THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. MARCELINO ADORABLE, ET AL., claimants; MIGUEL PEÑARANDA, claimant-appellant; PURIFICACION SOLINAP, ET AL., Claimants-Appellees. 

Evidente, Butalid & Peñaranda, for claimant-appellant. 

Manuel F. Zamora, for Claimants-Appellees. 

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; STANDARDS OF TRUTHFULNESS, FAIR PLAY AND NOBILITY; CASE AT BAR, AN EXAMPLE TO BE REMEMBERED. — In this case the attorney for the claimants and appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant and appellant’s ignorance of what really happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided. This is an example worth remembering by all members of the bar.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERFECTO, J.:

At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-appellant presented copies of several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions and orders, including copy of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, record on appeal, and the time the printed brief of said claimant-appellant who, at the time he filed his motion for reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was under the impression that the case, which was pending decision in the Court

of Appeals when the war broke out, remained unacted upon by said court until the motion for reconstitution was filed. 

On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant-appellant’s ignorance of what really happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided. 

Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, claimant appellant’s attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the records be declared reconstituted, together with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1942, and that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of the decision. 

The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to order that copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court for execution. This resolution is being adopted not without making of record that the action taken by Attorney Manuel F Zamora should be considered as an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar. 

LEON DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. HON. BIENVENIDO CHINGCUANGCO, Associate Judge of the Court of Agrarian

Relations, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA and TOMAS IMPERIO, Respondents.

Manuel A. Cordero for Petitioner.

Angel C. Imperio for Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally assailing an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay execution of its judgment dispossessing the tenant until he is indemnified for alleged expenses and improvements.

As leasehold tenant, Petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land owned by respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said land became the subject matter of litigation between said parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE ‘61 and 2902-NE ‘62. And on July 12, 1963, a decision was rendered therein, the dispositive portion running as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) ordering the ejectment of Leon del Rosario from the landholding in question subject to Section 43 and Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No. 2263; and (2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosario the value of the excess rentals received by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and 1962-63."cralaw virtua1aw library

Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 26, 1965.

Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations a motion for execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario however opposed it, on the ground that he has a right of retention over the land until he is indemnified for expenses and improvements, alleging that in the present case he is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian Relations, on November 18, 1965, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, stating that the judgment had become final and executory, and that Del Rosario’s claim for indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for determination, but cannot stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.

Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the present special civil action herein.

Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer the petition; and on January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction addressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To: Hon. Bienvenido Chingcuangco (reg.-Spl.-del.)

Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations

Cabanatuan City

The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija

(reg.-spl.-del.)

Cabanatuan City" 

stating:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOW, THEREFORE. until further orders from this Court, You, your agents, your representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf are hereby restrained from implementing the Writ of Execution dated December 16, 1965, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-

NE-61 and 2902-NE-62 of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Cabanatuan City entitled ‘Leon del Rosario, plaintiff, versus Tomas Imperio,Defendant.’" 

On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further developments came by way of two petitions for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent Imperio dated February 5, 1966, to declare petitioner’s counsel in direct contempt, on the alleged ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority. Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario, dated June 20, 1966, to cite for contempt respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen Remigio Baldonado and Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario from the land in question notwithstanding this Court’s preliminary injunction. To this a supplementary petition for contempt was filed, dated July 25, 1966, alleging further that with the full backing of said policemen, Imperio caused the plowing and harrowing Or the landholding and prevented Del Rosario from reaping the crops therein.

After the respective parties had filed their comments to the petitions for contempt, We deferred their resolution until consideration of this case upon the merits.

At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper interpretation or application of Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee. — With the creation of the tenancy relationship arising out of the contract between the landholder-lessor and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter the premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful enjoyment thereof. He shall have the right to work the land according to his best judgment, provided the manner and method of cultivation and harvest are in accordance with proven farm practices. Upon termination of the relationship, he shall be entitled to one-half of the value of the improvements made by him, provided they are reasonable and adequate to the purposes of the lease." (Emphasis supplied)

in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, stating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 15. — Writ of Execution.

"Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Execution in Case of Final Judgment Ejecting Tenant. — In cases where the dispossession is authorized by final judgment no writ of execution shall issue unless upon certification of the corresponding Judge that the tenant has been fully indemnified of his claim under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199 in case of share tenancy or under Section 43 thereof in case of leasehold tenancy."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 merely grants the tenant the right to recover one-half of the value of improvements he made on the land, without giving him any right of retention over the land until he is so reimbursed. As to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, they contend that the same had been superseded with the advent of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844), effective August 8, 1963, which replaced the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations with the ‘Rules of Court (Sec. 115, R.A. 3844). And, they emphasize that there can be no vested right on procedure, arguing that petitioner’s right under the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations cannot be anything more than procedural.

There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations is not applicable in this case for having been abrogated with the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it is true, provides that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (Sec. 155, R.A. 3844). And neither the Rules of Court then obtaining nor the present Rules of Court contain a similar provision requiring payment to the tenant of one-half of the value of his improvements before there can be execution of a judgment dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules of Court were applied to the Court of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963,

pursuant to Republic Act 3844 as aforestated, its effectiveness to pending cases as of that time, such as the instant case, should follow the norm set forth in Rule 133 therein; "These rules . . . shall govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply."cralaw virtua1aw library

Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made improvements on the landholding, — a point not for Us now to decide — then Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 clearly gives him the right to one-half of their value, thereby imposing upon the landholder dispossessing him the correlative duty of paying the same. The rule prevailing during the pendency of this case in the Court of Agrarian Relations required that this account be settled before any judgment of ejectment can be executed. It is therefore not difficult to see that to apply the Rules of Court, which do not contain a similar provision, would be unjust to the tenant. In this event, the former procedure is to be followed, namely, Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Respondent Imperio’s argument that petitioner failed to show that improvements were in fact made, should be addressed to the Court of Agrarian Relations. The point is that the tenant’s claim for reimbursement under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 should first be threshed out, determined and resolved before the tenant can be dispossessed by writ of execution. This recourse is but in accordance with the policy of the law to protect the rights of tenants upon the principle of social justice (Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199).

The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner’s counsel of having cited a fictitious case and a non-existing ruling. The record bears out that petitioner’s counsel alleged in page 5 of the petition for certiorari herein, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated on Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,

supra, has been upheld to be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so that now no writ of execution can be issued unless it is complied with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. v. Celestino Abad, Et Al., G.R. No. L-121447). This ruling, in effect, created and established or confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant to indemnification before he is finally ejected from his holding."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner’s counsel obviously had in mind this Court’s decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. v. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket number L- 121447 instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the names of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel’s interpretation of this Court’s decision in said case, or of what the ruling therein "in effect" created, established or confirmed, the same are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first petition for contempt is therefore without merit.

The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio and three others, not parties herein: the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Eduardo Dumlao; policeman Remigio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo Miguel. Said petition as well as the supplemental petition thereto, allege that respondent Imperio, with the aid of the three law enforcement officers, disturbed petitioner in the possession and cultivation of the land, on June 13, 1966; caused its plowing and harrowing on June 27, 1966; and prevented the petitioner from reaping the second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true, would be a ground for contempt only if at the time this Court’s writ of preliminary injunction was issued, respondent court’s writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From the sheriff’s return, 1 however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was placed in possession of the land by virtue of the writ of execution as of December 18,* 1965. This Court’s preliminary injunction, restraining implementation of the writ of execution, was issued only on January 8, 1966. Respondents, therefore, may not be held in contempt. Nonetheless, the premature implementation of the writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be restored to

peaceful and undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his claim for payment of improvements (one-half of their value) is settled by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, respondent court’s orders of November 18, 1965 and December 14, 1965, denying petitioner’s motion to stay execution pending settlement of his claim for one-half of the value of alleged improvements, as well as the writ of execution already issued, are hereby set aside; respondents are ordered to restore petitioner to the landholding, and to proceed according to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, by first determining petitioner’s claim for improvements under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199, before issuing a writ of execution for the said tenant’s dispossession. The petitions for contempt are denied for lack of merit. No costs. So ordered.

