IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)

REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial.

In People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa, the trial court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua. During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up to find petitioner on top of her. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her. Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner. On automatic review, 8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child

was medically consistent with the time of the rape.

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence. Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn. Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. 12 This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21, 2001. Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. 16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container A."

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired Leahlyn due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Was the DNA result a valid basis for habeas corpus and new trial?

HELD:

No.

As to Habeas Corpus:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, 25 we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. This Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.

As to new trial:

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review 1 to set aside the Decision 2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders 3 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent.

Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent's mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. - Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology, head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratoryhead of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA analysis laboratory, and a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Is DNA result admissible as evidence in this case?

HELD:

Yes.

As to admissibility:

In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim

matched the accused's DNA profile. We affirmed the accused's conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

In the case of People v. Yatar (2004), a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo's footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence.

As to right against self – incrimination:

Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court's 3 February 2000 Order with approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress.

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

(VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.)

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural- born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an

American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions — first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits — 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being — a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.Complementary to the new code

was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that —

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified."

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. (Mendoza vs. Mella) In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document."

In the 1950 Civil Code, voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the

child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G.R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter's capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

As to DNA Testing...

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactory establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing —

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory

has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."