Epistemontological View of

Reality

Dr. Angell O. de la Sierra, Esq.

Table of Contents.

Prologue.

1. Introduction.

2. Understanding the Consciousness Literature.

3. An Epistemontological Argument.

4. The Possible Quantum Interface and the Hybrid Nature of Reality.

5. Exploring the Possible Quantum Interface.

6. A Brief Analysis of Beliefs.

7. Notes on the Possible Structure of a Belief Proposition.

8. Is the brain a probabilistic or a logical calculating machine?

9. A Fishing Expedition Inside Hilbert’s Space.

10. Being and Becoming in Brain Dynamics.

11. Neurodynamics of Causation., More on Being and Becoming.

12. The Neurodynamics of Probabilistic Causation?

13. Dynamic Synthesis of Levels of Consciousness. An Epistemontological

View.

14. Between Random Impossibility and Illusory Certainty, The Survival of

Free Will. From Chaos to Probable Outcome.

15. Axiology in Post Modern JudeoChrIslamic Monotheism.

Epilogue.

End of Table of Contents.

This journey across the bumpy trail of the abstract mind ended in the first

volume of this treatise pretty much the same way it all started; a horizon

was in sight, a strategic plan to get there was executed but still many

conceptual obstacles and hurdles to climb at the end. In this second

attempt, with the benefit of hindsight, there seems to be no end to the

sinuous trail... for there will always emerge a new bifurcation to decide

upon and follow slowly, with trepidation.. but with an unrelenting burning

desire to reach that invisible, ever receding noumenal Omega destination

where it all begins....and ends? For those insatiable masoquist spirits

who'd rather obsessively travel than get there, the mapping journey for

others to follow becomes the destination when you search for the meaning

of life and consciousness.

Natural language continues to play, in our opinion, a leading role in

the formulation and explanation of what is alleged by cosmologists (and

other brainy poets) to be a conformation and functioning of the all

encompassing global consciousness. We still hope to identify that missing

link connecting the sense-phenomenal ontology (of the perceptually

falsifiable observations in objects and events, by external or internal

receptors) and the corresponding abstract epistemology (of the

conceptual, mathematical/modal-logic maps) of the experienced

existential reality. A tautological, epistemontological hybrid model of

reality would be our biggest contribution to the study of consciousness.

But, as before, the effort has turned out to generate more questions and

abstractions than we had hoped to answer and bargained for. As we

discussed in the first volume of "Neurophilosophy of Consciousness."

(chapters 12, 21, 22) and many other places since, we had hoped to give

a complete ambitious description of the amygdaloid complex as a natural

candidate for the seat of consciousness based primarily, among other

things, on its well documented participation (with the hippocampus

formation) in coordinating the avoidance reflex responses when humans

were confronted with natural life-threatening environmental stimuli. This

would arguably take care of the ontological aspect of the hybrid model of

reality. As it turns out the stimulating natural object / event in this case is

meaning-neutral, the semantic tag being provided by inherited life-

preserving amygdaloidal audio-visual (and other modalities) codelets as

modified by experience. We called the amygdaloidal complex the inherited

proto-semantic data base. Pursuant to the analysis we developed we

designated the ‘shores’ surrounding the Sylvian fissure (perisylvian area)

inter-connecting all sensory inputs traveling into Heschl-Wernicke’s-

angular gyrus region and relaying them to Broca’s area (pre-frontal

executive cortex), the ‘proto-linguistic organ’ (plo). We labored hard to

weave together a meta-linguistic distributed network headquartered at

‘plo’ and modeled to integrate nativist considerations on syntax,

semantics, referentials, phonology, truth values, pragmatics, vector space

network theory and DNA-encoded language inputs. We even thought we

had found the 4-d coordinates for Chomsky’s generative grammar as the

same locus for a regenerative semantics, all embodied by the ‘plo’. There

we could combine both elements (universal grammar & proto-semantics)

and bring to life a comprehensive theory of ‘meaning’ linking linguistic

elements such as figures, signs, noises, marks and body movements as

different manifestations of a communication urge, mostly reducible in

principle to ‘propositional attitudes’ as configured in syntax structure and

semantics. We hoped it would represent the beginnings of a veritable

truth-conditional theory of meaning of high coherence value. We laid the

foundations, based on a reinterpretation of Fodor’s ‘mentalese’ and

Piaget’s theory on language acquisition by the newborn as discussed in

Volume I (chapter 5) and elsewhere. We scattered many seeds on fertile

grounds to germinate and flourish but still have not found the magic

fertilizer concept to make them sprout into a luxuriant independent

existence.

