Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness ...

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Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness: A Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness: A

Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 106 Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 106

Daniel J. Capra Richter, Liesa L.

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Capra, Daniel J. Richter, Liesa L., "Evidentiary Irony and the Incomplete Rule of Completeness: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 106" (2020). Minnesota Law Review. 3217. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3217

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Article

EvidentiaryIronyandtheIncompleteRuleofCompleteness:AProposaltoAmendFederalRuleofEvidence106

DanielJ.Capra† andLiesaL.Richter††

“[T]hewitnessmayhave‘toldthetruth,butuseditlikealie.’”1

INTRODUCTIONInrecentyears,therehavebeenmanycallsandsuggestionsfora

more equitable criminal justice system.2 Although sometimes over-lookedinthatdialogue,thefairoperationoftheFederalRulesofEvi-dence isacrucialcomponent inensuringsuchanequitablesystem.Unfortunately, there are certain rules—and rule applications—thatcanleadtounfairresults.Forexample,assumethatalawenforcementwitnessinahomicideprosecutiontestifiesthattheaccuseddefendantorallyconfessedtobuyingthefirearmusedtocommitthemurder—butconvenientlyfailstoexplainthatthedefendant,inhisstatement,

† PhilipReedProfessorofLaw,FordhamLawSchool.ReportertotheJudicialConferenceAdvisoryCommitteeonEvidenceRules.AllviewsexpressedinthisArticlearethoseoftheauthorsindividuallyanddonotrepresenttheofficialviewsoftheAd-visoryCommitteeonEvidenceRules.Copyright©2020byDanielJ.Capra.

†† WilliamJ.AlleyProfessorofLaw,UniversityofOklahomaCollegeofLaw.Ac-ademicConsultanttotheJudicialConferenceAdvisoryCommitteeonEvidenceRules.OursincereappreciationgoestoJamesBrudney,DeborahDenno,BruceGreen,JamesKainen,MichaelW.Martin,PaulRadvany,IanWeinstein,andBenjaminZipurskyfortheirthoughtfulcommentsonadraftofthisArticle,aswellastoAllysonShumaker,J.D.UniversityofOklahoma,2021,forherinvaluableresearchsupport.Copyright©2020byLiesaL.Richter. 1. 7DANIELD.BLINKA,WISCONSINPRACTICE:WISCONSINEVIDENCE§107.1(4thed.2019) (quoting EURIPIDES, THEBACCHAE OFEURIPIDES67 (Donald Sutherland trans.,1968)). 2. See,e.g.,FirstStepActof2018,Pub.L.No.115-391,§404,132Stat.5194,5222(permittingacourttoorderareducedsentenceforacrimecommittedbeforetheFairSentencingActof2010asiftheacthadbeeninplaceatthetimeofsentencing).

902 MINNESOTALAWREVIEW [105:901

alsoemphasizedthathesoldtheweaponmonthsbeforethemurder.3Theprosecutionhasdissectedthedefendant’sstatementinamannerthatcreatesamisleadingimpressionaboutwhatheactuallystated.Areasonablejurorhearingonlythatthedefendantadmittedbuyingtheweaponwouldlogicallyassumethatheadmittedowningthegunatthecrucialtimeofthemurder.Evidencerulesthatpermitsuchadis-tortedandinaccuratepresentationofastatement,andthatdenythewrongeddefendantanyremedy,fallfarshortoftheequitableideal.

And yet, the interpretation of FederalRule of Evidence 106 insomejurisdictionspermitssuchanunjustresult.Rule106,alsoknownasthe“ruleofcompleteness,”ispremiseduponnotionsoffundamen-talfairnessandostensiblypermitsapartytoforceitsadversarytoin-troducetheremainderofawrittenorrecordedstatementwhentheadversaryhasofferedaportioninaselectiveandmisleadingmanner.4Inone important respect, the federal courtshaveappliedRule106uniformly.TheyhaveproperlyinterpretedthefairnessthresholdforinvokingtheRulenarrowly,recognizingtheneedforcompletiononlywhen the first-introduced statement creates an inaccurate anddis-tortedinferenceaboutitstruemeaningandthecompletingstatementisnecessarytoeliminatethedistortionandtomakethestatementac-curateasawhole.5Solimited,Rule106isacriticaltoolnecessarytoachieving theunderlying fairnessgoalsof theFederalRulesofEvi-dencegenerally,asoutlinedinRule102:“Theserulesshouldbecon-struedsoastoadministereveryproceedingfairly,eliminateunjusti-fiableexpenseanddelay,andpromotethedevelopmentofevidencelaw,totheendofascertainingthetruthandsecuringajustdetermina-tion.”6

Despitetheseimportantprinciples,inconsistentandunfairappli-cationofRule106hasplaguedtheRulesinceitsadoptionin1975andhasfrustrateditscorepurposeofdemandingfairpresentationofout-

3. SeeUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,664(D.Md.2017)(describingthisscenarioasa“classic”exampleofdistortion). 4. FED.R.EVID.106. 5. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44,58,60(2dCir.2019)(explain-ingthattheprosecution’sintroductionofthedefendant’sconfessiontoowningafire-armdidnotrequirecompletionwiththedefendant’searlierdenialofownership;omis-sion of the initial denial did not distort or alter the meaning of the subsequentconfession);UnitedStatesv.Hird,901F.3d196,217(3dCir.2018)(rejectingcomple-tionwheretheexcerptoftestimonydefendantsoughttoadmit“occursmanypagesbefore the testimony”offeredby theprosecution,was “separatedby thepassageoftimeduringquestioning”andwas“unrelatedintheoverallsequenceofquestions”),supersededonreh’g,913F.3d332(2019)(quotedportionofdecisionunchanged). 6. FED.R.EVID.102(emphasisadded).

2020] EVIDENTIARYIRONY 903

of-courtstatements.Mostsignificantly,adefendantlikethehypothet-icalmurderdefendantdescribedabovewillrunheadlongintoapros-ecutorialhearsayobjectionwhenheattemptstoutilizeRule106.Theprosecutionwillemphasize that thegovernmentmay introducethedefendant’sownstatementsagainsthimpursuanttothehearsayex-emptionforpartyopponentstatementsfoundinFederalRuleofEvi-dence801(d)(2)(A).Butitwillargue—correctly—thatthedefendantmaynotintroducehisownhearsaystatementsunderthatone-wayex-emption.7TheprosecutioncanclaimthatthecompletionrightfoundinRule106doesnottrumpthehearsaydoctrine.Injurisdictionsthatacceptthisargumentandsustaintheprosecution’sobjection,thejuryisleftwiththeimpressionthatthedefendantadmittedtoowningthemurderweaponatthetimeofthekilling,whenhedidnosuchthing.Alternatively,theprosecutionmayobjectthatthedefendant’sconfes-sionwasmadeorallyandthatRule106offersthedefendantnore-course because it permits completion only of written or recordedstatements.8Again,ifthisobjectionissustained,thefact-finderisleftwithadistortedscrapofthetruth.Duetotheubiquitoususeofcrimi-naldefendants’ incriminatingstatementsbyprosecutors,theriskofunfaircherrypickinghasthepotentialtoarisewithgreatfrequency.

TheunfairapplicationofaruledesignedtopromotefairnesswasmadepossiblebecausetheoriginaldraftersofRule106chosetocraftaruleofcompletenessthatonly“partially”codifiedthecommonlawdoctrineof completeness.9ThedraftinghistoryofRule106revealsthatitscreatorswerefocusedprimarilyuponthetimingofcompletionandcraftedarulecreatingarightto“interrupt”anadversary’strialpresentationtodemandcompletionofapartialandmisleadingstate-ment“atthattime.”10Thisfocusontimingledthedrafterstoincludeonly“writings”or“recorded”statements inthetextofRule106,onthe theory that proof of unrecorded oral statements would

7. SeeBailey,322F.Supp.3dat662(“[T]heGovernmentarguedthatanythingBaileytoldtheagents...that[thegovernment]intendedtointroduceduringitscaseinchiefwouldbeadmissiblenon-hearsay,butthatanythingexculpatorythatBaileytold them thathe intended to elicit ...wouldbe inadmissiblehearsay.”);cf.UnitedStatesv.McDaniel,398F.3d540,545(6thCir.2005)(“Rule801(d)(2),however,‘doesnotextendtoaparty’sattemptto introducehisorherownstatementsthroughthetestimonyofotherwitnesses.’”). 8. SeeFED.R.EVID.106(applyingonlyto“awritingorrecordedstatement”). 9. SeeBeechAircraftCorp.v.Rainey,488U.S.153,171–72(1988)(statingthatRule106isapartialcodificationofthecommonlawruleofcompleteness). 10. SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(noting“theinadequacyofre-pairwork”whencompletionisdelayedtoalaterpointinatrial).


unnecessarilyinterruptdirectexamination.11ButexpresslycoveringonlywritingsandrecordingsinRule106texthasleftcompletingoralstatementsoutinthecoldtobeadmittedthroughcommonlawdoc-trines,otherevidencerules,ornotatall.Mostimportantly,Rule106—which is a rule about the admission of out-of-court statements—makesnomentionofthehearsayrulethatcouldbeheldtopreventcompletionwithotherwiseinadmissiblestatements.

This incomplete rule of completeness has left federal courtsstrugglingfordecadeswithobjectionstooralstatementsandother-wise inadmissible hearsay offered to correct a misleading partialpresentationofastatement.Althoughmanyfederalcourtsadmitoralstatementsandotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaystatementswhennec-essarytocorrectamisleadingimpressioncreatedbyapartialpresen-tationliketheonepositedabove,othersdonot.12Insomefederalju-risdictions, therefore, the scenario presented above is a shockingreality—statementsarepresentedinamisleadingwayandstandun-corrected.Whilethatinjusticecouldbevisitedonanylitigant,itmostoftenfallsoncriminaldefendants.

AlthoughthefederalcourtshavebeenwrestlingwiththeproperoperationofRule106sinceitsadoption,theyarenoclosertoauni-formandjustinterpretationoftheprovisionthantheywereforty-fiveyears ago. Accordingly, Rule 106 should be reconstructed to allowcompletionoforalstatementsandtopermitcompletionwithother-wiseinadmissiblehearsaywhenevernecessarytopreventdistortedevidencefrominfluencingthefact-finderimproperly.Onlythenwillthe“ruleofcompleteness”betrulycomplete.

ThisArticleaddressestheneedtoamendRule106infourParts.PartIdescribesthepre-Rulescommonlawdoctrineofcompletenessfrom which the more limited Federal Rule of Evidence 106 wascrafted.PartIthentracestheadoptionofRule106andthedrafters’decisionto“partially”codifythecommonlawdoctrineofcomplete-ness.PartIIexaminesthefederalcasesandcommentaryinterpretingRule106sinceitsadoptionin1975.PartIIhighlightstheconflictandconfusionsurroundingRule106, revealing that it ishigh time forachangetobringfairnessanduniformitytotheruleofcompletion.PartIIIexplorespotentialamendmentalternativesforRule106designedtoaddressthefairnessdeficitcurrentlypermittedbysomeinterpre-tationsoftheRuleandtocreatetheuniformityacrossfederaljurisdic-tionsthattheFederalRulesofEvidenceweredesignedtoestablish.

11. See id. (“Forpractical reasons, the rule is limited towritingsand recordedstatementsanddoesnotapplytoconversations.”). 12. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Adams,722F.3d788,826–27(6thCir.2013).


PartIVconcludeswithacalltoaction,recommendinganamendmenttoRule106thatwouldcompletetheworkonameaningfulandjustruleofcompletion—byallowingcompletionoverahearsayobjection,andbycoveringoralstatementsspecificallyundertheRule.13

I.FEDERALRULEOFEVIDENCE106:THEORIGINSTORYAmericantrialsfollowaformulaicorderofproof,inwhicheach

partyhasanopportunitytoprovehercaseordefenseatanappointedstageoftheproceeding.14Duringherturn,counselseekstopresentevidencethatmaximizesherclient’s likelihoodofsuccess.Althoughanadversaryenjoystherighttoobjecttoevidencepresentedduringheropponent’scaseandtocross-examinewitnesses,shemustwaitherturntopresentcounterproofhelpfultoherclient’sposition.15

Thedoctrineofcompletionrepresentsonelimitedexceptiontothisstandardoperatingprocedure,forbiddingapartyfrom“[telling]thetruth,butus[ing]itlikealie”duringherpresentationofproof.16Itpreventsapartyfromusingherrighttopresentevidenceduringhercaseinchiefinawaythatwouldmisleadthefact-finder,byallowinganadversarytointerjectwithcompletingevidencewheneverapartypresentsapartialstatementinawaythatdistortsitstruetenor.17

A. THECOMMONLAWDOCTRINEOFCOMPLETENESSTheconceptofcompletenessisoneoffundamentalfairnessthat

courtshaveappliedinsomeformsinceatleasttheseventeenthcen-tury.18Inaleadingcasein1897,Carverv.UnitedStates,thedefendant

13. AlthoughthisArticlefocusesonthesignificantimpactofRule106inthecon-textofadefendant’sstatementsinacriminalcase,thisamendmentwouldbeadvanta-geoustoalllitigantsincivilandcriminalcasesalike. 14. See1WEINSTEIN’SEVIDENCE:COMMENTARYONRULESOFEVIDENCEFORTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTSANDMAGISTRATES106-2.1(JackB.Weinstein&MargaretA.Bergereds.,1992)[hereinafterWEINSTEIN](“Americantrialpracticehastraditionallygiveneachsidefreedomtopresenttheevidencefavoringhissidealone.”). 15. FED.R.EVID.103 (requiringa timelyobjection toanadversary’sevidence);FED.R.EVID.611(b)(limitingcross-examinationthatisoutsidethesubjectmatterofthedirectexamination). 16. SeeBLINKA,supranote1. 17. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Castro,813F.2d571,575–76(2dCir.1987)(allowingcompletiononlywhennecessary“toexplainthe[partialstatement],toplace[partialstatements] incontext, toavoidmisleading the jury,or toensure fairand impartialunderstanding”). 18. 4 JOHNHENRYWIGMORE, ATREATISE ON THEANGLO-AMERICANSYSTEM OFEVI-DENCEINTRIALSATCOMMONLAW§2094(2ded.1923)(describingthefamousseven-teenthcenturyEnglish trialofAlgernonSidney for seditionand illustrating the im-portanceofcompleteness).


wasconvictedformurderafterheshothismistress.19TheSupremeCourtreversedhisconvictionduetoanumberoferrors,includingre-fusaltoallowthedefendant’switnessestotestifytowhatwassaidbe-tweenthedefendantandhismistressatthesceneofthecrime—aftergovernmentwitnesseswerepermittedtotestifytoapartofthesameconversation.Infindingerror,theCourtnoted:

Ifitwerecompetentforonepartytoprovethisconversation,itwasequallycompetent for the other party to prove their version of it.... [W]here thewholeorapartofaconversationhasbeenputinevidencebyoneparty,theotherpartyisentitledtoexplain,vary,orcontradictit.20New York’s Field Codemarked the first attempt to codify the

broadcommonlawcompletenessdoctrinein1850,asfollows:Whenpartofanact,declaration,conversationorwritingisgiveninevidenceby oneparty, thewhole on the same subjectmaybe inquired into by theother;whenaletterisread,theanswermaybegiven;andwhenadetachedact,declaration,conversationorwritingisgiveninevidence,anyotheract,declaration, conversationorwriting,which isnecessary tomake itunder-stood,mayalsobegiveninevidence.21Thisversionof theprincipleofcompletenesswasquiteexpan-

sive,encompassingthepartialpresentationof“acts,”aswellasutter-ances,andsuggestingthatapartymaynotmakepartialpresentationsatall.Thisbroadformulationofthecompletiondoctrinesuggeststhat“thewholeonthesamesubject”maybeinquiredintobyanadversarywheneverapartofastatementoreventispresented.22

Later,DeanWigmorewouldcharacterizethedoctrinemorenar-rowlyasoneof“verbalcompleteness”requiringthatthewholeofa“verbalutterance”onasingletopicortransactionbetakentogether.23Wigmorejustifiedtheexclusionofactsandoccurrencesfromthedoc-trineofcompletenessonthegroundsthat,interalia,actsarerarelyso“inseparablyunited” thatpresentationofasingleactoroccurrence

19. Carverv.UnitedStates,164U.S.694,694–95(1897). 20. Id.at696–97(emphasisadded);seealsoStevensonv.UnitedStates,86F.106,111(5thCir.1898)(citing1BISH.CR.PROC.§1241;Carver,164U.S.at696)(explainingthatitis“elementary”that“[w]hereonepartofaconversationisintroduced,theotherpartyisentitledtoallthatrelatestothesamesubject,andallthatmaybenecessarytofullyunderstandtheportiongiven”);Jacksonv.State,60Ga.App.142(1939)(same). 21. 21ACHARLESALANWRIGHT,ARTHURR.MILLER&KENNETHW.GRAHAM,JR.,FED-ERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE:EVIDENCE§5071(2ded.2020)(quotingN.Y.COMM’RSONPRAC.&PLEADINGS,THECODEOFCIVILPROCEDUREOFTHESTATEOFNEWYORK§1687,at704–05(1850)). 22. Id.(e.g.,“whenaletterisread,theanswermaybegiven”). 23. 7JOHNHENRYWIGMORE,EVIDENCEINTRIALSATCOMMONLAW§2094,at594–95(revisedbyJamesH.Chadbourn,1978).Foranin-depthstudyofthe“complexityandconfusion”surroundingthecommonlawdoctrineofcompleteness,seeDaleA.Nance,ATheoryofVerbalCompleteness,80IOWAL.REV.825,829–60(1995).


wouldmisleadthefact-finderwithoutpresentationofothers.24Incon-trast,Wigmoreemphasizedthatverbalutterancesare“attemptstoex-pressideasinwords”andthatwordsmayeasilybedistortedbypre-senting them in a piecemeal fashion out of context.25 Wigmorecautionedthatonlyremaindersthatconcernthe“samesubjectmat-ter”andthatexplaintheinitiallyadmittedutteranceshouldbeadmit-tedforpurposesofcompletion.26

PriortotheenactmentoftheFederalRulesofEvidence(EvidenceRulesorRules),courtspermittedcompletionofbothwrittenandoralutterances,althoughtheyacknowledgedthepracticaldifficulties in-herentindeterminingthe“whole”ofanoralutterance.27Withrespecttowrittenutterances,checkingforverbalprecisionandcontextwasmaderelativelyeasyduetoawrittenrecordofthepreciseutterancesmade.28Inlightofthechallengesinherentinrequiringverbalpreci-sionandentiretyfororalutterances,courtstypicallyacceptedcom-pletionoforalstatementswhenneededtoprovidethetrue“substanceoreffect”ofaconversation.29Wigmoreconcludedthatdisputesabouttheaccuracyofawitness’srecollectionofanoralstatementconsti-tutedquestionsofcredibilityforthejury.30

With respect to the timingof completion,Wigmorearticulatedtwocategoriesofcompletion:“compulsory”and“optional.”31Compul-sorycompletenessrepresentedtherootofthemoderninterruptionruleandrequiredtheproponentofanutterancetopresentthecom-pletingportionofastatementduringher initialpresentation.32Op-tionalcompletenessontheotherhanddidnotmandatecompletionby

24. 7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2094,at594. 25. Id.at595. 26. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2113, at 508–09; see also 1 CHRISTOPHER B.MUELLER&LAIRDC.KIRKPATRICK,FEDERALEVIDENCE§1:42,at285(4thed.2013)(notingthat completion required a fact-specific inquiry and that courts considered factorssuchas “thenatureof thepartofastatement that is firstoffered, thenatureof thebalance,whooffersthestatement,whatitisofferedtoprove,andtheissuesinsuit”(citing7WIGMORE,EVIDENCE§2094(3ded.1940))). 27. SeeWEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-4to-5. 28. 7WIGMORE,supranote23,§§2102,2104. 29. Id. §2097,at608–09 (“Thegeneral rule,universallyaccepted, is thereforethatthesubstanceoreffectoftheactualwordsspokenwillsuffice,thewitnessstatingthissubstanceasbesthecanfromtheimpressionleftuponhismemory.Hemaygivehis‘understanding’or‘impression’astothenetmeaningofthewordsheard.”). 30. Id. (quoting Bathrick v. Detroit Post & Trib. Co., 16 N.W. 172, 175 (Mich.1883)). 31. Id.§2095,at607. 32. Id.(explainingthatcompulsorycompletenessmeansthataproponentofanutterance“canoffernopartunlessheoffersthewhole”).


theoriginalproponentofastatement,butratherpermittedtheoppo-nentoftheinitialstatementtopresentthecompletingremainderher-self,eitheroncross-examinationof thewitnesswhotestifiedtothepartialstatement,orlaterduringherowncase.33Althoughtherewassomeconflictinthecasesconcerningthepropertimingofcompletion,optionalcompletionofbothwrittenandoralstatementsbyanoppo-nent during cross-examination or her own casewas commonly al-lowed.34Incontrast,courtsweremorereluctanttorequire“interrup-tion” of a proponent’s case to complete partially presentedstatements,particularlyoralstatements.35Wigmoredefendedthisre-luctance,notingthatthe“whole”ofanoralconversationislessdistinctthantheentiretyofawrittendocument,andthatmultiplewitnessesmightbe required to convey theentiretyof anoral conversation—makingcompulsorycompletionduringtheproponent’scaseinchiefamoredifficultenterprise.36

