European Best Practice for industrial Disaster Risk Management (iDRM) F. Bemmerlein-Lux GIZ Senior...

European Best Practice for industrial Disaster Risk Management (iDRM)

F. Bemmerlein-Lux

GIZ Senior Advisors of the cdDRM Programme under ASEM

and

Dr. Christian Jochum

Director of Centre, European Process Safety Centre (www.epsc.org)

Chairman, German Commission on Process Safety

NCDC industrial Disaster Management Programme

8.-19.Augsut 2011

Outline

11 iDRM Approach in EuropeiDRM Approach in Europe

Best Practice of Emergency ManagementBest Practice of Emergency Management33

Risk Management PrinciplesRisk Management Principles22

ConclusionsConclusions44

2

3

Ger:357 111 km²

> 81 Million Inhabitants

MA: 307.762 km²

> 112 Million Inhabitants.

4

Berlin

Hamburg

Frankfurt

Munich

Alps

Ruhr District

Nuremberg

Rhi

ne V

alle

y

Germany Panorama

6

Laws and RegulationsLaws and

RegulationsSpatial PlanningSpatial Planning

Self-RegulationSelf-Regulation

EIAEIAEconomic

InstrumentsEconomic

Instruments

AdvisoryServicesAdvisoryServices

Environmental Education

Environmental Education

EnvironmentalResearch

EnvironmentalResearch

Instruments

März, 00 7

Principles

Emissions and land-use should be avioided using the latest technical standards. Precausion is important for:

+ Still not known/undedrstood risks+ Long term efficts+ Combined Risks (cascading effects)

The principle is most important for political and guiding decisions.

Cooperation

Polluter pays

Prevention

8

All costs for not done environmental care and

the use of environmental resources have to

be paid by the one causing the alterations

Even while developing products and processes

the use of environmental resources have to be

considered – should lead to ecological honest

prices.Cooperation

Polluter pays

Prevention

Principles

März, 00 9

Wherever possible a voluntary cooperation is

requested and required.

Motivations based on marked economy are

used to initiate and sustain innovations of

environmental protection (via tax,

compensations, self-obligations, fees etc. )Cooperation

Polluter pays

Prevention

Principles

11

Example: Air

Federal Emission Control Act21 Ordinances5 Guidelines for administration.

All rules are oriented on the sources of the immissions.

Areas of origin (cause) Like:

• The ordinance for large boilers

• The Technical Ordinance Air (TA Luft)

• The ordinance for small boilers

12

Laws / Acts+ Hazardous Chemicals+ Law on Plant protection+ Law on Genetic Techniques+ Private Liability Law+ Criminal Law Environment+ …..

Technical Standards and Guidelines

; TA Air, TA Noise, TA Waste, TA

Ordenances:: Disasters (Störfallverordnung): Prüfnachweisverordnung: Chemikalienverbotsverordnung: Gefahrstoffverordnung: Giftinformationsverordnung: Verordnungen des Abfallgesetzes

Regulations for Hazardous Substances

13

+ Chemikaliengesetz zum Schutz vor gefährlichen

Stoffen (ChemG)

+ Gefahrstoffverordnung (GefStoffV)

+ Verordnung über brennbare Flüssigkeiten (VbF)

+ Verordnung über Anlagen zum Umgang mit

wassergefährdenden Stoffen (VAwS)

+ Gefahrgutbeauftragtenverordnung (GbV)

+ Technische Regeln brennbare Flüssigkeiten

(TRbF)

+ Gefahrgutverordnung Straße (GGVS)

+ Arbeitsstättenverordnung (ArbStättV)

+ Störfallverordnung etc…..

Regulations for Hazardous Substances Ordinances

14

Beispiele:

Explosionsgefährlich

Brennbarkeit

Giftigkeit

Reizend

Symbols for Storage and Transport of haz. Substances(nach Gefahrstoff-verordnung)

Regulations for Hazardous Substances Ordinances

The drivers for Process Safety and industrial Disaster Risk Management (iDRM) in Europe are

• Lessons learnt (Bhopal, Seveso, Toulouse, Texas City, Buncefield, ...)