In this second volume we inevitably compounded the complexity of an

explanation on the structure/function of empirical reality when we realized

the importance of 'time' in extracting meaningful BPS survival information

from a potentially dangerous environment. In the first volume we

concluded, with others, that 'change', not time, was the most important

independent variable. Any serious observer must have noticed how reality

seems to be undergoing inexorable changes at all levels of organization,

from the cosmological to the sub-Planckian levels. Yet, when we get a

closer analytical look at objects they seem to change independent of

causal, temporal or symmetrical considerations. This contrasts with our

vital existential life dependence on those variables? We spend various

chapters in this second volume explaining why we must invent the

concepts of time and space to deal with nature's temporal asymmetry. We

are not sure how successful our modeling of reality would be when force

to include 'time' in our algorithm as a sine qua non to make sense and

extract meanings from nature's acausal, atemporal and asymmetric

reality, not to mention its probabilistic behavior, as discussed below. Thus

we find ourselves in a sense-phenomenal world posited between the

cosmological and noumenal invisibility to our senses and brain

computational capacities requiring the invention of a non-observation-

based mathematics and logic to explain the un-describable probable

reality we live in. The solution is a synthesis of the falsifiable empirical

descriptions with the mathematical logic explanations using the

metaphysical tool of quantum theory. This synthetic amalgamation of the

perceptual and the conceptual required no less than a modification of both

quantum theory and classical logic to accomodate the human 'free will'

between the indeterministic epistemological explanations and the

ontological descriptions of a probable world. Enter the epistemontological

model successes and pitfalls as described below.

In our opinion, we repeat, the focus of any such search for a

marketable algorithm should start first on revaluating the role played by

nature’s non-intentional sounds and signs as they get incorporated into

heritable proto-semantic ‘mentalese’ ‘atomic’ codelets and second on

analyzing the relative priority assignment of verbal (and non-verbal)

language in either thought ‘formation’ and / or ‘transmission’. The priority

choices get narrowed down to the alternatives of considering language as

either causally efficient in producing thought or dependant on it. Both

alternatives either co-exist independently or are mutually dependent on

each other. We still sustain that the biological survival inherited proto-

semantics in defense of biological integrity of the human species default

the operation of the psychic and social domains. In what seems like a

deterministic world where the visceral limbic brain defaults and controls a

bio-psycho-social (BPS) neuro-humoral equilibrium, man combines his

perceptual and conceptual past experiences in cortical attractor units of

probable future adaptive outcomes behavior ready to be executed when

confronted with a significant BPS change of survival contingencies

threatening the BPS equilibrium.

The inescapable (and expected 'lei motif') is clearly seen when

considering causality relations between two different domains, the

'physical' language (or its symbolic representation thereof) and the non-

physical ‘thought’. Fortunately, for starters, the choice approach should

narrow down to an manageable epistemological argumentation, trying to

avoid the constraints of wearing an elusive ontological straight jacket

fitting an ephemeral ‘thought entity’. The chosen strategy is driven by

pragmatic considerations if one can appreciate that it is more reliable to

analyze language as the basis of thought than the opposite approach

requiring more speculative activity when analyzing what ‘content’ of

thought is causing language generation as we analyzed in the first

volume.. Besides, the only known way we can be sure about subject A’s

thought content is by way of subject A’s first person account, a language

narrative. Analytically speaking, the choices are clear: either we get more

tangible results concentrating on analyzing linguistic syntacto-semantics

structure as being causal to thought or get lost analyzing the elusive

vagaries about the ‘intentionality’ content of thought or mental states as

causally efficient in producing the logic structure of language. The latter

approach, besides being counter-intuitive, would have to depend

considerably more on self-referential accounts of language users about

the beliefs and intentional mental states allegedly preceding the

corresponding language formulation on the basis of an equally

questionable co-variation of thought and language, or teleological wishful

thinking or an unconscious self-serving functional scheme of neo-

behaviorists as discussed elsewhere.

