Examples of the Influence of Sanskrit Grammar on Indian Philosophy - Raffaele Torella

Examples of the Influence of Sanskrit Grammar on

Indian Philosophy

by RAFFAELE TORELLA

In the West, apart from earlier isolated intuitions (1), it only began to become

clear at the beginning of this century that language was not merely the docile instru ment of thought and that a far more significant role than the already important one

of the vehicle for thought should be claimed for it. The works of E. Sapir, B.L. Whorf

and others have shown how great a part language plays in structuring reality (2). In

order to capture the given, thought uses a net which is largely linguistic. This having been established, philosophical and linguistic research is presented with a new direc

tion: that of trying to discern how much in the experience of reality - even that which

is apparently immediate - depends on the subject's linguistic structure (3). And, fur

thermore, how far reflections on reality -

primarily philosophy, but also the human

sciences in general and even the natural sciences - reflect the linguistic horizon of

the subject who has expressed and formulated them. Moving in this direction are

works such as E. Benveniste's well-known study (1958) on Aristotle's categories, seen as the transposition of grammatical categories of the Greek language onto an

ontological plane (but see also Belardi 1985:147 ff.). Indian philosophy, too, obviously lends itself to being examined from this point

of view. A point of view which, furthermore, fits particularly well into the context

of Indian thought, where the close link between thought and language, or even their

*Extended version of a paper read at the VIIth World Sankrit Conference, held in Leiden 23rd-29th

August 1987. I wish to thank Prof. A. Aklujkar for his interesting contribution to the discussion.

(1) Cf. W. von Humboldt's statement: 'Die Sprache is das bildende Organ des Gedankens' cit. G.R.

Cardona 1976: 64.

(2) See in particular Sapir 1929, 1931; Whorf 1956. In spite of the provisional and often unilateral character of the results obtained, these two authors possess the merit of having opened up a new field of research. For an evaluation of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and of the reactions

it gave rise to, see G.R. Cardona 1976:63 ff., with bibliography; see also G.R. Cardona 1985.

(3) See for instance Whorf's studies (1956) on the Hopi language: An American Indian Model of

the Universe, The relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language, Science and Linguistic.

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complete identification, has been proclaimed many times - from the Satapatha brdhmana (4) to Bhartrhari's classical formulations (5) and, though from a different

angle, the logical-epistemological schools of Buddhism. But although this line of

research maintains its validity, which is, so to speak, universal, in India, as happens not infrequently, things become complicated. To the influence of the language as such in India one has to add that of a linguistic and grammatical speculation, whose

importance and prestige are unequalled in any other culture; furthermore, this

grammatical tradition is not in the possession of specialists only, but is the common, fundamental heritage of every educated man. The texts - from the literary to the

philosophical-religious ones - abound in the praises of grammar, the science of

sciences (6). Where does this privileged rank derive from? In part surely from its

being the science of the Holy Word, the Vedas. The context in which it is inscribed is doubtless sacral, the same context in which the science of ritual is developed (7); ritual and grammar seem - in their procedures, articulations and lexis - in many

respects like sisters, as L. Renou has shown in a famous article (1941-42; see also Staal

1982:1-38). Most of the aims of the study of grammar indicated by Patafijali in the

Paspasa are of a religious character; 'This is the door to salvation', says Bhartrhari (8), who also speaks of a mysterious 'vocal' yoga (sabdapfirvayoga,

(4) VIII 1.2.7 vag vai matir vaca hidam sarvam manute 'Thought is language, because it is through

language that every being in this world thinks'; cf. Renou 1941-42: 105-6.

(5) VP I 115-16 na so'sti pratyayo loke yah iabdanugamad rte / anuviddham iva jfianam sarvam

sabdena bhasate // vdgruipata ced utkramed avabhodasya issvati / na prakdsah prakaeta sa hi

pratyavamargini // 'There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge

is, as it were, intertwined with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to

disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification poss ible' (transl. Iyer 1965:110-11).

(6) Cf. Haracaritacingimani XXVII 269 sarvavidyandm mukhyam vyakaranam 'Grammar is the most

important of all sciences'; MBh I, p. 1 pradhdnam ca satsv angesu vyakaranam 'Grammar is the most

important of the six auxiliaries disciplines of the Vedas'; Dhvanydloka 113 (vrtti) prathame hi vidvamso

vaiyakaranah vyakaranamllatvat sarvavidyandm 'First among the sages are the grammarians, because

grammar is the root of all sciences', cit. Bhattacarya 1980:91, fn. 3; VP I 11-12 asannam brahmanas

tasya tapasam uttamam tapah / prathamam chandasam aigam ahur vyakaranam budhah //

praptariipavibhagaya yo vacah paramo rasah / yat tat punyatamam jyotis tasya margo 'yam afijasah // 'The best of all the austerities, the one that is nearest to that Brahman is the discipline called " Grammar", the first among the auxiliary sciences of the Vedas, so the sages declared. This

discipline is the shortest route to the attainment of that supreme essence of the Word which has

assumed differentiation, of the holiest of all lights' (transl. Iyer 1965:16-17).

