Evaluation of UNDP Contribution - United Nations Development

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTSE V A L U A T I O N O F U N D P C O N T R I B U T I O N COLOMBIA

Evaluation Office, September 2007United Nations Development Programme

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The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect theviews of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by UNDPand reflects the views of its authors.

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Team Leader Osvaldo Nestor Feinstein

Team members and Fernando Medellin andEO task manager Oscar A. Garcia

Research Assistant Natalia Perez Andersen

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EVALUATION TEAM

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: COLOMBIA

F O R E W O R D i

The Evaluation Office of UNDP conductsindependent country-level evaluation calledAssessment of Development Results (ADR), toassess the relevance and strategic positioning ofUNDP’s support and its contributions to thecountry’s development over a given period oftime. The aim of the ADR is to generate lessonsfor strengthening country-level programmingand to contribute to the organization’s effective-ness and substantive accountability.

An ADR was conducted in Colombia coveringtwo country cooperation frameworks from 1998to 2006. Colombia was selected to undertake anevaluation for a number of reasons: it is a middleincome country and UNDP has a portfolio ofprojects mobilizing a significant amount of thirdparty resources from national and internationalpartners. UNDP in Colombia has interventionscontributing to foster democratic governance andpoverty reduction in the midst of conflict. Thechronic conflict that has affected the countrysince the 1960s has been fueled by internationaldrug trafficking making peace building initiativesmuch more complex. Important lessons could bedrawn from that experience. In recent years,Colombia has achieved rapid economic growth,which has been amongst the fastest in SouthAmerica. Despite the economic growth, Colombiafaces several challenges related to inequalities amongregions and among rural and urban areas. Over49 percent of Colombia’s population lives inpoverty, and 14.7 percent of its people are indigent.

In that context, the evaluation found that overallUNDP has contributed to foster democraticgovernance and the rule of law, by promotinginstitutional capacity building of national and subnational institutions, as well as by promotingdialogue among development actors on nationalneeds, including incorporation of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs) into nationalplanning. However, the evaluation also found that

in an effort to generate additional operationalresources, and to respond to the demands ofgovernment and international agencies, UNDPbegan expanding its role in development supportservices (DSS) spreading the portfolio too thinly.This modus operandi carried costs in terms ofthe programme’s relevance and considerable risksto UNDP’s reputation (mostly by association withDSS activities involving procurement).

The production of national and sub nationalhuman development reports in Colombia hashelped develop the analytical capacities needed toaddress sensitive aspects of human developmentand conflict. These reports have also served asadvocacy tools and played an important role in the agenda-setting process in Colombia. Aparticipatory process was followed in the design,production and dissemination of the reports,which proved key in developing nationalownership and promoting their use.

UNDP demonstrated considerable leadership inits coordinating role to facilitate the G-24London-Cartagena forum. Through this venuethe Government of Colombia, together with theinternational community and civil society organi-zations, discussed crucial peace and developmentissues and established a development agenda.

The programme of interventions supported byUNDP in Colombia during the period 1998-2006contributed to development results that strength-ened the country’s peace and development process.This ADR identifies risks that should bemanaged and opportunities that can be pursuedto consolidate peace and foster sustainable humandevelopment in Colombia.

The evaluation recommends that UNDP concen-trate its resources on areas of crucial importanceto Colombia, such as democratic governance andpeace-building. In doing so, it should draw on its

FOREWORD

F O R E W O R Di i

worldwide expertise and its neutrality, keeping itsinvolvement in development support services tothe minimum. UNDP’s credibility is one key assetwhich must be maintained, and which enhancesits effectiveness in politically sensitive areas such associal policy with a human development perspective.

A number of people contributed to this evalua-tion, particularly the evaluation team composedof Osvaldo Feinstein, team leader, FernandoMedellin, a locally-recruited team member, andOscar A. Garcia, the Evaluation Office teammember and task manager. We would also like tothank Natalia Perez for her background research,and Kutisha Ebron and Anish Pradhan for theiradministrative support.

The research and preparation of the evaluationwas also completed thanks to the collaborationand openness of the staff of the UNDP CountryOffice in Colombia, led by Resident RepresentativeBruno Moro and by Country Director BarbaraPesce. I would also like to thank the RegionalBureau for Latin America and the Caribbean,particularly Director Rebeca Grynspan.

This report would not have been possiblewithout the commitment and support of theGovernment of Colombia. In particular, theevaluation team would like to thank the Agencyfor Social Action and International Cooperationfor its time and insights as the government focalpoint for the evaluation. The team is also indebtedto those representatives from civil society, non-governmental organizations, universities, donorcountries, international financial institutions andthe United Nations Country Team, who generouslygave their time and frank views.

I hope that the findings and recommendations of this report will assist UNDP in responding to the country’s challenges and provide broaderlessons that may be of relevance to UNDP and itspartners internationally.

Saraswathi MenonDirector, Evaluation Office

Acronyms and Abbreviations iv

Executive Summary v

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Objectives and Approach of the Colombia ADR 11.2 Country Context 2

2. UNDP’s Contribution to Development Results 7

2.1 UNDP’s Strategic Positioning in Colombia 72.2 Development Results by Modality of Operation 112.3 Development Results by Practice Area 16

3. Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations 29

3.1 Positioning UNDP-Colombia for the Future 293.2 General Recommendations 313.3 Results and Recommendations by Practice Area 32

Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference 35Annex 2. List of People Consulted 39Annex 3. Select Bibliography 43Annex 4. Media Analysis of UNDP in Colombia 47

Boxes

Box 1. Good Practices Used in the 2003 National Human Development Report for Colombia 14Box 2. UNDP-supported Publications on Poverty Reduction and

MDG Monitoring in Colombia 21

Tables

Table 1. Economic Indicators for Colombia, 2001–2005 3Table 2. UNDP Goals and Service Lines for Colombia 7

Figures

Figure 1. Growth in Colombia’s Gross Domestic Product, 1995–2005 9Figure 2. Share of the Population Living Below the Poverty Line in Colombia, 1991–2005 10Figure 3. Gini Coefficient in Colombia, 1991–2005 10Figure 4. Progress in Governance in Colombia, 2000–2005 11Figure 5. Programme Expenditure by Practice Area in Colombia, 2004–2006 12Figure 6. Causal Chain of Risks to UNDP’s Reputation 13

C O N T E N T S i i i

CONTENTS

A C R O N Y M S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N Si v

ADR Assessment of Development Results

CCF Country Cooperation Framework

DNP Department of National Planning

DSS Development support services

EO Evaluation Office (UNDP)

FARC-ED Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia—People’s Army

G-24 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development

GEF Global Environment Facility

GDP Gross domestic product

GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation

HDI Human development index

IDPs Internally displaced persons

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

MAVDI Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

NGOs Non-governmental organizations

RBLAC Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNDP)

REDES Reconciliation and Development Programme

UNCFD United Nations Capital Development Fund

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y v

This report presents the findings of anAssessment of Development Results (ADR) forColombia. The purpose of the ADR was to assessUNDP’s overall performance and contribution todevelopment results as well as to draw lessons for future strategies. Specifically, it analysedprogrammes and projects undertaken by UNDPin Colombia under the 1998-2006 CountryCooperation Frameworks, with emphasis on2002-2006 and UNDP’s strategic positioning.The ADR was carried out between May andSeptember 2006. Its results are based on fieldwork that took place during July 2006, in whichmore than 140 interviews were conducted inColombia. This was complemented by interviewsheld at UNDP Headquarters and an extensiveand intensive documentation review, as well as acontent analysis of the Colombian media.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS BY PRACTICE AREA

The activities of UNDP in Colombia wereclustered in four practice areas: poverty reductionand the achievement of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs), fostering democraticgovernance, supporting energy and environmentfor sustainable development and crisis preventionand recovery.

POVERTY REDUCTION

UNDP has provided valuable support for themeasurement and analysis of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals at the national, departmen-tal/subnational and municipal levels. This workhas been one of the few instances of effectiveinter-agency coordination. In addition, UNDPplayed an important role in mainstreaming theMDGs within the Colombian public sector, notonly by supporting research and analysis at all

three levels of government, but also by assistingin the elaboration of a policy document settingout targets and strategies designed to allow theGovernment of Colombia to incorporate theMDGs into its national development policies.

A related area of UNDP support has been thedevelopment of policy frameworks for povertyreduction and the production and disseminationof several relevant studies dealing with criticalpoverty reduction issues.

Recommendations. An important task for theUNDP office in Colombia is to disseminate anddeepen the debate around the first MDGmonitoring report for Colombia, based on thevaluable work that has already been done by theColombian Government with support from theUN system and UNDP.1

The sustainability of UNDP poverty reductionactivities depends on future actions, particularlyon developing alliances with other developmentagencies that can build on UNDP’s achievements(especially those organizations of the UN systemthat are actively involved in the productivesectors, such as the International Fund forAgricultural Development, the UN IndustrialDevelopment Organization and the WorldBank). UNDP could play a brokering role withthese agencies, enabling it to bolster peace andrecovery efforts through productive activities andother development projects, thus contributing togreater development effectiveness in Colombia ofthe UN system as a whole.

UNDP’s relevance could be further enhanced byengaging in a dialogue about the eventualconsequences of the government’s social andfiscal policy, which is currently based on a

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 According to Colombian Country Office the report was published at the end of 2006 and its launching date is to beagreed upon with the National Government, during 2007.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Yv i

combination of transfers and subsidies, andwhose equity, effectiveness and sustainability isdoubtful. UNDP’s perceived neutrality couldallow it to enter into, and contribute to, thisdebate in a way that would not be feasible for theinternational financial institutions.

Finally, UNDP could draw further from theexpertise of its regional and/or internationalcentres, and mobilize South-South cooperation,to provide its country programmes with additionalhuman resources, experience and support thatcould significantly increase their substantiveadded value.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

UNDP contributions to democratic governancein Colombia have focused primarily on improvingthe monitoring of government decision-makingat all levels. The ‘Fight against Corruption’ and‘Citizens’ Participation’ projects, implementedwith the government’s Comptroller General’sOffice, provide positive examples of the results ofUNDP involvement in public administrationreform and anti-corruption efforts. Throughthese projects, citizens’ ‘Monitoring and EvaluationCommittees’ were institutionalized as a form offiscal control, and ‘Citizens’ Agendas’ became aformal mechanism for the articulation of civilsociety in social policy.

The persistence of conflict in the country overthe last five decades has made peace-building anobligatory component of UNDP interventions in the area of governance. The main UNDPactivities in this area during the 2002-2006programming cycle consisted of four projectsunder the Reconciliation and DevelopmentProgramme (REDES). The basic formula ofactivating civil society, strengthening localgovernmental institutions and building alliancesamong local, regional, national and internationalactors is not entirely new. However, it offers apromising approach for introducing developmentactivities in conflict-ridden areas where thenational government has a limited presence andno effective tools for fostering subnational orlocal development.

UNDP’s capabilities for adding value throughtechnical assistance are greatest at the level ofsubnational/municipal governments, as thepositive results achieved in Bogotá indicate.Outside the city of Bogotá, which is rapidlygaining institutional capacities and expertise,other major metropolitan areas, intermediatecities and rural communities throughoutColombia still have considerable need for UNDPfinancial management services, technicalexpertise and knowledge transfers.

Recommendations. With just three years’experience, replication of the REDES programmeis premature. However, results so far are encour-aging. Systematic evaluation, at regular intervals,of the REDES approach to peace-building, conflictresolution and strengthening of democraticgovernance at the local level should be requiredin the next UNDP programming cycle.

To extend the successes achieved in Bogotá toother regions and localities in Colombia, UNDPshould undertake investments in knowledge-creationand in distilling lessons learned from thoseinterventions so as to facilitate their incorporationby local-level planners and decision-makers.

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

During the 2002-2006 programming cycle,UNDP’s interventions have aimed to help theGovernment of Colombia and civil societyorganizations achieve sustainable developmentthrough the effective use and management of the country’s natural resources. UNDP strategiesfor this area have prioritized environmentalgovernance, climate change, and linkages betweensustainable environmental management practicesand other biological resources. UNDP’s contri-bution to results in these areas, however, has beenmodest and of limited effectiveness. UNDP’senergy and environment programmes werelargely demand-driven and more reactive thanproactive. Moreover, UNDP was not able toeffectively anticipate development challenges inthis area. UNDP-Colombia is generally perceivedas a resource administrator, and not as a real sourceof technical expertise with useful knowledge

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y v i i

relevant to addressing the country’s majorsustainable development challenges at thenational or subnational levels.

Recommendations. Issues related to Colombia’sindigenous populations now form part of UNDP’senergy and environment portfolio. However,there is no evidence that UNDP has developed asystematic strategy towards Colombia’s multi-faceted indigenous problems. Such a strategywould effectively integrate population issues intoUNDP’s ongoing conflict-resolution, peace-building, democratic governance and sustainabledevelopment programmes. The lack of a compre-hensive strategy should be taken into account inthe upcoming UNDP country programme.

UNDP should also elaborate a strategy linkingnatural resource management to conflict prevention.Such an approach would make a significantcontribution to knowledge and good practices inthis area.

UNDP could also consider sponsoring ananalysis of the recently completed US-ColombiaFree Trade Agreement, to explore implications ofresulting energy and environmental regulationsfor Colombia’s competitiveness.

Finally, UNDP should take advantage of itsneutrality to convene a national dialogue on keyenvironmental and energy challenges to sustainabledevelopment in Colombia.

CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

Among the most important UNDP initiatives inthis area are those that encouraged peace-building and recovery in several widely dispersedconflict zones (primarily REDES and thelandmine programmes), and that attempted toresolve disputes and conflicts affecting thecountry’s indigenous populations. One result ofREDES has been the development of a method-ology for fostering peace-building at the locallevel in Colombia. REDES’ basic strategyinvolves the activation or mobilization of localactors from both civil society and governmentthrough the formation of local associations and

networks that facilitate cooperation among civilsociety groups and between civil society organi-zations and local governmental officials onsubnational and municipal development projects.Initial and still tentative evidence suggests thatthis approach is helping to reduce local conflictsand to provide alternative mechanisms for disputeresolution. The sustainability of the REDESprojects, however, remains to be demonstrated.

So far, UNDP interventions involving indigenouspopulations have not been incorporated into theREDES programme. And although there aresome links between REDES and activitiesinvolving landmines and unexploded ordnance,there is a dispersion of activities in this area. Thisis partly a consequence of UNDP’s reactiveapproach—that is, trying to respond to multipledemands from different national and interna-tional organizations.

Recommendations. The next UNDP program-ming cycle should consider expanding UNDPinterventions to the country’s indigenous andAfro-Colombian populations. To guide suchefforts, the ADR recommends the elaboration ofa strategy for UNDP activities involvingColombia’s indigenous and Afro-Colombianpeoples, with particular attention to the integra-tion of these groups within the REDES andlandmine programmes.

The prevention strategy covering antipersonnelmines and active abandoned munitions requiresmore effective coordination within the UNsystem (especially between UNDP and the UNChildren’s Fund) and between the UN systemagencies and the Vice Presidency’s MineObservatory to improve the overall results of theanti-mine campaign.

CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The excessive use of ‘development supportservices’ poses a risk to UNDP’s reputation.Colombia is a middle-income country. As aconsequence, UNDP core funds have been

limited and have not provided sufficient resourcesto meet the multidimensional challenges of peaceand development in a context of chronic internalarmed conflict. (It should be noted that theconflict has been fuelled by international drugtrafficking, thus becoming an issue of globalpublic concern.) In an effort to generateadditional operational resources, and to respondto the demands of government and internationalagencies, UNDP began expanding its role indevelopment support services (DSS). In fact,these services were largely administrative innature rather than development-oriented, andincluded activities such as procurement and thepayment of payrolls. Over the 2001-2006 period,70 percent of UNDP’s project portfolio inColombia corresponded to DSS.

While initially successful, this modus operandicarried significant costs in terms of theprogramme’s relevance and considerable risks toUNDP’s reputation (mostly by association withDSS activities involving procurement). Theprincipal lesson from UNDP’s experience inColombia is that the incentives to self-finance acountry office can lead to an over-expansion ofdevelopment support services. In the process,UNDP’s development contribution, and itsreputation, can be jeopardized, a fact that has yet to be acknowledged by the UNDP office in Colombia.

On the other hand, through such services,UNDP was able to facilitate the operations ofseveral international cooperation agencies—bilaterals but mainly international financialinstitutions. Indeed, by responding to thedemands of government agencies and theseinternational partners, UNDP-Colombia developeda portfolio of 180 projects. However, theseprojects lacked focus and often had limitedrelevance to national development priorities.

The production and dissemination of humandevelopment reports generated a number ofgood practices. The production of national andsubnational human development reports inColombia since 2003 has helped develop theanalytical capacities needed to address sensitive

aspects of human development and conflict.These reports have also served as advocacy toolsand played an important role in the agenda-setting process in Colombia. A participatoryprocess was followed in the design, productionand dissemination of the reports, which provedkey in developing national ownership andpromoting their use.

UNDP demonstrated leadership in its coordi-nation of civil society, government and theinternational community, but played a limitedcoordination role among UN organizations.UNDP demonstrated considerable leadership inits coordinating role to facilitate the G-24London-Cartagena forum. Through this venue,the Government of Colombia, together with theinternational community and civil society organi-zations, discussed crucial peace and developmentissues and established a development agendaprioritizing six thematic issues: 1) forests,2) reintegration of armed combatants intocivilian life, 3) productive and alternativedevelopment, 4) strengthening the rule of lawand human rights, 5) subnational developmentand peace programmes, and 6) forced displacementand humanitarian assistance. The forum provideda unique platform for dialogue among varioussocial actors, allowing, among other things, a morefluent interaction between civil society organiza-tions, the national government and internationalcooperation agencies. That said, a frequentlycited concern among UN organizations inColombia was the very limited role that UNDPhas played so far in UN system coordination.

UNDP STRATEGIC POSITIONING

In positioning itself for the future, UNDP-Colombia should avoid spreading itself toothinly. Rather, it should concentrate its resourceson areas of crucial importance to Colombia, suchas peace-building. In doing so, it should draw onits worldwide expertise and its perceived neutrality,keeping to the minimum its involvement indevelopment support services. UNDP’s credibilityis one of its key assets, which must bemaintained, and which enhances its effectivenessin politically sensitive areas such as social policy.

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Yv i i i

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y i x

In light of this credibility, UNDP could also helpColombia close the ‘development informationgap’—that is, to overcome the lack of reliable and comprehensive information required todesign, implement, monitor and evaluate peaceand development policies and interventions.UNDP could further contribute, in partnershipwith Colombian and international organizations,by cooperating to strengthen Colombian’s statis-tical system.