However, a re-interpretation of both Grice and Fodor may well do the

trick as we discuss in Volume 1. Based on all things considered and their

possible outcomes that we gambled and put our stock on the idea of a

language precursor to thought, especially after having previously

suggested the proto-linguistic organ ('plo') as the putative site for the

assembling of language-dependent thoughts, an attractive connectionist /

representationalist view of how the mind may operate. We also thought

that our new cortical attractor basin approach would give the

clinician/theoretician an additional pragmatic/logic tool to predict psychic

etiologies of disease based on first person mental state narratives as an

additional input.

This places modal logic and quantum theory development (and ‘plo’)

at center stage in our evolving ‘bps’ model of consciousness. We had

reasoned early on that if an appropriate environmental life- threatening

stimulus, e.g., a snake sound and a visual context of the scenery it came

from, can trigger an adaptive inborn behavior in a newborn species by

‘plo’ then it can also be involved in related but more complex language

elaboration. By integrating into its species-specific genetic memory the

acquired memories of existence, the primeval sounds and sights danger

cues get elaborated into a biopsychosocial (‘bpo’) survival strategy,

including a communication tool. The role played by DNA, genetic

archetypes, etc. in unleashing chemically-mediated adaptive responses

when triggered by environmental stimuli (cues) has been discussed

elsewhere. This mechanism included a consideration of mother’s ‘baby

talk’ cooing and her facial expressions as effective primitive phonemes

and cues to trigger appropriate modifier archetypes that add on to the

genetic proto-semantic reservoir of inherited ‘meanings’. The role played

by cortical ‘mirror neurons’ in imitating behavior is reasonably well

established. We now add another dimension to mirror neuron assemblies

when we charging them with empathizing not only with the subject under

observation but also with the observer and thereby generating the

experience of self consciousness as discussed in this volume.Thus the

inherited universal grammar links with a regenerative semantics clothed in

phonology and mimicry to evolve the sentential logic structure

(‘propositional attitudes’?). Species’ environmental survival tactics,

clothed as nature’s ‘meaningful cues’ survive by getting coded into DNA,

transmitted across generational gaps and translated in the newborn into a

proto-semantics nested circuitry (codelets). These get then shaped into a

regenerated environmental survival weapon de novo. Its presence is felt

first by reflex adaptive patterns as described elsewhere and then gets

developmentally modified into a syntacto-semantic architecture. The

inherited first stage gets modified in the newborn by mothers ‘cooings’

and facial expressions and posterior environmental sense inputs.

This view of language generation places primeval semantics transfer

at unconscious nativist levels ahead of syntactic arrangements by ‘plo’.

This and the arguments in favor of cortical attractors leaves volition and

free will at ‘the proximate cause’ level of control and now further defined

as a 'consent' to pre-existing effector strategies with a probability of

adaptive success tailor made for the individual. a as discussed in this

volume and elsewhere. "A man can surely do what he wants to do. But he

can not determine what he wants.", Schopenhauer once said. It was at

this conjectural point that we discovered Dr. Jerry Fodor and the

‘language of thought’ (LOT) hypothesis which has given impetus and

corroboration to our model, save for some minor and major

disagreements as had been noted in the first volume.