Common-lawcourtsalsograppledwiththeissueofcompletingstatementsthatwereotherwiseinadmissible.Forexample,inRosen-bergv.Wittenborn,theplaintiffinanaccidentcaseelicitedfromapo-liceofficerthedefendant’sdamningadmissionsatthesceneoftheac-cidentthathislightwas“red”whenheenteredtheintersectionandthathewasgoingapproximately“30milesperhour.”37Whenthede-fensesoughttoasktheofficeroncrossaboutthedefendant’ssimulta-neous explanation that he went through the red light because hisbrakesfailed,theplaintiffraisedahearsayobjection.38TheCaliforniaCourtofAppeal foundthatcompletionwithotherwise inadmissiblehearsaywasnecessarytoprovideafairdepictionofthedefendant’sstatementsatthesceneoftheaccident:

Considerationsof fairplaydemanded that theportionof theconversationplaced in evidence by plaintiffs be supplemented by the qualifying and

33. Id.§2113,at653–54. 34. Id.§2099,at618(notingthe“copiousrulingsallowingtheopponentafter-wardstoputintheremainder”ofanoralutteranceand“theabsenceofrulingsrequir-ingtheproponenttoputinthewholeatfirst”);id.§2113,at653(“[T]hereisandcouldbenodifferenceofopinionastotheopponent’sright, ifapartonlyhasbeenputin,himselftoputintheremainder.Indeed,itistheveryfactofthislateropportunityandrightwhich ...has frequentbearingupon thequestionwhether it isworthwhile torequireitfromtheproponentinthefirstinstance.”). 35. Id.§2099,at618(explainingthatjudgesonlyrequiredaproponenttoadmitaremainderduringitsownpresentationinspecialcircumstances,suchaswhenpre-sentingformertestimony). 36. Id.at619. 37. Rosenbergv.Wittenborn,3Cal.Rptr.459,462(Dist.Ct.App.1960). 38. Id.


enlighteningportionsoftheconversationwhichgaveitaverydifferentcom-plexionthanthatwhichtheplaintiffs’segregatedpassagesbore.39Wigmorerecognizedthatremainderssuchasthisoneordinarily

wouldconstituteinadmissiblehearsayifofferedtoprovethetruthofthecompletingstatementandsuggestedthattheremaindershouldbeusedonlytogive“context”totheportionofthestatementalreadyad-mitted and shouldnot beused as substantive evidence.40 Butmostcommon-law courtsdisagreedwith this “context only” approach totheevidentiaryvalueofacompletingremainder.41Courtsfrequentlypermittedcompletionwithanotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaystate-mentwithoutlimitingthepurposeforwhichthecompletingremain-derwasadmitted.Somecourtswentsofarastocharacterizetherightto complete as supplying an “independent exception to the ruleagainsthearsay.”42

39. Id.at463;seealsoRokusv.CityofBridgeport,463A.2d252,256(Conn.1983)(explainingthatthetrialcourterredinexcludingonhearsaygroundsdefendant’scom-pletingstatementthathe“didnotsee”theplaintiffbecausetheplaintiff“raninfrontof[the]truck”justbeforetheaccident). 40. 7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2100,at626(“[T]hecomplementaryandexcul-patorypartoftheconfessionisputin,notastestimony,butmerelyasqualifyingtheeffectoftheconfessingportions....”).SomehavesuggestedthatWigmoreultimatelyexpressedsomedoubtonthisnon-hearsaytheoryofadmissibility.SeeNance,supranote23,at842–43,843n.57. 41. See7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2113,at660(“[I]tisnotuncommonforcourtstotreattheremainingutterance,thusputin,ashavingalegitimateassertiveandtes-timonialvalueofitsown—asif,havingoncegotin,itcouldbeusedforanypurposewhatever.”);Simmonsv.State,105So.2d691,694(Ala.Ct.App.1958)(“[Complete-ness]makesadmissibleself-servingstatementswhichotherwisewouldbeinadmissi-ble.”);Storerv.Gowen,18Me.174,176–77(1841)(arguingthatcompletingremain-ders “are equally evidence to the jury” as prior admitted statements); Michael A.Hardin,This Space IntentionallyLeftBlank:What toDoWhenHearsayandRule106CompletenessCollide,82FORDHAML.REV.1283,1299(2013)(notingthatthe“contextonly”approach“hasneverbeenuniversallyaccepted”(citingSimmons,105So.2dat694));WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5072.1(“[T]hemajorpurposeofthecommonlawcompletenessdoctrinewastoprovideanexceptiontothoserulesthatpreventedtheopponentfromshowinghowtheproponenthadmisledthejury.”). 42. Rokus,463A.2dat256;seealsoStevensonv.UnitedStates,86F.106,110–11(5thCir.1898)(“[W]hentheUnitedStatesprovedtheconversationsanddeclarationstheaccusedwasentitledtohavethefullconversationorconversationsgiveninevi-dence.”);CAL.L.REVISIONCOMM’N,TENTATIVERECOMMENDATIONANDASTUDYRELATINGTOTHEUNIFORMRULESOFEVIDENCE:ARTICLEVIII.HEARSAYEVIDENCE599(1962)(“Totheextentthatthissectionmakeshearsayadmissible,wemayregardthesectionasaspe-cialexceptiontothehearsayrule.”);Nance,supranote23,at839–40(explainingthatcourts routinely permitted the presentation of otherwise inadmissible evidence—mostcommonlyhearsayevidence—ifitwasnecessarytoofferacompletepictureofthefragmentedevidencealreadyintroduced).


With respect to confessionsof a criminaldefendant¾themostcommon context in which completeness issues arise today¾pre-Rulescourtsgenerallydemandedadmissionofanentireconfessionwhentheprosecutionsoughttousesomeportions.InUnitedStatesv.Wenzel,43 theFourthCircuitCourtofAppealsdescribedtherulere-gardingcompletionofadefendant’sconfessionasfollows:

Whenaconfessionisadmissible,thewholeofwhattheaccusedsaiduponthesubject at the time ofmaking the confession is admissible and should betakentogether;andiftheprosecutionfailstoprovethewholestatement,theaccusedisentitledtoputinevidenceallthatwassaidtoandbyhimatthetimewhichbearsuponthesubjectofcontroversyincludinganyexculpatoryorself-servingdeclarationsconnectedtherewith.44Insum,atcommonlaw,partieswerepermittedtocompleteboth

written and oral statements first presented in fragmented formbytheiradversaries.Whilethecourtsemployednumerouslinguisticfor-mulas to describe the circumstances in which completion was re-quired,courtsgenerallypermittedcompletiontopreventamislead-ingimpressionthatwouldbecreatedbytakingthefirstfragmentoutofcontext.45Courtswerecautiousaboutallowinganopponenttoin-terrupthisadversary’scasetorequirethepresentationofaremain-der,particularlywithoralstatements.46Morecommonly,courtsper-mitted an opponent to engage in “optional” completeness duringcross-examination of his adversary’s witnesses or during his owncase.47Finally,themajorityofcommonlawcourtsallowedthecom-pletionrightto“trump”otherevidentiaryrestrictionsandpermittedadmissionofcompletingremaindersthatwouldhavebeeninadmissi-ble had the proponent not introduced a partial, misleading state-ment.48

B. THEINCOMPLETERULEOFCOMPLETENESS:FEDERALRULEOFEVIDENCE106

WhentheFederalRulesofEvidencewereenacted,thedoctrineof completeness was addressed in Rule 106.49 Ironically, the Rule

43. UnitedStatesv.Wenzel,311F.2d164(4thCir.1962). 44. Id.at168(quoting20AM.JUR.§488,at425(1939)). 45. 7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2113,at653. 46. Id.§2099,at618. 47. Id.§2113,at653–54. 48. Nance,supranote23,at839–40. 49. Asoriginallyproposed,theruleofcompletenesswasRule107.SeeREVISEDDRAFTOFPROPOSEDRULESOFEVIDENCE,51F.R.D.315,329(1971).ItwasrenumberedRule106afteraproposedruleallowingatrialjudgetocommentontheevidencewasdeletedbyCongress.WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071.


ultimatelyadoptedtoaddresstheneedforafairandcompletepresen-tation of a thought or idea codified the common law conception of“completion” only partially or incompletely—an incomplete state-mentoftheruleofcompleteness.50Initscurrentform,Rule106reads:

Ifapartyintroducesallorpartofawritingorrecordedstatement,anadversepartymayrequiretheintroduction,atthattime,ofanyotherpart¾oranyotherwritingorrecordedstatement¾thatinfairnessoughttobeconsideredatthesametime.51Theprincipaladvancementofthecodificationwasthecreationof

arighttointerruptaproponent’spreferredpresentationofhiscasetorequirehimtointroducecompletinginformation“atthattime.”52TheAdvisoryCommitteeonEvidenceRules(AdvisoryCommitteeorCom-mittee)notedthattheprovisionwasbasedupontwoconsiderations:(1)“themisleadingimpressioncreatedbytakingmattersoutofcon-text,”and(2)“theinadequacyofrepairworkwhendelayedtoalaterpointinthetrial.”53Requiringimmediatecompletionaddressesmul-tiple concerns, such as a jury’s genuine inability to reconsider ataintedviewofthecasecreatedbyanearlierpartialpresentation,aswellastheinherentbenefitsofconsideringrelatedinformationholis-ticallyratherthanpiecemeal.54

Unlikethecommonlawrule,Rule106waslimitedto“writing[s]”and “recorded statement[s],” thus omitting oral unrecorded state-mentsfromitscoverage.Althoughtheearliestdraftofthecomplete-nessruleincludedarighttocomplete“conversations,”thefinaldraftofRule106omittedoralstatementsfor“practicalreasons.”55Injusti-ficationoftheexclusion,theReporterfortheAdvisoryCommitteesug-gestedthatoralstatementsweredeletedbecause“thegeneraloutlineofaconversationislessdefinitethandocumentaryevidenceandex-plorationofwhatinfairnessoughttobeconsideredwithrespecttoa

50. SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(providingthattheruleis“anexpressionoftheruleofcompleteness”). 51. FED.R.EVID. 106.The rulewasgender-neutralized in1987and restyled in2011,butithasnotbeensubstantivelyalteredsinceitsadoption.SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snotesto1987and2011amendments. 52. FED.R.EVID.106. 53. FED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote. 54. SeeWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5072.1;Nance,supranote23,at868(“Notonlydoweworrythatthemisimpressioncannotbecorrectedbydelayedresponse,butalsoweseenogoodreasontoimposetheadditionalburdenonthetrierof factnecessarytomaketheconnection.”). 55. FED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(“Forpracticalreasons,theruleislimitedtowritingsandrecordedstatementsanddoesnotapplytoconversations.”).ForthelanguageoftheoriginaldraftofthecompletenessRule1-10,seeWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071.


conversationislikelytoinvolveamorediscursiveandtime-consum-inginquiry.”56TheAdvisoryCommittee’snotetoRule106cautionedthat“[t]heruledoesnotinanywaycircumscribetherightofthead-versarytodevelopthematteroncross-examinationoraspartofhisowncase,” signaling that common lawprotectionsapplicable to in-completeoralstatementssurvivedthecodification.57

Indefiningtheelusivecircumstancesinwhichcompletionisre-quired, the Advisory Committee rejected an expansive “relevance”standardandchosethelanguageof“fairness”fromthemanycommonlawdescriptorsused to limitcompletion.58TheCommitteeselectedthe“fairness”standardbecause itmirroredthe languageofFederalRuleofCivilProcedure32,whichalreadypermittedcompletionofse-lectedportionsofdepositionsusedattrial.59Duringthedraftingpro-cess,theDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)objectedtothe“fairness”stand-ard, complaining that it was “vague,” failed to provide “necessaryguidance,”andcould“beutilizedtousurpthefunctionofcross-exam-inationbypermittingonepartytodisrupttheorderlypresentationofevidencebytheotherbymovingintoevidence,underaclaimoffair-ness,otherdocumentswhichproperlyshouldbeadmittedonlyinitsowncase.”60TheDOJproposedlanguageforRule106thatwouldhavepermitted contemporaneous completion only with portions of the“samedocument”onthe“samesubjectmatter.”61TheAdvisoryCom-mittee,theJudicialConference,andtheSupremeCourtallrejectedtheDOJ’sproposalandproceededwiththe“fairness”limitonthecomple-tionright.62

56. WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,670(D.Md.2017)(notingthatthe“practicalreasons”forexcludingoralconversationsfromRule106“undoubtedlyincludetheneedtoavoid‘hesaid,shesaid’disputesaboutthecontentofanunrecordedorunwrittenstatement”). 57. FED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote. 58. WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071(notingthatearliestdraftofcomplete-nessrulewasanexpansiveonethatutilizedarelevancestandard). 59. SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(“[Rule106]ismanifestedastodepositionsinRule32(a)(4)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,ofwhichtheproposedruleissubstantiallyarestatement.”). 60. WEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-7n.12;seealsoWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071(detailingaletterfromDeputyAttorneyGeneralRichardKleindiensttoChiefJusticeWarrenBurger). 61. Apparently,“severalpowerfulSenators”threatened“thatfailuretoaccedetothe[Justice]Department’sdemandsmightendangertheSupremeCourt’srulemakingpower.”WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071;seeDaniel J.Capra&LiesaL.Richter,PoetryinMotion:TheFederalRulesofEvidenceandForwardProgressasanImperative,99B.U.L.REV.1873,1910(2019)(describingDOJeffortstoinfluencerulemakingpro-posalsthroughthreatsofcongressionalinvolvement). 62. FED.R.EVID.106.


Rule106wasmysteriouslysilentastotheadmissibilityofcom-pleting remainders that would otherwise constitute inadmissiblehearsay.Heretoo,theDOJattemptedtolimitcompletingevidencetothat which would be “otherwise admissible,” thereby allowing thehearsayprohibitiontodefeatcompletion.63TheDOJformallysoughtthismodification ina letter to theChairmanof theSenate JudiciaryCommittee,buttheCommitteemadenochangetotheRule, leavingRule106textuallyambiguousonthiscrucialpoint.64

***Insum,FederalRuleofEvidence106codifiedonlywhatwasrec-

ognizedas“compulsory”orimmediatecompletionofwrittenandrec-ordedstatementsatcommonlaw.TheRuleomittedoralstatementsfrom the interruption rule, making compulsory completion of oralstatementsunavailable,butemphasizedinAdvisoryCommitteenotesthatoptionalcompletionoforalstatementsbyanopponentwouldstillbepermissible.Importantly,thelanguageofRule106maintainedsi-lencewithrespect to theuseofotherwise inadmissibleevidencetocomplete.

II.ANEVER-ENDINGSTORY:CONFLICTINTHEFEDERALCOURTSREGARDINGRULE106

SincetheenactmentofRule106,thefederalcasesinterpretingithave revealed a conflicting narrative. On the one hand, the federalcourtshavepresentedaunitedfrontintakingauniformlyrestrictiveviewofthe“fairness”standardjustifyingcompletionundertheRule.65

63. WRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071(explainingthattheDOJsoughttoaddlanguagetotherulerequiringacompletingremaindertobe“otherwiseadmissible”orforwhichaproperfoundationislaid). 64. Id.§5078.1. 65. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44,61(2dCir.2019)(holdingthatcompletionwasnotrequiredbecausethedefendant’sinitialexculpatorystatementsdidnotmakehissubsequentconfessionmisleading);UnitedStatesv.Hird,901F.3d196,217(3dCir.2018)(holdingthatportionsofthedefendant’sgrandjurytestimonywerenotadmissibletocompleteotherexcerptspresentedbythegovernmentbecausetheywere“unrelatedintheoverallsequenceofquestionsandtotheanswers”alreadypresented);UnitedStatesv.Dotson,715F.3d576,583(6thCir.2013)(holdingthatthedefendant’sstatementsthathehadaroughupbringing,hadbeensexuallyabusedasachild,andwasconcernedthat thevictimknewhewasexploitingherwerenotadmissibletocompletehiscontemporaneousadmissiontomakingvideosandphotosof a minor victim in a child pornography and exploitation case); United States v.Branch,91F.3d699,731(5thCir.1996)(holdingthatthedefendant’sstatementdeny-ingthathefiredaweaponataWacocompoundwasnotadmissibletocompletehisadmissiontodonningbattledressandpickingupgunswhenhesawATFagentsap-proaching;theprosecutionwasforusingorcarryingafirearmduringacrimeofvio-lence).


Onlywhen theportionof a statement initially introducedcreatesadistortedandmisleadingimpressionaboutthestatementitselfhavefederalcourtshonoredcallsforcompleteness.66TheD.C.CircuitCourtofAppealsaccuratelycapturedthetenorofRule106precedentwhenitstatedthat“[i]nalmostallcaseswethinkRule106willbeinvokedrarelyandforalimitedpurpose.”67Thisnarrowinterpretationofthetriggerforthecompletionrightisentirelyappropriateandshouldnotbealtered.

Withrespecttoalmosteveryotherinterpretiveissuearisingun-derRule106,however,thefederalcasesaremarkedbyconflict,con-fusion,andmixedmessages.Mostimportantly,Rule106isplaguedbyquestionsconcerning:(1)theadmissibilityofcompletingstatementsthatarehearsay,and(2) theadmissibilityofcompletingoral state-mentsnotcoveredbytheRule.

A. THECOMPLICATEDRELATIONSHIPBETWEENCOMPLETENESSANDTHEHEARSAYRULE

Thefederalcourtshavegrappledwiththeproblemofcompletingstatementsthatareotherwiseinadmissibleduetothebanonhearsayevidence.Somecircuitspermittheadmissionofotherwiseinadmissi-blehearsaythroughthedoctrineofcompletionwhenitisnecessarytopreventadistorted impressioncreatedbyapreviouslyadmittedportionofthesamestatement.Othercircuitsrejectcompletionwithotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayaltogether,allowingadistortedviewoftheevidencetogouncorrected.Stillotherspermittheadmissionofacompletingstatementoverahearsayobjection,butonlyforits“non-hearsayvalue”inprovidingcontextfortheoriginalpartialstatementandnotforthetruthoftheremainder.Addingtotheconfusion,there

66. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Haddad,10F.3d1252,1258(7thCir.1993)(holdingthat,inafelonfirearmpossessioncase,prosecution’spresentationofaportionofthedefendant’sstatementadmittingknowledgeofmarijuanafoundnearaweaponmis-leadinglysuggestedknowledgeof thenearbyfirearm;thedefendant’ssimultaneousdenialofknowledgeof thegunwas required to complete);UnitedStatesv.Castro-Cabrera,534F.Supp.2d1156,1159(C.D.Cal.2008)(admittingonlythedefendant’ssecondanswertoquestionabouthiscitizenshipinwhichhestated,“IguessMexicountilmymotherfilesapetition”misrepresentedthetenorofhistestimonybecausehestated“[h]opefullyUnitedStatesthroughmymother”immediatelypriortomakingtheadmittedstatement). 67. UnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1369(D.C.Cir.1986);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,668(D.Md.2017)(“Rule106shouldnevercomeintoplayunlessmisleadingevidencehasbeenintroducedthatrequiresclarificationorexplanation—otherwisethereisnounfairnessthatneedscorrection.”).


aresomefederalcircuitswithinwhichatrialjudgecanfindsupportformorethanoneoftheseapproaches.68

1. CompletionasaTrumpCardManyfederalcourtshaveheldthatthe“fairness”standardincor-

poratedinRule106requirestheadmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaywhenit isnecessarytopreventadistortedimpressionofapreviouslyadmittedpartialstatement.Thewell-reasonedopinionoftheD.C.CircuitCourtofAppealsinUnitedStatesv.Suttonreflectsthisview.69

InSutton,adefendantwasconvicted inconnectionwithacon-spiracytobribefederalofficials.70Attrial,thegovernmentintroducedselectportionsofrecordedconversationsbetweenthedefendantandanallegedcoconspirator.AccordingtotheD.C.Circuit,theportionsoftheconversationsintroducedbythegovernmentincriminatedthede-fendantbecausetheycreatedtheimpressionthathewasafraidthatcertainindividualswouldrevealhisroleintheconspiracy:“Inshort,thegovernment’sevidencetendedtoshowSucher’sconsciousnessofguilt.”71Thedefendantclaimedthatthestatementspresentedbythegovernmentdidnotsuggesthiscriminalintentwhenviewedalong-side other statements hemade in the same recording which wereomittedfromthegovernment’spresentation.ThedefendantsoughttohavethesestatementsadmittedthroughRule106todemonstratethatthetruetenorofhisrecordedconversationssuggestednotthathewasguilty,butratherthathewasafraidoffalsehoodsthatcertainindivid-ualsmighttellthegovernment.Thetrialcourtsustainedthegovern-ment’shearsayobjectionwhenthedefendantattemptedtoadmithisowncompletingstatementsandthedefendantappealed.72

TheD.C.Circuitprovidedfiveimportantreasonsforallowingtheadmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayinthenameofcomplete-ness.First,thecourtpointedtotheplacementofRule106withintheEvidenceRulesscheme:

ThestructureoftheFederalRulesofEvidenceindicatesthatRule106iscon-cernedwithmorethanmerelytheorderofproof.Rule106isfoundnotin

68. CompareUnitedStatesv.Gravely,840F.2d1156,1163(4thCir.1988)(find-ingacompletingstatementwasproperlyadmittedunderRule106overahearsayob-jection),withUnitedStatesv.Hassan,742F.3d104,135(4thCir.2014)(holdingthatdefendant’s web postings were not admissible under Rule 106 because they werehearsay). 69. Sutton,801F.2d1346. 70. Id. 71. Id.at1367. 72. Id.at1346.


