Erfahrung und Analyse - Witgenstein Symposium.pdf

8/22/2019 Erfahrung und Analyse - Witgenstein Symposium.pdf

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Erfahrung und Analyse

Experience and Analysis

Abstracts

27. InternationalesWittgenstein Symposium

8. 14. August 2004Kirchberg am Wechsel

27th InternationalWittgenstein Symposium

August 8 14, 2004

Kirchberg am Wechsel


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Distributors

Die sterreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein GesellschaftThe Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechselsterreich/Austria

Gedruckt mit Untersttzung derAbteilung Kultur und Wissenschaftdes Amtes der N Landesregierung

Redaktion: Maria Elisabeth Reicher und Johann Christian Marek

Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz

Druck: Druckwerker, 1050 Wien


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IS EVERYTHING NAMEABLE?C. Anthony Anderson, Santa Barbara, California

Seeking a foundation for intensional logic, argumentsbearing on whether everything is nameable are examined

and all are found to be without force. These include Fre-ges on unsaturated functions, an Intuitionistic argument, aLeibnizian argument, and Graham Priests Berkelian ar-gument. The reasoning of the Zermelo-Knig paradoxleading to the conclusion that all ordinals are nameable isstated within a theory of possible languages and foundwanting. It is concluded that the question is entirely open.

GESTALT UND ZEIT.HISTORISCH-SYSTEMATISCHE ANALYSENZUR GESTALTTHEORIEMauro Antonelli, Milano, Italien

Die Gestalttheorie stellt historisch einen der fruchtbarstenVersuche dar, eine Wissenschaft der Wahrnehmungs-gegenstnde zu begrnden. Indem allerdings die Ge-stalttheorie jeglichen Verarbeitungsprozess in der Wahr-nehmung prinzipiell ausschliet, kann sie nicht ber einerein deskriptive Experimentalphnomenologie der schonformierten Perzepte hinausgehen. Dies macht eine ge-netische Ergnzung erforderlich, die den Konstitutions-prozess des Gegebenen in der Zeit untersucht. Dennjeglicher Wahrnehmungsgegenstand weist nicht nur einerumliche und qualitative Einheit, sondern auch eine, wennauch minimale, zeitliche Dauer auf sei es, dass derGegenstand mit sich selbst identisch bleibt, sei es, dass erkontinuierlich seine rumlichen und/oder qualitativenBestimmungen wechselt. Eine genetische Experimental-phnomenologie, die den zeitlichen Innenhorizont desWahrnehmungsprozesses hervorhebt und die passive,prattentive Genesis des Gegebenen untersucht wie siein etwa Vittorio Benussi parallel zum gestalttheoretischenModell entwarf , knnte die traditionelle Gestalttheorie derzeitgenssischen kognitiven Psychologie annhern undneue Forschungshorizonte erffnen.

WITTGENSTEINS CONTRIBUTION TOTHE UNDERSTANDING OFPREDELUSIONAL STATESJos Mara Ariso, Madrid, Spain

The emphasis Wittgenstein placed on ungrounded ways ofacting led him to consider those events in which he wouldbe torn away from the sureness of the game. In this paperI weigh up the possibility that some delusions are due notonly to events which might throw us entirely off the rails,but also to the loss of the confidence which allows us totake part in language-games.

ANALYSIS AS THE VANISHING OF VALUE?Brian Armstrong, University Park, Pennsylvania

Although the Tractarian notion of value has recently begunto receive more scholarly attention, there is still no clear

account of this notion. While I can hardly offer such anaccount here, I do believe that our theme of experienceand analysis can be used to shed new light on the issue.This new light results from the interesting paradox thatopens up in the Tractatus with respect to value and ourtheme: the value that we experience seems to vanish uponanalysis. I will question whether this is so, asking why it isthat we are tempted to speak of value, how value arises ina logical-philosophical treatise, and what a philosopher cando about it. My conclusion will be that the Tractarianproject depends on a dynamic and paradoxical relation tovalue: we must experience value that vanishes uponanalysis if analysis is itself to be possible.

PHNOMENALISMUS UND SKEPTIZISMUSAlexander Bagattini, Leipzig, Deutschland

Hat das empirische Wissen eine Grundlage? Knnen wirWissen ber die Gegenstnde unseres Alltagsver-stndnisses alleine auf der Basis unserer Sinnesdatenbegrnden? Der Skeptiker beantwortet zumindest diezweite Frage negativ: Nein, Sinnesdaten alleine sind nichthinreichend zur Begrndung des empirischen Wissens. Erfhrt hierfr als Argument an, dass es keinen gltigenrationalen Schluss von den internen Sinnesdaten auf dievermeintlichen externen, physikalischen Gegenstnde gibt.Phnomenalisten greifen dieses skeptische Argument mitder These an, dass physikalische Gegenstnde nichtsanderes sind als Akkumulationen von Sinnesdaten. Die

versierteste Form des Phnomenalismus der linguis-tische Phnomenalismus versucht diese These dadurchzu begrnden, dass ein definitorisches Verhltnis zwi-schen Propositionen ber physikalische Gegenstnde undPropositionen ber Sinnesdaten behauptet wird.

Es soll gezeigt werden, dass es nicht mglich ist, Propo-sitionen ber physikalische Gegenstnde definitorisch aufPropositionen ber Sinnesdaten zurckzufhren, weshalbeine phnomenalistische Antwort auf den Auenwelt-skeptizismus scheitert.


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THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCEOF PHENOMENOLOGYSorin Baiasu, Manchester, Great Britain

Contemporary approaches to ethical issues confine the

practical relevance of phenomenology to the exploration ofmeta-ethical questions. From this perspective, moralphilosophers interested in questions of normative ethicsmay seem justified in denying the significance ofphenomenology; moreover, phenomenologists interestedin meta-ethical questions may seem justified in rejectingthe philosophical importance of normative ethics. In thispaper I focus on the descriptive character of the phe-nomenological method as one of the main reasons forthese views regarding phenomenologys practical rele-vance, and I argue for the central role that phenomenologycan play in an adequate approach to questions of norma-tive ethics.

INDEXIKALITT, KOGNITIVE DYNAMIKUND PRAKTISCHES BERLEGENJohannes D. Balle, Berlin, Deutschland

Gedankendynamische Argumente erweitern das Spektrumder Debatten um indexikalische Gedanken mit Blick aufVerstehens- und Verhaltenserklrungen ber die Zeit. Eswird argumentiert, dass kognitive Dynamik gerade auch frdie Analyse praktischer berlegungen eine ganz zentraleRolle spielt. Hierzu wird eine Rekonstruktion der kognitivenInhalte notwendig, die in dynamischen Einstellungeninvolviert sind und mit denen wir es immer dann zu tunhaben, wenn wir kontextbezogene Informationen in kon-text-unabhngiger Weise und ber Kontexte hinweg inunsere praktischen berlegungen miteinbeziehen.

SEARLE BER DEN ZUSAMMENHANGZWISCHEN INTENTIONALITTUND BEWUTSEINWolfgang Barz, Berlin, Deutschland

Ich untersuche ein Argument, das Searle zur Begrndungseiner These des begrifflichen Zusammenhangs zwischenIntentionalitt und Bewutsein vorgetragen hat. DiesesArgument sttzt sich auf den Begriff der Aspektgestalt undauf die Rede von irreduzibler Subjektivitt. Nachdem ichjeweils zwei Lesarten von Aspektgestalt und irreduzibler

Subjektivitt herausgearbeitet habe, komme ich zu demErgebnis, da Searles Argument in jeder mglichenKombination dieser Lesarten von mindestens einer fal-schen Prmisse Gebrauch macht.

MIND AND (BRACKETED) WORLD(COULD THERE BE ANEXTERNALIST EPOCH?)Hilan Bensusan, Braslia, Brazil

This work investigates the internalist assumptions of amethod of proceeding in the analysis of experience (and

thinking) that makes an appeal to the idea of an epoch. Itcontrasts these assumptions with externalist theses about

knowledge and mental contents. It discusses the work ofBeyer concerning Husserlian epoch and argues that bothuniversal and local epoch are to be rejected from anexternalist perspective.

A PLAUSIBLE ELIMINATIVISM?Jos Luis Bermdez, St. Louis, Missouri

This paper starts from the premise that Paul Churchlands"official" arguments for eliminative materialism areunsatisfactory. My aims are, first, to refocus the debate onwhat I take to be more interesting and fruitful argumentsfor eliminativism and, second, to explore how far thosearguments might take us. The most promising strategy forthe eliminativist has two components. The first is to putpressure on what I have elsewhere called the broadconstrual of the scope of commonsense psychology. Thesecond is to try to establish a fundamental mismatchbetween the model of representation implicated in just

about all ways of thinking about commonsense psychologyand the family of models of representation that seem toprovide the best general picture of how the brain can berepresentational. Standard ways of understanding theputative mismatch are unhelpful. New ones are proposed.

EXPLAINING EMOTIONAL ACTIONMonika Betzler, Gttingen, Germany

According to a standard model of rational agency emo-tional actions are either arational, or they are rational to theextent that emotions can be captured by beliefs anddesires rationalizing the action. In this paper, I propose an

alternative way to explain emotional actions. Someemotional actions are rational in that they are done forreasons ensuing from what an agent has come to value,but cannot value any longer in light of newly acquiredinformation. Such actions serve the function to enhanceevaluative coherence and re-adaption to new circum-stances. Emotions motivate such actions to reduce per-ceived incoherences.

BER DEN WERT DER GEFHLEChristian Beyer, Erfurt, Deutschland

Im ersten Teil des Beitrags wird der Gefhlsbegriff als

Familienhnlichkeitsbegriff bestimmt. Als paradigmatischeGefhle erweisen sich dabei die aktuellen Gefhlsereb-nisse. Diese werden im zweiten Teil mit den Wahrneh-mungserlebnissen verglichen. Ausgehend von der Beo-bachtung, da Gefhlserlebnisse ebenso wie Wahrneh-mungserlebnisse manchmal veridischsind, wird im drit-ten Teil schlielich fr die These argumentiert, da auchGefhlserlebnisse als unmittelbare Rechtfertigungsmotivefr Urteile und berzeugungen fungieren knnen. Insofernbietet die Belief/desire-Psychologie durchaus einen geeig-neten theoretischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen die Fragenach der Rationalitt gefhlsbedingter Handlungen zu be-antworten ist.


