Ethnopolitics Papers No 25 Final Version · Ethnopolitics!Papers!|No.25!!!! ! 3!! !! ! 1....

Ethnopolitics Papers

June 2013 | No. 25

Socio-‐Political and Socio-‐Economic Causes of Conflict Escalation in the

North Caucasus

Huseyn Aliyev

PhD Candidate | Department of Politics, University of Otago

E-‐mail address for correspondence: [email protected]

Abstract

Escalation of armed conflict in the Russian North Caucasus has dramatically intensified during the last five years, resulting in the rise of conflict-‐related violence in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabar-‐dino–Balkaria. This article examines the causes of growing instability in the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. While the spill-‐over of violence from Chechnya, along with the spread of radical religious ideology, ethnic nationalism and secessionism are generally acknowledged as the key causes of conflict escalation, the socio-‐economic and socio-‐political aspects often remain ne-‐glected. Drawing insights from representative surveys conducted in the conflict-‐affected region during the last eight years, this study suggests that factors other than radical Islam and separatist aspirations can be held accountable for the spread and escalation of violence in the North Cauca-‐sus. Of these factors this paper argues that social insecurity, systemic corruption, a lack of popular representation and the lawlessness of authorities are the key determinants of conflict intensifica-‐tion in the region.

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ISSN: 2048-‐075X

Ethnopolitics Papers is an initiative of the Exeter Centre for Ethnopolitical Studies and published jointly with the Specialist Group Ethnopolitics of the Political Studies Association of the UK.

Edited by Dr Annemarie Peen Rodt, Roskilde University Dr Anaïd Flesken, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg Gareth Curless, University of Exeter We welcome contributions and comments on Ethnopolitics Papers to [email protected].

Ethnopolitics Papers are available online at http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopoliticspapers.htm

Ethnopolitics Papers | No. 25

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1. Introduction

On October 31, 2007 the Chechen warlord, Doku Umarov, announced the creation of the Caucasus

Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz) -‐ a radical Islamic state which was to replace the Chechen Republic of

Ichkeria. The establishment of the new state not only marked the end of the Chechen national-‐

liberation struggle but was also followed by an unprecedented rise in conflict-‐related violence in

Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria. By abandoning the dream of Chechen independ-‐

ence, which became increasingly remote following the 1999 Russian invasion of Chechnya, in fa-‐

vour of a Sharia-‐governed state encompassing most of the North Caucasus, Umarov formally com-‐

pleted the Islamization of the North Caucasus started by his predecessor, Shamil Basayev. Since

2008 the escalation of violence that has followed the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate has

characterized by an increase in conflict-‐related casualties and growing instability across the region.

However, it remains doubtful whether the tenets of the radical Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which

lies at the core of insurgents’ ideology, and the desire for an independent state from Russia ruled

by the Sharia law are the main driving causes for hundreds of the North Caucasus’ residents to join

the Caucasus Emirate. While the bulk of academic literature on recent conflict escalation in the

North Caucasus prioritizes religious sectarianism and ethnic separatism as the key causes of the

increase in violence in Chechnya’s neighbours – Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria –

this article stresses the significance of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic factors as determinants

of conflict escalation in the region. Drawing evidence from representative surveys conducted in

the North Caucasus from 2004 to 2012, this study suggests that rampant violations of human

rights, lack of political representation, widespread unemployment and systemic corruption are the

key causes of political violence in the North Caucasus. This paper argues that the ongoing armed

conflict in the region is much more than simply a spill-‐over of violence from Chechnya and growing

religious sectarianism. Rather, the dramatic decline in human security and civil liberties, in con-‐

junction with the nepotism of the authorities, population increases and pressing socio-‐economic

problems in the North Caucasus’s societies provide a consistent flow of recruits to the militant

underground.


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2. Data

This study is based on an analysis of representative public surveys administered in different parts

of the North Caucasus from 2004 to 2012. The bulk of survey data employed by this paper is bor-‐

rowed from region-‐wide surveys conducted by the Prague-‐based media group Caucasus Times.

Two rounds of surveys conducted by the Caucasus Times from 2004 to 2006 and from 2007 to

2008 in Adygea, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino–Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia and

North Ossetia are cited by this paper.1 The average survey sample size was 3,800 participants for

the first round and 6,200 respondents for surveys in 2007–08. Following this, the project utilizes

the data from public surveys conducted by the Samara-‐based Russian NGO Social Research Fund

and the Moscow-‐based institute of social marketing Insomar, which were carried out in all regions

of the North Caucasus during 2011 and 2012. The survey’s sample size was 3,500 people. Fur-‐

thermore, this article borrowed survey data from an independent analytical-‐news magazine Dosh

which conducted public polls in Dagestan (2,117 respondents) and Ingushetia (1,500 participants)

in 2011. This paper also incorporates survey data collected by Gerber and Mendelson (2009) in

Dagestan, Kabardino–Balkaria and North Ossetia during 2006 with a sample size of around 1,200

people. Lastly, additional survey data was taken from the Caucasus Times ‘Corruption in the North

Caucasus’ 2008–09 nation-‐wide surveys from six republics of the North Caucasus (2,400 respond-‐

ents). Apart from the analysis of survey data, this study also relies on reports from the North Cau-‐

casus-‐based independent news agency Caucasus Knot (Kavkaz Uzel) and scrutinizes the recent

academic literature and reports by international organizations on the North Caucasus conflict.

3. Theoretical Dimension

To theoretically classify the ongoing armed conflict in the North Caucasus, this paper employs the

term ‘new war’, coined by Kaldor (2007). A new war is a typical intra-‐state post-‐Cold War conflict

waged by loosely organized militias relying on gratuitous and often uncontrolled violence. Kaldor

(2007: 39) emphasized that in new wars:

1 Due to this paper’s emphasis on conflict-‐affected parts of the North Caucasus, the bulk of data employed by this study is on Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria. Besides, North Ossetia and Karachay-‐Cherkessia – less violent republics of the North Caucasus – are also occasionally mentioned.


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direct fighting between the contestants is rare and most violence is directed against civil-‐ians. They are also wars in which the manipulation of food supply, loot and pillage, and the control of valuable commodities are built into the functioning of a war economy.

In contrast, ‘old wars’ are inter-‐state conflicts fought ‘over collectively articulated, broad, even

noble causes, such as social change’ (Kalyvas 2001: 102). As argued by Ballentine (2003), new wars

are often fought not only over political ideology but mostly over material ‘greed’ and domestic

‘grievances’. However, this study attempts to move beyond the greed and grievance theories of

conflict escalation by suggesting that the recent increase of violence in the North Caucasus cannot

only be explained by profit-‐seeking motives and the ‘crude resource accumulation’ (ibid: 30). Even

less probable are the explanations seeking to build a link between the insurgency in the Caucasus

and the global ‘War on Terror’ (Bodansky 2007). This article also rejects religious sectarianism as a

main cause of conflict escalation in the region. From a theoretical perspective, the goal of this

study is to suggest that it is a combination of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic variables that en-‐

courages the growth of conflict-‐related violence.