Rule611,whichgovernsthe“ModeandOrderofInterrogationandPresen-tation,”butinArticleI,whichcontainsrulesthatgenerallyrestricttheman-nerofapplyingtheexclusionaryrules.73Second,thecourthighlightedRule106’somissionoftheproviso

commonlyfoundinevidentiaryprovisionsintendedtobelimitedbyother exclusionary principles: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided bythese rules.”74 Had the drafters intended to limit the admission ofhearsay throughRule106, thecourt reasoned, theywouldhave in-cludedthis familiarclause.Third, thecourtreferencedtheDOJ’sef-fortstodefeattheadmissibilityofhearsaybyproposingtheadditionofthisexactproviso—andtheultimaterejectionofthisDOJrequest.75Fourth,thecourtnotedthatRule106waspatternedaftertheCalifor-niaruleofcompleteness,andthattheCaliforniarulewasknowntoallowforadmissibilityofhearsay.76Fifthandmost importantly, theSuttoncourtconcludedasamatterofpolicythatRule106canfulfillitspromiseof“fairness”onlyifitpermitstheadmissionofsomehear-saythatwouldhavebeeninadmissiblebutfortheneedtocomplete:“Acontraryconstructionraisesthespecterofdistortedandmislead-ing trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trialcourt.”77

TheSeventhCircuitinUnitedStatesv.Haddadechoedthesenti-mentsof theSutton court inholding thatadefendant’sexculpatorystatementsshouldhavebeenadmittedinthenameofcompleteness.78Inthatcase,thedefendantwaschargedwithbeingafelonknowinglyin possession of “one Intratec TEC–9, 9millimeter, semi-automaticpistol”afteritwasfoundinhisapartmentduringtheexecutionofasearchwarrant.79Duringtheexecutionofthesearchwarrant,thede-fendant admitted to a local police officer that themarijuana foundnearthepistolbelongedtohim,butdeniedanyknowledgeofthegun.Attrial,theofficertestifiedaboutthedefendant’sadmissiontopos-sessingthenearbymarijuana, toshowthatthedefendantknewthegunwasthereifheknewthenearbydrugswerethere.Thetrialcourtsustainedaprosecutionhearsayobjectionwhenthedefensesoughttoask about the remainder of the statement expressly disavowingknowledgeofthepistol.

73. Id.at1368. 74. Id. 75. Id.at1368n.17. 76. Id. 77. Id.at1368. 78. UnitedStatesv.Haddad,10F.3d1252,1258(7thCir.1993). 79. Id.at1254.


Thedefensearguedthattheexculpatorystatementwas“partandparcel”ofthestatementintroducedbytheprosecution,andtheSev-enthCircuitagreed.Thecourtheldthatcompletionwasrequired,overahearsayobjection,becausetheremainderwasnecessarytodispelamisleadinginferencecreatedbythegovernment’sportionofthestate-ment:

The defendant in effect said “Yes, I knew of the marijuana but I had noknowledgeof thegun.”Theadmissionof the inculpatoryportiononly (i.e.thatheknewofthelocationofthemarijuana)mightsuggest,absentmore,thatthedefendantalsoknewofthegun.Thewholestatementshouldbead-mittedintheinterestofcompletenessandcontext,toavoidmisleadinginfer-ences,andtohelpinsureafairandimpartialunderstandingoftheevidence.80OthercircuitcourtshavesimilarlyinterpretedRule106toactas

atrumpcardinthefaceofahearsayobjection.InUnitedStatesv.Bucci,theFirstCircuitstatedthat“caselawunambiguouslyestablishesthattheruleofcompletenessmaybeinvokedtofacilitatetheintroductionofotherwiseinadmissibleevidence.”81AndinUnitedStatesv.Gravely,theFourthCircuitrejectedadefensehearsayobjectionwhenthegov-ernmentsoughttocompletewithportionsofthegrandjurytestimonyofawitness.82Thecourtreasoned:

Thecross-designatedportions,whileperhapsnotadmissiblestandingalone,areadmissibleasaremainderofarecordedstatement.Fed.R.Evid.106al-lowsanadversepartytointroduceanyotherpartofawritingorrecordedstatementwhichoughtinfairnesstobeconsideredcontemporaneously.Therulesimplyspeakstotheobviousnotionthatpartiesshouldnotbeabletoliftselectedportionsoutofcontext.83Thus,severalcircuitshaveheld,consistentwiththecommonlaw

approachtocompleteness,thatotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaymaybeadmittedthroughRule106ifnecessarytopreventdistortionofastatementandtoensurefairness.

2. TheHearsayRuleasaBarriertoFairnessThereisaclearsplitofauthorityregardingRule106,however,as

severalcircuitopinionshaverefusedtopermitcompletingevidenceoverahearsayobjection.TheSixthCircuitopinioninUnitedStatesv.Adamsrepresentsaclassicexampleoftheunfairnessperpetuatedby

80. Id.at1259. 81. UnitedStatesv.Bucci,525F.3d116,133(1stCir.2008);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Harry,816F.3d1268,1279–80(10thCir.2016)(notingthatthefairnessprincipleofRule106“canoverridetheruleexcludinghearsay”butfindingthatfairnessdidnotrequirecompletionintheinstantcase). 82. UnitedStatesv.Gravely,840F.2d1156,1163(4thCir.1988). 83. Id.(citingUnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1366–69(D.C.Cir.1986)).


thisinterpretationofRule106.84Inthatcase,astatecourtjudgewasaccused of conspiring to buy votes and of helping appoint corruptmembersoftheClayCountyBoardofElections.85Attrial,thegovern-mentpresentedportionsofaphonerecordinginwhichacooperatingwitness, aMs.White, told the judge about questions she had beenaskedduringhergrandjurytestimony.Whitetoldthejudgethatshehad been asked whether he had appointed her as an election of-ficer.Thejudgeresponded,“[d]idIappointyou?([l]augh),”andWhitesaid“[y]eah,”andthejudgethensaid,“Idon’treallyhaveanyauthor-itytoappointanybody.”86Thelaststatementwasredactedfromthegovernment’spresentation,leavingthejurywiththeimpressionthatthe defendant had adopted the accusation that he had appointedWhite. When the defendant sought to complete the government’spresentation under Rule 106with his contemporaneous statementthathedidn’thaveauthoritytomaketheappointment,thetrialcourtexcludeditashearsay.

Remarkably,theSixthCircuitfoundthatthegovernmenthadpre-sentedtheevidenceunfairlybutheldthatnothingcouldbedoneaboutit:

Defendantsclaimthat“byseverelycroppingthetranscripts,thegovernmentsignificantly altered themeaning of what [defendants] actually said.”Alt-houghweagreethattheseexampleshighlightthegovernment’sunfairpresen-tationoftheevidence,thiscourt’sbaragainstadmittinghearsayunderRule106leavesdefendantswithoutredress.87Troubledbythisresult,theAdamspanelstatedthat“shouldthis

courtsittingenbancaddresswhetherRule106requiresthattheotherevidencebeotherwiseadmissible,itmightconsider”alltheauthori-tiesthathavecriticizedtherulethatallowsthegovernmenttoadmitamisleadingportionandthenobjectonhearsaygroundstoaneces-sarycompletion.88

84. UnitedStatesv.Adams,722F.3d788(6thCir.2013). 85. Id.at798. 86. Id.at827. 87. Id.at827(emphasisadded)(citationomitted);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Wan-dahsega,924F.3d868,883(6thCir.2019)(“[Rule106]doesnottransforminadmis-siblehearsayintoadmissibleevidence.”);UnitedStatesv.Costner,684F.2d370,373(6thCir.1982)(“Therulecoversanorderofproofproblem;itisnotdesignedtomakesomethingadmissiblethatshouldbeexcluded.”). 88. Adams,722F.3dat826n.31.TheauthoritiescitedbytheAdamscourtwere:STEPHENA.SALTZBURG,MICHAELA.MARTIN&DANIELJ.CAPRA.,1-106FEDERALRULESOFEVIDENCEMANUAL§106.02;CHARLESALANWRIGHT,ARTHURR.MILLER&KENNETHW.GRA-HAM,JR.,21AFEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE§5078.1(2ded.2012);Nance,supranote23;UnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1368(D.C.Cir.1986).


Similarly,inUnitedStatesv.Hassan,thedefendantwaschargedwithseveraloffensesarisingfromterrorismactivities.89Attrial,theprosecutionadmitteda“trainingvideo”postedonlinebythedefend-antdepictinghimperformingaseriesofphysicalfitnessworkoutsandaccompaniedbyanArabicphrase,animageofanassaultrifle,andref-erences to “strong Muslim[s].”90 The trial court refused to requirecompletionwithcommentsthedefendantpostedsuggestingthathedid“notsupportterrorists.”91Onappeal,theFourthCircuitaffirmed,noting that Rule 106 “does not ‘render admissible the ... evidencewhichisotherwiseinadmissibleunderthehearsayrules.’”92There-fusaltopermitcompletionwithotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaynotonlyconflictswithothercircuitsthatpermitthecompletionrighttotrump a hearsay objection, it is also in apparent conflict with theGravelyopiniondiscussedabove¾alsointheFourthCircuit¾whichallowed the prosecution to complete with otherwise inadmissiblegrandjurytestimony.93

3. AFairnessHalf-MeasureFinally,somecourtshaveaddressedotherwiseinadmissiblere-

maindersbydrawinguponthetime-honoredhearsaytenetthatstate-mentsarenothearsayatallwhentheyarenotofferedforthetruthofthe matters they assert.94 This approach posits that a completing

89. UnitedStatesv.Hassan,742F.3d104(4thCir.2014). 90. Id.at134. 91. Id. 92. Id. (quotingUnitedStatesv.Lentz,524F.3d501,526(4thCir.2008)).Thecourtalsoexpresseddoubtthatthejurywasmisledorconfusedbytheexclusionoftheexculpatoryposts.Id.at135;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Hayat,710F.3d875,896(9thCir.2013)(“Rule106‘doesnotcompeladmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayevi-dence.’” (quoting United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996), asamended(Oct.21,1996)));UnitedStatesv.Vargas,689F.3d867,876(7thCir.2012)(“[A]partycannotusethedoctrineofcompletenesstocircumventRule803’sexclusionofhearsaytestimony.”);Collicott,92F.3dat983(“BecauseZaidi’sout-of-courtstate-mentstoKehldonotfallwithinanexceptiontothehearsayrule,theyareinadmissible,regardlessofRule106.”);U.S.FootballLeaguev.Nat’lFootballLeague,842F.2d1335,1375–76(2dCir.1988)(“Thedoctrineofcompleteness,Fed.R.Evid.106,doesnotcompeladmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayevidence.”);UnitedStatesv.Cis-neros,2018WL3702497,at11(C.D.Cal.July30,2018)(“IftheCourtadmitteddefend-ant’sexculpatorystatementsattrial,he‘wouldhavebeenabletoplacehisexculpatorystatements “before the jurywithout subjecting [himself] to cross-examination, pre-ciselywhatthehearsayruleforbids.”’”(quotingUnitedStatesv.Ortega,203F.3d675,682(9thCir.2000))). 93. SeeUnitedStatesv.Gravely,840F.2d1156,1163(4thCir.1988). 94. FED.R.EVID.801(c)(2)(defininghearsayasastatementthat“apartyoffersinevidencetoprovethetruthofthematterasserted”).


statementneednotbeadmittedforitstruthtodispelanymisconcep-tioncreatedbytheinitialselectivepresentationofthestatement.Un-derthisview,thecompletingremaindermaybeadmittedoverahear-sayobjection,butonlyforitsnon-hearsayvalueinproviding“context”forthemisleadingportion.

This“context”approachcanbetracedtoWigmore’sinterpreta-tionofcompletionatcommonlaw.Althoughheexpressedaminorityviewon this point,Wigmore suggested that completing statementsshouldnotbeadmittedfortheirtruth:“[T]hecomplementaryandex-culpatorypartoftheconfessionisputin,notastestimony,butmerelyasqualifyingtheeffectoftheconfessingportions.”95Somesupportfortheadmissionofcompletingremaindersfortheirnon-hearsayvalueinshowingcontextmayalsobefoundindictaintheSupremeCourt’sdecision inBeechAircraft Corp. v. Rainey¾the only SupremeCourtopiniontoaddressthecompletionprinciplesincetheadoptionofRule106.96

InBeechAircraft,thehusbandofadeceasednavypilotsuedthemanufacturer of an aircraft that crashed during training exercises,killinghiswifeandastudentpilot.Attrial,thehusband’stheorywasthata fuel flowmalfunctioncausedtheplaneto loseenginepower,leadingtothefatalcrash.Thehusbanddidnottestifyduringhisowncase,buthewascalledasanadversewitnessbythedefense.Duringitshostiledirect,thedefenseaskedthehusband¾whowasalsoanavypilot¾aboutareporthehadsenttothenavycommanderinvestigat-ingthecrashshortlyaftertheaccident.Althoughthefullreportcon-taineddetailedanalysisoftheaccidentdemonstratingapowerfailureastheprimarycauseofthecrash,thedefenseaskedthehusbandonlyabouttwostatementsinthereportsuggestingthathiswifeattemptedtocanceltheill-fatedtrainingflightduetothefatigueofherstudentpilot and acknowledging that the plane violated its flight patternshortlybeforethecrash.Thehusband’scounselsoughttoaskhimoncross-examination whether the same report also concluded thatpowerfailurecausedthecrash.Thedefensepromptlyobjectedtotheadmission of other parts of the husband’s report¾not on hearsaygroundsbutasinadmissible“opinion”—andthetrialcourtsustainedtheobjectionandpreventedthehusband’scounselfromdemonstrat-ingthetruetenorofthereport.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court hadabuseditsdiscretion,findingthatRule106permittedthehusbandto

95. 7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2100,at626;seealsosupranote41. 96. BeechAircraftCorp.v.Rainey,488U.S.153,171(1988).


offercompletinginformationaboutthereport“whichwouldhaveputincontexttheadmissionselicitedfromhimondirect.”97AlthoughthepartiesbriefedtheapplicationofRule106intheSupremeCourt,theCourtexpresslydeclinedtoruleonthescopeandmeaningofthatpro-vision.Instead,theCourtheldthat“generalrulesofrelevancy”pro-videda“readyresolution”ofthecase.98TheCourtnotedthat,whenonepartycreatesadistortedimpressionbypresentingaportionofadocument, thematerial required todispel thedistortion is relevantand admissible through Rules 401 and 402.99 The Supreme Courtagreedthatthetrialjudgehaderredwhenherefusedtoallowthehus-band’scounseltoinquireabouttheconclusionofthereport,findingthatthejurywasgivena“distortedandprejudicial”viewofthereportthat suggested that the husband found the accident to have beencausedbypiloterroranddevelopedthetheoryofpowerfailurelatersolelyforpurposesoflitigation.100

Indictainafootnote,theBeechAircraftCourtaddressedthehear-sayconcernraisedbytheadmissionofcompletingout-of-courtstate-ments.101TheCourtstatedthat,hadthedefenseraisedahearsayob-jectiontothecompletingportionofthehusband’sreport(whichitdidnot), that objectionwouldnot havedefeated admissibility, becausethehusband’sstatementaboutpowerfailure inhisreportwas“notoffered‘toprovethetruthofthematterasserted.’”102Instead,itwasoffered“simplytoprovewhat[thehusband]hadsaidabouttheacci-dent...andtocontributetoafullerunderstandingofthematerialthedefensehadalreadyplacedinevidence.”103Thus,whiletheBeechAir-craftopinionsuggestedanon-hearsayresolutionoftheissueofcom-pletingout-of-courtstatements,itdidsoonlyindictadiscussingahy-potheticaltrialobjectionthatwasneverraisedandinanopinionthatdeclinedtoapplyorinterpretRule106.

ArecentopinionbytheSecondCircuitechoesBeechAircraft insuggestinga“contextonly”non-hearsayapproachtocompletingout-of-court statements, but againonly indicta. InUnitedStates v.Wil-liams,thedefendantwasconvictedofbeingafeloninpossessionofafirearmafterofficersfoundaloadedfirearmintheconsoleofarental

97. Id.at153–54. 98. Id.at172. 99. SeeFED.R.EVID.401,402. 100. BeechAircraft,488U.S.at170. 101. Id.at173n.18. 102. Id.(quotingFED.R.EVID.801(c)). 103. Id.


carhewasdriving.104Whenconfrontedwiththefactthatofficershadfoundaweapon,thedefendantinitiallydeniedknowledgeofthegunandclaimedtohavebeenreturningtherentalcar.Later,headmittedtoofficersthatthefirearmbelongedtohimandsignedaswornstate-mentinwhichheconfessedtopossessingit.Attrial,onlytheconfes-sionwasadmitteddespitethedefendant’seffortstoofferhisearlierexculpatorystatementunderthedoctrineofcompletion.

Onappeal,theSecondCircuitacknowledgedadefendant’srighttooffercompletingstatementsnecessarytocorrectamisimpressioncreatedbythemisleadinguseofastatement,butheldthatthedefend-ant’sinitialself-servingexculpatorystatementinnowayexplainedormodifiedhissubsequentconfession:“[T]heruleofcompletenessdoesnotrequiretheadmissionofself-servingexculpatorystatementsinallcircumstances,andthemerefactthatasuspectdeniesguiltbeforead-mitting it, does not—withoutmore—mandate the admission of hisself-servingdenial.”105Thecourtwentontoexplainthat“whentheomittedportionofastatementisproperlyintroducedtocorrectamis-leadingimpressionorplaceincontextthatportionalreadyadmitted,itisforthisveryreasonadmissibleforavalid,nonhearsaypurpose:toexplainandensurethefairunderstandingoftheevidencethathasal-readybeenintroduced.”106Butthishearsaydiscussionwasdictumbe-cause thecourt found that thedefendant’s confessionwasnotmis-leading,andthathisexculpatorydenialwasthereforeunnecessarytocomplete.

UnlikeWilliams,otherfederalopinionsobliquelynotethathear-saymaybeadmittedunderthedoctrineofcompletiontoplaceadmit-tedstatements“incontext,”withoutexpresslyexplainingwhetherthecompletingstatementsmaybeofferedfortheirtruthoronlyfortheirnon-hearsay value.107 Courts that allow admission to show context

104. UnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44(2dCir.2019). 105. Id.at61(citationsomitted). 106. Id.at60;seealsoUnitedStatesv.LeFevour,798F.2d977,981(7thCir.1986)(“Ifotherwiseinadmissibleevidenceisnecessarytocorrectamisleadingimpression,theneitheritisadmissibleforthislimitedpurposebyforceofRule106...or,ifitisinadmissible(maybebecauseofprivilege),themisleadingevidencemustbeexcludedtoo.”);WEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-20to-21(“[I]tcanbearguedthatiftheotheractorwritingismerelyusedtomaketheonegiveninevidenceunderstood,itisnothearsaybecauseitisnot‘offeredinevidencetoprovethetruthofthematterasserted.’”(quotingFED.R.EVID.801(c))). 107. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Johnson,507F.3d793,796(2dCir.2007)(“[E]venthoughastatementmaybehearsay,an ‘omittedportionof[the]statementmustbeplacedinevidenceifnecessarytoexplaintheadmittedportion,toplacetheadmittedportion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial


mightbesuggestingthenon-hearsaysolutiondiscussedbyWilliamsbecause“context” isclassicnon-hearsayvocabulary.108But itseemsmorelikelythatthecourtsreferringto“context”intheRule106arenaaresimplydescribingtheirrationale forallowingcompletion in thefirstplace.CompletionisallowedunderRule106onlywhennecessaryto provide proper context for a previously admitted statement.Whetherthecompletingstatementisthenadmissibleforitstruthpre-sentsaseparatequestion.Therefore,itseemsprobablethatmostfed-eralcourtsarenotstakingoutanypositionontheusetowhichcom-pletingstatementsmaybeputwhentheyemploy“context”language.SuchlanguageisbetterunderstoodasshorthandtoexpressthattheRule106standardissatisfiedandnotasalimitationontheuseofthecompletingstatementforitstruth.

***Thefederalcases,therefore,offerthreedistinctviewsofthein-

teractionbetween thehearsay ruleand thedoctrineof completion.SomeholdthatotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaymaybeofferedforitstruthunderRule106ifnecessarytopreventdistortioninthepartialpresentationofastatement.Othersexcludecompletingout-of-courtstatements in the faceofahearsayobjection,evenwhenneededtodispeldistortioncreatedbyapreviousselectivepresentation.Thisap-proachleavesmisleadingpartialstatementsuncorrected.Still,otherfederalcourtspermittheadmissionofcompletingout-of-courtstate-ments,butonlyfortheirnon-hearsaycontextualvalue.Andtherearecourtsthatappearnottohaveconfrontedhowthecompletingstate-mentmaybeusedafteritisadmitted.