• Ethical dimension (Responsible Care )

• Seveso 2

• National Standards• Industry benchmarking

(Major Hazard record of industry)

• Economics (Business Continuity)

15

iDRM basic principle

Crisis management assessment should cover all parts of emergency- and crisis- management ...

• identify hazards comprehensively

... pursuing the goal to define and train as much as possible in advance

• avoid or control risks

• communicate remaining risks

• mitigate consequences

• remediate damages

• restore trust

16

• Mandated by the Federal Emission Control Act – Advises government as well as plant operators and state

and local authorities on process safety – 32 members with different professional and educational

background representing different stakeholders (“Round Table”)

– Any group needs “allies” to win votes– Consensus intended, but majority decisions possible

• About 55 guidelines issued on different topics, e.g.– Land Use Planning (Safety distances) – Risk evaluation and perception – Emergency Planning– Industrial parks– Provisions against terrorist attacks on chemical plants

• All publications of the Commission are available (partly in English) at www.kas-bmu.de

Commission on Process Safety (Kommission fuer Anlagensicherheit [KAS])

17

Outline





20

“Farbwerke Hoechst” outside Frankfurt/Germany at about 1870

22

Hoechst Industrial Park (Frankfurt/M, Germany) today

Zoning around Industrial Sites

(Off-site Emergency Plan)

Recommended separation distances for “greenfield” planning

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500

Phosgene (DN 15)

Acrolein

Chlorine

Sulphur dioxide

Hydrogen sulphide

Formaldehyde (>90%)

Hydrogen cyanide, HCN

Oleum 65 % (Sulphur trioxide)

Bromine

Ammonia

Hydrogen f luoride

Fluorine

Ethylene oxid

Acrylonitrile

Hydrogen chloride

Methanol (f ire)

Propane (explosion)

Benzene (f ire)

Ethylene oxide (f ire)

Methanol

[Distance in m]

Class IVClass IIIClass IIClass I

Allocation to distance class

25

HAZARDS

RISK REDUCE

RESIDUAL RISK MANAGE

RISK Analyze/Assess

DISCONTINUE ACTIVITY

RISK TOLERABLE

YES

NO

RISK REVIEW REQUIREMENTS

WHEN

& WHO

WHAT

& HOW

SIMPLIFIED RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

DETERMINE

IDENTIFY

IS

? RISK BE

REDUCED CAN

?

YES

NO

PreventionThis map is common, you will see it again

Risk is a combinationof HAZARD Severity and FREQUENCY or LIKELIHOOD

Mitigation

Risk Review Requirements

The risk review process has to be determined• by all relevant stakeholders/departments of the

organisation• in writing (company guideline)• shared with authorities etc.• defining the risk review team (multi-disciplinary

including operator level)• defining milestones for and different levels of risk

review (e.g. Design phase, pre-commissioning, pre-start up, changes, etc)

26

Hazard Identification

All hazards have to be identified comprehensively and systematically ...

• eg. „classical“ EHS (Environment, Health, and Safety)-hazards, loss of production, ...

Operation hazards

Operation hazards

Network hazards

Network hazards

Environmental hazards

Environmental hazards

• eg. failure of utilities, supplies, transportation ...

• eg. natural hazards, adjacent plants and traffic ways, ...

• eg. densely populated areas/buildings, natural reserves, ...

Environmental vulnerability

Environmental vulnerability

• eg. plant vulnerability, neighbourhood/environment sensitivity, company image, ...

Terrorist threats

Terrorist threats

... by e.g. “What if”, checklists, HAZOP, FMEA etc. 27

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis• is a procedure in product development and operations

management• potential failure modes within a system for classification

by the severity and likelihood of the failures

28

FMEA

29

Hazard and operability study •A systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. •developed to analyze chemical process systems• A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guide-words and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.