Apart from being a new war, the ongoing violence in the North Caucasus is also a case of a region-‐

al or an ‘outward’ conflict spill-‐over from Chechnya. The concept of conflict spill-‐over, also labelled

as contagion or diffusion, is a well-‐known phenomenon in conflict studies (Starr 1985; Simowitz

1998). According to Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 98–99): ‘“Internal” wars have external effects on

the region through the spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links with terrorism, disruptive

floods of refugees, and spill-‐over into regional politics when neighbouring states are dragged in or

the same people straddle several states.’ Hammarström (1994: 265) defines this as ‘conflict gen-‐

eration’, whereby an existing or ongoing ‘military conflict may trigger the onset of a new military

conflict’. Sequential conflicts – occurring as a result of regional spill-‐over – are explained in the

literature as an outcome of both regionalization and globalization of politics (Kaldor 2006; Buhaug

2008). The 1990s War in Balkans and conflicts around the African Great Lakes are often offered as

representative examples of conflict spill-‐over processes (Buhaug 2008: 217).

Numerous studies on conflict spill-‐over have examined different patterns of conflict expansion

ranging from internationalization of domestic violence in Darfur (Maio 2010) to the potential of

conflict diffusion in case of the Arab Spring (Saideman 2012). Despite having defined the current

North Caucasus’s insurgency as a spill-‐over conflict, it must be emphasized that the present-‐day


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conflict has a life of its own and is no longer an extension of its diffusion source – the Chechen

Wars. Instead, as it will be shown in the latter parts of this paper, the intensity of conflict-‐related

violence is much higher in areas relatively recently affected by the conflict, such as Dagestan and

Kabardino–Balkaria, rather than in the traditional ‘hot spot’ of Chechnya. To explain the causes of

conflict intensification in the North Caucasus, this analysis begins with an examination of conflict

development and evolution over the past ten years.

4. Conflict Dynamics

By 2002, with the end of its active combat phase, the Second Chechen War began to transform

into a protracted low intensity guerrilla conflict fought between Chechen rebels and Russian fed-‐

eral troops, with the latter also being supported by pro-‐Moscow Chechen fighters. No longer ca-‐

pable of conducting large-‐scale operations, Chechen militants were divided between the ever-‐

decreasing number of supporters of the president, Aslan Maskhadov, and the Islamists, led by

Shamil Basayev. While most of the hostilities still took place within Chechnya, the year 2004

brought significant changes within the hierarchy of Chechen militants and their determination to

spread the anti-‐Moscow insurgency to neighbouring North Caucasian republics. First, with the

death of a prominent warlord, Ruslan Gelayev, in February 2004, Basayev became the most influ-‐

ential warlord in Chechnya. Second, the killing of Maskhadov by federal troops in March deter-‐

mined the fate of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria: Maskhadov’s successor, Abdul-‐Khalim Sadul-‐

layev, a little known (outside of Chechnya) Islamic scholar, had neither charisma nor ability to con-‐

trol the insurgency. There is little doubt that by the end of 2004 the Chechen insurgency not only

adopted the ideology of fundamentalist jihadism as a replacement to national secessionism but

also began sending shock waves across the region. Organized by Basayev, the Moscow Nord–Ost

theatre and the Beslan school hostage takings, in conjunction with the high profile militant attacks

on government installations in Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria during 2005, marked the start of

the Chechen conflict’s spill-‐over. Militant underground communities, the so-‐called jamaa’ts, were

sprawling across Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino–Balkaria. Realizing the potential of a region-‐

wide insurgency and understanding the limits of the Chechen national liberation struggle, Basayev

steadily embarked on transforming the Chechen-‐centred separatist movement into an interna-‐

tional all-‐Caucasian Islamist insurgency. In 2005, Basayev and Sadullayev announced the opening


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of a ‘Caucasus Front’ designed to spread the anti-‐Kremlin insurgency to all Muslim nations of the

North Caucasus. Both Basayev and Sadullayev died in 2006 leaving the task of organizing the all-‐

Caucasus jihad to Sadullayev’s vice-‐president, Doku Umarov. In 2007, on inheriting from Sadul-‐

layev the post of the president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Umarov single-‐handedly abol-‐

ished the Republic of Ichkeria in a favour of an Islamic state – Caucasus Emirate. Umarov declared

himself the head or amir of the Caucasus Emirate. Although the exact borders of the Emirate re-‐

mained unclear, Umarov stated that the Emirate: ‘should include all historical Muslim lands within

and beyond the Caucasus’ and ‘it is a state that is far more real than all artificial colonial borders of

today.’2 Administratively the Caucasus Emirate is composed of seven provinces or vilayets of Dage-‐

stan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino–Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia, North Ossetia and a part of

Stavropol Krai. Less charismatic and popular than Basayev, Umarov nevertheless managed to re-‐

ceive pledges of loyalty from all jamaa’t leaders across the North Caucasus. Though it is widely

assumed that Umarov’s ability to control or even influence insurgents outside and within Chech-‐

nya3 is nominal, he claimed to have organized a number of high-‐profile terrorist attacks beyond

the borders of the North Caucasus.4

However, it is in the North Caucasus where the creation of the Caucasus Emirate brought the most

notable changes. While the level of militant activities in Chechnya was not unlike the situation in

2002–06, the escalation of violence in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria reached a

record high level. As observed by Kuchins et al. (2011: 3): ‘from August 2008 onward, the levels of

violence recorded in Chechnya were either less than or equal to the violence levels in its neigh-‐

bouring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan; indeed Chechnya’s numbers even dropped below

those of Kabardino–Balkaria in 2010.’ A report by the Caucasus Knot confirms that the levels of

conflict-‐related violence almost doubled in Ingushetia and tripled in Dagestan and Kabardino–

Balkaria from 2008 to 2010. Whether or not the efforts of Basayev and Umarov in spreading the

Chechen insurgency to the rest of the region were successful, the numbers of militant attacks in

2 The official statement by Doku Umarov on the declaration of the Caucasus Emirate was released on 20 November 2007 (Kavkazcenter.com, 22 November, 2007). 3 In August 2010, following a dispute with Umarov, a number of Chechen rebel commanders withdrew their allegiance to Umarov as amir of the Caucasus Emirate. However by the end of the year most of the renegade Chechen leaders reconciled with Umarov pledging their allegiance to his leadership. 4 The most prominent terrorist acts claimed by the Caucasus Emirate are the bombing of a high speed train Nevsky Express in 2009, the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings and the 2011 Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing.


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Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria serve as obvious evidence of conflict spill-‐over. Be-‐

sides, if the 2004–06 militant activities outside Chechnya were mostly organized and financed by

Chechen warlords, the militant activities from 2008 onward were domestically prepared and fund-‐

ed (Tlisova 2009). With the expansion of insurgent jamaa’ts in numbers, militant groups in Ingush-‐

etia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria no longer required Chechen military expertise and man-‐

power. Indeed, since 2006 the militant underground in these three republics survived all attempts

by the federal forces to eliminate them. Unlike the insurgency in Ingushetia, which was seriously

weakened by the arrest of its long-‐time leader, Amir Magas in 2010, the insurgent jamaa’ts of Da-‐

gestan and Kabardino–Balkaria proved to be resilient and adaptive. In spite of the death or cap-‐

ture of many of its leaders throughout 2010–11, as of 2012 Dagestan’s insurgency remains the

strongest numerically and the most active in terms of attacks on security personnel, numbers of

law enforcement members killed and injured, and its overall contribution to instability within the

region. For example, in Kabardino–Balkaria although the elimination of the entire leadership of the

jamaa’t (April–March 2011) temporarily halted the insurgency, it did not undermine its overall

capacity. By summer 2012, the Kabardino–Balkaria’s insurgents had re-‐organized, replenished

their ranks and stepped up the attacks.