To maximize its added value and improve itsresponse to the country’s development needs, theUNDP office in Colombia will have to increasethe proportion of staff and consultants withsubstantive knowledge. At the same time,UNDP-Colombia should rely more heavily on UNDP’s global knowledge network tostrengthen its development effectiveness.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

UNDP interventions in Colombia have lackedan appropriate monitoring and evaluationsystem. It would be worthwhile for UNDP-Colombia to ensure that its new operationsinclude adequate provisions for monitoring andevaluation as part of their design, and that suchsystems are implemented. Furthermore, the termsof reference for completion of interim implemen-tation reports should include an explicit requestto consider the role of UNDP in the intervention.

Finally, a programme of outcome evaluationsshould be developed and implemented by thecountry office in Colombia.

UNDP PRESENCE AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

UNDP has undertaken a decentralization processin Colombia by creating subnational offices (twoof which are still functioning). The Manizalesand the Cartagena offices have become a focalpoint for development initiatives in each region,involving local institutions from both the privateand the public sector, including universities andmunicipal governments. However, the potentialof the subnational office model for effectivecoordination of UN-system activities in Colombiahas been exploited only to a limited extent. In thefuture, Colombia’s subnational offices could playa much more important role in the coordinationof the UN system.

SUMMING UP

The programme of interventions supported byUNDP in Colombia during the period 2002-2006 contributed to development results thatstrengthened the country’s peace and developmentprocess. This ADR identifies risks that should bemanaged and opportunities that can be pursuedto consolidate peace and foster sustainablehuman development in Colombia.

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N 1

Assessments of Development Results (ADR) are independent evaluations that assess UNDP’scontributions to development results at thecountry level. They seek to ensure UNDP’saccountability as a development organization,provide an evidence base for learning on substantivematters, and support programming at thecountry-office level.

In the case of Colombia, a key challenge isfostering human development in a conflictsituation. This is discussed in the second part of this chapter, after a brief presentation of the objectives and methodology of the ADR.Chapter 2 analyses UNDP’s strategic positioningin Colombia and summarizes development resultsin four thematic areas: democratic governance,poverty reduction, energy and environment, andcrisis prevention and recovery. Chapter 3 presentsthe conclusions, recommendations and lessonslearned from UNDP’s experience in Colombia.

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THE COLOMBIA ADR

Colombia was selected as an ADR topic in 2006for several reasons. First, UNDP’s programme in Colombia is important in terms of its successin resource mobilization. Additionally, it hascontributed to democratic governance andpoverty reduction in a country characterized bychronic conflict. Important lessons can be drawnfrom this experience and applied to otherconflict-ridden countries and regions. (It shouldbe noted that Colombia was not included in a2002 evaluation of the role of UNDP in crisis andpost conflict-situations.2) Second, the completion

of the 2002-2006 Country Cooperation Frameworkpresents an opportunity to evaluate the achieve-ments and results of UNDP activities inColombia over the recent and earlier programmecycles. Third, the findings of this evaluation will provide valuable inputs in the formulation ofthe 2008-2011 Country Programme for Colombiawithin the context of the new United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework. And finally,the appointment in early 2006 of a new UNDPResident Representative in Colombia provides anopportunity to enhance accountability in futureUNDP programmes and to facilitate learningbased on UNDP experiences.

The evaluation has two primary objectives: 1) toanalyse the extent to which UNDP has positioneditself strategically in Colombia to add value inresponse to national needs and changes in thenational development context, and 2) to provide anoverall assessment of development results achievedthrough direct UNDP support and throughUNDP partnerships with other key developmentactors. Based on this analysis of positioning andachievements, the evaluation then summarizesthe principal findings, draws key lessons andhighlights major recommendations.

The questions guiding this evaluation are as follows:

� What significant changes have taken place at the national and subnational level in thefour UNDP programme areas: democraticgovernance, poverty reduction, energy andenvironment, and crisis prevention and recovery?

� What are the achievements of UNDPinterventions in these areas?

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

2 UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002. Institutional Flexibility in Crises and Post-conflict Situations. Available at: http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/CPC_evaluation_2004.pdf; UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002. Lessons Learned in Crises and Post-conflictSituations. Available at: http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/LL_in_CPC_situation_2002.pdf

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N2

� Which are the limitations of those interventions?

� What are the foreseen and unforeseenchanges, both positive and negative, thataffected UNDP’s interventions?

� What lessons have emerged from UNDP’sexperience in Colombia?

These questions, combined with the standardevaluation criteria presented below, are used tosystematically explore the four thematic areasoutlined above.

The internationally accepted evaluation criteria3

used by the ADR are:

� Relevance: the extent to which the objectivesof a development intervention are consistentwith beneficiaries’ requirements, countryneeds, global priorities and the policies ofpartners and donors.

� Effectiveness: the extent to which theobjectives of the interventions were achieved,or are expected to be achieved, taking intoaccount their relative importance.

� Efficiency: a measure of how economicallyresources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.)are converted into results.

� Sustainability: the continuation of benefitsfrom a development intervention after majordevelopment assistance has been completed.

The ADR is based on field work that took placein Colombia during July 2006. A participatoryapproach was adopted, involving key stakeholdersat all stages of the evaluation process (for detailsabout the methodology used, see Annex 1). Thefield work was complemented by interviews heldat UNDP Headquarters, an extensive and intensivedocumentation review and a media analysis of

UNDP in Colombia (see Annexes 2 and 3 for alist of people and documents consulted, andAnnex 4 for a description of and findings fromthe media analysis).

1.2 COUNTRY CONTEXT

This section provides a brief overview ofColombia to clarify the context in which UNDPoperated during the 2002-2006 programmingcycle. It does not attempt to represent the richand complex reality of the country, but ratherfocuses on a few key facts that may be useful incontextualizing UNDP’s interventions.

1.2.1 THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Colombia is located in the northwestern cornerof South America, and has a total area of over 1 million square kilometres. The country sharesborders with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuadorand Panama. According to the 2005 census,Colombia’s total population is 41.2 million—thethird most populous country in Latin America.Over 3 million Colombians live abroad (Colombia’sCentral Bank estimated that remittances represented3.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)in 2004), and nearly the same number have beendisplaced from their homes. Colombia is amongthree countries in the world with the highestnumbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs),and it has the largest number of IDPs in LatinAmerica. Colombia’s annual population growthrate is currently estimated at 1.02 percent, half the1985 rate.4 Blacks (or Afro-Colombians) represent8 percent of the country’s total population. Likethe country’s indigenous groups (less than 1 percentof the population), Afro-Colombians are amongthe poorest segments of Colombian society.5

Colombia ranks 70 out of 177 countries in the 2006human development index (HDI). It is categorized

3 See UN Evaluation Group. 2005. ‘Standards for Evaluation in the UN System’; Organisation for Economic Developmentand Co-operation/Development Assistance Committee. 2002. ‘Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results BasedManagement’. Paris: OECD.

4 Ernesto Rojas Morales, Director, National Administrative Statistics Department. 2006. Reflections on the 2005 censusin Colombia.

5 Department of National Planning (DNP). 2004. ‘CONPES 3310 for Affirmative Policy Action for Black or Afro-Colombian populations’. Bogotá, Colombia.


as a ‘medium human development’ country, witha life expectancy at birth of 72.6 years, an adultliteracy rate of 92.8 percent, and a HDI value of0.790, which is below that of Latin America andthe Caribbean as a whole (0.795).

Colombia is a democratic State, organized as asingle republic. It is decentralized, with autonomousterritorial entities divided into 32 departments, 4special districts (Bogotá, Cartagena, Santa Martaand Barranquilla) and 1,120 municipalities.6

1.2.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IMPACT ON THE POOR

During 2001-2005, economic growth acceleratedin Colombia, inflation declined and the value ofits currency appreciated (see Table 1). During thisperiod, unemployment decreased from 15.7 percent

in 2002 to 11.8 percent in 2005. In 2005, theconsolidated public sector registered a fiscal balance,which had not been achieved since 1994.

Although Colombia’s economic achievementsover the last five years have been impressive,some academic and opinion leaders regard theresults as unsatisfactory, considering the pace ofregional economic expansion. A report from theComptroller General’s Office and the NationalUniversity of Colombia7 concludes that, duringthis period, the government benefited fromfavourable external circumstances that are unlikelyto occur again (high prices for coffee, coal andferronickel, among other Colombian exports) andthat, given this extremely positive set of externalfactors, results could have been much better.

Table 1. Economic indicators for Colombia, 2001-2005

Goals 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a

GDP at market prices (trillions of Colombian pesos)

188.6 203.5 228.5 254.4 283.8

GDP (US$ billions) 82.0 81.2 79.4 96.8 122.3

Real GDP growth (%) 1.5 1.9 3.9 4.8 5.1

Consumer price inflation (average; %) 8.0 6.3 7.1 5.9 5.0

Population (millions) 42.8 43.5 44.2 44.9 45.6

Exports of goods fob (US$ millions) 12,848.0 12,315.0 13,813.0 17,225.0 21,726.0

Imports of goods fob (US$ millions) 12,268.0 12,079.0 13,257.0 15,878.0 20,132.0

Current-account balance (US$ millions) –1,088.0 -1,359.0 –974.0 –938.0 –1,931.0

Foreign-exhchange reserves excluding gold (US$ millions)

10,154.0 10,732.0 10,784.0 13,394.0 14,787.0

Total external debt (US$ billions) 36.2 33.2 37.0 37.7 34.9b

Debt-service ration, paid (%) 35.0 39.4 44.6 33.0 39.3b

Exchange rate (average) Colombian pesos: US$ 2,299.9 2,504.7 2,877.5 2,628.4 2,321.1

a Actual. b Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

6 Deparment of National Planning. 2005. ‘Municipal Transfers’.7 National University of Colombia and the Comptroller General of the Republic. 2006. ‘Welfare and the Macroeconomy

2002-2006: Unequal Growth is Not Sustainable’.

C H A P T E R 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N4

Over 49 percent of Colombia’s population live in poverty, and 14.7 percent of its people areindigent.8 The poverty index in the rural sectoris 1.5 times greater than in the urban sector,while rural indigence is 2.2 times greater than inthe urban sector.9

Over the past few years, debate has been heatedover the various approaches used to measurepoverty, indigence and exclusion in Colombia.10

According to the national government, based oninformation provided by its ‘Mission AgainstPoverty’ report, the number of people livingbelow the poverty line was reduced by 7.8percentage points between 2002 and 2005,reaching 49.2 percent (an alternative estimate of64 percent will be discussed in Chapter 2).Similarly, the share of indigent people declinedfrom 20.7 percent in 2002 to 14.7 percent in2005. During the last several years there wereadvances in the fight against inequality, povertyand exclusion, with a reduction in the Ginicoefficient from 0.57 in 2002 to 0.55 in 2005.Nevertheless, according to the ‘Mission againstPoverty’, Colombian society faces the challengeof further reducing indigence and poverty both inrural and urban areas.

A report from the Comptroller General’s Officeand the National University of Colombiaindicated that inequality and poverty will not bereduced substantially in Colombia if economicgrowth is not accompanied by effective measuresto improve income distribution. The report alsonoted that growth is dependent on reducing thehigh concentration of rural and urban land in the hands of a few wealthy landowners and ondemocratizing capital markets.11

1.2.3 INTERNAL CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Since the 1940s, Colombia has suffered fromserious internal violence. Guerrilla groups becameactive in the mid-1960s, and since the 1980s,three additional factors have come into play:paramilitary groups (or illegal defence forces),illegal crops in zones controlled by guerrillas orparamilitary fronts (which created even moreconflict in order to obtain control over theseareas), and drug trafficking, which providesimportant resources for combatants and alsoaffects Colombia’s public life (that is, politics and the judicial system, among other areas).Violence in Colombia has also hampered thecountry’s development. The 2003 nationalhuman development report, entitled Colombia’sConflict: Deadlock with a Way Out, introduced ahuman development index adjusted for violence.When considering a fourth variable (rate ofhomicides) to the index, the value of Colombia’sHDI fell from 0.772 to 0.643.12

The first peace negotiations with guerrilla groupstook place between 1982 and 1986, resulting in the demobilization of 4,000 combatantsduring 1986-1990. With the goal of changingthe Constitution, a referendum was carried out in 1990 for the democratic election of aConstitutional Assembly.

Between 1989 and 1994, most of the guerrillamovements forged agreements with the State.Still active are the Armed Revolutionary Forcesof Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP)—andthe National Liberation Army (ELN), both ofwhich originated in the mid-1960s.

Between 1998 and 2002, a dialogue began withinsurgent groups in Colombia and, especially,

8 Department of National Planning. 2006. ‘Results balance for the 2005 National Development Plan’. Indigence refers tothose living below the ‘indigence line’, that is, people whose income is below the cost of a food basket that satisfies theminimum nutritional requirements of a household.

9 Department of National Planning. 2006. ‘Visión Colombia 2019’.10 Discussion of the different measurement models are synthesized in: Department of National Planning. 2006. ‘Mission

for the Design of a Poverty and Inequality Reduction Strategy. Measurement Methodology and Size of Poverty inColombia’. Bogotá, Colombia.

11 National University of Colombia and the Comptroller General of the Republic, 2006.12 UNDP. 2004. Colombia’s Conflict: Deadlock with a Way Out. 2003 national human development report for Colombia.


with the FARC-EP. The humanitarian situationin Colombia worsened as the negotiation processensued, exacerbated by difficult social conditions,an economic recession in 1999, and seriousviolations of human rights and internationalhumanitarian law.

The peace process ended in 2002. The‘democratic security’ policy became a pillar ofÁlvaro Uribe’s presidential campaign, and hewon in the first round of elections with 53 percentof the votes.The first period of the Uribe presidency(2002–2006) strengthened military action againstillegally armed groups (guerrillas and the paramil-itary). Progress was also made in the paralleldevelopment of a peace and demobilizationprocess of the paramilitary structures (which hadincreased in strength over the last ten years).

In comparing the human rights situation of 2005with that of 2002, official data show thathomicides were reduced by 37 percent, thenumber of massacre victims declined by 82percent, kidnappings decreased by 78 percent,forced displacement was down by 51 percent, andattacks on small towns decreased by 94 percent.On the other hand, accidents and victims ofantipersonnel mines and abandoned activemunitions grew continuously from 2000 to 2006.

Over this period, nearly 42,000 combatantsabandoned their weapons. And, in 2005, theColombian Congress issued Law 975 on ‘justiceand peace’, which enabled former members ofillegally organized forces to integrate into civil

society. Despite these positive trends, tensionsdeveloped between the national government,human rights organizations and some agencies ofthe United Nations during the period 2002–2006as a result of reports on Colombia’s human rightssituation (including those issued by HumanRights Watch and the Colombian Commissionfor Human Rights, among others).

The human rights crisis in Colombia still exists,13

manifested in part by extreme inequality andpolitical exclusion. Human rights organizations alsoclaim that the democratic security policy and actscarried out by the armed forces have seriouslyaffected the civilian population.14 In response,the Government of Colombia has expressed thedesire to forge a relationship with internationalagencies based on cooperation, “mutual consultationand agreement” on human rights issues.

In this context it should be noted that, in 2005,over two thirds of the world’s supply of cocaine(640 tons) originated from crops in Colombia.Moreover, such crops were distributed through23 of the 32 departments in the country.15

International drug trafficking has exacerbatedthe conflict in Colombia16 for several reasons:because 1) it provides resources to violentgroups,17 2) it supports the illegal activities ofthose who participate in the drug business underthe ‘protection’ of armed groups, and 3) itpromotes among revolutionary or anti-insurgentorganizations the adoption of methods andpractices associated with the drug industry. It hasalso become an issue of global public concern.

13 See the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia for 2005.14 See: Final report, Colombia Project; four-month report on the Colombia Project, October 2004 – March 2005; yearly

report on the Colombia Project, 2003; and yearly report on the Colombia Project, 2002 from the Andean Project forHuman Rights. Also see www.hrw.org

15 UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 2006. Report on illicit crops in Colombia.16 UNDP. 2004. Colombia’s Conflict: Deadlock with a Way Out.17 Ocampo, J.A. 2004. ‘Among the Reforms and Conflict’. Bogotá, Colombia, p. 133.

C H A P T E R 2 . U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 7

This chapter discusses UNDP’s strategic positioningin Colombia, taking into account the countrycontext and results achieved in four thematic areas.

2.1 UNDP’S STRATEGIC POSITIONINGIN COLOMBIA

UNDP has been an active development partnerin Colombia since 1974. The UNDP countryoffice in Colombia is one of the largest in theworld in terms of delivery, with a long history ofaddressing the country’s main developmentchallenges. In the last eight years, UNDP hasresponded to the demands of its Colombian

counterparts by sponsoring directly and/or supportinga broad and diverse portfolio of projects. Duringthe period under review, the UNDP countryoffice averaged more than 100 projects a year;as of December 2004, it had reached a total of211 active projects with an annual delivery of$144 million.18 Both types of projects fall withinthe main programming areas of UNDP, accordingto the Multi-year Funding Framework, whichidentifies five global goals or practice areas and33 service lines. Each UNDP country office selectsthe priority goals and service lines through whichit proposes to achieve results. The goals andservice lines chosen in Colombia for the 2002-2006 programme cycle are shown in Table 2.

Chapter 2

UNDP’S CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Table 2. UNDP goals and service lines for Colombia

Goals Service lines

1. Achieving the MillenniumDevelopment Goals(MDGs) and reducinghuman poverty

Service line 1.1 MDG country reporting and poverty monitoring

Service line 1.3 Local poverty initiatives, including microfinance

Service line 1.5 Private sector development

Service line 1.6 Gender mainstreaming

2. Fostering democraticgovernance

Service line 2.6 Decentralization, local governance and urban/rural development

Service line 2.7 Public administration reform and anti-corruption

3. Energy and environmentfor sustainable development

Service line 3.5 Conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity

Service line 3.6 National/sectoral policy and planning to control emissions of ozone-depleting substances and persistent organic pollutants

4. Crisis prevention and recovery

Service line 4.1 Conflict prevention and peace-building

Service line 4.2 Recovery

18 UNDP Office of Audit and Performance Review. October 2005. UNDP Office in Colombia Performance Audit. NewYork: UNDP.

C H A P T E R 2 . U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S8

An analysis of the contributions of UNDP ineach practice area is presented in section 2.3 ofthis chapter. The evaluation concentrated onthree main modalities of intervention providedby UNDP-Colombia: 1) development supportservices, 2) advisory and knowledge-based services,and 3) coordination and facilitation.

2.1.1 RELEVANCE OF THE UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMME

In assessing the relevance of UNDP’s countryprogramme, it is necessary to first considerColombia’s national development priorities asdefined by the government’s 2002 NationalDevelopment Plan.19 The main objectives wereas follows:

1. Overcome the violence imposed by differentcriminal organizations in Colombia.

2. Restore economic growth and reduce the fiscalgap in order to reduce poverty and improvethe country’s worsening social indicators.