B. THEPATCHWORKAPPROACHTOCOMPLETINGORALSTATEMENTSTheinterfacebetweenthehearsayruleandcompletionisnotthe

only interpretive conundrum created by the partial codification ofcompleteness in Rule 106. Federal courts have also struggledwithtrial requests to complete selectively presented oral state-ments¾statementsomittedfromRule106’scoverageof“writing[s]orrecordedstatement[s]”for“practicalreasons.”109Astheyhavewith

understandingoftheadmittedportion.’”(quotingUnitedStatesv.Castro,813F.2d571,575–76(2dCir.1987),cert.denied,484U.S.844(1987))). 108. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Barragan,871F.3d689,705(9thCir.2017)(“[T]heinformant’sstatementsonthetapeswerenothearsaybecause,asthecourtinstructedthejury,theywereofferedonlyforcontext,notfor‘thetruthofthematterasserted.’”(quotingFED.R.EVID.801(c)(2))). 109. FED.R.EVID.106&advisorycommittee’snote.


respecttothehearsayissue,federalcourtshaveadoptedvariousap-proachestothecompletionoforalstatements.

1. TheCommonLawLivesAfewfederalcourtshavefoundarighttocompletemisleadingly

presentedoralstatementsinthecommonlawthatremainsinthegapsleftbytheFederalRulesofEvidence.110Forexample,inUnitedStatesv.Sanjar,thedefendantsoughttocross-examineagovernmentagentwhohadtestifiedondirectaboutoralstatementsthedefendanthadmadetohim.111Inseekingtobringoutadditionalstatementshehadmadetotheagentduringcross,thedefendantrelieduponRule106,arguingthatitcontrolledbecausetheagenthadlaterrecordedhisoralstatementsinasummary.

TheFifthCircuitnotedthatRule106,byitsterms,appliesonlytowrittenandrecordedstatementsandfoundthatitdidnotgoverninacircumstancewheretheagentwasnotaskedaboutanddidnotrelyupon his summary in answering questions about the defendant’sstatements.112 But the court found that “[t]he common law rule ofcompleteness,whichisjustacorollaryoftheprinciplethatrelevantevidenceisgenerallyadmissible,doesprovidearighttocrossexam-ine”regardingincompleteoralstatements.113TheFifthCircuit’sreli-anceonthecommonlawtofindarighttocompleteoralstatementscan be traced to the Supreme Court’s decision inBeech Aircraft.114TakingapagefromtheSupremeCourt’sbookoncompletion,courtslike theSanjar courthaveventuredoutside therulebookandhaveutilizedthesame“commonlaw”generalprinciplesofrelevancytore-solvetheissueoforalstatementsleftunaddressedbyRule106.115

110. SeeUnitedStatesv.Abel,469U.S.45,51–52(1984)(statingthatthecommonlawretainssomerelevanceininterpretingtheFederalRulesofEvidence). 111. UnitedStatesv.Sanjar,876F.3d725,739(5thCir.2017),cert.deniedsubnom,Mainv.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1577(2018). 112. Id.Thisanalysisrevealsyetanother interpretivedifficulty inapplyingRule106—theproblemofclassifyingastatementoriginallymadeorally,butlaterrecordedinsomefashion.ByleavingoralstatementsoutofRule106,thedraftersoftheoriginalprovision have forced courts to draw the sometimes-awkwarddistinction between“oral”and“recorded”statements. 113. Id.Ultimately, thecourt foundcommon lawcompletion inapplicable tode-fendant’s circumstance because the defendant’s oral assertions of innocence were“‘notnecessary toqualify, explain,orplace into context’ the limited statements theagenttestifiedaboutondirect.”Id.(quotingUnitedStatesv.Self,414F.App’x611,615(5thCir.2011)). 114. BeechAircraftCorp.v.Rainey,488U.S.153,171(1988). 115. SeeUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,670(D.Md.2017)(“Rule106onlypartially codifies thecommon lawdoctrineofcompleteness,and forsituations


2. CompletingOralStatementsUnderRule611(a)Themajorityoffederalcourtshaveavoidedresortingtothelin-

geringcommonlawandhaveinsteadfoundauthorityforthecomple-tion of oral statements in Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).116 Rule611(a)providesasfollows:

CONTROLBYTHECOURT;PURPOSES.Thecourtshouldexercisereasonablecontroloverthemodeandorderofexaminingwitnessesandpresentingevi-dencesoasto: makethoseprocedureseffectivefordeterminingthetruth; avoidwastingtime;and protectwitnessesfromharassmentorundueembarrassment.117Althoughatriallawyermightnotintuitivelyrecognizearightto

completioninaruledesignedtocontrolthe“modeandorder”ofex-aminingwitnesses, federal courtshaveconnected theright tocom-pleteoralstatementswiththedeterminationof“truth.”

The leading case on unrecorded statements and completenessunder Rule 611(a) isUnited States v. Castro.118 Two co-defendantswerejointlytriedoncocaine-relatedcharges.Thegovernmentprof-feredonedefendant’soralstatementtoanarrestingofficerthatco-cainewouldbefoundinacertainbaginthehousewherehewasap-prehended. The defendant simultaneously told the officer that thecocainebelongedtoanothermanwhoendedupbeinghisco-defend-ant.119Thedefendantarguedthatpresentingonlyhisfirststatementpointingtheofficertothedrugswouldcreateaninferencethathehadconfessedownershipofthedrugs—aninferenceexpresslydeniedbyhiscontemporaneousstatementattributingownershiptoanother.Heargued that fairness required admission of his simultaneous state-mentregardingownership.120Thetrialcourtrefusedtoadmitthede-fendant’s statement implicating his co-defendant in their joint trialand,insteadpermittingthedefensetoclarifygenerallyduringcross-

beyondthereachofRule106,thecommonlawstillapplies.”).ButseeUnitedStatesv.Oloyede,933F.3d302(4thCir.2019)(expressingdoubtthatthecommonlawofcom-pletionsurvivedtheenactmentofRule106). 116. WEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-4(notingthatRule611(a)“providesequiv-alentcontrolovertestimonialproof”). 117. FED.R.EVID.611(a). 118. UnitedStatesv.Castro,813F.2d571,576(2dCir.1987)(balancingthecourt’sprinciplesofcommonsenseandfairnesswithprotectionofsociety’s interest in thetruth). 119. Id.at574. 120. Id.at575.


examinationoftheofficerthatthedefendanthadnotadmittedown-ershipofthedrugs.121

The defendant appealed the exclusion of the remainder of hisstatement.122TheSecondCircuit foundRule106inapplicabletothedefendant’soralassertions,butturnedtoRule611(a)tofindauthor-ityforthecompletionoforalstatementsnotcoveredbyRule106.123ThecourtexplainedthatRule611(a)givestrial judgesnotonlythepowertocontrolproceedingstoensurefairness,butanobligationtodoso.124Accordingly,thecourtconcludedthat

whetherweoperateunderRule106’sembodimentoftheruleofcomplete-ness,orunderthemoregeneralprovisionofRule611(a),weremainguidedbytheoverarchingprinciplethatitisthetrialcourt’sresponsibilitytoexer-cisecommonsenseandasenseoffairnesstoprotecttherightsofthepar-ties....125Like the court in Castro, the majority of federal circuits have

foundauthoritytorequirethecompletionoforalstatementsthatismissingfromRule106inRule611(a).126

121. Id.TheSupremeCourt’sholdinginBrutonv.UnitedStatespreventedadmis-sionofdefendant’stestimonialstatementincriminatinghisco-defendantintheirjointtrial.Brutonv.UnitedStates,391U.S.123,123,137(1968). 122. Castro,813F.2dat572. 123. Id.at575–76. 124. Id.at576. 125. Id.(findingthatthetrialjudgedidnotabusehisdiscretionindenyingcom-pletionbecausehepermittedthedefendanttotellthejurythathehaddeniedowner-shipofthedrugs);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44,59(2dCir.2019)(“[I]nthisCircuit,thecompletenessprincipleappliestooralstatementsthroughRule611(a)....”). 126. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Tarantino,846F.2d1384,1409–13(D.C.Cir.1988)(holdingunrecordedstatementsofagovernmentwitnesswereproperlyadmittedtocomplete);UnitedStatesv.Verdugo,617F.3d565,579(1stCir.2010)(“[T]hedistrictcourtretainedsubstantialdiscretionunderFed.R.Evid.611(a) toapply theruleofcompletenesstooralstatements....”(citingUnitedStatesv.Lopez-Medina,596F.3d716,734(10thCir.2010)));UnitedStatesv.Holden,557F.3d698,705(6thCir.2009)(“ThecommonlawversionoftherulewascodifiedforwrittenstatementsinFed.R.Evid.106,andhassincebeenextendedtooralstatementsthroughinterpretationofFed.R.Evid.611(a).”);UnitedStatesv.Haddad,10F.3d1252,1258(7thCir.1993)(findingRule611(a)givesthejudgethesameauthorityregardingunrecordedstate-mentsasRule106grantsregardingwrittenandrecordedstatements);UnitedStatesv.Woolbright,831F.2d1390,1395(8thCir.1987)(statingthatRule611supportsaruleof completeness forunrecordedstatements that is the sameas thatapplied towritten and recorded statements under Rule 106); Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 734(“[W]ehaveheld‘theruleofcompletenessembodiedinRule106is“substantiallyap-plicable to oral testimony,” aswell by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) ....’” (quotingUnitedStatesv.Zamudio,141F.3d1186(10thCir.1998)));UnitedStatesv.Baker,432F.3d1189,1223(11thCir.2005)(“WehaveextendedRule106tooraltestimonyinlightofRule611(a)’srequirementthatthedistrictcourtexercise‘reasonablecontrol’


3. CompletingOralStatementsExcludedThe third and most troubling approach to oral statements is

foundinfederalcasesthatendtheiranalysisofcompletionwithalit-eralreadingofthetextofRule106.Insuchcases,courtsdenycomple-tionoforalstatementssimplybecauseRule106omitsthemfromcov-erage.ThesecourtshavenotlookedtoRule611(a)orthecommonlawtofindarighttocompletionforpurelyoralstatements.

AprimeexampleofthisapproachcanbefoundinUnitedStatesv.Gibson.127Inthatcase,thedefendantcomplainedthatthetrialcourterredinpreventingdefensecounselfromcross-examiningaformeremployeeaboutanunrecordedstatementthatthedefendantmadetohim.128Thedefendantcontendedthatthegovernmenthadondirectinquiredintootherstatementsthatthedefendanthadmadetotheem-ployee,andthatthedefendanthadarightunderRule106tointroduceastatementthatcompletedthemisleadingportion.129Thecourtdisa-greed,grounding itsanalysisonly in the fact that“Rule106appliesonly towritten and recorded statements.”130 Further compoundingtheconfusionsurroundingthecompletionoforalstatements,theGib-soncasewasdecidedintheFifthCircuitin2017¾thesameyearthattheFifthCircuitopinioninUnitedStatesv.Sanjarannouncedarighttocompleteoralstatementsgroundedinthecommonlaw.131

Othercaseshaveemployedasimilarlyglibanalysistothecom-pletionoforalstatements.CasesintheNinthCircuithaverepeatedlyrejected completeness arguments with respect to oral statementsbasedonlyonthefactthatRule106excludesthemfromcoverage.132InUnitedStatesv.Wilkerson, apanelof theFourthCircuit similarlydisposed of a defendant’s completeness objection relating to oralstatements by holding that “[t]he rule applies only to writings or

overwitness interrogationandthepresentationofevidencetomakethemeffectivevehiclesfortheascertainmentoftruth.”). 127. UnitedStatesv.Gibson,875F.3d179(5thCir.2017). 128. Id.at183. 129. Id.at193–94. 130. Id.at194n.10. 131. UnitedStatesv.Sanjar,876F.3d725,739(5thCir.2017). 132. UnitedStatesv.Ortega,203F.3d675,682(9thCir.2000)(“Becausetheof-ficer’stestimonyconcernedanunrecordedoralconfession,theruleofcompletenessdoesnotapply.”);UnitedStatesv.Hayat,710F.3d875,896(9thCir.2013) (“[O]urcaseshaveappliedtheruleofcompleteness‘onlytowrittenandrecordedstatements.’”(quotingOrtega,203F.3dat682));UnitedStatesv.Liera-Morales,759F.3d1105,1111(9thCir.2014)(“Byitsterms,Rule106 ‘appliesonlytowrittenandrecordedstate-ments.’”(quotingOrtega,203F.3dat682)).


recorded statements, not to conversations.”133 In United States v.Ramirez-Perez,theEleventhCircuitofferedaparticularlyperplexinganalysis of the interaction between completion and oral state-ments.134Inthatcase,thecourtheldthatRule106didnotapplytothedefendant’sconfessioneventhoughitwaswrittenandsigned,becausetheofficerwhotooktheconfessionwasaskedattrialonlyaboutwhatthedefendantsaid,notwhatthedefendantwrotedown.135Thecourtconcludedthat“[b]ecausetheprosecutorquestionedtheagentonlyaboutwhatMaclaviosaidratherthanaboutwhatwaswritteninthedocument,Rule106didnotapply.”136TheomissionoforalstatementsfromRule106was,therefore,manipulatedtodefeattherighttocom-pleteawrittenstatementcoveredbytheRule.

WherecourtshaverefusedtoventurebeyondtheplainlanguageofRule106tofindacompletionrightfororalstatementsinthecom-monlaworinRule611(a),thereisanirrationalandunjustdistinctionbeing drawn between selectively presented written and recordedstatementsandsimilarlysituatedoralstatements.

***AswiththehearsayquestionarisingunderRule106,thereare

threeapproachesinthefederalcourtstothecompletionoforalstate-ments.Inafewcourts,thereisapparentlynorighttocompleteselec-tiveandmisleadingoralstatements.Eveninthecircuitsthatpermitcompletionofpartialanddistortedoral statements, judgesand liti-gantsmust hunt through cases to find the right to complete in theephemeralhazeofcommonlawremainingfollowingtheenactmentoftheFederalRulesofEvidence,orinthevaguepromiseofproceduresthatare“effectivefordeterminingthetruth”inRule611(a).

III.COMPLETINGCONSTRUCTIONOFTHERULEOFCOMPLETENESS

ConflictandconfusionhavesurroundedRule106sincetheenact-mentoftheFederalRulesofEvidence.Federalcasesfromthe1980s

133. UnitedStatesv.Wilkerson,84F.3d692,696(4thCir.1996).Thecourtwentontofindthattheruleofcompleteness,“ifitappliedtooralconversations,”wouldnothaveappliedtothecase“wheretherewasnopartiallyintroducedconversationthatneeded clarificationor explanation.” Id. (emphasis added); seealsoUnitedStates v.Oloyede,933F.3d302,313–14(4thCir.2019)(“Whilewedoubtthataresidualcom-monlawruleofcompleteness[thatwouldadmitoralstatements]survivesRule106’scodification,weholdthatanysuchcommonlawrulecannotbeusedtojustifythead-missionofinadmissiblehearsay.”). 134. UnitedStatesv.Ramirez-Perez,166F.3d1106,1111–14(11thCir.1999). 135. Id.at1113. 136. Id.


reflectthesamedisagreementsovertheadmissibilityofhearsayandoralstatementsunderRule106thatarefoundinrecentprecedent.137CommentatorshavecontinuouslylamentedtheambiguityinherentinRule106’spartialcodificationofthedoctrineofcompleteness.138Thefederalcircuitshavehadforty-fiveyearstocoalescearoundauniformandclearapproachtoRule106andtocompletenessmorebroadly.Instead,thecircuitsplithasbecomecalcifiedandshowsnosignsofbeing resolved throughaprecedential consensus.Even in theSixthCircuitwhereathree-judgepanelcalledforenbancreconsiderationoftheprohibitionontheadmissionofhearsaythroughRule106,noactionhasbeentaken.139TheU.S.SupremeCourtappearsunlikelytoweighintocorrecttheuncertaintysurroundingRule106.TheCourthasconsideredRule106ononlyoneoccasioninBeechAircraftCorp.v.Raineyin1988.140AlthoughthepartiespresentedtheCourtwithaquestionarisingunderRule106,theCourtdeclinedtoofferanyinter-pretation of the Rule, instead resolving the issue on common lawgrounds.141

AnimportantanimatingprinciplebehindtheFederalRulesofEv-idence isuniformity in theadministrationof justice throughout thefederalcourtsystem.142Andoneofthemostimportantfunctionsofa

137. CompareUnitedStatesv.Gravely,840F.2d1156,1163(4thCir.1988)(find-ingthatcompletingstatementwasproperlyadmittedunderRule106overahearsayobjection),andUnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1369(D.C.Cir.1986)(conclud-ingthatRule106admitsotherwiseinadmissiblehearsay),withUnitedStatesv.Sanjar,876F.3d725,739(5thCir.2017)(“Whenofferedbythegovernment,adefendant’sout-of-courtstatementsarethoseofapartyopponentandthusnothearsay.Whenof-feredbythedefense,however,suchstatementsarehearsay....”(citationomitted)),cert.deniedsubnom.Mainv.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1577(2018),andUnitedStatesv.Hayat,710F.3d875,896(9thCir.2013)(“Rule106 ‘doesnotcompeladmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayevidence.’”(quotingUnitedStatesv.Collicott,92F.2d973,983(9thCir.1996))). 138. SeegenerallyNance,supranote23;JamesP.Gillespie,FederalRuleofEvidence106:AProposaltoReturntotheCommonLawDoctrineofCompleteness,62NOTREDAMEL.REV.382(1987)(exploringthepossibilityforexpansionofRule106);Hardin,supranote41;HaroldF.Baker,CompletingtheRuleofCompleteness:AmendingRule106oftheFederalRulesofEvidence,51CREIGHTONL.REV.281(2018)(highlightingcircuitsplitregardingRule106). 139. UnitedStatesv.Adams,722F.3d788(6thCir.2013). 140. BeechAircraftCorp.v.Rainey,488U.S.153,171–72(1988)(decliningtoan-alyzethedoctrineofcompletenessinRule106). 141. Id. at 175 (holding the District Court abused its discretionwhen Rainey’scross-examinationwasrestricted);see7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2100at626(notingthatspeechdoesnothavetobebelieved);seealsosupranote95andaccompanyingtext(questioningthecourt’sillogicalreluctancetoadmitremainders). 142. SeeEdwardJ.Imwinkelried,TheGoldenAnniversaryofthe“PreliminaryStudyoftheAdvisabilityandFeasibilityofDevelopingUniformRulesofEvidencefortheFederal


rulesadvisorycommitteeistomonitorcircuitsplitsandtoproposeamendmentstorestoreuniformity.143TheAdvisoryCommitteeonEv-idence Rules evaluated the possibility of amending Rule 106 in2002.144Inthefaceofcompetingpriorities145andrelyingonthefed-eralcourtstomanagetheissue,theAdvisoryCommitteeexercisedre-straint anddeclined topropose an amendment toRule106.146 Thefederalcourtshavehadalmosttwoadditionaldecadestodevelopacoherent blueprint for the operation of Rule 106, but the dysfunc-tionalanddisparateprecedentpersists.