Figure 1: Conflict-‐related Deaths in North Caucasus, 2008–2012 (Caucasus Knot 2012)

Conflict-related Deaths in North Caucasus, 2008-2012

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Year

Dea

ths

Total

Chechnya

Dagestan

Ingushetia

Kabardino-Balkaria


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Although the number of conflict-‐related deaths in the North Caucasus in 2012 is lower (679 peo-‐

ple) than in the previous year (750 deaths), the insurgent underground proved that elimination of

their leaders does not necessarily reduce their operational capacity. As observed by Goble (2013:

1): ‘The North Caucasus is far more unstable and more threatening to Moscow’s control [in 2012]

than it was a year ago’. Indeed, based on reports by the Caucasus Knot (2013), in Dagestan the

number of people killed during the conflict in 2012 (405 deaths) remained very similar to 2011

(413 deaths) and continues to sustain the upward growth in numbers of conflict-‐related deaths

which numbered 378 in 2011 and 300 in 2010. Moreover, in 2012 the violence began to escalate

in Ingushetia where 84 people became victims of the armed conflict, yet only 70 militants and ser-‐

vicemen were killed in 2011, in contrast to 134 deaths in 2010 (Kavkaz Uzel 2013). The increase in

militant activity in that republic is also a sign of the recovery of Ingush insurgents. In Chechnya,

despite the slight reduction in the number of people killed in 2012 (82 deaths) as compared to

2011 (95 deaths), there were more servicemen (42 people) killed than militants (28 people). If

numbers of conflict-‐related deaths for the last two years are fairly similar and hardly indicative of

the increasing strength of the North Caucasus armed underground, the growing numbers of secu-‐

rity personnel (siloviki) killed each year offers clear evidence of the insurgents’ increasing sophisti-‐

cation. For instance, in contrast to 190 military and law enforcement personnel killed in 2011, fed-‐

eral and republican siloviki lost 209 men in 2012 (ibid). Apart from the increase of military and

police casualties, there were also more militants killed in 2012 (404 people) in comparison to 2011

(384 deaths) and less civilians.5 Furthermore, throughout 2012 the conflict remained confined to

its four key ‘hot spots’ – Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Kabardino–Balkaria. Conflict-‐related

casualties in Karachay–Cherkessia last year were lower than in 2011 (5 dead in 2012 and 22 deaths

in 2011), as well as in Stavropol Krai (10 killed in 2012 and 17 in 2011) (ibid).

5. Explanations

The ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus is classified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

(UCDP) (2013) as a separatist conflict waged between the forces of the Caucasus Emirate and the

government of the Russian Federation over territorial incompatibility. Yet separatism is hardly a

cause of the present-‐day conflict escalation in the North Caucasus. In fact, the failure of the Che-‐ 5 In 2011, according to the Caucasus Knot, 176 civilians were killed during the conflict across the North Caucasus, 180 perished in 2010. In 2012 the number of civilian deaths decreased to 87 people.


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chen state-‐building project during its short independence from Russia in the 1990s and the politi-‐

cal and economic chaos that engulfed the region in its aftermath was sufficient to dissuade the

North Caucasus residents from pursuing independence from Russia. For instance, a representative

survey administered by the Social Research Fund in six republics of the North Caucasus during

2011 reported rather negative attitudes among the populations towards independence from Rus-‐

sian Federation. In asking ‘do you think your republic can achieve better results in terms of its so-‐

cio-‐economic development as a part of Russia, as independent state or a federation of Caucasus

states?’ only 7 per cent of the population surveyed in all republics, with the largest shares in In-‐

gushetia (17 per cent) and Chechnya (15 per cent), thought that their republic could achieve more

as an independent state. By contrast, 82 per cent region-‐wide believed that being a part of Russia

is the best option for their republic, 5 per cent were in favour of the federation of Caucasian na-‐

tions and 6 per cent would not answer the question. It was also noted by analysts that despite

their aspirations for an independent Muslim state in the North Caucasus, the visionaries of the

Caucasus Emirate never endeavoured to substantiate the abstract notion of the Emirate with

state-‐building projects or at the very least provide detailed information on expected political

structure or institutions of the Emirate (Roshchin 2009). In a recent report by the Center for Stra-‐

tegic and International Studies (CSIS) on North Caucasus (Kuchins 2011: 5), the authors observed

that: ‘Unlike the Chechen aspirations for independence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s,

there is little evidence to suggest that the violence occurring across the North Caucasus today is

driven by secessionist goals.’

With secessionism being an unlikely explanation for the conflict development, the academic litera-‐

ture on conflict escalation in the North Caucasus is dominated by supporters of the assumption

that the recent violence in the region is a spill-‐over of Chechen wars fuelled by the fundamentalist

Islam (Hahn 2011; Roshchin 2009; Zhemukhov 2011; Knysh 2009; Dannreuther 2010; Markedonov

2010; Shlapentokh 2010; Bodansky 2007). The key assumption supported by the proponents of

the Islamist-‐centred explanations of the North Caucasus conflict’s escalation revolves around the

argument that it is the spread of radical Islam, often heralded by Arab radicals and foreign fighters,

before and after 9/11, in conjunction with the close ties between the North Caucasus’s militants

and Al Qaeda, that serves as the impetus for the rise in violence. Indeed, the influx of foreign

fighters, many with links to global Islamist movements, during the Second Chechen War and the


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transformation of insurgency’s ideology from nationalist towards jihadist provided plenty of caus-‐

es for classifying the conflict as the Islamist insurgency. However, the establishment of the Cauca-‐

sus Emirate, rather than solidifying ties between global Islamists and North Caucasus’s militants,

increased the localization of the Caucasus’s insurgency.

There are many reasons as to why the North Caucasus’s militancy became more of a domestic

movement. Unlike Basayev, who was well connected to Arab donors and jihad financiers, Umarov

has limited, if any, links in the jihadist world. Moreover, prior to the establishment of the Caucasus

Emirate, Umarov was widely regarded as a follower of the North Caucasus’ traditional moderate

Sufi branch of Sunni Islam and close associate of such secular Chechen nationalist leaders, such as

Akhmed Zakayev. The fact that Umarov is not well versed in Salafi ideological tenets was observed

by analysts (Kuchins 2011: 10; Leahy 2010: 266), and is clearly a result of his previous lack of asso-‐

ciation with jihadist circles. Besides, tight border control and increased intensity of ‘counter-‐

terrorist’ operations during the last five years made it particularly difficult to transport human re-‐

sources and transfer funding from outside the North Caucasus. Apart from the rapid decline of

contacts between Al Qaeda and the Caucasus Emirate, as well as the dramatic decrease in num-‐

bers of foreign jihad fighters in the North Caucasus as emphasized by Moore (2008), insurgent

jamaa’ts became much less dependent on foreign funding. As stated by the late commander of

the Kabardino–Balkaria’s militants, Anzor Astemirov (Tlisova 2009: 3):

Financial support from the West or Arab countries is an absolute lie and a myth. If we re-‐ceived any support – even meagre not to mention significant – we would be much more successful in all respects. We created and systematized internal support techniques, and Sharia gives us clear rules for collecting military zakat (taxes).