IÑIGO F. CARLET, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, VIRGINIA C. ZARATE, JACOBO C. ZARATE, VICTORIA C. ZARATE, HON. CONRADO DIZON, Acting Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan Laguna, and DEPUTY SHERIFF ROGELIO S. MOLINA of Biñan, Laguna, Respondents.

Modesto Jimenez for Petitioner.

Noe Cangco Zarate for Private Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Jose Sevillo bought Lot 981 of the Biñan Estate in Laguna in 1910. Pablo Sevillo, Jose’s son, declared said lot for taxation purposes even if the property was still in Jose Sevillo’s name. Pablo married Antonia Palisoc in 1920.

Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo. The union produced no offspring. Candida’s daughter, Cirila Baylo Carolasan, was sired by another man.

Pablo Sevillo, filed a petition for reconstitution of title, which was allowed. TCT No. RT-926 was issued in the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo and Candida died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively.

In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan, all surnamed Zarate, had herein private respondents, filed a case for annulment of deed of sale over Lot 981 and for partition of property among the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656. The Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was allegedly executed by Candida Baylo in favor of Gregorio, Samero, Martin and Andrea, all surnamed Sevillo and Isidro Zamora. After trial on the merits, the court declared the deed of sale null and void.

Private respondents, the Zarates, filed Civil Case No. 2375, an ejectment suit against the Sevillos before the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan. The trial court ordered the defendants below, the Sevillos, to immediately vacate the subject property.

Petitioner Iñigo F. Carlet, as special administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia, filed an action for reconveyance of property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582 against the Zarates. Plaintiff therein prayed for a declaration of ownership over the entire Lot 981 in the name of the estate of Jose Sevillo and/or his heirs.

The Zarates, the defendants, moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata, claiming that the issue of ownership had already been pleaded and passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case No. B-1656. The trial court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-3582.

Hence, the instant petition for review where the issue to be resolved is whether or not the adjudication in Civil Case No. B-1656 constitutes res judicata to Civil Cases No. B-3582.

When material facts or questions are judicially determined in an action, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.

Respondent court correctly concluded that there is identity of parties between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582), an action for reconveyance of Lot No. 981, and Civil Case No. B-1656 for annulment of deed of sale and partition involving the same Lot 981. It should be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to be applicable. A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle.

There is no dispute as regards the identity of subject matter since the center of controversy in the instant case and in Civil Case No. B-1656 is Lot No. 981 of the Biñan Estate.

Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. B-1656 was an action for annulment of deed of sale and partition while Civil Case No. B-3582 is for reconveyance of property alter the fact that both cases have an identical cause of action, because the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; NATURE THEREOF. — When material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined there are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. The parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. A change in the form of the action or in the relief sought does not remove a proper case from the application of res judicata. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated — republicae ut sit finis litium. And an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. As this Court has had occasion to rule: "The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate." (Nabus v. CA, 193 SCRA 732, February 7, 1991.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — There are four requisites to successfully invoke res judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. A judgment on the merits rendered in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when the three identities are present.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. — It should further be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not required for the

principle of res judicata to be applicable. A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.

4. ID.; ID.; "FORUM-SHOPPING" ; APPLIES ONLY WHEN TWO (OR MORE) CASES ARE STILL PENDING; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the issue of forum-shopping, this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending. Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the "non-forum-shopping rule" is not violated.

5. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; WHEN VIOLATED. — What counsel for petitioners did in filing an action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that" (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood . . . nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Counsel’s act of filing a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive of the courts’ processes and may be viewed as "improper conduct tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice." (Said improper conduct is considered as indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court; Heirs of Guballa, Sr. v. CA, 168 SCRA 539 [December 19, 1988] citing Gabriel v. CA, 72 SCRA 275.)