(7) Even the growth of sciences, such as geometry, has been traced back to a ritual context; cf.

Seidenberg 1960-61, mainly based on Indian sources. See also Seidenberg 1962.

(8) VP I 14a tad dvaram apavargasya; cf. also VP 1 16 idam adyam padasthanam siddhisopanapar vanam / iyam sa moksamananam ajihva rajapaddhatih 'This is the first step in the ladder leading to

liberation, this is the straight royal road for all who desire salvation' (transl. Iyer 1965:22). And

again VP I 22 yad ekam prakriybhedair bahudha pravibhajyate / tad vykaranam agamya param

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vagyoga) (see Iyer 1964 and Gaurinath Shastri 1980:79-85). But the vydkaranasastra,

despite the character this origin confers on it - and which will always remain in the

background - is the science of language in the broad sense of the term, both sacred

and ordinary language, which are like the two sides of the same coin. Having the

word as object in a civilization like the Indian one, which is eminently a civilization

of the word, and the standard of excellence that this discipline very soon reached are

among the reasons at the root of the prestige it enjoyed. The science of language thus

became the science par excellence, also creating a model for other branches of

learning. As D.H.H. Ingalls (1954) and J.F. Staal (1965) were the first to show,

grammar in India occupied the place held by geometry in ancient Greece as the model

science. The Euclid of India was Panini with his Astddhydyi which also became a

model for rigorous and succint exposition and was more or less imitated later by the

texts which, in the most varied fields, aimed at being normative ().

The weight that the vydkaranasastra carries in philosophical-religious literature

depends primarily on the fact, already mentioned, that it is an important part of

every thinker's cultural heritage, whatever school he may belong to. This, so to speak, 'universalistic' tendency, this presenting itself as over and above the factions, can

already be detected at birth in this discipline, which sets out to be valid for all the

four Vedas (sarvavedapdrsdda), unlike a related discipline such as the phonetics of the

Pratisakhyas and the Siksas (10). The 'secular' counterpart of this attitude is found

later in its claim to be valid for any darsana, its object being words, which all

philosophical systems, to the exclusion of none, cannot do without ("). Grammar

brahma-dhigamyate // 'That which, though one, is variously interpreted in the different traditions, that supreme Brahman is attained by a knowledge of Grammar' (transl. Iyer 1965:23).

(9) The 'siitra' genre - which was later flanked by that kind of versified suitra which is the

kdrika - most probably did not arise in the ambit of grammar but in that of ritual, with the

Srautasitras (cf. Renou 1963:168). It is, however, in grammar that it soon reaches maximum saturation

point, finding in the unattainable concision of the Astddhydyi its limit; it is embodied in the last sitra

a a, beyond which begins the domain of silence. It is in the field of grammar, with the work of Katya

yana, that the varttika genre - a kind of concise critical commentary in the margin of the sitra -

originates; the combination suitra-vdrttika constitutes the starting point of the form destined to become

peculiar to so much of the technical and philosophical-religious literature of India (cf. Renou 1963:169-70).

(10) The different status which grammar enjoys in respect of the other veddngas leads one to

consider it the outcome of a development of an original grammatical veddnga, of a more merely illustra

tive character and linked to a particular samhita (see Renou 1963:167).

(11) Cf. VP I 14b and vrtti pavitram sarvavidyanam adhividyam prakasate '(Grammar is) the

purifier of all the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge' - ata' ca adhividyam prakdate,

sarvo hi prayena svasyarm vidyayamg vyakaranam anugacchati apabhramiaprayogena ca niyatam

apatrapate 'What is meant by "shines in every branch of knowledge" is that everybody follows the

science of grammar even for composing a work on his special subject and is very careful to avoid the

use of corrupt forms'. Cf. also VP 1 15 yatha-rthajatayah sarvdh 'abda-krtinibandhanah/ tathaiva loke

vidya-na-m esi- vidya para-yanam 'Just as all the universal of things depend upon the form of their words

for their communication, so is this science the basis of all sciences' (transl. Iyer 1965:21-22).