3. Address the lack of a social safety net toprotect the poorest sectors of society.

4. Address the erosion of public confidence inthe capacity of the state to respond tosociety’s basic needs.

To achieve these priorities, the Government ofColombia outlined the following policy objectivesin its development plan:

1. Strengthen democratic security.

2. Promote sustainable economic growth andjob creation.

3. Increase social equality by improving thequality of social expenditure.

4. Enhance the state’s transparency and efficiency.

According to a study carried out by the UNsystem in 2001,20 Colombia faced a situation ofextreme economic, social and political exclusionthat hindered the emergence of a culture

conducive to peaceful resolution of the country’sproblems. The UN assessment stated that theabsence of a civic culture founded on full respectfor human rights was the primary obstacle topeace and harmonious relations in Colombia, toeconomic growth and to reasonable conditionsfor development.

This diagnosis of Colombia’s main developmentproblems differed from that of the government,which was put forward in its NationalDevelopment Plan. These differences inemphasis are important to note since nationaldevelopment needs do not always coincide withthe government’s priorities or the prioritiesidentified by international cooperation.

UNDP’s perspective on Colombia’s nationaldevelopment priorities was in basic alignmentwith the UN Development Assistance Framework(UNDAF), but it adopted a slightly differentapproach. The main priority for UNDP inColombia was identified in the UNDAF aspeace-building and reconciliation. UNDP proposedto achieve this goal by promoting povertyreduction initiatives, generating conditions forlocal development and for peaceful resolution ofconflicts, and by fostering respect for humanrights, democratic governance and the rule of law.

Some discrepancies in the government’s nationaldevelopment priorities and those articulated bythe UN system and by UNDP were apparent atthe outset of the 2002-2006 UNDP programmingcycle. However, these discrepancies did notprevent UNDP from undertaking interventionsthat were also highly relevant to the government’soverall development goals for that period. At thesame time, demands from different governmentagencies, along with the need to make theUNDP office financially self-sufficient, led to thedispersion of UNDP’s interventions, some ofwhich were relevant to neither the priorities ofthe government or UNDP. This issue is discussedin greater detail in the following sections.

19 National Planning Department. 2002. ‘National Development Plan 2002-2006: Towards a United State’. Bogotá, Colombia.20 UN system in Colombia. 2001. Common Country Assessment.

C H A P T E R 2 . U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 9

2.1.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMME

At the time that UNDP’s programme was beingformulated, the debate over the exact extent ofpoverty in Colombia was heated and intense. UNDPcontributed to Colombia’s ‘Mission againstPoverty’ report by bringing international expertiseon poverty measurement to Colombia to help clarifysome of the crucial technical issues surroundingthe debate. UNDP also supported governmentinitiatives by helping to design social safety netsthat targeted Colombia’s indigent population. Andfrom the very outset of the 2002-2006 program-ming cycle, UNDP stressed the need to developpolicies that specifically target the poorest segmentsof Colombian society (though UNDP did not,directly, contribute to reducing unemployment).

Despite some differences in priorities andapproach between UNDP and the Governmentof Colombia, UNDP’s interventions in the areaof poverty reduction were relevant to nationaldevelopment priorities, with some exceptions.As far as overall impact, the Government ofColombia claims that economic growth increased

and that poverty and inequality were reducedover the period 2002-2006 (see Figures 1, 2 and3), though it is impossible to attribute the impactresulting from UNDP assistance.

UNDP’s interventions in the area of democraticgovernance during the 2002-2006 programmingcycle focused on institution-building. Activitiesat the national level, aimed at increasing theeffectiveness of the State, were often substantiallyfunded by resources provided to the Governmentof Colombia by the Inter-American DevelopmentBank and the World Bank. A second set ofUNDP interventions concentrated on givingvoice to Colombia’s poor and on improving theaccountability of local governments. Finally, athird set of interventions sought to foster moreeffective control of corruption, through theregalías (royalties corresponding to oil exports,transferred from the central to the subnationalgovernment) project and anti-corruption initiativessponsored by the Vice-President’s Office.Independent of their effectiveness in terms ofresults (as discussed in section 2.3.1), thesevarious UNDP interventions at different levels of

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4.28%

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1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1998

2000

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2004

2005

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Source: National Planning Department – SINERGIA (2006)

Figure 1. Growth in Colombia’s gross domestic product, 1995-2005

C H A P T E R 2 . U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S1 0

government in Colombia were relevant to theGovernment of Colombia’s stated developmentpriorities during the 2002-2006 period. Andwhile it is impossible to measure their impact ondevelopment outcomes, the Government of

Colombia has cited progress in the area ofdemocratic governance over the period in whichUNDP contributed using governance indicatorsdeveloped by the World Bank Institute (seeFigure 4).21


Figure 2. Share of the population living below the poverty line in Colombia, 1991-2005

Po

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Figure 3. Gini coefficient in Colombia, 1991-2005

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19931991 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

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21 National Planning Department. 2005. SINERGIA. Evaluation report No. 25. Bogotá, Colombia.

legal status, were avoiding national contractinglaws that regulated procurement involving theuse of government funds. If the government haddemanded the strict application of Colombiancontracting laws for all UNDP’s procurementactivities, such a decision would have deprivedthe UNDP country office of its primary source ofcost-sharing contributions. Instead, negotiationswith the government ultimately produced anagreement in which UNDP is expected to keepthe terms of the original agreement and providetechnical assistance in all its present and futuredevelopment activities.

During this same period (2004), an internal studyby the UNDP country office concluded that theUNDP portfolio: 1) was largely demand-driven,with no significant added value in terms ofdevelopment, 2) involved too many projects andthematic areas, 3) posed numerous unidentifiedrisks, and 4) contained no cost-benefit analysis.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS BYMODALITY OF OPERATION

2.2.1 DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT SERVICES

Between 1998 and 2004, 70 percent of UNDP’sproject portfolio in Colombia fell into thecategory of development support services (DSS),resulting in an average delivery of $130 million ayear. These services, largely geared towardsresource administration and procurement, generatedsubstantial income for the country office. However,in most cases they were more administrative thandevelopment-oriented, and were eventually calledinto question by the government.

In 2004, the Government of Colombia, throughthe Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduria),looked into the country’s Basic StandardAgreement with UNDP, which set out the modelof national execution. The agreement waschallenged on the grounds that some governmentagencies, by availing themselves of UNDP’s special

Figure 4. Progress in governance in Colombia, 2000-2005

C H A P T E R 2 . U N D P ’ S C O N T R I B U T I O N T O D E V E L O P M E N T R E S U L T S 1 1

Voice and accountability

Political stability/no violence

Government effectiveness

Regulatory quality

Rule of law

Control of corruption

0

Country’s percentile rank (0–100)Comparison between 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2000 (top-bottom order)

25 50 75 100


In addition, the office was seen to be operationallyweak, to have limited monitoring and evaluationcapabilities and to suffer from poor-qualityproject formulation. A strategic review of theportfolio was undertaken to refocus UNDPactivities in the country on fewer thematic areasand clients, to reduce potential risks, and torationalize the number of projects and theworkloads of programme officers. An action planwas developed and UNDP’s portfolio wasrestructured, declining from 211 projects at theend of 2004 to 168 projects in December 2005.Total UNDP delivery was correspondinglyreduced from $153 million at end 2004 to $98

million at end 2005 and was concentrated in thefollowing five areas:

1. Local development, including crisis preventionand recovery as well as peace-building activities

2. Public administration and reform, coveringthe main projects for democratic governance

3. Institutional development financed byinternational financial institutions, also inthe area of democratic governance

4. Energy and environment

5. Poverty reduction and achievement of theMillennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Source: UNDP Executive Snapshot (2006)

Figure 5. Programme expenditure by practice area in Colombia, 2004-2006

US$

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140,000

120,000

100,000

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$149,227 (100%)

$35,420 (24%)

$2,755 (2%)

$100,020 (67%)

$10,984 (7%)

$93,017 (100%)

$18,159 (20%)

$1,984 (2%)

$65,846 (71%)

$6,867 (7%)

$91,235 (100%)

$9,419 (10%)

$1,862 (2%)

$61,385 (67%)

$18,377 (20%)


Results and risks. The evaluation team verifiedthrough its interviews and documentation reviewthat national counterparts perceive that UNDP isproviding good operational support for resourceadministration through development supportservices, although some delays were cited. Anexample of UNDP’s positive role in this area wasits management of funds and ancillary supportservices for the city of Bogotá in the implemen-tation of the Transmilenio—a mass transit system that carries more than 2.7 million passen-gers daily via a surface metro system, significantlyreducing commuting time. A second examplecited was UNDP’s support for the reconstructionof the Coffee Zone (El Eje Cafetero) followingthe 1998 earthquake in Armenia, Colombia. Thisambitious undertaking involved the constructionof 36,000 new houses, the repair and restorationof 90,000 homes and the construction of morethan 1,800 facilities, including schools, hospitalsand parks. Furthermore, the modernization ofthe State Comptroller (Contraloria) may not havebeen possible without UNDP’s participation.The project involved the development andimplementation of online communicationsthroughout Colombia that connected local anddepartmental-level Comptroller’s offices with theState Comptroller in Bogotá for the first time.The new system also enabled citizens to registercomplaints electronically regarding potentialcorruption cases, thereby enhancing social fiscalcontrol of public expenditure and investment.

Such activities, and other projects carried outover the 2002-2006 period, developed largely in

response to the demands of several governmentas well as international cooperation agencies. Atthe same time, some operations, includingprocurement and the financing of payrolls ofstate agencies, also exposed UNDP to unneces-sary risks to its reputation. (Figure 6 illustratesthe causal chain of risks to UNDP’s reputation.)

Such risks were confirmed by a recent analysis ofmedia coverage of UNDP in Colombia over theperiod 2002-2006 (see Annex 4), whichsuggested that procurement was a particular areaof vulnerability for UNDP in terms of publicperception. The area in which press coverage wasunfavourable to UNDP was that of procurement,for which 50 percent of the messages indicatedthat ‘UNDP permits corruption’. Though 29percent of the messages highlighted the positiveresponse by UNDP, in ‘correcting mistakes’,procurement is clearly a high-risk area that couldresult in a severe damage to UNDP’s reputation.

A 2002 Internal Audit Report, commissioned byUNDP Headquarters, had already pointed outthat procurement was a weak area in theColombia country office. So, given this context,to engage heavily in development supportservices could easily have jeopardized UNDP’sperceived neutrality and transparency, which isespecially important given the intensity of theconflict situation in Colombia. However, there isno evidence that these risks to its reputation wereacknowledged by the country office. An effort torealign the UNDP portfolio in Colombia wasinitiated in 2004, but this process of realignment

*Including those imposed by drug trafficking and armed conflict.

Figure 6. Causal chain of risks to UNDP’s reputation

Very limited core funds

Multidimensionalchallenges*

Active search for non-core

funds

Widespreadengagement indevelopment

support services

Risks to UNDP’sreputation


needs further emphasis to increase its focus onthe country’s development priorities.

In the newly distributed portfolio, followingrevisions made in 2004, the current average numberof projects per programme officer is 23, with anaverage expenditure per officer of $19.6 million.Moreover, in light of the fact that small projectsrequire essentially the same amount of operationalactivity as do larger ones, this project load hasadversely affected the quality of the follow-upprovided by each programme officer. It has alsolimited the country office’s ability to deliverfollow-up services in general. (This was confirmedby a customer satisfaction survey among a sampleof stakeholders conducted by the UNDP countryoffice in 2005.) Project counterparts repeatedlycomplained about the high turnover in theUNDP country office, which may be attributedin part to heavy workloads. Counterparts alsoindicated to the ADR mission that UNDP staffin the country office had limited problem-solvingskills and only seldom were able to providetechnical assistance.

2.2.2 ADVISORY AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED SERVICES

Official development assistance in Colombiarepresents only 0.3 percent of GDP. Given thisvery modest contribution in external financing,international cooperation as a whole, and UNDP’scontribution in particular, should primarily

highlight knowledge-sharing and the normativerole that the UN system plays in promoting the UN Charter, the mandate for humandevelopment, the MDGs and other internationalconventions and protocols.

Four of UNDP’s interventions in Colombiaunderscore its normative role in promotingrespect for human life and human rights: thepreparation and publication of the 2003 nationalhuman development report, on the theme ofconflict; the institutional strengthening of thePersoneria of Bogotá as a way to protect citizens’rights from the actions of local government; thesetting up and support of the National Programmefor Human Development; and the work carriedout through the Local Governance with Assetsof Citizenship programme.

The production of national human developmentreports has helped to develop the analyticalcapacities the country needs to address sensitivehuman development issues. These reports havealso served as advocacy tools and played animportant role in the agenda-setting process. Partof the success of the reports, particularly the 2003report, lies in the participatory approach that wasused in their design, production and dissemination.Indeed, these broad-based consultations provedto be key in developing ownership of the reportsand to promote their use. (For a list of other goodpractices, see Box 1.)

� Identification of a niche or issue relevant to the country and an approach that reinforces UNDP’s perspective

� High academic and research standards with a careful use of data and evidence

� Participatory processes, including consultations with a broad range of development actors, to reflectdifferent perspectives and concerns regarding the selected issue before, during and after the launchof the reports

� Use of accessible language to communicate with a broad audience

� Constructive relationships with the government that simultaneously permit maintenance of theintellectual independence of the reports while commanding official attention to the issues covered in them

� Practical public policy recommendations

� An active dissemination campaign starting at the outset of the process and involving broad consultation.

Box 1. Good practices used in the 2003 national human development report for Colombia


A second example of UNDP’s effectiveness indelivering advisory services to Colombia is itssupport to the Personeria of Bogotá. Like anombudsperson, the Personero is responsible formonitoring human rights and protecting citizensfrom the arbitrary actions of local government inthe Federal District of Bogotá. UNDP providedtechnical assistance for the reorganization of thePersonero’s office and operations, with particularattention to the office’s role in the defence ofeconomic, social and cultural rights.

A third example is UNDP’s technical assistanceto Colombia in the establishment, in 1998, of ananalytical unit within Colombia’s NationalPlanning Department. This initiative, known asthe National Programme for Human Development,has functioned continuously since 1998 withUNDP support, and is jointly funded by theNational Planning Department, the ColombianAgency for International Cooperation andUNDP. The programme was initially responsiblefor the national human development reports andhas been carrying out research and producing anddisseminating analytical reports, including the‘Mission against Poverty’, in order to orient andmonitor social policies.

The experience of UNDP in Colombia showsthat humanitarian crises brought about by violentconflict require direct interventions at the local levelto effectively address victims’ basic needs. Thus,UNDP has aimed to strengthen local democraticgovernance by building local institutional capaci-ties, empowering civil society organizations andfostering dialogue among development actors tomitigate, if not prevent, the devastating effects ofconflict. The programme on Local Governancewith Assets of Citizenship, launched initially inCartagena, Bolivar, and Soacha, Cundinamarca(cities with large populations of internallydisplaced persons), exemplifies this type ofUNDP intervention. Among other things, theprogramme seeks to channel the results of‘governance dialogues’ it sponsors into productiveand sustainable responses to the developmentneeds of affected regions.

UNDP has contributed significantly to theproduction of relevant analyses and knowledge toimprove the situation of human development inColombia. Its role as a provider of technicalassistance with valuable expertise in the areas ofdemocratic governance, crisis prevention andrecovery is recognized in Colombia. Nevertheless,UNDP-Colombia does not fully utilize itsresources as a global knowledge network. Moreover,the quality of the technical assistance providedvaries greatly according to the level of expertise,experience and proficiency of the individualprogramme officers involved.

2.2.3 COORDINATION AND FACILITATION

A key role for UNDP in Colombia is that of acoordinator and facilitator of dialogue. The roleis enhanced by the organization’s reputation as aneutral and impartial partner, which gives it prestigeand legitimacy among subnational, national andinternational development partners. In Colombia,UNDP has the potential to perform this role atthree levels: 1) ‘horizontally’, between differentsectors and players, such as central governmentinstitutions, private sector organizations, churchesand international donors (for example, in roundtablesorganized by the G-24), 2) ‘vertically’, betweencentral, departmental and municipal governmentalentities (as in the reconstruction of Armenia),and 3) internally, among the 21 UN agenciesactive in Colombia.

UNDP’s capacity for horizontal cooperation wasdemonstrated in its leadership in coordinatingthe G-24 London-Cartagena forum. Through thisprocess, the Government of Colombia, jointlywith the international community and civilsociety organizations, discussed crucial peace anddevelopment issues and established a developmentagenda prioritizing six thematic issues. Theseincluded: 1) forests, 2) reintegration of armedcombatants into civilian life, 3) productive andalternative development, 4) strengthening the ruleof law and human rights,5) subnational developmentand peace programmes, and 6) forced displacementand humanitarian assistance.22 The forum hasprovided a platform for dialogue among various

22 Government of Colombia. 2005. ‘Estrategia de Cooperación Internacional’. Presidencia de la Republica. Alta Conserjeríapara la Acción Social. Bogotá, Colombia.


social actors, allowing, among other things, amore fluent interaction between civil societyorganizations, the government and internationalcooperation agencies.23

UNDP’s role in facilitating horizontal coordinationwas also demonstrated in cities such as Manizalesand San Buenaventura.There, various developmentactors were brought together for dialogues onprojects such as the subnational human develop-ment report for Eje Cafetero and ‘localizing’ theMDGs for the port of San Buenaventura.The role of UNDP in this work at the local level appeared to be more effective than in itsinteractions with the Federation of ColombianMunicipalities and with non-governmentalorganizations nationwide.

UNDP in Colombia can and should play a moresignificant role in terms of dialogue facilitationand coordination. Its leadership is sought by bothnational and international counterparts. It is atlocal level, however, that UNDP interventionshave had their most significant results. TheReconciliation and Development programmeand the Local Governance with Assets ofCitizenship programme are the most notableexamples of UNDP’s coordinating role at thelocal level. UNDP facilitation has also helpedforge important agreements at the subnationaland subregional levels, as demonstrated by thepost-earthquake reconstruction in Armenia andsurrounding areas and the subnational humandevelopment report for Eje Cafetero.

Where UNDP has been less effective is in itscoordinating role within the UN system itself.An often repeated theme in interviews conductedby the evaluation team was the absence ofeffective UNDP coordination of the various UNagencies operating in Colombia. Granted, thedifferent and sometimes conflicting mandatesamong UN agencies have made coordinationdifficult. For instance, the UN High Commissionerfor Human Rights has denounced abuses of

human rights in conflict zones. In those samezones, representatives of the UN Office on Drugsand Crime are supporting the eradication of cocacrops by the army, sending conflicting messagesto the peasants of these villages, both under theUN flag. The major exception to the widespreadcomplaint of weak coordination was UNDP’sfollow-up role in coordinating the ‘MillenniumDevelopment Goals Report’, in conjunction withthe National Planning Department, and in preparingthe Common Country Assessment in 2006.

2.3 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS BY PRACTICE AREA

This section presents the ADR’s findings in eachof the four programme areas emphasized byUNDP during the 2002-2006 programmingcycle: democratic governance, poverty reduction,energy and environment, and crisis preventionand recovery.

