Evolution and Resilience of the Nuclear Nonproliferation System

Arian L. Pregenzer

November 3, 2013

The goal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)

Commit not to assist other states to acquire or develop nuclear weapons

Commit not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and to implement IAEA safeguards

All agree not to export nuclear equipment or material to NNWS except under safeguards

All agree to facilitate exchange of peaceful nuclear technology

All agree to work towards future nuclear (and total) disarmament

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The nuclear nonproliferation system includes a range of multilateral and bilateral measures

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NPT

Export Control (sensitive nuclear technology)

Detection and interdiction

Capacity buildingTechnical assistance

Material and weapon security

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

Limitations on highly enriched uranium and plutonium

Border and port security

Diplomacy

Security Alliances

SanctionsArms Control

Nonproliferation system has been largely successful. But what will happen next?

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1945 1960 1975 1990 2005 2020 2035 20500

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Nuclear Energy States

Enrichment States

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Thresholds in the nonproliferation system?

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Capability

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nd Region to Avoid

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Evolution of Nonproliferation Strategies1945 - 1990

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Unilateral military strikes

International Export Controls

Security Alliances

NPT / IAEA Safeguards

Diplomacy

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Evolution of Nonproliferation Strategies1991 - 2001

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IAEA Additional Protocol

Regional Security

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Unilateral military strikes

International Export Controls

Security Alliances

NPT / IAEA Safeguards

Diplomacy

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Innovative Strategies of the 1990sCooperative Threat Reduction

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Warhead Safety and Security

Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities

Dismantlement of Russian Submarine

Disassembly of Missile Launch Tube

Innovative Strategies of the 1990sThe Cooperative Monitoring Center

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Nuclear Safety Data Exchange (Northeast Asia)

Meteorological Data Gathering and Exchange (Israel/PA)

Cooperative Aerial Monitoring Cooperative Border CrossingsNaval Confidence Building Measures

Cooperative Disease Surveillance(Middle East)

India / Pakistan

Evolution of Nonproliferation StrategiesPost 2001

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Nuclear Reductions

Military Strikes

Missile Defense

Detection / Interdiction (PSI)IAEA

Additional Protocol Capacity

BuildingRegional Security

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Unilateral military strikes

International Export Controls

Security Alliances

NPT / IAEA Safeguards

Diplomacy

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Innovative Strategies of the 2000sThe Proliferation Security Initiative:

Goals Stop trafficking WMD-related

materials and technologies Framework

No formal secretariat Coalition of “willing”

Methods Exchange of information and

best practices Exercises

Participation 10 states (2003) > 100 states (2013)

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41-country exercise off Japan in 2007

Can concepts of systems resilience be applied to the nonproliferation system?

Resilience is a measure of a system’s ability to absorb continuous and unpredictable change and maintain its vital functions

Strategies for resilience will emphasize general capabilities to deal with unknown hazards

Resilient systems constantly evolve to maintain function in a changing environment

Resilient systems are functionally diverse

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The Adaptive Cycle and Systems Resilience

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growth

conservation

grow

th release

A resilient system continues to perform its vital functions as it moves through the adaptive cycle over time.

reorganization

reorganization

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Where is the nonproliferation system?

Arms ControlMilitary Strikes

Missile DefenseCapacity Building

Detection / Interdiction (PSI)

Cooperative Threat Reduction

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IAEA Additional protocol

Export ControlsMilitary Strikes

Security AlliancesNPT / IAEA SafeguardsDiplomacy

Information classification

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What can be done to enhance resilience of the nonproliferation system?

Acknowledge that not all determined states can be prevented from developing nuclear weapons

Fewer intellectual and economic resources to “prevention”

Emphasize general international capabilities that increase overall security and can respond to “point failures” Nuclear emergency / incident response Missile defense Standards for nuclear weapons security

Apply systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation Clarify processes Understand feedbacks

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Systems Analysis: Understanding FeedbacksModeling the Nonproliferation System

• Benefits Clarify thinking

about system processes

Account for feedbacks and unintended consequences

• Cautions Unknown

interactions Difficult to

quantify

See “A Systems Approach to Assessing Nonproliferation Strategies,” A. Pregenzer, S. DeLand, R. Glass, W. Beyeler, A. Ames, A. Williams; http://www.sandia.gov/CasosEngineering/docs/Nonproliferation%20Model%20INMM%205-30-11_SAND2011_3768C.pdf

Final Thought: Nonproliferation system interacts with other systems at larger and smaller scales.

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Country Space Globe

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Nonproliferation System

Global Order / International Security

State NW Programs