[31 153



- it is often said - does not deal with things, but with words and meanings of

words (12). And we sometimes see grammatical speculation very freely using doctrines that

belong sometimes to one school, sometimes to another (see Iyer 1950:90-92). That does not prevent Madhava, however, from describing in the Sarvadarsanasarmgraha a

PAninidarsana, which represents, on the one hand, the exaltation of this discipline -

elevating it to the rank of a conception of the world - and, on the other, the

reduction of its claim to universality. But what constitutes the core of the so-called

Pdninidarsiana are above all some linguistic-metaphysical implications, particularly

developed in Bhartrhari's work.

The grammatical tradition, incarnated principally in the triad Panini-Katyayana

Patan-jali and, some centuries later, in Bhartrhari, runs through the whole of the

Indian philosophical-religious tradition, entailing three different consequences. The first, and the most intrinsic one, is that on nearly every page of the most diverse texts of philosophical-religious literature we come across grammatical explanations, the presence of which is so much more plausible if we consider how much of this

literature takes the form of a commentary. The other two consequences are of a

subtler nature and are directly linked to the exemplary character which, as we have

seen, is attributed to the vydkaranasastra. There is on the one hand, the philosopher's

frequent adoption of the grammarian's modus operandi, with its rules and artifices; and on the other, the more or less conscious appropriation of some of the contents of

grammatical speculation through their reformulation in logical and ontological terms (1). I intend here briefly to consider the latter case.

I shall draw some examples from the literature of so-called Kashmir Shaivism

and in particular from the works of that extraordinary chain of masters who, between the 9th and 12th century A.D., took upon themselves the task of system

atizing the teachings contained in the huge and multiform collection of revealed texts

of the monistic saiva tradition. I shall deliberately not refer directly to their debt

towards the more 'philosophical' sector of the vyakaranasastra (present particularly in Bhartrhari's work), which has, relatively speaking, been more studied, and

concentrate, instead, on their relations with the more specifically grammatical specu lation.

The Spandasamdoha by Ksemarja, Abhinavagupta's illustrious disciple, is an

(12) Cf. Patafijali's statement (MBh I, p. 11) fabdapramanaka vayam / yac chabda dha tad

asmakam pramanam 'We have the word as authority; what the word says, that is our authority', so often

quoted and commented upon by the later authors. See Jyer 1950:90-92.

(13) The specific contributions to this line of research are not many. To the already quoted works

of Renou, Ingalls and Staal we can add Renou 1957 and 1961, Ruegg 1958; some interesting remarks

in Ruegg 1959 - review by Staal 1960 -, and, more recently, Ruegg 1978, Bhattacharya 1980, 1980-81.

154 [41



elaborate and complex commentary on the first stanza only of the Spandakdlika

(yasyonmesanimesabhyar jagatah pralayodayau / tam Sakticakravibhavaprabhavam samkaram stumah /). In the grip of a real interpretative delirium, which has

few equals in the literature of Kashmir Shaivism (see some parts of the

Pardtrims'ikdvivarana) and in Tantric literature in general, Ksemaraja explores all the

real or presumed recesses of the sloka and in so doing pursues his aim which it to

expound some of the essential themes of these schools, with a particular eye on the

doctrines of the Krama. One of these themes, which runs through the whole of Kashmir

Shaivism, may be condensed in the formula sarvam sarvitmakam 'all is in all', 'all is

made of all'. No reality may be said to be separate and self-contained, since

everything is pervaded by a single nature, Sivatd (as Somananda insistently repeats in the Sivadrti) or the Power. Thus there do not really exist separations or confines

of any kind, there is nothing that remains definitively excluded from this circulation

of the dynamism of Consciousness, which comes about precisely through this infinite

melting and coagulating. Thus from everything it is possible to make the leap or

immerse oneself in the heart of the absolute, precisely because this absolute, in a cer

tain sense, does not have any centre (except the I) or because its centre is everywhere. In order to find confirmation of this principle, Ksemaraja turns to grammatical

speculation and quotes a passage on the theory of the dvandva (Spandasarndoha p. 10

tatha ca dvandvasamase bhasyam 'yadi nidariayitum buddhih evam nidarsayitavyam dhavau ca khadirau ca' ity-adi). He is given this opportunity by two dvandvas in the

kdrika, which he dwells upon at length. The quoted passage is apparently corrupted, but does not fail to reveal an unequivocal reference to Katyayana's thesis

of yugapadadhikaranavacanatd (14). Indeed, according to Katyayana, in order to give an account of the dual or plural ending attributed to the final member of the dvandva, one cannot but consider each member of the compound as implicitly containing the

others. Each of the words that form the dvandva must thus express both its own mean

ing and that of the others. This conception, as we know, is not shared by Patafijali, who brands it as duhkha ca durupapddd ca (5). He believes that, without so many

unnecessary complications - which are, besides, far removed from common sense -

the dual or plural ending is the direct result of the grouping (samuddya) of the words,

which, however, maintain within the grouping their own meaning. Patafijali's commentators Kaiyata and Nagesa were to share the same point of view. The

quotation that appears in the Spandasamdoha, therefore, though it is introduced by dvandvasamase bhdsyam cannot come from the Mahdbhsya (and in fact it does not) which, as we have seen, is opposed to the yugapadadhikara/avacanata; its source remamI s

unknown.

