European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 25, 417-433socialemotiveneuroscience.org/pubs/Greenberg,...

European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 25, 417-433 (1995)

Testing alternative explanations for mortality salience effects: terror

management, value accessibility, or worrisome thoughts?

JEFF GREENBERG and LINDA SIMON University of Arizona, U.S.A.

University of Kansas, U.S.A.

SHELDON SOLOMON Skidmore College, U. S.A.

TOM PYSZCZYNSKI University of Colorado, U.S.A.

EDDIE HARMON-JONES

and

DEBORAH LYON University of Arizona, U.S.A.

Abstract

Previous research has shown that reminding subjects of their mortality encourages negative reactions to others whose behaviour or attitudes deviate from the cultural worldview (e.g. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland and Lyon 1990; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon and Chatel 1992; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski and Lyon 1989). According to terror management theory, thesejindings result from a heightenedneedfor faith in the cultural worldview that is activated by reminders of one’s mortality. Study I assessed the plausibility of an alternative explanation which posits that mortality salience simply primes individuals’ values. Whereas mortality salience led to harsher bond recommendations for a prostitute, a procedure that directly focused subjects on their values did not. Studies 2 and 3 assessed the possibility that reminding subjects of any worrisome future concern wouldproduce the same effect as a reminder of mortality. In both studies, mortality salience led to negative

Addressee for correspondence: Jeff Greenberg, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, U S A .

Thanks to Carol Fortier for her contributions to this work and to the many colleagues who raised the questions that these studies were designed to address. Thanks to Caroline Reniker and Caroline Vincignerra for serving as experimenters for Study 3. This research was partially supported by National Science Foundation grants no. BNS8910876 and SBR9312546 and a grant from the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation.

CCC 0046-2772/95/040417- 17 0 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 10 June 1994 Accepted 22 May 1994

418 J. Greenberg et a].

reactions to a deviant and had no effect on self-reported aflect, whereas other worrisome thoughts had no eSfect on reactions to a deviant but did create negative ajfect. Thus, consistent with terror management theory, mortality salience eJfects seem to result exclusively from thoughts of death.

INTRODUCTION

According to terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon, 1986; Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1991), the hostility that is often exhibited toward those who reject or violate cultural standards results from the important role that acceptance of and adherence to such standards serve in providing protection from anxiety concerning human vulnerability and mortality. Consistent with this reasoning, a growing body of research has shown that reminding people of their mortality increases the negativity of their reactions to those who violate or reject cultural standards and beliefs (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990, 1992a; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Although these studies have examined several alternative explanations for the mortality salience effects, at least two additional plausible alternative explanations warrant consideration. The research reported in this paper was designed to assess the validity of these alternative explanations towards determining whether these effects do indeed result specifically from thoughts of mortality.

Terror management theory

Terror management theory begins with the assumption that, like other animals, humans are born with an instinctive drive for self-preservation. However, unlike other animals, because of their highly developed cognitive capacities, humans are aware of their physical vulnerabilities and ultimate mortality. This awareness of the inevitability of death in an animal instinctively programmed for self-preservation creates the potential for paralysing terror.

According to the theory, one of the most important functions of culture (although certainly not the only function) is to help individuals manage this terror. Cultures do this, in part, by providing means of physically controlling threats and forestalling death (e.g. medicine, laws that prohibit harming others). However, these measures go only so far in minimizing our vulnerabilities, and nowhere at all in securing our ultimate self-preservation and transcendence of death. Regardless of how long it is forestalled, death is still the inevitable fate awaiting all. Thus culture needs to provide the individual with something more than these direct means of self-preservation. It needs to provide a symbolic means of minimizing existential terror.

Rather than directly defending against specific threats to health and longevity: the symbolicmeans of terror management provide a shield against the anxiety which arises as a result of awareness of the inevitability of death. To this end, cultures transmit to their developing members a relatively benign conception of reality that imbues the world with order, stability, meaning, and permanence. In addition, cultures provide: (a) standards of value through which individuals can attain a sense of self-worth and (b) the promise of literal or symbolic immortality to those who meet these standards. Literal immortality is provided by the religious components of most cultures which promise an afterlife for those who live up to standards of moral behaviour. Symbolic

Testing Alternative Explanations 419

immortality entails being a valuable part of something larger than oneself, such as a nation, family, or other group (such as a scientific discipline), that will continue to exist even after any given individual’s physical death. By believing in the cultural worldview and living up to the standards of value that are part of it, one attains the hope of transcending death in one or both of these ways.

