sanctions. Accountability of public organizations
is designed to be enforced both within Government and between Government and
citizens. It is understood also as a situational concept, in that it needs to be specified
in context: who is accountable to whom and for what?
As for executive agencies, the accountability relationship and arrangements exist at
two different but complimenting levels (Verhoest, et al., 2005). The first (horizontal)
level is the interface between executive agencies as service providers on the one
hand and on the other hand, services users and other citizens. The second (vertical)
level involves executive agencies responsibility to several principals from the
Government institutions such as ministries, the National Assembly, the National
Audit Office, and others.
The study‘s attention rests on performance accountability, which is both process-
based and results-based kind of accountability. Under process-based accountability,
the agency is responsible for adhering to the set Government principles, standards
and regulations related to its performance and to share results with stakeholders. As
for results-based accountability, the agency is responsible for producing
outputs/outcomes, on time and in sufficient quality.
To start with horizontal accountability, the customers and the citizens are the
stakeholders who have the right to seek for information, scrutinize decisions and
actions in the light of performance results, and finally pass judgement through ―exit‖
or ―voice‖ options (Paul, 1991). If performance results are to their dissatisfaction
when matched against their own standards or expectations, the consumers and public
24
at large may decide to find alternative service provider or submit their complaints to
the concerned executive agencies or directly to the responsible persons, who should,
hopefully, use the feedback information to improve their performance for achieving
more satisfactory results. As a process, accountability is an interactive one with both
the executive agencies and the service users and citizens being proactive.
The vertical accountability, on the other hand, is about executive agencies and the
ACEOs specifically, to be answerable to the minister whose ministry sets a policy
framework and Permanent Secretary who is responsible for its strategic direction.
The minister possesses a mandate to monitor and ensure that the executive agencies
are answerable for those policy-related outcomes. Usually, ACEOs enter into
Performance Agreements with the Minister or the principal official at the parent
ministry to facilitate monitoring and evaluation on the basis of explicit, preset
benchmarks.
Based on this conceptualization, an executive agency is accountable when it is
adequately responsive, in a political sense, to the minister, or in civil sense, to the
service users and citizens. The two-dimensional view of accountability and related
processes of agency accounting to the Government (Ministry and Parliament),
customers and the public is presented in figure 1.1.
25
Figure1.1: The Legal-Institutional Framework for Executive Agency
Accountability in Tanzania
Vertical Accountability to Parliament
(via Minister) Enquiries Performance Reporting
Performance Vertical Accountability to Parent Ministry
monitoring Performance reporting
Pressure
Downwards Horizontal Accountability Information sharing, Complaints handling
Response
Voice
Source: Author, 2008
The model demonstrates two centres of accountability for the executive agency. As
key benefactors of agency performance, both the parent Ministry and the public are
assumed to be interested and able to be proactively engaged in the account-
demanding process. On behalf of the Government, the Ministry pressurizes for
results that would contribute towards positive policy outcomes whereas the service
users and the citizens demand the performance of the agency that meets their
expectations and standards.
The model suggests that executive agencies need to become transparent about their
performance and bring the service users and citizens closer to them through some
PUBLIC
Customers and Citizens
PARENT MINISTRY Minister, Permanent Secretary,
Ministerial Advisory Board
EXECUTIVE
AGENCY
PARLIAMENT
26
consultative mechanisms. A conical element here is reliable information flow that
would enable citizens and customers to evaluate and give comments about the
agency performance. These comments and complaints act as impetus for the agencies
to reach their threshold as they stand for promoting more quality, standards and
value of the public services (Osborne, 2007).
On the other side, the ministry effectively monitors the agency performance by
ensuring there is regular reporting and that the results are measured (assessed) using
an agreed-upon performance targets as benchmarks. In a complete framework for
agency accountability, the vertical accountability extends to include accountability
between the ministers and the Parliament. As the minister is given responsibility for
specific agencies, he becomes responsible for their conduct and results and could
face parliamentary enquiries. Chief executive officers and managers of the agencies
are expected to be responsive to policy priorities, and work to preserve its integrity
and professionalism.
Independent and Dependent Variables
The conceptual framework has allowed for identification of independent and
dependent variables. Based on the framework, the autonomy which the agency gains
following its separation from the ministry is presumed to cause the agency to become
more accountable for its performance. The independent variable is, thus, ‗autonomy‘
and the dependent variable will be ‗(performance) accountability‘. The criteria for
examining and comparing these variables are explained in detail in the specific
relevant chapters dealing with those issues.
27
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The way in which research is conducted may be conceived in terms of the research
methods employed and the research instruments utilized in the pursuit of a solution
to a research problem and/or a goal (research objective). The purpose of this chapter
is firstly to expound on the adopted research methods and to introduce the research
instruments used to collect data for analysis in order to provide answers to the set
research questions and thus fulfil the research objectives. The considerations behind
the choice of the methods and instruments of data collection are explained as well.
3.2. Qualitative Research Design
Qualitative research is the approach to understanding the essential nature of a
phenomenon, within a particular context. This kind of research design was found
appropriate for this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, its purpose is not
generalization, but rather, to produce evidence about the impact of increased
autonomy on the executive agencies' responsibility and responsiveness to the
Government and public, without imposing biased preconceptions. Secondly, the task
of analysing governance of executive agencies is a complex one. It is assumed that
effectiveness of these organizations depends on the institutional context within
which they exist and operate (Schick, 1998). Through qualitative research approach,
we can examine the executive agencies within their unique institutional contexts
thereby ensuring the ecological validity of the research and better understanding of
their governance.
28
In addition to that, qualitative research approach provides grounds for getting
sufficient and trustworthy information through the use of multiple methods of data
collection for meaningful results. It frees the process of data collection from
constraints of some predetermined categories of analysis, allowing for a level of
depth and detail that quantitative strategies can't provide (Patton, 2002). The use of
multiple data collection methods generates sufficient data for analysis.
Qualitative research offers four types of methods: experimental, longitudinal, cross-
sectional and case studies. Case studies are considered as prime designs of
qualitative research due to its interpretive approach to data and consider the
subjective meanings that people bring to their situation2. Case study is a qualitative
method for an in-depth, empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its
real-life context that produces context-dependent knowledge (Yin, 1989). What
made the method appropriate is that it allows asking ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions so
as to understand more comprehensively the accountability processes taking place
between the executive agencies, government ministries, customers and other citizens.
It was also taken into consideration that ‗accountability‘ being so broad in scope
cannot be comprehensively investigated. By employing the case study method, the
scope is narrowed down as the research involves investigation of one or two cases.
Rather than generalization, this method provides for an effective approach for
falsification (Flyvbjerg, 2006); which in this study happens to be falsification of the
assumptions of the agency model.
2 See http://www.nyu.edu/classes/bkg/methods/005847ch1.pdf.
29
Research experts advise the use of multiple cases to make the findings
‗generalisable‘, but they insist that there are instances where even a single case is
instructive.3 For comprehensive investigation two executive agencies were selected.
3.3. Scope of the Study
This study investigated two case studies from Tanzania, namely NHBRA and TFDA.
The field work was done in Dar es Salaam, which is the centre of business of the two
agencies and their ministries. Further details on the cases are found in chapter four.
3.4. Target Population and Characteristics of Respondents
Governance of executive agencies involves interaction among concerned officials
from the ministries, agency managers and staff, and the public. To ensure inclusion
of appropriate number of people in the research, probability samples or non-
probability samples are used. Miles and Huberman (1994), Weiss (1998) and
Flyvbjerg (2006) argue that non-probability sampling which is information-oriented
and involves a small sample is the most appropriate for the study as it allows in-
depth examination and analysis while maintaining a high degree of validity. From
the three broad categories of stakeholders, namely Ministries, Agencies, and the
Public, a total of 61 respondents were selected. The size of the selected sample was
found to be manageable considering time constraint faced by the researcher, but also
representative of the target population especially for the case of customers that were
randomly selected from a constructed sample frame. Table 3.1 gives the categories
and number of selected respondents from each of the three categories or levels.
3See http://www.is.cityu.edu.hk/staff/isrobert/phd/ch3.pdf.
30
Table3.1 Respondents from the Ministries, Agency and Public
Level Type
Respondents
Studied
Agencies
Number of
Respondents
NHBRA TFDA Total
Ministry 3 2 5
Agency Managers 2 2 4
Staff 1 1 2
Public Customers 25 25 50
Total 31 30 61
The Ministry officials (5) from the Ministry of Lands and Ministry of Health were
selected on ‗knowledge‘ and ‗relevance‘ criteria which was based on their designate
positions and as suggested by the Director of Administration and Personnel (DAP).
From the two agencies, four respondents were selected from the managerial and
operational cadres, using the ‗knowledge‘ criteria also. The 50customers were
selected using clientele lists obtained from agency (NHBRA) or constructed4
(TFDA). The set of questions that were prepared for and asked to the respondents
differed among the Ministry officials, Agency managers, agency staff, and the
customers.
Besides the basic demographic data on gender and age, it was important for the case
of interviewed customers and the citizens to include level of education because it is
one of the theorized factors influencing the extent to which the public can hold
service providers accountable. The demographic data shows gender imbalance
whereby males accounted for 90% of the 50 customers. Most of the customers fell
under the middle-age categories (54%) or youth (30%). Overall a few (8) customers
4TFDA‘s Clients‘ Service Charter delineates its clients and customers under various categories. The
reviewed document provided the basic guide for the selection of clients.
31
fell under the old age category, 5 being NHBRA customers and 3 TFDA customers.
On levels of education, it was found out that the majority of the customers had
attained adequate education. Out of 50 customers 31 had reached a tertiary level, 13
secondary level, and 6 were degree holders. There was slight difference when
comparison was made between the customers of the two agencies. Out of 25
customers of NHBRA, 18 had reached tertiary level, 4 university level and 3
secondary level; compared to 13, 2 and 10 customers of TFDA that reached those
three educational levels, respectively.
3.5. Data Collection: Sources of Data and Methods of Collection
The bulk of the data used in the study came from written documents and to a much
lesser extent, online publications. Published and unpublished documents obtained
from the agencies themselves and elsewhere enabled us to exploit rich information
about the studied agencies. Also, various government documents, research reports
and those commissioned for the studied agencies were used.
The field data was collected through interviews and questionnaires to augment the
reviewed documents. The data was in the form of views/opinions based on
respondents‘ actual experience as well as details that support documented facts.
The interviews with the managers and clients of the cases were formal but involved
open-ended questions listed in an interview guide. This format was considered
appropriate for collecting facts, details and respondents‘ views. It helped to
understand the respondents‘ points of view about the central issues that the study
aimed to address.
32
The other kind of method was a focus group discussion. Patton (2002) argues that it
is a highly efficient qualitative data collection technique, which allows the
participants (respondents) to hear each other‘s responses and, as a result, be
encouraged to make additional comments beyond their own responses. It is, thus,
fairly easy to assess consistency in the shared views among the participants. In the
study, the focus group discussion involved Government Officials at the Housing
Division at the Ministry of Lands. Besides those advantages, the technique was used
because the respondents themselves found it less time consuming and it was more
convenient to the researcher than the preview kind of interview.
Lastly, questionnaires were used to solicit the views, understandings, experiences
and attitudes of randomly selected citizens, as a segment of the general public. For
ordinary Tanzanian, decent shelter and food safety are very basic needs. Based on
this belief, the researcher approached people randomly in the streets for questioning.
The use of a variety of data sources and multiple techniques to study the problem of
accountability of executive agencies made triangulation possible which is important
for ensuring the validity of information used for analysis.
3.6. Data Handling and Analysis
This study was based on qualitative research. The science of qualitative research
depends on the organization and analysis of rich and complex qualitative data
without the statistical tools that dominate the world of quantitative analysis. This
makes coding a crucial stage of qualitative data analysis. The bulk of unsorted
structured and unstructured data was post-coded using the typology technique. This
33
coding technique allowed for organization of the data into these main categories:
agency autonomy, ―Agency-Public‖ interface, vertical accountability, horizontal
accountability, and factors affecting levels of accountability. These categories were
created based on the conceptual framework and the specific objectives that the study
aimed to achieve.
