Evidencedoctrines Midterms

8/13/2019 Evidencedoctrines Midterms

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Lalay Abala. ALS2014B. Evidence. 1

EVIDENCE DOCTRINES

Admissibility

Reyes v. CA (1992)

- Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases evenin a suppletory character. In the hearing, investigation anddetermination of any question or controversy, affidavits andcounter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible inevidence. (Section 16, PD 946)

- In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is nomore than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence doesnot necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is requiredin an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be suchrelevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion and its absence is notshown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record,

direct or circumstantial.

People v. Turco (2000)

- Minor lapses in a witness testimony should be expectedwhen a person recounts details of an experience sohumiliating and so painful to recall as rape.

- No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow anexamination of her private parts, and thereafter pervertherself by being subjected to a public trial if she was notmotivated solely by the desire to have the culpritapprehended and punished. Her testimony deserves

credence accorded thereto by the trial court.- Sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, andthe like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim.

- Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and isnot excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Sinceadmissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance andcompetence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic andlaw. On the other hand, the weight to be given to suchevidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation

within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the

jurisprudence laid down by the Court.!While evidence maybe admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weightmay be inadmissible because a special rule forbids itsreception.

Agustin v. CA (2005)

- We have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test foridentification and parentage testing.

- Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNAtest as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as theappropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule onthe admissibility of DNA evidence.

Relevance

Lopez v. Hessen (1961)

- The expert testimony regarding the rifles should be admittedbecause it is relevant to the issue. The expert testimony wasupon the ultimate issue of whether or not the safety device

was dangerous and defective.

State v. Ball (1960)

- The unexplained flight and resisting arrest even after 30days after the supposed commission of the crime is arelevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes tothe weight of evidence rather than its inadmissibility.

Anti-Wiretapping Act

Gaanan v. IAC (1986)

- There must be either a physical interruption through awiretap or the deliberate installation of a device orarrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record thespoken words. An extension phone cannot be placed in thesame category as a Dictaphone. The telephone extension in


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this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happenedto be there for ordinary office use.

- Framers of RA 4200 were more concerned with penalizingthe act of recording a telephone conversation than merelylistening thereto.

-

Hence, mere act of listening to a telephone conversation inan extension line is not punished by Anti-Wiretapping Law.To be punishable, it must be with the use of the enumerateddevices.

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA (1994)

- Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations notadmissible in evidence under RA 4200.

- Absent a clear showing that both parties to the phoneconversation allowed the recording of the same, theinadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory.

Ramirez v. CA (1995)

- Even a person privy to a communication who records hisprivate conversation with another without the knowledge ofthe latter violates RA 4200. The law makes no distinction asto whether the party sought to be penalized by the statuteought to be a party other than or different from thoseinvolved in the private communication.

- The mere allegation that an individual made a secretrecording of a private communications by means of a taperecorder would suffice to constitute an offense. It doesntneed to be heard by a third person.

Judicial Notice

City of Manila v. Garcia (1967)

- The charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein totake judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal

board.

Baguio v. Vda. De Jalagat (1971)

- The lower court certainly could take judicial notice of thefinality of a judgment in a case that was previously pendingand thereafter decided by it.

- Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases todetermine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or

whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the caseunder consideration (Chief Justice Moran)

Prieto v. Arroyo (1965)

- As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicialnotice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, ofthe contents of other cases, even when such cases have beentried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstandingthe fact that both cases may have been tried or are actuallypending before the same judge.

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales (1988)

- A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the ru les ofevidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot beconsidered by a court of justice unless such custom isproperly established by competent evidence like any otherfact.

- To establish a valid foreign marriage, the existence of theforeign law as a question of fact and the alleged foreignmarriage must be proven by convincing evidence.

- Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.

- In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, itshould be presumed that it is the same as ours.

Tabuena v. CA (1991)

- See Prieto v. Arroyo doctrine.- Nevertheless, it [the court] applied the exception that (a) in

the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience toall parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of theoriginal record of a case filed in its archives as read into therecord of a case pending before it, when (b) with theknowledge of the opposing party, (c) reference is made to it


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for that purpose, by name and number or in some othermanner by which it is sufficiently designated; (d) or when theoriginal record of the former case or any part of it, is actually

withdrawn from the archives by the courts direction, at therequest or with the consent of the parties, and (e) admitted

as a part of the record of the case then pending.

People v. Godoy (1995)

- In rape committed through forcible means, the testimony ofthe complainant must be corroborated by physical evidenceshowing use of force.

- The SC is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of thecomplainant of having been threatened appears to be acommon testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge.

- The SC takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in ruralareas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required toact with circumspection and prudence, and that great

caution is observed so that their reputations shall remainuntainted.

BPI v. CA (2000)

- See Prieto v. Arroyo doctrine.- Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts

may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known tojudges because of their judicial functions. (A copy of thedecision of the CTA in a previous case was already attachedto the Petition for Review before the SC.)

