Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:
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Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Do Local Governments Matter? Pui Shen Yoong International Politics & Economics Honors Thesis April 20, 2012
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Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:. Do Local Governments Matter?. Pui Shen Yoong International Politics & Economics Honors Thesis April 20, 2012. Presentation Outline. Context: Brazil & the Bolsa Família Program Research Question Methodology Quantitative Findings - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Evaluating Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program:
Do Local Governments Matter?
Pui Shen YoongInternational Politics & Economics Honors Thesis
April 20, 2012
Presentation Outline
Context: Brazil & the Bolsa Família Program
Research Question
Methodology
Quantitative Findings
Qualitative Findings
Conclusion
Brazil – A Country of Contrasts
Mean per capita income (PPP US$ of 2005)
Source: World Bank.
The Bolsa Família Program
• Conditional cash transfer program
• Cash in exchange for schooling/nutrition ‘conditionalities’:• Pregnant women : pre-natal care• Children aged 0 – 6 : vaccination, monitoring• Children aged 6 – 15 : minimum attendance 85 %• Teenagers aged 16 – 17 : minimum attendance 75 %
• Families who earn <140 reais per capita (80 USD) a month
• Allowances from 32 to 306 reais (20 – 180 USD) a month
Decentralized Management
Research Question
“How does local government capacity affect the program’s ability to improve beneficiaries’ health & education across municipalities?”
Methodology: Regression Analysis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Administrative Capacity
% of beneficiaries monitored for compliance with health/education requirements
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Effect on health/education
-- % of beneficiaries complying with health/education requirements
853 municipalities in Minas Gerais stateMunicipal fixed-effects model (i=municipality, t=year)
Methodology: Case Studies
Araçuaí
Capelinha
Human Development Index by Municipality, Minas Gerais, 2000
Contagem
Belo Horizonte
Quantitative Results
• Monitoring rates have significant and positive effect on compliance rates, both for health & education.
• Population size, degree of urbanization, program coverage rates, log of tax revenue – no significant effect. Neither do supply-side factors (health teams, social assistance centers)
• But why/how do monitoring rates affect compliance rates?
Qualitative Results
Cross-sector collaboration – health, education, social assistance departments
Administrative Structure
Financial capacity does not explain differences in compliance rates
Conclusion
Local government capacity matters!
Investment in building monitoring capacity (MDS & municipalities)
Incentives for horizontal collaboration among local-level agents