3.7. Limitations and Challenges Encountered
Most often, limitations and challenges that social science researchers face when
investigating a phenomenon is methodical, or related to data collection. This study
was not exceptional; the researcher did not get access to the Director General of
TFDA and the Chief Executive Officer of the NHBRA who could probably supply
more accurate information about the relationship between them and the Permanent
Secretary, Ministerial Advisory Board, and the Parliament on the other hand.
Alternatively, we interviewed managers that constitute the Management Team of the
two agencies, who proved to be knowledgeable about those issues of concern.
It was also difficult to obtain complete data because access to some important
documents was restricted, especially in TFDA. The researcher had to consult the
Librarian of TFDA whose assistance made it possible to access some of the reports
meant for internal uses. In the case of NHBRA, some of the important documents
that we requested could not be easily found because of the poor conditions of its
library and improper management of records making. These challenges meant that
our research took longer than we had planned, but at the end we were able to
assemble adequate information to make this study possible.
34
CHAPTER FOUR
FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND AUTONOMY OF EXECUTIVE
AGENCIES UNDER INVESTIGATION
4.1. Introduction
The exploration of the research problem involved two case studies, namely NHBRA
and TFDA. This chapter provides some basic institutional characteristics of the two
agencies which include origin of their formation, organizational structure, and
governance. The aspect of agency autonomy is more thoroughly examined under a
separate section. These institutional characteristics are presented under an individual
agency, after which some comparative notes are inserted.
4.2. Institutional Characteristics of Executive Agencies under Investigation
4.2.1. Case I: The National Housing and Building Research Agency (NHBRA)
Tanzania, like other developing countries, has been facing shortage of quality
housing for decades. Both pre- and post-independence governments realized the
housing problem and the urgency to solve it. Thus Cabinet Paper ECC No. 7 of 1970
established the National Housing and Building Research Unit (NHBRU) as a
division under the then Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development to
address the problem of high cost of building construction which were unaffordable to
the majority of the people.
Under the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), the GOT redefined the Unit‘s
role and objectives so as to meet the present needs of Tanzanians. In accordance with
35
the Executive Agency Act No. 30 of 1997,5 the NHBRU was transformed into a
Government Executive Agency in August 2001 and renamed the NHBRA that
operates commercially for the benefit of its customers, taxpayers and its own
employees (NHBRA, 2001a:2).
With this transformation, NHBRA‘s business portfolio has expanded to include more
services and products. It is now able and ready to act in partnership with local
communities, Non-Governmental institutions, Government Ministries, Departments,
and Agencies (MDAs), Donor organizations and private sector in order to carry out
and fulfill its mission. The new roles of NHBRA are threefold: (1) to ensure research
results and technical information on human settlements and development issues are
made available to all who need them; (2) to promote affordable and durable local
building materials and associated technologies, and appropriate housing construction
techniques; and (3) to provide building research consultancy services. These are in
line with the National Human Settlements Development Policy of 2002, the National
Housing Development Programme, 2002, the Habitat agenda of 1997, and
Tanzania‘s vision for 2025 (NHBRA, 2001A:6).
The governance structure includes the ACEO who is appointed by the Minister of
Lands for a term not exceeding five years. The ACEO is charged with the overall
management of the organization. There are three line managers, who head the
business support, research and development, and consultancy department, and
together with the ACEO constitute the Senior Management Team. The ACEO is
5under the establishment order 2001 section 3(1) of the Government Notice No. 355 (Subsidiary
Legislation of the Government Gazette No. 42, Vol. 82)
36
directly answerable to the Permanent Secretary, who oversees the interests of the
ministry and the government in general and is responsible for policy and strategic
management of the agency. The overall personnel size is 56, which is 6 personnel
short from the needed capacity, and their quality is relatively high partly because of
periodic training in short and long courses they undertake.
4.2.2. Case II: The Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA)
The TFDA is a regulatory body under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare but
has executive agency status also. It was established under section 4(1) of the
Tanzania Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act No. 1 of 2003 and its operations
commenced on 1st July 2003 in accordance with the Executive Agency Act, 1997.
The legislation repealed the Pharmaceutical and Poisons Act No. 9 of 1978 and Food
(Control and Quality) Act No. 10 of 1978 to enable merging of the Pharmacy Board
and the National Food Control Commission into one regulatory body with the status
of an Executive Agency as per PSRP objectives.
The core functions of TFDA as a regulatory agency include: (1) to regulate
importation, manufacturing, labelling, distribution, storage, promotion and sale of
foods, drugs, cosmetics and medical devices; (2) to inspect manufacturing facilities,
product outlets and inlets, to verify compliance, to set standards, and practices; (3) to
prescribe standards of quality, safety and effectiveness for food, drugs, cosmetics and
medical devices; (4) to issue licenses and permits for dealing in regulated products;
(5) to collect data on adverse health effects related to the use of the regulated
37
products; and to educate and provide unbiased information to the stakeholders and
the public on products it regulates.
The wide variety of these regulatory functions has led to a broad, multi-layered and
complex organizational structure. At its establishment, TFDA had a four-directorate
structure but which could not provide for effective and efficient delivery of service
due to fragmentation of related functions and imbalance of responsibilities and
workload among sections. In consultation with the Permanent Secretary and approval
by the Ministerial Advisory Board (MAB), TFDA has been restructured with the
new Public Relations and Customer Care units attached to the Director General‘s
Office and zonal offices established in Mwanza, Arusha and Mbeya in an attempt to
strengthen its regulatory services.
The Director General is the head of the authority and takes executive responsibility
for strategy, operational management and service delivery. As the accounting officer,
he is answerable to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health. The Director
General together with the Departmental Directors constitutes the management team.
The total number of staff at the time of research was 1186. These were found to be
qualified and well-trained to handle the technicality of the agency‘s key activities.
In accordance with section 5(2) of the Tanzania Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act of
2003, the TFDA maintains a system of cooperation with a number of public and
private institutions. For example, it collaborates more closely with the Regional and
Local Authorities in implementation of the Public-Private Partnership initiative
6recruitment of additional staff was underway
38
called the Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlet (ADDO) program in Rukwa, Ruvuma,
Morogoro, and Mtwara regions.
4.2.3. Some Comparative Notes on the Two Agencies
The examination of the two agencies has revealed several differences between them.
Firstly, the genesis of the two organizations is different. The TFDA resulted from
merging the defunct Pharmacy Board and the National Food Control Commission,
which were independent authorities, while NHBRA existed as a departmental unit
within the Ministry of Lands.
Secondly, the two agencies belong to different types of executive agencies. The
NHBRA is a ‗mainstream‘ agency which makes it fundamental to the main policy
orientation of the parent Ministry, whereas TFDA is a regulatory agency that has a
more vivid organizational identity.
The third difference lies in their structure and their size. To start with, the NHBRA
has a flat organizational structure with only one level of hierarchy separating the
ACEO at the top from the employees at the bottom. On the other hand, the TFDA‘s
organizational structure is more hierarchical because its line-and-staff structure has
far more sections under staff specialists and lengthier chain of command. Moreover,
TFDA has twice as many (118) employees as NHBRA (56).
4.3. Relative Autonomy of the Two Agencies
It is stipulated in the legislation that executive agencies are ―semi-autonomous‖
organizations within the ambit of Government Ministries charged with the
responsibility to provide public services in selected areas. Pursuant to the study
39
objectives outlined in chapter one, this part presents findings on the extent of
autonomy possessed by the two agencies relative to their Ministries and make a
comparison between them. The relative autonomy was measured and compared
using three variables: financial independence, operational independence, and
autonomy over personnel issues. Financial independence was indicated by the
degree of authority and discretion over agency‘s revenues, assets and liabilities. The
indicators of autonomy to operate were twofold: (1) discretion to set objectives,
priorities, and strategic plans and (2) non-interference in the day-to-day operations.
Lastly, the indicators of autonomy over the personnel issues were: (1) authority over
personnel management and (2) presence of appropriate internal controls over the
performance of the employees.
4.3.1. Financial Independence of the Two Agencies
The legislation stipulate financial powers, procedures and specific guidelines, which
are further clarified under the Framework Documents, to be used for the purpose of
achieving the strategic objectives of the two agencies while maintaining financial
integrity. Both agencies have mandate to charge and collect fees or commissions for
the provision of goods or services, and even borrow monies in order to meet
expenditure in accordance with their strategic frameworks. The revenues collected
by or payable to the two agencies become their property. But Section 12(3) of the
legislation empowers the Minister after consulting the Minister of Finance ―to
determine the amount of revenue which shall remain the property of the agencies,
and the amount which shall be treated as public funds and credited to the Exchequer
Account‖.
40
It was learned that, the amount of revenue which may be credited to the Exchequer
Account depends on three factors: the capacity of the agency to generate its own
income, whether it can become self-financing, and the financial implications of its
plans and budgets. In simpler terms, the agencies which are more capable of
generating income and have potential to become self-financing are more likely to
have more latitude compared to those agencies with low capacity and lack of
potential. These conditions impose limitations to the financial autonomy of the two
agencies because they contain potential to discourage the agencies to strengthen their
income-generating capacities as it would imply losing their revenues.
Caulfield (2003) argues that an expectation in Tanzania that all agencies, after a
time, will become financially self-sufficient is elusive. Our findings concur with
those of Caulfield (2003). The two agencies remain financially dependent on the
government. For instance, review of Cash flow statement of NHBRA which was
found in the Business Plan for the period July 2008–June 2009 revealed that
Government Grant worth Tshs 1.4 billion was expected to be the largest source of its
cash inflow followed by the PSRP‘s Tshs 510 million and NHBRA‘s own Tshs 385
million sources (NHBRA, February, 2008).
It was found out through a review of Framework Documents that the ACEOs of the
two agencies have substantial authority in relation to the capital expenditures. The
ACEOs have powers to authorize capital expenditures on capital projects, to transfer
funds allocated from one budget item to another, and to carry over to the next
financial year unspent funds (in full) on capital provision from the previous financial
41
year. Moreover, with regard to assets and liabilities, the ACEOs can authorize
special payments, disposal of assets, and expenditure on individual consultancy
services.
These budget flexibilities and financial delegation suggests that the two agencies
enjoy a high degree of financial autonomy. But it was found out during the
interviews with managers of the agencies (two from each agency) that the two
agencies are ‗non-immune‘ from close supervision and scrutiny by the Ministries and
less ‗free‘ as it may seem. A manager of NHBRA explained that there were countless
occasions when the agency had to keep ‗begging‘ for timely release of funds from
the Ministry. Another manager (from TFDA) argued that despite increased freedom
in other areas of their operations, bureaucratic tendencies of the Ministry imposed
restrictions on them to access subventions.
It was found out that the Ministries are keen about financial performance of the two
agencies which was indicated by desire to scrutinize their financial accounts. The
legislation under Section 14(2) empowers the Controller and Auditor-General to
conduct audit or to appoint a qualified person to do the task on his behalf. Moreover,
the internal auditors in the Ministries are empowered under the Framework
Documents to perform auditing in the agencies in order to give independent
assurance to the Permanent Secretary. Further scrutiny of accounts is guaranteed
under the statutory requirements of performance reporting by the agencies under
Section 15(1-a) which stipulates that a copy of the audited accounts of the agencies,
42
together with the auditor‘s report on those accounts, must be attached to the annual
performance report.
In the words of an official from the Ministry of Lands during the focus group
discussion, financial scrutiny is necessary to ensure that the agencies do not
manipulate the relationship with the ministry to wield autonomy beyond
government‘s control. We agree that financial scrutiny is critical to avoid
embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, but the rationale needs to be
more than desire of the government to control the agencies and the efforts will be
meaningful if similar emphasis is put on performance results (outputs) of the
agencies.
