Eugenio to Inok
Transcript of Eugenio to Inok
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G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
JR.,respondents.
PUNO,J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the
Career Executive Service Board is challenged in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank
on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On
September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service
Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993,
respondent Civil Service Commission 2passed Resolution
No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B
provides that Civil Service shall be
administered by the Civil Service
Commission, . . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the
1987 Philippine Constitution provides
that "The Civil Service Commission, as the
central personnel agency of the
government, is mandated to establish a
career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progresiveness and
courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle
A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 grants the Commission the power,
among others, to administer and enforce
the constitutional and statutory
provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A,
Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 Provides, among others, that The
Career Service shall be characterized by
(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to
be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly
technical qualifications; (2) opportunity
for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A
Book V of the administrative Code of
1987 provides that "The third level shall
cover Positions in the Career Executive
Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes
the imperative need to consolidate,
integrate and unify the administration of
all levels of positions in the career service
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17,
Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 confers on
the Commission the power and authority
to effect changes in its organization as the
need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the
Constitution provides that the Civil
Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy and the necessary implications
thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the Civil Service Commission
hereby resolves to streamline reorganize
and effect changes in its organizational
structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career
Executive Service Board, shall now be
known as the Office for Career Executive
Service of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the
Career Executive Service Board shall now
form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable
Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service
Commission issued CSC Resolution No.
93-4359 which abolished the Career
Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result
of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-
4359, including whether the Civil Service
Commission has authority to abolish the
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Career Executive Service Board. Because
these issues remain unresolved, the Office
of the President has refrained from
considering appointments of career
service eligibles to career executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the
appropriate court to settle the legal issuesarising from issuance by the Civil Service
Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-
4359, for guidance of all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as
the Career Executive Service Board which recommended
her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the
petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No.
93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED
THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF
CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE
CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC
USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF
CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed
with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent
Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It
posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-
CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT
TO A CESO RANK OF PETITIONER
EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT
DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION
OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAS
PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANKFOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY
SITUATED AS SAID PETITIONER.
FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING
THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE
FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE
PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO
APPOINT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB
INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZEDBY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A,
Book V of the Administrative Code of the
1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD
ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE
HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND
MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380.
THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS
ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATIONOF THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition. 3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated
Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan
provides:
Article IV Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to
form a continuing pool of well-selected
and development oriented career
administrators who shall provide
competent and faithful service.
2.A Career Executive Service hereinafter
referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is
created to serve as the governing body of
the Career Executive Service. The Board
shall consist of the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission as presiding officer,
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the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-
officio members and two other members
from the private sector and/or the
academic community who are familiar
with the principles and methods of
personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules,
standards and procedures on the
selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of
the Career Executive Service. The Board
shall set up the organization and
operation of the service. (Emphasis
supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily alegislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on
Public Officers and
Employees, 5viz:
Except for such offices as are created by
the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.
In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional
provisions, it supreme, and the legislature
may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient. When
in the exigencies of government it isnecessary to create and define duties, the
legislative department has the discretion
to determine whether additional offices
shall be created, or whether these duties
shall be attached to and become ex-
officio duties of existing offices. An office
created by the legislature is wholly within
the power of that body, and it may
prescribe the mode of filling the office and
the powers and duties of the incumbent,
and if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any
law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary,
in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993,
the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of
CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section
17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to
abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Eachoffice of the Commission shall be headed
by a Director with at least one Assistant
Director, and may have such divisions as
are necessary independent constitutional
body, the Commission may effect changes
in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor
General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16
of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the
respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The
Commission shall have the following
offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
Directorheaded by an Executive Director,
with a Deputy Executive Director shall
implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations promulgated by the
Commission; coordinate the programs of
the offices of the Commission and render
periodic reports on their operations, and
perform such other functions as may beassigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection
Boardcomposed of a Chairman and two
(2) members shall have the following
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide
the Chairman with legal advice and
assistance; render counselling services;undertake legal studies and researches;
prepare opinions and ruling in the
interpretation and application of the Civil
Service law, rules and regulations;
prosecute violations of such law, rules
and regulations; and represent the
Commission before any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and
Managementshall formulate development
plans, programs and projects; undertake
research and studies on the different
aspects of public personnel management;administer management improvement
programs; and provide fiscal and
budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall
provide the Commission with personnel,
financial, logistics and other basic support
services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel
Records shall formulate and implement
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policies, standards, rules and regulations
pertaining to personnel records
maintenance, security, control and
disposal; provide storage and extension
services; and provide and maintain
library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules andregulations relative to the administration
of position classification and
compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination
and Placementshall provide leadership
and assistance in developing and
implementing the overall Commission
programs relating to recruitment,
execution and placement, and formulate
policies, standards, rules and regulations
for the proper implementation of the
Commission's examination and placementprograms.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and
Standards shall provide leadership and
assistance in the formulation and
evaluation of personnel systems and
standards relative to performance
appraisal, merit promotion, and employee
incentive benefit and awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource
Developmentshall provide leadership and
assistance in the development andretention of qualified and efficient work
force in the Civil Service; formulate
standards for training and staff
development; administer service-wide
scholarship programs; develop training
literature and materials; coordinate and
integrate all training activities and
evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and
Auditshall develop policies, standards,
rules and regulations for the effective
conduct or inspection and audit
personnel and personnel management
programs and the exercise of delegated
authority; provide technical and advisory
services to Civil Service Regional Offices
and government agencies in the
implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall
provide leadership and assistance in the
development and implementation of
policies, standards, rules and regulations
in the accreditation of employee
associations or organizations and in the
adjustment and settlement of employee
grievances and management of employee
disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall
formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulationsgoverning corporate officials and
employees in the areas of recruitment,
examination, placement, career
development, merit and awards systems,
position classification and compensation,
performing appraisal, employee welfare
and benefit, discipline and other aspects
of personnel management on the basis of
comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement
Administration shall be responsible for
the enforcement of the constitutional andstatutory provisions, relative to
retirement and the regulation for the
effective implementation of the
retirement of government officials and
employees.
(15) The Regional and Field Offices. The
Commission shall have not less than
thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be
headed by a Director, and such field
offices as may be needed, each to be
headed by an official with at least the
rank of an Assistant Director.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is
that respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as
enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its
inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee
"the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to
view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook."6 The essential autonomouscharacter of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
attaching one functionally inter-related
government agency to another is to attain "policy
and program coordination." This is clearly etched
out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the
aforecited Code, to wit:
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(3)Attachment. (a) This refers to the
lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and attached
agency or corporation for purposes of
policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a
member, with or without voting rights, ifthis is permitted by the charter; having
the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic
reporting which shall reflect the progress
of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide
general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall
serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or
agency.