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DAS VISUELLE ZIMMERPHNOMENOLOGISCHE FRAGEN INWITTGENSTEINS SPTPHILOSOPHIEElisabeth Birk,Aachen, Deutschland

Der folgende Beitrag skizziert anhand einer Analyse der 398ff. der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, in welchemSinn man von phnomenologischen Fragen in Witt-gensteins Sptphilosophie sprechen kann. Das Beispieldes visuellen Zimmers verbindet die Kritik an einemsolipsistischen Subjektbegriff mit der Frage nach derMglichkeit einer phnomenologischen Sprache. Ph-nomenologische Beschreibungen so die hier vertreteneThese sind fr die Sptphilosophie nicht von solchen desSprachgebrauchs zu trennen, da sie nicht die Be-schreibung besonderer Gegenstnde (wie Sinnesdaten)darstellen, sondern auf den Gegenstand selbst Bezugnehmen.

ANALYSIS AND THEELUCIDATORY INTERPRETATION OFWITTGENSTEINS TRACTATUSAndreas Blank, Berlin, Germany

In her elucidatory interpretation of the Tractatus, MarieMcGinn has suggested to exclude Wittgensteins view oflogical analysis from the elucidatory core of the work.However, her suggestion depends strongly on Wittgen-steins later critique of his earlier view of analysis, whichpartially distorts the content of his earlier ideas. Inparticular, the Tractatus explicitly excludes a type ofanalysis that leads to particular forms of elementarysentences and simple objects from the realm of logic.

Rather, the early Wittgenstein connects the idea ofanalysis with the idea of the purely descriptive nature ofphilosophy. Because the type of analysis leading to purelydescriptive insights only makes implicit knowledge explicit,and thus does not have to do with explanation or theoryconstruction, it should be seen as forming a part of anelucidatory strategy.

LOGIC AND THE NOTHING: CARNAPSCRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER AND THEANALYTIC/CONTINENTAL DIVIDEJon Rostgaard Boiesen,Aarhus, Denmark

Philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century wasmarked by a split between analytic and continentalphilosophy. In this paper I will argue that one of the mostimportant origins of this split is to be found in Carnapscritique of Heidegger in his 1932-article The Elimination ofMetaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language, andthat the reason for Carnaps critique of Heidegger is notconfined to what both Carnap and Heidegger consideredstrictly philosophical issues, but is connected withCarnaps self-understanding as being part of a progressivesocialist movement, and the fact that Heidegger in thisperiod showed sympathy for Nazism. Further I argue thatthe advent of Nazism plays an important causal role for theestablishment of the analytic/continental-divide.

DOES METAPHOR FORCE US TO STUDYTHE NATURE OF THOUGHT?Ewa Boliska, Krakow, Poland

To reveal the nature of metaphor, to explain why it is an

important part of our creativity and cognition, it isnecessary to turn from studying the matters of languageand language use to studying the nature of thought. Theaim of this article is to present how semantics andpragmatics fail to provide a satisfactory description of thenature of metaphor. The discussion on metaphor is verycomplex, thus I would like to appeal to just one of thepossible connections between semantics and pragmaticsof metaphor, namely the concept of metaphor introducedby Davidson and a possible response to it as given byGrice.

IS NAGEL DAVIDSONIBLE?

Cristina Borgoni and Makmiller Pedroso, Braslia, Brazil

Nagel (in What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 1991) argues thatwhile inner experiences of organisms are always from theirparticular points of view, physical explanations are beyondwhatever standpoint. Departing from these assumptionsNagel concludes that physical descriptions are alwaysobjective and, therefore, will never grasp the subjectivecharacter of inner experiences. Or, in other words, physicalexplanations will always leave out phenomenologicalfactors. The legitimacy of this Nagelian view depends onthe rejection of two Davidsonian convictions. The first isthe monism or the idea that all that exists can be explainedby physical laws. The second is the idea that we cannotseparate out empirical facts on the one side andconceptual schemes on the other. The central aim of this

paper is to investigate the possibility of maintaining aphenomenology even after the Davidsonian criticisms.

EXPERIENCE, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE.SOME REFLECTIONS ON BERMDEZSAPPROACH TO NONLINGUISTIC COGNITIONJohannes L. Brandl, Salzburg, Austria

This paper deals with the problem of how to account forthe specific nature of nonlinguistic thinking by contrastingthis type of cognitive activity with sensory experiences onthe one hand and language-based reasoning on the other.

It agrees with Bermdez that nonlinguistic thoughts cannotgenerally be denied to have a propositional content. Itargues, however, that propositional content can be as-cribed to nonlinguistic thoughts only if one regards crea-tures entertaining these thoughts as using genuine con-cepts, not just protoconcepts as the minimalist theorywould have it.


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BIOLOGICAL KINDS ANDTHE CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEIngo Brigandt, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This paper uses an example from biology, the homology

concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theoryof reference give an incomplete account of referencedetermination. It is suggested that in addition to samplesand stereotypical properties, the scientific use of conceptsand the epistemic interests pursued with concepts areimportant factors in determining the reference of naturalkind terms.

LEIBNIZ UND WHITEHEADBER PERZEPTIONHans Burkhardt, Mnchen, Deutschland

Gewhnlich wird das lateinische Wort perceptio aus-schlielich mit Wahrnehmung bersetzt vor allem vonschlichten deutschen Epistemikern. Dass diese berset-zung meist nicht stimmt, zeigt schon die LeibnizscheWiderspiegelungstheorie nach der jede Monade die Ge-amtheit aller Monaden widerspiegelt. Da kann offen-sichtlich von Wahrnehmung keine Rede sein.

Wenn man bisher der Ansicht war, dass Leibniz diese ab-strakte und wahrnehmungsferne Auffassung von Perzep-tion in die Philosophie eingefhrt hat, wird man durcheinen Text von Francis Bacon, der von Whitehead zitiertwurde, eines Besseren belehrt. Perzeptionen sind nachdiesem Text gerade keine Wahrnehmungen, sonderngarantieren nicht nur eine wahrnehmungsfreie und damitoft przisere Erfahrung und tragen zur Konstitution undIndividualitt aller Krper bei. Sie gewhrleisten gleich-

zeitig die Beziehung und die Abgrenzung von Krpernjeglicher Art gegenber anderen Krpern.

Fr Whitehead ist dieser Text grundlegend, denn dieprehensionssollen in seiner Metaphysik dasselbe leistenwie die Baconschen und Leibnizschen Perzeptionen. Legtman diesen Begriff von Perzeption zugrunde, dann drngtsich eine Neuinterpretation alter und bekannter Texte auf,so z.B. des esse est percipi von Berkeley.

CHILDRENS PHILOSOPHIZING(AND REASONING JUDGMENT AS ITSCONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT)

AS A SOURCE OF TOLERANTCONSCIOUSNESS FORMATIONMarina Chebakova, Ekaterinburg, Russia

This work is devoted to one of the interesting themes ofmodern philosophy that is connected with the problem ofchildrens philosophizing. The special importance of thistheme is also in its topical practical value; it involves theeducational reforms according to the humanization andhumanitarization of education, which are being in progressin Russia now.

Modern education seeks for the new concept of its owndevelopment at every level. The beginning of this searchwas connected with the global changes of Russian socialand political history and reflected the interest of Russianeducation to reach the world tendency of the open

education model formation. At that time, the importance ofsuch educational principles as humanization and humani-tarization, the necessity of the connecting of educationalcontent with social, historical and national features of theregion were coming to life.

EXPLAINING THE SEEMINGLY SELF-INTERPRETING CHARACTEROF A FORMULAKai-Yuan Cheng,Min-Hsiung, Taiwan

In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein convincinglyargues against the proposal that rule-following consists ina persons having a verbalized formula in mind, by pointingout the interpretation regress problem. However, averbalized formula, such as f (x) = 2x + 2, is seeminglyself-interpreting. Phenomenologically, it specifies for aperson a certain procedure of deriving the number f (x) forany value of x. However, Wittgenstein points out that theformula fails to fixthe rule being followed. In this paper, Ioffer a dispositional account of rule-following which canexplain why a formula seems self-interpreting, when in factit isnt. I argue that rule-following consists in a personshaving a disposition to behave in a certain way, rather thanhaving a verbalized formula in mind. Supplemented with aDennettian functionalist account of introspection, I explainwhy phenomenologically there seems to be no gapbetween the verbalization of a formula and its inter-pretation.

THE NECESSITY OF THE ETHICAL ORWHY MURDER MUSTBE WRONG

Anne-Marie Christensen,Aarhus, Denmark

In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we find Wittgen-steins first published investigation of ethics. Furthermore,together with the Lecture on Ethics, this is the last timehe makes any longer investigation into this subject, as theNachlassreveals only a few, scattered remarks on ethicalmatters after 1929. I will argue that if the ethical sections ofthe Tractatus are seen in connection to the concept ofshowing, they then reveal a coherent and radical alter-native to traditional conceptions of ethics; an alternativewhich sheds light on the necessity of ethics.


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BRENTANO UND ARISTOTELESBER DIE ONTOLOGIE DERINTENTIONALEN BEZIEHUNGArkadiusz Chrudzimski,Zielona Gra, Polen Salzburg, sterreich

Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos war in mehrfacherHinsicht von Aristoteles abhngig. Auch an den Stellen, woer seine Intentionalittstheorie bespricht, beruft er sich aufAristoteles, und zwar oft in der Form, als ob beinahe alles,was man heute als Verdienste der Brentanoschen Inten-tionalittstheorie betrachtet, im Grunde schon bei Ari-stoteles latent vorhanden wre. Ich will indessen zeigen,dass es zwischen der Aristotelischen und BrentanoschenOntologie der Intentionalitt doch betrchtliche Unterschie-de gibt. Die Aristotelische Ontologie der intentionalen Be-ziehung sieht auf den ersten Blick viel einfacher undeleganter aus. Es zeigt sich allerdings, dass die grereKomplexitt, die Brentano in Kauf nimmt, durch gewissetheoretische Vorteile aufgewogen wird.