A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2012: 17) confirmed that most of the mili-‐

tant’s funding originates from extortion of local businesses and racketeering. In addition, reliance

on local sources of funding was also mentioned in the economic policy of the Caucasus Emirate

which prioritizes the taxing of local business and other sustainable forms of fundraising (Leahy

2011). With the lack of economic and logistical ties to the global jihad movement, the North Cau-‐

casus’s jamaa’ts also became more ideologically independent. For instance, the appearance and

rise to fame of homegrown ideologues, such as Said Buryatsky, began embedding the jihadist ide-‐

ology into local contexts.


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While no evidence exists of the Caucasus Emirate’s links to Al Qaeda, there also seems to be insuf-‐

ficient proof to the claim that the North Caucasus’s violence is a sectarian conflict, that is, a con-‐

frontation between the followers of traditional Sufi forms of Islam and fundamentalists or Salafis

(ICG 2012: 3). Yet not only internal splits within the Caucasus Emirate but also the marginal popu-‐

larity of the radical Salafi form of Sunni Islam among the population of the region puts into ques-‐

tion the assumption that the conflict is fuelled by the religious sectarian tensions. In an interview

to a Russian news agency, Ruslan Gereyev, an expert at the Dagestan-‐based Centre for Islamic

Research in the North Caucasus, pointed out that the popularity of radical Salafi Islam amongst the

Dagestan’s youth is nothing less than an attempt to escape from the dire socio-‐economic situation

in the republic (Amelina 2011). Gereyev emphasized that without Salafi ideology, the republic’s

youth would have found another channel to express their frustration with systemic corruption,

unemployment and the clan-‐centred politics. Experts on the North Caucasus began questioning

the validity of the theory on Islamist insurgency as early as in 2006, when Gerber and Mendelson

(2006: 831) presented the results of their public survey in the North Caucasus, suggesting that

there were only ‘few signs of burgeoning radical Islam or ethnic animosity. Instead, economic con-‐

ditions and poor governance are primary concerns.’ Prior to the spill-‐over of the Chechen conflict,

reports by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response-‐Eurasia (FEWER) (2005) and by the

Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) (Ivanov 2005) highlighted the importance of socio-‐economic and

socio-‐political factors in conflict de-‐escalation in the North Caucasus. Furthermore, the reports

prepared by Snetkov (2011) for the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) and by Kuchins et al. (2011)

for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in addition to their emphasis on Islam-‐

ist ideology as one of the explanations for the growth of insurgency, also highlighted the im-‐

portance of factors such as unemployment, corruption, and the rampant violation of human

rights. For instance, Kuchins et al. (2011: 13) observed that

it is widely accepted that much of the unrest stems from the climate of violence, impuni-‐ty, and fear in the region. In addition, socio-‐economic and socio-‐political troubles, such as economic disparity, unemployment, lack of political expression and corruption, almost certainly play a part in fermenting the unrest and contribute to the sense of frustration and social alienation that many people in the North Caucasus experience.

While this study does not reject the validity of the dominant explanations in the academic litera-‐

ture regarding the recent conflict escalation in the North Caucasus, its goal is to emphasize the


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significance of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic causes in the development of conflict in the re-‐

gion. It also avoids suggesting that the ongoing armed conflict in the North Caucasus is solely a

result of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic incompatibilities. Rather there is no doubt that the

religious sectarianism and fundamentalism, as well as ethnic nationalism contribute to the vio-‐

lence. Yet neither of these factors offers a plausible explanation as to why the armed conflict in

the North Caucasus continues to rage. With this in mind, this paper conducts an empirical analysis

of such socio-‐political and socio-‐economic causes, including human rights violations, lack of popu-‐

lar political representation, unemployment and corruption in the North Caucasus’s republics.

6. Socio-‐Political Factors

6.1 Human Insecurity

Though the North Caucasus’s militants are known for their violations of human rights and contri-‐

bution to the lack of human security in the region, it is the republican and federal security services

that are most often blamed for the environment of fear and insecurity. As stated by the director of

Amnesty International’s Europe and Central Asia program, John Dalhuisen (RFE 2012: 2):

There’s been no real move towards addressing some of the fundamental issues that are driving this underground conflict that is taking place in the region. One of the factors is a very, very widespread lawlessness, both on the part of armed groups, but then also cer-‐tainly on the part of the security structures, law enforcement structures, and judicial structures.

The most widespread forms of human rights violations regularly committed by security forces in

the North Caucasus are the abductions of individuals suspected of participating in insurgency or

assisting or sympathizing with rebels. As reported by the independent Russian human rights

group, Memorial (2012), hundreds of people were missing in the North Caucasus by 2011. Howev-‐

er, the number of disappeared individuals all over the North Caucasus since the end of active

combat phase in Chechnya is much higher. The head of the department for the North Caucasus

Federal District of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office said more than 2,000 disappearances

are reported throughout the North Caucasus since 2001 (Jamestown Foundation 2011). While the


14

majority of abductions by the law enforcement are taking place in Chechnya,6 the numbers of kid-‐

napped people are also rising in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria (Amnesty

International 2012). Reports also indicate that enforced disappearances often take the form of

collective punishment against the families and relatives of insurgents (ICG 2012: 28). For instance,

the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Liudmila Alekseeva, stated that those kidnapped not only

include the suspected rebels and their sympathizers but also human rights activists and journalists,

a number of whom have disappeared during the last several years (Dzutsev 2012). The head of

European Division of the international organization Reporters without Borders, Johann Beer,

stressed the radical deterioration of the freedom of press in the North Caucasus during the last

two years expressed in attacks on both local and international mass media personnel (Reporters

without Borders 2011). While Russian authorities prefer avoiding an inconvenient topic on en-‐

forced disappearances, local republican officials hardly try concealing their implication in abduc-‐

tions of their citizens. For example, the Kremlin-‐appointed president of Ingushetia, Yunus-‐bek Yev-‐

kurov, openly admitted that the security agencies are responsible for every five out of eight kid-‐

nappings occurring in Ingushetia in 2011 (Vatchagaev 2012a). Dalhuisen (RFE 2012: 2) points out

that:

this is a situation of institutional, organizational chaos that might have evolved uninten-‐tionally but is clearly being perpetuated by design. It is a system that allows for – indeed very much encourages – human rights violations by ensuring effective impunity for those who engage in them.

Apart from enforced disappearances, human rights groups mention other widely practiced human

rights violations by law enforcement, including torture, unlawful detention, extrajudicial execu-‐

tions and degrading treatment of detainees (Amnesty International 2012; HRW 2011; Memorial

2012).

With the above in mind, it is hardly surprising that the populations of the North Caucasus attribute

the human rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties by the law enforcement agencies for

the escalation of violence. Representative surveys held by the Caucasus Times in all autonomous

republics of the North Caucasus from 2007 to 2008 revealed that the vast majority of respondents

6 The International Crisis Group (ICG 2012) reported that between 2007 and 2009, there were 427 officially registered disappearances in Chechnya. Additionally, 142 proceedings on enforced disappearances were investigated.