Respondent Commission also relies on the caseofDatumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No.
114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the
CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to
state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the
cited case was dismissed for lack of standing of the
petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution
No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 115942 May 31, 1995
RUBLE RUBENECIA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FELICIANO,J.:
Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service
Commission ("CSC" or "Commission") Resolution No. 94-
0533, dated 25 January 1994, aquitting him of a charge of
insubordination but finding him guilty of several other
administrative charges and imposing upon him the penalty
of dismissal from the service. He also questions the validity
of CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993, which
allegedly abolished the Merit System Protection Board
("MSPB") and authorized the elevation of cases pending
before that body to the Commission.
Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman,
Northern Samar, filed before the MSPB an administrative
complaint against petitioner Rubenecia, the School
Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and
violation of Civil Service Rules. After a preliminary inquiry,
the MSPB on 15 January 1992 formally charged Rubenecia
and required him to file an answer with the CSC Regional
Office in Tacloban City. On 24 February 1992, petitioner
Rubenecia, instead of filing an answer, requested that he
be furnished with copies of the documents submitted by
complainants in support of the charges against him. 1
On 15 May 1992, the CSC Regional Director assigned to
investigate the case invited Rubenecia to the RegionalOffice and there identify and pick up the documents he
desired. The Regional Office had then just received the
records of the case transmitted by the MSPB.
In response, Rubenecia requested that his visit to the CSC
Regional Office be deferred because of alleged problems in
his school relating to the enrollment period. The CSC
reiterated on 10 June 1992 its order to Rubenecia to file
his answer. In turn, petitioner through counsel in a letter
dated 9 July 1992, reiterated his request that the CSC
Regional Office furnish him copies of the documents
submitted in connection with the charges against him.
Although petitioner did not file his answer, the Regional
Director set the case for hearing on 20 August 1992. This
hearing, however, did not take place as the complainants
did not there show up. Petitioner Rubenecia appeared at
that hearing, but filed no answer. In an order issued on the
same day, i.e., 20 August 1992, the Regional Office declared
that the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the
basis of the documents theretofore filed.
On 25 August 1992, Rubenecia wrote to the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, praying that the case against
him be dismissed and attaching to that letter many
documents in support of his claim of innocence.
On 28 September 1992, the Regional Director submitted
an investigation report to the Chairman, MSPB. Before the
MSPB could render a decision, the Commission issued on
29 June 1993 Resolution No. 93-2387 which provided,
among other things, that cases then pending before the
MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision.
The Commission, accordingly, took over the case against
petitioner and on 25 January 1994, rendered its Resolution
No. 94-0533 finding petitioner guilty and ordering his
dismissal from the service. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, asserting lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Commission and attaching most if not all of the same
documents he had annexed to his letter-answer to support
his assertion of innocence. The motion for reconsideration
was denied in a resolution of the Commission on 31 May
1994.
Two (2) principal issues are raised in this Petition
for Certiorari:
(1) Whether or not the CSC had authority
to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and
assume jurisdiction over the
administrative case against petitioner;
and
(2) Whether or not petitioner had been
accorded due process in connection with
rendition of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533
finding him guilty and ordering his
dismissal from the service.
I
In respect of the first issue, petitioner Rubenecia contends
that the Commission had no jurisdiction to take over the
administrative case against him from the MSPB for the
reason that CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 was invalid. The
argument of the petitioner is that since the MSPB was a
creation of law, it could be abolished only by law, and that
Resolution No. 93-2387 was accordingly an ultra vires act
on the part of the Commission.
Resolution No. 93-2387 reads in full:
WHEREAS, the Civil Service Commission
recognizes the government-wide call and
the need for streamlining of operations
which requires implification of systems,
cutting of red tape and elimination of
unnecessary bureaucratic layer;
WHEREAS,one of the powers and functions
of the Commission provided for in Section
12 (11) of Book V of the Administrative
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Code of 1987 is to hear and decide
administrative cases institutedby or
broughtbefore it directlyor on appeal,
including contested appointments and
review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attach to it;
WHEREAS, Section 47 (1) of Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 specifically
provides that theCommission shall decideupon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of penalty
ofsuspension for more that thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer removal or dismissal from office;
WHEREAS, under Section 16 (2) of Book V
of the Code, the Merit System Protection
Board(MSPB),an office of the Commission,
has the function to hear and decide
administrative cases involving officials
and employees of the civilservice concurrently with the Commission;
WHEREAS,most decisions on
administrative cases rendered by the
MSPB are later appealed to the
Commission for review and final
resolution;
WHEREAS,the existing procedure wherein
most administrative cases are first
reviewed by the MSPB before they are
elevated to the Commission makes it
difficult for these cases to be finallyresolved within a short period of time ;
WHEREAS, the present situation
requires immediate streamlining of the
operation of the Civil Service Commission
to achieve as speedier delivery of
administrative justice and economical
operation without impairing due process
and the substantive rights of the parties in
administrative cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to theprovisions of Section 17 of Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which
authorizes the Commission, as an
independent constitutional body, to effect
changes in its organization as the need
arises, the Commission Resolves as it is
hereby Resolved to effect the following
changes;
1. Decisions in
administrative
cases involving officials
and employees of the
civil serviceappealable to
the Commission pursuant
to Section 47 of Book V
of the Code including
personnel actions such
as contested
appointments shall now
be appealed directly to
theCommission and notto
the MSPB; and
2. Decisions and
administrative
cases involving the
officials and employees
of the Civil Service
including contested
appointments which
have already been
appealed to the
MSPB and other pendingadministrative cases
brought directly before
the MSPB, shall now
be elevated to the
Commission for final
resolution.
Parties in administrative cases pending
before the MSPB shall be notified in
writing that their respective cases have
already been elevated to the Commission
for final resolution. They shall have 15
days from receipt of notice to submit theircomments on or objections to the new
procedures.
This Resolution shall take effect on 1 July
1993 and the new procedure shall remain
effective until rescinded by the
Commission in another resolution.
Adopted this 29th day of June 1993.