Calamba Steel Center v. CIR (2005)- See Prieto v. Arroyo and Tabuena v. CA doctrines- Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force.

(CTA was well-aware of the existence of another similar casepending before it.)

- Admissibility is one thing, weight is another. To admitevidence and not to believe it are not incompatible with eachother.

Judicial admissions

Lucido v. Calupitan (1914)

- The original, withdrawn pleading of the party to an actionmay be introduced in evidence as an admission against him,especially when it is singed by himself acting as his ownattorney.

Torres v. CA (1984)

- An original complaint once amended cease to be a publicrecord or a judicial admission. An adverse statement in theoriginal pleading must be adduced and offered in evidence.

Real and demonstrative evidence

People v. Bardaje (1980)

- Physical evidence is of the highest order. The medicalfindings showed no evidence of external injuries, disproving

what complainant testified to that she was dragged from thehouse thus rendering her credibility in doubt.

- It is impossible that complainant could have been raped bythe accused inside a small room occupied by a woman andtwo children and in a small hut where the owner, his wife,and seven children are all particularly where allegedly theappellant was with five other persons residing therein.

- Extrajudicial confession is not enough to convict unlessaccompanied by evidence of corpus delicti.

Sison v. People (1995)

- The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, whenpresented in evidence, must be identified as to its productionand testified as to the circumstances under which they wereproduced.

- Photographer is not the only witness who can identify thepicture he has taken they can also be identified by any


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other competent witness who can testify to their exactnessand accuracy.

- Even if the person who took the photographs was notpresented to identify them, the use of said photographs bysome of the accused to show their alleged non-participation

in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracythereof.

People v. Atadero (2002)

- Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from themouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself.Evidence is credible when it is such as the commonexperience of mankind can approve as probable under thecircumstances. We have no test of the truth of humantestimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,observation and experience.

- Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order it speaksmore eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

Adamczuk v. Holloway (1940)

- Before a photograph is made admissible, it must form part ofa witness testimony, in other words, it must be verified.

- If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed, and iscompetent to testify that the photograph correctly representsit, it should, if relevant, be admitted.

- The rule is well-settled that a picture may be put in evidenceif it is relevant to the issue and if it is verified. It does nothave to be verified by the one who took the photograph.

Verification depends on the competency of the verifyingwitness.

State v. Tatum (1961)

- For a photograph to be admissible in evidence, theauthentication required by courts is that some witness (notnecessarily the photographer) be able to give some indicationas to when, where, and under what circumstances thephotograph was taken, and that the photograph accuratelyportray the subject or subjects illustrated.

Best evidence rule

Air France v. Carrascoso (1966)

- When the subject of the inquiry is not the actual entry in adocument but the fact that the entry was made, it

does not come within the prohibition of the Best Evidence Rule andis therefore admissible in evidence.

Meyers v. US (1948)

- The best evidence rule is limited to cases where contents of awriting are to be proved.

People v. Tan (1959)

- If the documents or papers to be introduced in evidence wereproduced by the use of carbon sheets, and which therebyproduced a facsimile of the originals including the figuresand the singatures on the originals, they are regarded asduplicate originals and may be introduced as such, even

without accounting for the non-product ion of the otheroriginals.

Seiler v. Lucas Film Ltd. (1986)

- Best evidence rule applies in copyright infringement cases,where plaintiff possessed no originals of any work he

contended was copied; accordingly, before subsequentreconstructions were admissible, plaintiff had to establishthat originals were lost or destroyed through no fault of hisown.

- Creative literary work or photograph, proof of those contentsis necessary in copyright, defamation or invasion of privacycases, is covered by best evidence rule.

People v. Tandoy (1990)


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- The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of thedocument are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is onlyas to whether or not such document was actually executed, orexists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding itsexecution, the best evidence rule does not apply and

testimonial evidence is admissible.- Since the marked money was presented solely for thepurpose of establishing its existence and not its contents,other substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox copy is thereforeadmissible without the need of accounting for the original.

US v. Gregorio (1910)

- In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it isindispensable that the judges and the courts have beforethem the document alleged to have been simulated,counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find

whether or not the crime was actually committed; in the

absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude,with only a copy of the said original, that there has been acrime committed, because in such a case, even the existenceof such original may be doubted.

Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes (1931)

- The rule of procedure which requires the production of thebest evidence, is applicable to the present case, and thecopies of the weekly where the libelous article was published,and its translation, certainly constitute the best evidence ofthe libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of

an article published in it.

Vda. De Corpus v. Brabangco (1963)

- It is not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contentsof lost instruments, that the witnesses should be able totestify with verbal accuracy to its contents.

Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union (1977)

- Original writing must be produced except when originalconsists of numerous accounts or documents which cannot

be examined in court without great loss of t ime and the factsought to be established from them is only the general resultof the whole

- Voluminous character of the accounts or documents shouldbe established

-

Accounts or documents should be made accessible to theadverse party- An audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is

inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records,books of accounts, reports or the like.

Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer (1968)

- Requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence whenoriginal is in adverse partys custody (1) opponentspossession of the original, (2) reasonable notice to opponentto produce the original, (3) satisfactory proof of its existence;and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original

in court.- Regarding the first element, it is not necessary for a party

seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that theoriginal is in the actual possession of his adversary. It isenough that the circumstances are such as to indicate thatthe writing is in his possession or under his control. Neitheris it required that the party entitled to the custody of theinstrument should on being notified to produce it, admithaving it in his possession.

Michael & Co. v. Enriquez (1915)

!The writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost ordestroyed, in which case, before its contents may be proved

by other evidence, it must be shown by the person offeringthe secondary evidence (a) that the document was dulyexecuted and delivered, where delivery is necessary and (b)that it has been lost or destroyed.

! The execution and delivery of the document may beestablished (a) by the person or persons who executed it, bythe person before whom its execution was acknowledged, (b)

by any person who was present and saw it executed anddelivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and


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recognized the signature or (c) by a person to whom theparties to the instruments had previously confessed theexecution

! The loss may be shown by (a) any person who knew the factof its loss, (b) anyone who has made, in the judgment of the

court, a sufficient examination in the place where the doc orpapers of similar character are usually kept by the person inwhose custody the document lost was, and has been unableto find it (c) who has made any other investigation which issufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeedlost.

! After proper proof of the due execution and delivery and itsloss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents

by any person who signed the document, or who read it, orwho heard it read knowing, or it being proved from othersources, that the document read was the one in question.Such evidence may also be given by any person who waspresent when the contents of the document were talked over

between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give himreasonably full information as to its contents; or the contentsmay be proved by any person to whom the parties to theinstrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof; or

by a copy thereof; or by a recital of its contents in someauthentic document.

De Vera v. Aguilar (1988)

- Secondary evidence is admissible when the originaldocuments were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to theintroduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent

must establish the former existence of the instrument. Thecorrect order of proof is asfollows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although thisorder may be changed if necessary in the discretion of thecourt. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for theadmission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicialdiscretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of theparticular case.

- See Michael & Co. v. Enriquez doctrine.

Hutchinson v. Buscas (2005)

- To successfully maintain an action to recover the ownershipof a real property, the person who claims a better right to itmust prove 2 things (1) the identity of the land claimed,and (2) his title thereto.

- The person who claims has a better right to the propertymust first fix the identity of the land he is claiming bydescribing the location, area and boundaries thereof.

- What defines a piece of land is not the size ment ioned in theinstrument but the boundaries thereof which enclose theland and indicate its exact limits.

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong (2007)

- The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronicdocument as admissible in evidence if it complies with therules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and

related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribedby the said Rules. An electronic document is also theequivalent of an original document under the Best EvidenceRule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or othermeans, shown to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to beadmissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to beconsidered as the functional equivalent of an originaldocument under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing mustforemost be an electronic data message or an electronicdocument.

- The term electronic data message does not apply to telexesor faxes, except computer-generated faxes. This construction

of the term is in harmony with the Electronic CommerceLaws focus on paperless communications and thefunctional equivalent approach that it espouses. Hence,facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, paperless,

but verily are paper-based.- A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic

evidence it is not the functional equivalent of an originalunder the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible aselectronic evidence.

- Since a facsimile transmission is not an electronic datamessage or an electronic document and cannot be


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considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greaterreason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission notelectronic evidence.

- The offeror of secondary evidence must prove the predicatesthereof namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original

without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror whichcan be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practicesof destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove

by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonableinference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and(c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide butunsuccessful search has been made for the document in theproper place or places. It has been held that where themissing document is the foundation of the action, morestrictness in proof is required than where the document isonly collaterally involved.

- Evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may bevalidly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.

NAPOCOR v. Codilla (2007)

- An electronic document refers to information or therepresentation of information, data, figures, symbols orother models of written expression, described or howeverrepresented, by which a right is established or an obligationextinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,

which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,retrieved or produced electronically.

- When the original document has been lost or destroyed, orcannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its

execution or existence and the cause of its unavailabilitywithout bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by acopy, or by a recital of its contents in some authenticdocument, or by the testimony of witnesses in the orderstated.

- The offeror of secondary evidence See MCC v. Ssangyongdoctrine.

Estrada v. Desierto (2001)

- All these prior events are facts which are within judicialnotice by the SC. The reference by the Court to certainnewspapers reporting them as they happened does not makethem inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The newsaccount only buttressed these facts as facts.

-

Production of the original may be dispensed with in the trialcourts discretion, whenever in the case at hand, theopponent does not bonafide dispute the contents of thedocuments and no other useful purpose will be served byrequiring production.

- Where the former president was given an opportunity toinspect the Angara Diary but did not object to itsadmissibility, it is already too late to raise his objections inan Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been used asevidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.