4.3.2. Operational Discretion of the Two Agencies
The Framework Documents were found to set out key aspects of the operations of
the two agencies, among those found being the aims, roles, strategic objectives, and
key performance standards. In accordance with legislation under Section 3(1)-(2), the
creation of an executive agency is a decision of the Minister based on the opinion
that it can more effectively carry out the functions of a department of the ministry.
It may seem that the two agencies are creatures of the Ministries but collected facts
revealed that their establishment was based on their own, rather than Ministers‘
initiatives. For the case of TFDA, the current Director General was the founder of the
organization after successful initiative to merge the defunct Pharmacy Board and the
National Food Control Commission. It was learned from the officials at the Ministry
of Lands the proposals to transform the Building Research Unit into a separate and
43
more autonomous agency (NHBRA) were prepared and successfully presented by
those that currently occupy the top positions. In both cases and others not under this
investigation, the Ministers have been receptive on the formation of agencies. ESRF
(2004) thinks it is because they wanted to reduce their workload to focus more on
policy roles. Other analysts have associated speedy formation of agencies with
motives of the would-be top leaders to earn more pay and enjoy other privileges. We
argue that, since the creation of agencies had been accepted as a new policy direction
by the GOT and donors have ensured her resources, Ministers on the one hand had
nothing to lose by being receptive and the would-be leaders had a lot to gain by their
initiatives. After creation of the two agencies, as it will be explained in detail under
chapter six, the Ministers have escaped political accountability and ensured a degree
of autonomy which Caulfield (2003) found to be more than what the legislation
prescribed.
It was learned that, there have been significant changes in the structure and extent of
jurisdiction on the side of TFDA. The Director General of TFDA had successfully
initiated and carried out (with approval of the Minister) restructuring of the
organization on the ground that the previous four-directorate structure was
inappropriate for efficient and effective service delivery. The shortfalls of the old
organizational structure included fragmentation of related functions, centralization of
functions at the headquarters and imbalance of responsibilities and workload (TFDA,
2008). While this move can be interpreted as reflecting a strong commitment of
TFDA‘s leadership to improve service delivery (which is commendable), it also
44
indicates its high degree of autonomy (which may have negative implications for
vertical accountability).
Moreover, TFDA was found to use its legal and leadership capacities to protect and
at times to extend its jurisdiction which indicates its higher autonomy than that of
NHBRA. Using the Legal Service Unit, the leadership of TFDA spearheaded the
review of the Tanzania Dairy Industry Act 2004 which led to drafting of the new
Dairy Regulations which omits provisions for regulating quality and safety of milk
by the Tanzania Dairy Board (TFDA, 2008), and thereby allowing TFDA to extend
its regulation mandate by including milk products under its list of regulated products.
This move has led to extension of TFDA‘s areas of jurisdiction, wielding power and
autonomy7. This kind of bold decision when supported by some visible achievements
had made good impression to the minister at the Ministry of Health which helped in
wielding more power and discretion from the ministry.
With respect to discretion over routine operations, the legislation promises that the
agencies should not be subjected to interference in their routine operations. The
overall responsibility to discharge day-to-day activities of the two agencies and
accountability thereof lies with ACEOs following delegation by the ministers. Of
course to discharge this responsibility necessitated the Chief Executive Officer of
NHBRA and the Director General of TFDA to use their statutory powers to
determine the number and responsibilities of the managers and directors who
7TFDA is now deeply engaged in fighting all sorts of counterfeit products not just drugs, medicines,
cosmetics, and medical devices as prescribed by the legislation; but even electronic products like
televisions.
45
constituted the top leadership (management team) of the two agencies in accordance
with the business needs.
Data obtained from various studies revealed that the creation of agencies in Tanzania
has led to a substantial shift of power through delegation of authority and
institutional separation between the ministries and the created agencies, which result
into the latter‘s increased autonomy as well. A study by Tella (2003) found that after
the transformation and acquisition of agency status there was substantial internal
delegation of authority within the 5 agencies studied and increased discretion in
decision-making relative to their ministries. Most of the staff who were interviewed
argued that the oversight role of the ministry had no interference with day-to-day
management of those agencies. Also, ESRF (2004) analyzed the institutional
framework and management systems of some 12 agencies and reported that agencies
were operating free from bureaucratic and political control8. The field data that were
collected through interviews with agency managers and Ministry officials reaffirmed
the previous findings.
All of the managers and officials that we interviewed agreed that the two agencies
operate without bureaucratic and political interferences from the ministries. The
assessment of these respondents was that they have become relatively more
autonomous than they had been under the previous arrangements. However, there
were variations in the perceptions about the degree of autonomy of the two agencies.
Managers of TFDA thought that the degree of autonomy of their organization was
8It was noted, however, the high demand of the Tanzania Roads Agency‘s services led to
bureaucratic and political interference a ―management nightmare‖ because all politicians
want to improve roads in their constituencies (ESRF, 2004:9)
46
adequate and one of them confidently associated that situation with their
achievements.
The NHBRA‘s managers had expressed less satisfaction with the degree of
organizational autonomy. On the contrary, interviewed officials from NHBRA's
parent Ministry, that is the Ministry of Lands, thought that NHBRA has been granted
―too much‖ freedom. It was explained that, while the drive for efficiency was a valid
reason for disaggregating NHBRU from the Ministerial structure, the need for more
freedom and discretion was even more pressing for those that occupied the top
positions therein.
4.3.3. Authority and Control over the Employees
The review of legislation revealed that the ACEOs have adequate authority for
personnel management, organization, control, and discipline9 of the employees in the
agency. In accordance with that mandate, the ACEOs of the two agencies were found
to possess and have used their authority to appoint employees as they considered
necessary. The procedures for recruitment give the Minister power of approval of
those recruited which is partly because the salaries of agency employees are paid by
the Ministry (case of NHBRA). It was learned from the interviews with the Business
Support Manager (a de facto Human Resource Manager) of NHBRA and Human
Resource Manager of TFDA that this arrangement is a formality because the
recruitment process were initiated and controlled by the agencies themselves without
any form of involvement of persons from the Ministry.
9It is stipulated in the legislation that the ACEO can terminate the appointment of an employee for
misconduct and incompetence.
47
Of course, the recruitment process is supposed to be done in accordance with the
Public Service Employment Policy (1998) which emphasizes openness and
competitiveness for appointments and promotion within and outside the public
organization. We did not find it relevant to explore if those principles of recruitment
were observed because this would have not helped to achieve the study objectives.
However, researchers can explore the propriety of human resource practices which
may offer alternative explanation to variation of levels of service delivery across
executive agencies in Tanzania.
In terms of organization of the employees, the ACEOs were found to have used their
delegated authority to place different types of employees at various levels and to
make job descriptions so that each job could contribute to the achievement of their
missions. Both agencies have Schemes of Service10
which seek to clarify and define
lines of responsibilities and were found to be appropriate as tools for hiring and
promoting their employees. The ACEOs have authority to introduce changes deemed
necessary to maximise the agency‘s efficiency and effectiveness. It was learned from
the interviews with the Business Support Manager of NHBRA and Human Resource
Manager of TFDA that the two agencies were in the process of revising their
Schemes of Service in order to meet the arisen needs. The NHBRA was at the initial
stage of the process while the Director General of TFDA had already produced a
draft amendment document to be submitted to the Workers‘ Council and after there
10
The TFDA‘s ‗Scheme of Service and Salary Structure for the TFDA Staff‘ and the NHBRA‘s
‗Scheme of Service‘ were prepared, respectively, in March and February.
48
to the MAB for further action. The approval powers of the Schemes of Service for
both agencies lie with the PO-PSM.
In addition to the mandate to design and revise the Schemes of Service from time to
time, the ACEOs of the two agencies have authority to determine the terms and
conditions of service for the employees. These terms and conditions were based on
the Executive Agencies (Personnel Management) Regulations of 1999 and because
of the status of their employees (public servants) the ACEOs are required to consider
directions of the Minister responsible for the Civil Service.
With respect to internal controls of its employees‘ performance, the relevant
mechanisms were found in place for both agencies. These mechanisms have striking
differences. The Business Support Manager of NHBRA explained during the
interview that the performance of employees at all levels is appraised through the
Open Performance Review Appraisal System (OPRAS) as per section 34 of the
Public Service Act, 2002, Regulation 22 of the Public Service Regulations, 2003,
and the Public Service Circular No.2 of 2004. In TFDA, performance appraisal of
employees is no longer done using OPRAS.
It was explained by TFDA‘s Human Resource Manager in an interview that
implementation of OPRAS revealed several shortcomings that rendered the system
less useful to manage performance of its employees. The mentioned shortcomings
included: reducing mutual trust and confidence between the supervisor and
subordinate due to the presence of third party in the appraisal process; feedback is
not provided to the appraised employee; rewards and sanctions for performance and
49
non-performance are excluded; and there is room for activities outside the work plan
(which he argued were many and critical). In the light of these shortcomings the
TFDA designed an alternative appraisal system which would address these problems
but remain within the same legal framework. The interviewed manager refused to
explain about the new appraisal system because it was at its infancy stage of
experimentation, but informed the researcher that the PO-PSM had approved the
system and highly commended their innovativeness. The innovativeness showed by
the TFDA has earned the agency trust of its portfolio Ministry and other relevant
authorities which provide potential for increased autonomy over its operations.
50
CHAPTER FIVE
STATUS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
5.1. Introduction
In Tanzania, executive agencies are required to observe three operational principles:
efficient and effective service delivery, high standard of financial management and
accounting, and high responsiveness to customers‘ needs. To enforce the principles,
Act No. 13 of 1997 and the Framework Documents provide for the legal and
institutional framework for governance of the agencies under which hierarchical
accountability relationships between the agencies and key government actors are
stipulated. This chapter assessed the extent of (vertical) accountability of the two
agencies using data from reviewed key documents and interviews with Ministry
Officials and agency managers.
It examined two activities (variables): viability of Performance Monitoring and
viability of Performance Reporting. The choice of these variables took into account
the fact that while performance targets are critical to sound management, they make
sense only when subjected to systematic monitoring and reporting which can make
those responsible individuals accountable (PO-PSM, 2004:61-62). The indicators for
viable monitoring are twofold: (1) proactive Ministries‘ supervision over the
agencies; and (2) sufficient and appropriate incentives to facilitate accountability of
the agencies. While viable reporting is indicated by: (1) appropriate reporting
requirements; (2) extent of compliance by the agencies; and (3) high quality reports.
51
5.2. Monitoring Performance of the Two Agencies
5.2.1. Ministerial Supervision of the Two Agencies
The vertical accountability relationship between the Ministry and the two agencies
involves four key actors: the Minister, the Permanent Secretary, the MAB and the
ACEO. But contrary to the United Kingdom‘s Model which our own is supposed to
emulate, Ministers‘ role is only nominal as they are sidelined from the actual
processes of performance monitoring. Caulfield (2003) has noted that the agency
model strengthens the bureaucracy rather than making it more open to political and
public scrutiny. We concur with her findings, because this framework for
governance of the agencies can undermine democratic principle of ministerial
accountability and findings revealed that the public lacks access to these agencies
(this is discussed in chapter six). It is our view that if the Minister was to face
political scrutiny from the Parliament and subjected to public scrutiny, it could push
the Minister into taking a more proactive role in making the agencies accountable.
The legislation provides that a MAB for each executive agency consists of Minister‘s
appointees from within and outside the public service. The MABs advice the
Minister and Permanent Secretary on various substantive issues which include:
review of strategic plans, business plans and performance reports; setting up of
objectives, priorities and annual performance targets for the Agency; approval of
plans, annual reports and accounts; development and maintenance of a strategic
framework.
52
These advisory bodies have potential that cannot be neglected. Ministers can use
MABs to make the agencies more responsive to the customers because he has
powers to appoint persons who are representative of the interests of the Agency's
customers. Presence of these persons in the MABs can help the agencies take more
consideration of the demands and preferences of their customers. However, a deeper
examination of the legislation revealed that the potential of the MABs to exert
pressure on the two agencies is seriously limited. In the first place, their mandatory
function is advisory rather than executive. The agency managers who were
interviewed admitted that the role of MABs is only marginal due to absence of
incentives for the Board members who are not answerable to the Minister. It was
learned that most often MABs meet once or twice per annum.