15

associate the growth in conflict-‐related violence with the actions of the security forces. For in-‐

stance, in 2005, 46 per cent of respondents in the capital of Kabardino–Balkaria believed that the

outburst of violence in their republic is a direct response to the counter-‐insurgency operations

conducted by law enforcement. In 2005 Dagestan, only 25 per cent of respondents linked the es-‐

calation of violence with the work of law enforcement forces in the republic, versus 25 per cent of

those who thought that it was the result of conflict spill-‐over from Chechnya, while another 30 per

cent blamed local criminal groups.

However, the continuous growth of human insecurity in Dagestan during the next two years un-‐

doubtedly affected the responses of Dagestan’s public to a similar survey conducted by the Cauca-‐

sus Times in 2008. In 2008, the majority of survey participants in Dagestan (62 per cent) identified

the law enforcement as the cause of an increase in militant attacks, assassinations and abductions

in the republic. Of those, 23 per cent specifically mentioned security agencies (spetssluzhby), 21

per cent the federal government (federaly) and 18 per cent local law enforcement (siloviki). Fur-‐

thermore, the most recent survey conducted in Dagestan by the North Caucasus-‐based independ-‐

ent mass media agency Dosh presented that 49.4 per cent of its respondents across Dagestan be-‐

lieve that Dagestan’s citizens join the militants because of the lawlessness of the law enforcement

‘to save their lives and to revenge their relatives.’

In Chechnya, the 2005 Caucasus Times survey found over 93 per cent of respondents confident

that the instability and lack of security in the republic is to be blamed on law enforcement and the

military. In asking ‘whether the situation with abductions and assassinations by law enforcement

improved since the start of Ramzan Kadyrov’s presidency’ the majority (48 per cent) of respond-‐

ents said that they did not notice any improvements and 30 per cent thought that things became

worse.

The Caucasus Times survey held in Ingushetia in 2007 reported that 78 per cent of survey partici-‐

pants mention local and federal authorities as the main cause of conflict escalation in the republic.

More specifically, 38 per cent of respondents in Ingushetia blamed security agencies (spetsslu-‐

zhby), 24 per cent republican authorities and 16 per cent federal agencies (federaly). In contrast,

only 8 per cent of respondents in Ingushetia mentioned the militants as the cause of conflict-‐

related violence.


16

Also of interest for this paper is Gerber and Mendelson’s (2006) public survey conducted in Dage-‐

stan, Kabardino–Balkaria and North Ossetia. This survey reported that 41 per cent of participants

in Dagestan, 42 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria and 36 per cent in North Ossetia said that they

have fear of being a subject to violent abuse by the police. Similarly, 42 per cent of respondents in

Dagestan, 41 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria and 35 per cent in North Ossetia fear arbitrary arrest.

The most recent representative survey conducted by the Social Research Fund and Insomar

(Khaikin 2012) in six republics of the North Caucasus (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino–

Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia and North Ossetia) during 2011 reported results very similar to pre-‐

vious surveys in the region. 59 per cent of respondents across the region expressed their distrust

in police and other law enforcement agencies, versus only 31 per cent of those who trusted the

law enforcement. In responding to ‘whether there were improvements in terms of human rights

and liberties during the last two years’, 53 per cent of the regional majority of respondents be-‐

lieved that nothing has changed, 26 per cent emphasized that things became worse and only 12

per cent thought that some improvements occurred.

In light of this data it seems that the law enforcement authorities heavy-‐handed ‘witch hunts’ for

militants not only convinces the population of the North Caucasus of the direct link between the

systematic abuses committed by law enforcement agencies and the conflict escalation, but also

cultivates popular support for insurgency. As noted by a number of analysts, the reliance on the

traditional customary law – adat – remains high in the North Caucasus (Tatum 2010; Vatchagaev

2009, January 15). Keeping in mind that blood revenge and honour retaliations are an inseparable

part of the adat, in absence of a functional justice system the practice of blood revenge is likely to

encourage the growth of violence and increase the numbers of rebel recruits. As argued by Sou-‐

leimanov (Tatum 2010: 87–88):

rules of traditional customary law (adat) still play a crucial role in the North–East Cauca-‐sus – … – as does the blood feud; and the archaic concept of honor is still intact in the traditionalist eastern parts of the Caucasus, which explains why the level of violence is so high in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The link between the vicious circle of violence and the brutality of law enforcement in the North

Caucasus becomes obvious even to the Russian public: a national survey by the Levada Centre in

2011 revealed that although 40 per cent of the Russian public believe that harsh ‘counter-‐


17

terrorism’ tactics employed by law enforcement (siloviki) in the North Caucasus help to undermine

the ‘terrorist underground,’ a considerable percentage of the population (34 per cent) states that

the heavy-‐handed approach is more likely to expand the social support base for militants by creat-‐

ing widows, orphans and other revenge-‐seekers.

6.2 Lack of Political Representation

In a move to solidify the state’s control in the regions following the 2004 Beslan school massacre

in North Ossetia, Vladimir Putin abolished the direct popular election of regional governors in the

Russian Federation (RF). Justified by the lawlessness, unaccountability and, in particular, weakness

of federal authorities in the North Caucasus, the ban on the election of local heads of administra-‐

tions was continuously sustained by the escalation of violence in the region. The Caucasus Times

survey in 2005–06 reported rather mixed public attitudes towards the ban on regional elections in

different republics. In Ingushetia, 60 per cent of respondents believed that the appointment of the

republic’s president by the Kremlin would either exacerbate existing problems or create new ones,

and only 20 per cent of survey participants thought that this policy can alleviate the instability. In

contrast, only 30 per cent of Dagestan’s public were negative towards the new law and the majori-‐

ty (49 per cent) believed that the decision was to the republic’s benefit. In Kabardino–Balkaria, 40

per cent of respondents said that the ending of elections is likely to create more problems, versus

33 per cent of those who thought that the move would stabilize the republic. Overall the survey,

held in five republics of the North Caucasus, captured the public mood almost equally divided into

40.6 per cent of population against the abolition of elections and 40.8 per cent in support of

Putin’s decision to abolish these.

Yet, the Kremlin began to change its mind when in January of 2012, then-‐president, Dmitry

Medvedev introduced a bill restoring elections of regional governors in Russia, including the au-‐

tonomous republics of the North Caucasus. In addition, in his December 2012 press conference

Putin reiterated the Kremlin’s willingness to reintroduce direct elections in the regions.7 It remains

unclear if this decision was influenced by mass protests in Moscow in the aftermath of the 2011

7 The press conference of the President of Russian Federation was held on 20 December 2012.


18

parliamentary elections fraud or by Kremlin’s frustration over the inability of its strongmen in the

North Caucasus to improve the situation in the region.

Indeed, the lack of political representation for the population in the North Caucasus cannot be

ignored as a cause of conflict escalation. To be precise, the growth of violence in the region rough-‐

ly coincides with the end of popular elections and the direct appointments of heads of the auton-‐

omous republics by the Kremlin. Previously peaceful and stable Kabardino–Balkaria plunged into

bloodshed with the appointment of Arsen Kanokov as the head of republic in 2005. In Ingushetia,

the replacement of widely unpopular, yet directly elected head of the republic, Murat Zyazikov, by

even more unpopular Kremlin-‐appointed Yunus-‐bek Yevkurov in 2008 led to the unprecedented

increase in militant activity.8 Nevertheless, the most counterproductive of the Kremlin’s political

choices appeared in Dagestan. Appointed in 2006 as the first president of Dagestan,9 Mukhu Aliev

not only failed to curb militancy in the republic but also witnessed the growth and proliferation of

the Dagestan’s insurgent jamaa’t. His successor, the incumbent president of Dagestan Magomed-‐

salam Magomedov appointed in 2010, similarly appears unable to take control over the lawless-‐

ness in the republic. Contrastingly, the reign of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya is characterized both

by the decline of Chechen insurgency and by an increase in rampant human rights violations

committed by Kadyrov’s and federal security forces.