WITTGENSTEINS CRITICISM OFHUSSERLS SYNTHETIC A PRIORIPROPOSITIONSRoberto Ciuni, Genoa, Italy

The aim of this paper is to show the inadequacy ofWittgensteins criticism of the definition of a synthetic apriori proposition provided by Husserl. I shall attempt todemonstrate that such a criticism is valid only on conditionthat exactly the Tractarian conception of a syntheticproposition is shared. Unfortunately, Husserl does notinclude these assumptions in his theories. After exposing

the Tractarian equivalence analytic a priori necessary,my paper will focus on the Tractarian conception ofsynthetic, since the equivalence synthetic depictiveconstitutes the main (although implicit) assumption in thecriticism Wittgenstein addresses to Husserl.

IS A NATURALISTIC THEORY OFREFERENCE DEFENSIBLE?Andrea Clausen, Konstanz, Germany

In this paper, I argue that even the most promising versionof a naturalistic theory of reference, Millikans evolutionaryapproach, does not always avoid indeterminacy ofreference. In consequence, an evolutionary approach mustat least be amended by non-naturalistic elements such aselements that build upon Brandoms social-inferentialapproach. Furthermore, I argue that his version of a socialconception of reference, just like an evolutionary one, doesnot imply that a linguistic community is at liberty to fixreference. In consequence, a completely social-inferentialposition is as convincing as the combination of anevolutionary and a social-inferential approach. But even ifone opts for the former position, naturalistic aspects more precisely, causal-counterfactual relations betweenstimuli and observation reports are important in order toguarantee that these reports serve as preliminary regress-stoppers in the social-inferential process that determinesreference.

IS PERCEPTION INFERENTIAL?William Cornwell, West Point, New York

Applying Kent Bachs take-for-granted principle to JerryFodors faculty psychology, I argue that perception usually

is non-inferential, but I also indicate how and under whatcircumstances perceptual processes are and ought to beinferential. The epistemological consequence is that someperceptual knowledge is basic or foundational (hence,coherentism and confirmation holism are false) but someperceptual knowledge has inferential justification.

GENERIC ESSENCEFabrice Correia, Tarragona, Spain

I distinguish two kinds of essentialist statements, thegenericand the objectual, reject a number of accounts ofgeneric essence, and (tentatively) suggest that the notion

(i) is primitive, and (ii) can be used to define objectualessence, metaphysical necessity and analyticity.

THE TRACTATUSAND THE NEED OFNON-TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONSJoo Verglio Gallerani Cuter, So Paulo, Brazil

The Tractatus is bound to recognize that not everyoperation is a truth-functional one. Non-truth-functionaloperations are essential in applied arithmetic, althougharithmetical series can be defined in independence ofthem.

WHAT WE CANNOT SAY,WE CAN AND MUST SPEAK ABOUTDarlei DallAgnol, Florianpolis, Brazil

This paper seeks to show that Wittgensteins Tractatuscanbe interpreted as a criticism of two views, namely thatethics can be a science and that philosophy can establishthe foundations of morality, but not as a defense ofquietism. In the first section, the limits of what can be said(science) are reconstructed. In the second, the relationshipbetween to say and to show is clarified and a newdistinction between to sayandto speakis introduced. The

following section makes another distinction between besilent in a trivial way and in a logical-philosophical one.This subsequently is used to show that Wittgenstein isprohibiting any kind of foundationalism. The last sectionshows how morality, free from philosophical confusions,can be expressed. A final distinction between moral andimmoral silence is drawn in order to show that what wecannot say, we can and must speak about.


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COLOUR SPACE:PHENOMENAL OR PHYSICAL?Lieven Decock, Tilburg, Netherlands

Colours can be regarded as properties of phenomenal

experiences, and as properties of physical objects. Theycan accordingly be ordered in a phenomenal colour space,or in a physical colour space. It is often believed thatcolour is in the first place ordered in a phenomenal colourspace, and that the various psychophysical colour spacesare physical models of this internal space. However, atcloser scrutiny, there is no reason to believe in theexistence of a unique phenomenal colour space, deter-mined by a hue, brightness, and saturation dimension. Amultitude of colour spaces has been proposed, and thisreveals a real problem for the phenomenal colour space;namely, that it is impossible to characterise its metricalproperties. Psychophysical colour spaces, characterisedby spectrometric parameters, are unproblematic from amathematical point of view.

ON WITTGENSTEIN ON MATHEMATICSJ. W. Degen, Erlangen, Germany

The theoretical or just philosophical status of Wittgen-steins remarks about mathematics is still very controver-sial. His remarks are almost always hard to understandwith respect to their precise meaning and/or theirtheoretical (or merely philosophical) significance. However,there are also many perfectly intelligible statements thatare plainly false and often even absurd.

THE WITTGENSTEINIAN IDEAOF ANALYSIS AS A BASEFOR CONSTRUCTIVECONTEMPORARY SCEPTICISMAleksandra Derra, Torun, Poland

Examining Wittgensteins remarks from PhilosophicalInvestigations about the philosophical idea of analysis, Iargue that his view of philosophy can be treated as auseful base for constructive contemporary scepticism. Inorder to enrich the understanding of the matter, I will firstcall your attention to the more general idea of philosophyunderstood as a special kind of descriptive analysis. Tryingto show that scepticism can be seen as a useful and fruitful

philosophical approach, I will shortly present such a formof scepticism and demonstrate how it can be derived fromthe Wittgensteinian idea of analysis. I will conclude ex-pressing the conviction that the Wittgensteinian idea ofphilosophising is a good starting point and a rich source forpluralism in philosophy a position Wittgenstein exhortedus to take in his late philosophy.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLEIN LIFE AND LITERATURE:CAN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE EXPANDOUR EMOTIONAL REPERTOIRE?Ronald de Sousa, Toronto, Canada

Philosophical reflection has historically claimed to improveour individual lives. The claim is seldom made today; onthe other hand, philosophers and psychologists (e.g.Nussbaum, Oatley) have argued that art and literature, bymeans of simulations running on the virtual machineimplemented by our brains, can expand and refine ourrepertoire of emotional responses and thereby our ethicalsensibility. Others (Posner) have been skeptical. What iscertain is that fictional literature can be thought of as anexploration of possible worlds. I propose to identify asense of possibility, individual possibility, suitable tomake sense of the idea that the possible is part of thereality in which we make life choices, and to suggest somespecific conditions under which we can hope for our ownlives and our ethical responses to be enlarged andimproved by the experience of art and literature.

WITTGENSTEIN BER MUSIKVERSTEHENUND DIE UNTERBRECHUNGDER INNEREN STIMMENicolas Dierks, Hamburg, Deutschland

In diesem Papier gehe ich von einer Interpretationverschiedener Stellen des Briefwechsels Wittgensteins mitRudolf Koder aus. Nach einer Rekonstruktion von As-pekten von Wittgensteins Musikauffassung um 1930(Meinen, Verstehen, innere Stimme) wird diese mit

spteren Motiven aus den PU konfrontiert (Erlebnis,Absicht, Inspiration). Wie weit hat sich Wittgenstein vonfrheren Auffassungen entfernt und spielten seinemusikalischen Vorlieben dabei eine Rolle?


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VALUE-PREDICATES ANDVALUE-PROPERTIESJohn F. Drummond, Bronx, New York

Husserls moral theory stands on two pillars: an account of

evaluative intentionality and an analogy between formallogic and formal axiology. This paper explores Husserlsaccount of the analogy between formal logic and formalaxiology in order to reveal features of evaluative inten-tionality. The analogy appeals to the similarity between thegrammar of cognitive judgments and evaluative judg-ments. However, this grammatical similarity masks im-portant logical differences that point in turn to importantphenomenological and ontological differences. The paperattempts to discern these differences by investigating aseries of logical distinctions regarding adjectives, thepredicates belonging to the judgments. This investigationwill point to some conclusions about the ontological statusof value-properties. More important, these logical andontological differences necessarily point to differences inthe manner in which cognitive and evaluative experi-

ences disclose their objects. The affective dimension ofmeaning involved in judgments of value introduces newstructures into the objectivity, the normativity, and thetruth of evaluative experiences and judgments. Theaffective dimension of experience transforms not only ourexperience but the ontological possibilities at work in theexperienced world.

METZGER, KANT ANDTHE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITYMaurizio Ferraris, Turino, Italy

Allow me to tell you a true story, related to me by PaoloBozzi.

In 1943-1944, Wolfgang Metzger was serving in the armyin Cassino, Italy. One day he went to the toilet in thebarracks where his company was quartered, and when hewas done he flushed the toilet. At that very moment agrenade hit the barracks, so that Metzger got theimpression that by flushing the toilet he had been thecause of the disaster. Metzger saw such causality, just asone sees a chair or a color.

One way to straighten out the whole matter would be toclaim that Metzger had been victim of some kind of opticalillusion. But if we try to look into it more carefully, werealize that deep in Metzgers toilet lies a radical attackagainst the last stronghold of Kants transcendental

philosophy namely the fact that there is at least one thingwhich is not in the world but which is supplied by thought,namely causality.

EINGEBILDETE EMPFINDUNGEN:WITTGENSTEINS ANALYSE EINESPHILOSOPHISCHEN TRIEBESEugen Fischer, Mnchen, Deutschland

Der spte Wittgenstein behandelt philosophische Pro-bleme, die durch ein Mideuten unserer Sprachformenentstehen (PU 111), durch Fehlinterpretationen, zu denenwir systematisch getrieben werden von verschiedenen

Trieb[en], das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mizuverstehen

(PU 109). Anhand einer Analyse von Wittgensteins Un-tersuchung des Lesens (PU 156-78) soll dieser Aufsatzerklren, was ein solcher Trieb ist, und wie er den Ein-druck von Problemen erzeugen kann, wo keine sind. DieseErklrung der Entstehung und Natur der von Wittgensteinbehandelten (Schein-)Probleme wird die therapeutischen

Aspekte seines Ansatzes erhellen, die derzeit im Mit-telpunkt der Diskussion stehen (Creary & Read, The NewWittgenstein, 2000; Ammereller & Fischer, Wittgenstein atWork. Method in the Philosophical Investigations, 2004).

ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION INHUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEINDagfinn Fllesdal, Oslo, Norway

Husserl is often regarded as a fundamentalist in epis-temology, holding that we can obtain a priori, infallibleknowledge. Wittgenstein is known for his advocacy of theopposite view, arguing in ber Gewissheit and other

places that there are no infallible foundations for know-ledge. Wittgenstein proposed instead another way of re-butting scepticism.

In this paper it will be argued that Husserl was not afoundationalist in the above sense, but had a view similarto, but also interestingly different from that of Wittgenstein.In Husserls position, theLifeworldplays a role similar tothat of a form of life in Wittgenstein. But here, too, thereare interesting differences. It will be argued that several ofthese differences go significantly in Husserls favor.

IDENTIFYING, DISCRIMINATING ORPICKING OUT AN OBJECT:SOME DISTINCTIONS NEGLECTEDIN THE STRAWSONIAN TRADITIONMartin Francisco Fricke, Coyoacn, Mxico

In a strict and philosophically adequate sense ofidentification, to identify means to say or realise that twothings are the same. Several quotes in StrawsonsIndividualssuggest that Strawson wishes to use the strictnotion of identification where he explains what isnecessary for the understanding of reference. However, itis artificial and implausible to interpret Strawsons notion ofspeaker-hearer identification in the strict sense. Moreover,there seems to be an incoherence in the fact that a strictidentification introduces a new reference which has to be

understood in order to understand the identification. Evansdoes not use the strict notion of identification. This enableshim to claim that understanding reference requiresidentification in the sense of discriminating knowledge.Picking out is generally equated with distinguishing.However, this might be wrong. A picking out constitutes adistinguishing fact; but the picker does not have to beaware of this fact in order to do the picking.


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ZEITLICHKEIT UND BEWUSSTSEINBEI FRANZ BRENTANOEduardo Fugali, Graz, sterreich

In diesem Beitrag wird Brentanos Auffassung der

Verbindung zwischen Bewusstsein und Zeitlichkeit dar-gestellt, wie sie sich in der mittleren Phase (ca. 1878-1900) des Denkwegs des Philosophen entwickelt hat.Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Phnomen derPhantasie bzw. der ursprnglichen Assoziation geschenkt,indem sie die zeitliche Synthese leitet und dadurch dasBewusstsein als inneren Sinn kennzeichnet.

BER DIE PHNOMENALITTINTENTIONALER ZUSTNDEMartina Frst, Graz, sterreich

In dem vorliegenden Artikel wird die These vertretenwerden, da ein qualitativer oder phnomenaler Gehaltallen Arten mentaler Zustnde zugesprochen werden mu.Meine Analyse wird mit einer kurzen Darstellung dessenbeginnen, was ich unter dem Begriff des qualitativen Ge-haltsverstehe, welcher als die Essenz sogenannter ph-nomenaler Zustnde ausgewiesen werden mu. Sobaldeine Charakterisierung der Qualia erarbeitet worden ist,wird eine spezifische Form mentaler Zustnde nmlichdie intentionalen Zustnde hinsichtlich eines mglichenphnomenalen Aspekts untersucht und fr das Vorliegendesselben argumentiert werden. Die Signifikanz phno-menaler Eigenschaften fr intentionale Einstellungen wirdsowohl aufgrund einer speziellen Form des Inhalts desbewutseinsimmanenten Inhalts als auch anhand derPhnomenalitt der Einstellungsmodi zum Ausdruckkommen.

SHARED VALUES AND SOCIAL UNITYMargaret Gilbert, Storrs,Connecticut

There is considerable reference to shared values in theliterature of contemporary political philo. At the same timethere has been little esophy as well as in other disciplinesand practical contextsxploration of what it is to sharevalues. This paper considers two accounts of sharingvalues in relation to a thesis that has partisans on bothsides the thesis that sharing values unifies thoseinvolved in a substantial, society-constituting way. One of

the accounts considered, the simple summative account, islikely to come to mind first. The other is what I call theplural subject account. I argue that those who deny theunifying quality of shared values are right, if they have inmind the simple summative account. Those who acceptthe unifying quality of shared values are right, if they havein mind the plural subject account.

INTENTIONALITY DENATURALIZEDEdwin Glassner, Durham, North Carolina

In my paper I investigate the ways in which Intentionalitycan be understood as (1) influenced by a social context

and (2) becoming the property of language or collectives.A constructed dialogue between Putnam (Why Reason

Cant Be Naturalized 1983) and de Man (Allegories ofReading 1979) introduces the problem of methodologicalsolipsism and the related problem of an intentional subjectas the origin of utterances. Analyzing the critical traditionwhich rejects Intentionality as part of the condition oflanguage production, I describe the inverse of the critique

of a naturalization of Putnam (Putnam 1983), showing thatthe problem of collective Intentionality hinges on howstrong a notion of individual Intentionality is acceptable,since the strength of this delineation from some socialpredetermination is central to the problem. Finally, I will tryto illuminate that almost any higher-order notion ofIntentionality is more problematic than tolerable, since thenew subject of this sort of Intentionality cannot bespecified.

A NATURALIZED APPROACH TO THETURING TEST: IS DNA COMPUTINGA WAY OUT OF THE CHINESE ROOM?

Rodrigo Gonzlez, Leuven, Belgium

The Turing Test involves an instrumentalist approach tothe assessment of intelligence by the emulation of in-telligence rather than the verification of its creation. In thisrespect, Searles Chinese Room conclusion is that ArtificialIntelligence is doomed to failure if it does not replicate thecausal properties that engender mental life. I will arguethat DNA computing can bridge the gap betweensimulating and creating mental life, for DNA can beregarded as the encoded program of life able to self-reproduce and from which adaptive and intelligent be-havior arises.

DIE ROLLE EINER MULTIPLIKATIVENWAHRSCHEINLICHKEITSMETHODE(MPE-METHODE) BEI DERGESTALTWAHRNEHMUNGRainer Gottlob, Wien, sterreich

Es wurde die Rolle der Multiplikation der Fehlerwahr-scheinlichkeiten (MPE-Methode) fr die Gestaltwahrneh-mung untersucht. Diese Methode ist unbewusst, aber nurgrenordnungsmig durchfhrbar. Fr die Gestaltwahr-nehmungen von Personen und von einer Melodie gelangtman durch die (unbewusste) Multiplikation zu Sicherheitenfr alle praktischen Zwecke, das sind Fehlerwahrschein-lichkeiten in Grenordnungen zwischen 10-10und 10-80.


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EMOTION AS PERCEPTIONOF BODILY CHANGES:ARE SOMATIC FEELING THEORIESEFFORTS IN REUNIFYING THE EMOTIONCATEGORY FORLORN HOPE?

Verena Gottschling, Mainz, Germany

My focus is on theories that understand emotion asperception of bodily changes. The question I amconcerned with is whether these James-Lange accounts toreunify the emotion category can be successful or not.Paul Griffiths presented a challenging argument thatemotions do not form a natural class, because some basicemotions are modular and others have an essentiallydifferent structure. For this reason James-Lange accountscannot be successful. I argue that this argument does notsucceed.

THE SELF-PRESENTATIONAL NATUREOF PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITYGeorge Graham, Winston-Salem, North CarolinaTerry Horgan, Tucson, ArizonaJohn Tienson, Memphis, Tennessee

The thesis ofphenomenal intentionalityasserts (1) that allmental states, events, and processes that are immediatelyaccessible to the cognitive subject including occurrentthoughts and desires that are thus accessible arephenomenally conscious, and (2) that virtually allphenomenally conscious mental phenomenal includingsensory-experiential phenomena are intentional. Webriefly rehearse some considerations that have previouslybeen advanced in support of each component of the

phenomenal intentionality thesis, by ourselves and byothers. We then consider a potential form of Cartesianskepticism, directed toward ones own immediate beliefsabout which mental phenomena one is currentlyundergoing. Why, we ask, does this form of radicalCartesian skepticism get no grip upon people (Descarteshimself included)? The answer we propose is thatphenomenal consciousness has a self-presentational na-ture, and thus that a constitutive feature of onesphenomenally intentional mental phenomena is that one isdirectly acquainted with them in experience. Immediatebeliefs about matters of direct experiential acquaintanceare not susceptible to radical Cartesian doubt.

ASYMMETRICAL PRACTICAL REASONSPatricia S. Greenspan, College Park, Maryland

I want to defend a conception of practical reasons thatassigns a different force for action to positive and negativereasons, or what I call qualifying and disqualifyingreasons. A positive or qualifying reason, understood as aconsideration in favor of some option, does not in itselfyield a rational requirement, even in the absence ofcompeting reasons. So reasons as such do not compel,rationally speaking. It is only a serious negative or dis-qualifying reason, as a reason against some option, that itwould be irrational to acknowledge as undefeated and yetmake no attempt to act on. The positive/negative asym-metry can be explained by a picture of practical reasons as

primarily serving to offer or answer criticism of action. In

the present paper I shall attempt to answer objections tothis critical conception of practical reasons that charge itwith misrepresenting the phenomenology of ordinaryrational choice.

MEANING WITHOUT INTENTIONHajo Greif, Graz, Austria

According to the programme of teleosemantics, allintentional phenomena are to be subject to a naturalisticexplanation in terms of an evolutionary history. A certainversion of that programme is defended in the light of anon-deterministic reading of evolution. The thesis is that,firstly, the intentionality as the meaning of linguisticforms is not determined by the intentionality aspurposiveness of the speakers minds; speakersintentions are one among other environmental conditionsfor the selection of the functions of linguistic forms.Secondly it is argued that the functions of mental

representations and language in general, albeit historicallyand environmentally correlated, are subject to differentregimes of selection, thus to be accounted for each in theirown right.