2.3.1 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

UNDP contributions to democratic governancein Colombia have focused primarily on institution-building at the national, regional/departmentaland local/municipal levels. This includedinterventions aimed at strengthening politicalinstitutions, facilitating State decentralization,improving government information systems,designing and implementing anti-corruptionmeasures, and fostering citizen participation in—and monitoring of—government decision-makingprocesses at all levels. The persistence of conflictin the country over the last five decades has made peace-building an obligatory component of UNDP interventions in the democraticgovernance sphere.

UNDP has approached governance from theperspective of human development. The keyelements of this approach were cogently articu-lated in the 2003 national human developmentreport,24 which generated nationwide discussion

23 Rettberg, Angelika. 2006. ‘Buscar la paz en medio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua’. Bogotá: University ofthe Andes and UNDP-Colombia, p. 56.

24 See UNDP. 2004. Colombia’s Conflict: Deadlock with a Way Out, p. 512.


on the basic causes and principal characteristicsof Colombia’s ongoing conflict and its possiblesolutions.25 It also spawned a series of subsequentsubnational human development reports inwhich civil society actors, subnational authorities,and private sector leaders actively participated.26

UNDP’s interventions in the field of democraticgovernance during the 2002-2006 programmingcycle can be grouped into three main areas ofactivity: 1) public sector administration and anti-corruption, 2) decentralization and resourceallocation to subnational entities, and 3) governanceand local development. As of end 2005, UNDPwas funding a total of 80 projects (52 percent ofall UNDP projects in Colombia at the time) thatfell under the category of democratic governance.

Public sector reform and anti-corruption. Themain projects supported by UNDP in this areaincluded the Public Financial AdministrationModernization project, implemented by theMinistry of the Treasury; the Fight against Impunityproject, implemented by the Ministry of Interiorand Justice; the Fight against Corruption andCitizens’ Participation projects, implemented bythe central government’s Comptroller General’sOffice; the Bogotá Anti-corruption project,implemented by the Bogotá Comptroller’s Office;and the Public Administration Reform project,implemented by the Attorney General’s Office.These projects sought to enhance the institutionalcapacities and develop the legal and policy toolsneeded by the national government and Bogotá’sdistrict government to enforce greater accounta-bility and transparency in public service. Theyalso sought to promote higher levels of civilsociety participation in democratic governance.

UNDP support in the Fight against Corruptionand Citizens’ Participation projects provides

one positive example of the results of UNDPinvolvement in public administration reform andanti-corruption. Jointly with the Netherlands,UNDP supported the Comptroller General’sOffice in an innovative approach to promotecitizens’ participation and the formation of socialcapital as tools to fight corruption. The projectinstitutionalized participatory fiscal controlarrangements, such as the piloting of citizens’‘Monitoring and Evaluation Committees’ tocontrol the use of royalties. It also established 32 ‘Citizens’ Agendas’ at the departmental level(one for each department and some at themunicipal level), which became a formal mechanismfor the articulation of civil society viewpointsamong public sector agencies implementingsocial policies and the Comptroller General’sOffice. These agendas were complemented by‘Articulated Audits’, which promote civil societyinvolvement in audits conducted by the ComptrollerGeneral’s Office. Additionally, the projectsponsored studies that provided a conceptualframework for social capital initiatives27 and forsocial fiscal control.28

UNDP also provided administrative and technicalsupport, particularly for the dissemination ofinformation concerning participatory fiscal controltools and experiences, through a nationwidecommunity radio programme called ‘Manos Amigas’.

Decentralization and subnational resourceallocation. The main projects supported byUNDP in this area included the RegionalPlanning for Bogotá and the Department ofCundinamarca project; the Cadastral RegistryModernization project, implemented by theAgustín Codazzi Geographic Institute; theBogotá Public Services project, implemented bythe Bogotá municipal government; the PrivateSector Participation and Infrastructure project;

25 See, for example, the special section of the national daily newspaper, El Tiempo, dedicated to the analysis of the 2003national human development report, entitled ‘Esto si tiene salida’. El Tiempo, 12 October 2003.

26 For an overview and assessment of national and regional human rights reports in Colombia, see Celina Souza,‘Assessment of National Human Development Reports in Colombia’. New York: UNDP Evaluation Office, October,2005, p. 27.

27 Vazquez Caro, L., et al. 2006. ‘Social Capital in Colombia’. Bogotá, Colombia: Comptroller General of the Republic.28 Alvarez Ortiz, D., et al. 2006. ‘Control social en Colombia’. Bogotá: Comptroller General of the Republic.


and multiple projects undertaken with the officeof the Personero of Bogotá. The basic goal of all ofthese projects was to develop capacities and fosteralliances among subnational/local governmentaland civil society actors to improve policy formulation,service delivery and resource management at thesubnational and local levels.

Several of UNDP’s activities in decentralizationand subnational resource allocation weredescribed as ‘successful’ by various Bogotámunicipal government officials interviewed bythe evaluation team. The results from UNDP’sinterventions in infrastructure development inBogotá, especially in the planning and constructionof the Transmilenio mass transit system, werehighly appreciated.

UNDP’s support for strengthening the Personeriaof Bogotá produced highly positive results interms of institutionalizing mechanisms forparticipatory monitoring and the defence ofhuman and civil rights, according to interviewsconducted by the evaluaton team with officials inthat office. Newly created associations forcitizens, families, students, youth, women anddisplaced persons, among others, reportedlyincreased levels of social protection for suchgroups and their ability to seek redress ofgrievances from government institutions in theFederal District.29

Governance and local development. The bulkof UNDP support in this area was directed to fourprojects under the Reconciliation and Developmentprogramme (known as REDES). The REDESprogramme grew out of UNDP’s experience withthe Peace and Development Programme in theMagdalena Medio region of central Colombia(which was initiated by a Jesuit priest, FatherFrancisco de Roux, in 1996). The REDES pro-gramme was launched in mid-2003 in Meta andthen expanded to the Montes de Maria (2004),Eastern Antioquia (2005) and Huila (2006) regions.

The main objective of the REDES programme isto contribute to peace-building and conflictresolution through a combined strategy of peaceand development, grounded in the creation ofstrategic alliances among key actors (drawn fromcivil society, local, subnational, and nationalgovernments, various UN agencies, and othermembers of the international community). Theprogramme assumes that only through thecreation of strong alliances will it be possible todesign, implement and sustain the policyreforms, development initiatives and peace-building mechanisms needed to establish andmaintain democratic governance in Colombia’sconflict-ridden communities. (For this reason,the REDES programme is analysed both underthe democratic governance section and the crisisprevention and recovery section of this report.)

The Montes de Maria project, which is analysedin more detail in this section, is the mostadvanced of the four REDES projects currentlyunder way. The Montes de Maria region is amountainous, conflict-plagued area of northernColombia that straddles the departments of Bolivarand Sucre (15 municipalities) located about 150 kilometres from the Atlantic Coast. The area’s350,000 inhabitants live primarily from agriculture,cattle-raising and handicraft production. Theregion has been hard hit by violence stemming fromguerrillas and paramilitary bands, the extensiveuse of landmines, forced recruitment (especiallyof children), systematic violations of humanrights, and intense flows of displaced persons andillicit drugs over the last two decades.

The Montes de Maria project has been promotedby UNDP in collaboration with three dioceses ofthe Catholic Church, the local branch of theMennonite Church, several subnational businessesand a variety of non-governmental organizations(NGOs). It is funded primarily by the WorldBank and the Government of Colombia. It hassought to activate the participation of civil societyorganizations, to strengthen local governmental

29 For a description of the results achieved through the strengthened Personero’s Office, see, for example, Herman AriasGaviria, Personero de Bogotá, DC. 2005. Informe al Concejo de Bogotá: Gestión año 2004. Bogotá: Personeria de Bogotá,DC, p. 54; also Personero de Bogotá, DC. 2006. Gestión 2005. Bogotá: Personeria de Bogotá, DC, p. 15.


institutions, and to foster alliances among localactors in an effort to stimulate subnationaleconomic and institutional development. Thesegoals have been implemented through governanceprojects ranging from landmine clearance andwomen’s and youth group formation to humanrights, security and disaster preparedness initiativesto the development of a network of local mayors,and subnational public policy, employment andbusiness councils. The initial two-year phaseconcentrated on forging cooperative relationsamong different sectors and institutions in theregion as a platform for building trust. Theapproach succeeded in creating the ‘MontesmarianaNetwork’, which includes the Catholic andMennonite churches, 15 local town councils andmayors, various universities and businessenterprises, several chambers of commerce andsome 5,000 local residents. It has also fosteredthe creation of a Montes de Maria Foundation,under the auspices of the Catholic Church,which has played a positive role.

Summing-up. The democratic governanceservice line is the largest delivery area in theUNDP portfolio as indicated by budgetary datafrom UNDP’s Multi-year Funding Framework.30

The bulk of these projects, however, fall into the‘resource administration’ (DSS) category andhave limited added value in terms of UNDPtechnical assistance. This is especially true ofmost of the UNDP interventions at the nationallevel, with the notable exception of the Fightagainst Corruption and Citizens’ Participationprojects and some of the poverty reductionprojects discussed below.

UNDP’s capabilities for adding value throughtechnical assistance are greater at the subnationallevel of regional/municipal governments, as thepositive results achieved in Bogotá indicate.Outside of Bogotá (which is rapidly gaininginstitutional capacities and expertise), the needfor UNDP financial management services,technical expertise and knowledge transfer in

other metropolitan areas and intermediate citiesthroughout Colombia remains high.

Efforts to extend UNDP’s successful interventionsin Bogotá (the mass transit system, for example,along with infrastructural development and theexperience with Bogotá’s Personero) to other partsof the country could provide major opportunitiesfor highly relevant UNDP contributions toeffective democratic governance in Colombia.This would require an investment in knowledgecreation, especially in distilling lessons learned fromthose interventions that could be easily absorbedby local-level planners and decision-makers.

The REDES interventions in local peace-buildingand democratic governance appear promising.The basic formula of activating civil society,strengthening local governmental institutionsand alliance-building among local, subnational,national and international actors, although notentirely new, offers a strategy that facilitates theintroduction of development projects in conflict-ridden areas where the government has a limitedpresence. This capacity for local-level involvementis one of the key strengths of UNDP’s REDESprogramme from the perspective of governmentauthorities in Bogotá. However, with less thanthree years’ experience, and without a functioningmonitoring and evaluation system (which is beingdesigned several years after implementation), it ispremature to consider REDES a success. It isalso risky for UNDP to propose the replication ofREDES before producing evidence of itsaccomplishments.

They are, however, the only local governance anddevelopment initiatives in Colombia’s conflictzones that, at least potentially, provide a formulafor peace-building and economic and institutionaldevelopment at the local/subnational level. Theyshould, therefore, be strengthened while undergoingcareful monitoring and evaluation during thenext UNDP programming cycle. The findings,conclusions, recommendations and lessons

30 It should be noted that, within the budget categories, ‘ART/GOLD’ projects are classified by UNDP as interventions inlocal democratic governance. However, given that these initiatives are designed as poverty reduction interventions, theyare discussed below, in section 2.3.2.


learned that will be reported in the forthcomingexternal evaluation of the REDES programmeshould provide valuable insights for shaping theprogramme in the next UNDP programming cycle.

2.3.2 POVERTY REDUCTION

UNDP support for poverty reduction in Colombiahas focused primarily on two areas: 1) measuringpoverty and inequality, and 2) developing policyframeworks for poverty reduction.

Measuring poverty and inequality. UNDP hasprovided support for the measurement andanalysis of MDGs at the national,31 departmental/regional32 and municipal levels (the latter focusingon health, education and poverty reduction toestablish a baseline at the municipal level).33 Inaddition, UNDP played an important role inmainstreaming the MDGs within the Colombianpublic sector, not only by supporting research andanalysis at all three levels of Colombia’s govern-ment, but also by assisting in the elaboration of a policy document (called CONPES), which setsout targets and strategies for incorporating theMDGs into the government’s national develop-ment policies.34

Just two out of eight years in the period between1997 and 2004 (that is, 2000 and 2003) were‘pro-poor’ growth years in Colombia. The growthelasticity of the income of the poorest segmentsof the country’s population is 0.5, which meansthat if GDP grows at 4 percent, the income of

the poor grows by just 2 percent.35 Poverty iswidespread in Colombia, by any calculation (49.7 percent of the population is classified asliving below the poverty line, according to the government’s own estimates; alternativeestimates, which were used in the preparation of national human development reports, haveplaced the figure as high as 64 percent).Nevertheless, the government’s external coopera-tion strategy does not specifically include povertyreduction among its six priority areas.36 Instead,the government appears to have adopted atrickle-down approach to poverty reduction,based on the expectation that higher rates ofeconomic growth will lead to lower levels ofpoverty. Given the limited growth of the incomesof the poor despite rising national economicgrowth, such an assumption is unwarranted. InColombia, there is a clear need for appropriatetargeting of social policies towards the poor(which requires more and better information thatis appropriately disaggregated, a point that isfurther developed in Chapter 3), and for anevaluation of the effectiveness of those policies.37

UNDP support for poverty reduction has focusedon gender dimensions, specifically MillenniumDevelopment Goals 3 and 5 (on gender equalityand maternal health, respectively). The datagathered in these areas have been used for HDIestimates at Colombia’s three levels of govern-ment. This work has resulted in more compre-hensive diagnoses of the extent and patterns of

31 Núñez, J., and González, N. 2006. ‘Colombia in the Context of the MDGs: Trophies, Achievements and the WayForward’. Bogotá, Colombia: Centre of Economic Development Studies (CEDE).

32 Sarmiento, A., et al. 2004. Colombian Regions vis-à-vis the MDGs. Bogotá, Colombia: UN system agencies, NationalHuman Development Programme-Department of National Planning-UNDP, Colombian Agency for InternationalCooperation, Federation of Colombian Municipalities, GTZ (German Technical Cooperation Agency).

33 Department of National Planning. 2006. ‘Colombian Municipalities Towards the Millennium Development Goals:Health, Education and Poverty Reduction’. Bogotá, Colombia: UNDP, GTZ, Department of National Planning,Federation of Colombian Municipalities.

34 Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES). 2005. ‘Strategies of Colombia for the Achievement of theMillennium Development Goals—2015’. Bogotá, Colombia.

35 See Núñez y González, 2006, pp. 11-12.36 Colombian Agency for International Cooperation. 2005. ‘Strategy for International Cooperation’. Cartagena: Ministry

of External Relations, p. 77. Although the strategy includes a ‘thematic unit’ on productive and alternative development,the latter aspect overshadows the former.

37 On the importance of evaluating social expenditure programmes, see Wiesner, E. 1997. ‘La efectividad de políticas públicasen Colombia’. Santa Fe de Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, p. 283. SINERGIA plays an important role in this respect, andUNDP, as well as other development cooperation agencies, could make much more use of it.


poverty in the country, which take into accountsignificant variations at the inter- and intra-regional levels. In turn, these diagnoses can beused (and to some extent have already been used)to design more targeted interventions and forfund-raising (particularly in the case of regionssuch as the Eje Cafetero, whose HDI reflects aconsiderably worse situation than the traditionalindicators in terms of poverty levels and unsatis-fied basic needs). However, it should be notedthat the HDI estimates at the municipal levelrequire very strong assumptions to compensatefor the lack of actual data at this administrativelevel. Consequently the final HDI estimates arenot as robust as they may appear to most readersof the report (and decision-makers using it).38

These fragile estimates indeed pose an additionalpotential risk to UNDP’s reputation.

Developing policy frameworks for povertyreduction. A second area in which UNDP has

focused its efforts in poverty reduction is insupporting related policy frameworks. This workreflects, in part, the expertise of the director/chiefeconomist at UNDP’s International PovertyCentre in Brasilia, and included the preparationand launching of several studies addressingpoverty-related issues, including the MDGs, inColombia (see Box 2 for the list of publications).

Other poverty-related initiatives. Another lineof action followed by UNDP has been supportfor the preparation of development plans at thelocal or municipal level, such as the plan forBuenaventura, which recently led to the design ofa government policy to improve living conditionsfor that city’s poverty-stricken population.39

Local development interventions (such as thosedealing with indigenous peoples) that arerelevant to poverty reduction are analysed inother sections of this report. However, the ART/

38 In the 2002 Human Development Report it was pointed out that the concept of human development is much richer thanthe human development index. See also: Sen, A. 2006. ‘Human Development Index’, in Clark, D. A. (ed.): The ElgarCompanion to Development Studies. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, on the limits of the human development index evenat the national level, and the broader and more important concept of human development.

39 See: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2006/febrero/20/13202006.htm

1. Poverty and Social Protection in Colombia

2. Colombian Municipalities Towards the MDGs: Health, Education and Poverty Reduction

3. Colombian Regions vis-à-vis the MDGs

4. Poverty Factors in Colombia, 1996-2004

5. Results of the SISBEN Survey at the Municipal Level

6. The Oriente Antioqueno Labour Market

7. The Structure and Dynamics of the Sucre Labour Market

8. The Economic Structure and Dynamics of the Urban Labour Market in the Department of Meta

9. Who Benefits from SISBEN? An Evaluation

10. Poverty in the Newspaper El Tiempo

11. UNDP-Ministry of Social Protection Papers: Poverty, Equity and Social Efficiency, Poverty in Colombia,Factors Determining School Attendance and Drop-out Rates

12. Impact of Carbon Royalties in the Cesar Municipalities, 1997-2003

13. Gender and Development Studies in Colombia

14. Ten Years of Human Development in Colombia

Box 2. UNDP-supported publications on poverty reduction and MDG monitoring in Colombia


GOLD programme, discussed below, is noteworthy.(‘ART’ corresponds to the French acronym for ‘localor area networks’, and ‘GOLD’ is an abbreviationof ‘governance and local development’).40

ART/GOLD is an internationally sponsoredinitiative that brings together programmes andactivities of various United Nations organizationsto work cooperatively with local communitiesand actors to implement the MDGs. The aim isto produce subnational and local developmentplans with the joint involvement of civil societyassociations and UN agencies at all three levels ofgovernment. Over the last three years, theUNDP office in Colombia and the ART/GOLDprogramme have initiated activities in severalmunicipalities of Colombia with the financial andtechnical support of two bilateral donors (Italyand France). However, these activities have beencarried out in virtual isolation from other UNagencies working in Colombia. Moreover, insteadof cooperating in the preparation of developmentplans, ART/GOLD has been involved primarilyin the support of ‘business plans’. Although theprogramme has helped UNDP establish a valuablefield presence at the local level, much more activecoordination is needed among interventionspromoting democratic governance and localpoverty reduction initiatives. The forging ofeffective cooperative relationships with variousUN agencies already present in Colombia, suchas the UN Capital Development Fund(UNCDF), the UN Industrial DevelopmentOrganization (UNIDO) and the InternationalFund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),would significantly increase the potential ‘valueadded’ of future ART/GOLD activities.

Another poverty-related initiative supported byUNDP is seeking to address temporaryunemployment among people who are betweenjobs or searching for new jobs. The project isbased on the Swedish matching model, whichinvolves the development of an informationsystem connecting labour supply with demand.