HAZOP

The HAZOP team determines what are the possible significant Deviations from each intention, feasible Causes and likely Consequences. It can then be decided whether existing, designed safeguards are sufficient, or whether additional actions are necessary to reduce risk to an acceptable level

Risk Assessment

Risk is a combination of hazard Severity and Likelihood or frequency, often expressed as R=f(S,L)

• Severity may be determined by • Gas dispersion in combination with criteria for human effects such as:

• ERPGs (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines)

• AEGLs (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels)

• Explosion Overpressure & Fire radiation effects using tools such as:

• estimating local overpressure as a function of explosion source strength and distance TNO- methodology

• FLACS - explosion simulator

• Likelihood may be estimated by• expert opinion/experience

• databases for failure frequencies

• (semi-) quantitative assessments (risk graph, fault or event trees etc.)

• Assessment of safety barriers and mitigation (e.g. “bow tie” diagram, Layer of Protection Analysis = LOPA, “Swiss cheese model”)

30

31

The “Swiss Cheese Model”

32

Plant Emergency Response

Physical Protection e.g. Relief Devices

Safety Instrumented System preventative action

Critical Alarms and Operator intervention

Basic Process Control System, Operating Discipline / Supervision

Plant Designintegrity

Community Emergency Response

The LOPA “Onion”

Layer of Protection Analysis

33

Initiating Event

EstimatedFrequency

f i = x

PFD 1 = y 1

success

Impact EventFrequency,f3 = x * y 1 * y 2 * y 3

Safe Outcome

Safe Outcome

Safe Outcome

success

success

PFD 2 = y 2

PFD 3 = y 3

IPL 1 IPL 2 IPL 3

f1= x * y 1

f2=x * y 1 * y 2

Impact EventOccurs

IPL - Independent Protection LayerPFD - Probability of Failure on Demandf - frequency, /yr

Key :Arrow representsseverity and frequency ofthe Impact Event if laterIPLs are not successful

ImpactEvent

Severity

Frequency

Protection Layer Concept

LOPA criteria -1-

Initiating events• Control system failures• Human error• Piping and equipment failures• Interruption of utilities (e.g. Cooling)

Independent layers of protection• Basic Process Control System (possibly)• Alarm and operator response• Relief systems• Safety Instrumented Systems• Other qualifying Safety Related Protection Systems• Need to be independent, effective, tested, audited

LOPA criteria -2-

Conditional Modifiers• Weather conditions• Probability of ignition• Probability of ignition leading to explosion• Probability that person(s) will be exposed• Probability that an exposed person will suffer a particular harm• May be difficult to justify and evaluate

Mitigation (right hand side of bow tie)• Fire protection• Emergency Response• Water curtains• Secondary and tertiary containment• etc

‘Tolerable’ frequencies for events

• What risk can we tolerate?– Frequency for an event of a given severity (injury,

environmental insult etc.)• Users need to specify but aim to meet or exceed (do

better than) regulator requirements • The chosen tolerability becomes the target for risk

management sometimes called ‘Risk Governance’ for the company (usually Individual or Societal Risk)

• Data and guidance available for injury/fatality and environmental effects

36

Likelihood of ‘n’ fatalities from a tank explosion

per tank per yearRisk Tolerability

10-4/yr - 10-5/yrTolerable if

ALARPTolerable if

ALARPTolerable if

ALARP

10-5/yr - 10-6/yrBroadly

acceptable Tolerable if

ALARPTolerable if

ALARP


acceptableBroadly

acceptableTolerable if

ALARP


acceptableBroadly

acceptableBroadly

acceptable

Fatalities (n) 1 2-10 11-50

Tolerability Data (Fatalities) (Buncefield LOPA Guidance Dec 2009, final report from U.K. HSE)

ALARP = As Low as Reasonably Practicable

37

Heading and introduction from Section 3.7 in “IPPC H1: Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) and Environmental Assessment and Appraisal of BAT”, Version 6 July 20

Categories for Environmental Risk (U.K. Environment Agency)

Catastro-phic

• Major airborne release with serious offsite effects • Site shutdown • Serious contamination of groundwater or watercourse with extensive loss of

aquatic life

Major • Evacuation of local populace • Temporary disabling and hospitalisation • Serious toxic effect on beneficial or protected species • Widespread but not persistent damage to land • Significant fish kill over 5 mile range

Severe • Hospital treatment required • Public warning and off-site emergency plan invoked • Hazardous substance releases into water course with ½ mile effect

Significant • Severe and sustained nuisance, e.g. strong offensive odours / noise disturbance • Major breach of Permitted emissions limits with possibility of prosecution • Numerous public complaints