WITTGENSTEIN ON MUSICAL EXPERIENCEAND KNOWLEDGEEran Guter, Haifa, Israel

Wittgensteins thinking on music is intimately linked to coreissues in his work on the philosophy of psychology. I arguethat inasmuch musical experience exemplifies the kind ofgrammatical complexity that is indigenous to aspectperception and, in general, to concepts that are based onphysiognomy, it is rendered by Wittgenstein as a form ofknowledge, namely, knowledge of mankind.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OFNEGATION IN HUSSERLSPHENOMENOLOGYLeila Haaparanta, Tampere, Finland

In the analytic tradition, logic has been both a central fieldof research and a source of tools for philosophical practice.Phenomenologists have usually had a reserved attitude

towards using logical tools in philosophy. The presentpaper pays attention to some of the roles that logic playedin early phenomenology. It takes a closer look at thephenomenological roots of intuitionistic logic and studiesHusserls way of seeking the origin of negation inconsciousness. Some remarks are made on the relationsbetween Husserls phenomenological analysis and Kantstranscendental logic. It is concluded that there is no clearanswer to the question of whether Husserl wished to reviselogic in such a way that it would attend to his trans-cendental excavations. Still, it seems that analysing con-sciousness by means of a formal system that has cut off itsties to consciousness would not fulfil the requirements thata phenomenologist sets to philosophy.


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HINGES AND FRAMES: WITTGENSTEINSSURROGATES FOR MODALITYRom Harr, Washington DC

Wittgensteins metaphors of hinge and frame base

modality on the concept of rule. However, this conceptcovers both instructions and verbal formulations ofnonverbal constraints. Neither hinges nor frames can bewholly propositional.

KRIPKE'S FINITENESS OBJECTIONTO DISPOSITIONALIST THEORIESOF MEANINGJussi Haukioja, Turku, Finland

It is often thought that Blackburn and Boghossian haveprovided an effective reply to the finiteness objection to

dispositional theories of meaning, presented by KripkesWittgenstein. In this paper I distinguish two possiblereadings of the sceptical demand for meaning-constitutivefacts. The demand can be formulated in one of two ways:an A-question or a B-question. Any theory of meaning willgive one of these explanatory priority over the other. I willthen argue that the standard reply only works if B-questions are seen as prior, while the dominant dis-positionalist theories of meaning see A-questions as prior.

ONE DOGMA OF EMPIRICISMClaire Ortiz Hill, Paris, France

Willard Van Orman Quines famous criticisms of theanalytic-synthetic distinction are studied in connection withEdmund Husserls criticisms of the same and his theoriesabout axiomatization, the foundations of arithmetic, sets,and manifolds. Reference is made to Bernard Bolzano,Karl Weierstrass, Franz Brentano, Gottlob Frege, andDavid Hilbert.

DID WITTGENSTEIN FOLLOW THE RULES?(OR WAS HE GUIDED BY THEM?)Jaakko Hintikka, Boston, Massachusetts

In The Blue Book Wittgenstein recognized two possibleaccounts of what it means to follow a rule: (1) acting inaccordance with it; (2) the rules playing a part in myactivity of following it. Wittgenstein initially rejected (1)because it seems to provide only a causal account of rule-learning and rule-following. He opted for (2), which poseda problem because he had given up his earlier belief in thedirect accessibility of rules in experience. Hence Wittge-nsteins problem was not an epistemological problem ofhow to follow a rule, but the question as to how a rule asan external object can guide my actions. This is essentiallythe same as to how the blueprint of a machine determinesits movements. Wittgenstein never solved his problem, andreverted back to the account (1).

ARE THERE CHARACTERISTICSAND THINGS?Herbert Hochberg,Austin, Texas

In a once celebrated controversy, Moore and Stout both

took for granted (1) that there were things and theircharacteristics, and (2) the latter were predicables, theformer not. The debate concerned whether characteristicswere universalsor what are now commonly called tropes.Taking characteristics to be tropes is a moderate form ofnominalism, by contrast with the extreme nominalism,going back to a view attributed to Rocelinus and prom-ulgated by Quine and his progeny, that takes predicates toreplace properties and thereby denies that there are char-acteristics, whether universal or particular. F. MacBridehas recently exhumed a further twist in the dialectic Ramseys argument in Universals challenging the dis-tinction between what is predicable and what is not whileArmstrong has contributed a purportedly new analysis ofpredication. Ramseys challenge, MacBrides argumentsand Armstrongs proposal are analyzed. All are found

wanting. The discussion suggests a way to give our experi-ence of objects, characteristics, relations and facts itsdue.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLEOF CONSCIOUSNESS FORINTROSPECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGEFrank Hofmann, Tbingen, Germany

Recently, some philosophers have claimed that con-sciousness has an important epistemological role to play inthe introspective self-ascription of ones own mental states.

This is the thesis of the epistemological role of con-sciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticizeBonJours account of the role of consciousness for intro-spection. He does not provide any reason for believing thatconscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalistaccount of how the thesis could be true. Conscious statesare available to the subject in a very special way in whichnon-conscious states are not available. This is the first partof the explanation. The crucial further element in therepresentationalist account is what I would like to call theintrospective mode of mind. A mind can operate in certainways or modes modes of mind. Introspection normallytakes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgmentsabout ones environment in the mode of taking onesappearances at face value. And there probably are othermodes of mind. The introspective mode of mind ischaracterized by the special way or framework in whichcognitive capacities are employed.


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EMOTIONALE AKTE UNDMORALISCHE WERTERafael Hntelmann,Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland

In dem Vortrag soll aufgewiesen werden, da moralischeWerte objektiv sind, da sie zum Bestand unserer realenWelt gehren wie Handlungen. Moralische Werte sind abernicht wahrnehmbar. Bei Ihrer Erkenntnis spielen emo-tionale Akte eine besondere Rolle. Die Nichtwahrnehm-barkeit moralischer Qualitten spricht aber nicht gegenderen Objektivitt. Damit wird dem Non-Kognitivisteninsofern Recht gegeben, als er die Auffassung vertritt, damoralische Qualitten nicht wahrnehmbar sind, es wirdihm aber widersprochen, sofern er die Auffassung ver-teidigt, da moralische Eigenschaften berhaupt nichterkennbar sind. Ein emotionaler Akt hat einen Gegen-stand, der ebenso wenig subjektiv ist wie der Gegenstandeines Wahrnehmungsaktes, bzw. der keine blo mentaleEntitt ist. Wahrnehmungsakte knnen emotionale Akteverursachen, die angemessen oder unangemessen sein

knnen. Allein Akte des Glaubens erkennen aber mora-lische Tatsachen.

DIEAUTOBIOGRAPHISCHEN BEMERK-UNGENVON LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN:ZWISCHEN REPRSENTATIONUND KONSTRUKTION.KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHEBETRACHTUNGEN ZUM (AUTO-)BIOGRAPHISCHEN SCHREIBEN.Nicole L. Immler, Graz, sterreich

Bereits in den 1950er Jahren war seine BiographieLegende (Ingeborg Bachmann), und sptestens nachden Jubilen, hundertster Geburtstag (1989) und 50-jhriger Todestag (2001), wurde das Bedrfnis laut, denMythos Ludwig Wittgenstein entkrften zu wollen. Dazu seiaber weder eine Sammlung von Erinnerungsstcken,noch ein biographisches Unternehmen im vertrauten Sinne(erlaubt), wo nach der Illusion der Einheit von Werk undLeben gefahndet wird, sondern vor allem Beteiligte, derProtagonist selbst, wie Zeitzeugen heranzuziehen. Kanndieser Ruf nach den sogenannten Primrquellen helfen,gewissen Stilisierungen der Biographen auf die Spur zukommen bzw. den wahren Wittgenstein zu entdecken? Indiesem Diskussionskontext sind Wittgensteins auto-biographische Bemerkungen in Bezug auf Selbstwahr-nehmung und Selbstdarstellunginteressant.

WHAT ARE PROPER NAMES FOR?Frank Jackson, Canberra, Australia

Critics of the description theory of reference for propernames often say that we can refer using a proper name Nwhen we do not know descriptions that serve to pick outwhat N refers to. Supporters of the description theory pointout that this isnt correct. What is correct is that certaincandidates to be the identifying descriptions do not fill thebill. Critics then reply that the sense in which this is truedoesnt really blunt the substance of their criticism.

We are all familiar with this to-ing and fro-ing. I will revisitthe debate from the perspective of an enquiry into why wehave proper names in natural languages in the first place. Iwill use this enquiry to motivate a style of descriptiontheory that meets some recent objections made by itscritics including some by Scott Soames.

WHO HAS GOT OUR GROUP-INTENTIONS?Ludger Jansen, Bonn, Germany

There are group-actions, and if actions are intentional,there should also be group-intentions. Who has got theseintentions? The groups? This seems to be the naturalanswer. But then: Groups do not have a mind or brain ofthere own to form any mental attitude. Different kinds ofindividualistic analyses of group-intentions have beensuggested in the literature. On the one hand there aresuggestions to reduce group intentions to a complex ofdifferent I-attitudes. John Searle, on the other hand,

suggests a special social kind of attitudes, namely we-intentions. We-intentions are being had by individualpersons, though they have the form We intend to do such-and-such. However, because of the fallibility of Searlianwe-intentions and the possibility of ignorance this conceptis of no help: We-intentions are neither necessary norsufficient for group-intentions. In this respect, MargaretGilberts approach is much more successful, though itcovers only a special case, namely small-scale informalgroups. I suggest a generalised solution in order to coveralso large-scale and formal groups.

TRUTHMAKING: A COGNITION-INDEPENDENT INTERNAL RELATIONWITH HETEROGENEOUS RELATAIngvar Johansson, Saarbrcken, Germany

For many assertions, the correspondence theory of truthseems intuitively to give the best account of the differencebetween truth and falsity, but one of its problems is how toexplicate the notions of correspondence and truth-making. In conformity with the view of David Armstrong, itis claimed that truthmaking is an internal relation betweena truthmaker and a truth(-value-)bearer. The truthbearer (atoken proposition) can exist without the truthmaker (anobject or a state of affairs), and vice versa, but when bothexist the truthmaker necessarily makes the truthbearer trueand correspondence obtains. Contrary to Armstrongsreductionist analyses of internal relations and propositions,however, it is argued that internal relations can have amind-independent existence and add to being, thattruthbearers and truthmakers are categorially different, andthat the correspondence theory of truth requires adistinction between internal relations with heterogeneousand homogeneous relata, respectively.