The MABs do not seem to have taken their role seriously because despite the low
quality of NHBRA‘s reports and unexplained mismatch between performance targets
and results, the managers did not recollect any incidence where their performance
reports were rejected. In some few cases the MAB approved agency budgets but the
Ministry sent the budget back to the agency for reworking. There was not a case
where MAB facilitated responsiveness of the two agencies to customers and the
public. Also, despite statutory powers of the Permanent Secretary to seek
information or explanation about agency performance, it was learned through the
agency managers that none of them recalled a formal request for information or
explanation on submitted reports from the Permanent Secretaries. This showed
ministries‘ disinterest in becoming proactive in supervision of the agencies.
53
The four managers (two from NHBRA and two from TFDA) who were interviewed
had different explanations for the overall low interest shown by the parent Ministries
to monitor their agencies‘ performance. Ministries were more concerned with the
input side (that is finances). Some argued that financial issues, unlike performance
issues (that is output), affect more directly the Ministry‘s own budget which implies
the Minister can more easily come under political scrutiny by the Parliament and by
the media. Indeed, after reviewing TFDA‘s performance reports (2003-2008) and
NHBRA‘s performance reports (2003-2007), it became apparent that value for
money (quality) from the customers‘ perspective is not treated as among the critical
performance indicators, and the Ministries have never raised queries regarding the
extent to which the performance satisfy the customers and clients.
A manager from the NHBRA believed that performance monitoring is a managerial
and very complicated activity, one which the Ministry cannot perform because of the
bureaucratic orientations and avoidance of responsibilities by the senior officials. He
said the technical aspects of the NHBRA can also be a factor that may discourage
close monitoring. Another manager (from TFDA) argued that minimal intervention
was ‗part of the deal‘ (agreed principle of the executive agency model). He reasoned
that interference by the Government has always resulted into unnecessary delays and
the blame returns to them. He stressed that TFDA‘s status as free standing regulatory
agency is what explains its success within a relatively short time.
Officials from the Ministry of Health expressed high trust in the capabilities of
TFDA‘s top leadership and professionalism of its staff and thus the Ministry was less
54
concerned about scrutinizing the organization. The Officials said they were not
worried about the autonomy of the TFDA because it was a professional body and
results of its activities do not require written evidence. More specifically, they
referred to TFDA‘s success stories in spotting and destroying counterfeit products to
protect public health11
. The successes of TFDA were used as pretext for the
disinterest shown by the ministry in scrutinizing agency‘s performance.
It was found out that the discretion with which the monitoring process is supposed to
be handled by the Ministries has done little to facilitate accountability of the two
agencies. In Sections 6(c)-(d) and 7 of the Executive Agencies Act, No.13 of 1997,
exclusive oversight powers and responsibility are delegated to the Permanent
Secretary and MAB. It was learned from the focus group discussion at the Ministry
of Lands that despite the presence of adequate experts in the Housing Division, these
are not usually consulted by the Permanent Secretary. Though the legislation
specifies and clarifies the lines of responsibility and accountability, we argue that the
arrangement overlooks the fact that the Permanent Secretaries have far more
overwhelming duties as top executives at the ministry and there are sufficient
incentives to members of MABs which create loophole for the two agencies to avoid
effective scrutiny.
5.2.2. Incentives to Make the Agencies Accountable
Incentives constitute the critical element in any effective system of accountability.
Analysts (Mulgan, 2000; Strom, 2003) agree that potential of sanctions (as
11It was reported in that TFDA has exposed and destroy unfit drugs worth 786,148,786/- and
cosmetics worth 24, 267,200/- and approximately 4,600 metric tons of unfit food worth
1bn/- (Daily News; Monday, June 30, 2008).
55
incentives) makes the difference between non-committal disclosure of information
and being held to account. After reviewing the legislation we found out that the
incentives at the disposal of the parent ministry to make the two agencies
accountable are insufficient. Unlike other laws which clearly stipulate penalties
against specific faults, the legislation is silent about such explicit sanctions.
In the legislation the Permanent Secretary has mandatory powers to discipline and
control the chief executive officers of the agencies, and can even recommend for
their termination for misconduct or incompetence.12
Indeed, these powers can be
used to keep constant pressure on the ACEO to improve his performance in a
consistent manner. However, the use of these powers for purposes of holding the
agencies accountable for their performance was found to be very low due to various
reasons that we point out below.
First, the ministries were found to be disinterested to engage in a proactive
monitoring of the two agencies. In the interviews, agency managers admitted not to
recollect any incidence where the Permanent Secretary raised queries about their
performance. We reviewed NHBRA‘s performance appraisal reports and found
discrepancies between performance targets and reported results but the two managers
who were interviewed did not recollect their agency and ACEO being pressurized to
give detailed explanation. Without a close and proactive monitoring the ministries
cannot have accurate and unbiased information of the agencies‘ performance which
impose limit on to control.
12
Under Section 5(2), and 9(6)
56
Second, the institutional set up for vertical accountability of the two agencies is
inappropriate. Review of the legislation revealed three contradictory roles of the
Permanent Secretaries: firstly as responsible for strategic management of the
agencies, secondly as the principal accounting officer to be accountable for
performance of the agencies, and thirdly as chairperson of the MAB which evaluates
the agencies‘ performance and advices him and the Minister. This arrangement
creates a situation in which the account holder (Permanent Secretary) is biased and
not independent from the actor (ACEO), thereby imposing limit on unbiased
monitoring of the two agencies.
The third factor is related to the political context under which the two agencies exist
and operate. In Tanzania holding public officials accountable has not been a culture
of the bureaucracy. This culture is only now being promoted by the opposition
political parties, the private media, and the donors. As McDavid (1998) and Mihyo
(1986), argue bureaucrats tend to resist or avoid any form of full accountability
because this would shift power and discretion away from them. With the minister
and Parliament taking a background role in the monitoring of the agencies, to expect
that the Permanent Secretary will effectively hold the ACEO accountable is to
neglect the mutual interest that they share (to avoid blame from politicians).
5.3. Performance Reporting by the Two Agencies
Monitoring makes sense only if results will be reported and disseminated; for
reporting ―drives‖ monitoring. We reviewed the legislation and Framework
Documents to capture the statutory requirements and obligations of executive
57
agencies and five Ministry officials were interviewed in order to determine
compliance of the two agencies.
5.3.1. Reporting Requirements and Extent of Compliance by the Two
Agencies
In accordance with the legislation, it is the statutory obligation of agencies to report
about their operational performance and financial accounts, for the purpose of
facilitating accountability of those who are responsible. Reporting requirements are
with respect to two aspects: contents of the report, time to submit the report and
dissemination of the reports. We look at these aspects in turn.
Section 15(1)-(2) of the Executive Agencies Act of 1999 provides for a general
format of the annual performance reports of all executive agencies in the country.
The annual report must contain: (1) a copy of audited accounts of the Agency,
together with Auditor General‘s report on those accounts; (2) a report of performance
against key targets and any other related information; (3) a report on the operations
of the Agency during that financial year; (4) such other information as the Permanent
Secretary may require; and (5) the Annual Performance Agreement between the
Permanent Secretary and the ACEO. Once a report contains all these items it was
considered complete and marks the end of reporting process.
We found this process not ―complete‖ in a sense that it is not adequate to make the
agencies accountable. Though the Permanent Secretary can inquire or demand any
information from the agency, there were no evidence that this power was being
utilized effectively to enforce accountability of the agencies. Once submitted, the
58
reports were simply regarded as credible by the ministries and efforts were never
made to verify the information contained therein. In the interviews with the agency
managers, it was learned that none of the two agencies had received a request or
directive from the ministry to provide any extra information besides that contained in
their reports. The general disinterest showed by the ministries was found to reduce
potential to facilitate accountability of the two agencies through the reporting system
because the agencies were not expecting any inquiries or questions, which indicated
non-accountability.
In the same law section 15(2), specific timeframe within which the agencies are
required to prepare and submit those reports is not stipulated. The time to submit the
performance report depends on the kind of reports. Agencies are required to submit
their annual performance reports within two months after the end of each financial
year. Besides the annual reports, the agencies are required to report their
performance twice a year (bi-annually). However, no sanctions for non-compliance
were found out in the legislation, and this limits the usefulness of reporting as a
means to hold the agencies accountable. While interviews with officials from the
Ministry of Health confirmed that TFDA‘s reports and financial accounts are,
usually, timely, it was found out that NHBRA‘s final annual accounts and financial
statements for three consecutive financial years (2002 to 2004) were submitted not
less than a month after the stated deadline.
Related to time requirements, the legislation requires that the agencies publish and
circulate their performance reports among the relevant authorities. Once the
59
performance reports are prepared the agencies are required to send them to the MAB
and the Permanent Secretary for approval before they go to the minister. Moreover,
the minister is directed by the legislation to ensure a copy of the annual reports of the
agencies is laid before the National Assembly not more than two months after
receiving the reports. Although the involvement of the National Assembly is
commendable, its role in facilitating accountability of the two agencies was found to
be only nominal. This was attributed to sidelining of the ministers from governance
of the two agencies which seem to have replaced ‗political‘ accountability (Minister
as answerable) with ‗administrative‘ accountability (ACEOs as answerable).
Moreover, legislation fails to provide for dissemination of these reports to the public
which has kept the agencies from serious public scrutiny. The existing system of
performance reporting system continues to be inward-looking because the public, to
whom the agencies are supposed to be responsive, was not identified by legislation
as an important stakeholder like the government authorities. The failure of the
legislation to require that the agencies publish and disseminate their performance
reports has imposed informational barriers against the public which have hindered
the use of ‗voice‘ against the two agencies.
5.3.2 Quality of the Performance Reports by the Two Agencies
Also, the legislation is silent on the quality of the performance reports which
downplays their potential to help Ministries hold the agencies accountable. The
review of the annual performance reports of the two agencies revealed significant
60
qualitative differences of those reports between the two agencies. The annual
performance reports of TFDA (2003 - 2008) that were examined were found to be
well-written, reader-friendly, and contained sufficient information, explanations and
even some justifications for all actions taken by the top management which affect its
performance outputs. By having these qualities, the TFDA‘s performance reports
revealed potential to help the responsible ministry officials and other stakeholders to
make sound judgement about its performance. Performance reports of NHBRA
(2004 - 2007) were substandard both in terms of substance and style, but we did not
come across ministerial queries on them.
61
CHAPTER SIX
THE “AGENCY-PUBLIC” INTERFACE AND THE STATUS OF
HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
6.1. Introduction
Horizontal accountability can be considered to be complete and thus potentially
effective when the customers and citizens have substantial influence on the agencies,
and when the agencies recognize and provide the customers and public with formal
or informal avenues through which to get feedback in order to know their needs,
demands, preferences and even disappointments. It is assumed that a closer interface
between service provider and service user promotes information exchanges and
performance-based accountability. The chapter thus focuses on two related issues,
namely ―Agency-Public‖ interface and ―horizontal accountability‖ (for
performance). To examine the ‗agency-public‘ interface three indicators were used:
(1) degree of transparency; (2) presence of appropriate feedback mechanisms; and
(3) rate of customers‘ use of the services.
To analyze ‗horizontal‘ accountability we examined two main variables: first, service
‗effectiveness‘ and second, customers‘ propensity or potentiality to improve
responsiveness by the agency. To determine service effectiveness two indicators
were used: (1) perceived service improvements and (2) customers‘ satisfaction. On
the ―demand-side‖, we examined the potential of the public to hold the two agencies
accountable whose indicators include: (1) public expectations of service
improvement; (2) presence and potential use of ―exit‖ options to make the agencies
62
responsive; and (3) rate of public demand for better services. In close relation with
the potentials of the customers to make the agencies responsive, we assessed their
actual propensity which was indicated by the rate of submitting complaints.