Federaljudgesandlitigantscollectivelyexpendconsiderablere-sourceslitigatingtheissuessurroundingRule106onaroutinebasisandwouldbenefitgreatlyfromaclarifyingamendment.In2017,onedistrictcourtjudgeobservedthatcompletionissuesare“recurringinnature,”andthatthereis“ascarcityofhelpfuldecisionalauthority”to“guidecourtsandcounsel”inresolvingthe“sometimescomplicatedissues”raisedbythedoctrineofcompleteness.147Thecourtwentontolamenttheuncertainandcomplexstateofthelaw:“althoughthereisnoshortageofcaselawandtreatiseanalysisonthissubject,thelawisfarfromsettled,andcourtsandcommentatorshavereachedstarklydifferentresultsbyapplyingavarietyofapproaches,resultinginan

Courts”:MissionAccomplished?,57WAYNEL.REV.1367,1368–69(2011)(discussingthehistoryofthedevelopmentoftheFederalRulesofEvidence). 143. Capra&Richter,supranote61,at1886–87(emphasizingtheimportanceofrulemaking initiatives that resolve circuit splits); see also Edward Becker & AvivaOrenstein,TheFederalRulesofEvidenceAfterSixteenYears—TheEffectof“PlainMean-ing” Jurisprudence, theNeed foranAdvisoryCommitteeontheRulesofEvidence,andSuggestionsforSelectiveRevisionoftheRules,60GEO.WASH.L.REV.857(1992)(em-phasizing the importance of an Evidence Rules Advisory Committee to proposeamendmentstoresolveconflictsinthecourts). 144. ADVISORYCOMM.ONEVIDENCERULES,MINUTESOFTHEMEETINGOFAPRIL25,2003,at9;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,665n.3(D.Md.2017)(“In2002–03,theAdvisoryCommitteeconsideredwhethertoamendRule106toextenditsscopetooralstatementsandacts,andwhethertoamendtheruletostatethatevi-dencethatmetthefairnessrequirementofRule106wasadmissibleevenifitwouldbeinadmissibleifofferedonitsown.”). 145. In 2003,many concerns and conflicts within the operation of the FederalRulespresentedmorepressingpriorities.Successfulamendmentshavebeenadoptedtodealwiththesecriticalissues,movingtheunderinclusivenatureofRule106anditsconflictingandsometimesunfairapplicationbythefederalcourtstothetopofthelist.SeeCapra&Richter,supranote61,at1892(describingamendmentstotheFederalRulesofEvidencesincethereconstitutionoftheAdvisoryCommittee). 146. SeeWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5071(“TheCommitteevotedunanimouslynottoamendRule106onthegroundthatthecostsexceededthebenefitsbecause‘anyproblemsunderthecurrentrulewerebeingwell-handledbythecourts.’”(quotingAD-VISORYCOMM.ONEVIDENCERULES,supranote144)). 147. UnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,663(D.Md.2017).


evidentiary landscape that isunclear.”148Other federal judgeshavecommentedonthefrequencywithwhichissuesofcompletenessariseintheheatofcriminaltrials,thusdeprivingjudgesandlitigantsofthetime for study and reflection afforded bymotions in limine.149 Alt-houghtheyarisewithgreatfrequencyincriminalcases,completenessconcernscomeupincivillitigationaswell.150Inallofthesecases,trialjudgesrequireclearruletextthatresolvesthemostcommonlyoccur-ringcompletenessissues.151

Notably, several states have adopted evidence rules governingcompletionthatdeviatefromRule106andoffermoreclaritytojudgesandlitigants.152AlthoughtheFederalRulesofEvidenceweredesignedasamodel for thestates toutilize indevelopingevidencedoctrine,completionrepresentsanareainwhichthefederalsystemcouldben-efitfromtheexperienceofthestatecourts.153

Insum,itisclearthatRule106isaworkhorseevidenceprovisionthat is inneedof remodeling.154Toconstructamorecompleteand

148. Id. 149. SeeADVISORYCOMM.ONEVIDENCERULES,MINUTESOFTHEMEETINGOFOCTOBER25,2019,at9(commentingonthefrequencywithwhichcompletionissuesarisedur-ingtrial). 150. See,e.g.,PhoenixAssocs.IIIv.Stone,60F.3d95,101(2dCir.1995)(findingtheaccountant’sworkpaperswerenecessary to completepresentationof financialstatementsbecausethefinancialstatementsontheirownweremisleading);Brewerv.JeepCorp.,724F.2d653,657(8thCir.1983)(“Theappellantwasfreetointroducethefilmcontainingthejeeprolloversbutonlyupontheconditionthatthewrittenstudyexplainingthesegraphicscenesalsobeoffered.Thetrialcourt’sorderrequiredonlythatthecompletereportbeadmitted,themundaneaswellasthesensational.Inthisthetrialcourtwasfairanditsexerciseofdiscretionwasnotanabuse.”). 151. SeeImwinkelried,supranote142,at1368–69(discussingimportanceofhav-ingasetofruleslawyerscancarryintocourttoresolvequicklycommonevidenceis-sues). 152. SeeCAL.EVID.CODE§356(Deering2020);CONN.CODEEVID(2018).Sec.1-5;GA. CODEANN. § 24-8-822 (2020); IOWAR. EVID. 5.106 (2016); MONT.R. EVID. 106(2019);NEB.REV.STAT.ANN.§27-106(2020);N.H.R.EVID.106(2016);OR.REV.STAT.ANN.§40.040(2019);TEX.R.EVID.106–07(2020);WIS.STAT.§901.07(2019). 153. Symposium, Association ofAmericanLawSchoolsAnnualMeeting, EvidenceSection Program: The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 765(2002)(notingthecommentsofProfessorChristopherB.Muellerencouragingthefed-eralAdvisoryCommitteeonEvidenceRulestoattendtotheinsightsofferedbystateevidencerules). 154. Ofcourse,Congressretainsconcurrentauthoritytoenactrulesofpracticeandprocedureandcould,intheory,stepintoregulatecompletion.Butthispotentialforafixisbothunlikelyandill-advised.SeeCapra&Richter,supranote61,at1904(explain-ingthatCongressrarelyenactsevidenceprovisionsindependentlyandthatdirecten-actmentbyCongressisinferiortotherulemakingprocess).Onemightalsoarguethatunfairnessresultingfromacriminaldefendant’sinabilitytorebutamisleadingpresen-tation with completing hearsay could be rectified by the Constitution. But federal


functional rule of completeness, however, rule-makersmust deter-minetheoptimalapproachtootherwiseinadmissiblehearsayandtooralcompletingstatements.

A. ADDRESSINGTHEHEARSAYELEPHANTINTHEROOMRule106shouldbeamendedtoresolve,onceandforall,thedi-

lemmaofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayneededtocorrectanunfairand incomplete presentation of a statement. The decision of Rule106’s original drafters tomaintain silence on this critical issuehasgeneratedmuchof the confusion surrounding theRule.An amend-ment that allows a party to complete with otherwise inadmissiblehearsaywhenthefairnessstandardissatisfied¾andtorelyuponthecompletingstatementforitstruth¾ismostconsistentwiththeintentbehindtheoriginalRuleandwiththepurposeoftheEvidenceRulesmorebroadly.155

1. OtherwiseInadmissibleHearsay:ToAdmitorNotToAdmit,ThatIsthe(First)Question

An amendment to Rule 106 should specifically provide that astatement,necessarytocompleteastatementpresentedinamislead-ingmanner,isadmissibledespitethefactthatitishearsay.Thatsolu-tiontothehearsayproblemistheonlyonethatisconsistentwiththefundamentalpurposeofthecompletenessdoctrineandwiththein-tentoftheoriginaldraftersofRule106.

Allowingahearsayobjectiontodefeatcompletionauthorizedun-derRule106’snarrowfairnessstandardpermitsamisleadingpresen-tationofevidencetogounrebuttedandleavesthefact-finderwithadistortedviewoftheevidence.TheAdamsopinionfromtheSixthCir-cuitillustratesthedeleteriousimpactoftheexclusionalternative.Inthatcase,thecourtrecognizedthattheprosecution’sselectivepresen-tationof thedefendant’sstatements left jurorswith the impressionthatthedefendantadmittedunlawfullyhand-pickingcorruptpeople

courtshavedeniedconstitutionalchallengesbasedupontheadmissionofadefend-ant’sinculpatorystatementswithoutcompletingevidenceofexculpatorystatements.SeeGacyv.Welborn,994F.2d305,316(7thCir.1993)(“Beyondexplicitrulessuchastheprivilegeagainst self-incriminationand theconfrontationclause,noneofwhichapplieshere,theConstitutionhaslittletosayaboutrulesofevidence.Thehearsayruleanditsexceptionforadmissionsofapartyopponentarevenerabledoctrines;noseri-ousconstitutionalchallengecanberaisedtothem.”(citationomitted)).And,ofcourse,theconstitutionalrighttoaneffectivedefensehasnoapplicabilitywheretheunfairportionisofferedbythecriminaldefendant,orbyapartyinacivilcase.Inthosesitua-tions,theremedyagainstunfairnessmustcomefromtheEvidenceRulesornotatall. 155. FED.R.EVID.102.


toserveonanelectionboardwhenhehadinsteaddenieddoinganysuchthing.156Nonetheless,thecourtupheldthetrialcourt’sexclusionof the defendant’s completing statements based upon controllingSixthCircuitprecedentpreventingthepresentationofthedefendant’sotherwise inadmissible hearsay statements through Rule 106.157Therefore,thedefendant’sconvictionwasbased,inpart,onamislead-ingpresentationofhisownstatements.

AninterpretationofRule106thatpermitsaselectiveandmis-leadingpresentationofastatementtogounrebuttedisaclearperver-sionofitsfundamentalpromiseof“fairness.”158Indeed,suchaninter-pretation defies the fundamental purpose of the Rules in theirentirety.FederalRuleofEvidence102makesclearthattheRulesaretobeconstrued “toadministereveryproceeding fairly”and “to theendof ascertaining the truthand securinga justdetermination.”159AmendingRule106inamannerthatallowslitigantstopresentevi-denceunfairlyandoutofcontextcannotbesquaredwithRule102’sclearmandate.

a. LegislativeHistorySupportstheAdmissionofHearsayThelegislativehistoryofRule106supportsitsuseasatoolfor

overcomingahearsayobjection.Asdiscussedabove,theDOJfoughtforanexpresslimitationonRule106thatwouldpreventcompletionwithhearsaybefore theAdvisoryCommitteeandCongress.160BothrejectedtheDOJ’scalltoexcludecompletingstatementsthatwouldbeotherwise inadmissible.161 Although it is theoretically possible thatCongress rejected this limitation because it thought proposedRule106alreadypreventedtheadmissionofotherwiseinadmissibleevi-dence,notedcommentatorshavecharacterizedthispossibilityas“un-likely”because:

Onewould suppose that if the [Judiciary] Committee¾[withinwhich] theJusticeDepartmentdidnotwantforfriends¾thoughtthatallitwouldtaketomaketheDepartmenthappywastomaketheRulesaywhattheSenatorsintendeditshouldmean,thentheDepartment’sproposedamendmentwould

156. UnitedStatesv.Adams,722F.3d788,826–27(6thCir.2013). 157. Id.at827. 158. FED.R.EVID.106;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,675(D.Md.2017)(“Onecanhardlyclaimthemoralhighgroundthroughawillingnesstoac-ceptanunfairresultinthenameofevidentiarypurity.”). 159. FED.R.EVID.102. 160. SeeWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21. 161. Id.


havebeenadoptedorsomestatementofCongressionalintentplacedintheCommitteeReport.162Thislegislativehistorydemonstratesthatcompletionwasnever

intendedtobeforeclosedbyahearsayobjection.Andthismakeseminentsense.Requiringcompletingevidenceto

be“otherwiseadmissible”wouldreducethedoctrineofcompletiontoatimingadvantagebeneficialonlytolitigantsalreadycapableofself-help.163Partiespossessingtheindependentevidentiaryauthoritytoadmitcertainout-of-courtstatementswouldbeabletopresentthemearlierinthecase.Thelitigantswhoneedprotectionfromadistortedpresentation of the evidence the most¾those who cannot inde-pendentlyadmitthecompletingevidence¾wouldremainexposedtoselectiveandunfairpresentations.Excludingcompletingstatementsthatarenot“otherwiseadmissible”makesthecompletionrightadeadletter in any circumstancewhere the parties possess asymmetricalrights to admit an out-of-court statement under existing hearsayrules. Completion concernsmost commonly arise in those circum-stanceswheretheriskofabuseismostserious:whenthegovernmentseeks to present a criminal defendant’s incriminating statementswithoutincludingexculpatoryportions.164Duetotheone-wayadmis-sibilityofparty-opponentstatementsunderFederalRuleofEvidence801(d)(2)(A), there is always anasymmetrical right in favorof the

162. Seeid.§5078.1,atn.32. 163. Inhisinfluentialworkontheruleofcompletion,ProfessorDaleNancealsoarguedthatcompletionmusthavebeenintendedtotrumpexclusionaryrulesbecauserebuttaloroptionalcompletionduringanopponent’scaseinchiefwasroutinelyrec-ognized as a distinct doctrine. According to ProfessorNance, if completion didnottrumpexclusionaryrules,therewouldbenopurposeforrecognizingcompletionasadistinctdoctrineintherebuttalcontextbecausethebasicrulesofrelevancewouldau-thorizeadmissionofanotherwiseadmissibleomittedremainderduringanopponent’scaseinchiefwithouttheneedforanyspecialdoctrine.Theonlyreasontorecognizeaspecialdoctrine toallowthisrebuttalcompletion is toovercomeexclusionaryrulesthatcouldotherwiseblocktheadmissibilityofthisrelevantevidence.DaleA.Nance,VerbalCompletenessandExclusionaryRulesUndertheFederalRulesofEvidence,75TEX.L.REV.51(1996). 164. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Terry,702F.2d299,314(2dCir.1983)(“Rule106doesnotrenderadmissibleevidencethatisotherwiseinadmissible.”);UnitedStatesv.Coplan,703F.3d46(2dCir.2012);UnitedStatesv.Nixon,779F.2d126(2dCir.1985);UnitedStatesv.Hassan,742F.3d104,134–35(4thCir.2014)(findingdefendant’swebpostingswere not admissible under Rule 106 because theywere hearsay); UnitedStatesv.Lentz,524F.3d501(4thCir.2008);UnitedStatesv.Oloyede,933F.3d302(4thCir.2019);UnitedStatesv.Costner,684F.2d370,373(6thCir.1982);UnitedStatesv.Adams,722F.3d788(6thCir.2013);UnitedStatesv.Vargas,689F.3d867,876–77(7thCir.2012);UnitedStatesv.Hayat,710F.3d875,896(9thCir.2013)(“Rule106‘doesnotcompeladmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayevidence.’”(quot-ingUnitedStatesv.Collicott,92F.2d973,983(9thCir.1996))).


governmentinsuchcases.165Adefendantmaynotadmithisownout-of-courtstatementsunderthatexception.166Therefore,ifacomplet-ingstatementmustbe“otherwiseadmissible,”completionwillalmostalwaysbeunavailablewhen theprosecutionunfairly distorts a de-fendant’sownstatements.167

b. PlacementoftheRuleItmightbearguedthattheplacementofRule106inArticle1of

theEvidenceRules indicatesthat thedraftersdidnotconsider it tooperateasahearsayexception—iftheyhad,theargumentgoes,theywouldhaveplaceditwiththehearsayruleanditsexceptionsinArticle8.Butthisargumentiseasilydismissed.Rule802,whichistheopera-tiveruleagainsthearsay,168providesthathearsayisinadmissible“un-lessanyofthefollowingprovidesotherwise:

●afederalstatute;●theserules;or●otherrulesprescribedbytheSupremeCourt.”169Thereferenceistotheserules,meaningalloftheEvidenceRules.

IfthedraftershadwantedtolimithearsayexceptionstothoseinArti-cle8,Rule802wouldhavereferredto“therulesinthisarticle”ratherthan“theserules.”Notably,courtshavefoundrulesoutsideofArticle

165. FED.R.EVID.801(d)(2)(A). 166. SeeSTEPHENA.SALTZBURG,MICHAELM.MARTIN&DANIEL J.CAPRA, 4 FEDERALRULESOFEVIDENCEMANUAL§801.02(2020)(“Thetouchstoneofadmissibilityisthatthestatement isbeneficial to,andofferedby, thespeaker’sopponentat thetimeoftrial. It follows that a party can never admit a statement in her favor under [Rule801(d)(2)];thestatementmustbeofferedbyaparty-opponent.”). 167. Suchasymmetryisnotlimitedtopartyopponentstatementsthatfavorthegovernmentincriminalcases.Similarissuescanarisewhenadefendantoffersapar-tial statement against the government under the former testimony or declarationsagainstinterestexceptionsandacompletingremainderisnotindependentlyadmissi-bleagainstthedefendantunderthoseexceptions.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Woolbright,831F.2d1390,1395–97(8thCir.1987)(determiningthatawoman’sstatementthatabagwheredrugswerefoundwasherswasadmissibleagainstgovernmentunderthedeclarationsagainstinterestexception,butthewoman’sstatementthatsheandthedefendantwere“ontheirhoneymoon”wasnot);Statev.Selalla,744N.W.2d802,818(S.D.2008);UnitedStatesv.Maccini,721F.2d840,845(1stCir.1983)(permittingaprosecutortohaveadditionalportionsofawitness’sgrandjurytestimonyreadafterdefensecounselintroducedamisleadingportionofthattestimony);UnitedStatesv.Mosquera,886F.3d1032,1049(11thCir.2018)(affirmingthedistrictcourt’sappli-cationofRule106toallowthegovernmenttoadmitadditionalportionsofawitnessinterviewafterthedefendantselectivelyadmittedportionsoftheinterview). 168. Rule801defineshearsay;Rule802isthesourceofexclusionofhearsay.FED.R.EVID.802(“TheRuleAgainstHearsay”). 169. Id.(emphasisadded).


8, includingFederalRuleofCivilProcedure32(a)(4),tobegroundsforadmittinghearsay.170IfahearsayexceptioncanbefoundoutsidetheEvidenceRules, there isno reasonwhyanexceptioncannotbefoundwithinthoserulesbutoutsideofArticle8.

Moreover, as stated by the D.C. Circuit inUnited States v. Sut-ton,171theplacementofRule106isactuallyapointinfavoroffindingahearsayexception.Whileotherevidentiaryprovisionsqualify ad-missibilitybyreferencetootherrules,Rule106containsnoprovisothatitapplies“exceptasotherwiseprovidedbytheserules.”172There-fore,thefundamentalfairnesspurposeofRule106andaclear-eyedreading of its legislative history demonstrate that Rule 106 shouldpermitotherwiseinadmissiblecompletingstatementstobeadmittedfortheirtruth.

c. SubsequentCorrectionasanAlternativetoCompletionNotwithstandingthecompellingreasonstoadmittheotherwise

inadmissiblewhennecessaryforcompleteness,somecourtshavesug-gestedthatRule106neednotoperateasavehicleforadmittingoth-erwiseinadmissiblehearsayduetoanadversary’sabilitytocorrecttherecordlaterinthetrial.173Withrespecttothecompleting,excul-patoryhearsaystatementsofcriminaldefendants,forexample,courtshavesuggestedthatdefendantsmayofferstatementsexcludedduringtheprosecution’scasebytakingthestandduringthedefensecaseandrelatingtheirowncompletingexculpatorystatements.174Underthis

170. SeeFED.R.CIV.P.32(a)(4)(B).CivilRule32(a)(4)(B)allowsadmissionofhear-sayfromadepositioneventhoughthedeclarantisnotunavailableunderthetermsoftheEvidenceRules.IneffecttheCivilRulecreatesanindependenthearsayexception.Andcourtshaveupheldthatexception,referringtoRule802’slistofsourcesforanexceptionoutsideofArticle8.See,e.g.,Fletcherv.Tomlinson,895F.3d1010,1020(8thCir.2018).TheFletchercourtnotedthatRule32authorizesadmissibilityofdepositionhearsayeventhoughitisnotadmissibleundertheArticle8exceptions,aswellasthat“[d]ecisionsfromaroundthecountryhaveconcludedthatRule32(a)(4)(B)operatesasanindependentexceptiontothehearsayrule.”Id. 171. UnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1368(D.C.Cir.1986). 172. CompareFED.R.EVID.106,withFED.R.EVID.402,andFED.R.EVID.501. 173. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Sanjar,876F.3d725,739(5thCir.2017)(“Whenof-feredbythegovernment,adefendant’sout-of-courtstatementsarethoseofapartyopponentandthusnothearsay.FED.R.EVID.801(d)(2).Whenofferedbythedefense,however,suchstatementsarehearsay(thedefendantmay,ofcourse,reiteratetheout-of-courtstatementsonthestandifhechoosestotestify).”),cert.deniedsubnom.Mainv.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1577(2018). 174. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Holifield,No.05-920,2010U.S.Dist.LEXIS147815,at*3(C.D.Cal.May25,2010)(“ThecourtOrdersthatDefendantJordanmaynotintro-duceanyexculpatorystatements,notpreviouslyintroducedbytheGovernment,thatconstitute inadmissible hearsay” and that if the defendant wants to admit such


view,adefendant couldcorrect the recordby taking the standandsubjecting himself to cross-examination, rendering admissionthroughRule106unnecessary.

This “testimony” remedy for amisleading presentation by theprosecutioninacriminalcaseisflawedformanyreasons.First,theentire premise of Rule 106 is that contemporaneous completion iscrucialbecauserepairworkmaybe inadequate“whendelayedtoapointlaterinthetrial.”175Bythetimeadefendanthastheopportunitytotakethestandandrebutadistortedpresentationofhisownstate-ment,thejury’smisapprehensionoftheevidencemaybeintractable.Furthermore,adefendant’stestimonyisautomaticallyimpeachedbybiaswhenhetakesthestandinhisowndefense.176Ajurymayjustifi-ablysuspectadefendant’sowndelayedtestimonythathemadeself-servingstatementsalongwiththeinculpatorystatementsselectivelypresentedbytheprosecution,thusallowingtheprosecutiontoretainthebenefitofthemisleadingpresentation.Thedefendant’stestimonypalesincomparisontorequiringagovernmentwitnesstorecountthedefendant’scompletingexculpatorystatements,madeatornearthetimeofthestatementalreadyintroduced.