(14) Vdrtikas I-XV ad P II 2.9 (in particular vdrtt. 2 siddham tu yugapadadhikaranavacane

dvandvavacanat); see MBh I, pp. 430-34; see also Roodbergen 1974:139-90.

(15)MBh I, p. 434 iyam yugapadadhikaranavacanata nama duhkha ca durupapdda ca 'In fact, this

theory of simultaneous denotation is difficult to understand and difficult to prove'.

[51 155



This whole question is taken up again by Bhartrhari in the vrttisamuddesla of the

Vdkyapadiya. His short discussion of Ka-tyayana and Patafijali's positions concludes, rather unexpectedly, with the acceptance of the yugapadadhikaranavacanata, which, in spite of Pataijali's objections, he thinks must be accepted as being the only way to account for ordinary usage; Pataijali himself, according to Bhartrhari, cannot help

adopting it, tacitly, for practical purposes (16). Evidently he is led to take up this

position by his conception of action (17), indeed, an action, such as cooking, consists

of many segments -

lighting the fire, filling a pot with water, putting it on the

fire etc. - each of which, though having its own individuality, must necessarily contain the others (and the main action as well), if one does not want to run the

risk of pulverizing and, in the end, dissolving the whole action of cooking. Ksemaraja's acceptance of the yugapadadhikaranavacanatd is most likely the consequence of its acceptance by Bhartrhari, who acts very much like the filtre through which the

grammatical and linguistic doctrines found in the Kashmiri authors pass. This grammatical doctrine is immediately transferred by Ksemaraja onto the

ontological plane. How could a thing be both itself and something other than itself

(or how could a word express its own meaning and that of other words), if it were

not that all is contained in all, as it is in the saiva conception? (cf. Spandasamdoha p. 10 ihaiva ca svatantrasivadvayadariane ekaikasya arthasya anekatvam sarngaccha te). The given of grammatical speculation, therefore, sets out to be a given fact which

(16) VP III 14.32-35 arthantarabhidhayitvam tatharthantaravartinam / yabhyam caikam anekartham

tabhyam evaparam padam // samudayantaratvac ca tidrio'rtho na laukikah / anvayavyatirekabhyam

sastrartho'pi na drsyate // duhkha durupapada ca tasmad bhasye'py udahrta / yugapadvacita sa tu

vyavaharartham airita // samudayam upakramya padam tasyam prayujyate / vibhagena samakhyane tatas

tad dvyartham ucyate // 'In the same way, (in dvandvas) words which denote one thing express other

things also. The two objects by means of which one constituent (of a dvandva) becomes polysemic are

the very ones by which the other constituent also becomes polysemic. Therefore, the group (expressed

by the compound as a whole) being quite different, such meaning (of each constituent) is not known

in the world nor is it seen in the sastra by the method of agreement and difference. Therefore, this

simultaneous expression of both by each (yugapadvacital has been declared to be difficult to prove in

the Bhdsya but it has been adopted for practical purposes. When there is a desire to express both at

the same time (tasyam), the compound word is used keeping the group in mind. Therefore, in the

analytic statement, it is presented as expressive of both' (transl. Iyer 1974:138-41).

(17) VP III 8.4-5a gunabhiitair avayavaih samuhah kramajanmanam I

buddhya prakalpitabhe dah kriyeti vyapadifyate // samuhah sa tathabhutah pratibhedam samiihisu I 'What is called action is a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts which are subordinated to it. Such a whole is attributed to each one of parts' (transl. Iyer 1974:8). To

which we can add the lucid explanation of Helaraja (Prakirnakaprakasa II, p. 9) tathabhitasya hi samudayasya pratyekam avayave'dhyasat tatpratyayotpattih/ adhyasas ca sarvatra pacatiti

pratyayasyanuvrtter eva jfidyate / pratyavayavaparisamaptatvac ca samudayasyavayavanam tadr-padhyaropa

upapadyata eva. See also VP III 14.30 vyaparasamudayasya yathadhiirayanadisu / pratyekam jativad vrttis tatha dvandvapadesv api / 'Just as the whole set of activities exists like the Universal in each

part like the placing of the vessel on the fire (adhis"rayanam), so is the case with the constituents of

dvandva compound' (transl. Iyer 1974:137).