6.2. Interface of the Two Agencies and the Public
6.2.1. Transparency of the Two Agencies to the Customers
Transparency is instrumental to effective accountability (Bovens, 2005) because
provision of sufficient, accurate and relevant information by the actor lays ground for
the account holder to make judgement about the actor‘s conduct or performance. In
line with this fact, the information delivery systems of the two agencies were
examined to establish whether the interface has greater transparency of the two
agencies measured by the extent to which the agencies provide access to information
about the service and performance.
The study revealed that there were information delivery channels in both agencies
and some exclusively used by TFDA, but even these differed in the degree of
appropriateness and effectiveness as tools for enhancing transparency and
accountability to the customers and the citizens. Table 6.1 outlines the information
delivery channels that were found in the two agencies and it shows that a higher
number of channels are present in TFDA than NHBRA.
63
Table. 6.1: Information Delivery Channels of the two Agencies
No Means of Information Delivery NHBRA TFDA
1 Library x x
2 Client Service Charter x
3 Media x x
5 Public Relations Unit/Office x
6 Internet/Website x x
7 Exhibition x x
8 Sensitization seminar x x
Total score out of 8 6 8
Source: Field Data, 2008
The information delivery channels available in both agencies include library,
website, media, sensitization seminars, and exhibitions. Yet, there was a huge
difference in the appropriateness of these channels and TFDA has additional ways to
inform its customers and the citizens about itself.
The library of NHBRA lacks sufficient, up-to-date and relevant materials, and
personnel to run the library. The library is stocked with local newspapers and old
written materials without there being the annual performance reports, which makes
the library unsuitable as a resource centre for low cost housing as it was supposed to
be (NHBRA, 2006:14). Instead of obtaining the documents from the library the
researcher had to ask for print-outs from the Business Support Manager‘s office.
This indicated lack of quick and easy public access to information. In contrast, the
library of TFDA is operated by a professional Librarian with his Assistant, and it was
possible to retrieve the annual performance reports for the past five years with their
help. Other documents found were the various reports and market surveys that had
64
been conducted by the agency or their consultants. By visiting the library, the
customers and citizens can obtain relevant information about the activities and
performance of the agency since its establishment.
The second information delivery channels found in both agencies was internet
website under these addresses: www.tfda.or.tz (TFDA) and www.nhbra.go.tz
(NHBRA). By visiting the homepages of the two agencies, the public can obtain
information on the background, organizational structure, function and objectives, and
services and products which are offered. The NHBRA‘s website contained no
additional information. For the case of TFDA it was found out that the website
offers more details about its activities, previous and upcoming events, publications
(but not the annual performance reports), public alerts about adverse cosmetics,
drugs and medicines in the market, regulations or guidelines on registration, and
public education programmes among others. It can thus be said that TFDA‘s website
is more appropriate as an information delivery tool as it offers detailed and relevant
information to the customers and citizens alike.
To reach out to the public, the two agencies have used media for commercial
advertisements and provision of information about matters intended to inform only.
Under its Publicity or Promotional Programme, NHBRA has used print media and
electronic media for advertisements for the purposes of raising public awareness of
the agency‘s services and products (NHBRA, 2007). The types of media include
print media like newspapers, brochures, and journal13
, as well as electronic media
13
Ministry of Lands publishes a journal titled ―Ardhi ni Mtaji‖ in which information of its other
agencies including the NHBRA were found.
65
like television and radio. Despite these channels being repeatedly mentioned in the
Performance Appraisal Reports, there were no adequate details to ascertain their
actual use by NHBRA.
On the other hand, it was found out that the TFDA publishes the ―Drug Information
Bulletin‖ every three months to inform healthcare providers within the country and
abroad on quality, safety and effectiveness of drugs. The bulletin seeks also to
promote rational prescribing, dispensing and use of drugs. Also, TFDA has used
radio (especially Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam and Radio One14
) as its key media in
dissemination of information and education covering various programmes including:
organization and functions of TFDA, procedures for obtaining permits and license
from TFDA, rational use of Antiretroviral drugs, monitoring of Adverse Drug
Reactions and many others.15
Review of the Five-Year Annual Performance Report
revealed that the Public Relations Unit had organized 2 press conferences, issued 20
press releases, and published 72 newspaper articles in 2006 alone (TFDA, 2008).
The fourth information delivery channel used by both agencies was sensitization
seminars. The review of NHBRA‘s Performance Appraisal Report (2007-2008)
revealed that sensitization seminars and demonstrations on low cost, affordable
housing and using appropriate technologies were conducted in Ruvuma, Tabora,
Iringa, Mara, Arusha, Manyara and Dar es Salaam. On its part, TFDA had conducted
zonal sensitization seminars to inform and educate stakeholders on the Tanzania
Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act 2003 and the organization and functions of the
14
These two radio stations (Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam is now Tanzania Broadcast Corporation)
have the widest national outreach than any other in the country. 15
www.tfda.or.tz
66
TFDA. Participants of such seminar include manufacturers, importers, wholesalers
and retailers of food, drugs, herbal drugs, cosmetics and medical devices. Others are
City/Municipal/Town/District Executive Directors, law enforcers and representatives
from government and non-government organizations. These sensitization seminars
have been conducted in the following zones: Eastern zone (2003), Central Zone
(2004), Northern Zone (2004), Lake Zone (2004), Southern Highlands Zone (2005),
Southern Zone (2005), and Dar es Salaam (2005). The sensitization seminars in these
zones (except Dar es Salaam) the stakeholders were sensitized on Fees and Charges
Regulations & Delegation of Powers Regulation16
.
Exhibitions were used also by the two agencies to provide information to the
customers and citizens about their activities, objectives, achievements, services and
to respond to their questions. According to the Performance Appraisal Report (2007-
2008), the NHBRA carried out five exhibitions for the 2007/2008 period as follow:
Farmers Day (August 2007), Intellectual Property Exhibition (August 2007),
Tanzania Public Service Week (June 2008), Engineers Day (2008) and Dar es
Salaam International Trade Fair (July 2008). The TFDA had also participated in
exhibitions such as Tanzania Public Service Week (June 2008) for the purpose of
increasing awareness of its stakeholders and citizens on: Tanzania Food, Drugs and
Cosmetics Act 2003; organization and functions of the TFDA; procedures for
obtaining license and permit from TFDA; safety and quality of food, drugs, herbal
drugs, cosmetics and medical devices; rational use of food, drugs, herbal drugs,
16
www.tfda.or.tz
67
cosmetics and medical devices; and health hazard associated with the use of food,
drugs, herbal drugs, cosmetics and medical devices like adverse drug reactions17
.
Other information delivery channels were found in TFDA alone, namely client
service charter and public relations unit. On 27 January 2006 TFDA launched its
Clients Service Charter which seeks to establish agency‘s commitment to the
standards for which it strives to reach in providing services to its stakeholders. The
Charter provides information about TFDA service delivery approach and its
relationship with the clients in five areas: functions, communication, standards of
service delivery, clients‘ rights and responsibilities, and channels for feedback or
making a complaint. The Charter was found to be an important tool with potential to
facilitate horizontal accountability in three ways: it clearly specifies quality of
service that the customers should expect, and may use this commitment to demand
better service; it allows customers to evaluate performance of services and give their
feedback on the performance, which is critical for continuous improvement; and it
provides a basis for making comparisons between agencies which offer similar
services to that provided by TFDA, and this is a critical step towards the use of the
exit option by the customers as a means of making the agency more accountable for
its services.
It was learned from the NHBRA‘s Business Support Manager that the agency had
yet to officially launch its Charter as the PO-PSM had not released funds for the
launch event. This explanation was found to be unsatisfactory partly because the
reasons behind the failure of the agency management to secure funds for launching
17
www.tfda.or.tz
68
the Charter were not provided. It can be argued that the leadership of the agency has
not been aggressive enough in the question of launching the Charter.
The other mechanisms for information delivery found in TFDA alone was the Public
Relations Unit which operates under the Office of the Director General. The Public
Relations Unit was established to strengthen the link between TFDA and the general
public through organizing press conferences, issuing press releases, and publication
of articles. It was reported in the Five-Year Annual Performance Report that during
the 2006/2007 financial year 20 press releases were issued, 72 articles appeared in
various newspapers, and 2 press conferences were conducted to clarify the results of
TFDA inspection of cosmetics and medical stores in Dar es Salaam. For the case of
NHBRA, there is no office charged formally and specifically to deal with public
relations matters; instead, the Director General acts as the spokesperson and de facto
public relations officer.
After tallying the number of available mechanisms for provision of customer and
public information from the two agencies, TFDA scored higher than NHBRA. Also,
a close examination of those mechanisms found in both agencies revealed that
TFDA‘s information delivery tools are more institutionalized and had potentials to
facilitate its accountability than those of NHBRA. However, out of 30 ordinary
citizens (not clients) that were asked if they knew about the functions and services
provided by the two agencies, only 3 professed knowledge of at least one function of
TFDA, with 23 admitting that they had no such knowledge while 4 did not even
answer the question. Despite the small size of the sample, the fact that these
69
respondents were a segment of the general public and randomly picked makes their
low level of knowledge indicative of the extent to which the information delivery
system of the two agencies has yet to reach the wider public.
6.2.2. Feedback Mechanisms
As part of their information systems, the two agencies possessed a number of
mechanisms through which they could obtain feedback from the customers and
citizens generally. The common ways shared by both agencies to get feedback for
their performance were four: letters, suggestion boxes, telephone, and exhibitions.
The contact details of the two agencies which their customers and citizens could use
to make a telephone call, send a fax, or send an email are available in the two
agencies‘ websites, client service charter (TFDA) and publications. Exhibitions have
been used to get feedback from stakeholders‘ assessment of the services and products
demonstrated by the two agencies. Other mechanisms were available in TFDA alone.
Table 6.2 outlines feedback mechanisms available in the two agencies.
Table 6.2: Feedback Mechanisms Available in the two Agencies
No Feedback Mechanisms NHBRA TFDA
1 Suggestion Box x x
2 Official Correspondence x x
3 Internet/Website x
4 Exhibitions x x
5 Customer Care/Public Relations Office x
6 Customer Surveys x
Total score out of 6 3 6
Source: Field Data, 2008
70
The NHBRA has a website, but the homepage does not provide opportunity for
customers and citizens to give any kind of feedback. On the other hand, TFDA‘s
website has a ―Feedback Form‖ that allows any interested person to make a
comment, or advice, or a complaint about the services of the agency.
As a measure to enhance implementation of Quality Management Systems (QMS)
functions, the Director General‘s Office introduced a Customer Care Desk to attend
all customers for purposes of improving service delivery (TFDA, 2006). The
Customer Care Officer has the responsibility to receive public complaints or queries
through physical visits and official correspondence and forward them to relevant
Directories for necessary corrective measures. Moreover, TFDA had commissioned
consultants or sponsored internal officers to conduct surveys for the purpose of
soliciting perceptions, opinions, and attitudes towards its mission, objectives and
performance in service delivery. These studies include 2004 Customer Satisfaction
Survey (Excel Media 2004), Self-Assessment of the Performance of Tanzania Foods
and Drugs Authority (Singonda and Sillo 2005), and Factors contributing to the
Delay in the Drugs Registration Process at the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority
(Komero, 2006). The NHBRA had no customer care officer but the secretary to the
Chief Executive Officer acts as a de facto complaints officer, and the only survey
conducted was prior to its acquisition of agency status back in 2001.
6.2.3. Rate of Service Use by the Public
The extent to which the agencies as service providers and public as service users was
determined by focusing on the rate of service use, whereby the high or increasing
71
rate of service use by the customers was taken to signify greater or increasing degree
of close interface as a potential stimulus for horizontal accountability, and the low or
decreasing rate of service use signified lower or decreasing degree of closeness
between agencies and the public.
Data used to determine the rate of service use by the public were obtained from
interviews with a total of 50 customers (25 for each agency) and from the
documentary sources, particularly TFDA‘s annual performance reports (2003-2008)
and NHBRA‘s annual performance appraisal reports (2004-2007). The secondary
data were used as baseline and compared to the results of the customer survey
(2009). By the use of secondary and primary data it was possible to analyze the
trends in the rate of service use. One challenge however was that the two agencies
offered different kinds of services and so the analysis focused on those core services
of the agencies without attempting to set some common criteria for comparison. The
trends were studied separately with TFDA and NHBRA as independent cases and
thereafter a general comparison based on the findings of each agency was made.