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
Chairman
Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr. Thelma P. Gaminde
Commissioner Commissioner
Juanito Demetrio
Board Secretary VI
(Emphasis supplied)
The Merit System Protection Board was originally created
by P.D. No. 1409, dated 8 June 1978, Section 1 of which
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said: "There is hereby created in the Civil Service
Commission a Merit Systems Board." The Board was
composed of "a commissioner and two (2) associate
commissioners" appointed by the CSC. 2 The powers and
functions of this Board were set out in Section 5 of P.D. No.
1409 in the following terms:
Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the Board.
The Board shall have the following
powers and functions, among others:
(1) Hear and decide administrative cases
involving officers and employees of the
civil service.
(2) Hear and decide cases brought before
it by officers and employees who feel
aggrieved by the determination of
appointing authorities involving
appointment promotion, transfer, detail,
reassignment and other personnel
actions, as well as complaints against any
officers in the government arising fromabuses arising from personnel actions of
these officers or from violation of the
merit system.
(3) Hear and decide complaints of civil
service employees regarding malpractices
of other officials and employees.
(4) Promulgate, subject to the approval of
the Civil Service Commission, rules and
regulations to carry out the functions of
the Board.
(5) Administer oaths,
issue subpoena and subpoenaduces tecum,
and take testimony in any investigation or
inquiry. The Board shall have the power
to punish for contempt in accordance
with the rules of court under the same
procedure with the same penalties
provided therein.
(6) Perform such other functions as may
be assigned by the Civil Service
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Decisions of the Board involving removal of officers and
employees from the service were "subject to automatic
review by the Commission;" all other decisions of the
Board were also subject to appeal to the Commission. 3
As noted, P.D. No. 1409 had "created in the Civil Service
Commission [the] Merit Systems Board." Section 16 of the
present Civil Service Law found in the 1987 Administrative
Code followed the same line and re-created the Merit
Systems Board as an office of the Commission and gave it a
new name: "Merit System Protection Board."
Section 16 of the present Civil Service Law reads as
follows, in pertinent part:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The
Commission shall have the following
offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director . .
(2) The Merit System Protection Board
composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members which have the following
functions:
(a) Hear and decide on
appeal administrative
cases involving officials
and employees of the
Civil Service. Its decision
shall be final except
those involving dismissa
or separation from the
service which may be
appealed to the
Commission;
(b) Hear and decide
cases brought before it
on appeal by officials and
employees who feel
aggrieved by thedetermination of
appointing authorities
involving personnel
actions and violations of
the merit system. The
decision of the Board
shall be final except
those involving division
chiefs or officials of
higher ranks which may
be appealed to the
Commission;
(c) Directly take
cognizance of complaints
affecting functions of the
Commission, those
which are unacted upon
by the agencies, and such
other complains which
required direct action of
the Board in the interest
of justice;
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(d) Administer oaths,
issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum,
take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry,
punish for contempt in
accordance with the
same procedures and
penalties prescribed in
the Rules of Court; and
(e) Promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out
the functions of the
Board subject to the
approval of the
Commission.
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs . . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The 1987 Administrative Code thus made clear that the
MSPB was intended to be an office of the Commission like
any of the other thirteen (13) offices in the Commission:
e.g., the Office of Legal Affairs; the Office of Planning and
Management; the Central Administrative Office, and so
forth. The MSPB was, in other words, a part of the internal
structure and organization of the Commission and thus a
proper subject of organizational change which the
Commission is authorized to undertake under Section 17
of the present Civil Service Law:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Eachoffice of the Commission shall be headed
by a Director with at least one (1)
Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary to carry out
their respective functions.As an
independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the
organization as the need arises. (Emphasis
supplied).
Since it was part and parcel of the internal organization of
the Commission, the MSPB was notan autonomous entity
created by law and merely attached for administrative
purposes to the Civil Service Commission. InAida Eugeniov. Civil Service Commission, 4 the Court invalidated a CSC
Resolution which had transferred the Career Executive
Service Board to the Office for Career Executive Service of
the CSC precisely because the Career Executive Service
Board was an autonomous entity created by a special law
and attached, for administrative purposes only, to the Civil
Service Commission; that Board did not fall within the
control of the Civil Service Commission.
It will be noted that under the provisions of Section 16 (2)
(a) and (b) quoted earlier, cases originating outside the
Civil Service Commission itself and appealed to the MSPB
were, in cases involving division chiefs and higher officials
and cases where the penalty imposed was dismissal or
separation from the service, subject to further appeal to
the Commission itself. At the same time, cases filed
originally with the MSPB could also be filed directly with
the Commission itself under Section 12 (11) of the Civil
Service Law. It was this apparent duplication or layering of
functions within the Commission that the Commission
sought to rationalize and eliminate by enacting Resolution
No. 93-2387 quoted in full earlier.
The change instituted by CSC Resolution No. 93-2387
consisted basically of the following: decision in
administrative cases appealable to the Commission
pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law
may now be appealed directly to the Commission itself and
not to the MSPB. Administrative cases already pending on
appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly to
the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93-
2387, were required to be elevated to the Commission for
final resolution. The functions of the MSPB relating to the
determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in
other words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. Thesechanges were prescribed by the Commission in its effort to
"streamline the operation of the CSC" which in turn
required the "simplification of systems, cutting of red tape
and elimination of [an] unnecessary bureaucratic layer."
The previous procedure made it difficult for cases to be
finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The
change, therefore, was moved by the quite legitimate
objective of simplifying the course that administrative
disciplinary cases, like those involving petitioner
Rubenecia, must take. We consider that petitioner
Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step administrative
appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to
an office of the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter asecond appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (i.e.,
the Chairman and the two [2] Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission), a procedure which most frequently
consumed a prolonged period of time.
We note also that Resolution No. 93-2387 did notpurport
to abolish the MSPB nor to effect the termination of the
relationship of public employment between the
Commission and any of its officers or employees. At all
events, even if Resolution No. 93-2387 had purported to
do so, petitioner Rubenecia, who does not claim to be an
officer or employee of the MSPB, has no personality or
standing to contest such termination of publicemployment. InFernandez and De Lima v. Hon. Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas, etc., et al., 5 the Court upheld Resolution No. 94-
3710 of the Civil Service which effected certain changes in
the internal organization and structure of the Commission.
The Court said:
We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710
has notabolished any public office as that
term is used in the law of public officers.