We still have not provided a marketable account of how our ‘plo’

processing module mediates the transition from an on-line sense-

phenomenal (or conceptual off-line) brain codelet input (I) to a

corresponding syntactically-structured representational output (O) in a

systematic one to one instantiation by this special basic input-output

system (BIOS) of the ‘plo’ processor. We suspect that the inherited

original ‘machine language’ genetic code input, when translated from the

newborn DNA gets incorporated (and modified?) into the acquired

phonemic and facial expressions input from the lactating mother via

cortical mirror neurons as discussed briefly in a chapter below. ‘Meaning’

to the newborn (proto-semantics) gets somehow structured into a proto-

syntax in the ‘plo’ processor. The neuro-humoral reward-punishment

system of Olds-Pribram (connecting nerve trunk midbrain and ‘plo’ with

forebrain executive area via Medial Forebrain Bundle) may be intimately

involved in the original and subsequent valence classification of

environmental (internal & external) inputs. Somehow a systematic audio-

visual (or other sensory) input facilitates the formation of ‘inferential’

codelet loops that, added to other relevant modular inputs (visceral brain,

talking brain, non-dominant brain, etc) will configure the resultant of ‘all

things considered’, a "thought". And now we add, a consented to cortical

attractor. Whether this final event precedes a putative motor adaptive

response or not (see Libet’s timing data) is open to debate and should not

necessarily put into question the existence of a ‘free will’ for the reasons

already discussed here.

Besides tha language-based control of thought we seem to argue for,

the big problem still remaining is, of course, how to explain what kind of

‘sentential’ logic structure guides the jazz pianist when improvising his

music, or the artist when moving the brush over the canvas? We believe

there is no conscious thought guiding that kind of performance; we

discuss this problem in some detail in the first volume (chapter 19) and no

significant argument has evolved since..

How would one start laying out the groundwork for developing a

model for a linguistic generation of thought/mind? Following closely on the

steps of British empiricist Locke, Columbia U. Dr. J.A. Fodor had taken a

first step (see "The Language of Thought," 1975). Henceforth

neuroscientists and philosophers alike abandoned ship on the search for

explanations on the meanings of spoken words to concentrate instead on

the ‘contents’ of mental representations in the hope that therein

originated somehow the ‘meanings’ of words (see Grice’s essay "Meaning

Revisited,"1982). Nothing much has changed since the publication of the

first volume.

Within the scope of the ‘BPS’ model the family is the structural /

functional unit of viable human existence (see Eric From’s "Man for

Himself", 1947) and consequently it is not far-fetched to speculate that

language may have evolved in order to ease and synchronize the

correspondence in mental states between parents, siblings and one

another. On the same vein, we have written a last parting chapter

analyzing further the JudeoChrIslamic axiological concomitants attending

current post modern social behavior. For the reasons already stated above

we have to both agree and disagree with Dummet when he stated "..that

‘the fundamental axiom of analytical philosophy’ is that "the only route to

the analysis of thought goes through the analysis of language." Agree

because it is easier to infer from a well established language syntax

structure encoding semantics than the opposite view requiring an elusive

structure of mind to infer from. Yet, as we will argue, language structure

is intrinsically semantics neutral, its meaning to be discovered in the

mental state / representation of both speaker and listener that animate it.

In so doing we must resist the temptation to confuse the map with the

territory it represents, the cognition of ‘how’ with the cognition of ‘that’,

the epistemology with the ontology. The worst possible scenario will be,

anyway, that the resulting analysis will only translate our current

grammatical description of ‘mind’ into a richer theoretical system without

substantially improving on the older explanations and remaining at square

one as Wittgenstein has mocked about the analytical philosophy effort. We

have tried all along to identify those other fundamental concepts the diad

language-->mind is necessarily related to and establishing the

connections thereto.

This analytical philosophy strategy, as described, already supposes a

commitment to two important aspects of cognitive science: the content of

‘mental states’ (beliefs, desires and other intentional states) can be

represented (brain-encoded) as functional isomorphs (symbolic

representations) such that reasoning becomes a formal (logic)

manipulation (computer processing) of such representations (symbols)

according to a set of non-semantic rules (e.g., program). The credibility of

such approach rests on the premise that any logic operations applicable to

syntax can be either duplicated or emulated by a computer (after Turing).

Implied here is that ‘mental representations’, as described, carry both

syntactic and semantic properties (see Volume 1 for more on properties).