The cultural worldview is transmitted to the individual throughout the socialization process, both through direct interactions with parents and other agents of the culture and through cultural teachings, rituals, and documents. As a result of these experiences, each individual develops his or her own individualized version of the cultural worldview, which is his or her primary source of protection from existential terror. Effective terror management thus requires individuals to maintain a dual component cultural anxiety-buffer, consisting of: (a) faith in a cultural worldview, and (b) the belief that one is meeting the standards of value prescribed by that worldview (self- esteem). Because the cultural worldview is a fragile social construction, it is strengthened when others share our perceptions, beliefs, and values, and threatened when others deviate from us in these respects (cf. Becker, 1962,1973; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Festinger, 1954). Terror management theory posits that, because of our need for the protection provided by the cultural worldview, we respond positively toward those who help us maintain faith in it and negatively toward those who challenge this faith (see Solomon et al. (1991) for a more thorough exposition of the theory).

Mortality salience effects

If cultural worldviews function to minimize concerns about mortality, increasing the salience of mortality should increase one’s need for faith in one’s cultural worldview. Given our dependence on others for consensual validation of the worldview, it follows that mortality salience would lead to especially negative reactions to others who violate or dispute one’s worldview and especially positive reactions to others who uphold or consensually validate one’s worldview. These reactions are expected because a negative evaluation of one who threatens one’s worldview will help undermine the threat implied by his or her deviance and a positive evaluation of one who upholds one’s worldview will help maximize the validational value of his or her agreement. To date, most of the research generated by terror management theory has been centred around this general hypothesis (Greenberg et al., 1990, 1992a; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).

In the first of a set of six studies investigating this hypothesis (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), it was predicted and found that mortality salience encouraged American munici- pal court judges to set especially high bonds for what in the United States is viewed as a moral transgressor, an alleged prostitute (in a hypothetical case). Mortality was made salient to the judges by asking them to answer two open-ended questions about their own death. In the second study, this effect was replicated with college students and was shown to occur primarily among individuals with particularly negative attitudes toward prostitution. In the third study, the bond effect was replicated and mortality salience was also shown to increase recommended rewards for a hero who helped the police apprehend a violent criminal. The fourth study replicated the bond effect and showed that a self-awareness induction does not produce a similar effect and that ratings of positive and negative stimuli unrelated to the worldview are not affected by mortality salience. The fifth study replicated the effect of mortality salience on bonds while physiological measures of arousal were obtained. There was no evidence that the

420 J. Greenberg et al.

mortality salience treatment created arousal or that arousal mediated the bond effect. The sixth study conceptually replicated the previous effects with a different manipulation of mortality salience; specifically, it was shown that having subjects fill out a fear of death scale produces the same effect as the open-ended mortality salience treatment. In all six of these studies, as well as the five other mortality salience studies to be described below, the mortality salience treatment had no effect on self-reported affect and there was no evidence that self-reported affect mediated the mortality salience effects.

In a second set of studies (Greenberg et al., 1990), mortality salience was shown to affect evaluation of a number of other targets who impinged on subjects’ cultural worldviews. Study 1 showed that mortality salience encouraged Christian subjects to evaluate an ingroup member (a fellow Christian) especially positively and an outgroup member (a Jew) especially negatively. In Study 2, mortality salience led high authori- tarians (but not lows) to become especially negative in their evaluations of an attitudinally dissimilar other. In Study 3, mortality salience led American subjects to evaluate on individual with pro-U.S. views especially favourably and an individual with anti-U.S. views especially unfavourably.

More recently, Greenberg et al. (1992a, Study 1) have shown that mortality salience increases the negativity of evaluations of attitudinally dissimilar others, but only if this negativity does not violate a central or salient standard concerning the acceptance of those who are different. Specifically, the effect of mortality salience on evaluations of attitudinally dissimilar others was replicated, but shown not to occur among individuals highly committed to the value of tolerance (political liberals in the U.S.) or among individuals for whom the value of tolerance was recently made salient.

To date then, 11 published studies have supported predictions derived from terror management theory concerning the effects of mortality salience on evaluations of others who impinge on the cultural worldview. Although we believe that terror management theory provides the most compelling explanation for the mortality salience effects discussed above, a number of alternative explanations can also be generated. The evidence provided by the previous studies strongly suggests that mortality salience effects are not mediated by affect, arousal, or self-awareness (see especially Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The research presented in this paper was designed to assess two additional alternative explanations for these effects.

STUDY 1

Our first experiment was designed to assess a ‘value accessibility’ explanation of mortality salience effects. It could be suggested that asking subjects to think about their own death simply increases the accessibility of their value system. Because values may be closely linked to the problem of death, inducing subjects to think about their mortality may automatically activate their system of beliefs and values. As prior research on attitude-behaviour relations has shown (for a review of this evidence, see Fazio, 1986), increased accessibility can increase the influence of attitudes on judg- ments and behaviour. Thus rather than reflecting an increased need for the protection provided by the cultural worldview, previous mortality salience effects may have resulted from an increase in the accessibility of the individual’s values of right and wrong brought on by the mortality salience induction.