Inaddition, the testimonyalternativecomeswithaprohibitivecost:thedefendantmustsacrificehisFifthAmendmentrighttorefuseto testify and subject himself to cross-examination¾including im-peachmentwithpriorconvictions¾just tocorrectamisleading im-pression purposely created by the government.177 Finally, and

statements“hemustdosobytakingthestandandtestifyinghimself”because“FederalRule of Evidence 106 does not influence the admissibility of such hearsay state-ments.”). 175. FED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote. 176. SeeJeffreyBellin,CircumventingCongress:HowtheFederalCourtsOpenedtheDoor to ImpeachingCriminalDefendantswithPriorConvictions,42U.C.DAVISL.REV.289,299 (2008) (“Jurors ... arewellaware thatevenotherwisehonestdefendantshaveastrongincentivetoshadetheirtrialtestimonyinfavorofacquittal.”). 177. SeeUnitedStatesv.Walker,652F.2d708,713(7thCir.1981)(“[T]hesitua-tionathanddoesbearsimilarityto‘[f]orcingthedefendanttotakethestandinordertointroducetheomittedexculpatoryportionsof[a]confession[which]isadenialofhisrightagainstself-incrimination.’”(alterationinoriginal)(quoting1WEINSTEIN’SEV-IDENCE¶106[01],at106.7(1979)));UnitedStatesv.Sutton,801F.2d1346,1370(D.C.Cir.1986)(“SincethiswasacriminalcaseSucherhadaconstitutionalrightnottotes-tify,anditwasthusnecessaryforSuchertorebutthegovernment’sinferencewiththeexcludedportionsoftheserecordings.”);seealsoWEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-09(“[T]he defendant’s right against self-incriminationmay be jeopardized if he is re-quiredtotakethestandinordertointroducetheomittedexculpatoryportionsoftheconfession.”);Baker,supranote138,at304(“Isitnotthecasethatallowingthejurytohearmisleadingevidence—thatcannotbecompletedwithoutthedefendanttestify-ing—creates‘overwhelmingpressure’[onthedefendanttotestify]?”).


perhapsmostironically,theveryhearsayobjectionthatpreventedthedefendantfrominquiringabouthisowncompletingstatementduringthegovernment’sinitialpresentationshouldstilloperatetopreventthedefendantfromrecountingthestatementhimselfduringhisdirectexamination.178 If it ishearsaywhenofferedtocompleteduringtheprosecution’scase,thatsameout-of-courtstatementishearsaywhenthedefendantwishestotestifytoitlaterinthetrial.179

d. TheFloodgatesArgumentOthersmayarguethatRule106shouldnotprovideabasis for

admittingtheotherwise inadmissibleduetotheriskthat itwillbe-comeagatewayforadelugeofinadmissibleevidence.180Butadmit-tinghearsayunderRule106willnotopenthefloodgatestoallowtheunrestricted flow of previously inadmissible hearsay evidence intothetrialprocess.Rule106containsimportantthresholdrequirementsthatoperateassubstantiallimitsontheconsequencesofanyamend-ment. As explored above, Rule 106 authorizes completion of state-mentsonlywhen“fairness”requiresit.181Althoughtheyaredividedwith respect to all other completeness concerns, the federal courtshaveuniformlyinterpretedthisfairnessstandardnarrowlytopermitcompletiononlywhentheoriginalpartialpresentationofastatementismisleadingandcreatesadistortedimpressionofthestatementthatwasmade.182Asonefederaljudgerecentlyframedtheissue,“properapplicationof the ‘fairness’ requirement”willprevent anyabuseofRule106“because judgesshouldrestrictapplicationofRule106tothose situations where misleading information actually was intro-duced...andallowonlysuchcorrectingevidenceasisnecessarytocounteract it.”183 Therefore, fear thatRule 106will permit the freeflowofalargevolumeofinadmissibleevidenceintothetrialprocessismisplacedandoverblown.

178. SeeFED.R.EVID.801(c)(“‘Hearsay’meansastatementthat...thedeclarantdoesnotmakewhiletestifyingatthecurrenttrialorhearing....”). 179. SeeWRIGHTETAL.,supranote21,§5072,at386(“[T]hefirstproblemwiththeadversarysolutionisthattheprosecutionmaybeabletopreventthedefendantfromofferingtherestofhisconfessionbyobjectingthatitishearsay;aparty’sownout-of-courtstatementonlycomesinasanadmissionwhenitisofferedbyanadversary.”). 180. Seesupranote60. 181. FED.R.EVID.106. 182. Seesupranote65. 183. UnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,668(D.Md.2017).


e. TheForfeitureAnalysisAdmittinganotherwiseinadmissibleremainderforitstruthrep-

resentsnoinjusticetotheproponentwhoadmittedthepartialstate-ment.ByusingtherightthatitenjoysundertheRules¾notasashieldtopreventtheadmissionofpotentiallyunreliableevidence,butasaswordtomanufactureamisleadingimpressionoftheevidence¾theproponentshouldforfeittherighttoobjecttoacompletingremainder.

Itishardlyradicaltoconcludethatamisleadingpresentationfor-feitstherighttoobjecttootherwiseinadmissibleevidenceneededtocorrectthemisimpression.InPeoplev.Vines,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtheldthattheruleofcompletenessextinguishesacriminalde-fendant’sSixth Amendment confrontation rights.184 InVines, the de-fendantsoughttoadmitpartofatestimonialstatementmadetopolicebyhisaccompliceimplicatingathirdpartyintherobberyatissue.Thetrialcourtheldthattheprosecutionwouldbepermittedtoadmittheremainderoftheaccomplice’stestimonialstatementinwhichheim-plicatedthedefendant intheshootingthatoccurredduringtherob-berytodispeltheimproperinferencethattheaccomplicehadplacedfullresponsibilityonthethirdparty.185TheCaliforniaSupremeCourtaffirmed:

[L]ikeforfeiturebywrongdoing,[California’sruleofcompleteness]isnotanexceptiontothehearsayrulethatpurportstoassessthereliabilityoftesti-mony.Thestatuteisfoundedontheequitablenotionthatapartywhoelectstointroduceapartofaconversationisprecludedfromobjectingonconfron-tationclausegroundstointroductionbytheopposingpartyofotherpartsoftheconversationwhicharenecessarytomaketheentiretyoftheconversa-tionunderstood....AsCrawfordforbidsonlytheadmissibilityofevidenceunderstatutespurportingtosubstituteanothermethodfor[the]confronta-tionclausetestofreliability,evidenceadmissibleundersection356doesnotoffendCrawford.186

184. Peoplev.Vines,251P.3d943,968–69(Cal.2011),modifiedAug.10,2011,overruled byPeople v.Hardy, 418P.3d309 (Cal. 2018) (overrulingbasedonothergrounds);seealsoCrawfordv.Washington,541U.S.36,36(2004)(prohibitingadmis-sionof“testimonial”hearsaystatementsagainstacriminaldefendantpursuanttotheSixthAmendmentconfrontationclauseunlessthedeclarantisunavailableandthede-fendanthadaprioropportunitytocross-examinethedeclarant). 185. Vines,251P.3dat968(“DefendantwantedtorelyonapartofProby’sstate-menttoimplythatBlackiewastheshooter,whichwascontrarytowhatProbyactuallysaidelsewhereinhisstatement.”). 186. Id. at 968–69 (quoting People v. Parrish, 152 Cal. App. 4th 263, 272–73(2007))(citingCrawfordv.Washington,541U.S.36(2004));seealsoPeoplev.Reid,971N.E.2d353,357(N.Y.2012)(“IfevidencebarredundertheConfrontationClausewereinadmissibleirrespectiveofadefendant’sactionsattrial,thenadefendantcouldattempttodeludea jury ‘byselectivelyrevealingonly thosedetailsofa testimonialstatementthatarepotentiallyhelpfultothedefense’....Toavoidsuchunfairnessand


Federalcourtshavesimilarlyfoundadefendant’sconfrontationrightsforfeitedduetoamisleadingpartialpresentationoftestimonialstatementsbythedefense.187

Ifacriminaldefendantmaylosehisconstitutionalrighttocon-fronthisaccusersthroughamisleadingpartialpresentationofatesti-monialhearsaystatement,thegovernmentshouldalsoforfeitamerehearsayobjectiontoacompletingremainderwhenitselectivelyandunfairlyintroducesacriminaldefendant’sstatement.

OutsideofRule106, theFederalRulesofEvidence specificallycontemplateaparty’sforfeitureofanobjectionduetothemisleadingpresentationordisclosureof certainevidence.Rule502(a) codifiesthedoctrineofsubjectmatterwaiverofprivilegethatcancauseapriv-ilege-holdertolosetheprotectionofprivilegewithrespecttoallma-terial on the same subject as previously disclosedmaterial.188 Rule502(a)providesthatawaiverofprivilegeextendstoadditionalundis-closedmatterwhentheoriginalwaiverwas“intentional,”whenthedisclosed and undisclosed information concern the “same subjectmatter,” and when “they ought in fairness to be considered to-gether.”189The“fairness”standardinRule502(a)wasmodeledafterRule 106 and was intended to require an onerous subject matterwaiverofprivilegewhenaselectivewaiverofaportionofprivilegedinformationcreatesamisleadingordistortedviewoftheentiretyof

topreservethetruth-seekinggoalsofourcourts,weholdthattheadmissionoftesti-monythatviolatestheConfrontationClausemaybeproperifthedefendantopenedthedoortoitsadmission.”(quotingPeoplev.Ko,789N.Y.S.2d43(App.Div.2005)));Peoplev.Parrish,152Cal.App.4th263,272(2007)(holdingthattheprosecutionwasproperlypermittedtointroduceotherportionsofaninterviewimplicatingdefendanttocompleteexculpatoryportionsadmittedbydefendant);Statev.Selalla,744N.W.2d802,818(S.D.2008)(explainingthatallowingadefendanttorelyupontheconfronta-tionclausetoexcludecompletingtestimonialstatementsofferedbytheprosecutionwould“setupunfairoutcomesarisingoutofnot-so-hypotheticalscenariossuchasthatofthedeclarantwhoconfessestothepolicethathemurderedtwopeople,butthensubsequently,duringthesameinterview,saysthatthedefendantforcedhimtodoit”). 187. SeeUnitedStatesv.Lopez-Medina,596F.3d716(10thCir.2010)(completingtestimonial hearsaywas admissible; defendant forfeitedhis SixthAmendment con-frontationrightbyintroducingportionoftestimonialhearsaybyconfidentialinform-ant—apartywhointroducesamisleadingportionopensthedoortoafaircompletion);Nguyenv.Macomber,No.15-CV-00228,2017WL2652874,at*6(N.D.Cal. June19,2017)(“Theconfrontationclause,however,doesnotprecludetheprosecutionfromintroducingevidencethatcompletesastatementpreviouslyintroducedbythedefend-ant.”). 188. FED.R.EVID.502(a). 189. Id.


privilegedinformationonthesamesubject.190Ifaselectivedisclosureofasinglepieceofprivilegedinformationcancostalitigantherattor-ney-clientprivilegewithrespecttoallotherprivilegedinformationonthesamesubject,theselectiveanddistortedpresentationofpartofahearsaystatementshouldalsocosttheproponentherhearsayobjec-tiontothecompletingremainder.

f. The“Unreliable”RemainderandCompletionasa“HearsayException”

Somemightcriticizethisforfeitureapproachasunfairtotheorig-inalproponentofthepartialstatementbyarguingthatittransformsRule106intoafree-standinghearsayexceptioncapableofadmittingwhollyunreliablehearsay.191Evenifitexpresslypermitstheadmis-sionofcompletinghearsayforitstruth,Rule106stillwillnotoperateliketraditionalhearsayexceptions.AsallacquaintedwiththeRulesofEvidenceknow,alawyermayofferanout-of-courtstatementthroughatraditionalhearsayexceptiononlybylocatinganexceptionwithad-missibilityrequirementsthatalignwiththestatement.Ifaprofferedstatementsatisfiestherequirementsofahearsayexception,thestate-ment isadmissibleattheproponent’selectionandnoactionbytheopponentisnecessarytotriggerorfulfilltheexception.192Insum,theproponent of a hearsay statement typically possesses a unilateralrighttoadmititthroughanapplicablehearsayexception.193

Bycontrast,litigantswillnotpossessanyunilateralrighttoadmitotherwiseinadmissiblehearsaythroughRule106.BecausetheRulemustbetriggeredbytheselectiveandmisleadingpresentationofastatement,theproponentofthatinitialstatementpossessesexclusivecontrolovertheadmissibilityofacompletingremainder.Ifthatpro-ponent prefers to exclude the otherwise inadmissible completinghearsay,sheretainstheunilateralauthoritytokeepitoutofevidence

190. SeeFED.R.EVID.502(a)advisorycommittee’snote (“[T]hus, subjectmatterwaiver is limited to situations inwhich a party intentionally puts protected infor-mationintothelitigationinaselective,misleadingandunfairmanner.”);seealsoCapra&Richter,supranote61,at1914–15(discussingadoptionofRule502(a)andthebor-rowingofthefairnessstandardfromRule106). 191. SeeUnitedStatesv.Costner,684F.2d370,373(6thCir.1982)(“Theruleco-versanorderofproofproblem;itisnotdesignedtomakesomethingadmissiblethatshouldbeexcluded.”).ButseeNance,supranote23,at866(notingthatthecomplete-nessdoctrineallowsanopponenttopiggy-backontheinclusionaryauthorityusedbytheproponentinadmittingtheinitialportionofthestatement). 192. See,e.g.,FED.R.EVID.803(2)(allowinganypartytoadmitout-of-courtstate-mentsfortheirtruthiftheyrelatetoastartlingeventandweremadewhilethedeclar-antremainedunderthestressofexcitementcausedbytheevent). 193. Subjecttoobjectionsongroundsotherthanhearsayofcourse.


by modifying (or foregoing) her own presentation. Her adversary,therefore,maynotutilizeRule106toadmithearsayatherelection,butremainslimitedbythetrialstrategyofheropponent.194

ItmightalsobearguedthatRule106willfosterunfairnessinthetrialprocessifitallows“unreliable”completingremainderstobead-mittedfortheirtruth.Butthisargumentmissesthepointofcomple-tionasapalliativeforadisingenuouspresentation.Inthetypicalcase,theoriginalproponentofapartialstatementpresentsthatstatementforitstruth.Thatispreciselywhatthegovernmentdoesinadmittingtheinculpatorystatementsofacriminaldefendant.Butwhenthegov-ernmentpresentssuchastatementinanincompleteandmisleadingfashion,itpeddlesahalf-truthtothefact-finder.Thecompletingre-maindermustbeadmittedforitstruth,notbecauseitisitselfreliable,butbecauseitisindispensabletoafact-findersearchingforthewholetruth and nothing but the truth. Furthermore, the statements of acriminal defendant are admissible against him pursuant to Rule801(d)(2)(A)inthefirstplace,notbecausetheyarereliable,butbe-causeadversarialfairnessrequiresapersontoanswerforhisownut-terances.195 If theoriginalparty-opponent statementofferedby thegovernmentneednotbereliabletobeadmittedforitstruth,astate-mentnecessarytoofferanaccuraterepresentationofthatstatementneednotbeeither.

Allowingtheadmissionofacompletingremainderfor its truthdoes not mean that the original proponent¾usually the prosecu-tion¾mustaccept the truth of the completing remainder.196 In the

194. OnehearsayexceptionthatdoesoperatesimilarlyisRule804(b)(6)—depriv-inganopponentofahearsayobjectionifsheactedwrongfullytocreatetheunavaila-bilityofadeclarantwiththeintenttopreventtrialtestimony.FED.R.EVID.804(b)(6).Prescribingapunishmentthatfitsthecrime,Rule804(b)(6)allowsallrelevanthear-say statements made by such an unavailable declarant to be admitted against thewrongdoer.Id.Rule106wouldprovideamorelimited,butproportional,remedybydenyingahearsayobjectiontoapartythatproffersamisleadingstatementthatcanbecompletedwith hearsay. See FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (allowing the admission ofpriorconsistentstatementsfortheirtruthonlyiftheopponentimpeachesthedeclar-antinaccordancewiththeexception). 195. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note (“Admissions by aparty-opponentareexcludedfromthecategoryofhearsayonthetheorythattheirad-missibilityasevidenceistheresultoftheadversarysystemratherthansatisfactionoftheconditionsofthehearsayrule.Noguaranteeoftrustworthinessisrequiredinthecaseofanadmission.”(citationsomitted)). 196. SeeJohnsonv.Powers,40Vt.611,612(1868)(“Itisthereforearuleofevi-dencethatthewholedeclarationoradmissionofthepartymadeatonetime,shallbetakentogether,butthejuryareatlibertytobelieveaportionanddisbelievetheother,astheyareofallevidence.”);seealso7WIGMORE,supranote23,§2100,at626(“[I]tisafavoritecautionaryadditionthattheexculpatorypartneednotbebelieved.”).


exampleofferedintheIntroduction,shouldthedefendantadmithiscompletingstatementclaimingtohavesoldthegunpriortothemur-der,theprosecutionwouldremainfreetoarguethefalsityofthede-fendant’sself-servingclaim.Permittingadefendanttoadmitthecom-pleting remainder of his statement on the same footing as theprosecution’sinitialproffersimplymeansthatthedefendantmayar-guethetruthofthecompletingstatement(muchastheprosecutionwillarguethetruthofhisdamagingadmission).Theprosecutionre-mainsfreetochallengethetruthofthecompletingremainder,arguingthatthedefendant’sinitialadmissionofculpabilityringstrue,butthattheself-servingremaindershouldberejectedbythejury.197

***Forallofthesereasons,anamendmenttoRule106shouldreject

theexclusionofcompletingstatementsthatsatisfythefairnessstand-ard simply because they are hearsay and should expressly permitcompletionwithstatementsthatwouldotherwisebeinadmissible.

2. TheTruthoftheMatter—theContextAlternativeDetermining that Rule 106 should authorize completion with

otherwiseinadmissiblestatementsdoesnotfullyresolvethehearsayissuethathasplaguedthefederalcourtsforsolong.Althoughmostfederalcourtshavenotsquarelyaddressedtheusetowhichcomplet-ingstatementsmaybeputonceadmitted,afewcourtsandcommen-tators have suggested that completing statements may sufficientlyservetheirfairnesspurposeiftheyareadmittedfortheirlimitednon-hearsayvalueinplacingadmittedstatementsincontext.198Underthisview,acompletingstatementcouldbeadmitted,butcouldnotbere-lieduponforitstruth.AnamendmenttoRule106thatauthorizestheadmissionofotherwiseinadmissiblehearsayshouldalsoofferguid-anceabouttheusetowhichsuchstatementsmaybeputoncetheyareadmitted.AnoptimalamendmenttoRule106wouldgofurtherthanacontext-onlyapproachandwouldtrulyleveltheplayingfieldbyad-mitting completing statements for the same purpose as the

197. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.108 commentary on a 1978 amendment (“ThisamendmentaddedafinalsentencetoSection90.108tomakeclearthataparty,whoisrequiredtointroducewritingsorrecordedstatementsunderthesection,willnotbeboundbytheevidencesointroduced.”). 198. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44,60(2dCir.2019)(“[W]hentheomittedportionofastatementisproperlyintroducedtocorrectamisleadingimpres-sionorplaceincontextthatportionalreadyadmitted,itisforthisveryreasonadmis-sibleforavalid,nonhearsaypurpose:toexplainandensurethefairunderstandingoftheevidencethathasalreadybeenintroduced.”).


statementstheycomplete,evenifthatmeansadmittingotherwisein-admissiblehearsaystatementsfortheirtruth.199

a. AdmittingCompletingStatementsforTheirTruthIsConsistentwiththeUnderlyingPurposeandOriginalIntentofRule106

AdmittingcompletingstatementsonthesamebasisandforthesamepurposeasthepartiallyadmittedstatementstheycompleteismostconsistentwiththeunderlyingfairnessrationaleforRule106.Alitigantcreatesheradversary’srighttocompletebyselectivelypre-sentingaportionofastatementinamannerthatmisleadsthejuryastoitstrueimport.200Onlybypermittingthecompletingpartytorelyupontheadmittedremaindertothesameextentastheinitialmislead-ingportionisfairnessrestored.Limitingthecompletingstatementtoitsnon-hearsayvalueindemonstrating“context”leavesthepartywhopresentedthepartialstatementinadistortedfashionwithatrialad-vantage.Theproponentwhomanipulatedtheevidenceunfairlymayarguethe“truth”ofthedistortedpartialstatement,whilethewrongedadversaryisleftwiththeweakandconfusingresponsethatthejuryshouldconsiderthecompletingportionofthestatement,notasproofofafact,butonlytoplacetheinitialassertionsof“fact”incontext.Thisallowstheproponentwhomisleadinglypresentedevidencetoretainthebenefitof thedistortedstatement.Arulethat ispremiseduponfairness in presentation cannot countenance such a fairness half-measure.

ThereisstrongevidencethatRule106wasintendedbythedraft-erstoallowcompletingstatementstobepresentedfortheirtruth.Alt-houghDeanWigmorearguedinfavorof limitednon-hearsayuseofcompleting statements, themajorityof courtsat common lawdisa-greedwithhimandallowedcompletingstatementstobeadmittedfortheirtruth.201Inthefaceofthiscommonlawhistory,thedraftersof

199. ThereisanargumenttobemadethatRule106shouldovercomeobjectionsotherthanhearsaytoproperlycompletingevidence.SeeNance,supranote23,at879–80(“[T]hetrumpingfunctionisimportantinanycontextwheretheexclusionaryrulesareasymmetric,thatis,wheretherulesmakecertainevidenceadmissibleifofferedbyoneparty,but inadmissible ifofferedbyanopponent.”).ThisArticle focusesonthehearsayproblembecausethehearsayprohibitioniscommonlyusedtothwartcom-pletion;nootherexclusionaryrulehasbeenraisedinthereportedcasesonRule106. 200. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Velasco,953F.2d1467,1475(7thCir.1992)(“Oncerelevancehasbeenestablished,thetrialcourtthenmustaddressthesecondhalfofthetest,andshoulddosobyasking(1)doesitexplaintheadmittedevidence,(2)doesitplacetheadmittedevidenceincontext,(3)willadmittingitavoidmisleadingthetrierof fact,and(4)willadmitting it insurea fairand impartialunderstandingofall theevidence.”). 201. Seesupranote42.