Yet the special status that Kadyrov enjoys as the leader of Chechnya, in conjunction with his un-‐

challenged and almost monarchical control over the republic, is not very likely to be changed by

the reintroduction of popular elections. A representative survey by the ‘Social Research Fund’ held

in 2011, revealed the extent of Kadyrov’s ability to control public opinion in the republic: 94 per

cent of respondents in Chechnya were satisfied with the work of Kadyrov’s administration and a

massive 85 per cent of public stated that if regional elections are held in future they would give

their votes to Kadyrov. In comparison, only 33 per cent in Dagestan, 40 per cent in Kabardino–

Balkaria, 47 per cent in Ingushetia were satisfied with the performance of their republican leaders.

8 According to public poll conducted by the independent mass media agency Dosh in Ingushetia during 2011, only 8.7 per cent of public expressed their support for Yevkurov, 9.5 per cent mentioned that they trusted his predecessor Zyazikov and the majority of 81.8 per cent said that they supported the first president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev (years in office 1993–2002). 9 From 1991 to 2006, Dagestan’s government was led by the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Dage-‐stan, Magomedali Magomedov, who was in charge of Dagestan’s administration during the Soviet rule (from 1983) and during whose chairmanship the republic became engulfed by the insurgency.


19

As for their future electoral preferences, only 12 per cent in Dagestan, 28 per cent in Ingushetia

and 32 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria said that they would vote for the incumbent heads of their

respective republics. It is interesting that the public survey by Gerber and Mendelson (2006) con-‐

ducted in 2004 reported that 64 per cent of respondents in Dagestan and 71 per cent in Kabardi-‐

no–Balkaria expressed confidence in the president of their republic. Evidently, despite the weak-‐

nesses and shortcomings of popularly elected heads of republican administrations, they were nev-‐

ertheless more trusted than the Kremlin-‐appointed leaders.

Few would argue that the problem of political representation in the autonomous republics of the

North Caucasus does not contribute to the administrative chaos and human rights violations by

authorities who are not accountable to the local population. As of early 2013 in the light of

amendments to the law on elections of regional governors, it remains unclear if the heads of local

governments in ‘unstable’ regions, such as the North Caucasus, would be elected or as previously

nominated (RFE 2013). However, the restoration of regional elections neither allocates more polit-‐

ical autonomy to the regions nor allows a free choice of candidates. As reported by RIA Novosti

(2012), the new electoral system would include the so-‐called ‘presidential filter’ consisting of con-‐

sultations between the president of RF and political parties nominating the candidates for gover-‐

nors, as well as the follow up talks between president and candidates. The president of RF secures

the right to express his opinion about the candidate thereby influencing the outcome of elections.

As argued by Markedonov (2013: 2):

Introducing elections, however, does not reduce the accountability [of governors] to the federal government. Even without the Kremlin’s system of appointments (which became a form of profitable investment at the corrupt political market), federal authorities have plenty of mechanisms to influence the autonomous republics and, if necessary to inter-‐vene directly.

7. Socio-‐Economic Factors

Nearly two decades of political violence, in conjunction with ineffective governance, left the North

Caucasus – a region famous in Soviet times for its ski resorts and sanatoriums – in dire socio-‐

economic situation. According to the Social Atlas of Russia’s Regions (Zubarevich 2010) in 2010

over 90 per cent of Ingushetia’s budget depended on transfers from the federal budget, in Dage-‐

stan federal subsidies accounted for 75 per cent of budget, in Chechnya 89 per cent and even in


20

relatively economically stable Kabardino–Balkaria (58 per cent) federal transfers into republican

budget exceeded the average for the Russian Federation (25 per cent). With the ‘shadow econo-‐

my’ accounting for a disproportionate share of the gross regional product in most of the North

Caucasus’s republics,10 industrial output of local economies is insignificant11 and a sizeable part of

residents’ incomes depends on remittances. However, among the many socio-‐economic problems

affecting the region, it is the widespread unemployment and systemic corruption that most of all

contribute to the growth of violence.

7.1 Unemployment

Heavily subsidized by the federal budget, the republics of the North Caucasus are plagued by high

unemployment rates. According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) in 2012

almost half (48.8 per cent) of the working age population in Ingushetia and a large number of

people in Chechnya (36.7 per cent) are unemployed. Though the unemployment rates are notably

lower in Dagestan (12.8 per cent) and Kabardino–Balkaria (10.8 per cent), even these relatively

economically stable republics are below the Russian average of 6.6 per cent of unemployment for

2011. Yet the actual unemployment rates are higher and the majority of unemployed, as well as

those with full-‐ or part-‐time jobs are also engaged in thriving ‘shadow economy.’ As described by

Kuchins et al. (2011: 14–15): ‘the shadow economy in the North Caucasus is substantial – be it the

shoemaking industry, illegal brandy production in Dagestan, or illegal vodka production in Kabar-‐

dino–Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Karachay–Cherkessia.’ The North Caucasus’s employment mar-‐

ket is also dominated by kinship, clan and friendship networks which distribute jobs on an unequal

basis further exacerbating the unemployment problems. Rogozin (2008: 83) observed that: ‘In the

patriarchal societies of the North Caucasus, friendship and family ties largely determine career

success.’ Apart from the importance of networks and connections, age hierarchy and the necessi-‐

ty, in absence of connections, to ‘buy jobs’ also create additional problems for young people in

search of employment.

10 The Social Atlas of Russia’s Regions indicates that ‘shadow economy’ accounts for 54.3 per cent of Ingushetia’s gross regional product and 40.3 per cent of Chechnya’s. 11 Industrial sector accounts for only 8.0 per cent of Chechen gross regional product, 4.6 per cent of Ingushetia’s economy and 8.5 per cent in Dagestan (the RF average is 32.3 per cent).


21

High unemployment rates are coupled with the rapid population growth in the North Caucasus.

According to the 2010 national census, Dagestan and Chechnya occupied the first (15.6 per cent)

and second (15 per cent) places respectively among the regions of Russian Federation with the

highest population growth rate followed by Moscow (10.9 per cent) and another North Caucasus’s

region – Karachay–Cherkessia (8.9 per cent). Despite the loss of working age population due to

migration to other regions of the Russian Federation (RF), Dagestan’s population increased from

2.5 million in 2002 to 3 million in 2010. Similarly, Chechnya’s population grew to 1,275,000 people

in 2010 from 1,075,000 in 2002. This rapid growth of population expectedly increases the numbers

of young people and their demand for jobs and education. The high numbers of unemployed

young people often provide a plentiful recruitment for rebel groups and contribute to the political

violence and armed conflicts in fragile developing states (Ballentine 2003). As argued by Hilker and

Fraser (2009: 22), ‘there are many case studies that suggest that youth unemployment can cause

instability and conflict.’