156 [61



reality has to reckon with. A conception of reality which sees objects as being strictly delimited within their own confines (pratiniyatanipa bhdvd)

- and here Ksemaraja has primarily the Buddhist conception in mind -, and therefore incapable of agreeing with this given of grammatical speculation, elides itself by itself (cf. ibid. anyatra hi pratiniyatarupa bhavah ity eko'pi dvyarthah aparo'pi dvyarthah iti ka samgatih).

Kashmir Shaivism, in general, denies the object an external (bdhya) reality,

independent of consciousness. The phenomenal world is only a reflection (dbhdsa) within

the consciousness and its reality consists in appearing to the consciousness (dbhdsa eva

vastu). To underline the centrality of the I in contrast with the apparent otherness and independence of the object, there is the continual recurrence in the saiva texts,

particularly from Utpaladeva onwards, of expressions such as dbhsayati, prakasayati 'make manifest', 'make shine', which refer both to the original creation (dbhasanam

evotpddanam) (IPVr ad I 6.7) and the ever new process of knowledge. Here we have one of the central problems of saiva philosophy. If the responsibility for the action

of manifesting, of shining, rested entirely with the primary subject (hetu, prayojaka) of the causative dbhsayati

- i.e. the consciousness -, this would mean that the

object is totally extraneous to the reality of light - and thus really bdhya and, from

the saiva point of view, a mere nothing. The object, therefore, must be essentially

light, because only that which is already in itself light can shine. The solution given to this not easy problem is closely connected with the

speculations of the grammarians on the nature of the causative. The most complete and exemplary treatment of this topic is by Bhartrhari (18), who takes up again the

observations made by Katyayana and Pataijali and integrates them by his personal contribuition. We have the causative precisely when one induces to action someone

(18) See in particular VP III 7.122-27 sambhavanat kriyasiddhau kartrtvena samaritah/ kriyayam

atmasadhyayam sadhananam prayojakah // prayogamatre nyagbhavam svatantryad eva niiritah / avilisto

bhavaty anyaih svatantrair muktasamsayaih/ nimittebhyo pravartante sarva eva svabhitaye /

abhipraydnurodho'pi svarthasyaiva prasiddhaye // presanadhyesane kurvams tat samarthani cdcaran / kartaiva vihitam astre hetusampjfiam prapadyate / dravyamatrasya tu praise prcchader lod vidiyate /

sakriyasya prayogas tu yada sa visayo nicah // gunakriyayam svatantryat presane karmatam gatah /

niyamat karmasamjfiiyah svadharmenabhidhiyate // 'The agent who is prompted by another is not

different from the other independent agents about whom there is no doubt because (1) he has been

chosen as the agent for his capacity to accomplish the action (2) he engages the other accessories to do

the action which they can accomplish, (3) he is prompted by another and so becomes subordinate just because of this independence. For some reason or other everybody acts for his own benefit. Following the wish of another is also in order to fulfil one's own purpose. It is the agent who, by ordering or

requesting and doing things favourable to an action, acquires the name of prompter which is taught in

the sastra. The imperative (lot) is used after roots like prcch when the bare object is prompted. When

the already active object is prompted, it comes within the scope of the causative affix (nic). The

agent who becomes the object of the act of prompting is called by his own characteristic (agent) because

he retains his independence in regard to his own minor action and also because of the restriction of the

name (karma) (to special cases)' (transl. Iyer 1971:219-22).

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who is already active (VP III 7.126b sakriyasya prayogas tu yada sa visayo nicas), someone one knows is already potentially able to carry out that particular action (19).

As Katyayana had already said (20), the definition of svatantrahkartd may therefore be

applied to the prayojya. The following considerations made by Abhinavagupta are

precisely an application of such argumentation:

'ata eva' iti yato 'bhimanamatrasaram maylyam abhasate svatantryam esam

niladinam, tato vrttau paratantryam esam niripitam, svatantryam tu na sprstam

iti dariayati 'antarnita' iti svatantrasyaiva hi pradhanakriyayam tannisthavighna sambhpvananirasopayogipraisadikriyantaravisayamparatantryam visaye'pi prasara

tiva mukhyakriyarupe, natu paramarthatah pradhanakriyayam asambhavatsva

tantryah praisadibhir abhisambadhyate (IPVV vol. II, p. 421).