Rule106maintainedtextualsilenceonthehearsayissuewhilecitinginCommitteenotestotheCaliforniacompletenessprovision,whichallowshearsaytobeadmittedfor its truthwhennecessarytocom-plete.202Hadthedraftersintendedtoalterthemajorityapproachtocompletinghearsayand to limit theuse towhichcompleting state-mentscouldbeput,theywouldhavedonesoexplicitly.

InTomev.UnitedStates,theSupremeCourtadoptedsimilarrea-soningwithrespecttoRule801(d)(1)(B)governingpriorconsistentstatements.Inthatcase,theCourtfoundapre-Rulescommonlawtim-inglimitationontheadmissibilityofpriorconsistentstatementsof-fered to rehabilitate impeached testifying witnesses.203 The Courtfoundthatamajorityofcourtsrequiredapriorconsistentstatementtohavebeenmadebeforeanymotivetofabricatewithwhichthewit-nesswas charged at trial.Where the drafters ofRule 801(d)(1)(B)weresilentwithrespecttoanytimingrequirement,theCourtfoundthecommonlawpre-motivelimitationbakedintotheRule.204Apply-ingthesamereasoningtoRule106suggeststhatthedraftersexpectedthecommonlawmajorityapproachthatpermittedcompletinghear-saytobeofferedforitstruthtocontinueundertheRule.

b. A“Context”OnlyApproach:WastefulComplexityandNeedlessDisruption

Thealternativeofadmittingacompletingstatementforitsnon-hearsayvalueinshowingcontextonlyissuboptimalforseveralrea-sons.Limitingtheuseofcompletingstatementswouldrequirethemtobeaccompaniedbylimitinginstructionscautioningthejuryagainstfulluseoftheevidence.Limitinginstructionsarenotoriouslyconfus-ingforjurorstocomprehendandfollow.205Requiringcompletingre-mainderstobeaccompaniedbylimitinginstructionsineverycasewilllead toconfusionat leastand fairnessdefeatingrejectionof there-mainderatworst.

Thedifficultythejurywilllikelyencounterwitha“context”solu-tioncanbeillustratedwiththehypothetical inwhichthedefendant

202. SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(citingCAL.EVID.CODE§356(Deering2020));seealsoRosenbergv.Wittenborn,3Cal.Rptr.459,464(Dist.Ct.App.1960)(explainingthatqualifyingstatementsashearsayprovidesnobasisforexclud-ingthemundertheCaliforniacompletenessrule). 203. Tomev.UnitedStates,513U.S.150,161–63(1995). 204. Id. 205. DavidAlanSklansky,EvidentiaryInstructionsandtheJuryasOther,65STAN.L.REV.407,447(2013)(“[I]fwecannotcomeupwithanexplanationforthe[limiting]instructionthatwillmakesensetojurors...itmaybeagoodtimetoreexaminetherulethattheinstructionattemptstoimplement.”).


stated: “Ibought thegun,but I sold it twomonthsbefore themur-der.”206Inthatcircumstance,thegovernmentcouldpresentthepor-tionofthestatementthatadmits“Iboughtthegun”andcouldarguethatthedefendant’spossessionofthegunbeforethemurderhasbeenprovedbyhisownstatement.Basedonthatpresentationalone,thejury could reasonably infer that, because the defendant bought thegun,hestillhaditatthetimeofthecrime.Evenifheisthereafterper-mittedtooffertheremainderofhisstatementaboutsellingthegun,thedefendantwouldnotbeabletoarguethattheevidenceindicatesthathenolongerhadthegun.Alimitinginstructionwouldalertthejurythatitcouldconsiderthedefendant’scompletingstatementaboutthesaleofthegunonlyfor“context.”Toproperlyadheretothatin-struction,ajuryshouldsimplydeclinetodrawtheinferenceitwouldotherwisehavedrawnfromthegovernment’spartialandmisleadingpresentation.Thejuryshouldnotassumethedefendanthadthegunat the timeof themurderbecause the completing statement elimi-natesthatinference.Andthejurymaynotassumethatthedefendantsoldthegunbeforethemurderifthecompletingstatementisnotad-missibleforitstruth.Accordingly,afterhearingbothportionsofthestatement,thejuryshouldassumethatthestatementprovidesnoev-idenceonewayortheotheraboutthedefendant’spossessionofthegunatthetimeofthecrime.Itishighlydoubtfulthatalayjurywillperform themental gymnastics required for this completion “solu-tion.”

Instead,itappearslikelythatjurorswillgiveeffecttotheportionofthestatementmisleadinglypresentedbytheprosecutionbecausethegovernmentcanandwillarguethetruthofthatstatement.Jurorsmayinterpretaperplexinginstructiontolimittheiruseofthedefend-ant’scompletingstatementto“context”ascode,cautioningthemtodisbelieveit.Befuddledbythelimitinginstruction,jurorsmaysimplyignore the completingportionaltogether. Sucha jurywouldbe leftwiththeinferencethatthedefendanthadthegunatthetimeofthemurder.Thus,adefendantwhomaynotarguethetruthofhiscontem-poraneous completing statement may lose any benefit from Rule106.207

206. UnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,664(D.Md.2017)(describingthisscenario). 207. JOHNH.WIGMORE,ASTUDENT’STEXTBOOKOFTHELAWOFEVIDENCE322(1935)(acknowledgingthatthenonhearsaytheoryrestsonadistinctionthatis“anartificialdoctrinetendingtoaquibble”);seealsoNance,supranote23,at874(“Whilethere-mainderbecomesadmissibleonlybyvirtueoftheproponent’spresentationofthein-completepart,theneteffectofthewholeoughtnottobelimitedinawaythatitwouldnothavebeen ifofferedby theproponent in the first instance.Thus, theuseof the


Furthermore,amendmentstotheEvidenceRulesshouldnotaddunnecessarycomplexitytothetrialprocess.Acontext-onlyapproachtocompletingstatementsiscontrarytotherecenttrendinevidencerulemaking,whichevincesanintenttoeliminateperplexingandneed-less limiting instructions. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence801(d)(1)(B)wasamendedin2014tomakecertainpriorconsistentstatements¾previouslyadmissibleonlyforthelimitedpurposeofre-habilitatinganimpeachedwitness¾admissiblefortheirtruth.208Oneoftheprincipalbenefitsofthisamendmentwastoeliminatetheneedforconfusinglimitinginstructionscautioningjurorstoutilizeanad-mittedpriorconsistentstatementonlyforitsnon-hearsayrehabilita-tivepurpose.209AnamendmenttoRule106shouldnotruncountertothisobjectivebyrequiringanincomprehensiblelimitinginstructionnotcurrentlygiveninthecompletioncontext.210

Thefactthatlimitinginstructionsarenotanexistingfeatureoffederal completion doctrine reveals another defectwith a “contextonly”amendment toRule106.Suchanamendmentwouldanointadistinctlyminorityviewofcompletionastheuniformfederalrule.Themajority of federal courts admit completing statements thatwouldotherwisebehearsayunderthecurrentversionofRule106withoutlimitingtheusetowhichtheymaybeput.211Otherfederalcourtsex-clude such statements altogether.212 Only one circuit has expresslyprovided that completing statements should be admitted for their“non-hearsay” value andeven thenonly indicta.213AmendingRule106tolimitcompletingstatementstotheirnon-hearsayvalueinall

remainderisnotrightlylimitedtonullifyingtheeffectoftheincompletepart.Thenetprobativeeffectofthewholeutterancemayfavortheopponent.”). 208. FED.R.EVID.801(d)(1)(B)advisorycommittee’snotetothe2014amendment. 209. See Liesa L. Richter, Seeking Consistency for Prior Consistent Statements:AmendingFederalRuleofEvidence801(d)(1)(B),46CONN.L.REV.937,942(2014)(de-scribingthegoaloftheamendment“toeliminatethedisparatetreatmentofsimilarly-situatedpriorconsistentstatementsattrial,aswellastheneedforconfusinglimitinginstructionsthatmaybefuddlealayjury”). 210. SeeBLINKA,supranote1,§107.2(“Thebetterpractice...istointroducetheremainingpartsonthesamefootingasthoseoriginallyoffered.Simplyput,theaddi-tionalevidence‘whichoughtinfairnesstobeconsidered’isalsoadmissibleundertheruleofcompleteness. Juries, likeallpeople(evenlawyers),areill-equippedtodrawtortureddistinctionsbetweenstatementsofferedfortheir‘truth’andthoseadmittedsolely toprovide ‘context.’ ... [T]he trial judge should admit only those statements‘whicharenecessarytoprovidecontextandpreventdistortion.’Thisstandardsufficeswithoutresorttoameaninglesslimitinginstruction.”). 211. Seesupranotes69–83andaccompanyingtext. 212. Seesupranotes84–92andaccompanyingtext. 213. UnitedStatesv.Williams,930F.3d44,64(2dCir.2019).


instanceswouldsignificantlydisruptthesettledoperationofRule106inalmostallfederalcircuits.Theoptimalresolutionofacircuitsplitistypicallyfoundinthemajorityapproachtoacontestedprovision,bothbecauseamajorityofthefederaljudgesthathaveconsideredtheissuehavefavoredoneapproachandbecauseamajorityresolutioncausestheleastdisruptiontoexistingpractice.214Toadoptalimitedcontext-onlyamendmenttoRule106wouldbetoenshrineanuntestedminor-ityviewinruletext.

ThemostsensibleamendmenttoRule106wouldpermitacom-pletingstatementtobeusedforthesamepurposeastheoriginalpar-tiallypresentedstatement.Mostcommonly,theoriginalstatementispresentedforitstruthunderahearsayexception.215If,however,theoriginal partial statement was offered only for its non-hearsayvalue¾perhapsinshowingtheeffectofthestatementonsomepartytothelitigationwhoheardthestatement¾thenlimitingthecomplet-ing statement to the samenon-hearsayusewouldbeboth fair andworkable.216Itwouldbefairbecauseitwouldmaintainalevelplayingfieldforbothpartieswhowouldbothbelimitedtothenon-hearsaypurpose.Becausetheoriginalstatementwouldforcethejurytocom-prehendthelimitedpurposeofthestatementincreatingsomeeffecton the party, a similar limitation on the completing portion of thestatementwouldnot add confusionor complexity. In thesenarrowcircumstances,anon-hearsay limitationonacompletingremainderwouldbeappropriateandwouldberequiredevenbyanamendmentauthorizinguseofacompletingstatementonthesamebasisas theoriginalstatement.ButanamendmenttoRule106shouldnotextendanon-hearsaylimittoallcompletingstatements.

Finally, an amendment to Rule 106 providing that completingstatementsmaybeadmittedfortheirnon-hearsayvaluewouldbeanineffectualexerciseofrulemakingauthority.Rule802oftheFederalRulesexcludeshearsayevidence,butRule801(c)defineshearsayas

214. SeeCapra&Richter,supranote61,at1891(explainingthata“draftershouldordinarilygivegreaterweighttothemajorityruleonanissue”). 215. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Sanjar,876F.3d725,739(5thCir.2017)(“Whenof-feredbythegovernment,adefendant’sout-of-courtstatementsarethoseofapartyopponentandthusnothearsay.”),cert.deniedsubnom.Mainv.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1577(2018). 216. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Sweiss,800F.2d684,690–91(7thCir.1986)(per-mittingthedefensetoofferarecordingofapriorconversationbetweenthedefendantandaninformantshowingthattheinformanttoldthedefendantaboutthechargedplotafterthegovernmentadmittedarecordingofaconversationbetweenthedefendantandthesameinformantsuggestingthatthedefendantknewinadvanceoftheconver-sationabouttheplot).


anout-of-courtstatementthat“apartyoffersinevidencetoprovethetruthofthematterassertedinthestatement.”217Accordingly,acom-pleting statement that is offered only for its non-hearsay value inshowingcontextforthepreviouslyadmittedpartialstatementisnothearsayundercurrentrulesandisthus,alreadyadmissibleunderex-istingRule106.NoamendmenttotheRulesisnecessarytomakeout-of-court statements admissiblewhen they are not offered for theirtruth.Anamendmentthatdoesnothingmorethanechotheoperationofexistingruleswouldnotrepresenteffectiverulemaking.

***Therefore, an ideal amendment toRule106would resolve the

longstandingcircuitsplitwithrespecttootherwiseinadmissiblehear-sayinfavorofadmissibility.Further,tofulfillthefairnessgoalsofRule106andtheFederalRulesofEvidencemorebroadly,anamendmentshould allow the admission of such completing statements for thesamepurposeas the statements they complete. If thepartial state-mentwasintroducedforitstruth,thecompletingstatementnecessarytopreventdistortionoftheevidenceshouldalsobeadmissibleforitstruth.

B. BRINGINGORALSTATEMENTSUNDERTHETENTAnyamendmenttoRule106shouldalsoaddressthelongstand-

ingconflictwithrespecttoincompleteoralstatements.BecauseRule106appliesbyitstermsonlytowrittenandrecordedstatements,itoffersnoremedy forpartiallypresentedoralstatements.Butselec-tivelypresentedoralstatementsraisethesamefairnessconcernsthatpartialwrittenandrecordedstatementsdo.218Courtshavebeenlefttothecommonlawofevidenceandtothenebulousauthorityofthetrialjudgetocontrolthe“modeandorderofexaminingwitnessesandpresentingevidence”underRule611 toaddresscompletenesscon-cernssurroundingoralstatements.Mosttroublingarethecourtsthathavedeniedcompletenessprotectiontooralstatementsentirelybe-causeoftheiromissionfromRule106.AmendingRule106toresolvethe hearsay question affords rule-makers an opportunity to craft amoreconciseandaccessibleapproachtooralstatementsaswell.

217. FED.R.EVID.801(c)(2). 218. WEINSTEIN,supranote14,at106-15(“Bothconsiderationsnormallyarepar-ticularlyimportant,whenwords,whetherwrittenororal,aretheobjectofproof.”);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,664(D.Md.2017)(“Ablanketruleofprohibition [on the completion of oral statements] is unwarranted, and invitesabuse.”).


1. LeavingWellEnoughAlone?IncontrasttothedraftinghistoryofRule106withrespecttothe

hearsayissue,thelegislativehistoryclearlyreflectstheoriginaldraft-ers’decisiontoomitoralstatementsfromtheRule.Inlightofthatun-equivocalintentiontoexcludeoralstatementsfromtheprotectionofRule106andtocodifycompletiononlypartially,acasecouldbemadefor leaving oral statements out of any amendment to the Rule. Anamendedprovisioncouldaddressthemost troublinghearsayques-tionandallowcourts tocontinuerelyinguponRule611(a)andthecommonlawtoresolvecompletenessconcernsattendingthepartialpresentationoforalstatements.

Butthereareseveraldrawbackstothecurrentstateofaffairsforincomplete oral statements. Leaving the completion right for suchstatementsoutintheetherofthecommonlaworinthepenumbraofRule611(a)createsatrapfortheunwarylitigator.TheFederalRulesofEvidenceweredesignedasaconcisesetofstandardsthatlawyerscouldcarryintocourtandconsultintheheatoftrialtoresolveevi-dentiaryquestionsastheyarise.219Unlikeissuessuchastheadmissi-bilityofexpertopiniontestimonyunderRule702orotheractsevi-dence under Rule 404(b) that are commonly argued in limine,completionissuesfrequentlyariseduringtrialinresponsetotheevi-dentiarypresentationofanadversary.Insuchasetting,trialjudgesandlawyersalikeneedtobeabletoconsulttherulebooktodeterminewhethercompletionisauthorized.

WithoutanycompletionprotectionapplicabletooralstatementsexpresslydefinedintheEvidenceRules,lawyers—andevenjudges—maynotthinktoconsidertheremainingcommonlawofevidence.AstheReporterfortheAdvisoryCommitteewhichdraftedtheoriginalRulesnoted:

Inprinciple,undertheFederalRulesnocommonlawofevidenceremains.“Allrelevantevidenceisadmissible,exceptasotherwiseprovided....”Inre-ality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist,thoughinthesomewhatalteredformofasourceofguidanceintheexerciseofdelegatedpowers.220Lawyersmaybeevenlesslikelytoconsiderthepossibilityofa

completionrightlingeringoutsidetheEvidenceRulesinthecommonlawbecause theRules containRule106, a provision that codifies acompletionrightforwrittenandrecordedstatements.Inotherareaswhere the common law has been found to persist—such as in the

219. Imwinkelried,supranote142,at1368–69. 220. EdwardCleary,PreliminaryNotesonReadingtheRulesofEvidence,57NEB.L.REV.908,915(1978).


regulationof impeachment forbias—theRulesaresilent.221 Incon-trast,the“partial”codificationofcompletioninRule106mayambushlawyerswhotaketheRule’sexclusionoforalstatementsatfacevaluewhenarguingforcompletionontheflyintheheatoftrialwithouttheopportunityforresearchor in-depthreviewofAdvisoryCommitteenotes.

Evenwiththeopportunityforstudyandreflection,courtsmaybereluctanttoembraceacommonlawsolutioninthefaceofanevidenceruleonpoint.IntherecentcaseofUnitedStatesv.Oloyede,222forex-ample, thedefendant specifically reliedon the common lawruleofcompletenesstoarguethatanexculpatoryportionofhisoralstate-ment should have been admitted. Notwithstanding the SupremeCourt’s recognition of common law completion rights inBeechAir-craft,theFourthCircuitexpressed“doubtthatacommonlawruleofcompletenesssurvivesRule106’scodification.”223Thecourtfurtherheldthat“anysuchcommonlawrulecannotbeusedtojustifythead-missionofinadmissiblehearsay.”224

NoristheRule611(a)solutionanymoreobviousthanthecom-monlawone.Rule611(a)doesnotrefertocompleteness,anditisnotimmediately evident that a lawyer canuse that provision for reliefwhentherulespecificallyonpointdoesnotprovideprotection.Bothlawyersandjudgesmaybeunawarethatthereisauthorityforcom-pletingoralstatementsoutsideRule106.Indeed,suchunawarenessmay explain the federal cases that simply deny completion of oralstatementsbecausetheyareexcludedfromRule106withoutanydis-cussionofRule611(a)orthecommonlaw.225AndevenforcourtsandlitigantsawareofcompletionrightsoutsideofRule106,bringingoral

221. SeeUnitedStatesv.Abel,469U.S.45,51–52(1984)(findingthatcommonlawimpeachmentforbiascontinuesundertheFederalRulesofEvidencethroughRule402whichmakesallrelevantevidenceadmissibleunlessotherwiseexcludeddespiteomis-sionofbiasrule). 222. UnitedStatesv.Oloyede,933F.3d302,313(4thCir.2019). 223. Id. 224. Id. 225. See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Gibson,875F.3d179,194n.10(5thCir.2017)(re-jectingacompletenessargumentbecauseRule106appliesonly towrittenandrec-orded statements);UnitedStatesv.Hayat,710F.3d875,895 (9thCir. 2013) (“Ourcaseshaveappliedtheruleofcompleteness‘onlytowrittenandrecordedstatements.’”(quotingUnitedStatesv.Ortega,203F.3d675,682(9thCir.2000)));UnitedStatesv.Ramirez-Perez,166F.3d1106,1113(11thCir.1999)(“Becausetheprosecutorques-tionedtheagentonlyaboutwhatMaclaviosaidratherthanaboutwhatwaswritteninthedocument,Rule106didnotapply.”);UnitedStatesv.Wilkerson,84F.3d692,696(4thCir.1996)(findingnorelieffromamisleadingpresentationbecausethecomplet-ingstatementwasunrecordedandomittedfromRule106).


statementswithinRule106’sorbithastheadvantageofresolvingallcompletionissuesthroughasingleconciseprovisionratherthanac-cordingtoaconfusingpatchworkofrulesandcommonlaw.

Further,ifRule106isamendedtoallowcompletionoverahear-sayobjection,leavingoralstatementsoutofRule106becomesevenmoreproblematic.Omittingoral statements fromanamendedRule106would leave the hearsay issueunresolvedwith respect to oralstatements.226AlthoughcourtsmightlooktoanamendedRule106forguidancewithrespecttothehearsayissueinthecontextoforalstate-mentsstillgovernedbyRule611(a)andthecommonlaw,theymightjustaseasilyrejectcompletingoralstatementsonhearsaygroundsbecausetheamendmentdeclinedtoextenditsnewhearsayprotectiontothem.AddingoralstatementstoanamendedRule106thatelimi-natesahearsayobjectiontocompletingstatementswouldcreatenec-essary parallel treatment ofwritten, recorded and oral completingstatements.