It is essential to note that none of the
"changes in organization" introduced by
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Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or
necessarily involved the termination of
the relationship of public employment
between the Commission and any of its
officers and employees. We find it very
difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code having mentioned
fourteen (14) different offices of the CSC,
meant to freeze these offices and to cast
in concrete, as it were, the internalorganization of the Commission until it
might please Congress to change such
internal organization regardless of the
ever changing needs of the civil service as
a whole. To the contrary, the legislative
authority had expressly authorized the
Commission to carry out "changes in the
organization," as the need [for such
changes] arises.
Petitioner Rubenecia also claims that the Civil Service
Commission itself (as distinguished from the MSPB) did
not acquire jurisdiction over his case because he had notbeen notified by individual written notice sent by mail that
his case had been elevated to the Civil Service Commission
as required by Resolution No. 93-2387. We consider this
objection unmeritorious. CSC Resolution No. 93-2387,
quoted earlier, did not require individual written notice
sent by mail to parties in administrative cases pending
before the MSPB. Assuming that Rubenecia had not in fact
been sent an individual notice, the fact remains that
Resolution No. 93-2387 was published in a newspaper of
general circulation (The Manila Standard, issue of 16 July
1993 6); the Commission may accordingly be deemed to
have complied substantially with the requirement of
written notice in its own Resolution. Moreover, petitionerhimself had insisted on pleading before the Commission,
rather than before the MSPB; he filed before the
Commission itself his letter-cum-annexes which effectively
was his answer to the Formal Charge instituted before the
MSPB. He cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction
of the Commission.
II
We turn to petitioner's contention that he had been denied
due process when the Commission rendered its Resolution
No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his dismissal
from the government service.
The fundamental rule of due to process requires that a
person be accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
These requisites were respected in the case of petitioner
Rubenecia.
The Formal Charge prepared by the MSPB and given to
petitioner Rubenecia constituted sufficient notice which, in
fact, had enabled him to prepare his defense. The Formal
Charge contained the essence of the complaint and the
documents in support thereof and the conclusion of the
MSPB finding a prima facie case against Rubenecia.
Rubenecia himself admitted that he had been furnished
with copies of an affidavit and testimonies of the principal
witnesses against him that were given during the
preliminary hearing of the case against Rubenecia. 7
We are also not persuaded by petitioner's complaint that
he had not been furnished copies of all the documents that
had accompanied the Formal Charge. Rubenecia was given
an opportunity by the Investigating Officer, the RegionalDirector of CSC, to obtain those documents from the CSC
Regional Office. Rubenecia did not avail himself of that
opportunity and he cannot now be heard to complain that
he was not given such documents. At all events, as already
noted, he sent a formal letter-answer to Chairman Sto.
Tomas controverting the charges against him and
submitted voluminous documents in support of his claim
of innocence and prayed for dismissal of the Formal
Charge. This letter-answer constitutes proof that he did
have notice of the accusations against him and was in fact
able to present his own defense.
Petitioner's answer to the Formal Charge was consideredby the Investigating Officer. This Officer, however,
concluded in his report that "the evidence presented by
respondent [Rubenecia] could not outweigh that of the
prosecution as contained in the records. 8
Finally, the motion for reconsideration filed by Rubenecia
before the Commission cured whatever defect might have
existed in respect of alleged denial of procedural due
process. 9 Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. 10 In the instant
case, petitioner was heard not only in respect of his motion
for reconsideration; he was also in fact affordedreasonable opportunity to present his case before decision
was rendered by the Commission finding him guilty.
Rubenecia also claims that the Commission had erred in
disregarding the "overwhelming evidence" in his favor.
The settled rule in our jurisdiction is that the findings of
fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long
as such findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of
an appellate court, like this Court, to weigh once more the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrativeagency in respect of sufficiency of evidence. 11 In the
present case, in any event, after examination of the record
of this case, we conclude that the decision of the Civil
Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the
administrative charges prepared against him, is supported
by substantial evidence.
In Resolution No. 94-0533, the Commission drew the
following conclusions in respect of the charges against
petitioner Rubenecia:
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I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES
AND REGULATIONS
The records show that Rubenecia
committed the said offense. He himself
admitted that he did not accomplish his
DTR but this was upon the suggestion of
the Administrative Officer. Rubenecia
cannot use as an excuse the alleged
suggestion of an Administrative Officer.As the principal of a national high School,
he is expected to know the basic civil
service law, rules, and regulations.
II DISHONESTY
The Commission finds Rubenecia liable.
He was charged for misrepresenting that
he was on "Official Travel" to Baguio City
to attend a three-week seminar and
making it appear in his CSC Form No. 7
for the month of October 1988 that the
has a perfect attendance for that month.Rubenecia in order to rebut the same
simply reiterated previous allegation that
he attended the SEDP Training in Baguio
City during the questioned months
without even an attempt on his part to
adduce evidence documentary or
testimonial that would attest to the truth
of his allegation that he was indeed in
Baguio during those weeks for training
purposes. A mere allegation cannot
obviously prevail over a more direct and
positive statement of Celedonio Layon,
School Division Superintendent, Divisionof Northern Samar, when the latter
certified that he had no official knowledge
of the alleged "official travel" of
Rubenecia. Moreover, verification with
the Bureau of Secondary Schools reveals
that no training seminar for school
principal was conducted by DECS during
that time. It was also proven by records
that he caused one Mrs. Cecilia vestra to
render service as Secondary School
Teacher from January 19, 1990 to August
30, 1991 without any duly issued
appointment by the appointing authority.
III. NEPOTISM
With respect to the charge of Nepotism,
Rubenecia alleged that he is not the
appointing authority with regard to the
appointment of his brother-in-law as
Utilityman but merely a recommending
authority. With this statement, the
Commission finds Rubenecia guilty. It
should be noted that under the provision
of Sec. 59, of the 1987 Administrative
Code, the recommending authority is also
prohibited from recommending the
appointment to a non-teaching position of
his relatives within the prohibited degree.
IV. OPPRESSION
Rubenecia is also guilty of Oppression. He
did not give on time the money benefitsdue to Ms. Leah Rebadulla and Mr.
Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers
of CNHS, specifically their salary
differentials for July to December 1987,
their salaries for the month of May and
half of June 1988; their proportional
vacation salaries for the semester of
1987-1988, and the salary of Mr. Tafalla
for the month of June, 1987. Rubenecia
did not even attempt to present
countervailing evidence. Without being
specifically denied, they are deemed
admitted by Rubenecia.