Indeed, a series of representative surveys held in the North Caucasus from 2004 to 2012 con-‐

firmed that unemployment is identified by the region’s residents as the most serious problem. To

start with, the 2005 survey by Gerber and Mendelson (2006) reported that 66 per cent of re-‐

spondents in Dagestan, 73 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria and 59 per cent in North Ossetia say

that the growth of unemployment in their republic is the problem that worries them the most. To

compare, only 5 per cent of Dagestan’s public, 4 per cent of Kabardino–Balkaria’s and 7 per cent of

North Ossetia’s were worried about the armed conflict in Chechnya (or the region).

This data is analogous to the Caucasus Times surveys conducted in all republics of the North Cau-‐

casus from 2004 to 2006. A regional average of 74.6 per cent of survey participants across the sev-‐

en autonomous republics of the North Caucasus believed that socio-‐economic problems, particu-‐

larly unemployment, are the most pressing, while a smaller (58.4 per cent), yet still significant,

percentage of respondents were concerned with security problems.12 Held two years later, the

Caucasus Times 2008 survey concluded that 51 per cent of the public in Dagestan thought that the

socio-‐economic situation in the republic had not improved over the last several years and 17 per

cent said that it became worse. The same survey found the majority of respondents (81 per cent)

12 The majority of those concerned with security issues were in North Ossetia (84 per cent) – mainly because the first wave of surveys was conducted in the aftermath of Beslan hostage taking.


22

in Kabardino–Balkaria and Ingushetia (63 per cent) were dissatisfied with the lack of jobs and low

salaries. Survey data offered by the Social Research Fund (Khaikin 2012) shows that in 2011 60 per

cent of survey participants in Dagestan, 63 per cent in Ingushetia, 55 per cent in Kabardino–

Balkaria and 48 per cent in North Ossetia thought that the socio-‐economic conditions in the re-‐

publics were in a state of stagnation. Additionally 21 per cent in Dagestan, 18 per cent in Ingushet-‐

ia, 19 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria and 11 per cent in North Ossetia described the socio-‐

economic situation as declining.

When asked ‘which problem you think is the most serious in your republic and requires immediate

attention of the government’, a 42 per cent majority in seven republics of the North Caucasus

identified unemployment and the creation of new jobs, additional 15 per cent lamented about low

salaries, insufficient income and the inflation. In asking ‘whether unemployment became a less or

more serious problem in 2011’, 51 per cent of respondents across the North Caucasus thought

that unemployment became worse and 40 per cent believed that no improvements had taken

place, versus only 9 per cent of those who said that unemployment is less of a problem today. Sim-‐

ilarly, a 42 per cent majority throughout the region mentioned that government’s efforts to create

new jobs had failed and 44 per cent said that nothing has changed in the employment market,

versus 9 per cent of people who felt that things had improved and 5 per cent who found did not

respond. While most of the surveys in the North Caucasus did not directly connect the socio-‐

economic issues with the escalation of violence, the public survey by Dosh held in Dagestan in

2011 asked the question of ‘why people in Dagestan join rebels’. A 49.4 per cent majority, as pre-‐

viously mentioned, said that Dagestan’s citizens join militants because of the lawlessness of securi-‐

ty forces. Yet, 20.8 per cent blamed the unemployment and the lack of opportunities to earn

money legally.

7.2 Corruption

The North Caucasus undoubtedly has one of the highest rates of corruption in the Russian Federa-‐

tion. Yet measuring corruption in the region is not an easy task. As noted by Natella Kolosova, a

researcher with the Higher School of Economics (Kavkaz Uzel 2012: 1):


23

It is impossible to measure the level of corruption in the region [North Caucasus] in num-‐bers, it acquires different forms – clan and kinship-‐based, that is promoting ‘people of cir-‐cle’, building kinship coalitions. A vivid example of this is Kadyrov’s clan in Chechnya.

Although the systemic corruption in the North Caucasus cannot be a cause of conflict escalation, it

certainly contributes to economic and social instability in the region, thereby further exacerbating

socio-‐economic problems. Souleimanov (Tatum 2010: 88) explains: ‘Corruption as such is very un-‐

likely to force people into killing others, although it is extremely instrumental in alienating the

population from local governments.’ Corruption as an impetus for conflict proliferation and the

growth of instability has also been mentioned in the Caucasus Times (2009: 7) report which states

that ‘it is the widespread corruption in the region that accounts for the explosive instability in

many republics of the North Caucasus’. In the North Caucasus, two fundamental factors associate

corruption with the overall instability in the region and irrevocably link it to the rise of conflict-‐

related violence.

First, the majority of people in the North Caucasus identify corruption as the second most serious

problem after unemployment in their republics. Gerber and Mendelson’s (2006) survey adminis-‐

tered in Dagestan, Kabardino–Balkaria and North Ossetia during 2005 shows that 61 per cent of

survey participants in Dagestan, 49 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria and 46 per cent in North Osse-‐

tia single out corruption and bribery as the problem that worries them the most. The massive

scale of corruption could also be observed from the results of the Caucasus Times survey (2009)

regarding the spread of corruption in six republic of the North Caucasus in 2008. According to the

survey’s findings only 19 per cent of respondents in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino–

Balkaria, Karachay–Cherkessia and North Ossetia had not recently encountered any forms of cor-‐

ruption and 4 per cent did not answer the question, while the majority of respondents had plenty

of experience in dealing with corruption or bribery. Similar data is presented by the representative

survey (Khaikin 2012) conducted two years later in all republics of the North Caucasus. When

asked ‘whether the problem of corruption in your republic today is growing, getting less serious or

there are no changes’ a majority (46 per cent) noted no changes, while 41 per cent believed that

corruption was growing and only 5 per cent thought that corruption had become less of a prob-‐

lem. Therefore, the issue of corruption is not only perceived by the public as the most important

problem, but it is seen as a growing problem.


24

Second, the rampant corruption is more often than not observed in dealings with law enforcement

agencies and therefore associated with human rights violations and the weakness of state institu-‐

tions. According to the Caucasus Times 2009 survey on corruption, a majority of respondents in

Kabardino–Balkaria (64 per cent), North Ossetia (65 per cent), Dagestan (48 per cent), Ingushetia

(45 per cent) and Chechnya (44 per cent) mentioned law enforcement as the most corrupt institu-‐

tion in their republic. Alternatively, 48 per cent in Kabardino–Balkaria, 44 per cent in Dagestan, 51

per cent in North Ossetia, 36 per cent in Ingushetia and 32 per cent in Chechnya identified the

judiciary branch, in particular courts, as the second most corrupt part of the government. While

education, healthcare and other social services were also accused of corrupt practices, law en-‐

forcement and the judiciary were most widely seen as plagued by corruption. Notably, the largest

percentage of people (62 per cent) blamed the local authorities as the main source of corruption

in the republic, while federal government was named by 42 per cent of the population as the se-‐

cond source of corruption. This shows that corruption is broadly understood as part of the prob-‐

lem of lawlessness of police and local administrations which in its turn contributes to the issue of

forced disappearances and other forms of human rights violations practiced by the law enforce-‐

ment agencies.

8. Not a Religious Sectarian Conflict After All

Portrayed as a religious sectarian conflict by the international community, as a war on terror by

Russian authorities and as a jihad by militants and their supporters (ICG 2012), the recent escala-‐

tion of violence in the North Caucasus, is in fact rather hard to associate with religious problems.

Despite the increase in numbers of adherents of Salafi school of Islam (ICG 2012), as seen from

recent surveys, the majority of the North Caucasus’s population do not emphasize sectarian prob-‐

lems as serious and hardly ever relate the armed conflict to religious fundamentalism. For in-‐

stance, Gerber and Mendelson (2009: 838) concluded, based on the results of their representative

survey in Dagestan, Kabardino–Balkaria and North Ossetia, that ‘support for Islamic radicalism is,

in fact, quite low among the young males in all three of these regions, even in Dagestan and Ka-‐

bardino–Balkaria where Muslims predominate.’ Correspondingly, the Caucasus Times survey in

2005–06 found only 6.1 per cent of public across six republics of the North Caucasus who ex-‐

pressed their concern with religious sectarianism. The next representative survey held by the Cau-‐


25

casus Times (Tekushev 2011) in 2010 in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino–Balkaria and

Karachay–Cherkessia revealed that 73 per cent of respondents across the region had a negative

attitude towards the radical Salafi form of Islam, also known in Russia as Wahabbism. Only 21 per

cent of the population, with the predominant majority in Kabardino–Balkaria and Karachay–

Cherkessia, said that they were positive towards Wahabbism. The survey by the Social Research

Fund conducted the same year in six North Caucasus’ republics reported that only 3 per cent of

the public mentioned religious fundamentalism as the main problem in their republic. Besides, the

association of Salafi followers with the insurgency became less of an issue with the recent recon-‐

ciliation between the state-‐backed Muslim Spiritual Board of Dagestan and Salafi Association of

Akhlu Sunna in Dagestan (Vatchagaev 2012b). Therefore, the signing of a resolution between the

religious authorities representing both Sufi and Salafi schools of Islam begins to clearly mark the

difference between the peaceful adherents of Salafi sect and militant underground which borrows

the fundamentalist tenets of Salafi teachings to attract new recruits or merely to justify their place

in the Caucasus Emirate.

9. Conclusion

The data on conflict-‐related casualties among federal forces, militants and civilians, compiled by

the Caucasus Knot (2012), offers compelling evidence regarding the ongoing large-‐scale region-‐

wide armed conflict in the North Caucasus’s republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Ka-‐

bardino–Balkaria. The intensity of violence seen in the numbers of conflict-‐related deaths in In-‐

gushetia, Kabardino–Balkaria and in particular in Dagestan confirms that the armed insurgency is

no longer confined to Chechnya, nor is Chechnya the most conflict-‐affected republic in the North

Caucasus. Encouraged by the nepotism of authorities, the militant underground in the previously

calm republics of Ingushetia, Kabardino–Balkaria and Dagestan expanded numerically and in-‐

creased their attacks on pro-‐Kremlin authorities and their supporters. It is also evident that insur-‐

gent jamaa’ts across the North Caucasus, despite formally pledging their allegiances to the Che-‐

chen-‐led Caucasus Emirate no longer require neither Chechen manpower and expertise nor for-‐

eign funding. Self-‐sufficient and, most importantly, hardly susceptible to crackdowns by law en-‐

forcement, militant jamaa’ts are clearly drawing support from local population and therefore easi-‐

ly replenish their ranks and procure funding. Therefore, although there is no doubt that the origins


26

of the spread of violence to Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino–Balkaria are in the spill-‐over of

the Chechen conflict, the present-‐day conflict is not longer part of the Chechen ‘problem’ and has

a life of its own.

On analyzing a series of representative surveys conducted in the North Caucasus from 2004 to

2012 and covering a period from the start of conflict spill-‐over to the present day, this paper

sought to emphasize the key role of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic factors of conflict escala-‐

tion in the region. The results of this study show that the rampant violations of human rights and

civil liberties committed by law enforcement agencies during their ‘counter-‐terrorism’ operations

are not only emphasized in reports of human rights organizations but are also a cause of serious

concern for the population. The survey data indicates that the majority of the North Caucasus’s

residents explain the escalation of the armed conflict as a result of brutality and heavy-‐

handedness of the part of the law enforcement agencies. By contrast, only a small percentage of

the populations in the republics most affected by violence -‐ Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and

Kabardino–Balkaria -‐ believed that the militants are to blame for the deteriorating security situa-‐

tion. The problem of human rights violations and police brutality is further exacerbated by the lack

of political representation in the North Caucasus and the absence of legitimate governments who

are accountable to the local populations. The Kremlin-‐appointed heads of local administrations are

not only disconnected from the population they are supposed to govern but also do not represent

people’s interests and either encourage the law enforcement brutality or turn a blind eye towards

it.

In the North Caucasus, lawlessness and political insecurity are supplemented by pressing socio-‐

economic problems. High unemployment rates in the North Caucasus’s republics, which are the

highest in the Russian Federation, and high population growth rates have contributed to an in-‐

crease in youth unemployment. With limited civil and human rights, harassed by police, deprived

of income and distrustful of their governments, scores of young people across the region have

chosen to join the rebels. Far from sharing the fundamentalist Islamist ideology of the militants’

leadership, new recruits seek to avenge family members, find purpose in life or to escape social

insecurity. We should not forget that it is socio-‐economic problems, in particular unemployment,

low salaries and dead-‐end jobs, which are identified by the absolute majority of the North Cauca-‐

sus citizens as the most serious problem in the region.


27

Corruption is the second most often mentioned problem and is irrevocably linked to the law en-‐

forcement agencies, who are not only widely regarded as unwilling to maintain law and order but

also as the most corrupt part of the government. If not directly contributing to the increase in vio-‐

lence, corruption on part of government officials supports the public’s perception of law enforce-‐

ment agencies as engaged in enforced disappearances, other forms of human rights violations and

financial crimes. A combination of state-‐encouraged political violence, unemployment, population

growth and social insecurity probabilistically explain why the insurgent underground survives and

thrives in the North Caucasus. A body of evidence in form of survey data and political events un-‐

folding in the North Caucasus suggests that religious sectarianism and religious extremism are not

the key causes of conflict escalation. While it is plausible that the radical Salafi teachings attract

some recruits to the rebel cause, it is not very likely that religious sectarianism encourages hun-‐

dreds of people to join the armed underground movements. Instead, this paper’s findings empha-‐

size the significance of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic variables of conflict escalation. Not only

are factors such as unemployment, corruption and brutality of law enforcement agencies of the

highest concern for the North Caucasus’s population but also more often than not these variables

are associated with the growth of political violence and the persistence of armed conflict.

What are the implications of this empirical analysis for conflict escalation studies beyond the

North Caucasus? This case study presents that conflict intensification processes are often a result

of multiple causal factors. Although the conflict spill-‐over process in the North Caucasus has fol-‐

lowed a trajectory similar to many other diffusion conflicts, the causes of the continuous escala-‐

tion of conflict-‐related violence in the region are numerous. This shows the limitations of the pop-‐

ular in post-‐Cold War conflict studies ‘greed and grievance’ approach. Instead, the findings of this

study suggest that a broader range of socio-‐political and socio-‐economic explanations has to be

examined in order to explain conflict development in a ‘new war’, such as the present-‐day vio-‐

lence in the North Caucasus,


28

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