Secondary evidence

Ebreo v. Ebreo (2006)

- When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,no evidence shall be admissible other than the originaldocument, except in the following cases: (a) when theoriginal has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced incourt, without bad faith on the part of the offeror, (b)whenthe original is in the custody or under the control of the partyagainst whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails toproduce it after reasonable notice, (c) when the original

consists of numerous accounts or other documents whichcannot be examined in court without great loss of time andthe fact sought to be established from them is only thegeneral result of the whole, and (d) when the original is apublic record in the custody of a public officer or is recordedin a public office.

- It is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adducesecondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of adeed or document, the party has to prove with the requisitequantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailabilityof all the copies of the original of the said deed or document.


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Parole evidence rule

Enriquez v. Ramos (1962)

- When the terms of an agreement have been reduced towriting, it is to be considered as containing all that has beenagreed upon, and that no evidence other than the termsthereof can be admitted between the parties, holds true onlyif there is no allegation in the pleadings that the agreementdoes not express the true intent of the parties

Canuto v. Mariano (1918)

- The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsicevidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrumentdoes not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of

an agreement between the parties in writing, entered intosubsequent to the time when the written instrument wasexecuted, notwithstanding such agreement may have theeffect of adding, changing, modifying or abrogating thecontract of the parties as evidenced in writing; for the parolevidence does not in any way deny that the originalagreement of the parties was that which the writing purportsto express, but merely goes to show that the parties haveexercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or tomake a new and independent contract.

Yu Tek & Co v. Gonzales (1915)

- There was a written contract where defendant undertook todeliver 600 piculs of sugar. The defendant sought to prove byparol evidence that it was the understanding that the sugar

was to be procured from defendants crop. There was nothingin the writing which could be construed as to limit theagreement to the defendants own crop of sugar.

Land Settlement and Development Corp. v. Garcia (1963)

- When operation of contract depends on occurrence of anevent which is a condition precedent, such may beestablished by parol evidence.

- When the agreement extending time for payment of thedefendants accounts to a date subsequent to the filing of the

action to recover the said indebtedness, made reference to aprevious agreement, the trial court should have admittedevidence of surrounding circumstances to show that thesupposed agreement to extend never became effective byreason of failure of some collateral condition.

Maulini v. Serrano (1914)

- Parol evidence is admissible to show that an indorsementwas made wholly without consideration and, that in makingit, the indorser acted as agent for the indorsee and as a mere

vehicle for the transfer of the naked title from the maker ofthe indorsee.

- The prohibition does not apply where the purpose of theparol evidence is to show that no written contract everexisted, that the minds of the parties never met on the termsof such a contract, that thye never mutually agreed to enterinto such a contract, and that there never existed anyconsideration upon which such an agreement could befounded.

PNB v. Seeto (1952)

- Assurances made by an indorser that the drawer has funds,which assurances induced the bank to cash the check, are

admissible in evidence but they are merely expressions of theobligations of the indorser.

Woodhouse v. Halili (1953)

- The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to beintroduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, butto prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it toprove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with

which or by which he secured the other partys consent


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thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parolevidence rule.

- Where parties prohibited from proving said representat ionsor inducements, on the ground that the agreement hadalready been entered into, it would be impossible to provemisrepresentation or fraud. The parol evidence ruleexpressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the

validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings.

Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos (1927)

- The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict awriting does not extend so far as to preclude the admission ofextrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneouscollateral parol agreements between the parties, but suchevidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the

written agreement contains reference to such collateralagreement.

- A court may take judicial notice of the fact that protracteddelay in the milling of sugar cane results in loss, and it mayhave recourse to scientific treatises dealing with thecultivation of cane for the purpose of obtaining informationon this point.

Cruz v. CA (1990)

- The reason for the rule is the presumption that when theparties have reduced their agreement to writing they havemade such writing the only repository and memorial of thetruth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be

understood to have been waived or abandoned.- Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of adocument embodying the terms of an agreement. Exhibit Ddoes not contain such an agreement, hence the rule will notapply, and parol evidence may be introduced to explain thereal agreement between the parties.

- A receipt a written acknowledgment, handed by one partyto the other of the manual custody of money or otherpersonalty will in general fall without the line of the rule. Itis not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the factsmay be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is

because usually a receipt is merely a written admission of atransaction independently existing, and, like otheradmissions is not conclusive.

- Failure to object to the introduction of evidence varying theterms of a written agreement, is deemed a waiver of the

benefit of the parol evidence ru le. The proper time to make aprotest or objection is when, from the question addressed tothe witness, or from the answer thereto, or from thepresentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, ormay be inferred.

- Courts cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily beincompetent under the rules but has been renderedadmissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.

Lechugas v. CA (1986)

- The parol evidence rule does not apply and may not beproperly invoked by either party to the litigation against the

other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not partyor a privy of a party to the written instrument in questionand does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a rightoriginating in the instrument or the relation establishedthereby.

Inciong v. CA (1996)

- The parol evidence rule does not specify that the writtenagreement be a public document.

- For the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract neednot be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties

as a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of asimilar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted byparol or extrinsic evidence.