In order to assess this alternative, we sought to replicate the bond effect found in Rosenblatt et al. (1989) and contrast the mortality salience condition with a value salient condition in which subjects were induced to focus directly on their values. Directly focusing subjects on their values of right and wrong should make such values more accessible than any possible indirect effect of the mortality salience treatment. If the mortality salience treatment increases bonds for an alleged prostitute because it increases the accessibility of subjects’ values of right and wrong, then direct questions concerning subjects’ values should create the same effect, if not a stronger one. In contrast, if the bond effect occurs because thoughts of mortality motivate bolstering of one’s worldview, then merely making values salient should not produce the same effect as the mortality salience treatment.

Subjects

Subjects were 34 males and 28 females who participated in partial fulfilment of a research requirement for their introductory psychology course.

Procedure

The procedure was based closely on that used by Rosenblatt et al. (1989, Studies 1-5). Six to 10 subjects at a time were escorted into the laboratory and asked to read and sign a consent form. The study was described as concerned with personality traits and the way people make decisions. Subjects were told that the packets in front of them consisted of a few personality measures and information concerning the kind of decisions that judges make in city courts. They were then informed that the decision they would be asked to make concerned how much bond should be set for a person accused of prostitution. It was explained that they would be getting the same information that actual judges get and that a bond in an amount of money a defendant must pay to avoid staying in jail until the time of the person’s trial. Furthermore, subjects were told that the amount of bond is not a statement by the judge as to whether or not he thinks the person is guilty. Subjects were instructed that the bond that is set is an indication of how sure the judge is that the person will show up for trial.

The experimenter then described some of the factors judges typically take into account in these cases (e.g. ties to the community, previous failure to appear, prior convictions). After that, it was explained that the bond can be set anywhere from $0 to $999, and that $0 means she is being released on her own recognizance. Subjects were then reminded that if the woman cannot pay the bond she has to remain in jail until her trial. Finally, the experimenter reiterated that the subjects can set the bond anywhere from $0 to $999.

Subjects were then instructed to read the information at the beginning of the packet (which summarized the information about bonds) and then proceed through the questionnaires in order, without flipping forward or back. When all subjects were done, they were probed for suspicion and fully debriefed.


Materials

Following the written instructions, subjects filled out the five-item attitude toward prostitution measure used in previous studies (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Then, after a filler ‘personality’ measure, the independent variable manipulation was introduced. Subjects in the mortality salient condition filled out the same two-item open-ended questionnaire used in previous research (e.g. Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Specifically, they were asked to ‘Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you’, and to ‘Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead’. Control subjects were asked parallel questions about a relatively neutral topic, watching television. This control condition has been used successfully in previous studies (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1992a). Value salient subjects were given parallel questions in which they were asked to ‘Please briefly describe what is important to you in your life, what you value, and what your goals are’, and to ‘Briefly summarize your basic values and your sense of right or wrong’.

The Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965 j followed the manipulation of the independent variable. It includes measures of anxiety, depression, hostility, and positive effect. After that, subjects saw a recommen- dation form listing the charge, the alleged prostitute’s address, length of time in town, and employment history. This form was followed by a copy of the citation supposedly issued to the defendant. Finally, subjects were asked to recommend a bond for the alleged prostitute and list factors that may have affected their decisions.

Results and discussion

Not surprisingly, all of the subjects in the value salient condition wrote explicitly about their standards of right and wrong, as well as about important values such as career, family, health, and helping others. In contrast, none of the mortality or TV salient subjects mentioned their values or standards of right and wrong. Thus it seems clear that values and standards of right and wrong were brought to mind more so for value salient subjects than for the other subjects. One-way ANOVA’s were performed on the bond and affect scales.’

As in prior research, there were no effects on any of the MAACL affect scales, allp’s > 0.20. As predicted, there was a significant effect of treatment on the bond that subjects recommended, F(2,59) = 3 . 2 6 , ~ < 0.05. As may be seen in Table 1, mortality salience led to higher bonds than either the TV control condition, t(59) = 2 . 0 2 , ~ < 0.05, or the value salient control condition, t(59) = 2.40, p < 0.01, with the latter two conditions not differing from each other, p > 0.20.