The important conclusion is that thereby syntax structure programming

becomes causally efficient in both the computer and the brain as long as

the relevant functions can be formalized (programmed). This makes

logical ‘inferences’ possible, the hallmark of reasoned thinking. This way a

"Language of Thought" (LOT) or ‘mentalese’ is modeled by Fodor as

discussed elsewhere in that text. It is clear that this model requires linear

input sequential processing, can not explain what it is like to have a

feeling (e.g., qualia) and does not explicitly spell out whether language

communicates thought or participates in the formation of thought (as

discussed in a Volume I where Fodor defends a ‘nativist’ idea using a

combinatorial argument successfully). Furthermore, the ‘Mentalese’ model

of Fodor supposes , like ours, that language precedes the formation of

thought but, unlike ours, that the meaning of an assertion (its semantics)

is encoded in the syntax arrangement according to a ‘propositional

attitude’ structural representation. For example, if I have a thought that

refers to George W. Bush and the WMD, it is because that thought is a

relation to a coded mental representation that refers to the US President.

If I think "Bush invaded Iraq in 2003" it is because I am in a particular

functional relation (characteristic of belief) that has the content: "Bush

Invaded Iraq to destroy the WMD in 2003" (e.g., Tarskian semantics).

Just like we cannot turn the lights on a pictorial representation of a

Cadillac, we have problems animating a linguistic representation

('propositional attitudes') with feelings. That being said, Fodor's poetry is

still very interesting, the reason we attempted in this volume to linearize

sensory inputs in our BPS model to make them compatible with the linear

processing of language. Along similar lines, we also tried to model belief

propositions but our success was limited because of the complexity of

using modal logic in a probabilistic context.

As we enunciated above we still differ in non-trivial aspects of Fodor's

interpretation and believe that an in-house, inherited proto-semantic

archetype precede and dictate syntax and its subsequent development

according to a layering build-up of the inherited by the external influence

of acquired language parameters derived initially from the mother, siblings

and others. But this is just an informed intuition in its embryonic stage as

was exposed in Volume I. We hold that inherited proto-semantics precede

syntax which is acquired from mother & environment.

Furthermore, propositional attitude states, that is, states that occur at

some specific moment in a person's mental life, have the sort of content

that might be expressed by a propositional phrase proper to the subjects

natural language (see the chapter on the "Possible Structure of a Belief

Proposition."). This variation still conceptualizes mental states as either

tokened mental representations at the sub-personal nativist level (Fodor)

or images them from natural language at the personal level (Caruthers).

What is important is that it considers much more significant how the

mental encoding came into being where genetic memory (implicit and

unconscious as opposed to the global conscious or the Freud-Jung

subconscious) levels of processing are controlling in behalf of ‘BPS’

survival imperatives. Our BPS model view may seem counterintuitive at

first sight but, observing how computers carry out programmed

instructions, it is easier to visualize a language generation of thought as

operations performed over the mental representations in a given language

than it is to extract a ‘meaning’ based on a particular structure of syntax.

Should the syntax be universal for all human languages? We think

not. The inherited proto-semantics IS, and it will be fashioned into the

future syntactic structure depending on the natural language acquired as

well as other mental development influences. This post-natal external

stage of language development only partially reivindicates the pre-

Chomskian behaviorist (classical and Skinnerian operant conditioning)

understanding of language learning and consolidation. Cognitive science

alone was able to explain the linguistic competence already observed in a

year-old toddler with little or no experience, i.e., through internal brain

mechanisms. It was the observed ability of toddlers to understand the

difference between "the cat chased the mouse" and "the mouse chased

the cat" or their equivalents formed by changing the position of the actors

or their relationship (i.e., systematicity) and the toddler’s natural ability to

generate an unlimited number of sentences / thoughts from a limited set

of lexical primitives proper of the age (i.e., productivity) evidenced an

innate presence of an universal grammar enabling them to –in a primitive

way- formulate and confirm hypothesis. In the BPS model this is evidence

of an inherited inner primeval language we call ‘genetic memory’ which we

have argued before as to its brain location in the perisylvian geography we

still call the ‘proto-linguistic organ’ (plo). These generalizations may not

apply to other aspects of communications like sign, sound (music) or body

language.