Noticeable • Noticeable nuisance off-site e.g. discernible odours • Minor breach of Permitted emission limits, but no environmental harm • One or two complaints from the public

Minor • Nuisance on site only (no off-site effects) • No outside complaint

38

CategoryAcceptable if

frequency less than

Acceptable if Reduced as Reasonably Practical and

frequency between

Unacceptable if frequency above

6

Catastrophic

10-6 per year 10-4 to 10-6 per year 10-4 per year

5 Major 10-6 per year 10-4 to 10-6 per year 10-4 per year

4 Severe 10-6 per year 10-2 to 10-6 per year 10-2 per year

3 Significant 10-4 per year 10-1 to 10-4 per year 10-1 per year

2 Noticeable 10-2 per year ~ 10+1 to 10-2 per year ~10+1 per year

1 Minor

All shown as acceptable

- -

Typical Environmental Tolerability Criteria

39

TOLERATED EVENT FREQUENCY(Target)

PER YEAR SINGLE FATALITY (e.g.)

10-5

(per year)

INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY

PER YEAR CONTROL SYSTEM LOOP FAILS

10-1

PROBABILITY OF IGNITION (e.g.)

PROBABILITY Quantity, M.I.E., site factors

10-1

PROBABILITY OF EXPOSURE

PROBABILITY 100% 10-0

INDEPENDENT LAYER OF PROTECTION 1

PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND

Basic Process Control System

10-1

INDEPENDENT LAYER OF PROTECTION 2

PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON DEMAND

Safety Instrumented System

<10-2

Example for Risk Calculation

40

Risk Assessment has to be adopted to the needs

LEVEL 1: PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS

Should be done by plant based people

They then have a better understanding of the risks and possibly how they may be reduced

LEVEL 2: RISK REVIEW

Specialist help from e.g. Process Engineering or Process safety function at site – should include Plant based people in the team

LEVEL 4: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Specialist help from external expertise. Owner needs to define scope and data and critique the outcome.

Level 1: PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

Level 2:RISK REVIEW

L4:QRA

LEVEL 3: ENHANCED RISK REVIEW

Specialist help from e.g. Process Engineering or Process Safety function within Corporate – should include Site and Plant based people in the team

Level 3ENHANCED RISK

REVIEW

41

Outline





42

Crisis Management Systems: can the unpredictable be planned?

Define as much as possible in advance, because ... • ... crisis always happen at the wrong time and place • ... your regular organisation is not sufficient to

handle crisis • ... all resources of the whole company have to be

available in due time • ... public, media and authorities expect professional

handling of crisis, too

43

Important: ability to react fast!

The bigger a corporation, the higher the expectations even for small sites

Management of Remaining Risks

Communicate remaining risks• to staff (operating procedures, training, drills, …)• to external stakeholders (customers, neighbours, authorities – but

careful regarding security risks!)

Mitigate consequences• Internal emergency planning (above all organisation, equipment,

drills) • Cooperation with external services (neighbouring plants, public

services)

44

Safety Operating Procedures

• Examples for visualization of safety information

• Acetone Ladders

Emergency Response

The basic principle: the faster and more effective the initial response, the smaller the consequences for men, environment and economy.

• Provide the infrastructure for fast response (fire brigade, emergency control room, availability of key personnel, etc.)

• Encourage immediate reporting of incidents (not to wait until own efforts failed ...), do not blame for false alarms

• If the fire brigade is (partly) staffed by operators be aware of the risks of understaffed production

• Better start with a higher level of alarm (worst case assumption) and grade it down later than vice versa

• Notify and involve public fire brigades and authorities as soon as possible

• Analyse every incident and the response to improve the emergency organisation without blaming anyone

46

Lokaler Datenträger (C).lnk

dark page

Notification to local and state authorities

warning procedures

Emergency response management group

Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park Frankfurt-Hoechst (this and following slides: courtesy of Infraserv Höchst and Sanofi-Aventis)

Categorisation of the incidentEmergency Manager

automatedtelephonemessages

sirensradio announcementsby police dep.

safety regulations

incidentincidentdispatchof task forces

emergency call

fire alarm system

Emergency Response Workflow: Example Industrial Park Frankfurt-Hoechst (Sanofi-Aventis/Infraserv Höchst)

Integrated Command Centre Hoechst Industrial park (Frankfurt/Germany)

49

24 hours crewed by 5 Dispatchers

Mock Drills

Major incidents hopefully become less frequent. This makes drills even more important ...