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

The Rules of Court provide litigants with options on what course of action to take in obtaining judicial relief. Once such option is taken and a case is filed in court, the parties are compelled to ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Such is the situation in the case at bar: whether or not there is res judicata or bar by prior judgment. The present controversy is surrounded by the following facts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

Lot 981 of the Biñan Estate in Laguna, with an area of 864 square meters, was purchased by Jose Sevillo in 1910 on installment. In 1917, Transfer Certificate No. 1599 was issued in his name after payment of the full purchase price. Jose Sevillo’s marriage to Severa Bayran produced four sons, Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo. Pablo married Antonia Palisoc in 1920 and they begot four children, Consolacion, Alejandra (Andrea), Samero (Casimiro) and Marin (Martin or Maltin) Sevillo. In 1949, Pablo Sevillo declared Lot No. 981 for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration Nos. 6125 and 2586 even if the property was still in Jose Sevillo’s name.

In 1955, Pablo, by then a widower, married Candida Baylo. The union produced no offspring. Candida’s daughter, Cirila Baylo Carolasan, was sired by another man.

In 1965, Pablo Sevillo, with Candida Baylo, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance for reconstitution of title. Reconstitution was allowed and TCT No. RT-926 was issued in the name of Pablo Sevillo, married to Candida Baylo. Pablo Sevillo and his wife died in 1967 and in 1974, respectively.

In 1980, the heirs of Cirila Baylo Carolasan, 1 all surnamed Zarate and herein private respondents, filed a case for annulment of

deed of sale over Lot 981 and for partition of property among the surviving heirs of Pablo Sevillo. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1656 before the Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna. The Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was allegedly executed by Candida Baylo, grandmother to the Zarates, in favor of Gregorio, Samero, Martin and Andrea, surnamed Sevillo and Isidro Zamora. After trial on the merits, the court rendered its Decision on June 15, 1982 with the following dispositive portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of sale entitled ‘Bilihang Patuluyan ng Bahagi ng Isang Lupang Panahanan’ purportedly executed by Candida Baylo on August 25, 1971, acknowledged before Notary Public Apolinario S. Escueta and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 124, Page No. 16, Book No. IV, Series of 1971, as null and void and of no force and effect, and the representative of the estate of the plaintiff Cirila Baylo Carolasan and the defendants Gregorio Sevillo, Samero Sevillo, Maltin Sevillo, Andrea Sevillo and Isidro Zamora, as the surviving spouse of Consolacion Sevillo, are hereby ordered to partition Lot No. 981 of the Biñan Estate, situated in Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna if they are able to agree among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, within 30 days from the finality of this decision, which shall be confirmed by this Court, otherwise, commissioners will be appointed to make the partition.

The defendants Gregorio Sevillo and Samero Sevillo are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiffs substituted heirs of the late Cirila Baylo Carolasan, namely, Virginia C. Zarate, of Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna, Jacobo C. Zarate, Victoria C. Zarate, Nemesio C. Zarate, Dominador C. Zarate and Elvira C. Zarate, all of Brgy. Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna, the sum of P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees and the sum of P2,000.00 for litigation expenses aside from costs of suit."cralaw virtua1aw library

The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued on November 10, 1982. Lot 981 was surveyed and subdivided into six lots, one lot having an area of 452.04 square meters, four lots with 86.49 square meters each

and one lot with 66 square meters as footpath or concession to a right of way. 2 By virtue of this adjudication, private respondents Zarate procured TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393 over their share in the property.