V INSUBORDINATION
He is not liable for Insubordination
arising from his alleged refusal to obey
the "Detail Order" by filing a sick leave
and vacation leave successively. The
records show that the two applications
for leave filed by Rubenecia were duly
approved by proper official, hence it
cannot be considered an act of
Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia
when he incurred absences based on anapproved application for leave of absence
Rubenecia is therefore found guilty of
Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and
Violations of Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the Commission hereby
resolves to find Ruble Rubenecia guilty of
Dishonesty, Nepotism, Oppression and
Violation of Civil Service Rules andRagulations. Accordingly, he is meted, out
the penalty of dismissal from the
service. 12
We find no basis for overturning the above
conclusions as the product merely of arbitrary
whims and caprice or of bad faith and malice.
We conclude that petitioner Rubenecia has failed to show
grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondent Commission
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in issuing its Resolution No. 93-2387 dated 29 June 1993
and Resolution No. 94-0533 dated 25 January 1994.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition
for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 112309 July 28, 1994
NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO, ANDRES DIZON, TOMAS F.
FALCONITIN and ADAP, Mediator Arbiters, National
Capital Region, Department of Labor and
Employment, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as
Chairman, Civil Service Commission; RAMON P.
ERENETA, JR. and THELMA P. GAMINDE, in theircapacities as Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission; and HON. MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in
her capacity as Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment, respondents.
Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REGALADO,J.:
The present petition for certiorari seeks to annul: (a)
Resolution No. 93-4480 1of the Civil Service Commission,
dated October 12, 1993, which declared the reassignment
of petitioners valid and legal; (b) the Order, dated July 26,
1993, 2of the Secretary of Labor, Hon. Ma. Nieves R.
Confesor, placing petitioners under preventive suspension
for ninety (90) days pending investigation of the charge
against them for gross insubordination; and (c) the Order,
dated October 25, 1993, 3of the said Secretary of Labor
finding petitioners guilty of two counts of grossinsubordination and accordingly suspending them for one
(1) year.
Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the
National Capital Region and, as such, were discharging
their duties as hearing officers when respondent Labor
Secretary Confessor issued on May 26, 1993 Memorandum
Order No. 4 4reassigning several med-arbiters, including
herein petitioners, which reads as follows:
In the interest of the service and in order
to expedite the resolution of inter-union
and intra-union cases, the followingassignment of
Med-Arbiters is hereby being made
effective immediately:
Appeals and Review Unit, OS:
A
n
d
r
e
Bureau of Labor Relations:
Paterno Adap
National Capital Region
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i
g
o
n
A
n
g
e
li
T
u
y
a
y
Region IV:
Anastacio Bactin
xxx xxx xxx
Med-Arbiters Brigida Fadrigon, Angeli Tuyay and
Anastacio Bactin promptly complied with the
memorandum order. However, petitioners, in a letter
dated June 7, 1993, 5sought the reconsideration and recall
of said memorandum order on the ground that their
reassignments were made without their consent, which
was accordingly tantamount to removal without just cause.
On June 23, 1993, respondent Secretary of Labor issued
another Memorandum 6declaring and clarifying that
Memorandum Order No. 4 contemplates, not a transfer as
erroneously alleged, but a mere reassignment wherein the
consent of petitioners is not required, and ordering
petitioners to report to their new assignments and to turn
over all records of cases and other documents in their
possession.
Petitioners, however, refused to comply and instead wrote
another letter, dated June 28, 1993, 7seeking the
reconsideration of Memorandum Order No. 4 and the
Memorandum of June 23, 1993, on the ground that the
same were issued in violation of their rights to security of
tenure and due process of law.
Acting on petitioners' letter, respondent Secretary issued
another Memorandum, dated July 7, 1993, 8denying their
request and directing them to show cause why they should
not be administratively charged for gross insubordination.
On July 12, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal 9with the
Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), and a supplemental
appeal 10dated July 19, 1993.
On July 15, 1993, petitioners submitted their explanation
in compliance with the Memorandum of July 7, 1993,
arguing that they could not accept their reassignment
considering that the same is unconstitutional, illegal and
without valid cause; that quasi-judicial officers may not be
transferred or reassigned except on grounds provided by
law; and that the law provides that pending their appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, their transfer or
reassignment should be held in abeyance.
On July 26, 1993, petitioners were formally charged with
gross insubordination and, pending investigation, were
placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days.
On October 12, 1993, the CSC issued its questioned
resolution finding the reassignment of petitioners valid
and legal and, consequently, dismissed their appeal for
lack of merit.
On October 25, 1993, respondent Secretary issued another
Order finding petitioners guilty of two counts of gross
insubordination and accordingly suspending them from
the service for one (1) year.
Hence, this petition assailing the foregoing resolution and
orders.
Petitioners first contend that the CSC has no jurisdiction to
review on appeal the aforestated Memorandum Order No.
4 as the same is vested in the MSPB pursuant to Section 13
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). There is no merit in the argument.
Resolution No. 93-2387 11of the CSC, which took effect on
July 1, 1993, declared the abolition of the MSPB in order tostreamline the operations of the CSC, so as to achieve a
speedier delivery of administrative justice and economical
operation without impairing due process and the
substantive rights of the parties in administrative cases.
Henceforth, decisions in administrative cases involving
officials and employees of the civil service appealable to
the Commission, including personnel actions, shall be
appealed directly to the Commission and not to the MSPB,
and those cases which have been appealed or brought
directly to the MSPB shall be elevated to the Commission
for final resolution. In the present case, petitioner's appeal
was filed only on July 12, 1993 when Resolution No. 93-
2387 was already in effect. Perforce, their appeal wasconsidered filed before the CSC.
Petitioners claim that there was malice, bad faith, undue
influence and partiality in the issuance of the order for
reassignment and its affirmance by the CSC. They aver that
there was undue influence exerted by respondent
Secretary and that the CSC acted with partiality because
respondent Secretary and CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas are
personal friends, aside from the fact that during the
pendency of their appeal with the CSC, the latter issued
legal opinions through its Director for Legal Affairs
concerning the very issues involved in the appeal even
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before the same could be officially resolved. Furthermore,
petitioner Fernando specifically asserts that the
reassignment was actually in retaliation for the
independent stance he has taken in Case No. OD-M-9301-
028 (APSOTEU vs. EEI) pending before him wherein he
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of registration of
APSOTEU. These allegations of petitioners should be
considered as mere speculations and conjectures, no
substantial evidence having been presented in support
thereof.
The reassignment of petitioners was made "in the interest
of the service and in order to expedite the resolution of
inter-union and intra-union cases." That the order was
issued for this purpose is even presumed under Civil
Service rules where there is no proof of harassment,
coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons therefor.