Although the initiative has the potential toshorten the duration of unemployment inColombia, it risks being overshadowed by arecently approved World Bank loan for $200million that will address labour reform and socialdevelopment policy.41

Finally, it should be noted that UNDP is usingthe mechanism of technical cooperation amongdeveloping countries, or ‘South-South’ cooperation,to support the government’s poverty reductionefforts. For example, through the efforts of UNDP,Colombian officials have become acquaintedwith Chile’s experience in poverty reduction.

Summing-up. The books and reports producedby UNDP-Colombia on poverty reduction haveaddressed key aspects of economic growth anddevelopment in the country and have been ofsignificant value to the national government and UNDP (as well as to other developmentcooperation agencies). They also provided crucialinputs for anti-poverty policy initiatives. Theyhave examined closely issues such as socialprotection, labour markets, royalties (regalías),inter- and intra-regional income disparities, andhuman development. They are, therefore, highlyrelevant, as is the work done on the MDGs. Aglaring limitation of, or gap in, the workproduced to date, however, is the lack of attentiondirected at the country’s large and deeplyimpoverished Afro-Colombian population.

The UNDP resources required to produce thesepublications have been quite modest. Indeed, theonly publication whose cost was significant wasthe 2003 national human development report,which was funded largely through the contributionof bilateral donors. Hence, these valuabledocuments were efficiently produced. Theirultimate effectiveness, however, depends on howthey are used. Evidence suggests that the onlypublications that have been widely used are the

40 See: http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:aW1j0Fi_GYwJ:www.yorku.ca/ishd/undp/ARTBROCHURE.pdf+%22art+gold%22+%2B+development&hl=es&gl=es&ct=clnk&cd=13&lr=lang_es|lang_en|lang_pt

41 Information about this recently approved World Bank operation is available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21004983~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html


national human development reports and, to amore limited extent, the subnational humandevelopment report for Eje Cafetero.

It is worthwhile to note that, despite the richnessof the documentation produced in the area ofpoverty reduction (partly reflected in Box 2), thesection on lessons learned that corresponds tothis practice area in the UNDP-Colombia websiteis empty. It would be worthwhile to prepare a setof brief notes distilling lessons in this area.

2.3.3 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

Balancing the growing demand for energy withenvironmentally sustainable development practicesis one of the major challenges that Colombiafaces. UNDP strategies in this area have prioritizedenvironmental governance, climate change and linksbetween sustainable environmental managementpractices and other biological resources. UNDP’smain interventions in the energy and environmentarea include:

� Promoting dialogue among various socialactors on the dimensions of environmentaldamage and options for recovery

� Building and strengthening local and nationalinstitutional capacities for the diagnosis, designand monitoring of alternatives practices thatpreserve the environment and promote sustain-able use of energy, land, water and forests

� Supporting activities that facilitate preparationand follow-up of international conventions,protocols, agreements and programmes

� Administering resources from the internationaldonor community and international financialinstitutions for programmes in environmentalprotection and regeneration

� Administering resources from the GlobalEnvironmental Facility (GEF) and theMultilateral Fund for the Implementation ofthe Montreal Protocol.

Issues related to Colombia’s indigenous peoplesalso fall into UNDP’s energy and environment

portfolio. The proclamation of the InternationalDecade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, on 10December 1994, and the establishment of thePermanent Forum for Indigenous Affairs as asubsidiary body of the Social and EconomicCouncil in 2000, helped spur the creation of aprogramme for indigenous peoples within UNDP-Colombia in 2003. Since that time, UNDPinterventions in areas relating to Colombia’sindigenous peoples have involved three mainactivities: 1) support in the formulation of publicpolicy, 2) support for humanitarian assistanceprogrammes in indigenous communities, and 3)strengthening of Indian organizations in zones orterritories inhabited by indigenous populations.UNDP-Colombia concentrated these activities infour regions of the country: the Colombian Macizo,the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, the Sierra dela Macarena and the Department of Guaviare.

In total, UNDP has supported more than 30projects related to energy and the environment inthe last 12 years. During 2006, 16 projects wereunder way and a similar number of projects werein various stages of preparation. In 2005, deliveryin this sector totalled $5.6 million; in 2006,delivery is estimated $6.4.42

UNDP’s Environment and Energy Unit hasworked in recent years with a range of partners,including the National Parks Unit of theMinistry of Environment, Housing and TerritorialDevelopment; the Macarena DevelopmentCorporation; the Municipality of Cali; and theMines-Energy Planning Unit of the NationalPlanning Department. The major donors providingfinancial backing for UNDP projects in energyand the environment included the GEF, theMultilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Spanish internationalcooperation agencies and the Government of theNetherlands. Negotiations were under way in2006 to develop projects and alliances with theAutonomous Corporation of the Valle del Cauca, theHumboldt Research Institute and the governmentof Cauca, as well as with potential contributors,

42 UNDP-Colombia. 2006. Position paper on energy and environment. Document for discussion.


such as the Natura Foundation, the NatureConservancy and the World Wildlife Fund.43

Biodiversity conservation. UNDP’s main contri-butions in this area since 1994 are summarized asfollows: First, during the second half of the 1990s,UNDP played an active role in the formulationand implementation of the Colombian Bio-PacificDevelopment Project, financed by the GEF. Thispilot project was designed to help protect andconserve the biodiversity of Colombia’s Pacificcoastal region and contiguous inland areas whilefostering sustainable development projects amongthe region’s predominantly poor, rural populationsof Afro-Colombian and indigenous descent. Theproject also sought to promote interculturaldialogue among the diverse population groupsinhabiting the region and to establish the basisfor future land titling and certification processesfor peasant farmers residing there.

The Bio-Pacific project was the first projectsupported by UNDP-Colombia involvingbiodiversity. During the 2002-2006 programmingcycle, two additional projects were launched: theBio-Macizo project in southern Colombia andthe Bio-Macarena project in the Sierra de laMacarena in the country’s eastern plains. Thesemost recent projects were designed to encouragebiodiversity protection and conservation processesthrough the participation of local populations(indigenous and peasant colonists) that inhabitthese delicate, biologically diverse zones. UNDPacts as an implementing agency for the GEF andthe Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund. Thereis no evidence on results that can be attributed tothese interventions, partly due to their timeframe and partly due to the lack of appropriatemonitoring and evaluation arrangements.

Institution-building. From the mid- to late-1990s,UNDP supported the strengthening of the NationalEnvironmental System and the Ministry ofEnvironment during the start-up and consolida-tion phases of these two innovative Colombianinstitutions. This support contributed especiallyto human resource development and to publicpolicy formulation in the Ministry of theEnvironment. In 2003, however, ten years afterthe ministry was created, it was merged with theDevelopment Ministry, to become the Ministryof Environment, Housing and TerritorialDevelopment (MAVDT). Following thisministerial reorganization, under the newlyinaugurated administration of President ÁlvaroUribe Velez (2002-2006), the MAVDT focusedprimarily on fulfilling new functions rather thanon addressing environmental issues.44 Colombianexperts consulted by the ADR mission repeatedlypointed out that this shift in priorities under theUribe Government led to the rapid loss ofenvironmental expertise that had been developedwith earlier support from UNDP.

Finally, during the 2002-2006 programmingcycle, UNDP-Colombia administered resourcesfrom the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund tosupport the creation of an Ozone Technical Unitwithin the MAVDT. UNDP also helped todesign and execute the country programme that wasintended to eliminate the use of ozone-depletingsubstances. As a result of these two programmes,Colombia is now among the countries that hasdone the most to comply with its treaty obliga-tions to eliminate ozone-depleting emissions.45

Summing-up. While UNDP assistance in thearea of energy and the environment has not beeninsignificant, its added value has been limited.First, UNDP’s institution-building within the

43 Ibid.44 During the first Uribe Administration, the Government of Colombia focused MAVDT activities primarily on the provision

of housing subsidies and credits, construction of and improvements in potable water and basic sewage systems, the promotion of the Territorial Organization Plans (Planes de Organización Territorial, or POT) at the municipal level, thecreation of housing construction materials banks, and strengthening the finances of the country’s 32 RegionalAutonomous Corporations (Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas, or CARs). In terms of environmental policy, the newlyreorganized ministry concentrated its attention mainly on the protection of the country’s flora and fauna (parques naturales),on the development of environmental controls, and on the establishment of ‘green’ markets.

45 The domestic and industrial refrigerator industry, as well as foam-producing industries, were retrofitted to conform totreaty obligations. The challenge now is to address the issue among small companies that are difficult to locate and thatare involved in refrigerator maintenance.


original Ministry of the Environment focusedprimarily on the development of human capitalrather than on knowledge management. As a result,when the ministry was reorganized and environ-mental issues were de-emphasized, in 2003, the‘installed technical capacity’ within the institutionwas rapidly depleted by the departures of keytechnical personnel. Hence, UNDP’s early contri-butions to the environment were unsustainable.

Second, although UNDP is commonly perceivedas a helpful (though expensive) resource managerfor energy and environment projects, it has notgenerally been viewed as an important source oftechnical expertise.

Third, although indigenous issues now form partof UNDP’s energy and environment portfolio,there is no evidence to date that UNDP hasdeveloped a systematic strategy in dealing withthe multifaceted problems related to Colombia’sindigenous peoples. Such a strategy shouldeffectively integrate population issues (such asgender, age and ethnic-group affiliation) intoUNDP’s ongoing conflict-resolution, peace-building, democratic governance and sustainabledevelopment programmes. In other words, UNDP’senvironment projects in strategic regions of thecountry should reflect a coherent approach thatincorporates issues related to natural resources,indigenous populations and conflict into aholistic strategy for sustainable development.

UNDP has a positive reputation as an impartialand reliable organization supportive of, andcommitted to, sustainable development initia-tives at the national, subnational, local andcommunity levels in Colombia. Nevertheless,UNDP’s environment interventions, by andlarge, have been more reactive than proactive.

2.3.4 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

During the 2002-2006 programming cycle,UNDP-Colombia undertook a number ofinterventions in the area of crisis prevention andrecovery. Among the most important of thesewere activities to encourage peace-building andrecovery in several widely dispersed conflict zones

(through REDES and the landmine programmes),and to resolve disputes and conflicts affecting thecountry’s indigenous populations. This sectionconcludes with a description of UNDP-supportedreconstruction efforts following an earthquake in Armenia, Colombia. Though work thereconcluded at the beginning of the 2002-2006UNDP programme cycle, it is still an untappedsource of lessons for the future.

The Reconstruction and DevelopmentProgramme. As described in section 2.3.1, theREDES (Reconciliation and Development)programme was launched in mid-2003 as apeace-building strategy oriented towards humandevelopment in four regions of the country. Sofar, the programme has facilitated the creation ofpublic-private partnerships, promoted knowledgemanagement on the topics of conflict anddevelopment, and supported the design andimplementation of public policies at the local,subnational and national levels.

Another important result of the REDESprogramme has been the development of amethodology for encouraging peace-building atthe local level in Colombia. REDES’ basicstrategy involves the activation or mobilization oflocal actors from both civil society and govern-ment through the formation of local associationsand networks (such as agricultural producers,artisans, businesspeople, mayors, church members,women and youth). Cooperation on municipaland subnational development projects is facilitatedamong civil society groups and between civilsociety organizations and local governmental officials.The keys to the success of this methodology are1) UNDP promotion or facilitation of theformation of such networks, and 2) systematiccapacity-building efforts on the part of UNDPpersonnel (and UNDP’s international develop-ment partners) to develop, train and sustain thesenetworks. The methodology does not involvenew techniques of community organization (the same basic techniques have been known and used for decades in various countries,including Colombia). But when such techniquesare applied in Colombia’s conflict zones, theyseem to provide valuable tools for stimulating


local cooperation on development projectsdespite the presence of conflict.46

UNDP has also designed a programme forColombia’s indigenous populations that has builtinto it a conflict-prevention approach. The basicgoal of the programme is to support indigenouscommunities in claiming their rights andpreserving the core elements of their culture.The programme focuses on issues of indigenousland-use planning in reservation areas; biodiversitypreservation on reservation lands and surrounding,publicly held ecological reserves; minimizing riskof environmental deterioration; humanitarianmatters; and the relationship between indigenouscommunities and entities of the Colombiangovernment. The conflict-prevention and resolutioncomponents of this UNDP programme involveaccompaniment (acompañamiento) and mediationactivities of UNDP personnel in support ofindigenous communities involved in violentconfrontations with illegal armed groups (guerrillasand paramilitaries), land disputes, and protestdemonstrations against government policies and/or local landowners. No solid evidence on resultsis available as yet due to the time frame of theseinterventions and the lack of an appropriate andoperational monitoring and evaluation system.

Action against landmines and unexplodedordnance. UNDP also supported interventionsdealing with antipersonnel mines and activeabandoned munitions. Colombia is one of thecountries that originally signed and subsequentlyratified the Ottawa Convention. This internationaltreaty prohibits the use, storage, production andtransfer of antipersonnel mines. The Conventionentered into effect in March 2001 and, sincethen, the Government of Colombia has beenunder treaty obligation to destroy mines producedand stored by government forces, to remove minesand active abandoned munitions from affected

areas, and to provide relief and restitution tovictims of these devices.

The problem of mines and unexploded ordnancehas been one of the most serious and fastestgrowing human rights issues (in terms ofaccidents and victims) in Colombia over the lastdecade. The government’s work to date on thisissue encompasses five main areas: 1) compliancewith the Ottawa Convention, 2) risk preventionand reduction in the number of mine victims(involving education, communication andadvocacy), 3) comprehensive assistance tovictims, 4) institutional adaptation and strength-ening, and 5) follow-up and evaluation.

Through UNDP’s REDES programme, activitiesinvolving mines and unexploded ordnance havebeen carried out in three regions of Colombia(Eastern Antioquia, Meta and Montes de Maria)over the 2003-2006 period. Interventions supportedby REDES include: 1) strengthening depart-mental committees for integrated action againstmines, 2) organizing meetings among victims,and 3) supporting decentralization and consolidationof integrated action committees at the municipallevel. An educational campaign on risk preventionhas been carried out by UNICEF in conjunctionwith the programme.

Other initiatives. Other UNDP-supportedpeace-building programmes include a joint effortwith ‘Fundación Social’ and local authorities inTolima in a subnational development and peaceprogramme covering 18 Tolima municipalities,which started in 2003. In collaboration with otheragencies, the programme has also supporteddevelopment and peace initiatives in EasternPiedemonte and the Northeast region ofColombia, although there are no evaluations ofthese programmes as yet.47

In terms of recovery efforts, the most noteworthyexample is UNDP’s support for the reconstruction

46 For discussions of the REDES methodology, see Rosende, Raul, Borja Paladini, Juan Chaves and Gabriel Turriago. 2006.‘Toward an Integrated Framework for Peace-building. The International Community Meets the Local Community: ACase Study of the UNDP Reconciliation and Development Programme, REDES, in Montes de Maria, Colombia,Bogotá: UNDP. Unpublished manuscript.

47 See Retteberg, 2006, pp. 72, 78.


of the Coffee Zone (El Eje Cafetero) followingthe 1998 Armenia earthquake. As mentionedearlier, this ambitious undertaking involved theconstruction or restoration of more than 100,000homes and public facilities.

Summing-up. As indicated in section 2.3.1, it isstill too early to assess the contribution ofREDES as a conflict-prevention approach (anexternal evaluation of REDES was scheduled tobegin in September 2006, after the completion ofthis ADR’s field work). The initial results,especially in the Montes de Maria region alongColombia’s Atlantic Coast, are encouraging.However, the lack of a monitoring and evaluationsystem (which several years after implementationis in the process of being developed) significantlylimits the extent to which assessments can bemade. The emphasis placed by the REDESprogramme on rebuilding or strengthening thesocial fabric in violence-torn areas and ondeveloping local governments’ institutionalcapacities appears to have provided a practicalmethodology for mobilizing development fundsfrom both the national government and externaldonors, while stimulating closer cooperationbetween civil society and the local government.The initial and still tentative evidence availablesuggests that this approach does help to reducelocal conflicts and to provide alternativemechanisms for dispute resolution (via efforts toorganize citizens and greater participation on thepart of citizens in the local political process). Thesustainability of these REDES projects, however,remains to be demonstrated.

UNDP’s conflict-resolution interventions indefence of indigenous rights, in regions such asCauca (Paeces and Guambianos) and the SierraNevada de Santa Marta (Aruhuacos and Kogis),have fostered valuable dialogue. They have alsoproduced initial agreements over land use and

restoration of reservation land while preventingthe escalation of potentially violent confrontations.The UNDP team involved in such programmeactivities is, however, very limited, both in termsof available personnel and resources.48

In terms of landmines and unexploded ordnance,significant resources have been mobilized foractivities in this area, partly as a result of UNDPsupport for the government’s advocacy role in the anti-mine campaign in Colombia, both atnational and international levels. However,communication difficulties between the expertsprovided by UNDP, along with a lack ofknowledge regarding mine removal in the midstof conflict, hampered the effectiveness oftechnical assistance provided.

As far as recovery efforts are concerned, anintervention model dealing with natural disasterswas developed empirically by a team of UNDPconsultants, working in close relationship withUNDP’s Colombia office, in the process ofreconstructing Armenia. Though the modelinvolved significant participation on the part ofthe civil society and private sector (in whosedevelopment UNDP played a crucial role), it hasnot been comprehensively documented for thebenefit of others seeking guidance in coping withsimilar natural disasters.Though there are a coupleof publications dealing with the reconstructionprocess,49 none of them lays out UNDP’s experiencein Armenia in a systematic way, which would beuseful not only for Colombia but for other countriesas well. This is an area where UNDP’s office inColombia may be able to develop a ‘knowledgeproduct’ (such as a good practices note). UNDPcould also organize an international conferenceon natural disasters, where lessons learned,including those from Armenia, could be shared.50

48 For a discussion of UNDP and its activities in the Paez community in the Cauca region, see Wilches-Chaux, 2005, pp. 5-26.49 Gomez, D., et al. (2001) includes only one reference, in passing, to UNDP, whereas in Lafourcade, O., et al. (2002), there

is a valuable and brief chapter by L.D. Campos on UN system attempts to deal with disasters. This could be a startingpoint for the systematization of UNDP’s experience in the reconstruction of Armenia.

50 The recently released evaluation of natural disasters by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank could alsobe presented at such a conference.

C H A P T E R 3 . C O N C L U S I O N S , L E S S O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 2 9

This final chapter provides a synthesis of themajor conclusions emerging from the report.It also identifies a number of lessons andrecommendations that could assist UNDP instrategically positioning its support in order toincrease its development effectiveness in Colombia.

3.1 POSITIONING UNDP-COLOMBIAFOR THE FUTURE

Colombia is a middle-income country. As aconsequence, UNDP core funds have beenlimited and have not provided UNDP’s countryprogramme with sufficient resources to meet the multidimensional challenges of peace anddevelopment in a context of chronic internalarmed conflict. This situation led UNDP’sleadership in Colombia to spread its portfolio toothinly across a variety of activities categorized asdevelopment support services to generate operationalresources. In doing so, the country office adopteda responsive approach to the demands generatedby agencies of the Government of Colombia andinternational financial institutions.