The losing parties in that case, the Sevillos, filed a case to annul the aforesaid decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. B-1656 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court (CA-G.R. SP No. 07657) alleging lack of jurisdiction based on service of summons on unauthorized counsel. On March 31, 1986, the appellate court granted the Zarates’ motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review filed by the Sevillos for lack of merit on September 8, 1986 in G.R. No. 74505. 3 

On May 6, 1983, private respondents, the Zarates, filed Civil Case No. 2375, an ejectment suit against the Sevillos before the Municipal Trial Court of Biñan. 4 The municipal court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendants below, to immediately vacate the subject property and remove their houses thereon and to pay rental in arrears, damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 5 Writs of execution and demolition were issued by the court. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but before said motion could be heard, they filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Civil Case No. B-3106). The Sevillos alleged that the inferior court did not have jurisdiction over the case which was filed more than a year after the alleged unlawful entry. The Regional Trial Court held that the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court’s decision on July 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806. Affirming the appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court denied the Sevillos’ petition for review in G.R. No. 94382 on April 10, 1991. 6 

On July 10, 1991, petitioner Iñigo F. Carlet, as special administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, filed the case at bar, an action for reconveyance of property, docketed as Civil Case No. B-3582, against the heirs of Cirila namely, Virginia, Jacobo, Victoria and Elvira, all surnamed Zarate. Plaintiff therein prayed for a declaration of ownership over the entire 864-square-

meter lot in the name of the estate of Jose Sevillo and/or the estate of Teodoro, Mariano, Vicente and Pablo Sevillo; that TCT Nos. T-163393 and T-163388 be annulled and a new one be issued in favor of said estate; and that defendants be ordered to pay P20,000.00, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and expenses of litigation. 7 

Defendants Zarate moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata, claiming that the facts alleged in the complaint had already been pleaded and passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case No. B-1656, the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 07657 and by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 74505. They also opposed the motion for preliminary injunction saying it was meant to delay and that the grounds relied upon had previously been passed upon by the lower court in Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and 2375, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 18806 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 94382.

On October 8, 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. B-3582, stating that the issue of ownership had been threshed out in the cases cited and that, as held by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07657, plaintiff below merely tried to obtain the same relief by way of a different action. The dispositive portion of said Order reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the same is hereby granted and the above case is hereby ordered dismissed. As a consequence, the motion for preliminary injunction is hereby denied.

Pursuant to well-settled pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff and her counsel are hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from receipt hereof why they should not be cited in contempt of court for forum-shopping. Let a copy of this order be furnished the local IBP Chapter where Atty. Modesto Jimenez belongs so that he may be administratively dealt with in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Carlet’s appeal to respondent court (CA-G.R. CV No. 36129) was dismissed on January 11, 1994, with the Court of Appeals affirming the questioned Order of the trial court in toto and ordering appellants and counsel to pay treble costs. 8 

Hence, the instant petition for review where the issue to be resolved is whether or not the adjudication in Civil Case No. B-1656 (including CA-G.R. SP No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505) constitutes res judicata to the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582).

Petitioner in the main contends that respondent court erred, because there is no identity of cause of action between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582) and the cases, cited, particularly Civil Case No. B-1656. The former is an entirely different case which seeks the annulment of TCT No. 1599 and the derivative titles issued in the name of private respondents Zarate. There is likewise no identity of parties. According to petitioner, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3582 is the Special Administrator representing the estate of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran, who does not represent any of the private respondents herein. 9 

We affirm the contested decision of the Court of Appeals.

When material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined there are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter. This is the essence of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. 10 

There are four requisites to successfully invoke res judicata: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. 11 A judgment on the merits rendered in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action when the three identities are present. 12 

The attendance of the first three elements for the application of res judicata is not disputed by petitioner. What needs to be determined is the existence of identity in parties, subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case Nos. B-1656 and B-3582.