Communication for ‘BPS’ survival is predicated upon an efficient and

reliable reciprocal sharing of ‘mental states’ between a language producer

and a receiver and includes linguistic and extralinguistic modes of

conveyance of intentionalities, a true ‘Theory of Mind’. As we said earlier,

a system of information-carrying linguistic symbols as such, in either

mode, are in principle neutral in meaning content until decoded by a

receiver, regardless of whether that was the intention of the producer or

not. It may just as well had been unspecific. The semantic content is not

intrinsic to the arrangement of symbols except for an intended or un-

intended receiver who must extract its meaning if able to synchronize her

mental state with the producer. We develop this theme further within the

context of mirror neurons below.

We may extrapolate further and say that DNA composition, regardless

of species, carries equivalent unit ‘symbols’ (sugar, base, phosphate) and

when assembled and transmitted by inheritance will not carry intrinsic

information as such except for the species it was intended for who must

extract it via individualized archetype activation. In this case we have to

assume that, other than the unlikely heritable somatic mutations (?), the

information coded into the germinal DNA was the result of a, just as

unlikely, Lamarckian-like encoding of environmental survival information

which gets transmitted by inheritance ("junk DNA"?) and then activated in

the newborn when triggered by an equivalent relevant stimulus in the new

generation. This way newly hatched chicks will react violently to a

proyector slide showing a hawk in flight and not when showing a duck (by

reversing the direction of same slide). This is a species-specific, semantic-

laden, inherited response. A similar argument holds for the avoidance

response triggered when we see (for the first time) a spider or a snake

moving our way. The species-specific survival kit of multi-modal (e.g.,

audio-visual) code for environmental specific information constitute a

genetic memory of sorts, to be activated should the same or equivalent

danger cue be present in the new environment. These are solid

experimental facts, regardless of their mode of inherited transmission.

This is reminiscent of Grice’s ‘natural meaning’ that requires no

intentionality other than that present in the mental state of the receiver. If

present, following a presentation of the ‘neutral’ stimulus, a chain of

reactions will ensue providing a meaningful adaptive response as the

result. The environmental stimulus is also affective neutral but adaptive

responses will have an affective positive, negative or alert valence. There

is not such thing as a neutral affective response. This fact can be equated

with our pain-pleasure affective system (see Olds, Pribram and others)

associated with peri-acqueductal grey (PAG), medial forebrain bundle

(MFB), hypothalamus and cingulate cortex. It is a common experience to

classify sensory, body proper or dreams input according to this primitive

affective state which we choose to postulate as a primitive ‘affective

meaning’ tag associated with phenomenal, conceptual, qualic or motor

experience. We are not now able to precise whether the input information

is tagged at the receptor, afferent pathways to intermediate association

neurons or at the amygdaloid complex as discussed in Volume I, but it has

the salutary protective effect of screening and classifying all information

input into the central brain. As we also discussed elsewhere, the

amygdaloidal complex controls the relay switch that immediately activates

a neuro-humoral Cannon-type response when confronted with a life-

threatening stimulus or an endorphin-type euphoric response when the

environmental information valence is positive. When in doubt (alert

status), the organism will ‘freeze’ and wait until more contextual

information arrives from the hippocampus social memory as explained

elsewhere. We have continued to develop these ideas in the second

Volume within the context of the structure and composition of cortical

attractor basins which are being continuously updated as they evolve as

probable future outcomes for the species. We believe that biological

survival strategies (visceral brain) trump any other consideration when

making a decision to act..except when we volitionally negate consent to a

particular solution, even when contrary to self-interest as we see in heroic

acts or pathology.

The proto-linguistic organ (plo) associates combo, coupling

amygdaloidal complex, hippocampus and cingulate cortex, show an early

embryological development in preparation for a more delayed

myelinization of primary and secondary sensory pathways converging into

angular gyrus and a more complete cephalization of functions requiring

communication circuits (Wernicke-Broca maturation) in coordination with

an executive and adaptive-dispositive forebrain. This is the type of

intrinsic brain universal grammar anlage that is posited in the newborn

serving as a foundation for future linguistic development as sensory input

and social interactivity gets more sophisticated inside the context of the

particular natural language adopted from the parents. This way the

natural language syntax structure will be learned and layered on the

inherited proto-semantic structure that guides and colors its subsequent

individualized evolutionary profile. This summarizes the first stage.