While initially successful, this way of workingcarried significant costs in terms of UNDP’srelevance and risks to its reputation (mostlystemming from its involvement in procurement).The government’s criticisms of UNDP’s involve-ment in development support services in 2004negatively affected the organization’s image, butnot to the point of permanently tarnishingUNDP’s reputation or preventing it fromcarrying out its mandate.

Indeed, UNDP’s 2002-2006 programme forColombia achieved important results. A major

accomplishment during this period was thedevelopment of a strong knowledge base onhuman development.The national and subnationalhuman development reports are generallyperceived to be useful and reliable sources ofinformation and analysis. They have also beenwidely praised as effective instruments for publicpolicy advocacy and for tackling sensitive humandevelopment issues such as violent conflict andsocial inequalities. Among the ‘best practices’demonstrated in the production of the reports isbroad consultation among multiple actors insociety, thereby increasing local ownership of thereports and promoting their use.

UNDP has also played a useful role in facilitatingdialogue in Colombia, and its leadership is soughtby both national and international counterparts.At the national level, UNDP’s interventions inthe G-24 consultation process proved critical inbuilding bridges between the government, civilsociety organizations and international cooperation.

At the local level, UNDP interventions are alsohaving promising results.The REDES programmeis piloting the implementation of developmentinitiatives in a context characterized by internalarmed conflict. That programme, along with theLocal Governance with Assets of Citizenshipprogramme, are the most notable examples of thevalue of UNDP’s coordinating role at the locallevel. UNDP has been less effective in performingthat role within the UN system itself.

Looking ahead, UNDP should capitalize on itsconsiderable experience, and concentrate itscountry programme for 2008-2011 to a greaterdegree. This will involve managing certain risksand pursuing opportunities that can strengthen

Chapter 3

CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C H A P T E R 3 . C O N C L U S I O N S , L E S S O N S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S3 0

and sustain Colombia’s peace and developmentprocess. For example, the future UNDPprogramme could take a rights-based approach,which is consistent with Colombia’s current—1991—Constitution, and focus on areas ofcritical importance to the country, such as peace-building. In doing so, UNDP should draw on itsworldwide expertise and its perceived neutrality,keeping to the minimum its involvement indevelopment support services.

This will mean transitioning from a demand-driven approach toward a more strategic way ofworking that will enable the organization tobalance responsiveness to national developmentpriorities with the need to maintain programmaticcoherence (within prioritized areas of intervention)and financial stability. In this transition, developmentsupport services that involve only resourcemanagement operations are slated to be phasedout as a key activity within UNDP’s portfolio,despite their past financial contributions toUNDP-Colombia’s operational budget.

UNDP’s credibility is one of its most importantassets, which must be maintained. This credibilityis especially important in the development ofsocial policy, an area in which internationalfinancial institutions are not perceived as neutral.It could also help Colombia to close the ‘development information gap’, that is, toovercome the lack of reliable and comprehensivedevelopment information required to design,implement, monitor and evaluate peace anddevelopment policies and interventions. Inpartnership with Colombian and internationalorganizations, UNDP could further contribute tofilling this gap by working to strengthen theColombian statistical system.

In better positioning itself for the future, UNDP-Colombia should also consider playing a brokeringrole with UN agencies dealing with productivesectors that are not based in Colombia, but thathave a portfolio in the country (such as IFAD).Such a partnership could blend peace andrecovery interventions with productive and otherdevelopment activities, thereby contributing to

greater development effectiveness in Colombia ofthe UN system as a whole.

3.1.1 LESSONS LEARNED

The principal lesson from UNDP’s experience inColombia is that the pressure and incentives toself-finance a country office can lead to theoveruse of development support services.Excessive dependence on such services canjeopardize UNDP’s development contributionand create problems that affect the overall imageof the organization. The evaluation teamrecognizes that there are circumstances in whichdevelopment support services can constitute avaluable modality of intervention for UNDP inColombia. Such circumstances include:

� The lack of national capacity to implement a project

� Limited consensus among development actorsto implement a project, combined with soundtechnical assistance capacity within UNDP

� A clear UNDP exit strategy.

Managing (or administering) resources can bejustified if it conforms to the three criteria above.Just as important, UNDP’s counterparts need toknow what services they can expect to receivefrom UNDP and the cost of those services fromthe outset of every project. Indeed, clarifyingexpectations from the beginning, according tothe modality of service provided, should becomestandard operating procedure.

A second lesson has to do with UNDP’s development contribution. The organization hasin the past, and can in the future, contributegreatly to capacity development, particularlywhere Colombia’s institutional capacity is fragile(such is the case of most subnational counterpartsin Colombia). The quality of UNDP’s knowledgeand advisory services, however, derives from acombination of analytical capacity and operationalexpertise related to problem-solving and capacity-building. These should be strengthened in theColombia office, and draw more fully on UNDP’sresources as a global knowledge network.


3.2 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Avoid using UNDP’s administrative capacitiesto manage government payrolls, procurementneeds or infrastructural projects with no addedvalue. This will help ensure that UNDP’sresources are used in ways that will yield thegreatest development effectiveness and avoidjeopardizing the organization’s reputation.

Realign development support services inaccordance with a ‘rights-based’ developmentapproach for the 2008-2011 programmingcycle. Such services could be based on thefollowing alternative cost-recovery strategies:

� Resource administration: Currently, UNDPcost-recovery is based on a fixed percentageof the total amount of resources involved in aparticular project, resulting in a subsidy fromlarge projects to small ones. Instead, astrategy calibrated by type of service shouldbe formulated in which resource administrationand procurement activities that requireprimarily operational follow-up on the partof UNDP would charge a lower overhead.

� Technical assistance and follow-up: ThoseUNDP activities that require more specializedtechnical assistance and/or qualified follow-upshould charge a higher overhead.

Increase the proportion of staff and consultantswith substantive knowledge to improve theresponse capabilities of the UNDP countryoffice vis-à-vis Colombia’s development needsin the 2008-2011 programming cycle. At thesame time, UNDP-Colombia should rely moreon UNDP’s global knowledge network tostrengthen its development effectiveness.

Strive for more effective internal coordinationamong the multiple UN agencies currentlyoperating in Colombia. UNDP can and shouldplay a pivotal role in bringing diverse developmentactors to the negotiation table. Demobilizationand reintegration of ex-combatants (under theauspices of the Justice and Peace Law) will be akey test of UNDP’s coordination capacity.

Include appropriate systems for monitoring andevaluation in the design of new programmes,and ensure that such systems are implemented.UNDP interventions in Colombia have lackedappropriate monitoring and evaluation. Monitoringhas generally been restricted to financial aspects,and interim implementation reports (which weresometimes presented as evaluations) werecompleted for only 18 out of 167 UNDP-supportedinterventions. These reports mainly provideddescriptions of the operations, without highlightingthe role of UNDP. The contribution of these‘evaluations’ in terms of knowledge and/oraccountability is negligible (outcome evaluationswere not performed at all).

The lack of a results-oriented system of self-evaluation deprives UNDP-Colombia fromdeveloping a knowledge base grounded in itsoperations that could facilitate learning andaccountability. For this reason, it would beworthwhile for the office to include in the designof its new operations appropriate systems formonitoring and evaluation; mechanisms mustalso be put into place to ensure that they areimplemented. Furthermore, the terms of referenceof completion or interim implementation reportsshould include an explicit request to highlightthe role of UNDP in the intervention. Finally, aprogramme of outcome evaluations should bedeveloped and implemented by UNDP-Colombia.

Use the model of decentralized offices toenhance UNDP’s presence at the subnationallevel and increase UN system coordination.UNDP has undertaken a decentralization processin Colombia, which entailed the creation of fivesubnational offices (two of which are stillfunctioning). One is located in Cartagena (for theColombian-Caribbean region) and the second inManizales (for the Eje Cafetero region). Theoffices develop projects and programmes forthese regions in consultation with public andprivate actors, taking into account UNDP’spolicies. The subnational offices also manageproject implementation within each region.(UNDP operations in other regions of Colombiaare developed and managed from UNDP’s mainoffice in Bogotá).


The Manizales and the Cartagena offices havebecome a focal point for development initiativesin each region, involving local institutions fromboth the private and the public sector, such as the Colombian Coffee Producers’ Associationand locally based universities and municipalgovernments. The preparation of humandevelopment reports for the regions is a jointventure involving multiple actors that helpedbuild social capital at the subnational level.

Despite initial successes, the potential of thesubnational office model for effective coordinationof UN system activities in Colombia has not beenfully exploited. In the future, Colombia’ssubnational offices could play a much moreimportant role in the coordination of the UNsystem, as demonstrated by subnational UNDPoffices in other countries.

3.3 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONSBY PRACTICE AREA

3.3.1 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

UNDP contributions to democratic governancein Colombia have focused primarily on improvingthe monitoring of government decision-makingprocesses at all levels. The ‘Fight againstCorruption’ and ‘Citizens’ Participation’ projects,implemented with the Comptroller General’sOffice, provide positive examples of the results ofUNDP involvement in public administrationreform and anti-corruption efforts. Throughthese projects, citizens’ Monitoring and EvaluationCommittees were institutionalized as a form offiscal control, and Citizens’ Agendas became aformal mechanism for the articulation of civilsociety in social policy.

The persistence of conflict in the country overthe last five decades has made peace-building anobligatory component of UNDP interventions in the area of governance. The main UNDPinterventions in this area during the 2002-2006programme cycle consisted of four projects underthe Reconciliation and Development Programme(REDES). The basic formula of activating civilsociety, strengthening local governmental institutions

and building alliances among local, regional,national and international actors, although notentirely new, offers a viable approach forintroducing development activities in conflict-ridden areas where the national government hasa limited presence.

UNDP’s capabilities for adding value throughtechnical assistance are greatest at the level ofregional/municipal governments, as the positiveresults achieved in Bogotá—including theTransmilenio mass transit system, infrastructuraldevelopment and the experience with Bogotá’sPersonero—indicate. Outside the city of Bogotá(which is rapidly gaining institutional capacitiesand expertise), other major metropolitan areas,intermediate cities and rural communitiesthroughout Colombia still have considerableneed for UNDP financial management services,technical expertise and knowledge transfers.

Recommendations. With just three years’experience, replication of the REDES programmeis premature. However, results so far are promising.Systematic evaluation, at regular intervals, of theREDES approach to peace-building, conflictresolution and strengthening of democraticgovernance at the local level should be requiredin the next UNDP programming cycle.

Efforts to extend UNDP’s successful interventionsin Bogotá to other parts of the country couldprovide major opportunities for UNDP tocontribute to effective democratic governance anddevelopment in Colombia. UNDP shouldconsider investing in knowledge-creation and indistilling lessons learned from those interventionsso as to facilitate their application by local-levelplanners and decision-makers.

3.3.2 POVERTY REDUCTION

UNDP has provided valuable support for themeasurement and analysis of the MDGs at thenational, departmental/regional and municipallevels. In fact, this work has been one of the fewinstances of effective inter-agency coordination.In addition, UNDP played an important role inmainstreaming the MDGs within the Colombian


public sector, not only by supporting research andanalysis at all three levels of government, but alsoby assisting in the elaboration of a policydocument setting out targets and strategiesdesigned to allow the Government of Colombiato incorporate the MDGs into its nationaldevelopment policies.

A related area of UNDP support has been thedevelopment of policy frameworks for povertyreduction and the production and disseminationof several studies dealing with critical povertyreduction issues.

Recommendations. UNDP’s relevance could befurther enhanced by engaging in a dialogue aboutthe eventual consequences of the government’ssocial and fiscal policy, which is based on acombination of transfers and subsidies and whoseequity, effectiveness and sustainability is doubtful.UNDP’s perceived neutrality could allow it toenter into—and contribute to—this debate in away that would not be feasible for internationalfinancial institutions.

The sustainability of some UNDP-funded povertyreduction activities depends on future actions,particularly alliances forged with other developmentagencies that can build on UNDP’s achievements(especially those agencies of the UN system thatare actively involved in productive sectors, such asIFAD, UNIDO and the World Bank).

An important role that UNDP can play inColombia is supporting the production anddissemination of poverty-related statisticalinformation that can be used as input inimproving the quality of poverty reductionpolicies, particularly those that target the poor.This would require an analysis of Colombia’sstatistical system, which could be undertaken inpartnership with other agencies (some bilateralagencies, such as the UK’s Department forInternational Development, have already beenactive in this area).

Finally, the expertise of UNDP’s regional and/orinternational centres (such as the International

Poverty Centre, based in Brazil) and South-South cooperation should be exploited to provideUNDP-Colombia with additional humanresources, experience and support, which couldsubstantially increase its added value.

3.3.3 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

During the 2002-2006 programming cycle,UNDP’s interventions have aimed to help theGovernment of Colombia and civil societyorganizations achieve sustainable developmentthrough the effective use and management of thecountry’s natural resources. UNDP strategies forthis area have prioritized environmental governance,climate change, and linkages between sustainableenvironmental management practices and otherbiological resources. UNDP’s contribution toresults in these areas, however, has been modestand of limited effectiveness. UNDP’s energy andenvironment programmes were largely demand-driven and generally more reactive thanproactive. Moreover, UNDP did not effectivelyanticipate development challenges in this area.UNDP is generally perceived in Colombia as aresource administrator, and not as a real source oftechnical expertise with useful knowledge relevantto addressing the country’s major sustainabledevelopment challenges at the national orsubnational levels.

The institution-building efforts undertaken byUNDP in the case of the Ministry of theEnvironment did not adopt a knowledge-management approach. Rather, they focused on the recruitment of human capital, while underes-timating the need for, or neglecting altogether,the development of organizational capacities anda knowledge base within the ministry. Much ofthe technical expertise subsequently left whenthe ministry was reorganized by the UribeAdministration in 2003.

Recommendations. Indigenous issues now formpart of UNDP’s energy and environmentportfolio. However, there is no evidence thatUNDP has developed a systematic strategytoward Colombia’s multifaceted indigenousproblems that effectively integrates population


issues into UNDP’s ongoing conflict-resolution,peace-building, democratic governance andsustainable development programmes. Thisshould be taken into account in the futureUNDP country programme.

UNDP should elaborate a strategy that links naturalresource management to conflict prevention. Suchan approach would make a significant contributionin terms of knowledge and good practices.

UNDP could also sponsor an analysis of therecently completed US-Colombia Free TradeAgreement, exploring the implications of energyand environmental regulations for Colombia’scompetitiveness.

Finally, UNDP should take advantage of itsneutrality to convene a national dialogue on keyenvironmental and energy challenges to sustainabledevelopment in Colombia. This could involvepartnership-building among subnational, nationaland international actors capable of designing andimplementing sustainable development projects.

3.3.4 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

Among the most important UNDP initiatives in this area are those that encouraged peace-building and recovery in several widely dispersedconflict zones (primarily REDES and thelandmine programmes), and that attempted toresolve disputes and conflicts affecting thecountry’s indigenous populations.

The REDES programme provides a promisingapproach for undertaking development interven-tions in conflict-ridden zones. Initial and stilltentative evidence suggests that this approach ishelping to reduce local conflicts and to providealternative mechanisms for dispute resolution.

The sustainability of the REDES projects,however, remains to be demonstrated.

So far, UNDP indigenous programmes have notbeen incorporated into REDES. And, althoughthere are some relations between REDES andinterventions involving landmines and unexplodedordnance, there is a dispersion of activities in thisarea. This is partly a consequence of UNDP’sreactive approach—that is, trying to respond tomultiple demands from different national andinternational organizations.

Recommendations. The next UNDP program-ming cycle should consider expanding UNDPinterventions to the country’s indigenous andAfro-Colombian populations. To guide suchinterventions, the ADR recommends theelaboration of a strategy for UNDP activitiesinvolving Colombia’s indigenous and Afro-Colombian peoples. The prevention strategycovering antipersonnel mines and active abandonedmunitions requires more effective coordinationwithin the UN system (especially betweenUNDP and UNICEF) and between the UNsystem agencies and the Vice Presidency’s MineObservatory to improve the overall results of theanti-mine campaign.

UNDP should seek to strengthen subnationalmanagement of the integrated anti-mineprogramme, particularly with respect to: 1) theconsolidation of departmental and municipalcommittees, 2) dissemination of standards regardingrisk education and care of mine victims, 3) follow-upand control of policy implementation and thedevelopment of procedures, 4) political decentral-ization, and 5) retrieval and processing ofinformation related to the diverse components ofthe campaign against mines.

A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 3 5

1. BACKGROUND

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) haslaunched a series of country evaluations, calledAssessments of Development Results (ADRs), inorder to capture and demonstrate evaluativeevidence of UNDP’s contributions to developmentresults at the country level. Undertaken inselected countries, the ADRs focus on outcomesand critically examine achievements andconstraints in the UNDP thematic areas of focus,draw lessons learned, and provide recommenda-tions for the future. The ADRs also providestrategic analysis for enhancing performance andstrategically positioning UNDP support withinnational development priorities and UNDPcorporate policy directions.

Colombia was among several Latin Americancountries considered for the ADR process. It was selected for a number of reasons: Thecompletion of the 2002-2006 Country CooperationFramework presents an opportunity to evaluatethe achievements and results over the pastprogramme cycle and before. The findings will beused as inputs to the 2008-2011 CountryProgramme within the context of the new UNDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF).UNDP’s programme in Colombia is importantin terms of resource mobilization, and in terms of its contribution to democratic governance andpoverty reduction in the midst of chronicconflict. Colombia was not part of the countriesconsidered in the evaluation of the role of UNDPin crisis and post-conflict situations. Further, anew UNDP Resident Representative in Colombiapresents an excellent opportunity to establish abasis for enhanced accountability for results.

The evaluation will provide an in-depth analysisof poverty reduction under a human developmentperspective through strengthening of national,institutional and individual capacities, particularlyanalyzing three thematic areas: a) peace-buildingand conflict prevention, b) democratic governance,modernization of state and decentralization, c)poverty reduction and social development.

The overall goals of the ADRs are to:

1. Support the Administrator’s substantiveaccountability function to the ExecutiveBoard and serve as a vehicle for qualityassurance of UNDP interventions at thecountry level

2. Generate lessons from experience to informcurrent and future programming at thecountry and corporate levels

3. Provide to stakeholders in the programmecountry an objective assessment of results(specifically outcomes) that have beenachieved through UNDP support andpartnerships with other key actors for a givenmulti-year period.

An ADR mission is planned for Colombia inJuly 2006. It will focus on the period of thecurrent Country Programme, but will alsocapture the key results over the past five to sevenyears that the Evaluation Team may findrelevant. It will refer to the UNDP activitiesunder the Second Country CooperationFramework (CCF) 2002-2006 and, whennecessary, to the first CCF 1997-2001.