The causative form prakas'yaminesu -

Abhinavagupta says - that

Utpaladeva uses in the IPVr (ad IPK I 8.7) (21) is meant to underline the essential

heteronomy of those object realities, such as the colour blue etc., which the power of maya, on the contrary, makes us presume autonomous (i.e. independent of conscious ness and external). But then what becomes of their (relative) autonomy, of their being the subject of the action of manifesting, of shining? This is not damaged; in

fact only he who is autonomous can be dependent with regard to the primary action - a dependence that consists in the command, the request etc, on the part of the prayojaka, to remove possible obstacles to the carrying out of the action. He

who does not have any free agency with regard to a certain action (i.e. manifesting) could not become the object of any pressure etc (22). Thus here, under the guidance of the vydkaranasastra, the status of dbhasa is delineated, in its delicate balance

between svatantrya and paratantrya.

In the Kdrika 1 5.12 of the major work of the Pratyabhijniia, the IPK by

Utpaladeva, we read:

atmata eva caitanyam citkriyacitikartrta-/tatparyenoditas tena jadat sa hi vilaksanah // 'Precisely for this reason the Self has been defined "consciousness",

(19) Cf. the passage of the lost Sivadrstydlocana by Abhinavagupta, cit. in the Pardtrimsikdvivarana

(p. 225), preryo'pi sa bhaved yasya saktata nama vidyate.

(20) Vdrtt I-III ad PI 4.54 'svatantrasya kartrsamjfiarm hetumaty upasamkhyanam asvatantratvat',

'na va svatantryad itarathd hy akurvaty api karayatiti syat', 'ndkurvatiti cet svatantrah'.

(21) may5aaktya bahih pratyaksatvena prakaiyaminesu bhavesu prakaavyatiriktesu bahirabhasa ity

ucyate.

(22) Abhinavagupta dwells upon the question of the nature of the causative form also in Tantrdloka

X 38-45, Pardtrimikd-vivarana pp. 224-25 and in the lost Sivadrstydlocana (cf. fn. 19).

158 [8]



meaning by that the activity of perceiving and being the subject of such activity. It is thanks to this "consciousness" that the Self is differentiated from inert reality'.

Being 'conscious' is the attribute (dharma) of the substance (dravya, dharmin) Self, which is, indeed, the dravya par excellence, because everything without exception rests

on him (23). To say 'The Self is consciousness' - as in the famous first sitra of the

Sivasutra, which inspires Abhinavagupta here - is to underline the absolute preemi nence of this quality with respect to all the others. In fact, permanence, incorporeality etc. may belong also to other entities, -whereas consciousness only appertains to the

Self and it alone is sufficient to characterize it (24). 'The suffixes of the abstract td

and tvam [to which the suffix syan- of caitanya is assimilable] -

says Katyayana -

indicated that quality whose presence in the dravya determines the application of

the name' (25) (one guesses the quotation in a corrupted passage of IPVV II, p. 186

relative to this kdrikal. In the particular case of caitanya the abstract form is laden

with meanings which are particularly pertinent to this context; cetana, in fact, is a krdanta and as such its abstract denotes a 'relation' (sambandha) (cf. the maxim

samdsakrttaddhitesu sambandhdbhidhdnam (26); Abhinavagupta's argumentation that I am referring to is implicitely based on this) and, through the relation, the two related

elements, i.e. the subject and the action of perceiving, of being conscious (IPV I,

p. 247 kartrkrdantat utpannena bhavapratyayena sambandhabhidhayinapi prddhanyena darsitah; tatha hi sambandhasya sambandhivisrantasya (27) pratitelh dravyariupasya ca

sarnbandhinah prakrtya uktatvat citikriyaripam dharmamsambaddham avagamayatd

syafia niskrsta eva amsah pratyayito bhavati). The kdrikd in question - so important

in the economy of the Pratyabhijfia, one of whose principal objectives is precisely to

confute the Vijfianavadin conception of an 'impersonal' consciousness - rest entirely on these grammatical premises.

The argument is taken up again with some interesting variations by Abhinava

gupta in IPVV II, p. 186. What is denoted by the abstract caitanya is not the

(23) Cf. IPV I, p. 246 dravyam hi tat ucyate yadvisrantah padarthavargah sarvo bhati ... sakalo'yam

tattvabhitabhavabhuvanasambharah samvidi visrantah tatha bhavati iti sa eva gunakarmadidharmarayab

hiitapadarthantarasvabhavah tam eva mukhyadravyasvariipam arayate iti saiva dravyam.

(24) Cf. Sivasutravimarsini, p. 2 sa ca (paramativa) yadyapi nityatvavyapakatvamiirtatvadyananta

dharmatma, tathapi nityatvadinam anyatrapi sambhavyamanatvat, anyasambhavinah svatantryasyalva

uddhurikarapradar'anam idam / ittham dharmantarapratiksepatas ca, caitanyam iti bhavapratyayena

darsitam; see Torella 1979:37. See also IPV I, pp. 245-47.