Thus far there has been no overt intention to exchange information

between two newborn cognitive agents, only an unconscious,

stereotypical, species-specific adaptive response to environmental cues

whose information content / meaning is extracted internally based on an

activation of the genetic memory archetypes controlling and unleashing

appropriate physiological effectors (glands, smooth and skeletal

musculature).

The second stage of linguistic development in the newborn is based on

re-enforcing the proto-semantic data base by adding new elements from

mother’s facial expressions, cooing sounds, baby talk and surroundings

and classifying them into subsets of the three primitive affects as they

become effective in reducing hunger, pain and general comfort. All this

activity goes on at unconscious and subconscious levels and limited to

expressing degrees of pain / pleasure affective equivalents reciprocally.

The most important brain mediators in these developments are the

cortical ‘mirror neurons’ discussed here and elsewhere. Thus true

communication starts by extracting meaningful information from primitive

environmental cues in the first stage including mimicry, both from

mother’s sounds (phonemes) and facial musculature expressions (as

analyzed at oculo-motor and audio-motor collicular centers) as visual,

auditive, tactile and kinesthetic resolution develop further. As discussed in

volume I, a primitive first order awareness, mostly sense-phenomenal

awareness, will develop as soon as the newborn realizes she is different

from the doll, the crib, the mother, etc. and not an extension thereof (see

Piaget’s "The Development of Thought", 1977). At this stage (first year of

life) Broca’s ‘talking brain’ connecting pathways are not developed

sufficiently to entertain propositional arrangements of mother --> son

communications, a requirement to share beliefs, a sine qua non for

effective reciprocal communication and a true ‘Theory of Mind’.

To illustrate, it has been demonstrated (Kaplan, 1989) how primitive

indexicals (context-sensitive expressions) become modified by linguistic

maturation of speaker as well as from extra-linguistic context experience

which varies (in content and meaning) with time, location and intentions.

It is important to keep in mind that indexicals are ‘sui generis’ in that their

content in context A is derived from (refers to) an object in that context

and not a description of A.

Only when the toddler believes (mental state) ‘that p’ (e.g., baby is

hungry) and overtly communicates ‘that p’ (body language) such that

mother extracts that meaningful information from the baby’s cue and

incorporates it by identities (both genetic and social memory) into her

own meaning of the ocurrence, has a belief being shared. At that point

they have shared beliefs sans much elaboration of linguistic proficiency.

The shared information, the semantics of it all, reflects an internal state of

the mind NOT an external state of the world.

This view carries important consequences. My view of existential

reality, e.g., my belief system, primitively inherited as argued, may have

been influenced originally from information extracted from environmental

cues but ultimately will be a ‘view’ of the internal state of my own mind,

always hoping that it corresponds one to one with external reality, but

NOT necessarily so! The eventual linguistic competence achieved will be

the result of the contribution made by both genetic and social memories in

creating a mental state -in harmony with the adopted natural language-

(initially via mimicry mediated by mirror neurons) from the internal,

semantically-coached combinatorial syntax architecture. Consequently,

commonly shared natural language does not validate the truth value of

literal linguistic meaning, even among identical twins! Identical world state

is no guarantee of identical internal mental states among niche dwellers.

Vive la difference!