Additionally, public respondents have in their favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties which petitioners failed to rebut when they did not
present evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith.
Bad faith can never be presumed; it must be proved byclear and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in
the case at bar. The circumstances attending the issuance
of Memorandum Order No. 4 do not in any way reveal any
malicious intent on the part of respondent Secretary. On
the contrary, we consider her actions as a valid exercise of
her power and authority as department head to take and
enforce personnel actions.
It is likewise argued that the reassignment of petitioners is
tantamount to their constructive dismissal because it was
effected without their consent. In the case ofBentain vs.
Court of Appeals, 12we categorically held that a
reassignment in good faith and in the interest of thegovernment service is permissible and valid even without
the employee's prior consent.
The reassignment is also challenged as being illegal
because it involves a reduction in rank and status, and it
violates the right to security of tenure and to due process
of law. Petitioners contend that with the reassignment,
their functions were changed from those of a hearing
officer to the drafting of decisions appealed to the
Secretary. In their view, they were in effect demoted.
A demotion, under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, is
defined as the movement from one position to another
involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution
in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may
not involve reduction in salary. On the other hand, Section
10 of the same rule defines a reassignment as the
movement of an employee from one organizational unit to
another in the same department or agency which does not
involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. A demotion,
therefore, involves the issuance of an appointment.
In the case at bar, it is clear and undisputed that no new
appointments were issued to herein petitioners. Hence, it
is incorrect for them to claim that they were demoted.
Moreover, petitioners failed to sufficiently establish that
there was a reduction in their salary. They would want to
suggest that there was a diminution in rank in the sense
that their present assignment as drafters of decisions on
appeal to the Secretary are subject to review by higher
authority, whereas in their former assignment as hearing
officers, they themselves render judgment. Petitionersseem to forget that the decisions of hearing officers are
also subject to review by the National Labor Relations
Commission. Thus unmasked, their argument has
definitely no leg to stand on.
Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the
National Capital Region. They were not, however,
appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the
Department of Labor in the National Capital Region
(DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned
from one organizational unit to another of the same agency
where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their
services may be used more effectively. As such they canneither claim a vested right to the station to which they
were assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners'
reassignment is not a transfer for they were not removed
from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given
new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows,
therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their
reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in
order.
Whatever alleged procedural infirmity may have rendered
defective the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 4 has
been cured when petitioners filed two motions forreconsideration seeking to recall the same. The two
motions were duly considered, discussed and resolved by
respondent Secretary. Petitioners were thereby afforded
full opportunity to present their arguments against the
issuance of said order.
Finally, we do not deem it appropriate to rule on the
merits of the order issued on July 26, 1993 by respondent
Secretary preventively suspending petitioners for ninety
(90) days, as well as her subsequent order dated October
25, 1993 finding petitioners guilty of insubordination and
imposing on them the penalty of suspension of one (1)
year. Evidently, herein petitioners, in asking us to resolvethe issues thereon in their present recourse, have
overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that the same
are clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
On the first aspect, petitioners allowed the 90-day period
ofpreventive suspension to lapse without appealing from
the Order of July 26, 1993. In fact, the investigation which
necessitated such suspension has long since been
concluded and thereafter resulted in the condemnatory
Order of October 25, 1993. Hence, they are now clearly
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estopped from invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court in a belated attempt to seek redress from the first
Order.
Secondly, as stated earlier, the Order dated October 25,
1993 imposing a punitive suspension of one year on herein
petitioners cannot be the proper subject of a petition
for certiorari for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Presidential Decree No. 807 and Executive Order
No. 292 explicitly provide that administrative disciplinarycases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension
for more than thirty (30) days are appealable to the Civil
Service Commission. 13Not having fully exhausted the
remedy available to them, petitioners cannot resort to
their present judicial action which is both premature at
this juncture and proscribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Neither do we find any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
could be applicable to the instant case, nor have
petitioners essayed any submission on that score.
WHEREFORE, no jurisdictional error or any grave abuse of
discretion having been shown to have flawed or taintedthe impugned resolution of respondent Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission or the challenged orders of
respondent Secretary of Labor, the present petition
for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 159940 February 16, 2005
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES,J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside and
nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) dated August 28, 2003.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
By letter1dated March 7, 1994 addressed to then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, the CSC approved the
Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office
of the Ombudsman (petitioner) including that for Graft
Investigation Officer III. The Qualification Standards forsaid position are:
EDUCATION: Bachelor of Laws
EXPERIENCE: 5 years of experience in the practice of law,
counseling, investigation/ prosecution of cases, hearings of
administrative/ criminal cases, legal research or other
related work.
TRAINING: 24 hours of relevant training
ELIGIBILITY: RA 1080 (Bar)
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) subsequently
advised the Ombudsman, by letter of May 29, 1996,2that
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s.1994, the
position of Graft Investigation Officer III, among other
positions in petitioner therein mentioned, was classified as
a Career Executive Service (CES) position, hence, governed
by the rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility,
appointment to CES ranks, and performance evaluation,
among other things.1awphi1.nt
On September 29, 1999, the members of the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), namely: the Commissionon Elections (COMELEC), CSC, Commission on Audit (COA),
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), petitioner and this
Court adopted Joint Resolution No. 623reading:
JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 62
WHEREAS, the independence of the members of the
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) is
guaranteed by the Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitution has several provisions that
guarantee and protect such independence, among which
are Sections 4 and 5 of Article IX, A thereof, which
respectively grant them Fiscal Autonomy and authorize
them to appoint their own officials and employees in
accordance with law;
WHEREAS, Section 7(3), Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 enumerates exclusively
and restrictively the specific positions under theCareer Executive Service, all the holders of which are
appointed by the President and are required to have
CES eligibility;
WHEREAS, in case of Home Insurance Guaranty
Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission and Daniel Cruz,
G.R. No. 95450, dated 19 March 1993, the Supreme Court
nullified the classification by the CSC of the position of
Corporate Vice President as belonging to the third level of
the Career Executive Services;
WHEREAS, the Court declared in the above cited case that
said position is not among those enumerated by law asfalling under the third level, nor one of those identified by
the CES Board as equivalent rank to those listed by law,
nor was the incumbent appointed by the President;
WHEREAS, in the case of Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T.
Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, dated 18 December 1990, the
Supreme Court ruled that "Article IX-A, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution expressly describes all Constitutional
Commissions as Independent. Although essentiallyexecutive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their
respective functions."