Ortanez v. CA (1997)

- Under the general rule, when the terms of an agreementwere reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the termsagreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admittedother than the contents thereof. Considering that the writtendeeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever


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is not found in said instruments must have been waived andabandoned by the parties.

- The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the terms of awritten instrument by testimony purporting to show that, ator before the signing of the document, other or differentterms were orally agreed upon by the parties.

- Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of acontract but cannot incorporate additional contemporaneousconditions which are not mentioned at all in the writingunless there has been fraud or mistake.

Rosario Textile Mills Corp. v. Home Bankers Savings(2005)

- Under the rule, the terms of a contract are renderedconclusive upont he parties and evidence aliunde is notadmissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceableagreement embodied in a document.

Madrigal v. CA (2005)

- Even if the document appears to be a sale, parol evidencemay be resorted to if the same does not express the trueintent of the parties.

Interpretation of documents

Lambert v. Fox (1914)

- The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, inthe first instance, from the words of the contract itself.Interpretation and construction should be by theinstruments last resorted to by a court in determining whatthe parties agreed to. Where the language used by the partiesis plain, then construction and interpretation areunnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for theparties.

Captial Insurance & Surety v. Sadang (1967)

- If the contract as actually drafted seems to be vague orambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against the party

who prepared the document, and in accordance with the realintention of the parties.

Mental incapacity or immaturity

People v. De Jesus (1984)

- Complainant, although feeble-minded, is a competentwitness, as she can perceive and transmit in her own way herown perceptions to others.

People v. Salomon (1994)

- A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualifiedfrom being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature andcredibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his perceptionsand the manner he can make them known to the court.

People v. Mendoza (1996)

- Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if hecan perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perceptionto others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which heis examined. No rule defines any particular age as conclusiveof incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particularchild is to be investigated.

- The requirements of a childs competency as a witness arethe: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection,and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining

whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to theforegoing requirements, it is settled that the trial court iscalled upon to make such determination.

- There are certain matters that aid the trial court in assessingthe credibility of a witness which are not available to theappellate court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the inflectionof the voice of the witness.


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People v. Macapal (2005)

- Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. Amentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptanceof his or her testimony depends on the quality of his or herperceptions and the manner he or she can make them knownto the court.

- Testimonial discrepancies, which could have been caused bythe natural fickleness of memory, tend to strengthen, ratherthan weaken credibility as they negate any suspicion ofrehearsed testimony and do not destroy the substance of the

victims testimony.

Spousal immunity

Ordono v. Daquigan (1975)

- Wife may testify against the husband who commits rapeagainst their daughter. That conclusion is in harmony withthe practices and traditions of the Filipino family.

- Where the marital and domestic relations are so strainedthat there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace andtranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based uponsuch harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity ofinterests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury

based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such asituation, the security and confidences of private life whichthe law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappyhome.

- When an offense directly attack or directly and vitallyimpairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within theexception to the statute that one shall not be a witnessagainst the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crimecommitted (by) one against the other.

People v. Castaneda (1979)

- Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification ofa deed of sale of conjugal house and lot where wife was madeto appear as having given her consent to the sale.

People v. Francisco (1947)

- Reasons for the incompetency to testify for or against eachother (a) identity of interests; (b) the consequent danger ofperjury; (c) policy of the law which deems it necessary toguard the security and confidences of private life even at therisk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects suchevidence because its admission would lead to domesticdisunion and unhappiness, and (d) where a want of domestictranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spousesthrough the hostile testimony of the other.

- Where the marital and domestic relations are so strainedthat there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace andtranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests

disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based onthat identity is non-existent. The security and confidences ofprivate life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing

but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a voidin the unhappy home.

- As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency itself isthe other that it may be waived. Objections to thecompetency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminalprosecution against the other may be waived as in the case ofthe other witnesses generally.

Lezama v. Rodriguez (1968)

! The provision deals with 2 different matters which rest ondifferent grounds of policy (1) disqualification of husbandand wife to testify in each others behalf, (2) as well as theirprivilege not to testify against each other. The reason is saidto be that relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniaryinterest, is the basis of the disqualification.

Alvarez v. Ramirez (2005)

! Reasons for the incompetencySee People v. Castaneda


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Dead Mans Statute

Guerrero v. St. Clares Reality (1983)

! The dead-mans rule does not apply to a witness who is nota party or assignor of a party or person in whose behalf acase is being prosecuted.

! The dead mans rule does not apply where the case is not aclaim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, buta case where defendant is being sued for allegedly claimingownership of plaintiffs lot without basis.

De Abraham v. Estate of Ysmael (1962)

! There was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel forthe administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on

the very matters subject of the prohibition.

Goni v. CA (1986)

! The privilege to invoke the dead mans statute is waived bythe defendant where (a) he cross-examines the plaintiff; and(b) he files a counterclaim against the plaintiff.