To start with NHBRA, we examined the rate of service, particularly its construction
and consultancy services. According to a review of annual performance appraisal,
the trend of service use has not been consistent and there was a significant variation
between individual customers and other types of customers such as Non-
Governmental Institutions. In table 6.3, the trend of construction and consultancy
services use for the periods 2004/2005 and 2007/2008 show the inconsistency and
variations between types of customers that used NHBRA‘s services.
72
Table 6.3: Rate of Use of NHBRA‟s Construction and Consultancy Services
Customers 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8
Individual customers 2 - 2 5
Central Government Institutions 2 - 4 7
Parastatals/Other Agencies 1 - 5 5
Non-Governmental Institutions 4 - 0 0
Total 9 - 11 17
Source: NHBRA (2004, 2006, 2007) 18
The baseline data show a very low rate of construction and customer service use by
the customers of NHBRA. There was a slight increase in the number of Individual
Customers from 2 in 2004/2005 to 5 in 2007/2008, Central Government Institutions
from 2 to 7 as well as Parastatals or Other Agencies from 1 in 2004/2005 to 5 in
2006/2007, but similar (or the same) number of customers used the services for the
year 2007/2008. On the other hand, the number of Non-Governmental Institutions is
shown to decrease from 4 in 2004/2005 to 0 in 2007/2008. Data for 2005/2006 could
not be obtained. The baseline data suggest that the NHBRA has a relatively small
customer base for its construction and consultancy services. Most of its customers
were noted to be governmental institutions or agencies while individual customers
were very few.
18
Data obtained from the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports between 2004/2005 and 2007/2008
raised a concern. It was noted that individual customers in 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 were 2, and
Parastatals or Other Agencies that used NHBRA‘s services were 5 for 2006/2007 and 2007/2008.
There is a possibility that these figures were ‗carried forward‘, because the names of the Individual
Customers in 2006/2007 were not mentioned unlike the case in 2004/2005, and they could not be
retrieved after the researcher asked for them. This however does not overshadow the general trend of
service use by the customers of NHBRA.
73
To augment the secondary data analyzed above, 25 customers of NHBRA were
interviewed. From their responses it was ascertained that consultancy services and
building construction were the key services offered by the NHBRA, but more (17) of
the customers had used consultancy services compared to only 8 who had used
construction services. Asked to indicate how often they had used those services, all
admitted that they had not used the services often or frequently. More specifically,
18 of the interviewed customers did not use NHBRA‘s services more than once and
other 7 consulted the agency twice. Generally speaking, responses from the
customers suggested low rate of service use which tallies with the data from the
secondary sources.
The low rate of customer use of construction and consultancy services offered by the
NHBRA can be explained as follows. Despite the fact that local materials used by
NHBRA bring down the cost of construction, many customers seem to favour
imported building materials as they are associated with social prestige in Tanzania
communities, especially urban dwellers. Also, competition has increased as a result
of economic liberalization which allowed proliferation of private firms that offer
construction and consultancy services as those offered by NHBRA and have
manipulated society‘s attitude to their advantage. NHBRA has to face competitive
institutions even within the Government like the National Social Security Fund
(NSSF) which has recently won tenders to build low cost houses for employees of
various government institutions. Recently also NSSF has won the tender from the
Ministry of Home Affairs to build houses for police officers at Kurasini area in Dar
es Salaam.
74
In addition to researcher‘s interest to establish the rate of service use, the reasons for
customers‘ decision to use those services were deemed important as well. Based on
the customers‘ responses, it was found out that the most influential ‗pull‘ factor was
affordability of NHBRA‘s services. Out of 25 customers who were questioned 16
argued that the costs for construction and consultancy services were much lower
compared to those of private service providers. Other 9 customers said that they were
more attracted by reliability of NHBRA‘s services which was (generally) attributed
to the fact that the agency‘s interest was not just profit-making since it is a
government institution.
From the interview of 25 customers of TFDA, it was found out that 17 of them
interacted with the agency for the purpose of acquiring business licences or permits
and the other 8 customers had used laboratory services. Also, most of the customers
had used the services only once and a fewer number of customers used the services
more than once. The low rate of service use can be attributed to the nature of services
that TFDA offers which include issuance of licenses and permits which are sought
after by customers when the need fore renewing the licenses or permits arise.
The customers‘ responses to the question on the reasons for using the TFDA‘s
services revealed that the number of customers attracted by reliability of the services
was fewer (4) than for the case of NHBRA‘s customers (9). A majority (21) of the 25
customers argued that they could not obtain the licences and permits for trading in
drugs, medicines and cosmetics which left them without an alternative source. It has
been observed that customers were not attracted by the quality of services, which
75
suggests that quality of service has insignificant influence on the rate of service use
by customers of TFDA and NHBRA.
6.3. Extent of Agencies‟ Responsiveness to the Public
6.3.1. Customers‟ Perceptions on Improvement and Satisfaction with Service
Delivery
In the survey, customers were asked to give their perceptions on the extent to which
service delivery levels have improved after the formation of the two agencies. There
was a variation in the customers‘ responses about their perceptions.
In the case of NHBRA, a majority of its 25 customers perceived improvements in
service delivery as either low (11) or moderate (8). Other 4 customers gave no
response. On the side of TFDA, more than a half of customers that were questioned
expressed positive perceptions about its service delivery improvements. Out of 25
customers, 7 ranked the improvements in service delivery as high and 11 thought the
improvements were moderate, while 7 customers believed the improvements were
low. Table 6.5 compares customers‘ ranking of the perceived service delivery
improvements by the two agencies.
Table 6.4: Customers‟ Ranking of Service Delivery Improvements
Source: Field Data, 2009
Studied
Agencies
Perceived Service Delivery
Improvement
Total
High Moderate Low DK/NR
NHBRA 2 8 11 4 25
TFDA 7 11 7 0 25
Total 9 19 18 4 50
76
Notwithstanding the findings that a relatively higher number of customers of TFDA
had positive perception about its service delivery improvements when compared to
NHBRA, the aggregated responses revealed that most customers found the
improvements as either moderate (19) or low (18), and only a handful ranked the
improvements as high. Generally, the aggregated responses suggest that the
improvements in service delivery of the two agencies have been adequate.
A related question was asked to establish the extent to which the surveyed customers
were satisfied with the services. The intent was to capture the extent to which the two
agencies effectively respond to the service needs and preferences of their customers.
Fifty (50) customers (25 customers from each agency) were asked to indicate
whether their satisfaction level with services of the two agencies was high, moderate,
or low, or if they were not satisfied with the agencies‘ services. Table 6.6 classifies
the customers‘ responses along those three ranks, as well as indicates customers who
were not satisfied at all with the services and those who gave no response.
Table 6.5: Customers‟ Satisfaction with Services of the Two Agencies
Studied
Agencies
Level of satisfaction Total
High
Moderate Low Not
Satisfied
DK/
NR
NHBRA 3 12 7 2 1 25
TFDA 8 11 2 3 1 25
Total 11 23 9 5 2 50
Source: Field Data, 2009
The findings indicated an overall low level of customer satisfaction with the service
delivery of the two agencies. The aggregated responses show that a majority (23) of
77
the customers expressed moderate satisfaction while only 11 customers they were
highly satisfied with the service delivery by the two agencies. A considerable
number of customers (9) expressed low satisfaction and a few (5) were not satisfied
with the service delivery of the two agencies. There were no responses from 2
customers.
The customers‘ level of satisfaction varied when the responses of TFDA‘s customers
were compared to those responses given by the NHBRA‘s customers. It was found
out that the number of customers who expressed high satisfaction with TFDA were
twice (8) as much as those (3) customers of NHBRA, but the number of NHBRA‘s
customers who expressed low satisfaction (7) were three times more than 2 TFDA‘s
customers. There was only a slight difference in terms of customers who were
dissatisfied, 3 for TFDA and 2 for NHBRA.
In order to determine which specific attributes of service delivery influenced the
satisfaction levels of the customers of the two agencies, customers were asked to
mention the aspects considered as satisfactory. Table 6.7 shows customers‘
satisfaction with five specific attributes19
of service delivery for the two agencies.
Those customers who gave no responses are excluded.
19
These five attributes were adopted from the TFDA 2004 customer survey conducted by Excel Media
experts. A comparative analysis between ‗baseline‘ and our own survey became impossible for both
cases because NHBRA has not done a similar study.
78
Table 6.6: Customers‟ Satisfaction with Specific Attributes of Service
Delivery by the Two Agencies
Source: Field Data
Out of 43 customers who responded to the question, 16 customers from TFDA (9)
and NHBRA (7) considered quality of the services of the two agencies as the most
satisfactory attribute of service delivery. Other attribute which were moderately rated
as satisfactory was reliability of the services, and thus some said the service received
met their expectations. These findings suggest only slight difference in the levels of
customers‘ satisfaction with specific attributes of service delivery offered by
NHBRA and TFDA, especially reliability (6 against 5) and services to meet
customers‘ expectations (6 against 5).
It is worth noting that TFDA‘s customers were more satisfied with reception of
information about the agency services and quality of the services than NHBRA‘s
customers. However, none of TFDA‘s customers expressed satisfaction with the
promptness of the agency in service delivery compared to 2 of the NHBRA‘s
customers who were satisfied with this attribute20
. From the TFDA‘s self-assessment
study, the most common aspects for which customers expressed strong
dissatisfaction include lack of prompt responses and delays in the release of
20
If we were to make a comparison between the baseline data from TFDA‘s 2004 customer survey and
our own survey, there is an increase in the level of overall customer satisfaction (42% of 606
customers as per baseline survey to 84% of 25 customers as per 2009 survey).
No Customer satisfaction with: NHBRA TFDA Total
1 Information 1 2 3
2 Promptness 2 0 2
3 Meeting customer expectation 6 5 11
4 Perceived quality 7 9 16
5 Trustworthiness/reliability 6 5 11
Total 22 21 43
79
laboratory results and long duration to register products (Sigonda and Sillo,
2005:34).
The observed variations can be explained as follows. According to the TFDA‘s Five-
Year Annual Performance Report, the reasons for its success in service delivery
include changing mindset of staff towards delivering quality services, collaboration
with stakeholders from both public and private sectors, and sufficient donor support
from various international public organizations (like World Health Organization, and
Foods and Agriculture Organization) and private foundations (like Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation). In addition to these factors the fact that the regulatory nature of
activities undertaken by the two agencies favours TFDA than NHBRA when it
comes to assessment of service delivery. Also NHBRA‘s Annual Performance
Appraisal Reports for 2007/2008 that were reviewed revealed that the agency
operates under-capacity because the current number of staff is below the human
resource need and the necessary equipments are outdated.
However, it is our view that the levels of commitment of the top leadership which
significantly differ between the two agencies have been the most decisive factor. It
was found out that within the period of five years in its operations TFDA has
undertaken important system development based on the results of several scientific
and independent surveys into their stakeholders‘ perceptions and needs. In the first
three years of its operations three surveys were conducted under the Director
General‘s initiative and funding. Based on the research reports, the Quality
Management System was created under which a Customer Care Desk was introduced
80
to attend all customers for purpose of improving service delivery. As a result, it was
reported in the Five-Year Annual Performance Report that a total of 8521 customers
were registered between January and June 2007 owing to courtesy and speed in
handling the customers. These initiatives from the top leadership have proven to
improve service delivery levels. It was learned that NHBRA had not taken initiatives
even remotely similar to those of TFDA.
6.4. Potential of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable
6.4.1. Level of Public Expectations for Better Services
The GOT anticipate that the creation of executive agencies would improve efficiency
and effectiveness of the delivery of public services. In order to determine whether the
service users themselves have similar or lower expectations from the agencies as
service providers, we asked 50 customers to state whether they expected
improvements or indifference or decline of service delivery by the two agencies.