2. OralStatementsand“PracticalConcerns”AmendingRule106tocoveroralstatementswillprovideimme-

diatecompletenessprotectionformisleadinglypresentedoralstate-ments in those jurisdictions that have denied the completion rightbasedsolelyontheomissionoforalstatementsfromRule106.Gath-eringthecompletionrightsapplicabletoallstatements,inwhateverformtheyaremade,underasingleuser-friendlyprovisionwillalsoaidjudgesandlitigantsinalljurisdictionsand“promotethedevelop-mentofevidencelaw,totheendofascertainingthetruthandsecuringajustdetermination.”227Still,anamendmenttoRule106thatbringsoralstatementswithinitsprotectionmustaccountforthe“practical”concernsthatledtheoriginaldrafterstoshyawayfromthem.

AlthoughtheAdvisoryCommittee’sexplanationforitschoicetoomitoralstatementsfromRule106iscryptictosaytheleast,twopri-maryconcernsmayhaveanimatedthedecision.Onepossibilityisthatrule-makers were apprehensive about time-consuming disputesaboutthecontentofunrecordedoralstatements—disputesthatarelesslikelytooccurwhenastatementiscommittedtowritingoroth-erwiserecorded.228Anotherrelatedpossibilityisthatthedraftershad

226. SeeOloyede,933F.3dat314(holdingthatthecommonlawcompletionrightcouldnotovercomehearsaydoctrine). 227. FED.R.EVID.102. 228. SeeUnitedStatesv.Bailey,322F.Supp.3d661,670(D.Md.2017)(“[T]he‘practicalreasons’whyoralconversationsareexcludedfromRule106undoubtedly


itmostprominentlyinmindtoenactarulethatwouldmandatecon-temporaneouscompletionandreversethecommonlawreluctancetoallowapartytointerrupthisadversary’scasetooffercompletingev-idence.229ThedraftersofRule106mayhaveforeseenobstaclestotheinterruptionofanopponent’scasetooffercompletingoralstatementsandmayhavefearedthattheinclusionoforalstatementswouldun-derminethegoalofmandatingimmediatecompletion.Forexample,alitigantmightneedtocompleteanoralconversationbycallingadif-ferentwitnesswhowasalsopresentandcouldtestifytotheremain-deroftheconversation.Itcouldbeundulydisruptivetointerrupttheopponent’scasetopresentawitness.Incontrast,immediatecomple-tionofawrittenorrecordedstatementmayeasilybeaccomplishedbyrequiringtheoriginalproponenttopresentadesignatedadditionalportionofthewrittenorrecordedstatement.

Butneitheroftheseconcernsshouldstandinthewayofamend-ingRule106toincludeoralstatements.First,itisnotatallclearthatdifficultiesofproofwereattheheartoftheAdvisoryCommittee’sde-cisiontorejectcompletionoforalconversations.ThatsameCommit-teeproposedaruleonpriorinconsistentstatementsthatallowedoral,unrecordedstatementstobeadmissiblefortheirtruth.230Therewasnoconcernexpressedabout thepotentialdifficulty inprovingsuchstatements,anditcouldbeexpectedthatawitnessbeingimpeachedwith aprior oral statementmightdenyhavingmade it. In fact, theproblems raised by unrecorded statements offered to complete—weretheyevermade,oraretheybeingmisreported—areproblemsraisedbyeveryunrecordedstatementreportedinacourt.231Thereisnosoundreasonfortreatingcompletingunrecordedstatementsdif-ferentlyfromanyotherunrecordedstatementroutinelyadmittedun-dertheFederalRulesofEvidence.

Moreimportantly,theexperienceofthemanyjurisdictionsthathavepermittedthecompletionofpartialoralstatementsrevealsnotime-consumingcostlydisputesoverthecontentof incompleteoralstatements.Asoutlinedabove,severalfederalcircuitscurrentlyper-mit the completionofmisleadingpartial oral statementsunder the

include theneed toavoid ‘he said, she said’disputesabout the contentof anunre-cordedorunwrittenstatement....”). 229. SeeFED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote(highlightingthe“inadequacyofrepairworkwhendelayedtoapointlaterinthetrial”). 230. SeeRICHARDD.FRIEDMAN&JOSHUADEAHL,FEDERALRULESOFEVIDENCE:TEXTANDHISTORY326(2015)(analyzingtheAdvisoryCommittee’sRevisedDefinitiveDraftofRule801(d)(1)(A)). 231. See,e.g.,FED.R.EVID.801(d)(2)(A)(admittingallstatementsallegedlymadebyapartyopponent,whetherrecordedorunrecorded).


authorityofthecommonlaworRule611(a).232Noneofthereportedfederalcasesdiscussadisputebetweenthepartiesaboutthecontentofanunrecordedstatement.Thisis,ofcourse,notdispositiveastotheexistenceofsuchdisputesbecauseitispossiblethatsomemaynotbereported.Still,itdemonstratesthatthereisnosignificantproblemat-tendingcompletionwithoralunrecordedstatementsinthosefederaljurisdictionsthatalreadyallowit.233

Finally,totheextentthatadisputedidariseconcerningthecon-tentorexistenceofanoralstatement,thedifficultyofproofisamatterthatcouldbehandledonacase-by-casebasisunderRule403.234ThefairnessrationaleofRule106shouldapplytocompletingunrecordedstatements,unlessthecourtfindsthattheprobativevalueofthecom-pletionissubstantiallyoutweighedbythedifficultiesanduncertain-tiesofprovingwhatwassaidinagivencase.

Theimpracticalityofcontemporaneouscompletionorinterrup-tionwithunrecordedstatementslikewiseshouldnotstandinthewayofamendingRule106 to includesuchstatements.Theexisting lan-guageofRule106requiresimmediatecompletionofwrittenandrec-ordedstatements“atthattime.”235Althoughsomecourtshavereadthatlanguageliterallyandhaverequiredcompletiontobecontempo-raneous,othershaveappliedRule106moreflexiblyandhaveallowedanopponenttooffercompletingevidenceatalatertime.236Withre-spect tounrecordedoral statementsnot currently coveredbyRule106,thecourtsthatpermitcompletionunderthecommonlaworun-derRule611(a)allowneededflexibilityastotiming.237AndtheAdvi-soryCommitteenotestoRule106expresslyprovidethat“[t]herule

232. Seesupranotes108–18. 233. SeeBailey,322F.Supp.3dat670(“Moreover,ifthecontentofsomeoralstate-ments are disputed anddifficult to prove, others are not—because theyhavebeensummarized(forexample,inaFBIagent’sform302summaryofthedefendant’scon-fession),orbecausetheywerewitnessedbyenoughpeopletoassurethatwhatwasactuallysaidcanbeestablishedwithsufficientcertainty.”). 234. SeeFED.R.EVID.403(allowingcourtsto“excluderelevantevidenceifitspro-bativevalueissubstantiallyoutweighed”bydangers,suchasunfairprejudice,confu-sion,andwasteoftime). 235. FED.R.EVID.106. 236. CompareUnitedStatesv.Larranaga,787F.2d489(10thCir.1986)(holdingthatthedefendantlosthisoneopportunitytointroducecompletinghearsaybecausehewaiteduntilredirecttodemandcompletion),withUnitedStatesv.Holden,557F.3d698, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that that the judge has “discretion to determinewhetherandwhenthecurativeevidenceshouldbeadmitted”). 237. SeeBeechAircraftv.Rainey,488U.S.153,171(1988)(holdingthatitwasanerrortoexcludethecompletinginformationwhenitwasofferedlateroncross-exam-ination).


doesnotinanywaycircumscribetherightoftheadversarytodevelopthematteroncross-examinationoraspartofhisowncase.”238

Therefore, an amended Rule 106 could extend the completionrighttomisleadingoralstatementsbyeliminatingtherigidtimingre-quirementintheexistingprovision.Anamendedprovisioncouldpre-servetheimportantrighttointerruptioninthecircumstanceswhereitcanbeenforcedeffectivelywhilevestingthetrialjudgewithdiscre-tiontodelaycompletiontoalatertimewhenanopponentprefersadelay orwhen the impracticality of completing oral statements re-quiresone.Infact,thisisthetypicalapproachtothetimingofcomple-tioninthefederalcourtstoday.Memorializingitinruletextthatcanbeappliedconsistentlyacrosscircuitsisnotonlyfeasible,butadvisa-ble.

Notably,severalstateshaveadvancedbeyondFederalRule106andhaveextendedtheirevidentiaryprovisionsregardingcompletiontooralstatementswithoutcomplicationorcontroversy.239AlthoughtheWisconsinruleofcompletenessoriginallymirroredFederalRule106,240 itwas amended in 2017 to bring oral statements expressly

238. FED.R.EVID.106advisorycommittee’snote. 239. SeeCAL.CODEEVID.§356(Deering2020)(“Wherepartofanact,declaration,conversation,orwritingisgiveninevidencebyoneparty,thewholeonthesamesub-jectmaybe inquired intobyanadverseparty ....”);CONN.CODEEVID. §1-5 (2018)(“Whenastatementisintroducedbyaparty,thecourtmay,anduponrequestshall,require the proponent at that time to introduce any other part of the statement,whetherornototherwiseadmissible....”);GA.CODEANN.§24-8-822(2020)(“Whenanadmissionisgiveninevidencebyoneparty,itshallbetherightoftheotherpartytohavethewholeadmissionandalltheconversationconnectedtherewithadmittedintoevidence.”);IOWAR.EVID.5.106(2016)(“Ifapartyintroducesallorpartofanact,declaration,conversation,writing,orrecordedstatement,anadversepartymayre-quiretheintroduction...ofanyotherpart....”);MONT.R.EVID.106(2019)(“Whenpart of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or recorded statement or seriesthereofisintroducedbyaparty...anadversepartymayinquireintoorintroduceanyotherpartofsuchitemofevidenceorseriesthereof.”);NEB.REV.STAT.ANN.§27-106(2020)(“Whenpartofanact,declaration,conversationorwritingisgiveninevidencebyoneparty,thewholeonthesamesubjectmaybeinquiredintobytheother.”);N.H.R.EVID.106(2016)(“Apartyhasarighttointroducetheremainderofanunrecordedstatementorconversationthathisorheropponentintroduced[givenit’srelatedtothe same subjectmatter and adds context].”); OR.REV.STAT.ANN. § 40.040 (2019)(“Whenpartofanact,declaration,conversationorwritingisgiveninevidencebyoneparty,thewholeonthesamesubject,whereotherwiseadmissible,mayatthattimebeinquiredintobetheother....”);TEX.R.EVID.107(2020)(“Anadversepartymayalsointroduceanyotheract,declaration,conversation,writing,orrecordedstatementthatisnecessarytoexplainorallowthetrieroffacttofullyunderstandthepartofferedbytheopponent.”). 240. SeeStatev.Eugenio,579N.W.2d642,649n.6(Wis.1998)(notingthat thethen-existingversionoftheWisconsinruleofcompletenesswas“identical”toFederalRule106).


withinitsreach.241ThiswasdonetoaligntheruletextwiththeWis-consincases,whichhavelongpermittedtheadmissionofcompletingoral statements.242 In State v. Eugenio,243 the Wisconsin SupremeCourt acknowledged that the fairness rationale supporting comple-tion ofwritten and recorded statements applies equallywhen oralstatementsarepresentedtothefact-finderoutofcontext.244Similarly,theNewHampshireruleofcompletenesswasamendedin2017toaddarighttocomplete“unrecordedstatementsorconversations.”245Ac-cordingtothecommentarytotherule,theamendmentwasdesignedtobringtheNewHampshireevidenceruleintolinewiththecommonlaw of New Hampshire that permits the completion of oral state-ments.246

Thereportedcasesinthestatejurisdictionsthathaveembracedthe completionofpurelyoral statements revealnomessy trialdis-putesregardingthecontentoforalstatements.247Further,thesestatejurisdictionshavehandledthetimingissuesthatattendthecomple-tionoforalstatementswithease,allowingcompletionduringcross-examinationofawitnessorduringthecompletingparty’scaseratherthan requiring interruption of the proponent’s presentation in all

241. WIS.STAT.ANN.§901.07(West2019)(“Whenanypartofawritingorstate-ment,whetherrecordedorunrecorded,isintroducedbyaparty,anadversepartymayrequirethepartyatthattimetointroduceanyotherpartoranyotherwritingorstate-mentwhichoughtinfairnesstobeconsideredcontemporaneouslywithittoprovidecontextorpreventdistortion.”(emphasisadded)). 242. SeeStatev.Sharp,511N.W.2d316,322(Wis.App.1993)(explainingthattheruleofcompletenesswasrecognizedinthecommonlawofWisconsinsinceatleast1872andthatthecommonlawofcompletionwasnotlimitedtowrittenstatements,butencompassedconversations). 243. Eugenio,579N.W.2dat409. 244. Id.(quoting7DANIELD.BLINKA,WISCONSINEVIDENCE§107.1,at32(1991)). 245. N.H.R.EVID.106(b)(“Apartyhasarighttointroducetheremainderofanun-recordedstatementorconversationthathisorheropponentintroducedsofarasitrelates:(1)tothesamesubjectmatter;and(2)tendstoexplainorshedlightonthemeaningofthepartalreadyreceived.”). 246. SeeN.H.R.EVID.106commentary(“Theadditionof(b),notincludedinFed-eralRuleofEvidence106, codifiesNewHampshirecase lawasset forth inStatev.Lopez,156N.H.416,421(2007).”);seealsoStatev.Warren,732A.2d1017,1020(N.H.1999)(“ThedefendantarguesthatwhileRule106permitsapartyincertaincircum-stancestorequireanopponenttointroducesimultaneouslywithawritingorrecordedstatementotherrelatedwritingsorrecordedstatements,thecompletenessdoctrineappliestoanyverbalutterance.Weagree.”). 247. See,e.g.,Warren,732A.2dat1020(findingthatdefendant’soralexculpatorystatementsservedtoplacehisexpressionofremorseforkillingincontextandwerepartofthesameconversationandthattheseoralstatementsshouldhavebeenadmit-tedunderthedoctrineofcompleteness).


circumstances.248 Although the Federal Rules of Evidencewere de-signedasmodelsforstatepractice,thestatescanserveasreal-worldlaboratoriestotestalterationsandadvancementsinevidentiaryprac-tice.249Whereseveralstateshavealreadyextendedtheirrulesofcom-pletenesstocoverunrecordedoralstatementswithoutanyadverseconsequences,FederalRuleofEvidence106maysafelyfollowsuit.

IV.THEOPTIMALAMENDMENTTOCOMPLETETHERULEOFCOMPLETENESS

Assurprisinglycomplicatedas the issuessurroundingthedoc-trineofcompletenessmaybe,anamendmentthatwouldresolvethoseissueswouldberelativelysimpletodraft.250Updatedruletextwouldneedtoaddressonlythreethings:

First,itwouldneedtoclarifythatacompletingstatementmaybeadmittedonthesamebasisastheoriginallyintroducedportionofthestatementandthatcompletionnecessaryforfairnessdefeatsahear-sayobjection.

Second,anamendmentwouldneedtoexpandthescopeofRule106tocoverincompleteunrecordedoralstatements.

Finally,anamendmentshouldpreserveanadversary’sright tocontemporaneouscompletioninappropriatecircumstances,whileex-presslygrantingflexibilitytopermitdelayedcompletionwhenneces-sary.

AnamendedRule106couldbedraftedasfollows:

Rule106.Remainder of or Related Writings or RecordedStatements

a)IntroducingtheStatement.Ifapartyintroducesallorpartofawritingorrecordedstatement,anadversepartymayrequirethein-troductionoformayintroducerequiretheintroduction,atthattime,ofanyotherpart—oranyotherwritingorrecordedstatement—that

248. See, e.g., CONN.CODEEVID. Sec. 1-5(b) commentary (“Unlike subsection (a),subsection(b)doesnot involve thecontemporaneous introductionofevidence.Ra-ther,itrecognizestherightofapartytosubsequentlyintroduceanotherpartortheremainderofastatementpreviouslyintroducedinpartbytheopposingpartyundertheconditionsprescribedintherule.”). 249. Seesupranote152. 250. ManythankstoEdChengandBrookeBowermanforhelpfulfeedbackonanearlierdraftofourproposedamendment language.Wemodifiedourproposed lan-guage slightly based upon their sage observations. SeeEdwardK. Cheng& BrookeBowerman,CompletingtheQuantumofEvidence,105MINN.L.REV.HEADNOTES(forth-coming2021).


in fairness ought tobe considered togetherwith the initially intro-ducedstatement.atthesametimeTheadversepartymaydosoevenifthecompletingstatementisotherwiseinadmissibleundertheruleagainsthearsay.

b)TimingtheIntroduction.Thecompletingstatementshouldbeadmittedatthesametimeasthe initialstatement.Butthecourtmay,initsdiscretion,allowcompletionatalatertime.

AnAdvisoryCommitteenotetoanamendedruleshouldempha-

sizethefairness-forfeiturejustificationforallowingacompletingre-maindertobeadmittedonthesamebasisastheoriginallyintroducedstatementandhighlighttheinequitiesintheprecedentthathaspre-ventedcompletiononhearsaygrounds.Thenoteshouldmakeclearthatsomeremaindersmaycreateafairandaccuratepictureofapre-viouslyintroducedstatementiftheyareintroducedonlyfortheirnon-hearsayvalueinshowingcontext.Forexample,iftheoriginalpartialstatementwasintroducedonlytoshowitseffectonsomepartytothecase,aremaindermayneedtobeintroducedonlyforasimilarnon-hearsaypurposetogiveanaccuratepictureoftheimpactofthestate-ment.Buttotheextentthattheoriginalstatementwaspresentedforitstruth,acompletingremainderrequiredbyfairnessshouldbeavail-ableforthesamepurpose.

The Advisory Committee note should also explain that theamendmentbringsoralstatementswithintheprotectionoftheRuletocollectcompletionrightsunderasingleuser-friendlyruleandtoavoidtheneedtoconsultRule611(a)orthecommonlaw.Thenoteshouldpointoutthatthecompletionoforalstatementsisalreadyper-mittedinthemajorityoffederaljurisdictionsandthattheadditionoforalstatementstoRule106doesnotalterthestandardsapplicabletothecompletionoforalstatements.

The Advisory Committee note should also instruct judges andlawyers as to the timing requirements of an amendedRule 106. ItwouldneedtoemphasizetheimportanceofimmediateinterruptionwithacompletingremainderthathasbeenthecornerstoneofRule106sinceitsadoption.Theretentionoftherighttocontemporaneouscompletioninmostcircumstancesisnecessarytoavoidadelaythatmighthamperanadversary’sabilitytoavoidamisleadingimpression.Still,thenoteshouldsignalthattrialjudgespossessthediscretiontopermitorrequiredelayedcompletiontoavoidinefficientdisruptionorotherproblemsofproof.

Finally, despite all the alterations to Rule 106 that such anamendment would bring, it would not and should not alter the


longstanding and narrow fairness standard that opens the door tocompletioninthefirstplace.ACommitteenoteshouldreiteratethatfairnessrequirescompletionundertheamendedprovisiononlywhentheinitialpresentationcreatesamisleadingimpressionanddistortsthetrueimportofthestatement—it isthemisleadingnatureoftheoriginalpresentationthatjustifiestheforfeiturebasisforcompletion.AlloftherevisionstoRule106wouldaddresstheproperoperationofcompletenessonlyafterthatnarrowstandardhasbeentriggered.

CONCLUSIONRule106,asoriginallyenacted,representeda“partial”codifica-

tionofthecommonlawdoctrineofcompletion.Itwasdesignedpri-marilytoaddressatimingconcernandtoallowinterruptionofanad-versary’scasetooffercompletingevidence.Accordingly,Rule106leftthorny issues, such as the interaction between completion and thehearsayruleandthecompletionoforalstatements, tothecommonlaw.Althoughaminimalistapproachtoevidencerulemakingisoftenpreferabletopreserveflexibilityintheproofprocess,thelessonofthelastforty-fiveyearsisthatthe“partialcodification”ofcompletionhascausedseriousconfusionandsometimesgenuineinjustice.RemainingsilentaboutthehearsayissuehascausedcourtsliketheSixthCircuittoconcludethatcompletingevidencemustbe“otherwiseadmissible,”whichappearstobeatoddswiththecommonlawandwiththedraft-ers’intentanddefeatsthefundamentalfairnesspurposeoftheRule.“Partial codification” has led to a court finding that the completionright is lost if not advanced contemporaneously, a holding that ap-pearstobeinconsistentwiththeintentofthedrafterstocreatearightto interrupt, but not to eliminate a completion opportunity if notsoughtimmediately.Finally,leaving“oral”statementsoutofthe“par-tialcodification”hasledtosomecourtsfindingnocompletionrightfororalstatementsandtoothersusingthecommonlawandRule611(a)tofillinthegaps,thuscreatingafragmentedruleofcompletionandatrapfortheunwary.

TheamendmenttoRule106proposedinthisArticlewouldcre-ateamuchfullercodificationofcompletionthanthepartialoneini-tiallyattempted.Indeed,itshouldmeanthatthereisnocommonlawofcompletenessremaining.Thatmoveisneededtoresolvetheambi-guitiesand inaccuracies thepartialcodificationhasengendered.Anincompleteruleofcompletenesshasproventobeanevidentiaryironythathashamperedthejustandefficientoperationofthetrialprocess.ThisnaggingandimportantissueisaddressedbyamendingRule106


to provide ameaningful remedy for amisleadingpresentationof astatement.

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