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TOWARD A SYNTHESIS:MUNSON AND THE PROBLEM OFWITTGENSTEINS PHENOMENOLOGYMatthew P. Johnson, Millersville, Pennsylvania

In 1962, frustrated with the rancor that marked the debatebetween continental and analytic philosophy, ThomasMunson offered the then-radical theory that the Wittgen-stein of the Philosophical Investigations was practicing atype of phenomenology. The problem, however, is that hisaccount of Wittgensteins phenomenology is vague, pro-vides inadequate support, and fails to make relevantcomparisons to continental literature. This paper intends toprovide Munson with adequate support for his claim vis--vis a comparison of the methods of Wittgenstein andHeidegger, as well as proposes an explanation for whyMunson failed to do so.

KNNEN SICH DINGE NDERN?Christian Kanzian, Innsbruck, sterreich

Im Alltag scheint es uns klar zu sein, dass Dinge,Lebewesen und menschliche Personen eingeschlossen,dieselbenbleiben, obwohl sie sich ndern. M.E. gehrt essogar zum Kern unseres Selbstverstndnisses, dass demso ist. Wir ndern uns. Wir bleiben dennoch dieselben.Warum soll es schwierig sein, das zu verstehen? DieseFrage knnen wir u.a. beantworten, wenn wir uns aufLeibniz Gesetz berufen, demzufolge Dinge genau dannidentisch sind, wenn sie in allen Eigenschaften ber-einstimmen: ndert sich ein Ding, stimmt es, vor dernderung, nicht mit ihm, nach der nderung, in allenEigenschaften berein. Also scheint es nach Leibniz Ge-setz auch nicht dasselbebleiben zu knnen. Wie, so lsstsich unser Problem formulieren, soll Leibniz Gesetz mitdem Phnomen der nderung und der Annahme dia-chroner Identitt zusammengehen?

In meinem Beitrag mchte ich einen neuen Lsungsansatzvorstellen, die diachrone Identitt von Dingen sowie derennderung zu verstehen, ohne Leibniz Prinzip aufgeben zumssen. (Und ohne die von Lewis und Simons aufge-wiesenen Probleme der zeitlich relativierten Prdikationvon Eigenschaften aus den Augen zu verlieren.)

DER INHALT INNERERREPRSENTATIONEN IM LICHT VON

PEIRCES ZEICHENBEGRIFFStefan Kappner, Idstein, Deutschland

Teleosemantic theories are based on the idea that thenormative notion of content can be explained with theequally normative notion of a biological proper function,applied to (internal) representations. But the problem ofhow to determine the specific content of a given biologicalrepresentation remains unresolved. According to Peircessemiotics, the determination of content must proceed fromthe (proper) interpretation of a given sign, not from its(proper) effects. In order to speak of biological represen-tations it is therefore necessary to use an extremely broadnotion of interpretation or semiosis. This approach yieldstwo results: First, that the indeterminism problem can be

solved. Second, that it is doubtful that we can meaningfully

speak of internal representations while using internalina strictly biological sense.

EXPRESSIVISM, NORMATIVITY,

AND MEANINGAntti Kauppinen, Helsinki, Finland

Expressivism is the view that in spite of appearances,evaluative and normative judgments are not factual butrather express attitudes toward non-normative facts. In thispaper, it is argued that expressivism and other forms ofnon- or quasi-factualism cannot coherently be generalizedto cover all areas of normative discourse. This is becausenon-factualism about one kind of normative talk, meaning-talk, would efface the distinction between factual and non-factual discourse in general, as Crispin Wright has argued,and so undermine expressivism as a position distinct fromrealism. Wittgensteinian considerations are invoked toshow why an objection to Wright by Simon Blackburn fails.

This means that it has to be possible to account for at leastone kind of normative discourse, meaning-talk, in factualterms. Since explaining normativity as such does notrequire adopting expressivism, doubt is cast on the needfor more local forms of it, such as moral expressivism.

MUSIK-PHNOMENOLOGIE:ZUR WAHRNEHMUNG VONEMOTION UND BEDEUTUNGKULTURELLER GEGENSTNDEAnnekatrin Kessler, Graz, sterreich

In diesem Paper soll versucht werden, Implikationen derHusserlschen Phnomenologie, insbesondere seinerKonzeptionen der Personund der geistigen Welt(Ideen zueiner reinen Phnomenologie...), auf die Musikpsychologieherauszustellen.

MusikpsychologInnen machen vor allem im Bereich derErforschung von Emotion und Bedeutung in der Musik den Fehler, Methode, Begriffsdefinition/Gegenstands-bereich und Interpretation der Ergebnisse nicht auf-einander abzustimmen. So kommt es in diesem For-schungsgebiet zu Kategorienfehlern, die es erforderlichmachen, die traditionellen insbesondere naturwissen-schaftlichen aber auch geisteswissenschaftlichen Metho-den der Musikpsychologie und deren Anwendungsgebieteneu zu berdenken. Eine solchermaen kritische Positio-

nierung gegenber der traditionellen Musikpsychologiemuss sich vor allem die Frage stellen, inwieweit stheti-sche Erfahrungen objektivierbar sind. Des weiteren soll dieBedeutung der intersubjektiven und subjektiven Erfah-rungswelt fr die sthetische Erfahrung herausgestrichenwerden.

Husserls Ausweisung der verschiedenen Seiten desSubjekts Krper, Leib,Geist/Person bietet nicht nur dieMglichkeit, die sthetische Erfahrung zu beschreiben,sondern beinhaltet auch ein wissenschaftskritisches Po-tential. Letzteres findet zwar Umsetzung im Bereich derKultur-Psychologie (Allesch, ed. Perspektiven der Kultur-psychologie, 1990) oder der Musiktherapie (Decker-Voigt,Aus der Seele gespielt. Eine Einfhrung in Musiktherapie2000), nicht aber innerhalb der Musikpsychologie.


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A DRETSKEAN PREDICAMENTOF INTENTIONALITY

Youngjin Kiem, Buffalo, New York

In opposition to the Brentanian perspective on the inten-

tionality of the mind, Fred Dretske proposes that there aredifferent levels of intentionality, and that even a simplephysical system could have a certain degree of intention-ality. At least in part he succeeds in separating the notionof the mark of the mental from the traditional idea of inten-tionality. When it comes to the proper role and function ofhigh-level intentionality, however, the idea of intentionalityas the mark of the mental seems to reappear. I call this aDretskean predicament of intentionality. I argue that oneway to overcome the difficulty is to avoid defining inten-tionality in terms of intensionality.

WITTGENSTEINS THERAPEUTISCHE

BEHANDLUNG VONBEDEUTUNGSTHEORIENMichael Kohler, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland

Wittgensteins Vergleich seiner Methode mit einer Therapiewird oft so aufgefat, da er weder in seiner Sprach-philosophie noch anderswo philosophische Aussagen umihrer selbst willen verfochten hat, sondern lediglich, umuns die Inhaltslosigkeit philosophischer Ausdrucksformenzu demonstrieren und uns so von unserem Bedrfnis nachPhilosophie zu heilen. Ich mchte in diesem Papier diealternative These vertreten, da Wittgensteins Therapiedarauf abzielt, uns zu zeigen, wie wir eine bestimmte Formvon Bedeutungstheorie akzeptieren knnen, wenn wir unsvon falschen Erwartungen frei machen. Dazu werde ich

auf Wittgensteins Vergleich der Sprache mit einer Technikeingehen und zwei Konzeptionen normengesteuertenVerhaltens unterscheiden, in deren Konfusion eine derUrsachen unserer verzerrten Selbstwahrnehmung liegt, dieWittgenstein diagnostiziert.

ON SOME METAPHILOSOPHICALIMPLICATIONS OF QUINEAN NATURALISMHeikki J. Koskinen, Helsinki, Finland

The nature and role of philosophy in relation to science isproblematic, especially within the analytic tradition. Thispaper tries to find a place for the discipline by charting

certain metaphilosophical implications of Quines position.It is argued that Quinean naturalism results in ametaphysical turn which enables philosophy to studygeneral ontological issues that do not belong to the sphereof any of the special sciences.

SUBJECTIVIST VS. OBJECTIVISTTHEORIES OF GOODNESS AND THEPOSSIBILITY OF A COMBINED STRATEGYMichael Khler, Erlangen Nrnberg, Germany

One might say that a conflict between subjectivist and

objectivist theories lies at the core of the debate aboutunderstanding goodness. So the first question is what

exactly is meant by a subjectivist and an objectivistaccount of goodness. After that, the question arises whichside should be favoured, given their respective arguments.However, if both sides are compelling in some ways andshow weaknesses in some others, a combined strategy, ifpossible, seems to be attractive.

In my paper I will mention some main features of bothsubjectivist and objectivist theories first and then point outthat neither a subjectivist nor an objectivist theory can bespelled out without implicitly leading to positions of theother. At this point, a quick look at some useful distinctionsin goodness can help to clarify the debate and to sketchthe possibility of a combined and thus more convincingstrategy.

LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OFPOLITICAL CONTRACTARIANISMJrg Khnelt, Konstanz, Germany

Many modern societies justify their political norms byreferring to a consensus of values that does not ne-cessarily exist in plural states. Therefore it should beexamined, whether the means of analytical philosophy aresystematically able to justify legal coercive power in such acontext. Contractarianism appears to be interesting, be-cause it legitimizes norms without recourse to a con-tentious moral base. These norms are legitimate if it canbe shown that they increase the utility of eachparticipatingindividual. In the first section this argument is introducedbriefly and it is shown why it is systematically limited to anarrow cooperation enabling less than the status quo ofmany states. In the following section an idea is presentedfacilitating further gains of cooperation within a frameworkof so called metanorms. The final part of this paper briefly

discusses the structure and function of these metanorms.

ANALYTICITY AND LOGICAL TRUTH:FROM BOLZANO TO QUINEWolfgang Knne, Hamburg, Germany

In Kants Critique of Pure Reason I was at once attractedby the distinction between analytic and syntheticjudgements, although I could never put up with Kantsexplanation of that distinction. Thus Bernard Bolzano whogave his own explanation of analyticity in general and oflogico-analytic truth in particular in 1837. When Quinerecapitulated in the mid-fifties his 1936 demarcation of

logical truth, he added an acknowledgement: Substantiallythis formulation is traced back, by Bar-Hillel, to Bolzano. Ishall try to determine the exact relation between Quinesand Bolzanos accounts and to evaluate their respective(de)merits.