The findings of Study 1 replicated the previous findings of Rosenblatt et al. (1989). Although inducing subjects to think about their mortality led them to recommend

Initial analyses including sex revealed no sex-related effects in any of the studies. Also, in Study 3, order of presentation of the targets had no effects. In addition, in Study 1, a two-way ANOVA was conducted using a median-split on attitudes toward prostitution as the second independent variable. Previous research had found an interaction between mortality salience and attitude toward prostitution, with high bonds occurring primarily among anti-prostitution mortality salient subjects. No such interaction occurred in this study, p > 0.20. One explanation for this i s that since the earliest studies, attitudes towards prostitution in the U.S. may have become increasingly negative. Indeed, the mean score on the attitude toward prostitution measure in this study was 27, which is considerably more negative than the mean of 23 found in Rosenblatt ef a/. (1 989).


higher bond for an alleged prostitute, this effect was clearly not duplicated in the value salient condition. Although subjects in this latter condition were instructed to think directly about their personal values and standards of right and wrong, and they clearly did so, this procedure had no effect on the bond that they recommended. Thus, these results are inconsistent with the possibility that mortality salience effects result simply from reminding people of their personal values and standards of right and wrong.

Table 1. Mean bond recommendations for Study 1

Mortality Values Television salient salient salient

41 3, 252, 276, Means that do not share a subscript differ at p < 0.05.

We believe that making values highly accessible is unlikely to cause these effects because values relevant to evaluation of the targets were likely to be highly accessible in all of the conditions in this and previous mortality salience studies. In the ‘prostitute studies’, all subjects fill out a questionnaire concerning their attitudes toward prostitution at the beginning of the experimental sessions, a procedure likely to make such attitudes highly accessible. In addition, the central focus of these studies is on assigning bond for the alleged prostitute. This would be expected to further increase the accessibility of subjects’ prostitution-relevant attitudes. The other mortality salience studies similarly involved procedures likely to make judgment-relevant values highly accessible across all conditions. Nonetheless, until the present study, the value-accessibility alternative had not been examined directly. The results of this study greatly reduces the plausibility of that alternative. This does not preclude the possibility that mortality salience can increase the accessibility of cultural values; however, the present findings clearly show that simply increasing the accessibility of cultural values does not produce effects parallel to those of mortality salience.

STUDY 2

There is an additional question that warrants investigation. Specifically, is death really the operative factor in mortality salience effects, or would the salience of any worrisome future event lead to a similar effect? It is not exactly clear why any worrisome future event would create these effects, but perhaps worrisome thoughts activate a defensive or rigid mode of thinking, or perhaps they can stimulate a subtle, as yet undetected form of negative affect that mediates the mortality salience effects by intensifying subjects’ responses.

From the perspective of terror management theory, whether or not thinking about threatening events other than death should produce similar effects depends on the type of threat involved. According to the theory, mortality salience should motivate greater defence of the individual’s worldview, but so should any event that threatens faith in the worldview (e.g. Festinger, Riecken and Schachter, 1956). Whereas mortality salience increases the need for the protection that the worldview provides, direct attacks on the worldview undermine the worldview’s effectiveness in providing such protection. Thus both types of events would be expected to lead to increased bolstering


and defence. In addition, many worrisome events, such as injuries and diseases, may evoke mortality concerns, and, if so, would also be expected to lead to greater defence of the worldview.

There are, however, many worrisome events that are not closely linked to death and that do not challenge the individual’s worldview. Most of these events threaten self-esteem and/or one’s ability to achieve important goals. Making such events salient could provide a test between terror management and general worry or subtle negative affect explanations of mortality salience effects. Terror management theory would predict that the salience of such worrisome events would not motivate adherence to the cultural worldview because the worldview is not at issue; rather, it would be one’s personal value at risk. To take the example of a devout Christian, reminders of the inevitability of death and threats to one’s faith may necessitate bolstering of faith. However, if one’s status as a good Christian is threatened by immoral behaviour, increased faith will not remedy the problem; efforts must be directed specifically at reasserting one’s goodness. Indeed, if one’s value as a person is threatened, bolstering faith in the standards by which that value is assessed might even magnify the threat by increasing concerns with living up to those standards.

In a student population, one future event that would qualify as both highly worrisome and inevitable, but that, if the terror management explanation of mortality salience effects is correct, should not motivate adherence to the worldview, is one’s next important exam. For most students, the mere thought of tests and examinations seems to be highly anxiety-provoking. However, the thought of exams is unlikely to either remind subjects of their mortality or threaten their beliefs and values. Rather, thinking about one’s next exam is likely to make salient the possibility of not living up to one’s standards for academic performance. As discussed above, terror management theory would not predict that such thoughts should increase the individual’s need for faith in his or her worldview, even though such thoughts are likely to be highly worrisome. Thus, we chose exam salience as a condition to compare with mortality salience, again employing the bond setting paradigm. If mortality salience effects simply result from making any worrisome event salient or from creating some previously undetected level of negative affect, then exam salience should duplicate the mortality salience effect on bonds. If it does not, further support would be obtained for the specific role of mortality concerns in producing the previously reported mortality salience effects.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were 13 males and 18 females in an introductory statistics course. Partici- pation was purely voluntary.