This question was posed based on premise that the level of customers‘ expectation
influences their attitude towards pressurizing service providers to become more
responsive to their needs and meet their expectations.
It was found out that 41 out of 50 customers of the two agencies who were
questioned had moderate expectations, 6 had high expectations and only 3 customers
expected no improvements. Customers‘ expectations of improvement in service
delivery were for the following service delivery attributes: low costs or affordability
(20); quality (16); and increased speed (11). The three customers who did not expect
any improvements argued that competition from private contractors (for the case of
81
NHBRA alone), continued use of old technology and relying on the same personnel
cannot improve service delivery by the two agencies.
The reasons behind moderate and high expectations of improved service delivery
differed significantly between the customers of the two agencies. Many of NHBRA‘s
customers believed that the agency‘s mission of providing low-cost housing would
appeal to many Tanzanians (especially residents of urban or semi-urban settings)
because most of them live in rented houses, and other customers thought low-cost
housing would be more preferable to expensive housing due to bad economic
conditions and high prices of building materials. On the side of TFDA customers,
they also expected increased public demand due to fast growth of trade in medicines
and cosmetics in the country but others believed more advanced technology would
have been applied to improve efficiency.
The findings established that unlike the Government of Tanzania, the expectations of
the surveyed customers indicated low potential for their role as agents for improving
of accountability of agencies.
6.4.2. Presence and Potential Use of “Exit” Option by Customers of the Two
Agencies
It matters whether the customers can or cannot find alternative service provider,
because lack of alternative supplier discourages any active involvement of those
customers to pressurize the monopolistic service provider to become more
responsive. To establish the presence or absence of exist options to the service users,
82
50 customers of the two agencies were asked to state whether they had alternative
sources of services.
It was learned from their responses that only 16 customers were able to access the
same services they provided by the two agencies from an alternative service
provider, but 34 customers admitted not to have alternative sources for services that
the two agencies provide. The phenomenon of ‗service dependency‘ was dominant to
TFDA‘s customers because none of its 25 customers who we questioned has
alternative supplier of services. This is based on the fact that TFDA has monopoly as
the sole regulatory authority with mandate to issue licences and permits for dealing
with food and food supplements, drugs, cosmetics, herbal drugs, and medical
devices21
.
On the other hand, 15 out 25 customers of NHBRA claimed to have access to other
contractors and consultants. Although the NHBRA has sole authority to control the
quality and specification of building materials in the country but its commercialized
services are widely supplied by other organizations from the public and private
sectors alike which include public corporations, research institutes, building
contractors, and registered consultants. This variation reflect the difference in the
impact of economic liberalization to public organizations in the country whereby
growth of private sector has increased the number of building contractors and
consultants who become exit options for customers of NHBRA, but the increased
21In addition to that, TFDA has taken several steps either to maintain this status or extend its
jurisdiction.
83
inflow of counterfeit products has created incentive for TFDA to extend its
regulatory activities which has made it a monopoly.
6.5. Propensity of the Public to make the Two Agencies Accountable
The closer interface between agencies and their customers was assumed to help
facilitate increased involvement of the customers in making the agencies more
responsive to their needs and demands. We asked the surveyed customers whether
they knew how to influence performance of the two agencies to their favour, in terms
of achieving improved service delivery. It was found out that 39 out of 50 customers
claimed to be aware of the ways to make the agencies responsive and other 11
customers admitted not to know how they can effectively influence performance of
the two agencies.
Despite the majority of the customers claiming to know how to make the two
agencies accountable, only 8 of those 39 customers had submitted formal complaints
to either NHBRA (3 customers) and TFDA (5 customers). In the interview with the
Secretary to the ACEO of NHBRA, she confirmed that customers do not submit their
complaints through formal channels as they would rather express their
dissatisfactions on site to the contractors. It was learned that the agency do not even
have a file of complaints received.
On the side of the TFDA, the Customer Care Officer that we interviewed said that
only few and minor complaints are occasionally received and these complaints are
most often handled without involving higher authorities. The common complaints
are about long duration of obtaining permits and the procedures and requirements for
84
registration of products. Customer often complained that the procedures and
requirements were cumbersome and too demanding. The dismal number of formal
complaints against TFDA was also captured in the 2004 survey report, whereby only
19 out of 596 customers and only 3 ordinary citizens had registered their complaints
(Excel Media, 2004:23). The overall propensity of customers to forward their
complaints was found to be generally low.
85
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Introduction
In the context of the ongoing PSRP, the study investigated the extent to which the
executive agencies in Tanzania particularly NHBRA and TFDA are accountable for
their performance (service delivery) to the public. The specific objectives of the
study were fourfold: to assess if the frameworks facilitate accountability of the
agencies; to assess the effect of autonomy on levels of accountability of the agencies;
to explore other factors that affect accountability of the agencies; and to recommend
ways to improve the accountability system of agencies.
This chapter has three objectives: first, to draw conclusions on the impact of
formation of executive agencies on accountability; second, to highlight the salient
factors affecting accountability of the studied agencies; and third, to recommend the
ways for improving the system of accountability for executive agencies in Tanzania.
7.2. The Impact of „Agencification‟ on Performance Accountability
The formation of the studied agencies was found to cause a substantial shift of power
through delegation of authority and institutional separation between the ministries
and the created agencies, which resulted into the latter‘s increased autonomy. The
studied agencies were found to discharge their routine operations and strategic
management functions without interference from their ministries, and the ACEOs
had substantial discretion over the human resources and enjoy a relatively high
degree of autonomy in financial management issues. With respect to financial
86
matters one limitation was found to be low degree of financial self-sufficiency which
has made both agencies dependent on Government subventions and thus must
conform to some bureaucratic procedures to secure funds.
The increased autonomy of the two agencies could not be established as a positive
cause for their performance accountability because it has instead reduced ministerial
control over the agencies without there being increased role of customers to make the
latter more accountable. To a large extent its operations, strategic management and
even the performance results of the two agencies have not been effectively monitored
by the Ministries concerned. Ministries demonstrated low interest to monitor their
agencies‘ performance partly because the ministers‘ role under the legal framework
is only nominal and thus the whole process to take place outside political scrutiny. It
was found out that there were no meaningful disincentives for the two agencies to
fully comply with performance reporting to their ministries and thereby failed in
several occasions to comply with the statutory obligations.
The second major impact of the formation of executive agencies was closer interface
between the two agencies and their customers. We found out that three mechanisms
have been commonly employed by the two agencies to get closer to their customers:
client assessments, publicity or promotional programmes, and customer care
practices. But there were variations in terms of appropriateness of the mechanisms
and level of their institutionalization.
The TFDA had institutionalized its customer care practice by formation of the
Customer Care desk under a professionally trained officer and recently established a
87
sophisticated system of obtaining and channelling feedback from its customers. In
addition, its Public Relations Unit has been very active and effective to inform the
public about the services and alerting its stakeholders about harmful products in the
market. On the contrary, NHBRA has only ad hoc mechanisms for public relations,
poor mechanisms to get feedback like Suggestion Box, and the agency relies on
annual exhibitions to reach the public. Between the two agencies, it is only the
TFDA that had conducted customer surveys and studies to understand the levels of
customer satisfaction and their preferences. It can thus be concluded that, TFDA has
managed to establish a closer interface with its customers.
The degree of closeness between the agencies and their customers correlated
positively with the degree of responsiveness to the expectations and preferences of
the customers. This was reflected by customers‘ perceptions about service
improvement and the level of their satisfaction. The majority of NHBRA customers
perceived improvements in service delivery as either low while more than half of
TFDA customers that were questioned expressed positive perceptions about its
service delivery improvements. With regard to customer satisfaction, a considerable
number of customers expressed low satisfaction and few were not satisfied with the
service delivery of the two agencies. However, the number of customers who
expressed high satisfaction with TFDA was twice as much as those customers of
NHBRA, but the number of NHBRA‘s customers who expressed low satisfaction
was three times more than TFDA‘s customers.
88
7.3. Factors Affecting Levels of Accountability of the Agencies
The Executive Agencies Act of 1997 which provides for the external framework for
agency accountability has several shortcomings that have been found to limit the role
of Ministries and the public to exercise effective account holding of the studied
agencies. Relocation of oversight powers from the departments into the office of the
Permanent Secretaries and the Ministerial Advisory Boards (MABs) has faded the
ministerial oversight over the agencies in both cases. In relation to this, the
legislation provides for overload of the responsibilities and contradictory roles to the
Permanent Secretary that has negative implications to the required objective and
effective performance monitor and scrutiny.
The Framework Documents of the two agencies provides for an inward-looking
rather than outward-looking performance reporting system. Under the current system
of accountability, the service users and the public, to whom the agencies are
supposed to be responsive, are not identified as the key stakeholders. It is only the
Government authorities who are clearly recognized and to whom performance
reporting is directed. Moreover, legislation fails to provide for dissemination of these
reports to the public which has kept the agencies from serious public scrutiny. The
failure of the legislation to require that the agencies publish and disseminate their
performance reports has imposed informational barriers against the public which
have hindered the use of ‗voice‘ against the two agencies. And, despite the existence
of performance reporting requirements these are not supported by penalties for non-
compliance which could act as disincentive for late submission and poor quality of
the performance reports, as it has been seen with the case of NHBRA.
89
While the study findings establish that the closer the agency is to its customers the
more likely it becomes responsive because such interface allows easy exchange of
information between the service providers and the service users, it has been found
that the impact of closer interface on responsiveness is limited by the low customers‘
expectations on service improvements and low propensity of the customers to
demand for improved services. It has been found that majority of the questioned
customers of the two agencies had only moderate expectations and few expected
high improvements which indicate low potentiality to make the agencies
accountable. On the other hand, the propensity of customers to make the two
agencies more responsive was low despite most customers admitting that they were
only moderately satisfied with the services. It can be argued thus, the disposition of
the customers is the determinant of the level of accountability of the agencies.
The third factor which was found to influence the level of accountability of the two
agencies was the attitude and commitment of the agency leadership to enhance
responsiveness. Unlike the NHBRA, the leadership of the TFDA has shown to
recognize the importance of public involvement in its activities and thereby has taken
several initiatives to provide for increased public access and involvement. For
instance, its annual ‗Stakeholders Forum‘ established in 2007 provides avenue
through which the stakeholders, inclusive of the customers and ordinary citizens,
give comments and advice the agency on how best to achieve what the customers
and larger public expect from them. Therefore, while the external framework (the
Executive Agencies Act of 1997) has encouraged the agencies to engage the public
90
in a consultative process, the study has established that it is the commitment of the
agency leadership which determine whether this is done or neglected.
7.4. Recommendations
Executive agencies need adequate autonomy to become more flexible and innovative
in their operations but the agencies should not be absorbed in their narrow concerns.
To avoid ministries and agencies becoming disconnected, a clear governance of the
relationship between the ministries and the agencies is necessary to ensure there is
shared strategic direction. Unless a Minister or Permanent Secretary is properly
engaged in agency issues, a governance vacuum will occur. By being actively
engaged, the Minister or Permanent Secretary can be aware of the agency‘s progress
which can help build confidence that the agencies play their part in meeting strategic
objectives. Furthermore, close relationship between ministries and the agencies can
discourage undue interference that may constrain the agencies from realizing high-
level performance.
The MAB should provide strong support to the ministry in regard to strategic
direction of the agency and the ACEO‘s responsibility for the delivery of expected
performance results. However, to avoid role conflict, the Chairperson of MAB
should not be the Permanent Secretary. Alternatively, the MAB should be chaired by
head of the relevant policy directorate within the Ministry. As a focal point within
the Ministry, the Chairperson should be able to use the chance to challenge the
ACEO and facilitate his work in meeting excellent performance.
91
Also, there is a need to augment the role of ministries to oversee performance of the
agencies as part of their executive responsibilities which should be judged by the
National Assembly and specifically the Parliamentary Committees. It is therefore
recommended that an unambiguous statutory provision be inserted into the Executive
Act of 1997 to allow for a proactive parliamentary role because this would more
easily create awareness to the public about the performance processes and results of
the agencies whose activities impact on their lives directly or otherwise.