Tongco v. Vianzon (1927)

! The object and purpose of this statute is to guard against thetemptation to give false testimony in regard to thetransaction in question on the part of the surviving party.

The law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and wasnot designed to suppress the truth.

! The law does not apply and a witness is competent to testifywhen the actions were not brought against the estate, norwere they brought upon claims against the estate.

Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf (1949)

! Inasmuch as the Rules of Court disqualifies only parties orassignors of parties, the officers and/or stockholders of acorporation are not disqualified from testifying for or against

the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim ordemand against the estate of a deceased person as to anymatter of fact occurring before the death of such deceasedperson.

Razon v. IAC (1992)

! It is clear that the testimony of the petitioner is not withinthe prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against theadministrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claimsagainst the estate. Furthermore, the records show that theprivilege respondent never objected to the testimony of thepetitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction withthe late elder Chuidian. The petitioners testimony wassubject to cross-examination by the private respondentscounsel. Hence, granting that the petitioners testimony is

within the prohibition of the Rules of Court, the privaterespondent is deemed to have waived the rule.

Londres v. CA (2002)

! The present case was not filed against the administrator ofthe estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estatesince it was the heirs of Filomena who filed the complaintagainst the private respondents. Besides, the fact thatcounsel failed to timely object to the admissibility of thetestimony is a waiver of the prohibition.

Marital privilege

People v. Carlos (1925)

! Where a privileged communication from one spouse to theother comes into the hands of a third party, without collusionor voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses,the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication,if otherwise competent, becomes admissible in evidence.

! If the communication (letter) was obtained throughvoluntary delivery, it is st ill privileged communication. If it is


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obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addresseesconsent, the privilege should cease.

Attorney-client privilege

Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society (1915)

! Communications made by a client to his attorney for thepurpose of being communicated to others are not privilegedafter they have been so communicated, and may be proved

by the testimony of the attorney. This rule applies to acompromise agreement perfected by the attorney with theauthority and under the instructions of his client.

! Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surroundscommunications made between attorney and client, is thatsuch communications are not intended for the information of

third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of thepurpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evidentthat a communication made by a client to his attorney for theexpress purpose of its being communicated to a third personis essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation.

When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructionsbe delivering the communication to the third person forwhom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot,by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as aprivileged communication between the attorney and hisclient. It is plain that such a communication, after reachingthe party for whom it was intended at least, is a

communication between the client and a third person, andthat the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary oragent.

Regala v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

! It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in fortheir clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are

being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and servicesperformed in the course of their duties as lawyers.Petitioners inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is

merely being used as leverage to compel them to name theirclients.

! An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because hepossesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed onhim by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the

judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different fromand superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, anattorney also occupies what may be considered as a quasi-

judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the Court andexercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to betaken favorable to his client.

! Generally, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuseto divulge the name or identity of his client. But clientidentity is privileged where a strong probability exists thatrevealing the clients name would implicate that client in the

very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.! Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his

identity is privileged.

! The content of any client communication to a lawyer lieswithin the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter ofthe legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.

! The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyersloyalty to his client extends even after the termination of therelationship.

Barton v. Leyte Asphalt (1924)

! The privilege which protects communication betweenattorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter

written by the client to his attorney which comes to the

hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of suchdocument is admitted, the court will take no notice of themanner in which it was obtained.

! Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication areentirely in the clients hands, and since the privilege is aderogation from the general testimonial duty and should bestrictly construed, it would be improper to extends itsprohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of thecommunications. One who overhears the communication,

whether with or without the clients knowledge, is not withinthe protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply


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to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of adocument in original or copy.

Orient Insurance Co. v. Revilla (1930)

! The introduction in evidence of part of a paper writing byone party waives privilege as to other parts of the same

writing.! With respect to this point it is difficu lt to see how a contract

for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might,under certain circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged.Of course contracts between attorneys and clients areinherently personal and private matters, but they are aconstant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to feesare essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege primarilyrefers to communications from client to attorney, an idea

which of course includes communications from attorney toclient relative to privileged matters. But, even supposing that

the matter contained in the letter and withheld from theinspection of the adversary was originally of a privilegednature, the privilege was waived by the introduction inevidence of part of the letter

Hickman v. Taylor (1947)

! A lawyer is an officer of the court, and is bound to work forthe advancement of justice while faithfully protecting therightful interests of his clients. In performing his variousduties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with acertain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by

opposing parties and their counsel. (Work product of thelawyer)

Upjohn Company v. US (1981)

! Communications are covered by the privilege insofar as theresponses to the questionnaires and any notes reflectingresponses to interview questions are concerned

! The control group test overlooks the fact that such privilegeexists to protect not only the giving of professional advice tothose who can act on it, but also the giving of information to

the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.While in the case of the individual client the provider ofinformation and the person who acts on the lawyer's adviceare one and the same, in the corporate context, it willfrequently be employees beyond the control group (asdefined by the Court of Appeals) who will possess theinformation needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level -- and indeed lower-level -- employees can, by actions

within the scope of their employment, embroil thecorporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only naturalthat these employees would have the relevant informationneeded by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise theclient with respect to such actual or potential difficulties. Thecontrol group test thus frustrates the very purpose of theattorney-client privilege by discouraging the communicationof relevant information by employees of the clientcorporation to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to theclient.