WHEREAS, only the Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions, the Commission on Human
Rights, Justices and Judges, as well as the Ombudsman and
his Deputies, are appointed by the President;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commissions, the
Supreme Court, the Commission on Human Rights, and
the Office of the Ombudsman are empowered to
appoint officials and employees to positions belonging
to first level up to third level of their respective
agencies, and that they are notpresidential
appointees;
WHEREAS, Section 22 par. 1, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V, of the Administrative Code of 1987, provides in
part that "[t]he degree of qualifications of an officer or
employee shall be determined by the appointing authority
on the basis of the qualification standard for the particular
positions[,]" and par. 2 thereof provides that [t]he
establishment, administration and maintenance of
qualification standards shall be the responsibility of the
department or agency, with the assistance and approval of
the Civil Service Commission;"
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/feb2005/gr_159940_2005.html#fnt1 -
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NOW, THEREFORE, the CFAG jointly resolves:
1. Thatall third level positions under each
member agency are career positions;
2. That, where appropriate and proper, taking into
consideration the organizational set-up of the
agency concerned, the overall screening and
selection process for these positions shall be a
collegial undertaking, provided that theappointment paper shall be signed only by the
Head of the member agency;
3. That all career third level positions
identified and classified by each of the
member agency arenotembraced within the
Career Executive Service (CES) and as such
shall notrequire Career Service Executive
Eligibility (CSEE) or Career Executive Service
(CES) Eligibility for purposes of permanent
appointment;
4. That should CFAG member agencies develop
their respective eligibility requirements for the
third level positions, the test of fitness shall be
jointly undertaken by the CFAG member agencies
in coordination with the CSC;
5. That in case the test of fitness shall be in written
form, the CSC shall prepare the questionnaires and
conduct the examinations designed to ascertain
the general aptitude of the examinees while the
member agency shall likewise prepare the
questionnaires and conduct in conjunction with
the CSC, the examinations to determine the
technical capabilities and expertise of the
examinees suited to its functions;
6. That the resulting eligibility acquired after
passing the aforementioned examination shall
appropriate for permanent appointment only to
third level positions in the CFAG member
agencies;
7. That the member agencies shall regularly
coordinate with the CSC for the conferment of the
desired eligibility in accordance with this
Resolution; However this is without prejudice tothose incumbents who wish to take the Career
Service Executive Examination given by the Civil
Service Commission or the Management Aptitude
Test Battery given by the Career Executive Service
Board. (Underscoring in the original omitted;
emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)1awphi1.nt
On July 31, 2002, Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, Paul Elmer
M. Clemente and Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr. were
appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by
the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on
the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of
tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive
(CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB.
By January 2, 2003 letter to the CSC, the Ombudsman
requested for the change of status, from temporary to
permanent, of the appointments of Carandang, Clemente
and De Jesus effective December 18, 2002. Invoking the
Court of Appeals ruling in Khem N. Inok v. Hon. CorazonAlma de Leon, et al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 49699), "as affirmed by
the Supreme Court," the Ombudsman wrote:
x x x
In the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
28, 2001 on CA G.R. SP No. 49699 as affirmed by
the Supreme Court with finality on July 2, 2002 in G.R.
No. 148782 entitled Khem N. Inok vs. Civil Service
Commission, it stated in said Decision thatthe letter
and intent of the law is to circumscribe the Career
Executive Service (CES) to CES positions in the
Executive Branch of Government, and that theJudiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of
the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human
Rights are notcovered by the CES governed by the
Career Executive Service Board. Said Decision thereby
effectively granted the petition of Mr. Inok for security
of tenure as Director II of the Commission on Audit
despite the absence of a CES eligibility.4(Emphasis and
italics supplied)
The relevant portions of the cited CA decision read:
Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, provides the following
levels of position in the career service, viz:
SEC. 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.
(a) Classes of positions in the career service
appointment to which requires examinations shall
be grouped into three major levels as follows:
(1) The first level shall include clerical,
trades, crafts, and custodial service
positions which involve non-professional
or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring less than four years of collegiate
studies;
(2) The second level shall include
professional, technical, and scientific
positions which involve professional;
technical, or scientific work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief level; and
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(3) The third level shall cover positions
in the Career Executive Service.
(b) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance
to the first two levels shall be through competitive
examinations, which shall be open to those inside
and outside the service who meet the minimum
qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher
level does not require previous qualification in
a lower level. Entrance to the third level shallbe prescribed by the Career Executive Service
Board.
(c) Within the same level, no civil service
examination shall be required for promotion to a
higher position in one or more related
occupational groups. A candidate for promotion
should however, have previously passed the
examination for that level.
The last sentence of Section 7(b) of P.D. No. 807 is similar
to the provision of P.D. No. 1, Article IV, par. IV, par. 5(a), to
wit:
(a) Membership. A person who meets such managerial
experience and other requirements and passes such
examinations as may be prescribed by the Board shall be
included in the register of career service eligibles and,
upon appointment to an appropriate class in the Career
Executive Service, become an active member in the
Service. In exceptional cases, the Board may give
unassembled examinations for eligibility. The area of
recruitment shall be government-wide, with provisions to
allow qualified or outstanding men from outside the
government to enter the service.
Thus, it could be gleaned from P.D. No. 1 of the Career
Executive Service (CES), which has been [d]rafted into
Executive Order No. 292, that the letter and intent of the
law is to circumscribe the Career Executive Service to CES
positions in the Executive Branch of government. Verily,
consistent with the principle of the ejusdem generisin legal
hermeneutics, the phrase "other officers of equivalent
rank" could encompass only such persons occupying
positions in the Executive Department. In the
contemporaneous case of the The Secretary of Justice
Serafin R. Cuevas, et. al. vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal, the
Supreme Court lent credence to this postulate, viz:
Security of tenure in the career executive service is
acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The
guarantee of security of tenure to members of the
CES does not extend to the particular positions to which
they may be appointed a concept which is applicable onlyto frst and second level employees in the civil service
butto the rank to which they are appointed by the
President. x x x
Prescinding from the foregoing disquisition, We are loathe
to stamp our imprimaturto the Commissions stance that
the "positions of Director III, including that of the COA,
belong to the third level. Hence, appointees thereto should
possess the x x x Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility
in accordance with the Qualification Standard of the said
position."