• ... to train seldom used procedures • ... to reduce mental stress during incidents• ... to optimise emergency- and crisis-

management• ... to make sure that necessary resources are

available

50

Site Fire Brigade with 2 Fire Stations within the Industrial Park

Crisis management group Operational Structure

Scene of Incident

Emergency Manager

Fire Brigade (site)

Environmental control

Site Security

Plant Manager

Occupational Physician

Police

Public Fire Brigade

Emergency Response Committee

Site Incident Manager

Emergency Manager 2

Fire Brigade (site)

Occupational Physician

Environmental Protection

Site Security

Plant Safety

Company Representative(company affected by incident)

Communications

Toxicology

Public Fire Brigade

Police

SecretaryEmergency Manager3-5

Additional Experts

Documentation

53

Crisis Management regulations / operating procedure

54

EHS Management System BI Germany

„Integrated Handbook System“,

taking into account:

• internal requirements (Corporate Centre)

• external requirements (Safety Management Systems, statutory order on hazardous incidents - StörfallV)

Organising Safety

Occupational Health & Safety

Emergency Management

Environmental Protection

55

Technical risks (examples)

Objectives & Targets

Business risks (examples)

• Product quality• Production failure• Environmental

protection• Occupational Health &

Safety• Fires & Explosions• Site Protection

• Market risks• Product risks• Portfolio risks• Investment risks, • Financing and taxation

risks• Risks with large-scale

projects

Safe management of the company`s technical risks

56

Management review process

Customer feedback

Findings of inspections and audits

Change in legislation,

market, technology

Status in achievement of

objectives/targetsand actions

Annual Management

review

Evaluation of suitability of management

system

Updating ofResponsible

Care Programme

Actions to improve management system

New and/or amended

objectives/ targets

Annual reports by specialist officers „Betriebs-beauftragte“

Events

57

Warning Procedures – Warning of Neighborhood

Warning of affected areas by

17 external sirens in 4 groups

Radio announcements

Automated telephone messages to hospitals, day care centers or schools

VCI

Transport-Accident-Information- and Emergency-

Response-System

Managing Transportation Emergency in Germany

The TUIS-System

Foundation in 1982 in Germany

Voluntary Assistance Program of the Chemical IndustryAssociation (VCI) in Germany

Agreements between VCI and Minister of Interior in 11 GermanCountries to ensure assistance during transportation emergency

TUIS Transport-Accident-Information andTechnical-Support-System

Part of the global Responsible Care® Initiative

„The Responsibility of the Chemical Industry doesn't stop atthe gateway of the plant“

Scene of accident

Emergency call centersTelephone exchange within the Federal Republic of Germany Europe

Level 1 Advice given by phone

Level 2 Expert Advice on the scene

Level 3 Technical Assistance on the scene

Authorized public authority(e.g. police, public fire brigade)

TUIS Emergency Call SystemTUIS Emergency Call System

TUIS member company as included in the list of companies, e.g. a company near the site of accident a manufacturer

BASF SE, Ludwigshafen (NRC)BASF Schwarzheide GmbHBayer Industry Services, LeverkusenDow Deutschland, StadeHenkel KGaA, DüsseldorfInfracor, MarlInfraLeuna GmbH, LeunaInfraServ, GendorfInfraserv, FrankfurtMerck KGaA, DarmstadtSchering AG, BerlinWacker Chemie AG, Burghausen

Sites of TUIS member companies (130)

TUIS- Emergency Centers (12)

Consultation in local language given by the Technical Officer of the companies fire department in case of incidents and accidents involving hazardous materials during transportation (rail, road, waterway), in production facilities or warehouses, depending on

Special Situation on the scene Weather conditions on the scene Location, Neighborhood

Form of Information Characteristics / Hazard / Impact Address of the producer Tactical advices to the Incident

Commander on the scene Waste disposal treatment Recommended technical equipment and personal protection

Level 1 - Advice given by phone

Advice given on the scene in difficult situations e.g.