In re Grand Jury investigation (1983)

! The policy behind the privilege is self-evident: in order topromote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legaladvisors must be removed.

! The name of the client will be considered privileged matterwhere the circumstances of the case are such that the nameof the client is material only for the purpose of showing anacknowledgement of guilt on the part of such client of the

very offenses on account of which the attorney wasemployed.! A significant exception to this principle of non-

confidentiality holds that such information may be privilegedwhen the person invoking the privilege is able to show that astrong possibility exists that disclosure of the information

would implicate the client in the very matter for which legaladvice was sought in the first case. (legal advice exception)

! It should be observed, however, that the legal adviceexception may be defeated through a prima facie showingthat the legal representation was secured in furtherance of


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present or intended continuing illegality, as where the legalrepresentation itself is part of a larger conspiracy.

US v. McPartlin (1979)

! McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his statements were made inconfidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a commonpurpose related to both defenses.

! The third type of communication occurs in the "jointdefense" or "pooled information" situation, where differentlawyers represent clients who have Some interests incommon. . . . The rule does not apply to situations wherethere is No common interest to be promoted by a jointconsultation, and the parties meet on a purely adversary

basis.! The privilege protects pooling of information for any defense

purpose common to the participating defendants.

Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances isoften not only in their own best interests but serves toexpedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trialpreparation.

US v. Gordon-Nikkar (1975)

! Communication divulged to strangers or outsiders canscarcely be considered confidential communication betweenattorney and client.

! Where at least one person, and perhaps others, in attorneysoffice at the time of the communication in question were not

clients of the attorney, the communication was not protectedby the privilege.! Attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications

regarding an intended crime. Where conversations dealt withplans to commit perjury so as to hide criminal activity ofdefendant and others, conversations were not protected byattorney-client privilege.

US v. Nobles (1975)

! At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mentalprocesses of the attorney, providing a privileged area within

which he can analyze and prepare his clients case.! The privilege derived from the doctrine is not absolute. It

may be waived. Respondent sought to adduce the testimonyof the investigator and contrast his recollection of thecontested statements with that of the prosecutions

witnesses. Respondent , by electing to present theinvestigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect tomatters covered in his testimony.

People v. Sandiganbayan (1997)

! There is no particular mode by which a confidentialcommunication shall be made by a client to his attorney. Theprivilege is not confined to verbal or written communicationsmade by the client to his attorney but extends as well toinformation communicated by the client to the attorney by

other means.! For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period

to be considered is the date when the privilegedcommunication was made by the client to the attorney inrelation to either a crime committed in the past or withrespect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. Inother words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice withrespect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed,he is given the protection of a virtual seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney

without the clients consent. The same privilegedconfidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a

crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in thefuture and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyersadvice.

! In order that a communication between a lawyer and hisclient may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or infurtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawfulpurpose prevents the privilege from attaching.

Physician-patient privilege


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Lim v. CA (1992)

! In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, thefollowing requisites must concur: (a) the privilege is claimedin a civil case, (b) the person against whom the privilege isclaimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgeryor obstetrics, (c) such person acquired the information whilehe was attending to the patient in his professional capacity,(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act inthat capacity, (e) the information was confidential, and, ifdisclosed would blacken the reputation of the patient.

! The requisites conform with the four fundamental conditionsnecessary for the establishment of a privilege against thedisclosure of certain communications: (a) communicationsmust originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed,(b) this element of confidentiality must be essential to thefull and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between theparties, (c) relation must be one which in the opinion of the

community ought to be sedulously fostered, and (d) injurythat would injure to the relation by the disclosure of thecommunications must be greater than the benefit therebygained for the correct disposal of litigation

! A physician may be considered to be acting in hisprofessional capacity when he attends to the patient forcurative, preventive or palliative treatment. Thus, onlydisclosures which would have been made to the physician toenable him safely and efficaciously to treat his patient arecovered by the privilege. It is the tenor only of thecommunication that is privileged. The mere fact of making acommunication, as well as the date of a consultation and the

number of consultations, are therefore not privileged fromdisclosure, so long as the subject communicated is notstated.

! The predominating view, with some scant authorityotherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient privilege,though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting aphysician to give expert opinion testimony in response to astrictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving thephysical mental condition of a patient whom he has attendedprofessionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon thehypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any

personal professional knowledge he may have concerningsuch patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, thephysician must base his opinion solely upon the factshypothesized in the question, excluding from considerationhis personal knowledge of the patient acquired through thephysician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does notexclude from consideration his personal professionalknowledge of the patients condition he should not bepermitted to testify as to his expert opinion.