Ineluctably, the judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the
Commission on Human Rights are not covered by the CES
governed by the CESB. The power of these constitutionaloffices to appoint their own officers and employees is
mainly intended to safeguard their independence, which is
the same power of appointment of all officials and
employees of the judiciary granted to the Supreme
Court.l^vvphi1.netAs commented by a noted
constitutionalist:
The authority of the Supreme Court to appoint its own
officials and employees is another measure intended to
safeguard the independence of the judiciary. However, the
Courts appointing authority must be exercised inaccordance with the Civil Service Law.
Irrefragrably, inherent in the power to appoint is the
power to administratively supervise the officials and
employees in the constitutional offices in the same
manner that the express power to appoint carries with it
the implied power to remove the personnel appointed in
said offices. x x x
x x x
Parenthetically, the power to administratively supervise is
designed to strengthen the independence of the
constitutional offices. A respected authority on political
law underscored the multifarious factors that are integral
to the independence of the constitutional offices, scilicet:
There are several factors that preserve the independence
of the three Commissions:
x x x
(3) Their appointment must be in a permanent capacity.
(4) The Commissions enjoy their own fiscal autonomy.
The independence of these constitutional offices serves to
exempt their respective officials and employees from the
coverage of the CES under the administrative authority of
the CESB. to be sure, they are embraced by the civil service
system. However, the administrative functions belong to
the constitutional offices, instead of the CESB in the same
manner that the Supreme Court administers the judiciaryscivil service.
x x x5(Italics and emphasis in the original;
underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied;
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citations omitted)
It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the
meantime conferred with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003.6
Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by
Resolution No. 02-03 dated August 18, 2003 including
Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified to
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. TheOmbudsman thereupon requested the approval of the
proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified
positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position, the
Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft
Investigation Officer III.
Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of
August 28, 2003, changed the status of Carandangs and
Clementes appointments to permanent effective June 6,2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that
he "has not met the eligibility requirements." The
pertinent portion of the questioned Resolution reads:
Relevant to the matter are Sections 4 and 6, Rule III and
Rule VI, respectively, of the Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Action, which state:
SEC. 4. Nature of Appointment. The nature of appointment
shall be as follows:
x x x
i. Change of status:
1. temporary to permanent the appointment issued to atemporary employee when he acquires the appropriate
eligibility or becomes fully qualified for the position to
which he is appointed.
x x x
SEC. 6. In cases where the appointee fully qualifies for the
position to which he is temporarily appointed, the
appointing authority shall no longer issue an appointment
for change of status from temporary to permanent. Upon
the appointees presentation of the required document/s,such change may be effected as a footnote on the
temporary appointment issued, copy furnished the
Commission.
It is explicitly provided therein that the change of status
from temporary to permanent can be effected only
once the appointee becomes fully qualified to the
position to which he is appointed.
x x x
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in the Inok
case cannot be made the basis for changing the
employment status of De Jesus. Let it be stressed that
nowhere in the aforesaid decision states that the Office of
the Ombudsman or the other constitutional agencies
mentioned therein are exempt or are not covered by the
Civil Service Law and Rules. On the contrary, the same
decision declares that these bodies are covered by the civil
service system. Basic is the rule that all appointments in
the government service, particularly the career service,must be in accordance with the qualification requirements
as laid down under existing civil service rules and
regulations. Such policy is in line with the Commissionsmandate to professionalize the civil service. The
requirements spelled out in the Qualification
Standards (QS) Manual are designed to determine the
fitness of the appointee in a certain position. These
requirements are indispensable in order to satisfy the
Constitutional mandate that appointment in the civil
service shall be made according to merit and fitness.
While it is true that constitutional agencies such as the
Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to appoint itsofficials in accordance with law, such law does not
necessarily imply that their appointment will not be
subject to Civil Service Law and Rules; otherwise, these
independent bodies will arrogate upon themselves a
power that properly belongs to the Civil Service
Commission. Had the intention of the framers of the
Constitution been to isolate and grant full independence to
Constitutional Commissions in the matter of appointments
it would have been so provided. But that is not the case.
the Philippine Constitution provides: "The Constitutional
Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees
in accordance with law" (Article IX-A, Section 4).
Specifically, Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution statesthat "The officials, shall be appointed by the
Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law." And since
all matters pertaining to appointments are within the
realm of expertise to the CSC, all laws, rules and
regulations it issues on appointments must be complied
with.
The Constitution speaks of only one civil service, to
encompass the first, second, and third levels. It is subject
to the same set of laws, rules and regulations in the
manner of observing and ensuring that the merit and
fitness principle, unless otherwise exempted therefrom by
the Constitution or law, is the guiding factor in issuingappointments. Hence, until and unless there is a law or
rule exempting one category of public officials from the
test in determining merit and fitness, all levels in the
government are deemed subject to it. Simply put, the third
level eligibility requirement for third level officials in all
agencies is mandatory.
Further, let it be clarified that the ruling enunciated in Inok
case was with regard to the authority of the Career
Executive Service Board to prescribe and to administer the
Career Executive Service Eligibility and it did not
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specifically nor particularly take away the functions of the
Civil Service Commission. This is evident from the
aforequoted decision in the Inok case, to wit:
The independence of these constitutional offices serves to
exempt their respective officials and employees from the
coverage of the CES under the administrative authority of
the CESB. To be sure, they are embraced by the civil
service system. However, the administrative functions
belong to the constitutional offices, instead of the CESB inthe manner that the Supreme Court administers the
judiciarys civil service.
Pursuant to the QS Manual, a Graft Investigation
Officer III position is a career service position
requiring a Career Service Eligibility or Career Service
Executive Eligibility. Considering that De Jesus has not
met the eligibility requirement, the change of status of
his appointment from temporary to permanent cannot
be effected. As held in Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA
235:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issuedonly to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed. Achacoso did not. Atbest, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary.
x x x (Underscoring partly in the original and partly
supplied; emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following
ground:
THE GENERAL POWER OF RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (CSC) TO ADMINISTER THE CIVIL SERVICE
CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY AND VALIDLY CURTAIL
THE SPECIFIC DISCRETIONARY POWER OF
APPOINTMENT, INCLUDING THE GRANT OF SECURITY OF
TENURE, BY THE OMBUDSMAN AS AN INDEPENDENT
CONSTITUTIONAL BODY IN FAVOR OF THE LATTERSOWN OFFICIALS, AND ANY SUCH CURTAILMENT BY THE
RESPONDENT CSC, AS IN ITS IMPUGNED RESOLUTION
NO. 030919 DATED 26 AUGUST 2003, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LEGALLY INFIRM.
Petitioner contends that the CSC misrea