In the course of this, I shall examine Bolzanos assess-ments of Locke and Kant and have a glance at Fregesand the Logical Positivists readings of analytic. In the endwe shall see that the struggle with the notion of logicaltruth gives us some incentive for being friendly to Stze ansich alias propositions.


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HORWICH AND THEGENERALIZATION PROBLEMKlaus Ladsttter,Albany, New York

In order to be complete, Horwichs minimalist theory must

be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logicaland an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalizationproblem are distinguished, and Horwichs responses toboth sides of the problem are examined. Finally somepersistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.

UNDERSTANDING LINGUISTIC SIGNS.A NOTE ON HUSSERL AND FREGESandra Lapointe, Montral, Canada

Analogies between Freges and Husserls respectivetheories of meanings are well known, but comparisons areoften unfair to Husserls philosophy of language. I am hereinterested not in what these two philosophers have to sayabout meaning per se, but about what they say aboutsigns, the way in which they can be said to signify, as wellas in their conceptions of the conditions under whichlinguistic signs can be identified and understood. Inparticular, I show how Husserls theory may help usunderstand a set of idiosyncratic remarks Frege makes inthe Grundgesetze which vouches for an interpretation ofhis philosophy of language which is both more plausibleand epistemologically more acceptable than the standardinterpretation will allow.

DETERMINISM, RANDOMNESS

AND DESERT-VALUENoa Latham, Calgary, Canada

This paper offers a thought experiment to show that valuesembodied in what I call desert principles should beabandoned if one believes either in determinism or inprobabilistic indeterminism. Desert principles are thoseentailing that the intrinsic goodness of a persons receivingpleasure or pain depends on the virtue or vice of theperson. I also offer two reasons for preferring to examinethe relation between values and determinism directlyrather that doing so in terms of free will or moralresponsibility.

INSTINCTS AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN REIDMarion Ledwig, Santa Cruz, California

I relate Reid to Tinbergens The Study of Instinct. TakingFreud as a starting point, I consider the question whetherinstincts are conscious in Reid.

EXPERIENCE AND ANALYSISOF A WORK OF ARTKeith Lehrer, Tucson, Arizona

Arnold Isenberg, in an article of remarkable longevity,

Critical Communication, claimed that the discursiveanalysis of a work of art required the experience of thework of art to fill in the meaning of the critical description.Other aestheticians have proposed that there is somethingineffable about the content of a work of art which one canonly understand in the particular experience of the work ofart. These reflections, if they contain an insight, leave uswith something of a paradox. How can the content of thework, or even what the work of art is like, be both particularto experience, in some way ineffable, and the subject ofcritical discourse? How can the content, or what the workof art is like, be at the same time general enough to be partof the meaning of critical discourse and at the same timebe particular and unique to the experience of the work?The problem intensifies when one attempts to understandthe relationship between the experience of art and the

theory of art. I argue that the solution to the problem iscontained in an understanding of how the particularexemplar becomes representational in a process I havecalled exemplarization which makes the particular partand parcel of the content of the work or what it is like.

SCIENCE AND VALUE-JUDGEMENTSAgnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Lublin, Poland

The paper defends the claim that value-judgements areessential for science. They cannot be restricted to purelyepistemic ones, if we take seriously both everydayscientific practice and the nature of our language. For

moral and methodological values are entangled, as muchas are facts and values. I attempt to demonstrate this byconsidering cases of scientific practice where moralconsiderations are necessary for (a) formulating a scientificproblem and evaluating a solution; (b) choosing a researchmethod; (c) accepting a hypothesis; (d) evaluating thecorrectness of fact description and explanation; (e)justifying a hypothesis. Admitting the presence of moralvalues in science does not threaten the objectivity ofscience but forces us to rethink our post-Humean un-derstanding of values and value-judgements.


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EXPERIENCING THE MEANINGOF A WORDDorit Lemberger, Ramat-Gan, Israel

In the second part of his book, Philosophical Investi-

gations, Wittgenstein integrates a number of extraordinaryterms: aspect perception, aspect blindness and wordsignificance experience. These terms are extraordinarysince they incorporate a type of judgment that can beapplied upon a persons ability to comprehend a wordsmeaning. The use of these terms is strange since Witt-genstein declaratively avoids using any judgment andfocuses on describing examples as a guiding metho-dology.

Even for the process of defining these terms he usesexamples, however, this is done by integrating terms fromvarious fields that express the idea of body and soulunification. This very unification is what enables Witt-gensteins methods break the boundaries of analyticalphilosophy in order to research additional fields in which

body and soul are integrated as well as in fields in whichvisual and verbal aspects are integrated such as: literature,art and psychology.

INTRINSIC VALUE ANDTHE NOTION OF A LIFEJerrold Levinson, College Park, Maryland

In this paper I explore the concept of intrinsic value, butfrom a particular angle. I am interested in the generalshape or form of sustainable judgments of intrinsic value.My main suggestion is that the notion of a life provides thekey to what that shape or form is. I claim, in particular, that

such judgments must have as subject that a sentient life isa certain way. This life-based conception of intrinsic valueis contrasted throughout with object-based and experi-ence-based conceptions. At the end of the paper I offersome reflections on whether aesthetic value is intrinsic,and on the idea of value in general.

INTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISMAND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTIONCaleb Liang, Taipei, Taiwan

Shoemaker has recently proposed a version of internalistrepresentationalism that aims to reconcile the possibility ofinverted spectrum with the transparency of experience andto give an essential role to qualia in experience. This viewis criticized by Michael Tye, and defended by Kriegel andby Shoemaker himself. In this paper, I investigate thisdebate and contend that neither Kriegels nor Shoemakersdefenses are satisfactory.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DES SPRACHSPIELSFR EINE NEUFASSUNG BIBLISCHERTHEOLOGIE: DIE SPRACHSPIELE JESUMarkus Locker, Manila, Philippinen

Obwohl die sprachphilosophischen Konsequenzen vonWittgensteins zentralem Begriff seiner Sptphilosophie,dem Sprachspiel, weitreichende Folgen fr die allgemeineTheologie hatten, blieb jene theologische Disziplin, die sichletztlich mit Sprache befasst, die Exegese und diedazugehrende biblische Theologie, davon fast unberhrt.Dieser Aufsatz zeigt, dass ein Versuch, biblische Spracheim Sinne eines Sprachspiels zu beschreiben, nicht nurneue Einsichten in die Bedeutung biblischer Texte bringt,sondern auch der bestehenden Crux dieses Faches, derDistanz zwischen Auslegung und Anwendung von Texten,entgegenwirkt. Somit knnen die dem Sprachspielzugehrenden Begriffe wie Lebensform undGrammatikzuzentralen Bausteinen einer fundamentalen Neuformulie-rung der biblischen Theologie werden.

ESPERANTO. THE FEELING OFDISGUST: WITTGENSTEINON PLANNED LANGUAGESWinfried Lffler, Innsbruck, Austria

Wittgensteins radical aversion against planned languageslike Esperanto and Basic English has found little attentionso far. But maybe the phenomenon deserves moreinterest, since it may give a clue to another point ofcontinuity between his early and later philosophy. Aftersome information on planned languages, I will put togetherthe directly relevant texts. An analysis shows that

Wittgensteins statements on planned languages werebased on superficial knowledge only, and that they wererather misguided from an interlinguistic point of view.

WOULD WITTGENSTEIN APPROVE ADISTINCTION BETWEEN INVENTED ANDNATURAL LANGUAGE-GAMES?Lin Ma, Leuven, Belgium

The standard reading of the Philosophical Investigationsas represented by Baker & Hackers work makes adistinction between invented and natural language-games.

According to this reading, the invented language-gamesare considered as genuine ones which consist in imaginarylanguage-involving activities designed for the purpose ofilluminating particular philosophical confusions. Naturallanguage-games result from applying this language-game method to parts of our actual linguistic practices. Inthis paper I undertake to show that both naturalness andinventedness belong together as two inseparable elementsinherent in the very conception of language-games. It goesagainst Wittgensteins intention to set apart these twointegrally united factors and projects them out as differenttypes. The misleading distinction between invented andnatural language-games constitutes one of the sources foran opposition between a conceptualistic construal and asociological interpretation concerning the more generalorientation of Wittgensteins thought.


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MEINONGS FRHEWAHRNEHMUNGSLEHREMarina Manotta, Bologna, Italien

Vor dem Aufbau der Gegenstandstheorie ist Meinongs

Wahrnehmungslehre durch zwei Spannungen gekenn-zeichnet: (1) die zwischen Rezeptivitt und Produktivittund (2) die zwischen elementaren und komplexen Be-wusstseinsinhalten. Seit 1891 schliet die Wahrneh-mungslehre in ihrem Bereich auch die Gestaltqualitten (inMeinongs Terminologie: die fundierten Inhalte) ein undwendet sich betrchtlich von der klassischen Psychologiedes 19. Jahrhunderts ab. Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, dieoben erwhnte Spannung darzulegen und einige derSchwierigkeiten zu beschreiben, die die Einfhrung vonGestaltqualitten mit sich bringt.

VALUES AND VALUE-JUDGMENTS

Johann Christian Marek, Graz, Austria

In the paper I argue against the thesis of the existence ofobjective values and try to defend the subjectivity of valuesin an important sense, namely as a kind of intersubjectivity.Despite its linguistic form a value-judgment rather ex-presses a value-attitude (evaluation, appraisal) than itdescribes things as having special objective value prop-erties. It is the movement of the mind that determines theconstellation of the values, and not the other way around,where there would be objective, absolute, impersonalvalues governing our mind.

Values are mental facts; they are mainly constituted andmaintained by our evaluations (value attitudes) and, be-hind them, by our value feelings. Evaluations are a special

kind of mental activity, such as assuming, judging, wishingand feeling are. Since subjects usually belong to groups,values generally are social facts, and value attitudes havea collective character (we-intentionality). The linguisticexpressions of evaluations are value-judgments (whichhave to be distinguished from statements about values andvalue-attitudes, i.e. descriptions and explanations of val-ues). Essential to an evaluation is its normative, emotional-volitive aspect, but value-attitudes always contain cognitivecomponents as well.