Procedure

Subjects were randomly assigned to mortality salient, television salient, or exam salient conditions and then asked to assign bond for an alleged prostitute. The procedure was very similar to that used in Study 1, except that all of the subjects were run at the same time during their regular class period.


Materials

The materials were identical to those used in Study 1 except for the following changes: (a) an additional filler personality measure was used; (b) the values salient questionnaire was replaced by an exam salient questionnaire, which asked subjects to ‘Please briefly describe the emotions the thought of taking your next important exam arouses in you’, and to ‘Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as you take your next important exam and once you have taken the exam’; and (c) instead of the MAACL, the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988), a more recently developed affect measure, followed the manipulation of the independent variable.

Results and discussion

As in Study 1, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the bond and affect measures. Relevant means may be found in Table 2. In contrast to the findings of our previous research, there was a main effect of treatment on negative affect F(2,28) = 4.53, p < 0.02. However, as the means in Table 2 indicate, negative affect was not increased by mortality salience but rather, by exam salience. In fact, exam salience led to more negative affect than either mortality salience t(28) = 2.30, p < 0.01, or the television control, t(28) = 2 . 8 8 , ~ < 0.01. The latter two conditions did not differ from each other, p > 0.20.

Table 2. Mean bond recommendations and negative affect scores for Study 2

Mortality Exam Television salient salient salient

Bond Negative affect

659, 15,

182, 22,

89b 13.4

For each measure, means that do not share subscripts differ a tp < 0.05. High means indicate large bonds or high levels of negative affect.

The main effect on bond recommendations was also significant, F(2,28) = 1 3 . 2 2 , ~ < 0.0001. However, the pattern of means for the bond displayed in Table 2 was quite different from that found for negative affect. In support of predictions derived from terror management theory, mortality salience led to higher bonds than either exam salience, t(28) = 3 . 8 5 , ~ < 0.001, or the control, t(28) = 4 . 6 0 , ~ < 0.001. The latter two conditions did not differ from each other, p > 0.20. Because there was an effect on negative affect, we assessed any possible mediating role of affect in the bond main effect by conducting an ANCOVA on bonds with negative affect as the covariates. The covariate did not approach significance, nor did it alter the main effect of condition, F(2,27) = 12.73, p < 0.0001.

The results of Study 2 provide further support for the role of mortality concerns in mortality salience effects. The fact that exam salience did not increase bond assess- ments, even though it did lead to more negative affect than the mortality salience treatment, indicates that such effects do not result simply from worrisome thoughts. In


addition, the fact that bonds were high in a condition in which negative affect was low, and, conversely, low in a condition in which negative affect was high, seem to further reduce the plausibility of the notion that mortality salience effects are mediated by the conscious experience of affect.

STUDY 3

Study 3 was an attempt to conceptually replicate Study 2 using a different method to make mortality salient, a different other worrisome events treatment, and measure- ment of responses to a different type of threat to the cultural worldview. In Study 3, mortality was made salient by giving the subjects a death anxiety scale rather than the two open-ended questions used in Studies 1 and 2. A similar questionnaire successfully replicated mortality salience effects in Rosenblatt et al. (1989). To make worrisome events other than death salient, instead of questions about an upcoming exam, in Study 3 subjects were asked to fill out a scale asking them how much they are worried about a variety of concerns college students are likely to have about the future (e.g. regarding their careers, financial success, and social life after college). Whereas Study 2 examined reactions to a moral transgressor, Study 3 examined American subjects’ evaluation of two targets, one who praised the U.S. and one who criticized the U.S.

Specifically, Study 3 examined the effects of mortality salience and future worries salience on American college students’ evaluations of a fellow American student who had spent a year abroad in Europe and wrote an essay either praising or criticizing the U.S. Previous research has shown that mortality salience increases the preference for a pro-U.S. target person over an anti-U.S. target person (Greenberg et al., 1990, 1992a). We hypothesized that mortality salience but not future worries salience would lead to an especially large preference for the pro-US. target over the anti-U.S. target.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were 23 female and 28 male introductory psychology students at the Uni- versity of Kansas who participated to partially fulfil a course requirement.

Procedure

Three to six subjects participated in each session. The first experimenter explained to the subjects that they would be participating in two short studies. She informed them that her study was concerned with the relation between personality characteristics and attitudes. She then distributed questionnaires and asked subjects to complete the questionnaires in the order they were presented.

Once subjects finished the questionnaires, the first experimenter collected them, thanked the subjects for their participation, and left the room. The second experimenter entered the room and explained that she was interested in how American students feel about other American students who have studied in another country for one year. She explained that over 40 essays written by these students about their experiences abroad were collected last year. The experimenter then explained that each subject would be randomly assigned two essays, and would be asked for their reactions


to the essays. The experimenter then distributed a consent form, and two envelopes (containing essays) that she drew from a box. After subjects finished their evaluations of the essays, they were thoroughly debriefed.

Materials

The packet for the first study began with a consent form and some filler questionnaires to enhance the cover story. The questionnaire used to manipulate the independent variable followed these questionnaires. Subjects were randomly assigned to complete the Death Anxiety Questionnaire (Conte, Weiner and Plutchik, 1982), renamed the Mortality Concern Questionnaire, an Attitude Toward Television Questionnaire, or a General Concern Questionnaire. The Mortality Concern Questionnaire was used to make mortality salient. The Attitudes Toward Television Questionnaire was used as a control. It was similar in format to the Mortality Concern Questionnaire in that subjects were asked to respond to 15 questions using a 3-point scale (0 = not at all to 2 = very much). The questions concerned watching television (e.g. Do you enjoy watching television?). Using the same format, the Genera1 Concern Questionnaire was designed to query subjects about worrisome events of the future. It was composed of 15 questions concerning future events about which college students might worry (e.g. Do you worry that if you don’t find a good job after college no one will respect you? Are you afraid you will never achieve the standard of living your parents have?). The PANAS followed the mortality salience manipulation.

The two handwritten essays for the second study were based on those used in Greenberg et al. (1992a). Each was followed by an evaluation form and trait rating form. The essay written in favour of the United States argued that the U.S. is more just than the country in which the author studied and that the U.S. is the best place in which to live. The essay written against the U.S. argued that Americans have superficial values and that the U.S. is not a good place in which to live.

The evaluation form that followed each essay asked five questions regarding the extent to which the essay made valid points, how much subjects liked the author, the extent to which the subjects agreed with the author’s views, how biased the essay was, and how well the essay was written (from 1 = not at all to 9 = extremely). The evaluation form then asked subjects to express any other reactions they had to the essay. The trait rating form asked subjects to rate the applicability of 16 randomly ordered traits (eight positive and eight negative) to the author on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all to 9 = extremely).

Results

Evaluations of essay and author

A principal-components factor analysis was performed on each set of five questions on which subjects evaluated the essay and author. The three questions directly focused on feelings regarding the contents of the essay loaded on one factor for both targets (> 0.60). These items forms a composite representing the favourability of the evaluation of the target. The items concerning the extent to which the essay was biased and how well the essay was written did not load on this factor and yielded no effects.

Discrimination in favour of the pro-American over the anti-American was calcu- lated by subtracting the ratings (on the three items) of the anti-American from the


pro-American, and analysed using a one-way ANOVA. A significant main effect for condition resulted, F(2,48) = 7.71, p < 0.001, indicating that mortality salient subjects discriminated more than both worries salient subjects, t(48) = 2.83, p < 0.01, and television salient subjects, (48) = 3.73, p < 0.001. The latter two conditions did not differ significantly. See Table 3 for the relevant means.2

Trait ratings

The scales composed of positive and negative traits were internally consistent (Cron- bach alphas > 0.79). Because a preliminary analysis revealed the pattern of results to be similar for both the positive and negative traits separately, a composite measure was formed by reversing the negative traits and adding them to the positive traits so that a favourability score resulted. Anti-American scores were then subtracted from pro- American scores.

These discrimination scores were subjected to a one-way ANOVA. A marginally significant main effect resulted, F(2,44) = 2.94, p = 0.06, indicating that mortality salient subjects discriminated significantly more than both worries salient subjects, t(44) = 2 . 2 2 , ~ < 0.05, and television salient subjects, t(44) = 1 . 9 4 , ~ < 0.07. The relevant means are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3. Cell means for discrimination scores in Study 3

Mortality Worries Television salient salient salient

Evaluation 8.45, 2.62, 0.89, Traits 3 1 .OO, 12.60, 15.25,,

For both measures, higher means indicate greater preference for the pro-American over the anti-American target. Within each measure, means that do not share subscripts differ a t p < 0.05.

Self-reported affect

Positive and negative affect, which were measured by the PANAS immediately following the manipulation of the independent variable, were analysed using one-way ANOVAs. For positive affect, there were no significant differences between conditions. There was, however, a marginally significant effect for negative affect, F(2,48) = 2 . 5 0 , ~ = 0.09, indicating that subjects in the worries salient condition reported more negative affect, (3 = 1.72), than subjects in the mortality salient condition (2 = 1.32),

For brevity, we used a pro-American minus anti-American composite in the results section of Study 3. When reactions to the two targets were examined separately using the overall error terms from 3 (condition) between x2 (pro versus anti-American target) within ANOVAs, t-tests comparing the mortality salient condition to the television salient and worries salient conditions found that mortality salient subjects rated the pro-American significantly more positively and the anti-American significantly more negatively on both the evaluation and trait measures, allp’s < 0.02. Thus, in Study 3, mortality salience intensified both liking for the pro-American target and, consistent with the negative reactions to the deviant in the first two studies, dislike for the anti-American target.


t(48) = 2.22, p < 0.05. Television salience fell in between (2 = 1.48) and did not differ reliably from either of the other two conditions. No other significant difference occurred.

Within-cell correlations

As in the prior studies, no significant within-cell correlations between affect and discrimination measure resulted, suggesting that self-reported affect did not mediate the evaluations of the authors and essays. We also examined correlations between scores on the scales used to make mortality and future worries salient and the discrimination scores. Interestingly, in the mortality salient condition, death anxiety scores were negatively correlated with extent of discrimination on the evaluation measure, r( 18) = -0.50,~ < 0.05. This correlation indicates that the less death anxiety a subject reported, the stronger pro-American preference the subject displayed. In contrast, no correlation was found between extent of future worries and pro-American preference, p > 0.30.

Discussion

Study 3 provides a conceptual replication of the findings of Study 2. As in Study 2, mortality salience affected evaluations of a person who impinged on the cultural worldview but did not increase subjectively experienced affect. Also as in Study 2, the salience of other future worries produced an increase in negative affect, but no effect on evaluations of individuals who impinge on the cultural worldview. By demonstrating that the findings of Study 2 generalize to different treatments and ratings of different targets, Study 3 increases our confidence in the generality of these findings. The fact that effects parallel to those of the mortality salience induction were not found when subjects thought about negative affect producing future concerns in Studies 2 and 3 greatly reduces the plausibility of negative affect, worrisome thoughts, or arousal as explanations for the mortality salience effect. The production of negative affect is clearly not sufficient to produce these effects.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The experimental method never enables one to confirm a theory; rather it makes it possible to eliminate alternative explanations for findings predicted from a given theoretical conception. Given the broad scope and psychodynamic roots of terror management theory, we have tried to be very careful in assessing possible alternative explanations for the mortality salience effects we have attributed to terror management processes. Fourteen prior experiments have yielded predicted mortality salience effects and, at the same time, cast serious doubt on alternative explanations based on affect, arousal, polarization, and self-awareness (Greenberg, et al., 1990, 1992a; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon and Breus, 1994; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The present studies provide three additional replications of the mortality salience effect, and reduce the plausibility of alternative explanations for these effects based on value accessibility, negative affect, and worrisome thoughts. Although these findings do not directly ‘prove’ the validity of the terror management analysis, they do increase our faith in this


analysis by showing that mortality salience effects are specifically caused by thoughts of mortality.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the emerging literature on these issues is that in none of the experiments in which mortality salience has been shown to influence evaluations of others has there been any hint that thinking about one’s inevitable death produces any signs of emotion or distress, on either self-report or physiological measures. Regardless of the theoretical implications of these findings, it is remarkable that a species that is so clearly invested in self-perpetuation seems to be able to ponder its ultimate death with such apparent equanimity.

Although subjects show no signs of emotional distress when pondering their mortality, it is clear that they are strongly affected by this experience. Seventeen separate experiments have shown that mortality salience leads subjects either to respond especially positively toward those who support the cultural worldview, to respond especially negatively toward those who threaten it, or to exhibit both reactions. Whereas, as we have argued above, the absence of emotional response to thoughts of one’s own death greatly reduces the plausibility of various alternative explanations for the mortality salience effect, it also raises some intriguing questions about the underly- ing processes through which reminders of one’s mortality influence responses to others.

We have argued that terror management occurs nonconsciously through a self- regulatory hierarchy of motives (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon and Hamilton, 1990; Solomon et al., 1991) and that mortality salience provokes automatic defence of the worldview (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Solomon et al., 1991). In essence, the theory posits that individuals are able to avoid experiencing the terror that would otherwise result from awareness of their vulnerability and mortality by becoming absorbed in a benign cultural drama. That is, by organizing their beliefs and perceptions around the cultural worldview, and then living up to the standards of value that are part of that worldview, individuals are able to avoid confrontation with the basic fears that underlie much of their motivation.

Recent research has provided a more direct test of the terror management theory proposition that immersion in the cultural drama enables the individual to minimize his or her anxiety concerning death. A series of studies has shown that bolstering self-esteem reduces subjects’ anxiety and anxiety-related behaviour, and also that self-esteem attenuates defence of their worldview in response to reminders of their mortality (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling, Lyon, Simon and Pinel 1992b; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, Simon and Jordan, 1993; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon and McGregor 1994). We have also recently found that subjects experience anxiety in response to mortality salience if their worldviews have been threatened immediately before the mortality salience induction, but do not experience such anxiety if their worldviews have been strengthened. These studies suggest that immersing oneself in the cultural worldview and living up to the standards that are part of that worldview help people minimize emotional reactions to knowledge of their mortality.

In attempting to explain the mechanisms through which reminders of one’s mortality influence reactions to those who impinge on one’s worldview without producing obvious signs of emotional arousal, we find Erdelyi’s (1986) recent attempt to provide a cognitive analysis of Freudian defence mechanisms useful. Erdelyi’s main thesis is that, although the previously dominant behaviourist meta-theory lacked the conceptual

Testing Alternative Explanations 43 1

machinery to provide a compelling account of such Freudian processes as repression, what is known about the mechanisms of human thought and memory from contempo- rary cognitive theory and research is eminently compatible with such psychodynamic formulations. To explain how a stimulus can produce defensive responses without any conscious experience of anxiety, one need only assume a multi-stage processing system, involving unconscious as well as conscious monitoring of stimuli, in which defensive reactions are instigated by the informational value of the stimulus prior to the arousal of affect. If defensive manoeuvres can effectively decrease the threat posed by the incoming stimulus, the experience of negative affect or anxiety may be averted.

In the present context, we suggest that reminders of one’s mortality signal the potential for experiencing a good deal of distress. Because of the unpleasant nature of such awareness, people generally avoid direct confrontation with this issue and organ- ize their daily affairs around the pursuits of various identity-relevant goals and standards derived from the cultural worldview. When confronted with reminders of their mortality, people avoid the subjective experience of distress by increasing their commitment to the cultural worldview and the pursuit of a positive self-image within the context of this framework.

Consequently, people become especially sensitive to anyone or anything that im- pinges on their ability to maintain this dual component anxiety-buffer. Thus, reminders of one’s mortality can influence reactions to deviant others without the subjective experience of affect. These reactions to those who impinge on the anxiety- buffer may help the individual avert the experience of terror concerning his or her more basic concerns. Consistent with this analysis, in a recent conceptual replication of the finding of increased anti-Semitism following mortality salience, Kunzendorf, Hersey, Wilson, and Ethier (1993) found that this effect was largest among individuals who had poor memory for the death-related stimuli.

Another set of findings also suggest that awareness of affect may not mediate defences against threat. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Sideris and Stubing (1993) found in two studies that expressing the emotion from which a defensive cognition presumably functions to provide protection reduces the use of defences. The first of these studies demonstrated that acknowledging discomfort after writing a counter- attitudinal essay eliminated the dissonance-reducing attitude change. The second study demonstrated that acknowledging one’s own fear of cancer eliminated subjects’ tend- ency to distance themselves from a cancer victim. These findings suggest that rather than directly mediating defensive responses, the conscious experience of the un- acceptable emotion from which defensive behaviour provides protection may actually interfere with such defensiveness.

Additionally, in a recent set of four studies (Greenberg et al., 1994), we have found that mortality salience effects are strongest after a delay and distraction and that, following mortality salience, accessibility of death-related thoughts is not increased immediately but is increased after such a distraction. These studies also found that if no distraction is provided for them, subjects quickly distract themselves away from thoughts of death following mortality salience. This research suggests that the immedi- ate conscious concern following mortality salience is to suppress further death-related thoughts. Once such thoughts have been effectively removed from current focal attention, they become more accessible and worldview defence is intensified. These findings thus provide further evidence consistent with the idea that terror management processes occur outside of conscious awareness.


Finally, the negative correlation between death anxiety and worldview defence (the display of pro-American bias) found in the present Study 3, and which was found in Jones (1992) as well, is also consistent with the idea that the mediation of mortality salience effects occurs outside of consciousness and in the absence of consciously experienced affect. Although these correlational findings are open to a number of interpretations, one plausible explanation for them is that those subjects who are most motivated to consciously deny their fear of death are also most motivated to defend their worldview. We plan to assess the validity of this explanation in the foreseeable future.

As we have noted previously (Solomon er al., 1991), a thorough understanding of the processes by which thoughts of mortality increase adherence to one’s worldview will require an integration of the relatively abstract terror management theory of the roots of various social motives with more concrete analyses of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie such behaviour. We hope that the investigation of the interesting micro-level process issues that arise from this research can be informative not only with regard to terror management processes but also with regard to other more general questions concerning defensive thought and behaviour.

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