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Evolution of National Security Activities

Charles University Prague Security Studies Institute

23 April 2015

Dr. Scott Pace George Washington University

Elliott School of International Affairs

space1@gwu.edu (202) 994-5278

1957 E Street, NW Suite 403 Washington, D.C.

Military Intelligence

Civil Commercial

Navigation & Scientific

Banking & Finance

Wireless Comm

WMD Imagery

Precision Farming

Joint Ops

Missile Threat

Growing Importance of Space

What Can Space Do for the Warfighter?

What We Want To Achieve... Rapidly Deployable Forces

Lethal, Non-Linear Battlefield High, Speed, Mobile Opns

Simultaneity of Opns

Dispersed Forces Joint/Coalition Opns

Massing of Effects • Opns Plan •  Deploy Forces •  Move to Combat •  Synchronize Forces •  Engage & Defeat Enemy •  Protect the Force •  Sustain the Force •  Redeploy & Prepare to Fight

Tasks

•  Real-Time & Near-Real Time Information

•  Situational Understanding •  Information Dominance

Battlefield Dominance

Enablers

Commanders Require Near-Real-Time to Real-Time Information to Conduct Decisive Combat Operations

4 Dr. Peter Hays 2011

Spectrum, Computers, and PNT

5

Source: Jules McNeff, 2010

U.S. Military Missions in Space

•  Space Support –  Launch of satellites and other high-value payloads into

space and operation of those satellites through a world-wide network of ground stations

•  Space Force Enhancement –  Provide satellite communications, navigation, weather

information, missile warning, command and control, and intelligence to the warfighter

•  Space Control –  Ensure freedom of action in space for the US and its

allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space

•  Space Force Application –  Provide capabilities for the application of combat

operations in, through, and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict

Space Support forces include: •  14th Air Force

•  Space launches at Canaveral and Vandenberg Air Force facilities

•  Satellite Operations Network •  Naval Satellite Operations Center •  US Army SMDC�s 1st SATCON Battalion

Space Support

Atlas V on pad at CCAFS

Delta IV Launch Pad at VAFB AFSCN Station

DSCS Ops Center D Co, 1st SATCON Battalion

Space Support missions are to deploy and maintain military space systems. These are the operations which deploy, augment, sustain and replenish space forces, to include:

–  Space Lift or Space Launch –  Satellite Control or Telemetry,

Tracking and Commanding (TT&C) –  Logistics ops to support space

forces

Force Enhancement

Position, Velocity, Time and Navigation

Communications

Environmental Monitoring

Warning

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)

•  Ensure Use of Space Assets •  Enhance Survivability

•  Maneuver •  Harden •  Redundancy

Protect •  Detect, Identify and Track Man-made

Space Objects •  Worldwide Network

•  Radar •  Optical Trackers •  Infrared

Surveil

Negate Prevent • Prevent Adversaries From Exploiting US or Allied Space Services

• Disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive or destroy adversary space capabilities

•  Encryption •  Shutter Control

Space Control

Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same

• SPACE SEGMENT

• GROUND SEGMENT

Offensive Space Control

•  Involves the use of lethal or non-lethal means and are conducted to achieve five major purposes: •  Prevention •  Deception •  Disruption •  Denial •  Degradation •  Destruction of space assets or capabilities

Defensive Space Control

•  Reduce and preclude the effectiveness of an adversary’s counterspace operations

•  Preserve the ability to use friendly space systems (including against unintentional threats)

•  Consists of active and passive defense

Space Force Application

•  Consists of attacks against terrestrial targets carried out by military weapon systems operating in (or through) space

•  Currently, there are no force application assets operating in space, but technology and national policy could change

National Security Space Communities

•  Military Space –  Satellite Systems –  Satellite Operations –  Launch –  Space Ranges –  DARPA –  Missile Defense Agency

•  Intelligence Space –  Satellite Systems –  Satellite Operations

•  NOAA –  Weather –  Remote Sensing

•  Commercial Space –  Communications –  Remote Sensing

•  NASA –  Technology –  Project Management

•  Other –  Department of Energy/

National Labs –  Department of Agriculture

(USDA)/U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)/LANDSAT

–  Department of Homeland Security/National Applications Office

–  National Science Foundation (NSF)/Space Weather

–  Allies

Dir DISA JFCC-GNO Dir NSA

14th AF

Organization for National Security Space

Congress

President Vice President

OSTP NSC OMB

SECDEF NASA Commerce State, Other… DHS DNI

NOAA CIA

STRATCOM

JFCC-ISR

CJCS communication

SecNavy SecArmy SecAF (EA for Space)

USD(AT&L) ASD(NII) USD(I)

Milestone Authority

Milestone Authority

Functional comp.