(25) Vdrtt. V ad P V 1.119 siddham tu yasya gunasya bhavad dravye "abdaniveias tadabhidhane

tvatalau.

(26) This paribhdsa is mentioned in the Paribhasavrtti of Siradeva; see Kielhorn 1874:537. It is al

so quoted by Heldraja in the Prakirnakaprakaa I, p. 55 (ad VP III 1.47).

(27) 1 follow here the reading of the KSTS edition (the Bhaskari reads, incorrectly, tatha hi sambandha-Isambandhi?Ivisrantasya).

191 159



action itself but the relation with it. Every relation, according to the Pratyabhiji-a, has as its essence the manifesting of the two related elements as resting on the

knowing subject (iha sanbandho nama pramatryisrantasambandhidvitayavabh sasara iti) and therefore every relation is the implicit affirmation of a subject.

Here, in particular, the abstract denotes a relation with the action of being conscious, of perceiving, and, therefore, in this case too, through the action the subject of this

action is also denoted, as the element which is correlated to it. To which one might

object that all the various kdrakas are connected with the action; why then state that

here it is necessarily a question of the kartr? (nanu kriyasam-bandhah karakantaresv

api tulyas tat katham uktam citkriyarupa citikartrteti). Because - it is replied -

it is through their resting on the subject that the other kdrakas participate in and

resolve into the action (kartrvisrantidvarena hi karakantara-ny upallyante kriyayam). The Kashmiri authors have recourse, more or less consciously, on various other

occasions, to the model furnished by grammatical speculation on the karakas. Once

again Utpaladeva, to give an account of the undeniable and necessary network of

relations which animates phenomenal reality (the cause-effect relation is, for

istance, interpreted according to the model of the relation kartr-karma (28)) refers to

the power of action to aggregate the many various karakas in the unity of the sentence (29). This role and power of unifying entities which by themselves would be unrelated and discrete is that which at all levels of reality is allotted to the

subject, and, in fact, it is to the I, the subject agent, that the action refers one (30).

(28) IPK II 4.2b and vrtti kartrkarmatattvaiva karyakaranata tatah - kartrtvam eva hi karanat

vam karmataiva ca karyatvam natv anyat 'Therefore. the relation of cause and effect is reduced

essentially to that of subject agent and object of the action. - Cause and effect, therefore, are

reduced respectively to the subject agent and the object of the action, nothing else'.

(29) IPK II 4.16 ata eva vibhaktyarthah pramatrekasamarayah / kriyakarakabhavakhyo yukto

bhavasamanvayah/ 'On the basis of what has been said, the only logically admissible relation between

things is to be identified in the meaning of the case ending, which represents the relationship between action and agents of the action and has as its only basis the knowing subject'; IPK II 2.6a and

vrtti. kriyavimariavisayah karakanam samanvayah -

kasthasthalidevadattaudananam pacatity

antahsamanvaydd bahirbhedac caikanekavisaya kriyamatih 'The link existing between the agents of the

action is based on the reflective awareness of the action - The notion of "action" is founded on unity

multiplicity, insofar as the various factors contribute to the accomplishment of the action - wood, pot,

Devadatta, rice - are externally differentiated and internally linked through their connection with the

verb "he cooks" '. For the grammarians the pre-eminent position and aggregating role of the verbal

action in the sentence are the object of common consensus. Action - says Kaiyata (see G. Cardona

1974:302, fn. 157) - is the principal element in the sentence insofar as it is that which must be

realized; the kdrakas are called dependent insofar as they enter into activity in order to realize the

verbal action (Pradipa II, p. 264, right column, ad Mbh on PI 4.3 kriyayah sadhyatvat pradhanyam tadarthatvat pravrtteh karakanam gunatvam). Cf. again Kaiyata, in the course of the discussion on the

meaning of ca, yada parasparanirapeksah padarthah kriyayam samucciyante tada samuccayai cartho ya tha gam asvam purusam ityadau vakye parasparanapeks- gavadayo nayanakriyaya sambadhyante (PradTpa II, p. 469, left column, ad MBh on P II 2.29).

(30) Action, for the Saivas, any action, presupposes an intention: the subject agent must therefore

160 [101



Action - says Abhinavagupta, using arguments which are typically grammatical

-

gravitates essentially towards the subject and resolves into it; this is proved by the

fact that all the other karakas in the sentence may be absent, but the presence of the

subject alone is sufficient to bring about the verbal action, and, on the contrary, even

if all the other karakas are present, the absence of the subject alone makes the action

impossible (IPVV III, p. 253 evam briivanais ca aparakarakaparyayapaye'pi sati

kartari kriyatattvasya darsanam asati tu aparaka-rakasa-magryam api adarianam iti

anvayavyatirekabhyamt kartrvisrantir eva kriyeti nirtipitam bhavati). The centrality

- at all levels of experience - of the I, as knowing and agent

subject, in Kashmir Shaivism, is the same as that of the kartr in the sentence. The

kartr, according to the grammarians, is the only karaka that cannot be absent, it is

the one everything revolves around (31), the only one that is indipendent and not, like the other karakas, a blend of dependence and independence (32). Behind

be endowed with consciousness and volition. 'An inert reality -

says Utpaladeva (IPVr ad II

4.20) - cannot be even the subject of the action of being "it exists, is", since it does not possess free

dom, which manifests itself through the "wanting to be" (jadasyapi asti-bhavati ity asyam api

sattakriyayam bubhisayogena svatantrybhavad akartrvam)'. One can attribute a certain action to an

insentient reality only in a metaphorical sense, unless one bears in mind that this sattd which practical

experience ascribes to it is in reality sivatakhyd. This point is developed by Utpaladeva in the vrtti

on Sivadrsti IV 32b-33a, where Somananda solves in the same terms the problem of the attribution in

discourse of the qualification of karaka (and therefore of the case endings) to entities that are by definition inexistent, such as the hare's horn etc... On the other hand, one could add that even the

kartrtd of the potter who makes a pot is his only insofar as it is inscribed in and he participates in the

only authentic kartrtd, which is that of Siva. The grammarians, for their part, generally exclude the

possibility of a necessary link between agency and animation and argue, among those who hold the

opposite thesis, especially with the Naiyayikas (see G. Cardona 1974:239, 252-53). The centrality of

the subject is reaffirmed by Utpaladeva a little further on: IPVr ad II 4.21 evam cidripasyaikasya kartur

eva cikirsakhya kriy mukhya, nakartrkam karmasti karmadinam kartrmukhenopacaratah 'There is no

object of the action without a subject agent: action, in fact, is attributed to the various karakas, such

as the object etc., only in a metaphorical sense, through the subject agent'.

(31) VP III 7.101-2 prag anyatah faktilabhan nyagbhavapadanad api / tadadhinapravrttitvat pravrttanam nivartanat // adrstatvat pratinidheh praviveke ca darianat / arad apy upakaritve

svatantryam kartur ucyate // 'The independence of the agent is accepted for the following reasons: (1) because the agent acquires his capacity before (the operation of the other accessories) and from some

other source (2) because he keeps the others subordinate (to himself) (3) because the others act according to his direction (4) because the agent can hold back the others already engaged (5) because no substitute

for him is seen (6) because he is present even when the others are not, even though he helps in the

accomplishment of the action from a distance' (transl. Iyer 1971:209). MBh I p. 326 ad P I. 4.23,

katham punar jiayate karta pradhanam iti / yat sarvesu sadhanesu sannihitesu karta pravartayita bhavati

'How to know that the kartr is the principal element? Insofar as, when the other accessories to the

action are present, the kartr sets them in motion'.

(32) Pradipa II, p. 246, left column, on Mbh ad P I 4.23 tena svatah svatantryam eva yasya

kartrsamnjia tasya, na tu paratantryasahitasvatantryayuktasya. Cf. also MBh I, p. 326 evam tarhi

pradhanena samavaye sthall paratantra vyavaye svatantra / tad yathd / amatyadinam rajfia saha sama

vaye paratantryam vyavaye svatantryam; Kdika ad PI 4.54 agunabhdto yah kriyasiddhau svatantryena

vivaksyate tat kdrakam kartrsamifiam bhavati (see Joshi-Roodbergen 1975:267, fn. 185).

[11] 161



the svdtantryavdda 'the philosophy of freedom' - the name the Kashmiri masters

often gave to their philosophy - one can clearly glimpse a universe of meanings which

has its centre of irradiation in Pnini's famous siu-tra svatantrah karta (cf. Ruegg 1959:32), with the relative explanations by Katyayana, Patafijali and Bhartrhari.

ABBREVIATIONS

IPK lvarapratyabhi#idkdikd IPVr livarapratyabhijdvrtti IPV lvarapratyabhijdvimarin

IPVV lvarapratyabhijfdvivrtivimariin1 KSTS Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies

MBh Mahdbhdsya P Pinini -

Astddhydyl VP Vdkyapadiya

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TEXTS

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Allahabad 1938-1950.

The 1varapratyabhijfiavrtti of Utpaladeva, critical edition and translation by R. Torella, SOR, (forth

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Examples of the Influence of Sanskrit Grammar on Indian Philosophy - Raffaele Torella

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