Annex 1

TERMS OF REFERENCEASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS - COLOMBIA

A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E3 6

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess UNDP’scontributions to development results andstrategic positioning in Colombia, draw lessonslearned and outline options for improvements.The ADR in Colombia will:

� Provide an independent assessment ofdevelopment results at the country level, withparticular emphasis on UNDP’s CountryProgramme, assessing the relevance andeffectiveness achieved through UNDP supportand in partnership with other developmentactors during the last five to seven years

� Contribute to accountability and to learningfrom experience, taking into account self-evaluations (project and outcome evaluations)and the role of development partners

� Provide an analysis of how UNDP haspositioned itself to add value in response tonational needs and changes in the nationaldevelopment context

� Present key findings, draw key lessons, andprovide a set of clear and forward-lookingoptions for management to make adjust-ments in the current strategy and nextCountry Programme.

3. SCOPE OF THE ASSESSMENT

The evaluation will undertake a comprehensivereview of the UNDP programme portfolio andactivities during the period of review, with morein-depth focus on specific areas. Specifically, theADR will cover the following:

A. Strategic positioning

� Ascertain the relevance of UNDP support tonational needs, development goals andpriorities, including linkages with the goal ofreducing poverty and other MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). This includesan analysis of the perceived comparativestrengths of the programme versus the majornational challenges to development.

� Assess how UNDP has anticipated andresponded to significant changes in thenational development context affecting specificthematic areas. The evaluation should considerkey events at the national and political levelthat influenced (or will influence) thedevelopment context, notably the roundtableprocess as well as the risk management ofUNDP, any missed opportunities for UNDPinvolvement and contribution, efforts atadvocacy, and UNDP’s responsiveness versusconcentration of efforts.

� The evaluation should consider the influenceof systemic issues, i.e. policy and administrativeconstraints affecting the programme, on boththe donor and programme country sides, aswell as how the development results achievedand the partnerships established havecontributed to ensure a relevant and strategicposition of UNDP.

B. Development results

� Provide an examination of the effectivenessand sustainability of the UNDP programmesby i) highlighting main achievements(outcomes) at the national level in the lastfive years and UNDP’s contribution to thesein terms of key outputs, ii) ascertainingcurrent progress made in achieving outcomesin the given thematic areas and UNDP’ssupport to this. Qualify UNDP contribution tothe outcomes with a fair degree of plausibility.Assess contribution to capacity developmentat the national and subnational level to theextent that it is implicit in the intendedresults. Consider anticipated and unanticipated,positive and negative outcomes.

� Provide an in-depth analysis of the mainprogramme areas, assessing the anticipatedprogress in achieving intended outcomes undereach of the objectives and programme areas.

� Identify and analyse the main factorsinfluencing results, including the range andquality of development partnerships forgedand their contribution to outcomes, and howthe positioning of UNDP influences itsresults and partnership strategy.

A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E 3 7

C. Lessons learned

� Identify key lessons in the thematic areas offocus and on positioning that can provide auseful basis for strengthening UNDP and itssupport to the country and for improvingprogramme performance, results and effective-ness in the future. Draw lessons fromunintended results.

D. Cross-cutting issues

� Assess implementation capacity as it pertainsto the implementation of UNDP’s programmesand the achievement of results and impact.

4. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will employ a variety of data-gathering techniques, including desk reviews,stakeholder meetings, client surveys, and focusgroup interviews and selected site visits. TheEvaluation Team will use triangulation of perceptions, documents and validations and willreview national policy documents, such as therecord of the roundtable meetings and sectorpolicies and action plans, as well as programmingframeworks (UNDAF, Common CountryAssessment, CCF, Strategic Result Framework/Results-oriented Annual Report, etc.), whichgive an overall picture of the country context.The team will also consider select projectdocuments and Programme Support Documentsas well as any reports from monitoring andevaluation at the country level. Statistical datawill be assessed where useful.

A stakeholder involvement and consultationprocess is envisaged. The Evaluation Team willmeet with government ministries/agencies, otherinstitutions, civil society organizations, NGOs,private sector representatives, UN agencies,multilateral and bilateral donors, and beneficiaries.The team will visit project/field sites as required.

In terms of methodology, the ADR will followguidance issued by EO in a phased approach:

Phase 1: Preparatory phase

� Desk review—Carried out by the EO inclose consultation with the Evaluation Team

Leader, the country office and the RegionalBureau for Latin America and the Caribbean(RBLAC) and based on the key questions forthe evaluation developed by the EO TaskManager and Evaluation Team Leader inconsultation with RBLAC.

� Scoping mission—Completed March 2006,the EO Task Manager together with theteam leader and locally recruited consultantconducted a brief mission to the country to define the scope and to complete theevaluability assessment.

� Development of final evaluation design andplan—including the background to theevaluation, key evaluation questions, detailedmethodology, information sources andinstruments for data-collection, plan fordata-collection, design for data analysis, andformat for reporting.

Phase 2: Conducting the ADR and drafting theevaluation report

� ADR mission for data-collection and validation—The main mission of two weekswill be conducted by the independentEvaluation Team, led by the EvaluationTeam Leader. The EO Task Manager is amember of the team.

� Stakeholder meeting—A meeting with thekey stakeholders will be organized in thecountry after the end of the ADR mission.Their comments will be incorporated intothe final evaluation report by the EvaluationTeam Leader.

� Analysis and reporting—The final phase willbe the analysis of all information collectedand production of the draft ADR report by the Evaluation Team within three weeksafter the departure of the team from thecountry. The draft will be subject to factualcorrections by the key clients for the evaluation, and a technical review by the EOusing expert evaluators. The Team Leader inclose cooperation with the EO TaskManager shall finalize the ADR report basedon these final reviews.

A N N E X 1 . T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E3 8

Phase 3: Follow-up

� Management response—The preparation ofthe management response and tracking itsimplementation will be undertakeninternally by UNDP.

� Learning events—The dissemination of thereport’s findings shall serve the purpose oforganizational learning, as part of the overallEO dissemination and outreach strategy.

5. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs are:

� A comprehensive final report: Assessment ofDevelopment Results—Colombia.

The final report of the ADR to be produced bythe Evaluation Team should, at the least, contain:

� Executive summary of conclusions andrecommendations

� Background, with analysis of country context

� Strategic positioning and programme relevance

� Programme performance

� Lessons learned and good practices

� Findings and recommendations

� Annexes (statistics, terms of reference, personsmet, documentation reviewed, etc.).

At the end of their mission, and prior to leavingthe country, the Evaluation Team will discuss itspreliminary findings and recommendations withthe Resident Representative and the countryoffice staff. The team will use this feedback tofinalize the report.

The team leader is responsible for submitting thedraft report to the EO no later than three weeksafter completion of the country mission.

6. EVALUATION TEAM

The composition of the Evaluation Team shallreflect the independence and the substantive

results focus of the evaluation. The team leaderand all members of the team will be selected by the EO. The team leader must have ademonstrated capacity in strategic thinking andpolicy advice and in the evaluation of complexprogrammes in the field.

The team will comprise three consultants, one ofwhom will be the team leader, a team specialistwith specific skills in topical areas relevant to theevaluation, a national consultant with extensiveknowledge of the country situation, and a staffmember from the EO as the Task Manager. TheTask Manager will bring to the team the results-based management perspective, knowledge of theADR methodology, familiarity with UNDPoperations and knowledge of UNDP’s practiceareas. The national consultant will support theteam in securing access to key stakeholders andpreparing analytical assessments.

7. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The EO will manage the evaluation and ensurecoordination and liaison with RBLAC and otherconcerned units at the Headquarters level. TheEO Task Manager will lead the ADR process, inclose consultation with RBLAC and Colombiacountry office management.

The UNDP country office will take a lead role inorganizing dialogue and stakeholder meetings onthe findings and recommendations, support theevaluation team in liaison with the key partnersand discussions with the team, and make availableto the team all the material that is available. Theoffice will provide support to logistics and planning.

The EO will meet all costs directly related toconducting the ADR. These will include costsrelated to participation of the Team Leader,international and national/regional consultantsand the EO Task Manager, as well as the preliminary research and the issuance of the finalADR report. The country office will contributesupport in-kind. The EO will also cover costs ofany stakeholder workshops during the ADR mission.

A N N E X 2 . L I S T O F P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D 3 9

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Sandra Alzate, Director, InternationalCooperation, Presidential Agency for SocialAction and International Cooperation

Juan David Ángel, Director, ReinsertionProgramme, Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs

Maria Sofía Arango, Adviser to the HighCommisioner, Presidency of Colombia

Constanza Atuesta, Adviser, National Parks—Ministry of Environment

Ana Maria Fernández Becerra, Monitoring &Results-based Budgeting, SINERGIANational Planning Department

Gustavo Botero, Consultant, National Parks—Ministry of Environment

Margarita Jaramillo de Botero, ReinsertionProgramme, Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs

Luz Estela Carrillo, Specialist, NationalPlanning Department

Ramiro Guerrero Carvajal, Vice Minister,Ministry of Social Protection

Fernando Carvalho, Director, National Savings Fund

Manuel Fernando Castro, Director, SINERGIANational Planning Department

Yessid Castro, Director of Economic Affairs,Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Irma Chaparro, Project Coordinator, SISBEN,National System of Beneficiaries Selection

Juan David Correa, International CooperationOffice, Colombian Bio-Massif

Rene Correa, Relations with UNDP, Ministryof Foreign Affairs

Rodrigo Guerrero, Consultant, NationalParks—Ministry of Environment

Esperanza Gutiérrez, Director, Ministry ofSocial Protection

Luz Piedad Herrera, Director, AntipersonnelMines Observatory

Luís Alfonso Hoyos, Director, PresidentialAgency for Social Action and International Cooperation

Gedeon Jaramillo, Multilateral Affairs, Ministryof Foreign Affairs

José Gabriel Jiménez, Project Coordinator,Colombian Bio-Massif

Claudia Medina, Project Coordinator,Modernization of the FinancialAdministration, Ministry of Finance

Sandra Mikan, Director of InternationalCooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Santiago Montenegro, Director, NationalPlanning Department

Sara Moreno, Finance & AdministrativeManager, Comptroller General’s Office

Norman Julio Muñoz, Revenue ProjectCoordinator, National Planning Department

Everardo Murillo, Peace and Development,Presidential Agency for Social Action andInternational Cooperation

Cesar Rey, Technical Sub-director, NationalParks—Ministry of Environment

Alex Rodríguez, Adviser, Fight againstCorruption, Presidency of Colombia

Ana Gomez Rojas, Focused Evaluations,SINERGIA National Planning Department

Luz Maria Salazar, Cooperation Director,Presidential Agency for Social Action andInternational Cooperation

Claudia Sánchez, Finance Director, ComptrollerGeneral’s Office

Alfredo Sarmiento, Director, HumanDevelopment Programme, NationalPlanning Department

Judith Sarmiento, Adviser, Presidential Councilfor Women’s Equality

Margarita Maria Soto, Assistant, National Tax and Customs Department

Juan Pablo Toro, Specialist, National Planning Department

Luz Angélica Villamizar, Coordinator, NationalTax and Customs Department

Annex 2

LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

A N N E X 2 . L I S T O F P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D4 0

SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

German Arias, Ombudsperson, Office of theBogotá Ombudsperson

Nubia Capera, Coordinator, Office of theBogotá Ombudsperson

German Cardona, Former mayor, ManizalesGilberto Toro Giraldo, President, Federation of

Colombian MunicipalitiesMarcela Jaramillo, Manager, Federation of

Colombian MunicipalitiesPatricia Lizarazo, Institutional Specialist,

Municipality of BogotáJuan Carlos Rodríguez, Assistant, Office of the

Bogotá OmbudspersonErika Milena Rodríguez, Budget Officer,

Office of the Bogotá Ombudsperson

CIVIL SOCIETY

Eugenia Mier Acevedo, Local social worker,Cartagena city

Clovis Zúñiga Álvarez, Local social worker,Cartagena city

Liliana Baena, Local social worker, Cartagena cityManuel Rodríguez Becerra, Former minister,

Ministry of EnvironmentEmiro Gomez Beltrán, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityAna Teresa Bernal, President, REDEPAZ

(Colombia’s largest peace network)Paula Gaviria Betancur, Human Rights and

Peace, Fundación SocialHaroldo Bolanos, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityLeonardo Davila, Grassroots leader,

Mogotes villageMaria Bernarda Estrada, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityLina Maria Garcia, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityAlejandro Gaviria, Dean, Economics

Department, University of the AndesDaniel Gomez, Professor, University of RosarioAlejandra González, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityJuan Manuel González, Director, Centre for

Regional Studies (CIDER),University of the Andes

Weildler Guerra, Executive Director,Observatory of Colombian Caribbean

Enelyis Guerrero, Local social worker,Cartagena city

José Gutiérrez, Local social worker, Cartagena cityArleide Manjares Herazo, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityRoberto Hinostroza, Dean, Department of

Finance, University of Externado, ColombiaSalomón Kalmanovitz, Former board member,

Banco de la RepublicaHedry Orozco Lara, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityJuan Mayr, Former minister, Ministry of

EnvironmentIngrid Batista Meza, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityRoxy Elena Montero, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityMaria del Pilar Montilla, Technical

Cooperation, Fundación SocialSandra González Montoya, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityJimena Nieto, Former director, International

Affairs, Ministry of EnvironmentJairo Núñez, Mission Against Poverty,

University of the Andes Nelly Cubides Paz, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityGerman Corina Prieto, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityMaría Eugenia Querubín, Vice President,

Fundación SocialJavier López Quiles, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityFrancisco de Roux, Director, UNETEEduardo Sarmiento, Former dean, Economics

Department, University of the AndesWilmer Molina Serpa, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityBexi Cruz Torrado, Local social worker,

Cartagena cityEduardo Uribe, Professor, University of

the AndesMauricio Uribe, Researcher, CIDER,

University of the Andes

A N N E X 2 . L I S T O F P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D 4 1

Milena Merlano Vásquez, Local social worker,Cartagena city

Eduardo Wiesner, Former minister, Ministry ofFinance

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERALCOOPERATION AGENCIES

Diego Arizzi, State Reform Specialist, Inter-American Development Bank

Fernando Balcazar, Sector Specialist, Inter-American Development Bank

Viviana Barberena, Consultant on localgovernance, GTZ

Rosa Maria Elcarte, Coordinator, SpanishInternational Cooperation Agency

Jeff Goebel, Project Development Specialist,US Agency for International Development

Camila Gómez, Programme DevelopmentSpecialist, US Agency for InternationalDevelopment

Ángel Fernando González, DeputyCoordinator, Spanish InternationalCooperation Agency

Nancy Hardy, Programme Director, US Agencyfor International Development

Marta Laverde, Acting Representative,World Bank

Mónica López, Chief of Technical Cooperation,Embassy of Mexico

Fernando Montenegro, Acting Representative,Inter-American Development Bank

Ana Maria Mojica, Cooperation Coordinator,European Union

Lena Nordstrom, Ambassador, Government of Sweden

Michael Reed, Coordinator, SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency

Jaques Remmesrwaal, Chief of Cooperation,Embassy of the Netherlands

Juan Pablo Ruiz, Environmental Specialist,World Bank

Monica Wulfing, Cooperation Specialist,Swedish International DevelopmentCooperation Agency

UNDP

Gabriel Amado, Programme Officer,Public Administration

Javier Amaya, Finance Analyst, OperationsJuan Ignacio Arango, Adviser, Resident

Coordinator’s OfficeHernando Gomez Buendía, Consultant,

Human Development Report, BogotáLuís Daniel Campos, Assistant Resident

Representative, Programme AreaEdgar Catano, Programme Officer,

Local DevelopmentAmparo Díaz, Communications Officer,

Resident Representative’s OfficeMaria Victoria Duque, Consultant, Human

Development Report, Bogotá Carlos Mauricio García, Assistant Resident

Representative, OperationsMaria Paulina García, Officer, REDES Sandra Guerrero, Programme Assistant,

Local DevelopmentElda Herazo, Human Development Report,

Regional Office, CaribeFernando Herrera, Programme Officer,

Senior EconomistMauricio Katz, Coordinator, REDES José Manuel Mariscal, Regional Director,

Regional Office, Eje CafeteroLuís Martínez, Procurement Analyst, Operations Bruno Moro, Resident Coordinator, Resident

Representative’s OfficeLuís Olmedo, Programme Officer, EnvironmentAdelina Paiva, Deputy Resident Representative,

Resident Representative’s OfficeZoilo Pallares, Consultant, Local

Development—ART/GOLDNora Posada, Officer, REDES Héctor Riveros, Consultant, Subregional

Facility, GovernanceMercedes Rizo, Programme Coordinator,

Regional Office, CaribeMarcela Rodríguez, Programme Officer,

Institutional DevelopmentMarta Ruiz, Local Development Officer,

Regional Office, Caribe

A N N E X 2 . L I S T O F P E O P L E C O N S U L T E D4 2

Juan Manuel Salazar, Coordinator, SubregionalFacility, Governance

Gabriel Turriago, Officer, REDES Héctor Trujillo, Regional Director, Regional

Office, CaribePaola Andrea Valderrama, Consultant, Human

Development Report, CaribeJuliana Zuluaga, Officer, Regional Office,

Eje Cafetero

UN SYSTEM

Liliana Garavito, Representative, a.i., UnitedNations Information Centre

Meter Gossens, Resident Representative, WorldFood Programme

Amerigo Incacaterra, Deputy ResidentRepresentative, Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights

Mona Kadbey, Resident Representative, UnitedNations Population Fund

Julio Roberto Meier, Resident Representative,Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Raul Rosende, Resident Representative,Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs

Roberto Sempertegui, Resident Representative,a.i., World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization

A N N E X 3 . S E L E C T B I B L I O G R A P H Y 4 3

Alvarez Ortiz, D., et al. 2006. ‘Control social enColombia’. Bogotá: Comptroller General ofthe Republic.

Anón. 2006. ‘Poverty, Principal Problem ofColombia’. Bogotá: Nota Uniandina,pp. 72-75.

Anzola, L.S. 2006. ‘Deslaboralización ysubjetividades en crisis’. Bogotá: Le MondeDiplomatique (Colombian edition), pp. 6-8.

Bejarano, Ana María. 2001. ‘Conflict and Peace in Colombia: Four Theses withImplications on the Ongoing Negotiations’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Bird, R.M., J.M. Poterba, and J. Slemrod, eds.2005. Fiscal Reform in Colombia: Problemsand Prospects. Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press.

CEPAL (Economic Commission for LatinAmerican and the Caribbean). 2006.‘Preliminary Economical Balance for LatinAmerica and Caribbean Economics for2005’. Santiago, Chile.

Colombian Agency for InternationalCooperation. 2005. ‘Strategy ofInternational Cooperation’. Cartagena:Ministry of External Relations.