The facilitative role of the Ministry needs to be taken more seriously for the agency
to achieve continuous performance improvement. Ministries need to ensure that the
agencies‘ performance targets are challenging and responsive to customers‘ needs.
The agency targets should not be retained if no longer relevant. The Ministry should
subject performance targets of its agencies to regular reviews to ensure consistency
with changing policy priorities and customer preferences.
Considering the centrality of information to accountability, it is recommended that
deliberate efforts be taken to make the agencies more open and share with their
customers and the larger public information about their performance. To achieve
this, each agency should be required to publish and disseminate widely its annual
report (or an abridged version) through various ways after the report has been tabled
in the National Assembly.
92
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2000), Public Administration: The Challenges of
21st Century.
Ayeni, V. (1998), ‗New Dimensions in Promoting Accountability in Public
Administration: International and Theoretical Overview‘, paper
presented at the Accountability & Corruption in the Pacific
Workshop, Australian National University, Canberra.
Boston, J. (1999), ‗New Zealand‘s Model of Public Management: The Promise and
the Reality‘, NIRA Review.
Bovens, M. (2005), ‗Public Administration‘, in E. Ferlie, L. Lynne and C. Pollitt
(editors.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
[Online:http://www.builtenvironment.uwe.ac.uk/research/ESRCsemi
nars/pdfs/mark_bovens_seminar1.pdf.]
Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2001), Taking Account of Accountability: A conceptual Overview
and Strategic Options, Centre for Democracy and Governance,
Washington D.C.,
Carlos, L. (2005), Practical Principles for Public Administration‘, an address to the
Council of Experts on Public Administration of the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, April 6, New York
[Online:www.bresserpereira.org.br/works/SmallPapers/9.principlespubl
icadministration-UN.pdf]
93
Casley, D.J., and Luvy, D.A. Data Collection in Developing Countries, Oxford
University Press,
Caulfield, J. (2002), ‗Executive Agencies in Tanzania: Liberalization and Third
World Debt‘, Public Administration and Development, 22: 209–220,
John Wiley& Sons.
Cook, A. (2003), ‗Managing for Outcomes in the New Zealand Public Management
System‘, New Zealand Treasury Working Paper04/15, Wellington.
Darwish, M. (1998), ‗Accountability in Some Executive Agencies‘, Asian Review of
Public Administration, 10(1):228-231
[Online:unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/EROPA/U
NPAN001429.pdf.]
Efficient Unit (1988), ‗Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps‘,
London: Prime Minister‘s Office, a Report.
ESRF (2004), Impact Assessment of Executive Agencies in Tanzania: Main Report,
PO-PSM, Dar es Salaam.
[Online:www.estabs.go.tz/files/Executive%20Agencies%20Main%20R
eport%20-%20Draft2%20Nov%2020041.pdf.]
Excel Media (2004), TFDA 2004 Customer Satisfaction Survey Report, TFDA,
Dar es Salaam.
Flynn, N. (2004), ‗Performance Management and Public Satisfaction in the public sector
in the United Kingdom‘, paper presentation at the European Group on
Public Administration Conference, Ljubljana.
94
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006), ‗Five Misunderstandings about Case Study Research‘,
Qualitative Inquiry, 12: SAGE Publications, California.
Gains, F. (2003), ‗Executive Agencies in Government: The Impact of Bureaucratic
Networks on Policy Outcomes‘, Journal of Public Policy, 23 (1): 55-79,
Cambridge University Press.
Jabbra, J.G. and Dwivedi, O.P. (editors) (1988), Public Service Accountability: A
Comparative Perspective, Kumarian Press Inc, Connecticut
James, O. (2003), The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall. Palgrave Macmillan,
London.
Julnes, P.L. (2000), ‗Evolution of Government Reform: The Centre for Accountability
and Performance (Cap) and Support of Managing for Results‘, paper
presented at the fifth International Congress of CLAD on State and
Public Administration Reform.
Kaul, M. (1997), ‗The New Public Administration: management innovations in
government‘, Public Administration and Development, 17: 13-26, John
Wiley &Sons.
Komero, O. M., (2006), Factors contributing to the Delay in the Drugs Registration
Process at the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority, unpublished M.BA
Dissertation, ESAMI and Maastricht School of Management.
Laking, R. (2002), ‗Agencies: Benefits and Risks‘, Victoria University of
Wellington, Wellington.
[Online: www.worldbank.org.cn/english/content/Rob_Laking.pdf.]
95
Lawson, A. and Rakner, L. (2005), ‗Understanding Patterns of Accountability in
Tanzania: A Report‘, Governance Working Group of the Development
Partners to Tanzania, Dar es Salaam.
McKinlay, P. (2000), ‗The New Zealand Reforms: They Worked in Theory, What
about the Practice?‘ in Asian Journal of Public Administration, 182–
234, Hong Kong University.
Miles, M.B., and Huberman, A. M. (1994), Qualitative data analysis: An expanded
sourcebook (2nd ed.), SAGE Publications, California.
Moynihan, D. (2004), ‗Ambiguity in Policy Transfer: Agencification in Sweden, the
United Kingdom and Slovakia‘, Paper for the Eight International
Symposium on Public Management, Budapest. [Online:
http://irspm.bkae.hu/papers/moynihan_paper.pdf.]
Mukandala, R.S. (editor) (2001), ―To Be or Not to Be: the Paradoxes of African
Bureaucracies in the 1990s‖ in African Public Administration: A
Reader, AAPS: Harare, 402-427
Mulgan, R. (2000), ‗Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept?‘ in Public
Administration, 78 (3): 555-573
NHBRA (2000), Stakeholders‘ Survey Report for Tanzania Mainland, March.
Dar es Salaam.
NHBRA (2001a), Framework Document, May. Dar es Salaam.
——— (2001b), Business Analysis, March. Dar es Salaam.
——— (2004), Performance Appraisal Report 2004/2005. Dar es Salaam.
——— (2004), Performance Appraisal Report 2005/2006. Dar es Salaam.
96
——— (2004), Performance Appraisal Report 2007/2008. Dar es Salaam.
——— (2006), Strategic Plan 2006-2011, August. Dar es Salaam.
——— (2008), Business Plan July 2008-June 2009, February. Dar es Salaam.
Ntukamanzina, D.A. (2001), ‗Civil Service Reform in Tanzania: A Strategic
Perspective‘, in Mukandala, R.S. (editor), African Public
Administration: A Reader. 524-536
OECD (2007), Modernizing Government: The Way Forward, OECD.
OPSR (2002), ‗Better government services: Executive Agencies in the 21st Century‘,
Crown copyright, London.
Osborne, D. (2007) ‗Reinventing Government: What a Difference a Strategy Makes‘
paper presented at the 7th
Global Forum on Reinventing Government,
Vienna.
Paul, S. (1991), ‗Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice, and Capture‘ in World
Bank Working Papers, Washington D.C. [Online:
www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB
/1991]
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand
Oaks, SAGE Publications, California
PO-PSM (2005), The State of Tanzanian Public Service Report, Dar es Salaam.
——, (2005), ‗Executive Agencies: Do They Perform Better?‘Dar es Salaam.
——, (2008), ‗Public Service Reform Programme II‘, Dar es Salaam.
Polidano, C. (1999), ‗The New Public Management in Developing Countries‘, IDPM
Public Policy and Management Working Paper, No. 13, Manchester.
97
Pollitt, C. (2005), „Performance Management in Practice: a comparative study of
Executive Agencies‘, paper for the SCANCOR workshop, California
Posner, P.L. (2007), ‗Accountability and Governance: Persistent Questions, New
Challenges‘.
[Online:http://igsbracu.ac.bd/UserFiles/File/archive_file/Paul%20Pos
ner.ppt.]
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006), ‗Ethics Baseline Opinion Survey of Stakeholders‘,
PO-PSM, Dar es Salaam
Quintyn, M. et al (2007), ‗The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and
Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors‘, IMF Working Paper,
February 2007.
Rexed, K. (2006), ‗Agency governance in Swedish State Administration‘, paper for
the Good Governance for Development in Arab countries Initiative,
OECD. [Online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/5/37903869.ppt]
Rugumyamheto, J.A. (2004), ‗Innovative Approaches to Reforming Public Services in
Tanzania‘, Public Administration and Development, 24:437- 446, John
Wiley &Sons.
Rugumyamheto, J.A. (2005), ‗Reforming the Public Sector in Tanzania: A Critical
Prerequisite to Economic Growth, Wealth Creation and Poverty
Reduction‘, a paper presented at the 26th AAPAM Annual Roundtable
Conference, Mombasa.
Schick, A. (1996), ‗The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in
a Time of Change‘, State Services Commission and the Treasury.
98
Segsworth, B. (2003), ‗Accountability, Evaluation and Performance Monitoring: A
Comparative Perspective‘, Laurentian University. [Online:
https://ozone.scholarsportal.info/bitstream/1873/3485/1/244167.pdf.]
Shellukindo, W.N. and Baguma, R., (1993), ‗Ethical Standards and Behaviour in
African Public Service‘ in Rasheed, S. and Olowu, D. (eds), Ethics and
Accountability in African Public Services, African Association for
Public Administration and Management.
Singonda, M. N. and Sillo, H. B. (2005), Self-Assessment of the Performance of
Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority: Final Report, TFDA, Dar es Salaam.
Sterick, M. and B. Scheers (2003), ‗The Use of Output and Outcome information in
Public Budgeting: Trends and Challenges‘, paper for the European Group
of Public Administration, Oeiras.
Strom, K. (2003), ‗Delegation and accountability in Parliamentary Democracies‘,
European Journal of Political Research, 37:261-289.
Tanzania Foods and Drugs Authority (TFDA), (undated), Clients‘ Service Charter.
Dar es Salaam
——, Annual Performance Report 2003/2004, Dar es Salaam
——, Annual Performance Report 2004/2005, Dar es Salaam
——, Annual Performance Report 2005/2006, Dar es Salaam
——, Annual Performance Report 2006/2007, Dar es Salaam
——, Annual Performance Report 2007/2008, Dar es Salaam
——, A Five-Year Annual Performance Report 2003-2008, Dar es Salaam
99
Talbot, C. et al (2000), ‗The Idea of Agency: Researching the agencification of the
(public service) world‘, a paper prepared for the American Political
Studies Association Conference, Washington D.C.
Tella, F.F.M. (2005), Strategies for Improving Public Technical Services in
Government Departments through Agency Creation: The Case of
Tanzania‘s Executive Agencies, unpublished M.A. Dissertation,
University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam
Teskey, G. and Hooper, R. (1999), ―Tanzania Civil Service Reform Program: A Case
study. Joint DAC Informal Network/ACBF Workshop on
Institutional Capacity Development: Harare
Therkildsen, O. (2000), Public Sector Reform in a poor, aid-dependent country,
Tanzania, Public Administration and Development, 20:61-71
Tomison, A.M., et al (1999), 'Blending qualitative and quantitative approaches: case
tracking studies in child protection systems', paper presented to the
Association for Qualitative Research 'Issues of rigour in Qualitative
Research' International Conference, 6-10 July 1999, Melbourne.
URT, Civil Service Department (1993), Report on Public Service Reform
Programmes, Dar es Salaam.
URT (1997), Executive Agencies Act No. 30 of 1997, Government Printer,
Dar es Salaam.
Verhoest, K et al., (2005), ―Agencification and Accountability regimes: Upwards and
downwards accountability in Flanders‖, a paper presented at the
Scancor/SOG workshop on ―Autonomization of the State: from
100
integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations‖,
Stanford University, April 1-2 2005.
Weiss, C. H. (1998). Evaluation methods for studying programs and policies (2nd
ed.). Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
World Bank (1999), Tanzania Public Service Reform Program, Washington, D.C.
Yin, R.K. (2002), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social
Research Methods series Vol.5: SAGE Publications, California.