! Information elicited during consultation in the presence ofthird parties removes such information from the mantle ofthe privilege.

! Failure to seasonably object amounted to a waiver of theprivilege.

Krohn v. CA (1994)

! Requisites in order that the privilege may be successfullyinvokedSee Lim v. CA doctrine.

! In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege isclaimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patients husband who

wishes to testify on a document executed by medicalpractitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within theclaimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considereda circumvention of the prohibition because his testimonycannot have the force and effect of the testimony of thephysician who examined the patient and executed the report.

State secrets

US v. Nixon (1974)

! A President and those who assist him must be free to explorealternatives in the process of shaping policies and makingdecisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling toexpress except privately. These are the considerations

justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential


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communications. The privilege is fundamental to theoperation of Government and inextricably rooted in theseparation of powers under the Constitution.

! In this case we must weigh the importance of the generalprivilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications inperformance of the President's responsibilities against theinroads of such a privilege on the fair administration ofcriminal justice

! A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in thecommunications of his office is general in nature, whereasthe constitutional need for production of relevant evidence ina criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fairadjudication of a particular criminal case in theadministration of justice. Without access to specific facts acriminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. ThePresident's broad interest in confidentiality ofcommunications will not be vitiated by disclosure of alimited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have

some bearing on the pending criminal cases.! When the ground for asserting the privilege as to

subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial isbased only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, itcannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due processof law in the fair administration of criminal justice.

Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board (1986)

! Books, papers which because of their confidential andprivileged character could not be received in evidence.

! Statutes declaring certain official records confidential mustbe liberally construed and an exception thereto is deemedimplied when the records are needed in a court of justice.

! Tapes and transcripts of Monetary Board deliberations whileconfidential, are not absolutely privileged and courts mayorder their production. The disclosure is here not intended toobtain disclosure would cause detriment to the government,to the bank or to third parties.

! The public officer who is being asked to disclose certaindocuments relevant to the case has the burden of proof toshow that public interest will be adversely affected thereby.

Neri v. Senate Committee (2008)

! A President and those who assist him must be free to explorealternatives in the process of shaping policies and makingdecisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling toexpress except privately. These are the considerations

justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidentialcommunications. The privilege is fundamental to theoperation of government and inextricably rooted in theseparation of powers under the Constitution

! Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions tosuch rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2)trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters,and (4) other confidential information. National securitymatters include state secrets regarding military anddiplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties andexecutive agreements. It was further held that even where

there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be"examined in strict confidence and given scrupulousprotection."

! Elements of presidential communications privilege: (a)communications must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, (b) communication must beauthored or solicited and received by a close advisor of thepresident or president himself; judicial test is that an advisormust be in operational proximity with the president, and (c)privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome

by a showing of adequate need, such that the informationsought likely contains important evidence and by the

unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriateinvestigating authority

Newsmans privilege

Matter of Farber

! No privilege to refrain from divulging confidentialinformation and the sources of such information when


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properly subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.! The compulsion to require production of the material is

derived from the necessities of system of administeringcriminal justice.

Admissions and confessions

Viacrucis v. CA (1972)

! The previous recognition by a party in physical possession ofthe property in dispute of the ownership in anotherconstitutes a declaration against the interest of the formerand may be received in evidence not only against such party

who made the declaration or his successors in interest butalso against third persons.

Keller & Co. v. COB (1986)

! Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that theact, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant factmay be given in evidence against him as admissions of aparty. The admissions of Bax are supported by thedocumentary evidence.

People v. Paragsa (1978)

! The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as animplied admission of the truth of the statements uttered inhis presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the

silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what issaid, it must appear: (a) that he heard and understood thestatement; (b) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (c)that the statement was in respect to some matter affectinghis rights or in which he was then interested, and calling,naturally, for an answer; (d) that the facts were within hisknowledge; and (e) that the fact admitted or the inference to

be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.

People v. Alegre (1979)

! As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused,although deliberately made, is not admissible and does nothave probative value against his co-accused. It is merelyhearsay evidence as far as the other co-accused areconcerned.

! The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminalcases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not betaken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse toanswer an incriminating question. It has also been held that

while an accused is under custody, his silence may not betaken as evidence against him as he has a right to remainsilent; his silence when in custody may not be used asevidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would beillusory.

! The silence of an accused under custody, or his failure todeny statements by another implicating him in a crime,especially when such accused is neither asked to comment orreply to such implications or accusations, cannot be

considered as a tacit confession of his participation in thecommission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescencedrawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement

would appear incompatible with the right of an accusedagainst self-incrimination.

Griffin v. California (1965)

! For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of theinquisitorial system of criminal justice, which the Fifth

Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts forexercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the

privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however,that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to factspeculiarly within the accuseds knowledge is in any eventnatural and irresistible, and the comment on the failure doesnot magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting aconstitutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given nohelp from the court is one thing. What it may infer when thecourt solemnizes the silence of guilt is not always so naturalor irresistible.

Evidencedoctrines Midterms

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