Respondent court correctly concluded that there is identity of parties between the case at bar (Civil Case No. B-3582), an action for reconveyance of Lot No. 981, and Civil Case No. B-1656 for annulment of deed of sale and partition involving the same Lot 981. Although Civil Case No. B-3582 was initiated by petitioner as administrator of the estate of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the fact remains that he represents the same heirs of Pablo Sevillo, namely Martin, Alejandra, Casimiro (or Samero) and Consolacion Sevillo who were defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, as the latter or their heirs would eventually benefit should petitioner succeed in this case. Petitioner’s allegation that he represents the heirs of Jose Sevillo and Severa Bayran Sevillo and, therefore, including Pablo Sevillo’s three brothers, is belied by the very title of the instant petition that he is the special administrator of the estate of Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, having been appointed as such on July 10, 1991. 13 

It should further be stressed that absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to be applicable. 14 A shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. 15 While it is true that the heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo will still be judicially determined at the intestate proceedings in which petitioner was named estate special administrator, it is equally true that the defendants in Civil Case No. B-1656, namely Consolacion, Alejandra, Samero and Martin Sevillo, are the children and heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo.

There is no dispute as regards the identity of subject matter since the center of controversy in the instant case and in Civil Case No. B-1656 is Lot No. 981 of the Biñan Estate.

As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the

second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two action be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. 16 

The instant case (Civil Case No. B-3582), which is an action for the reconveyance of Lot No. 981, is premised on the claim that TCT Nos. T-163388 and T-163393, belonging to private respondents as heirs of Candida Baylo and Cirila Baylo Carolasan, are null and void. 17 To succeed entails presenting evidence that the title acquired by the Zarates, upon which they founded their complaint for partition in Civil Case No. B-1656, is in fact null and void.

In Civil Case No. B-1656, the Zarates’ prayer for partition of Lot No. 981 was anchored on the authenticity of their title thereto. Consequently, the case provided the defendants, heirs of Pablo and Antonia Sevillo, the opportunity to prove otherwise, i.e., that the Zarates’ title was null and void. However, they failed to contest the matter before the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 18 Inasmuch as the same evidence was needed in prosecuting Civil Case No. B-1656 and the case at bar, there is identity of causes of action. The additional "fact" alleged by petitioner — that Candida Baylo was not in fact married to Pablo Sevillo and the reconstituted title in their name reflects a misrepresentation is, under the circumstances, immaterial. Said allegation could have been presented and heard in Civil Case No. B-1656. 19 The parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 20 

Neither does the fact that Civil Case No. B-1656 was an action for annulment of deed of sale and partition while Civil Case No. B-3582 is for reconveyance of property alter the fact that both cases have an identical cause of action. A change in the form of the action or in the relief sought does not remove a proper case from the application of res judicata. 21 

Moreover, as early as March 31, 1986 in the original action for annulment of judgment case, the then Intermediate Appellate Court immediately recognized that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Clearly, the relief sought in this action for annulment of judgment beyond nullity of the decision in Civil Case No. B-1656, is an adjudication that herein defendants are not entitled to Lot 981 of the Biñan Estate or any part thereof, on the stated grounds that said property in the name of Pablo Sevillo and Candida Baylo under T.C.T. No. RT-926 was in fact owned by Pablo Sevillo and Antonia Palisoc, and that in any event, Candida Baylo had ceded her interest therein to plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest on March 31, 1969.

The self-same issue of ownership of Lot 981 was squarely raised in Civil Case No. B-1656, herein defendants’ interest in said property having therein been traversed by invoking instead an alleged sale of Lot 981 to Gregorio Sevillo on August 25, 1971.

This amounts to employment of different forms of action to obtain identical relief, in violation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not twice be litigated (Yusingco v. Ong Hian, 42 SCRA 589)." 22 

It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fair adjudicated — republicae ut sit finish litium. And an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. As this Court has had occasion to rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate." 23 

With respect to the issue of forum-shopping for which the trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he should not be cited in contempt, 24 this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending.25cralaw:red

Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the "non-forum-shopping rule" is not violated.

What counsel for petitioners did, however, in filing this present action to relitigate the title to and partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that" (a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood . . . nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Counsel’s act of filing a new case involving essentially the same cause of action is likewise abusive of the courts’ processes and may be viewed as "improper conduct tending to directly impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice." 26 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED.