ESTATE AND DONORS TAXG.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, SALUD ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO,petitioners,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL DIAZ,respondents.G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, respondents.Ponciano G. Hernandez for Teodorico Alejandro, et al.Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.AQUINO.J.This is a case about donationsinter vivosandmortis causa. The bone of contention is Lot No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area of 5,678 square meters, situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7336. The facts are as follows: On January 20, 1949 the spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law Regina Fernando and their three children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses, located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The deed reads as follows:KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF DONATION)ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAY NITO:Ang pagkakaloob (donation) na ito, ginawa at pinagtibay dito sa municipio ng Sta. Maria, lalawigan ng Bulacan, Pilipinas, ngayong ika 20 ng Enero, 1949, ng mag-asawang GABINO DIAZ at SEVERA MENDOZA, filipinos, may mga sapat na gulang, naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan na dito'y kinikilalang NAGKALOOB (DONORS), sa kapakanan nila REGINA FERNANDO, filipina, may sapat na gulang, viuda; OLIMPIA DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Teodorico Alejandro, ANGEL DIAZ, filipino, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo, at ANDREA DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Perfecto Marcelo, mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, na dito'y kinikilalang PINAGKALOOBAN (DONEES).PAGPAPATUNAY:Na ang Nagkaloob (DONORS) ay siyang mayari, at kamayari at namomosision sa kasalukuyan ng mga parcelang lupa kasama ang mga kagalingan na nasa lugar ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, mapagkikilala sa paraang mga sumusunod (description and statements as to registration are omitted):1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No. 2502, 5,678 square meters.2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640 square meters.3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 square meters.4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 square meters.5. TCT No. 2051, Lot No. 4168, 1,522 square meters.6. TCT No. 17960, Lot No. 2522, 3,418 square meters.7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715 square meters.8. TCT No. 21453, Lot No. 2634, 8,162 square meters.Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una, ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito:(a) Na ang lupang sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2502 o Titulo No. 7336, (No. 1) sa unahan nito ay hinati sa dalawang parte ang unang parte (1/2) na nasa bandang Kanluran (West) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Angel Diaz, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo; at ang ikalawang parte (1/2) na nasa 'bandang silangan (East) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Andrea Diaz, kasal kay Perfecto Marcelo."(Note Some dispositions are not reproduced verbatim but are merely summarized because they are not involved in this case. Paragraph (a) above is the one involved herein).(b) Lot No. 2485, TCT No.10998, to Regina Fernando (daughter- in-law of the donors and widow of their deceased son, Miguel Diaz) and Olimpia Diaz in equal shares.(c) Lot No. 2377, TCT No. 10840, 1/3 to Angel Diaz, 1/3 to Andrea Diaz, and 1/3 "ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.(d) Lot No. 2448, TCT No. 10997 to Olimpia Diaz sa condicion na pagkakalooban ni Olimpia Diaz si Crisanta de la Cruz, asawa ni Alejandro - - - - - (sic) sakaling si Crisanta ay mamatay ng halagang isang daang piso (P100), bilang gastos sa libing."(e) Na ang lupang-solar na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 4168 o Titulo No. 2051 (No. 5); lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 25?2 o Titulo No. 17960 (No. 6); at lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2521 o Titulo No. 17961 (No. 7) sa unahan nito ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.(f) Lot No. 2643, TCT No. 21453, to Regina Fernando and her children with the deceased Miguel Diaz in whose name the said Lot was already registered.Na kaming mga pinagkakalooban (DONEES) na sila Regina Fernando, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz at Andrea Diaz ay tinatanggap namin ng buong kasiyahang loob ang pagkakaloob (Donation.) na ito, at sa pamamagitan nito ay kinikilala, pinahahalagahan, at lubos na pinasasalamatan namin ang kagandahang loob at paglingap na ipinakita at ginawa ng nagkakaloob (Donors).AT SA WAKAS, ang pagkakaloob na ito (DONATION), ay sumasailalim sa paraang mga sumusunod:1. Ang mga Pinagkakalooban (Donatarios) na sila Regina Fernando, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz, at Andrea Diaz, siyang nakaaalam sa mga gastos sa pagkakasakit at sa libing ng NAGKALOOB (DONANTE);2. Na ang mga Pinagkalooban (DONATARIOS) ay hindi maaaring makapagbili sa pangatlong tao ng nasabing mga pagaari samantalang ang nagkaloob (Donante) ay buhay Datapwa't kung ang pagbibiling gagawin ay upang malunasan ang mga gastos at menitencion ng Nagkaloob (Donante) samakatuwid ang nasabing pagbibili ay matuwid;3. Gayun din, samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy ang aming pamamahala, karapatan, at pagkamay-ari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito na pag-aari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios at mamatay na ang mga karapatan at pagkamay-ari ng bawa't Pinagkalooban (Donatarios) sa bawa't pag-aari na nauukol sa bawa't isa ay may lubos na kapangyarihan."SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, linagdaan namin ang kasulatang ito, dito sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan, ngayon ika 20 ng Enero, 1949, sa patibay ng dalawang sacsing kaharap.Signature Thumbmark SignatureGABINO DIAZ SEVERA MENDOZA REGINA FERNANDOThumbmarkSignatureSignatureOLIMPIA DIAZ ANGEL DIAZ ANDREA DIAZ(Acknowledgment signed by Notary Celedonio Reyes is omitted)Gabino Diaz died in 1962. On October 20, 1964 Severa Mendoza and her two children, Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed a deed of donation denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay na Magkakabisa Pagkamatay (DonationMortis causa)" over one-half of Lot No. 2377-A, which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate (which in turn is item 3 or [c] in the 1949 deed of donation already mentioned).In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share in Lot 2377-A, which one-half share is Identified as Lot 2377-A-1, on condition that Andrea Diaz would bear the funeral expenses to be incurred after the donor's death. She died in 1964.It should be noted that the other one-half share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No. 2377-A-2 was previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the funeral expenses on the occasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.On May 12, 1970 Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Sta. Maria Branch V for the partition of Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502 (Civil Case No. SM-357). Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz, and their children intervened in the said case. They claimed one-third of Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz alleged in his answer that he had. been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502 "for more than twenty years". The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was a voidmortis causadisposition.On March 15, 1971 the lower court rendered a partial decision with respect to Lot No. 2377-A. The case was continued with respect to Lot No. 2502 which is item No. 1 or (a) in the 1949 deed of donation. The record does not show what happened to the other six lots mentioned in the deed of donation.The trial court in its decision of June 30, 1971 held that the said deed of donation was a donationmortis causabecause the ownership of the properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only "upon the death of the donors".However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502 into two equal parts between Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as an extra-judicial partition among the parents and their children. Consequently, the Alejandro intervenors were not given any share in Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz and the intervenors were ordered to pay Andrea Diaz "attorney's fees of P1,000 each or a total of P2,000".The Alejandro intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration, On July 16, 1971 the trial court denied that motion but eliminated the attorney's fees.Andrea Diaz and the Alejandro intervenors filed separate appeals to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of donation is a valid donationinter vivosand that the trial court erred in deleting the award for attorney's fees. The Alejandro intervenors contend that the said donation ismortis causa; that they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that the trial court erred in characterizing the deed as a valid partition. In the ultimate analysis, the appeal involves the issue of whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-third of Lot No. 2502, or 1,892 square meters thereof, as intestate heirs of the Diaz spouses.To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the deed of donation isinter vivosormortis causa. A brief exposition on the nature of donationinter vivosandmortis causamay facilitate the resolution of that issue. Many legal battles have been fought on the question of whether a particular deed is aninter vivosormortis causadonation. The copious jurisprudence on that point sheds light on that vexed question. The Civil Code provides:ART. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. (620).ART. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)ART. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donationinter vivosunless a contrary intention appears. (n)ART. 731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutory condition of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter vivos. (n)ART. 732. Donations which are to take effectinter vivosshall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title. (621)."Nature of donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. Before tackling the issues raised in this appeal, it is necessary to have some familiarization with the distinctions between donationsinter vivosandmortis causabecause the Code prescribes different formalities for the two kinds of donations. An utter vivos donation of real property must be evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by the donee in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should be notified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in both instruments. (Art. 749, Civil Code. As tointer vivosdonation of personal property, see art. 748).On the other hand, a transfermortis causashould be embodied in a last will and testament (Art. 728,supra). It should not be called donationmortis causa. It is in reality a legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If not embodied in a valid will, the donation is void (Narag vs. Cecilio, 109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs. Sucilla 102 Phil. 902; Tuazon vs. Posadas, 54 Phil. 289; Serrano vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998, 1002).This Court advised notaries to apprise donors of the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the reservation of such right would be a conclusive indication that the transfer' would be effective only at the donor's death, and, therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while,a converso,the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place theinter vivoscharacter of the donation beyond dispute (Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68,72).From the aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of effectivity (aside from the form) which distinguishes a donationinter vivosfrom a donationmortis causa. And the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked ownership (dominum plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to the donees. (See Lopez vs. Olbes, 15 Phil. 540; Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105). The execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery or tradition (Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 46).If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donationmortis causawhich should be embodied in a last will and testament (Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) ) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation isinter vivos(Castro vs. Court of Appeals, L-20122, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1076).The effectivity of the donation should be ascertained from the deed of donation and the circumstances surrounding its execution. Where, for example, it is apparent from the document of trust that the donee's acquisition of the property or right accrued immediately upon the effectivity of the instrument and not upon the donor's death, the donation isinter vivos(Kiene vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 97 Phil. 352).There used to be a prevailing notion, spawned by a study of Roman Law, that the Civil Code recognizes a donation mortis as a juridical act in contraposition to a donation inter vivos. That impression persisted because the implications of article 620 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 728, that "las donaciones que hayan de producir sus efectos pro muerte del donante participan de la naturaleza de las disposiciones de ultima voluntad, y se regiran por las reglas establecidas en el capitulo de la sucesion testamentaria" had not been fully expounded in the law schools. Notaries assumed that the donationmortis causaof the Roman Law was incorporated into the Civil Code.As explained by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in the Bonsato case,supra, article 620 broke away from the Roman Law tradition and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain. Article 620 merged donationsmortis causawith testamentary dispositions and thus suppressed the said donations as an independent legal concept. Castan Tobenas says:(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro Derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donacionesmortis causahan perdido en el Codigo civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza, y hay que considerarlas hoy como una institucion suspirimida, refundida en la del legado. ...La tesis de la desaparicion de las donacionesmortis causaen nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el projecto de 1851, puede decirse que constituye unacommunis opinioentre nuestros expositores, incluso los mas recientes. ...Garcia Goyena, comentando dicho proyecto, decia que la Comision se habia adherido al acuerdo de suprimir las donacionesmortis causa, seguido por casi todos los Codigos modernos. Las donacionesmortis causa a;adia-eran una especie demontsruoentre los contratos y ultimas voluntades; las algarabia del Derecho romano y patrio sobre los puntos de semenjanza y disparidad de estas donaciones con los pactos y legados no podia producir sino dudas, confusion y pleitos en los rarisimos casos que ocurriesen por la dificuldad de apreciar y fijar sus verdaderos caracteres' "(4 Derecho Civil Espanol, Comun y Foral, 8th Ed., 1956, pp. 182-3).Manresa is more explicit. He says that "la disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: (1) que han desaperacido las llamadas antes donacionesmortis causa, por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; (2) que toda disposicion de bienes para despues de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion testamentaria" (5 Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, 6th Ed., p.107). Note that the Civil Code does not use the term donationmortis causa. ( Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code in imposing the inheritance tax uses the term "giftmortis causa").lwphl@itWhat are the distinguishing characteristics of a donationmortis causa? Justice Reyes in the Bonsato case says that in a dispositionpost mortem(1) the transfer conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the tansferor, or the transferor (meaning testator) retains the ownership, full or naked (domino absoluto or nuda proprietas) (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108; De Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil. 633; (2) the transfer is revocable before the transferor's death and revocabllity may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244), and (3) the transfer would be void if the transferor survived the transferee.In other words, in a donationmortis causait is the donor's death that determines that acquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the donation is revocable at the donor's will, Where the donation took effect immediately upon the donee's acceptance thereof and it was subject to the resolutory condition that the donation would be revoked if the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of money, the donation isinter vivos(Zapanta vs. Posadas, Jr., 52 Phil. 557).Justice Reyes in the subsequent cast ofPuig vs. Penaflorida, L-15939, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 276, synthesized the rules as follows:1. That the Civil Code recognizes only gratuitous transfers of property which are effected by means of donationsinter vivosor by last will and testament executed with the requisite legal formalities.2. That ininter vivosdonations the act is immediately operative even if the material or physical deliver (execution) of the property may be deferred until the donor's death, whereas, in a testamentary disposition, nothing is conveyed to the grantee and nothing is acquired by him until the death of the grantortestator. The disposition is ambulatory and not final.3. That in amortis causadisposition the conveyance or alienation should be (expressly or by necessary implication) revocablead nutumor at the discretion of the grantor or so called donor if he changes his mind (Bautista vs. Saniniano, 92 Phil. 244).4. That, consequently, the specification in the deed of the cases whereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation isinter vivosand not amortis causadisposition (Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).5. That the designation of the donation asmortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect the donation "is to take effect at the death of the donor", is not a controlling criterion because those statements are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor (Laureta vs. Mata and Mango, 44 Phil. 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823; Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68).6. That a conveyance for an onerous consideration is governed by the rules of contracts and not by those of donations or testaments (Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).7. That in case of doubt the conveyance should be deemed a donationinter vivosrather thanmortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.It may be added that the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection or past or future services is not a characteristic of donationsinter vivosbecause transfersmortis causamay be made also for those reasons. There is difficulty in applying the distinctions to controversial cases because it is not easy sometimes to ascertain when the donation takes effect or when the full or naked title passes to the transferee. As Manresa observes, "when the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise" (5 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 108).The existence in the deed of donation of conflicting stipulations as to its effectivity may generate doubt as to the donor's intention and as to the nature of the donation (Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823).Where the donor declared in the deed that the conveyance wasmortis causaand forbade the registration of the deed before her death, the clear inference is that the conveyance was not intended to produce any definitive effect nor to pass any interest to the grantee except after her death. In such a case, the grantor's reservation of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding on her until she dies. It does not mean that the title passed to the grantee during her lifetime. (Ubalde Puig vs. Magbanua Penaflorida, L-15939, Resolution of January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 136).In the following cases, the conveyance was considered a voidmortis causatransfer because it was not cast in the form of a last will and testament as required in article 728, formerly article 620:(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the donee something "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall produce effect only by and because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to pass title after the donor's death" (Howard vs. Padilla, 96 Phil. 983). In the Padilla case the donation was regarded asmortis causaalthough the donated property was delivered to the donee upon the execution of the deed and although the donation was accepted in the same deed.(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the donees after the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in the future tense, and the word "inherit" was used (Carino vs. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182).(c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and the products thereof. Such reservation is tantamount to a reservation of the right to revoke the donation (Bautista vs. Sabiniano 92 Phil. 244).(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation reveal that the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights to dispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the donor during her lifetime (David vs. Sison, 76 Phil. 418).But if the deed of donation makes an actual conveyance of the property to the donee, subject to a life estate in the donors, the donation is isinter vivos(Guarin vs. De Vera, 100 Phil. 1100).Articles 729, 730 and 731 have to some extent dissipated the confusion surrounding the two kinds of donation. The rule in article 729 is a crystallization of the doctrine announced in decided cases.A clear instance where the donor made aninter vivosdonation is found in De Guzman vs. Ibea 67 Phil. 633. In that case, it was provided in the deed that the donor donated to the donee certain properties so that the donee "may hold the same as her own and always" and that the donee would administer the lands donated and deliver the fruits thereof to the donor, as long as the donor was alive, but upon the donor's death the said fruits would belong to the donee. It was held that the naked ownership was conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the deed of donation and, therefore, the donation became effective during the donor's lifetime.InSambaan vs. Villanueva, 71 Phil. 303, the deed of donation, as in Balaqui vs. Dongso, 53 Phil. 673, contained conflicting provision. It was provided in the deed that the donation was made "en consideracion al afecto y carino" of the donor for the donee but that the donation "surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte (donor's death).That donation was held to beinter vivosbecause death was not the consideration for the donation but rather the donor's love and affection for the donee. The stipulation that the properties would be delivered only after the donor's death was regarded as a mere modality of the contract which did not change itsinter vivoscharacter. The donor had stated in the deed that he was donating, ceding and transferring the donated properties to the donee. (See Joya vs. Tiongco, 71 Phil. 379).In Laureta vs. Mata and Magno, 44 Phil. 668 the deed of donation provided that the donor was donatingmortis causacertain properties as a reward for the donee's services to the donor and as a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was made under the condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor"; that the ' donee should cause to be held annually masses for the repose of the donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses for the donor's funeral.It was held that the said donation wasinter vivosdespite the statement in the deed that it wasmortis causa. The donation was construed as a conveyance inpraesenti("a present grant of a future interest") because it conveyed to the donee the title to the properties donated "subject only to the life estate of the donor" and because the conveyance took effect upon the making and delivery of the deed. The acceptance of the donation was a circumstance which was taken into account in characterizing the donation as inter vivos.InBalacui vs. Dongso,supra, the deed of donation involved was more confusing than that found in theLauretacase. In theBalaquicase, it was provided in the deed that the donation was made in consideration of the services rendered to the donor by the donee; that "title" to the donated properties would not pass to the donee during the donor's lifetime, and that it would be only upon the donor's death that the donee would become the "true owner" of the donated properties. However, there was the stipulation that the donor bound herself to answer to the donee for the property donated and that she warranted that nobody would disturb or question the donee's right.Notwithstanding the provision in the deed that it was only after the donor's death when the 'title' to the donated properties would pass to the donee and when the donee would become the owner thereof, it was held in the Balaqui case that the donation was inter vivos.It was noted in that case that the donor, in making a warranty, implied that the title had already been conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the deed and that the donor merely reserved to herself the "possesion and usufruct" of the donated properties.In Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, it was provided in the deed of donation, which was also styled asmortis causa, that the donation was made in consideration of the services rendered by the donee to the donor and of the donor's affection for the donee; that the donor had reserved what was necessary for his maintenance, and that the donation "ha de producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante".It was ruled that the donation wasinter vivosbecause the stipulation that the donation would take effect only after the donor's death "simply meant that the possession and enjoyment, of the fruits of the properties donated' should take effect only after the donor's death and not before".Resolution of the instant case. The donation in the instant case isinter vivosbecause it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already effective during the donors' lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by the granting,habendumand warranty clause of the deed (quoted below).In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of the donors for the donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the donors, the latter, by means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionally give to the donees the lots mentioned and described in the early part of the deed, free from any kind of liens and debts:Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito:Following the above-ousted granting,habendumand warranty clause is the donors' declaration that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, in equal shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western part to Angel and the eastern part to Andrea.The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donationsmortis causa, being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the donation to their entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and give importance to the generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thank them.In thereddendumor reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that the donees would shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors and that the donees cannot sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors' lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray the expenses and support of the donors, then the sale is valid.The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees, implies that ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation and that, therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.However, paragraph 3 of thereddendumin or reservation clause provides that "also, while we, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration, right, and ownership of the lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but, upon our death, the right and ownership of the donees to each of the properties allocated to each of them shall be fully effective." The foregoing is the translation of the last paragraph of the deed of donation which reads:(3) Gayun din samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza ay buhay, patuloy and aming pamamahala, karapatan, at pagkamayari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito na pagaari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong Dios at mamatay na, ang mga karapatan at pagkamayari ng bawa't pinagkalooban (Donatorios) sa bawa't pagaari nauukol sa bawa't isa ay may lubos na kapangyarihan.Evidently, the draftsman of the deed did not realize the discordant and ambivalent provisions thereof. Thehabendumclause indicates the transfer of the ownership over the donated properties to the donees upon the execution of the deed. But thereddendumclause seems to imply that the ownership was retained by the donors and would be transferred to the donees only after their death.We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory clauses. All the provisions of the deed, like those of a statute and testament, should be construed together in order to ascertain the intention of the parties. That task would have been rendered easier if the record shows the conduct of the donors and the donees after the execution of the deed of donation.But the record is silent on that point, except for the allegation of Angel Diaz in his answer (already mentioned) that he received his share of the disputed lot long before the donors' death and that he had been "openly and adversely occupying" his share "for more than twenty years". (Andrea Diaz on page 17 of her brief in L-33849 states that the donees took possession of their respective shares as stipulated in the deed of donation. Pages 3,4,18 and 19, tsn March, 1971).Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of thereddendumor reservation clause refers to thebeneficial ownership(dominium utile) and not to the naked title and that what the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof. But, notwithstanding that reservation, the donation, as shown in thehabendumclause, was already effective during their lifetime and was not made in contemplation of their death because the deed transferred to the donees the naked ownership of the donated properties.That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the deed of donation, out of the eight lots owned by the donors, only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168, 2522 and 2521 were superflously reserved for the spouses or donors in addition to one- third of Lot No. 2377. If the deed of donation in question was intended to be amortis causadisposition, then all the eight lots would have been donated or devised to the three children and daughter-in-law of the donors.The trial court's conclusion that the said deed of donation, although void as a donationinter vivosis valid "as an extrajudicial partition among the parents and their children" is not well-taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code provides that 46 should a person make a partition ofhis estateby an actinter vivosor by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."We have already observed that the said donation was not a partition of the entire estate of the Diaz spouses since, actually, only five of the eight lots, constituting their estate, were partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the one contemplated in article 1080.There is another circumstance which strengthens ' the view that the1949deed of donation in question took effect during the donors' lifetime. It may he noted that in that deed Lot No. 2377 (items 3 and [c]) was divided into three equal parts: one-third was donated to Andrea Diaz and one-third to Angel Diaz. The remaining one-third was reserved and retained by the donors, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severo Mendoza, for their support. That reserved one-third portion came to be known as Lot No. 2377-A.In1964or after the death of Gabino Diaz, his surviving spouse Severa Mendoza executed a donationmortis causawherein she conveyed to her daughter, Andrea Diaz (plaintiff-appellant herein), her one-half share in Lot No. 2377-A, which one-half share is known as Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other half or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been already conveyed to Angel Diaz.That disposition of Lot No. 2377-A-2 clearly implies that the conveyance in the 1949 deed of donation as to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime of the donors, Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, and proves that the 1949 donation was inter vivos.The instant case has a close similarity to the pre-war cases already cited and to three post-liberation cases. In theBonsatocase, the deed of donation also contained contradictory dispositions which rendered the deed susceptible of being construed as a donationinter vivosor as a donation causa.It was stated in one part of the deed that the donor was executing "una donacion perfects e irrevocable consumada" in favor of the donee in consideration of his past services to the donor; that at the time of the execution of the deed, the donor "ha entregado" to the donee "dichos terrenos donados'; that while the donor was alive, he would receive the share of the fruits corresponding to the owner; and "que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatario Felipe Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor". These provisions indicate that the donation in question wasinter vivosHowever, in the last clause of the deed in the Bonsato case (as in the instant case), it was provided 'que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos log derechos de dichos terrernos en concepto de dueno absolute de la propriedad libre de toda responsabilidad y gravemen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente". These provisions would seem to show that the donation wasmortis causa.Nevertheless, it was held in the Bonsato case that the donation wasinter vivosbecause (1) the ownership of the things donated passed to the donee; (2) it was not provided that the transfer was revocable before the donor's death, and (3) it was not stated that the transfer would be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.It was further held in theBonsatocase that the stipulation "que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion", should be interpreted together with the prior provision regarding its irrevocable and consummated character, and that would mean that the charge or condition as to the donor's share of the fruits would be terminated upon the donor's death.ThePuigcase,supra, is even more doubtful and controversial than the instant case. In thePuigcase, the donor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon, in a deed entitled "DonacionMortis causadated November 24, 1948 cede y transfiere en concepto de donacionmortis causato the donee, Estela Magbanua Penaflorida three parcels of land in consideration of the donee's past services and the donor's love and affection for the latter.It was stipulated in the deed that thedonorcould alienate or mortgage the donated properties "cuando y si necesita fondos para satisfacer sus proprias necesidades sin que para ello tega que intervener la Donataria, pues su consentimiento se sobre entiende aqui parte de que la donacion que aqui se hace esmortis causa, es decir que la donacion surtira sus efectos a la muerte de la donante". It was repeated in another clause of the deed "que lacesion y transferencia aqui provista surtira efecto al fallecer la Donante".It was further stipulated that the donee would defray the medical and funeral expen of the donor unless the donor had funds in the bank or "haya cosecho levantada or recogida en cual caso dichos recursos responderan portales gastos a disposicion y direccion de la donataria". Another provision of the deed was that it would be registered only after the donor's death. In the same deed the donee accepted the donation.In the Puig case the donor in another deed entitled Escritura de Donacionmortis causa" dated December 28, 1949 donated to the same donee, Estela Magbanua Penaflorida three parcels of land en concepto de una donacionmortis causa" in consideration of past services. It was provided in the deed "que antes de su nuerte la donante, podra enajenar vender traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquiera persona o entidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de la donataria en concepto de una donacionmortis causa". The donee accepted the donation in the same deed.After the donor's death both deeds were recorded in the registry of deeds. In the donor's will dated March 26, 1951, which was duly probated, the donation of a parcel of land in the second deed of donation was confirmed.Under these facts, it was held that the 1948 deed of donationmortis causawasinter vivosin character in spite of repeated expressions therein that it was amortis causadonation and that it would take effect only upon the donor's death. Those expressions were not regarded as controlling because they were contradicted by the provisions that the donee would defray the donor's expenses even if not connected with her illness and that the donee's husband would assume her obligations under the deed, should the donee predecease the donor. Moreover, the donor did not reserve in the deed the absolute right to revoke the donation.But the1949deed of donation was declared void because it was a true conveyancemortis causawhich was not embodied in a last will and testament. Themortis causacharacter of the disposition is shown by the donor's reservation of the right to alienate or encumber the donated properties to any person or entity.In theCuevascase,supra, one Antonina Cuevas executed on September 18, 1950 a notarial conveyance styled as "DonacionMortis causa" where she ceded to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas a parcel of unregistered land. Crispulo accepted the donation in the same instrument. Subsequently, or on May 26, 1952, the donor revoked the donation.The deed of donation in theCuevascase contained the following provisions which, as in similar cases, are susceptible of being construed as making the conveyance aninter vivosor amortis causatransfer:"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabajo, makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ako binabawian ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iyaalis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya."Translation"Crispulo Cuevas should know that while I am alive, the land which I donated to him will still be under my continued possession; I will be the one to have it cultivated; I will enjoy its fruits and all the other rights of ownership until Providence deprives me of life and I cannot take away the property from him because when I die I reserve the property for him." (sic)It was held that the donation wasinter vivosbecause the phrase "hindi ko nga iyaalis (I will not take away the property") meant that the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another person and thereby manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the donee. The donor retained the beneficial ownership ordominium utileBeing aninter vivosdonation, it could be revoked by the donor only on the grounds specified by law. No such grounds existed. The donee was not guilty of ingratitude. The other point to be disposed of is the matter of the claim for attorney's fees of Andrea Diaz against the Alejandro intervenors.The other point to be disposed of is the matter of the claim for attorney's fees of Andrea Diaz against the Alejandro intervenors.After a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the apparent good faith of the Alejandro intervenors in asserting a one-third interest in the disputed lot and their close relationship to Andrea Diaz, we find that it is not proper to require them to pay attorney's fees (Salao vs. Salao, L-26699, March 16, 1976, 70 SCRA 65). (Andrea Diaz did not implead Angel Diaz as a respondent in her petition for review.)WHEREFORE, the trial court's amended decision is reversed insofar as it pronounces that the deed of donation is void. That donation is declared valid as a donationinter vivos.The disputed lot should be partitioned in accordance with that deed between Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.The decision is affirmed insofar as it does not require the Alejandro intervenors to pay attorney's fees to Andrea Diaz. No costs. SO ORDERED.Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsANTONIO,J.,concurring:I concur. I agree that all the features pointed out by Justice Aquino indicate that the conveyance was intended to produce definitive effect upon the execution of said instrument. For the important characteristic of a donationinter vivosis that it takes effect independently of the donor's death. Thus, when the donor states that he donates the properties subject to the "condition that the donee cannot take ion of the properties donated until after my death'.1or the ownership and possession of the property, as wen as its administration,. were turned over to the donee, but the right to reap and dispose of the fruits was deferred until after the death of the donor2or when it was expressly stated that the donation would take effect upon acceptance, but would be revokedipso factoupon the non-fulfillment of certain conditions,3it has been held that the donation is inter vivos, and the ownership over the property donated is transferred to the donee.4A donationinter vivosis a gratuitous contract whereby the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of the donee and, therefore, like any other contract, requires the concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the parties, and does not become perfect until it is accepted by the donee.5As observed by Manresa,6upon acceptance by the donee, the donor can no longer withdraw, and he can be compelled to comply with his offering or to deliver the things he wanted to donate. Consequently, it may not be revoked unilaterally or by the sole and arbitrary will of the donor. The donation, however, may be made revocable upon the fulfillment of resolutory conditions,7or may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. As explained inBautista, et al. v. Sabiniano,8except "in the instances expressly provided by law, such as the subsequent birth of children of the donor, failure by the donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the donee and reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness thereof, a donation is irrevocable. If the donor reserves the right to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the properties purportedly donated, there is no donation. If the disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect. upon the donor's death and becomesirrevocableonly upon his death, it is notinter vivosbut amortis causadonation." Here, the conveyance or alienation of the properties donated is not revocablead nutumSeparate OpinionsANTONIO,J.,concurring:I concur. I agree that all the features pointed out by Justice Aquino indicate that the conveyance was intended to produce definitive effect upon the execution of said instrument. For the important characteristic of a donationinter vivosis that it takes effect independently of the donor's death. Thus, when the donor states that he donates the properties subject to the "condition that the donee cannot take ion of the properties donated until after my death'.1or the ownership and possession of the property, as wen as its administration,. were turned over to the donee, but the right to reap and dispose of the fruits was deferred until after the death of the donor2or when it was expressly stated that the donation would take effect upon acceptance, but would be revokedipso factoupon the non-fulfillment of certain conditions,3it has been held that the donation is inter vivos, and the ownership over the property donated is transferred to the donee.4A donationinter vivosis a gratuitous contract whereby the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of the donee and, therefore, like any other contract, requires the concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the parties, and does not become perfect until it is accepted by the donee.5As observed by Manresa,6upon acceptance by the donee, the donor can no longer withdraw, and he can be compelled to comply with his offering or to deliver the things he wanted to donate. Consequently, it may not be revoked unilaterally or by the sole and arbitrary will of the donor. The donation, however, may be made revocable upon the fulfillment of resolutory conditions,7or may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. As explained inBautista, et al. v. Sabiniano,8except "in the instances expressly provided by law, such as the subsequent birth of children of the donor, failure by the donee to comply with the conditions imposed, ingratitude of the donee and reduction of the donation in the event of inofficiousness thereof, a donation is irrevocable. If the donor reserves the right to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the properties purportedly donated, there is no donation. If the disposition or conveyance or transfer takes effect. upon the donor's death and becomesirrevocableonly upon his death, it is notinter vivosbut amortis causadonation." Here, the conveyance or alienation of the properties donated is not revocablead nutum

G.R. No. L-36770 November 4, 1932LUIS W. DISON,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellant.Marcelino Aguas for plaintiff-appellant.Attorney-General Jaranilla for defendant-appellant.BUTTE,J.:This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, in a suit filed by the plaintiffs, Luis W. Dison, for the recovery of an inheritance tax in the sum of P2,808.73 paid under protest. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal because he received the property, which is the basis of the tax, from his father before his death by a deed of giftinter vivoswhich was duly accepted and registered before the death of his father. The defendant answered with a general denial and with a counterdemand for the sum of P1,245.56 which it was alleged is a balance still due and unpaid on account of said tax. The plaintiff replied to the counterdemand with a general denial. The courta quoheld that the cause of action set up in the counterdemand was not proven and dismissed the same. Both sides appealed to this court, but the cross-complaint and appeal of the Collector of Internal Revenue were dismissed by this court on March 17, 1932, on motion of the Attorney-General.1awphil.netThe only evidence introduced at the trial of this cause was the proof of payment of the tax under protest, as stated, and the deed of gift executed by Felix Dison on April 9, 1928, in favor of his sons Luis W. Dison, the plaintiff-appellant. This deed of gift transferred twenty-two tracts of land to the donee, reserving to the donor for his life the usufruct of three tracts. This deed was acknowledged by the donor before a notary public on April 16, 1928. Luis W. Dison, on April 17, 1928, formally accepted said gift by an instrument in writing which he acknowledged before a notary public on April 20, 1928.At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following ingenious stipulation of fact:1. That Don Felix Dison died on April 21, 1928;2. That Don Felix Dison, before his death, made a giftinter vivosin favor of the plaintiff Luis W. Dison of all his property according to a deed of gift (Exhibit D) which includes all the property of Don Felix Dizon;3. That the plaintiff did not receive property of any kind of Don Felix Dison upon the death of the latter;4. That Don Luis W. Dison was the legitimate and only child of Don Felix Dison.It is inferred from Exhibit D that Felix Dison was a widower at the time of his death.The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that he received and holds the property mentioned by a consummated gift and that Act No. 2601 (Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code) being the inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The provision directly here involved is section 1540 of the Administrative Code which reads as follows:Additions of Gifts and Advances. After the aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devises, legatees, or doneesmortis causa.The question to be resolved may be stated thus: Does section 1540 of the Administrative Code subject the plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an inheritance tax?The appellant argues that there is no evidence in this case to support a finding that the gift was simulated and that it was an artifice for evading the payment of the inheritance tax, as is intimated in the decision of the court below and the brief of the Attorney-General. We see no reason why the court may not go behind the language in which the transaction is masked in order to ascertain its true character and purpose. In this case the scanty facts before us may not warrant the inference that the conveyance, acknowledged by the donor five days before his death and accepted by the donee one day before the donor's death, was fraudulently made for the purpose of evading the inheritance tax. But the facts, in our opinion, do warrant the inference that the transfer was an advancement upon the inheritance which the donee, as the sole and forced heir of the donor, would be entitled to receive upon the death of the donor.The argument advanced by the appellant that he is not an heir of his deceased father within the meaning of section 1540 of the Administrative Code because his father in his lifetime had given the appellant all his property and left no property to be inherited, is so fallacious that the urging of it here casts a suspicion upon the appellants reason for completing the legal formalities of the transfer on the eve of the latter's death. We do not know whether or not the father in this case left a will; in any event, this appellant could not be deprived of his share of the inheritance because the Civil Code confers upon him the status of a forced heir. We construe the expression in section 1540 "any of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs", to include those who, by our law, are given the status and rights of heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they may receive as such heirs. That the appellant in this case occupies the status of heir to his deceased father cannot be questioned. Construing the conveyance here in question, under the facts presented, as an advance made by Felix Dison to his only child, we hold section 1540 to be applicable and the tax to have been properly assessed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.This appeal was originally assigned to a Division of five but referred to the courtin bancby reason of the appellant's attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540. This attack is based on the sole ground that insofar as section 1540 levies a tax upon giftsinter vivos, it violates that provision of section 3 of the organic Act of the Philippine Islands (39 Stat. L., 545) which reads as follows: "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embraced more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Neither the title of Act No. 2601 nor chapter 40 of the Administrative Code makes any reference to a tax on gifts. Perhaps it is enough to say of this contention that section 1540 plainly does not tax giftsper sebut only when those gifts are made to those who shall prove to be the heirs, devisees, legatees or doneesmortis causaof the donor. This court said in the case of Tuason and Tuasonvs.Posadas 954 Phil., 289):lawphil.netWhen the law saysall gifts, it doubtless refers to giftsinter vivos, and notmortis causa. Both the letter and the spirit of the law leave no room for any other interpretation. Such, clearly, is the tenor of the language which refers to donations that took effect before the donor's death, and not tomortis causadonations, which can only be made with the formalities of a will, and can only take effect after the donor's death. Any other construction would virtually change this provision into:". . . there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all giftsmortis causa. . . made by the predecessor to those who, after his death, shall prove to be his . . . doneesmortis causa." We cannot give to the law an interpretation that would so vitiate its language. The truth of the matter is that in this section (1540) the law presumes that such gifts have been made in anticipation of inheritance, devise, bequest, or giftmortis causa, when the donee, after the death of the donor proves to be his heir, devisee or doneemortis causa, for the purpose of evading the tax, and it is to prevent this that it provides that they shall be added to the resulting amount." However much appellant's argument on this point may fit his preconceived notion that the transaction between him and his father was a consummated gift with no relation to the inheritance, we hold that there is not merit in this attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540 under our view of the facts. No other constitutional questions were raised in this case.The judgment below is affirmed with costs in this instance against the appellant. So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-34937 March 13, 1933CONCEPCION VIDAL DE ROCES and her husband,MARCOS ROCES, and ELVIRA VIDAL DE RICHARDS,plaintiff-appellants,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellee.Feria and La O for appellants.Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.IMPERIAL,J.:The plaintiffs herein brought this action to recover from the defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, certain sums of money paid by them under protest as inheritance tax. They appealed from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the action, without costs.On March 10 and 12, 1925, Esperanza Tuazon, by means of public documents, donated certain parcels of land situated in Manila to the plaintiffs herein, who, with their respective husbands, accepted them in the same public documents, which were duly recorded in the registry of deeds. By virtue of said donations, the plaintiffs took possession of the said lands, received the fruits thereof and obtained the corresponding transfer certificates of title.On January 5, 1926, the donor died in the City of Manila without leaving any forced heir and her will which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the estate had been distributed among the instituted legatees and before delivery of their respective shares, the appellee herein, as Collector of Internal Revenue, ruled that the appellants, as donees and legatees, should pay as inheritance tax the sums of P16,673 and P13,951.45, respectively. Of these sums P15,191.48 was levied as tax on the donation to Concepcion Vidal de Roces and P1,481.52 on her legacy, and, likewise, P12,388.95 was imposed upon the donation made to Elvira Vidal de Richards and P1,462.50 on her legacy. At first the appellants refused to pay the aforementioned taxes but, at the insistence of the appellee and in order not to delay the adjudication of the legacies, they agreed at last, to pay them under protest.The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts alleged therein were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After the legal questions raised therein had been discussed, the court sustained the demurrer and ordered the amendment of the complaint which the appellants failed to do, whereupon the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the afore- mentioned appellants did not really have a right of action.In their brief, the appellants assign only one alleged error, to wit: that the demurrer interposed by the appellee was sustained without sufficient ground.The judgment appealed from was based on the provisions of section 1540 Administrative Code which reads as follows:SEC. 1540.Additions of gifts and advances. After the aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devisees, legatees, or doneesmortis causa.The appellants contend that the above-mentioned legal provision does not include donationsinter vivosand if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the following reasons: first, because it violates section 3 of the Jones Law which provides that no law should embrace more than one subject, and that subject should be expressed in the title thereof; second that the Legislature has no authority to impose inheritance tax on donationsinter vivos; and third, because a legal provision of this character contravenes the fundamental rule of uniformity of taxation. The appellee, in turn, contends that the words "all gifts" refer clearly to donationsinter vivosand, in support of his theory, cites the doctrine laid in the case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas(54 Phil., 289). After a careful study of the law and the authorities applicable thereto, we are the opinion that neither theory reflects the true spirit of the aforementioned provision. The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised Administration Code are, obviously, those donationsinter vivosthat take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor but are made in consideration or in contemplation of death. Giftsinter vivos, the transmission of which is not made in contemplation of the donor's death should not be understood as included within the said legal provision for the reason that it would amount to imposing a direct tax on property and not on the transmission thereof, which act does not come within the scope of the provisions contained in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which deals expressly with the tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitionsmortis causa.Our interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the rule laid down in the case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas,supra. We said therein, as we say now, that the expression "all gifts" refers to giftsinter vivosinasmuch as the law considers them as advances on inheritance, in the sense that they are giftsinter vivosmade in contemplation or in consideration of death. In that case, it was not held that that kind of gifts consisted in those made completely independent of death or without regard to it.Said legal provision is not null and void on the alleged ground that the subject matter thereof is not embraced in the title of the section under which it is enumerated. On the contrary, its provisions are perfectly summarized in the heading, "Tax on Inheritance, etc." which is the title of Article XI. Furthermore, the constitutional provision cited should not be strictly construed as to make it necessary that the title contain a full index to all the contents of the law. It is sufficient if the language used therein is expressed in such a way that in case of doubt it would afford a means of determining the legislators intention. (Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, p. 651.) Lastly, the circumstance that the Administrative Code was prepared and compiled strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law on that matter should not be overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws such as the Administrative Code, it is but natural and proper that provisions referring to diverse matters should be found. (Ayson and Ignaciovs. Provincial Board of Rizal and Municipal Council of Navotas, 39 Phil., 931.)The appellants question the power of the Legislature to impose taxes on the transmission of real estate that takes effect immediately and during the lifetime of the donor, and allege as their reason that such tax partakes of the nature of the land tax which the law has already created in another part of the Administrative Code. Without making express pronouncement on this question, for it is unnecessary, we wish to state that such is not the case in these instance. The tax collected by the appellee on the properties donated in 1925 really constitutes an inheritance tax imposed on the transmission of said properties in contemplation or in consideration of the donor's death and under the circumstance that the donees were later instituted as the former's legatees. For this reason, the law considers such transmissions in the form of giftsinter vivos, as advances on inheritance and nothing therein violates any constitutional provision, inasmuch as said legislation is within the power of the Legislature.Property Subject to Inheritance Tax. The inheritance tax ordinarily applies to all property within the power of the state to reach passing by will or the laws regulating intestate succession or by giftinter vivosin the manner designated by statute, whether such property be real or personal, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal. (26 R.C.L., p. 208, par. 177.)In the case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas,supra, it was also held that section 1540 of the Administrative Code did not violate the constitutional provision regarding uniformity of taxation. It cannot be null and void on this ground because it equally subjects to the same tax all of those donees who later become heirs, legatees or doneesmortis causaby the will of the donor. There would be a repugnant and arbitrary exception if the provisions of the law were not applicable to all donees of the same kind. In the case cited above, it was said: "At any rate the argument adduced against its constitutionality, which is the lack of Uniformity, does not seem to be well founded. It was said that under such an interpretation, while a doneeinter vivoswho, after the predecessor's death proved to be an heir, a legatee, or a doneemortis causa, would have to pay the tax, another doneeinter vivoswho did not prove to he an heir, a legatee, or a doneemortis causaof the predecessor, would be exempt from such a tax. But as these are two different cases, the principle of uniformity is inapplicable to them."The last question of a procedural nature arising from the case at bar, which should be passed upon, is whether the case, as it now stands, can be decided on the merits or should be remanded to the courta quofor further proceedings. According to our view of the case, it follows that, if the gifts received by the appellants would have the right to recover the sums of money claimed by them. Hence the necessity of ascertaining whether the complaint contains an allegation to that effect. We have examined said complaint and found nothing of that nature. On the contrary, it be may be inferred from the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 7 thereof that said donationsinter vivoswere made in consideration of the donor's death. We refer to the allegations that such transmissions were effected in the month of March, 1925, that the donor died in January, 1926, and that the donees were instituted legatees in the donor's will which was admitted to probate. It is from these allegations, especially the last, that we infer a presumptionjuris tantumthat said donations were mademortis causaand, as such, are subject to the payment of inheritance tax.Wherefore, the demurrer interposed by the appellee was well-founded because it appears that the complaint did not allege fact sufficient to constitute a cause of action. When the appellants refused to amend the same, spite of the court's order to that effect, they voluntarily waived the opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to have the case remanded for further proceedings, which would serve no purpose altogether in view of the insufficiency of the complaint.Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Buttes, JJ., concur.

Separate OpinionsVILLA-REAL,J.,dissenting:I sustain my concurrence in Justice Street's dissenting opinion in the case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas(54 Phil., 289).The majority opinion to distinguish the present case from above-mentioned case ofTuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, by interpreting section 1540 of the Administrative Code in the sense that it establishes the legal presumptionjuris tantumthat all giftsinter vivosmade to persons who are not forced heirs but who are instituted legatees in the donor's will, have been made in contemplation of the donor's death. Presumptions are of two kinds: One determined by law which is also called presumption of law or of right; and another which is formed by the judge from circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact under investigation, which is also called presumption of man(presuncion de hombre). (Escriche, Vol. IV, p. 662.) The Civil Code as well as the code of Civil Procedure establishes presumptionsjuris et de jureandjuris tantumwhich the courts should take into account in deciding questions of law submitted to them for decision. The presumption which majority opinion wishes to draw from said section 1540 of the Administrative Code can neither be found in this Code nor in any of the aforementioned Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, said presumption cannot be called legal or of law. Neither can it be called a presumption of man(presuncion de hombre)inasmuch as the majority opinion did not infer it from circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact with is the donation itself. In view of the nature, mode of making and effects of donationsinter vivos, the contrary presumption would be more reasonable and logical; in other words, donationsinter vivosmade to persons who are not forced heirs, but who are instituted legatees in the donor's will, should be presumed as not mademortis causa, unless the contrary is proven. In the case under consideration, the burden of the proof rests with the person who contends that the donationinter vivoshas been mademortis causa.It is therefore, the undersigned's humble opinion that the order appealed from should be reversed and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant ordered to file his answer to the complaint.Street, J., concurs.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-9374 February 16, 1915FRANCISCO DEL VAL, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.ANDRES DEL VAL,defendant-appellee.Ledesma, Lim and Irureta Goyena for appellants.O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.MORELAND,J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs.The pleadings set forth that the plaintiffs and defendant are brother and sisters; that they are the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio Nacianceno del Val, who died in Manila on August 4, 1910, intestate; that an administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed and the administrator discharged by order of the Court of First Instance dated December 9, 1911; that during the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to the defendant as sole beneficiary; that after his death the defendant collected the face of the policy; that of said policy he paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase; that the redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor; that the redemption of said premises they have had the use and benefit thereof; that during that time the plaintiffs paid no taxes and made no repairs.It further appears from the pleadings that the defendant, on the death of the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property, which he still has in his possession, and that he has also the balance on said insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and not to the defendant personally; that, therefore, they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased; that the defendant account for P21,634.80, and that that sum be divided equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of deceased.The defendant denies the material allegations of the complaint and sets up as special defense and counterclaim that the redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent; and that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property. He, therefore, asks that he be declared the owner of the real estate redeemed by the payment of the P18,365.20, the owner of the remaining P21,634.80, the balance of the insurance policy, and that the plaintiff's account for the use and occupation of the premises so redeemed since the date of the redemption.The learned trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action.It says in its opinion: "This purports to be an action for partition, brought against an heir by his coheirs. The complaint, however, fails to comply with Code Civ., Pro. sec. 183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.' Because of this defect (which has not been called to our attention and was discovered only after the cause was submitted) it is more than doubtful whether any relief can be awarded under the complaint, except by agreement of all the parties."This alleged defect of the complaint was made one of the two bases for the dismissal of the action.We do not regard this as sufficient reason for dismissing the action. It is the doctrine of this court, set down in several decisions, Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504, that, even though the complaint is defective to the extent of failing in allegations necessary to constitute a cause of action, if, on the trial of the cause, evidence is offered which establishes the cause of action which the complaint intended to allege, and such evidence is received without objection, the defect is thereby cured and cannot be made the ground of a subsequent objection. If, therefore, evidence was introduced on the trial in this case definitely and clearly describing the real estate sought to be partitioned, the defect in the complaint was cured in that regard and should not have been used to dismiss the action. We do not stop to inquire whether such evidence was or was not introduced on the trial, inasmuch as this case must be turned for a new trial with opportunity to both parties to present such evidence as is necessary to establish their respective claims.The court in its decision further says: "It will be noticed that the provision above quoted refers exclusively to real estate. . . . It is, in other words, an exclusive real property action, and the institution thereof gives the court no jurisdiction over chattels. . . . But no relief could possibly be granted in this action as to any property except the last (real estate), for the law contemplated that all the personal property of an estate be distributed before the administration is closed. Indeed, it is only in exceptional cases that the partition of the real estate is provided for, and this too is evidently intended to be effected as a part of the administration, but here the complaint alleges that the estate was finally closed on December 9, 1911, and we find upon referring to the record in that case that subsequent motion to reopen the same were denied; so that the matter of the personal property at least must be consideredres judicata(for the final judgment in the administration proceedings must be treated as concluding not merely what was adjudicated, but what might have been). So far, therefore, as the personal property at least is concerned, plaintiffs' only remedy was an appeal from said order."We do not believe that the law is correctly laid down in this quotation. The courts of the Islands have jurisdiction to divide personal property between the common owners thereof and that power is as full and complete as is the power to partition real property. If an actual partition of personal property cannot be made it will be sold under the direction of the court and the proceeds divided among the owners after the necessary expenses have been deducted.The administration of the estate of the decedent consisted simply, so far as the record shows, in the payment of the debts. No division of the property, either real or personal, seems to have been made. On the contrary, the property appears, from the record, to have been turned over to the heirs in bulk. The failure to partition the real property may have been due either to the lack of request to the court by one or more of the heirs to do so, as the court has no authority to make a partition of the real estate without such request; or it may have been due to the fact that all the real property of decedent had been sold underpacto de retroand that, therefore, he was not the owner of any real estate at the time of his death. As to the personal property, it does not appear that it was disposed of in the manner provided by law. (Sec. 753, Code of Civil Procedure.) So far as this action is concerned, however, it is sufficient for us to know that none of the property was actually divided among the heirs in the administration proceeding and that they remain coowners and tenants-in- common thereof at the present time. To maintain an action to partition real or personal property it is necessary to show only that it is owned in common.The order finally closing the administration and discharging the administrator, referred to in the opinion of the trial court, has nothing to do with the division of either the real or the personal property. The heirs have the right to ask the probate court to turn over to them both the real and personal property without division; and where that request is unanimous it is the duty of the court to comply with it, and there is nothing in section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits it. In such case an order finally settling the estate and discharging the administrator would not bar a subsequent action to require a division of either the real or personal property. If, on the other hand, an order had been made in the administration proceedings dividing the personal or the real property, or both, among the heirs, then it is quite possible that, to a subsequent action brought by one of the heirs for a partition of the real or personal property, or both, there could have been interposed a plea ofres judicatabased on such order. As the matter now stands, however, there is no ground on which to base such a plea. Moreover, no such plea has been made and no evidence offered to support it.With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property, we agree. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains in these Islands by virtue of section 428 of the Code of Commerce, which reads:The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the former.It is claimed by the attorney for the plaintiffs that the section just quoted is subordinate to the provisions of the Civil Code as found in article 1035. This article reads:An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.Counsel also claim that the proceeds of the insurance policy were a donation or gift made by the father during his lifetime to the defendant and that, as such, its ultimate destination is determined by those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to donations, especially article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce which provides for the terms of the contract, the relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of the policy.The proceeds of the life-insurance policy being the exclusive property of the defendant and he having used a portion thereof in the repurchase of the real estate sold by the decedent prior to his death with right to repurchase, and such repurchase having been made and the conveyance taken in the names of all of the heirs instead of the defendant alone, plaintiffs claim that the property belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone.We are not inclined to agree with this contention unless the fact appear or be shown that the defendant acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate in other words, that he proposed, in effect, to make a gift of the real estate to the other heirs. If it is established by the evidence that that was his intention and that the real estate was delivered to the plaintiffs with that understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct and that they are entitled to share equally with the defendant therein. If, however, it appears from the evidence in the case that the conveyances were taken in the name of the plaintiffs without his knowledge or consent, or that it was not his intention to make a gift to them of the real estate, then it belongs to him. If that facts are as stated, he has two remedies. The one is to compel the plaintiffs to reconvey to him and the other is to let the title stand with them and to recover from them the sum he paid on their behalf.For the complete and proper determination of the questions at issue in this case, we are of the opinion that the cause should be returned to the trial court with instructions to permit the parties to frame such issues as will permit the settlement of all the questions involved and to introduce such evidence as may be necessary for the full determination of the issues framed. Upon such issues and evidence taken thereunder the court will decide the questions involved according to the evidence, subordinating his conclusions of law to the rules laid down in this opinion.We do not wish to be understood as having decided in this opinion any question of fact which will arise on the trial and be there in controversy. The trial court is left free to find the facts as the evidence requires. To the facts as so found he will apply the law as herein laid down.The judgment appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the Court of First Instance whence it came for the purpose hereinabove stated. So ordered.Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J.,concur.Torres, J.,concurs in the result.

Separate OpinionsARAULLO,J.,concurring:I concur in the result and with the reasoning of the foregoing decision, only in so far as concerns the return of the record to the lower court in order that it fully and correctly decide all the issues raised therein, allow the parties to raise such questions as may help to decide all those involved in the case, and to present such evidence as they may deem requisite for a complete resolution of all the issues in discussion, because it is my opinion that it is inopportune to make, and there should not be made in the said majority decision the findings therein set forth in connection with articles 428 of the Code of Commerce and 1035 of the Civil Code, in order to arrive at the conclusion that the amount of the insurance policy referred to belongs exclusively to the defendant, inasmuch a this is one of the questions which, according to the decision itself, should be decided by the lower court after an examination of the evidence introduced by the parties; it is the lower court that should make those findings, which ought afterwards to be submitted to this court, if any appeal be taken from the judgment rendered in the case by the trial court in compliance with the foregoing decision.EN BANCG.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue,defendant-appellant.Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for plaintiff-appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for defendant-appellant.LAUREL,J.:On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased, and for the collection of interst thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from September 15, 1932, the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under protest. The defendant set up a counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question and which was not included in the original assessment. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga dismissing both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both parties appealed to this court.It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will provides, among other things, as follows:4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or otherwise disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my death, and that the same be handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my brother's children and their descendants.6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the above mentioned Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous.x x x x x x x x x8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of ther estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead.During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment consisting of a 1 per cent