Unknown product or not enough

information about the product Unknown producer Persons with less experience in managing

incidents with hazardous materials

Possible supporting experts: Technical Officer of the companies

fire department Chemist Master craftsman of the production plant Specialists (Environment, Engineering,…)

Level 2 - Advice given on the scene

Situation on the scene: Large accident / incident No suitable technical equipment Special operations necessary

Form of Support: Special technical equipment Salvage tanks Special knowledge in handling hazardous

materials / managing thr incident Technical Officer of the companies

fire department Operational Units of the company Chemist / Specialist (Environment, …) Master craftsman of the production plant

Level 3 - Technical assistance given on the scene

Costs

Level 1 Free of charge

Level 2 Reimburse insurance company of the party who was

responsible for the incident / accident

Experts

Level 3 Reimburse insurance company of the party who was responsible for the incident / accident

Emergency Services of the company on the scene Experts

Equipment Clean-Up (Technical Equipment, Protective Equipment, etc.)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Advice given by phone

Advice given on the scene

Technical Assistance givenon the scene

TUIS - 1990 to 2007

VCI

TUIS member companies have helped 1310 times in 2007.The advice given by phone is like the past years the most usedlevel by authorized public authority. In 220 cases TechnicalAssistance given on the scene was necessary.

Extensive Special Technical Equipment75 kVA integrated Power Generator360° Flood Lighting System 6 m / 9000 W80 kN / 60 m Winch System (Treibmatic)

Technical Equipment - Level 3

BASF-HAZMAT-TRUCK

Mobile flare

Capacity:ca. 250 kg/h Propane ca. 350 kg/h Ethylene

Intended for use inemergency cases e.g.Pumping propylene from aderailed pressurized tankcar to an empty one.


Remote Controlled Robotic Vehicle(ROBI) – The Manipulator

Step-climbing ability: 35° (70%)Gripper closing force: max. 600 NMax. carrier load: 500 kg


ROBI in action


Mobile Chlorine Absorption Unit

Chlorine absorption: 150 kg/h

Absorbency:300 kg

Cleaning it to an extent that the exhaust gas chlorine concentration is less than 10 mg/m3 (ppm)



Turbo-Extinguisher

Chassis: MAN LX 90

Power: 198 kWEquipment:

2 x Turbines Larzac 04C6 (Alphajet) each with 13.1 kN thrust

Founded by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) in 1991

Cross-border Transportation Emergency Assistance in Europe

Objectives: To train chemical companies (Company Scheme)

To set up in each country a system like „TUIS“ (Country Scheme)

To set up in each country a National Response Center (NRC)

To establish Emergency Response Intervention Cards (ERICs)

ICE - International Chemical Environment

GermanyAustriaItalySwedenNetherlandsNorwayGreat BritainFinlandFranceSpainCzech Republic HungaryBelgiumDenmarkSwitzerlandPolandSlovakia

ICE - Country Scheme (17)

= ICE-System ready for action

= ICE-System in preparation

Accident

NRC SpainMadrid

Spanish

English

NRC GermanyLudwigshafen / Rhein

German Producer

ICE - Cross boarder Communication

BAB 478 Neunkirchen 12. August 2004

Battery factory Trepcka/Mitrovica, Kosovo 13. September 2000

The Role of Authorities

The cooperation between authorities and companies at an incident depends on their cooperation before the incident.

• Open communication about risks and safety measures on a regular basis (e.g. in a local or regional committee) builds up trust which is urgently needed during emergency response

• Authorities need to know about the possible scenarios for major accidents to do their own preparations

• Authorities should have clear rules about their responsibilities in handling major incidents to avoid conflicts between the different agencies (e.g. labour safety, environment, civil protection, police etc.)

• Mitigation of consequences should come first, legal prosecution of individuals responsible for the incident later

82

Neighbours, Journalists and Environmentalists

The basic issue: Neighbours and the general public share the risks of industrial sites, but not necessarily the benefits.

• Communication of relevant risks has to be done openly and in an adequate form (“not scientific”) prior to incidents (e.g. “neighbourhood councils”, brochures, ...)– to build up trust in the competence of the company to handle

risks– to enable the neighbours to react adequately during an

incident• The response of neighbours etc. to incidents is strongly

influenced by the company´s response to requests and complaints prior to the incident

• Fast and open information after an incident is crucial• Fears and worries of neighbours etc. have to be taken seriously

even if they are based on emotions rather than science• On the long term, conflicts with neighbours etc. endangers the

“licence to operate” 83

Crisis Communication

Sometimes crisis communication becomes a crisis of communication!

84

Outline





85

Conclusions 1

– Investing in safe and eco-efficient plants pays off at least on the long term

– The (remaining) risks of industrial plants can be assessed and are the basis for scenarios for emergency planning

– The knowledge and experience of the operators should be used by all means

– Risks should be communicated as well as benefits to all stakeholders, esp. the neighbours

86

Conclusions 2

– The resources for emergency response (manpower, equipment, communications, organisation etc) have to be planned in advance and readily available in case of an incident. People usually accept the risk of a chemical/pharmaceutical plant, but not incompetence in handling it

– Authorities should involve themselves actively in emergency planning, balancing this out with their law enforcement duties

– Combined efforts will definitely lead to safer and more accepted plants, as the figures from Germany may show

87

Development of Accidents in Germany since 1950

„Arbeitsunfälle“ = occupational accidents

„Wegeunfälle“ = acc. on the way to work

83,12

109,18

98,65

54,51

34,9

21,13 20,4516,79 15,78 14,93

8,96

18,0813,92

8,165,85 5,42 5,37 5,31 5,01 4,96

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005

Arbeitsunfälle

Wegeunfälle

Per 1000 full time workers

Benefits of implementing Risk Management

Avoid accidents avoid costs, bad publicity and image

Safe workplace environment for employees and improved social responsibility for industrial estates

Less criticism from local communities and authorities due to a safer environment

Only industrial estates complying with international safety standards are interesting for foreign investors

Increased competitiveness of the industrial estate

What the client ordered

How the project mgr. understood it

How it was planned by the engineer

How it was implemented by the technicians

How the consultant interpreted it

How it was documented

How it was eventually built

What was chargedTo the client

What the client really wanted

What was subject of the service agreement

Design, Build and Operate

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91

http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/e5783/e17327/

iDRM Training Modules

92

http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/

93

•Confined Space Safety •Safety in Transportation of Hazardous Chemicals •Hazards Identification and Control Measures in Chemical (Industrial) Workplaces •First Aid in iDRM •Personal Protective Equipment •Accident Causation: Models and Theories •Human Factors in Accidents and prevention •Organisational Commitments in Reducing Accidents •Job safety analysis •What should I Know as District Collector and Why? •Risk Assessment and Management •Consequence analysis: application in emergency planning •On-site emergency plan •Off-site emergency management plan •Industrial Disaster Response Guide

iDRM Training Modules

Thank you for your attention!

... and special thanks to Richard Gowland, EPSC Technical Director, who contributed a number of slides

http://www.hrdp-idrm.in/e5783/e17327/

Training-cum-Visit - Environmental Management and Land Based Natural Resource Planning in GermanyECODEC / Dr. Tom Carl

Existing Planning Objectives

State levelDevelopmentProgramme

Statelevel

Regional Plan

Regionallevel

Master PlanLegally Binding Land-Use Plan

Locallevel

Planning Laws

FederalBuilding CodeNature

ConservationAct

Water Supply Act

RegionalPlanningLaw

Private or PublicBuilding Project„HARBOUR“

SupplementaryPlanning

RegionalPolicy HarmonizationProcedure

EnvironmentalImpactStudy

Interests

SectoralPlanningAuthorities

NatureConservationOrganizations

Affected Public

LegallyBindingPlanApproval

Guidelines

Consent M

anagementDecision Support

Guideli

nes

...

PLANNING OF AN INDUSTRIAL ESTATE

European Best Practice for industrial Disaster Risk Management (iDRM) F. Bemmerlein-Lux GIZ Senior...

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