This approach will be confronted with a view according towhich a value feeling has the function of presenting valuesin an objective sense, just as our senses present sensoryproperties like color and taste. Meinong, for example,takes value properties analogously to secondary prop-erties, and, moreover, interprets them as complex qualities

similar to Gestalt-qualities which involve sense qualitiesas their foundation. This assimilation to our Gestalt per-ception has its plausibility, but it seems not to do justice tothe phenomenologically normative and demanding char-acter of value judgments.

ON THE REDUCIBILITY OFCONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITYAusonio Marras, London, Canada

It has widely been claimed that the reduction of phe-

nomenal consciousness is confronted by an explanatorygap not confronted by other kinds of theoretical reductionsin science, or even by the reduction of intentional prop-erties. This claim presupposes a functional model ofreduction requiring an a priori entailment from the facts inthe reduction base to the facts to be explained arequirement that the reduction of consciousness is inprinciple unable to satisfy. I argue that the requirement inquestion is one that no reduction in science should beexpected to satisfy, and that the question of the reducibilityof either phenomenal or intentional properties is, like anyother case of reduction in science, a thoroughly empiricalquestion, not one to be settled on conceptual groundsalone.

HUMAN SOUL, HUMAN BODYAND HUMAN BEINGAsha Maudgil, Chandigarh, India

After 1930, Wittgenstein started questioning his earlierviews. Attack on the Cartesian subject for some yearsbecame his obsession. The Cartesian subject is undoubt-edly to be rejected, but it has to be rejected with duerespect. The human body seems to have obtained agreater significance in Wittgensteins later life. By sayingthat the human body is the best picture of the human soulWittgensteins view on the relation between the humansoul and the human body comes very close to the view ofAristotle. Wittgensteins metaphor of the body as the bestpicture of the soul can easily be substituted for Aristotlesmetaphor of the body as the dress of the soul. The conceptof thinking is tied to language. According to Wittgenstein, itis only in the primary sense thoughts and experiences canbe ascribed only to human beings. It is only in thesecondary derivative sense that animals have thoughtsand experiences.


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NICHT ALLES, WAS HUND GENANNTWIRD, MACHT WAU-WAU ERFAHRUNG UND ANALYSE ALSGRUNDLEGENDE KOMPONENTEN DESFREMDSPRACHENUNTERRICHTS

Annelore Mayer, Wien, sterreich

Am Beispiel einer typischen Situation im Fremdsprachen-unterricht soll gezeigt werden, wie die zu lernenden Wrterim Kontext ihre Bedeutung und ihren Gebrauchswerterhalten.

Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass jede Sprache ein ei-gener Fluss des Lebens ist, wo jedes Wort seine eigenekonkrete und symbolische Bedeutung hat und dadurchnicht ohne Verlust in eine andere Sprache bergefhrtwerden kann.

Eine analytische Untersuchung des Gebrauchs der Wrterin der Muttersprache und der Lernsprache soll es er-mglichen, deren Erfahrungswert fr das Erlernen einer

anderen Sprache nutzbar zu machen.Analyse und Erfahrung knnen so zu wechselseitigen Be-dingnissen im Unterrichtsgeschehen werden. Sie er-mglichen einen individuellen Direktzugang zur Lernspra-che, weil die Erfahrungen aus der Muttersprache berlegtin den Lernprozess eingebaut werden knnen. Durch dieKonfrontation mit den Inhalten und Wertigkeiten derLernsprache im Vergleich mit der Muttersprache wird auchein reflektierender Umgang mit den Erfahrungen aus dereigenen Sprache provoziert. So entsteht ein individuellesBewusstsein fr beide Sprachen, die den Lerner vor fal-schen Analogien und dem inadquaten Umgang mit denSymbolgehalten der Lernsprache bewahren knnen.

QUESTIONING THE ADEQUACY OFORDINARY LANGUAGE:A GLIMPSE AT WITTGENSTEIN, RICOEURAND CREATIVE METAPHORRyan Mays, Lexington, Kentucky

The later Wittgenstein attempts to dispel the difficultiesinherited from critiquing the language of everyday againstthe standard of the logically ideal by getting us to see theadequacy of ordinary language. Yet, some, such as PaulRicoeur, have objected that in so doing Wittgensteinconfines meaning to the success of using words already ina language game and thus ignores the poetic side oflanguage which is capable of producing new meaningwhich was not formerly a part of the language game. Whatcan Wittgenstein offer the poet who is restless withinordinary language and hopeful to create meaning throughthe intersection of different language games? DoesWittgensteins brand of ordinary language philosophy,meant as a cure for Russells and his own early logicalatomism, too hastily overlook the creative power of poeticlanguage in its drive to bring ideal logical theories ofmeaning to their knees?

AN APPROPRIATION, INSPIRED BY THEEARLY WITTGENSTEIN, OF EARLYDERRIDA ON ARISTOTLE ON TIMEDenis McManus, Southampton, Great Britain

This essay identifies two strands in Derridas early de-constructive reading of Aristotle on time. The first thedeep strand is that our philosophical thinking pre-supposes hitherto unrecognized structures to which thatthinking is committed but with which it cannot contend. Thesecond the shallow strand, which echoes an under-standing of philosophy that is presented most vividly in theearly Wittgenstein is that our philosophical thinking isgiven illusory substance by confusions that arise out ofsuperficial grammatical similarities. Though my suspicionis that both strands are essential to a full appreciation ofDerridas thinking, my paper suggests a way of ap-preciating some of his readings of philosophical texts through their shallow strand which does not commit us tothe reality of the problematic structures to which throughtheir deep strand those readings appear to lead us.

DER TOTALE SKEPTIZISMUS:EINE KONSEQUENTE AUSWEITUNG DESAUENWELTSKEPTIZISMUSGuido Melchior, Graz, sterreich

Ich werde folgendes zeigen: Wenn man von ganz grund-legenden erkenntnistheoretischen Thesen ber die Recht-fertigung und das Zutreffen von Annahmen ausgeht unddiese Thesen konsequent auf alle Annahmen, insbe-sondere auch auf Annahmen ber Rechtfertigung selbstanwendet, dann fhrt dies unmittelbar zu einem totalen

Skeptizismus, dem zufolge es fr jede Annahme gleicher-maen mglich ist, da sie zutrifft bzw. gerechtfertigt ist.

INTRINSIC VALUES ANDHUMAN EVALUATIONKirsten Meyer, Regensburg, Germany

In some areas of applied ethics or political philosophy, oneis confronted with disputes about intrinsic values. Inpolitical philosophy some argue against others thatequality is no intrinsic value. In environmental ethics manyphilosophers claim that nature has an intrinsic value undshould thus be preserved. As the term intrinsic value isnot common in ordinary language, one might wonder whatthis talk is all about. Many philosophers use the concept ofintrinsic value without explaining it. Others do explain it,but their explanations are often rather confusing. Thefollowing remarks show how the concept of intrinsic valueis employed and how it is connected with humanevaluation.


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NONSENSE, GRAMMAR, ANDTHE PHENOMENOLOGY OFACKNOWLEDGEMENT:WITTGENSTEIN ON MOOREThomas Andrew Meyer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The current therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein considersOn Certaintyas committed to the nonsensical character ofMoores response to skepticism. However, in this textWittgenstein makes sense of Moores anti-skepticalremarks as acknowledgements of the grammar. Wittgen-stein therefore does not treat Moores nonsense after themanner the therapeutic reading would suggest. InsteadWittgenstein here opens a distinctive question of thephenomenology of Moores seeming acknowledgements,that of the relation between acknowledging grammar andavowing an individuals subjectively certain beliefs, and ofthe proper placement of Moores remarks within the OnCertaintyaccount.

HUSSERL AND RUSSELL, 19111913Nikolay Milkov, Bielefeld, Germany

The objective of the paper is to compare Russells workfrom 191113, a period in which he was most creative, tothat of Husserl in the same period. I propose to discussfive topics on which the two philosophers came toastonishingly similar results.

(1) Russell believed that the prime task of philosophy is todiscover and describe logical forms; Husserl claimed that itis to describe phenomena. Logical forms/phenomena area priori and radically different from natural facts. (2) Logicalforms/phenomena are to be arrived at through logical

analysis/eidetic reduction. (3) Both Russell and Husserlaccepted the kind of philosophy which criticizes thenatural attitude. (4) Russell was indirectly influenced byHusserls attempt to classify all the elements that canoccur as constituents of mental phenomena. (5) BothHusserl and Russell made analyses of common senseobjects in terms of their perspectives and profiles.

INTENTIONALITY AND (UN)CONSCIOUSNESS:FREUDS DEBT TO BRENTANOFbio Jesus Miranda, Gois, Brazil

This paper emphasizes the role of intentionality as anessential property of human mental life. So, intentionalitysurpasses the conscious domain and questions theabsolutism of a rationality that claims the existence of aninternal link between consciousness and intentionality.

IS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSISA POSTERIORI?Nenad Miscevic, Maribor, Slovenia Budapest, Hungary

There are important a posteriori elements in conceptual

knowledge and conceptual analysis. The paper criticallyexamines Horgans diagnosis of those and then offers abrief taxonomy of possible sources of aposteriority at twolevels of justification, spontaneous and reflective. At thefirst level, the individual deep aposteriority infects the originof legitimacy, deriving from (1) the empirical origin of manyreferentially correct concepts. (2): more deeply, our innatecategories might derive from evolutionary trial-and-errorlearning. (3) and (4): beliefs analytical in referentially in-correct concepts and categories lack immunity from em-pirical revision.

The reflective level involves general coherence. (5): thepositive support might be one of wide reflective equilibriumwith empirical elements, and (6): the negative support, i.e.absence of undermining, might be sensitive to empirical

data. The last source concerns explanation of havingconceptual beliefs and of their reliability. (7): if causal ex-planation is part of reflective justification and is a posteriorithen justification is partly a posteriori.

INTENTIONALITY AND THEANTINOMY OF THE LIARKrystyna Misiuna, Warsaw, Poland

Mental acts are most important constituents of truth-bearers. This insight unde

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