JFCC-GSI

JFCC-IMD

JFCC-NW

CTF 214

JFCC-Space

JSpOC

Dir DIA

8th AF

SMDC/ARSTRAT

24th AF

SPAWAR SMDC

AFSPC

Chief of Staff

NSSO

AFMC

AFRL MDA

DARPA

DISA

NROC Coordination of Operations

DIA NSA

NGA

NRO

USD(P)

ASD/GSA

DASD/CSP

Dir Sp Pol

Legend Oversight

Funding, Priorities Coord Operations

Other (labeled)

Service Components (Org, train, equip)

2009

DoD Space Professionals

Air Force

Service Included Functional Areas The Numbers

Navy

Army

Marine Corps

Operations, Intelligence, Weather Cyberspace, Acquisition

12,338

Requirements, Assessment, Science and Technology, Operations, RDA

Operations

Operations

1,477

2579

80

Total: 16,474

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February 2011

Supporting Global and Theater Operations

USSTRATCOM’s Mission

Detect, deter, and prevent attacks against the United States and our allies - join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail

•  U.S. Cyber Command Ft. Meade, MD •  JFCC - Global Strike (JFCC-GS) Offutt AFB, NE •  JFCC - Space (JFCC-Space) Vandenberg AFB, CA •  JFCC - Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) Schriever AFB, CO •  JFCC - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-

ISR) Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. •  USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass

Destruction (SCC-WMD) Fort Belvoir, VA •  Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) Dahlgren, VA

AFSC Prioritized Space Capabilities July 2012

1.  Nuclear, Survivable Communications 2.  Launch Detection / Missile Tracking 3.  Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 4.  Space Situational Awareness &

Battlespace Awareness 5.  Defensive Space Control (DSC) 6.  Assured Space Access / Spacelift 7.  Space Command and Control (C2) 8.  Satellite Operations

9.  Protected, Tactical Communications 10.  Offensive Space Control 11.  Unprotected Communications 12.  Space to Surface Intelligence

Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

13.  Terrestrial Environmental Monitoring 14.  Nuclear Detonation Detection 15.  Responsive Spacelift

~1957-61

The Space Environment is Crowded

Mar 2007 ~2025

Evolution from few, military only assets to many, multi-agency, civil assets

Orbital Conjunctions

•  Routine orbital conjunction screening revealed possible conjunction between an active US Weather Satellite and dead Russian Scientific Satellite

•  31 Mar 07: Close conjunction predicted for 1 Apr 07 –  11 meter predicted miss distance –  Approx 33,000 MPH closing velocity of the approach –  Neither satellite had capability to perform collision avoidance

maneuvers

•  Possible collision could result in adding 1000s of debris objects threatening 100s of active LEO satellites

•  Post-event analysis shows final miss distance at time of closest approach only 73 meters

U.S. Space Surveillance Network

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Latest and Fifth Space Mission Area: Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

Break Point – Questions?

Congested and Contested

•  2002 - Falun Gong jamming and hijacking TV on Chinese COMSATs •  2003 - Iran jams Telestar-12 & Iraqis jam GPS •  2005 - Libya reportedly jams Telestar-12 •  2007 - China tests direct-ascent anti-satellite •  2008 - Interference on Terra AM-1 & Landsat •  2009 - Iran launches experimental satellite •  2009 - Iridium 33 – COSMOS 2251 collision •  2009 - North Korea space launch attempt fails •  2010 - Chinese Interceptor test •  2010 - Iranian SATCOM jamming •  2012 - North Korea space launch succeeds •  2013 - Chinese high altitude suborbital test Egyptian Satcom jamming •  2014 - Chinese non-destructive ASAT test

Counter Space Threat Continuum

Space capabilities are vital to U.S. national and global interest, but face a wide range of maturing threats and challenges

•  Congested - increased access to and use of space– orbital crowding; spectrum

competition; debris; collision risk •  Contested - Adversaries continue to seek means to deny space advantages

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Space Launch and Missile Proliferation

Foreign Space Intelligence •  Satellites

–  Imagery •  Electro-optical •  Synthetic aperture radar •  Film

–  Navigation –  Communication –  Other

•  Scientific • Weather • Oceanographic

•  Space launch vehicles •  Ground Segment •  Employment •  Doctrine, policy, intent

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Projected European EO/Radar Space Systems

28 Courtesy: Xavier Pasco 2013

Foreign Counterspace Intelligence

•  Space Object Surveillance and Identification •  Denial and Deception •  Cyber Attacks •  Jamming

–  SATCOM –  GPS –  Radar

•  RF Weapons •  Laser Blinding •  Orbital ASATs •  High Energy Lasers •  Ground Segment Attack •  High Altitude Nuclear Detonation

•  Employment •  Doctrine, policy, intent

Chinese ASAT Test, 11 January 2007

Example ASAT illustration

Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) polar orbit weather satellite, launched in

1999 and destroyed by an ASAT

Video

Fengyun-1C vs USA 193 Number of Trackable Objects

Remaining in Orbit

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5

Years from Event

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FY-1CUSA-193

Number of Trackable ObjectsRemaining in Orbit

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1000

1500

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Years from Event

Trac

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FY-1CUSA-193Fengyun-1C

USA 193

Fengyun-1C

USA 193

75 Year Graph

5 Year Graph

DISTRIBUTION A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

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Not

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Cold War Regional Conflicts Terrorism Net-Centric Warfare

Survivability

U.S. Reliance

Threats Not

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Trends Towards Contested Space

Employment of Space Forces

•  Space forces contribute at all levels of military activity and conflict •  Peacetime, deterrence, and military

operations other than war •  Escalation control •  Support during conflict •  Information dominance •  Post hostilities

Connectivity Among Space-Related Elements of US. National Security

Threat

Policy

Strategy

Doctrine

Missions

System Rqmts

System Deficiencies

System Concepts

Technology

•  Near peer competitors, rogue nations, terrorism

•  National space policy, DoD space policy

•  National Security Strategy of the U.S.

•  Joint Pub. 3-14, Air Force Doctrine Directive 2-2

•  Space force enhancement, space support, counterspace/space control, force application

•  Surveil and monitor continuously all significant activities in space

•  Space-based space surveillance; high altitude antisatellite capability

•  SBR; SBL;STSS

•  Focal plane arrays; laser shielding materials

Examples

Questions that Drive Forces and their Uses

•  What do we mean by strategy? –  Informal: Connecting means and ends given

limited resources and uncertainty

•  What is military doctrine? –  NATO definition: �Fundamental principles by

which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application�

What Do We Mean By…Strategy?

•  Grand Strategy –  …the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological,

and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.�

•  National Security Strategy

–  A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. See also national military strategy; strategy; theater strategy.

•  Strategy –  A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in

a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.

•  Military Strategy –  The employment of military force to achieve national objectives. Military

strategy is subordinate to grand strategy. •  Space Strategy [adaptation of various definitions]

–  The employment of space forces to achieve national objectives.

•  National Security Strategy of the U.S.

•  National Military Strategy

•  Joint Doctrine •  Individual Service

strategy •  AFSPC Strategic Plan

Hierarchy of Strategy Documents

Defining �Doctrine�

�Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.�

*Source: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/

Considered as both the means and the method, i.e., the preferred mode of a group of services, a single service, or a subservice for fighting wars…[and the] force posture, the inventory of weapons any military organization controls� that are employed in pursuit of national security objectives

*!

Defining �Joint Doctrine�

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

Joint operations: using multiple services, e.g. Navy and Air Force and Army

Combined arms: in the Army, using multiple branches, e.g. infantry, armor, and artillery or more generally, multi-national operations

Capstone Pubs

Keystone Pubs

Doctrine Pubs

JOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

Joint Doctrine Notes

Joint Communications

System 6-0

Joint Operations

3-0

Joint Operation Planning

5-0

Joint Doctrine1

JointPersonnel

1-0

Joint Logistics

4-0

JointIntelligence

2-0

Dictionary1-02

ReligiousAffairs

1-05

LegalSupport

1-04

FinancialManagement

1-06

GeospatialInformation

2-03

Joint Intel Prep of the Operational

Environment2-01.3

Joint & National Intel Supt to Military Ops

2-01

CI and HUMINT Support

2-01.2

MultinationalOperations

3-16

Military Info Support Ops

3-13.2

InformationOperations

3-13

Operations Security3-13.3

MilitaryDeception

3-13.4

Counter-IED Operations

3-15.1

Electronic Warfare3-13.1

Barriers, Obstacles, & Mine Warfare

3-15

SpaceOperations

3-14

CounterdrugOperations

3-07.4

Stability Operations

3-07

Cyberspace Operations

3-12

Operational Assessment

1-14

Globally Integrated Operations

2-14

Security Force

Assistance1-13

Close AirSupport3-09.3

JointFire Support

3-09

Security Ops in Theater

3-10

Antiterrorism3-07.2

Inter-organizationalCoordination

3-08

PeaceOperations

3-07.3

Ops in CBRN Environments

3-11

Amphibious Operations

3-02

UrbanOperations

3-06

AmphibiousEmbarkation and

Debarkation3-02.1

SpecialOperations

3-05

Countering Air & Missile Threats

3-01

JointInterdiction

3-03

ShipboardHelicopter Ops

3-04

Counter-insurgency Ops

3-24

Countering Threat Networks

3-25

Foreign Internal Defense

3-22

ForcibleEntry Ops

3-18

C2 for JointAir Operations

3-30

Counter-terrorism

3-26

HomelandDefense

3-27

Civil Support3-28

HumanitarianAssistance

3-29

Air Mobility Operations

3-17

PersonnelRecovery

3-50

CombatingWMD3-40

C2 for Joint Land Ops

3-31

EngineerOperations

3-34

CBRNEConsequence Management

3-41

JointTask Force

Headquarters3-33

Deployment &Redeployment

3-35

C2 for JointMaritime Ops

3-32

AirspaceControl

3-52

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

3-68

Public Affairs3-61

Joint Targeting

3-60

Security Cooperation

3-XX

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal

3-42

Unconventional Warfare3-05.1

DetaineeOperations

3-63

Meteorological &Oceanographic

3-59

Civil-MilitaryOperations

3-57

DistributionOperations

4-09

MortuaryAffairs

4-06

MobilizationPlanning

4-05

Logistics in Multinational

Ops4-08

OperationalContract Support

4-10

Petroleum and Water

4-03

TerminalOperations

4-01.5

SealiftSupport4-01.2

Health ServiceSupport

4-02

JLOTS4-01.6

DefenseTrans System

4-01

Electro-Magnetic

Spectrum Ops6-01

Commander's Communication Synchronization

2-13Under Development

Access to these JPs at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp requires CAC.

Classified Pubs

Pubs with Classified Appendices

LEGEND18 July 2014

81 Joint Doctrine Pubs

Development (New)

Joint Test Publication

Joint Pubs in Maintenance/ Initiation Stage

In Maintenance

77 Approved(24 in Revision)

4UnderDevelopment

Normal Revision

* Joint Pubs with pending change

Joint pubs to be consolidated or deleted pending development or revision of superceding publications

Change in Lieu of Revision

What Is Military Space Doctrine?

•  Provide guidance, based on fundamental truths and proven experience, on most effective way to develop, deploy, employ forces in support of national and military objectives

•  Explores realm of what is realistically and

operationally possible, yet remains subordinate to national policy

•  Must be sufficiently innovative to respond to changes in political circumstances, adversary capabilities, or available military technology

Foundational Joint Doctrine Statements for Space Operations*

•  Use of space capabilities has proven to be a significant force multiplier when integrated into joint operations

–  Joint force commanders (JFCs) and space operators must have common and clear understanding of how space forces and capabilities contribute to joint operations, and how military space operations should be integrated with other military operations to achieve U.S. national security objectives

•  Use of space capabilities by U.S. military has changed significantly since first military satellites were orbited –  Increasing dependence on space capabilities by U.S.

military, civil, and commercial sectors also a potential vulnerability

•  �purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on the Nation’s sovereign rights.�

•  “when practical and authorized, the joint force will protect civil, commercial, and foreign space capabilities.”

*Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 29 May 2013

Foundation Doctrine Statements From Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 (cont.)

•  Characteristics of space –  No geographical boundaries –  Orbital Mechanics –  Environmental Considerations: Space weather, debris, spectrum

dependency •  Considerations for joint space planners

–  Global access –  Persistence –  Limitations: satellite design life, inability to conduct maintenance,

amount of fuel aboard, orbit type, –  Predictable orbits –  Potential vulnerability to interference or attack –  Space Deterrence (?) –  Resource considerations (e.g., long lead times to replenish;

prioritization among multiple missions being performed) –  Timing Considerations (e.g., precision time) –  Legal considerations (e.g., treaties, frequency spectrum

management)

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What Are the Implications?

•  National spacepower is more than military space –  Commercial and international partners are important

•  Doctrinal statements acknowledge: –  Growing importance of civil and commercial space to military

space capabilities and vulnerabilities –  Need to consider integrated approaches to space systems

employment in military operations •  Choosing a strategic direction represents alternative

approaches to conduct of military space operations –  Consistent with high-level policy, legal guidance –  Hampered by uncertainty of security environment, commercial

market –  Need to consider relationship of military space to broader

instruments of national power •  Enhancing national spacepower requires deliberate efforts

to coordinate and communicate among diverse national interests – while managing limited resources and continuing uncertainty