Consejo Nacional de Política Económica ySocial (CONPES). 2005. ‘Strategies ofColombia for the Achievement of theMillennium Development Goals—2015’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Citizens’ Participation Comptroller Office.2006. ‘Social Control in Colombia,Characteristics and Tendencies’. Bogotá,Colombia: Comptroller General of the Republic.

Corredor Martínez, C. 2004. ‘Poverty, Equalityand Social Efficiency’. Bogotá, Colombia:Cuadernos PNUD-MPS.

Corte Constitucional. 2004. ‘Sentencia T – 025’.

Delgado Gutierrez, A., et al. 2006. ‘Informe dela misión de evaluación’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning (DNP).2006. ‘Colombian Municipalities Towardsthe MDGs: Health, Education and PovertyReduction’. Bogotá, Colombia: UNDP,GTZ, Department of National Planning,Federation of Colombian Municipalities.

Department of National Planning. 2006.‘Results Balance for National Development2005’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning. 2006.‘Visión Colombia 2019’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning. 2005.‘Municipal Transfers’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning. 2005.‘Methodology for the Measurement andAnalysis of the Municipal Performance’.2005. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional.

Department of National Planning. 2005.‘Document CONPES Social No 91’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning. 2004.‘CONPES 3310 para política de acciónafirmativa para la población negra o afrocolombiana’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning. 2003.‘National Development Plan 2002-2006.Towards a United State’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Department of National Planning, UNDP,Colombian Agency for InternationalCooperation and the National HumanDevelopment Programme. 2003. ‘Ten Yearsof Human Development in Colombia’.Bogotá, Colombia: Gente Nueva Editorial.

Department of National Planning. 2003.‘Who Benefits from SISBEN? IntegralEvaluation’. Bogotá, Colombia: MisiónSocial, Department of National Planning, UNDP.

Department of National Planning. 2002.‘The Revival of Coffee’. Bogotá, Colombia:UNDP-Department of National Planning.

Annex 3

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A N N E X 3 . S E L E C T B I B L I O G R A P H Y4 4

Gaviria, Herman Arias, Spokesperson ofBogotá, DC. 2004. ‘Council Report ofBogotá’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Gómez, Daniel. 2001. ‘Reconstrucción del EjeCafetero’. Bogotá: Fund for theReconstruction of Eje Cafetero.

Lafourcade, Olivier. 2002. ‘Memoria delseminario sobre la experiencia dereconstrucción del Eje Cafetero’. Bogotá:Fund for the Reconstruction of Eje Cafetero.

Ministry of Environment, Housing andTerritorial Development. 2006. ‘Informe de gestión del MAVDT, 2005’.

Ministry of Social Protection. 2006. ‘Mission forthe Design of a Poverty and InequalityReduction Strategy. MeasurementMethodology and Size of Poverty inColombia’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Modernization Project CGR-BID, Préstamo1243-OC-CO. 2006. ‘Report of Executionof the Covenant COL/01/053’.Bogotá, Colombia.

National Human Development Programme.2005. ‘Poverty and Distribution of Incomein Bogotá’. Bogotá, Project ‘Bogotá ComoVamos’.

Núñez, J., and S. Espinosa. 2005. ‘Poverty andSocial Protection in Colombia’. Bogotá,Colombia, ASDI -UNDP.

Núñez, J., and N. González. 2006. ‘Colombia in the Context of the MDGs: Trophies,Achievements and the Way Forward’.Bogotá, Colombia, Centre for EconomicDevelopment Studies (CEDE).

Ocampo, J.A. 2004. ‘Among the Reforms andConflict’. Bogotá, Colombia.

Pardo Pinzón, R., and O.L. Sorzano Monraña.2004. ‘Determinantes de la Asistencia y dela Deserción escolar en primaria ysecundaria’. Bogotá, Colombia: CuadernosPNUD-MPS.

Pécaut, Daniel. 2003. Measuring Forces. Bogotá,Colombia: Planeta.

Pesca Pita, Alirio. 2005. The Book of our Lives.Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Centro Don Bosco.

Proexport 2006. Available at: www.proexport.com.co/VBeContent/NewsDetail.asp?ID=6050&IDCompany=22 - 30k

Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. 2006.‘Political Constitution of Colombia’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Presidency of the Republic of Colombia.2006. ‘Report from Congress 2006’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Presidency of the Republic of Colombia.Available at: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2006/febrero/20/13202006.htm

Rettberg, Angelika. 2006. ‘Buscar la paz enmedio del conflicto: Un propósito que no da tregua’. Bogotá, University of the Andesand UNDP-Colombia.

Rojas Morales, Ernesto. 2006. ‘Reflexiones sobre el censo del 2005 en Colombia’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Sánchez Torres, F., C. Mejía Mantilla, and F. Herrera Araujo. 2005. ‘Impacto de lasregalías del carbón en los municipios delCesar 1997-2003’. Bogotá, Colombia:Cuadernos PNUD.

Sarmiento, A., et al. 2004. ‘Las regionescolombianas frente a los objetivos delmilenio’. Bogotá: National HumanDevelopment Programme-Department ofNational Planning-UNDP, ColombianAgency for International Cooperation,Federation of Colombian Municipalities, GTZ.

Sen, A. 2006. ‘Human Development Index’. InClark, D. A. (ed.): The Elgar Companion toDevelopment Studies. Cheltenham, U.K.:Edward Elgar.

Scheper, Elizabeth. 2005. ‘UNDP Bureau forCrisis Prevention and Recovery InternalReview—Colombia Field Report’.

United Nations. 2006. ‘Coca CultivationCensus’. Bogotá, Colombia: UN Office onDrugs and Crime.

UNDP. 2006. ‘Document of the Position ofEnergy and Environment in Colombia:Document for Discussion’. Bogotá, Colombia.

UNDP. 2006. ‘Facts from the Alley’. No. 16,Bogotá, Colombia.

UNDP. April 2006. ‘Practice Notes on Capacity Development’.

UNDP. 2005. ‘Feria de conocimientos degobernabilidad local en América Latina’.

UNDP. 2005. Human Development Report. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

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UNDP. 2005. ‘Human Rights in UNDP’.Practice note.

UNDP. 2004. ‘A Pact for the Region’. In:Regional Report of Human Development,Eje Cafetero. Manizales, Colombia.

UNDP. 2004 Colombia’s Conflict: Deadlock with aWay Out. 2003 national human developmentreport for Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia.

UNDP Office of Audit and PerformanceReview. 2005. ‘UNDP Office in ColombiaPerformance Audit’. New York: UNDP.

UNDP’s Office of Audit and PerformanceReview. 2002. ‘UNDP Office in Colombia(Management Audit)’. New York: UNDP.

UN Industrial Development Organization.2005. ‘Evaluation of the IntegratedProgramme for the Development ofCompetitive Industries in Local andInternational Markets’. Vienna: UNIDO.

UN Office on Drugs and Crime. ‘Report on Illicit Crops in Colombia 2006’.Vienna: UNODC.

National University of Colombia and theComptroller General of the Republic.2006. ‘Welfare and Macroeconomy 2002-2006: Growth is Not Sustainable’.Bogotá, Colombia.

Vazquez Caro, L., et al. 2006. ‘Social Capital inColombia’. Bogotá, Comptroller General ofthe Republic.

Vice President of the Republic of Colombia.2005. ‘Report on the Situation of DDHHand DIH in 2004’. Bogotá, Colombia.

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Wiesner, E. 1997. ‘La efectividad de políticaspúblicas en Colombia’. Santa Fé de Bogotá:Tercer Mundo.

Wilches-Chaux, G. 2005. Proyecto NASA:La construcción del plan vida de un puebloque sueña. Bogotá: UNDP, pp. 5-26.

A N N E X 4 . M E D I A A N A L Y S I S O F U N D P I N C O L O M B I A 4 7

1. METHODOLOGY

COMPILATION OF ARTICLES AND MEDIARELEVANCE CRITERIA

This study of news coverage of UNDP activitiesin the major print media in Colombia was basedon a compilation made by Jimeno Acevedo &Associates from electronic archives over theperiod 1 January 2002 to 16 July 2006.

The selection of daily newspapers and weeklymagazines was based on the following criteria:1) national circulation, 2) local circulation, 3) nationalinfluence, 4) local influence. They included:

� El Tiempo, largest national and local circulation(Bogotá), largest national influence, low localinfluence (outside Bogotá)

� El Colombiano, largest circulation in Medellín(Antioquia), low national influence, highlocal influence

� El País, largest circulation in Cali (Valle delCauca), low national influence,high local influence

� La Patria, largest circulation in Manizales(Caldas—UNDP local headquarters), lownational influence, high local influence

� Portafolio, medium local circulation (Bogotá),high local influence (Bogotá)

� Revista Semana, high national circulation, highnational influence, high local influence (Bogotá)

� El Espectador, low national circulation, lownational influence, medium local influence(Bogotá)

� Revista Cambio, low national circulation,low national influence, medium localinfluence (Bogotá)

� Revista Dinero, low national circulation, lownational influence, medium local influence.

THEMES OF STUDY

Articles were selected that mentioned UNDP inthree thematic areas:� Human development� Act No. 80 (procurement) � Neutrality, peace and conflict

Results: 327 articles were found in the threethematic areas.

AUDIENCE IMPACT (INFLUENCE OF MASS MEDIA)

Two categories, with a total of three variables,were used:

A) Circulation/number of readers (according tothe 2006 General Media Study – First Wave):

Points

100,000-300,000 copies: 1050,000-100,000 copies: 510,000-50,000 copies: 3

This category was also used to weight theimpact of news on different audiences on thebasis of readership studies (number of readersper copy).

B) Level of influence: national/regional, basedon 2006 Invamer-Gallup opinion studies.

General weight is constructed from thesethree variables with a maximum of 30 points(see Table A1).

TONE AND SCORE OF ARTICLES

Each article was analysed by a team of experts inmass media and rated in terms of tone (positive,

Annex 4

MEDIA ANALYSIS OF UNDP IN COLOMBIAANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE OF UNDP IN COLOMBIA OVER THE PERIOD 2002-2006

A N N E X 4 . M E D I A A N A L Y S I S O F U N D P I N C O L O M B I A4 8

negative or neutral). Depending on the intensityof the positive or negative message (radical ormoderate language), each article was given a scoreof 0 (negative limit) to 100 (positive limit),starting with 50 points (neutral). This scale allowsfor a nuanced determination of media impact.

In the present study, no article received an‘extremely unfavourable’ rating, and this categorydoes not appear in the tabulation of results.

SOURCES

The sources of news, cited in the text itself, werededuced from reading the articles, in thefollowing categories:

� UNDP

� Mixed (UNDP, government, community)

� Opinion column

� Local government

� National government

� Other sources (experts, NGOs, public figures)

� No source cited

� Project beneficiaries

� CommunityIMPORTANCE

Each article was characterized by the importanceascribed to UNDP: centred on the role ofUNDP; major reference in the text; secondaryreference in the text.

LEAD

Each article's lead is presented with the section inwhich it appeared.

MESSAGES

The principal messages in each area weresummarized and classified by their frequency ofrecurrence.

2. FINDINGS

During the 4.5-year period under study, UNDPtook part in nearly 300 programmes inColombia. In view of the variety and coverage ofits activities, UNDP selected three areas that itconsidered to be of greatest relevance for analysisof the communication impact of its programmes.

The public agenda for the period under study(2002-2006) was centred on:

� Restoration of national security (control of

Newspaper Circulation Nationalinfluence

Local influence

Points

El Tiempo 10 High 10 High 7 27

Portafolio 3 Low 1 High 8 12

El Colombiano 5 Low 2 High 10 17

La Patria 3 Low 1 High 10 14

El Pais 3 Low 1 High 10 14

El Espectador 3 Low 1 Medium 5 9

Revista Semana 3 High 8 High 8 21

Revista Cambio 3 Low 1 Medium 5 9

Revista Dinero 3 Low 1 High 6 10

Table A1. Assessing the influence of selected mass media publications


economically important areas); militaryoffensive against the FARC guerrillas

� Reduction of other causes of violence(demobilization of paramilitary and self-defence forces, fumigation of illegal crops)

� Climate of confidence and economic growth(investment, economic growth and recovery,reduction of unemployment, free tradeagreement).

Two of the three thematic areas selected by theevaluators were in tune with the public agendafor the period, which explains the relatively highnumber of news items (327) broadly dominatedby the human development theme. Attention isdrawn to the Human Development Reports, whichconstituted a reference point for the mass mediain terms of Colombia's development status,followed by neutrality, peace and conflict. Thethird area, Act No. 80 (procurement), has anegative aspect, owing to the controversysurrounding the use by some official entities ofthe UNDP procurement mechanism to expediteor avoid administrative formalities applied topublic procurement.

In general, it was observed that the majornational media (El Tiempo and Semana) andregional media (El Colombiano) disseminatedUNDP information in two principal areas(human development and neutrality, peace andconflict) in a full and positive manner, whilemedia coverage of the third area was limited to abrief period.

The positioning of UNDP that was observedduring the period under study can besummarized as follows:

� UNDP is a reference point for humandevelopment indicators. The presentation ofreports stimulates debate, clarifications andexplanations, for the most part positive.

� The positioning of UNDP in the regionalpress is ‘on the side of the community’ and oflocal governments through specific programmesthat it carries out or supports in the region.

� Third, the role of UNDP reports on theimpact of violence on development, particularlyits effect on poverty, stands out.

It is important to point out that the impact of thearticles on procurement was negative. Thesearticles initially transmitted a message of doubtabout UNDP (and other international agenciesthat were also accused of lending themselves toefforts to avoid the application of Act No. 80),presenting it as permissive, lax, or as enablingpublic entities to avoid fiscal oversight. Publicopinion is highly sensitized to the ‘corruption’issue; hence, the impact during the specificpublication period was negative. However, withthe passage of time and the way that the episodewas resolved, with the changes announced byUNDP, the damage—which, we repeat, waslimited to a period of several weeks in 2004—was cushioned.

NEWS BY THEMATIC AREAS

� Seventy-two percent of the news itemsanalysed focused on human development. Ofthese, 52 percent appeared in El Tiempo, thenewspaper with the largest circulation andnational influence.

� Twenty-four percent of the news itemscentred on neutrality, peace and conflict.

� Six percent of all news focused on Act No. 80(procurement).

NEWS BY LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE ASCRIBED TO THE ROLE OF UNDP

� Thirty-seven percent of all news centred onthe role of UNDP. Within all news onhuman development, the percentage ishigher (43 percent).

� In 43 percent of all news, there are importantreferences to the action or role of UNDP. Inthe controversy over Act No. 80 (procure-ment), 86 percent of the articles make animportant reference to UNDP.

� One of every five articles makes a secondaryreference to UNDP in the text.

A N N E X 4 . M E D I A A N A L Y S I S O F U N D P I N C O L O M B I A5 0

NEWS BY TONE OF MESSAGE

� Eighty-five percent of the messages reflect apositive tone with regard to UNDP.

� In the newspaper El Tiempo, the tone ispositive in 92 percent of the articles.

� The articles with a negative tone focused onAct No. 80 (procurement).

IMPACT OF NEWS ON AUDIENCES

� In measuring the impact of news (on a scaleof 1 to 100, where under 50 points is negativeand over 50 is positive), the average was 58points (moderately favourable).

� In weighting the results against the threevariables, it was found that in 44 percent ofnews (the percentage of news appearing in ElTiempo), the weighting was 27 out of a totalof 30 points. This figure indicates a highimpact on visibility/showing in the media andwith decision-makers. A similar considerationapplies with regard to the magazine Semana,which represents 16 percent of the news,with a score of 21 out of 30.

CONCLUSIONS BY MESSAGES

Human development The main messages were focused on humandevelopment:

� Participation in regional projects and studies(29 percent). Message: UNDP is on the sideof the communities in development projects.

� Presentation of overall and Colombian humandevelopment index figures (20 percent).Message: UNDP is the basis for assessing theresults of local social and economic policies,and is an authority in comparing Colombianindicators with those of other countries at asimilar relative level of development.

� Poverty increase alerts (17 percent). Consistentwith the preceding item. Message: UNDP isthe reference point on poverty indices.

� Millennium Development Goals (4.7 percent).Message (low impact): policies must beexecuted to meet the goals.

� Status of democracy in the region (3.8 percent).Message (low impact): UNDP assesses theprogress of democracy.

Neutrality, peace and conflict areaMessages obtained an average impact score of 56points: moderately favourable. This score isrelated to the debate that took place at the timethat the UNDP report on the Colombian conflictwas published. The report led governmentrepresentatives and some opinion-makers todismiss the results and to question the role playedby UNDP in the report's findings. The messagescentred on:

� Highlighting participation in regionalprojects and situations (33 percent).Message: UNDP is helping to mitigate theimpact of the armed conflict.

� Highlighting the report on the Colombianconflict, ‘Callejón sin salida’ (26 percent).Message: UNDP does not see a quicksolution to the conflict.

� Presenting the views of UNDP on aspects ofthe Colombian conflict (18 percent). Message:UNDP is proposing paths [to a solution].

Act No. 80 (procurement area)The average message impact score was 48 points:slightly unfavourable. This rating derived fromthe high sensitivity of public opinion and themedia to news involving corruption. The lowpercentage of news related to this thematic area(4 percent of the total) means that the final impacton the image of UNDP was low. Furthermore,what was involved was a short-term news itemthat did not develop subsequently, and that in theend reflected the interest of UNDP in ensuringthat its conduct was transparent. Twenty-ninepercent of the messages highlighted the positiveresponse of UNDP. The messages focused on:

� Criticism of the way that resources arehandled with international agencies (21percent). Message: UNDP lends itself to ActNo. 80 avoidance.

� Mismanagement in agreements with UNDP (50percent). Message: UNDP permits corruption.

� Positive response by UNDP (29 percent).Message: UNDP corrects [mistakes].


OVERALL WEIGHT

The 44 percent of the news articles analysed werepublished in El Tiempo, which has a weightedrating of 27/30, showing that the messagesreached the most important audiences.

In addition, there is the highly favourable ratingof most of the news about UNDP and itsprojects.The second-ranking medium in terms ofquantity of news—Revista Semana—has aweighting of 21/30. This has an importantimpact on the audiences that influence publicdecisions. Overall, 60 percent of the news itemsanalysed were transmitted by national mediahaving a high regional impact.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The assessment of all news items and themeasurement of their impact on differentaudiences, particularly decision-makers andopinion-makers, reflect the following:

� High interest among the major print mediain publishing news generated by UNDP.

� The thematic areas and messages derived fromeach news item were in tune with the publicagenda of the time, which helps to explainwhy UNDP had medium-high visibility.

� During the period under study, UNDP wasthe reference point for analysing Colombia'ssituation vis-à-vis its human development.

� The positioning of UNDP is higher at thesubnational level than at the national level.This is related to the importance that was ascribed to projects undertaken oradministered by UNDP in each region,which were reflected in actions visible in thecommunities and in the media.

� In the human development area, the averagerating of the messages' impact on audienceswas 60 points (substantially favourable).

Evaluation of UNDP Contribution - United Nations Development

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