It is clear to us that any model of consciousness conceiving language

as its genesis or exclusive conveyance must insert in its development,

besides the classical neuroscientific level of explanation, cognitive

(representational theory of mind, RTM), connectionist and especially

quantum mechanical algorithms to fill in the gaps left by the other’s

explananda. There are important conceptual areas of basic disagreements

that must be negotiated, e.g., meaning, property, relations, etc. If the

complexity of the challenge is overviewed under a BPS human survival

optics then the relevant areas of investigation / analysis become clearly

framed into one or more of the 5 classical aspects of a super-complex

reflex arc: receptor, sensory circuits, interneuronal integrating circuits,

motor circuits motoneuronal pool and effector. Only the retinal receptor

and its associated afferent pathways to occipital V1 cortex and

intermediate collateral branches to mesencephalon and diencephalon is

very well documented. Likewise, the efferent arm of the arc has only been

pretty well studied in the oculo-vestibular reflex analysis of Llinas and

Pellionisz involving the cerebellum and neck musculature. Most elegant

theoretical renditions have sprung from such approaches, e.g., Crick’s

cortico-thalamic 40Hz binding theory and Churchland’s vector phase

transformation theory, respectively. We do not anticipate a significant

improvement on the level of research sophistication when directed at

these two arms of the complex reflex arc. This leaves the interneuronal

complex of integration as the natural and eventual focus of attention. The

brain wetware can be considered as a compacted interneuronal phase

transformational complex where sensory input gets massively transformed

into motor adaptive output during normal functioning (see Glynn’s

"Anatomy of Thought",1999 and Feinberg’s "Altered Egos", 2001). In this

volume we argue for a closer examination of quantum theory as relevant

to the probabilistic nature of cortical attractor's involvement in decision-

making process.

Once the visual (or any other receptor) deconstructs the seeming

continuity of the environmental sensory scenario into digitized,

discontinuous events reaching the interneuronal compact, there is a

vector phase transformation and different algorithms continue the

deconstruction into codelet (Kantian?) categories. The totality of the

sensory codelets gets classified, partitioned and allocated different virtual

or real macro-locations in the not-so-hard disk of the wetware, whether in

modules or in a recurrent distributed network fashion. It becomes the task

of the inter-neuronal compact to reconstruct the ‘original’ or equivalent

representational scenario when called upon for (the binding problem) to

integrate. The resulting integral may not necessarily provide an adaptive

solution in neuropathology but will always reflect the dynamic equilibrium

state of the constitutive modular elements charged with the

implementation of ‘BPS’ survival strategies. Passed this test the ‘solution’

needs the intervention of executive cortical attractor basins involvement

to coordinate the best fitting adaptive response of the effectors at the

motor end of the reflex arc. This view is the typical functionalist picture

except for the inevitable inclusion of quantum theory brain dynamics, as

developed in this volume.

Bridging the sensorimotor divide we find a theorist trying to identify a

suitable algorithm appropriate to the computational task of the

neurological wetware and capable to deliver an implementation task to the

effectors. This is no easy task because the algorithm must satisfy

isomorphic requirements of the input-output divide, a transducer of sorts.

It would help if our theorist would precise the best symbol representation

of the massively parallel information flow to ease the transduction from

input to output. Our mind is the algorithmic symbol processor in the inter-

neuronal compact. Let’s see how the argument may likely develop at the

analytical philosophy level and the unavoidable constraints and paradoxes

it generates in the process. But consciousness research can’t stop at the

test tube and oscilloscope lab, at the tip of the iceberg’s view.

Now comes the qualitative jump of Fodor (1981) when he proposed

the view that mental states are ‘relations’ to symbolic representations. If

the implied ‘meaning’ adscribed to a logic propositional construction

‘relates’ to a ‘mental state’ in se, the latter will come to inherit the

semantic value and intentionality (meaning) of the construction where the

syntactic arrangement determines the semantic ‘meaning’. E.g., the

President (subject S) believes (attitude a) there are WMD inside Iraq

(proposition p) or <Sa that p> in modal logic. A mathematical purist may

argue that a strict canonical interpretation of set theory requires that an

interpretation of semantics must map the relevant terms exclusively into

mathematical objects, an obvious impossibility here, which argues for the

inadequacy of syntax to determine semantics. A complete demonstration

is beyond the scope of this essay but we can see at least that the meaning

of proposition p is not identical with the meaning of its representation p*,

the identity p=p* is untenable because it implies that there exists a 2

place relation between an inscription and its semantic value and further

assumes the possibility of an inexistent correspondence (thought sharing)

of meaning between a language producer and the receiver, unless

mediated by a linguistic convention, something we argue can only be

found in a genetic memory mediating interface. It may be further added

that there exist many mental processes not reducible to algorithmic

manipulations, especially when the argument is drawing from outside the

defined problem domain and is thereby not purely inductive or

processable by rule-based techniques. In the best possible scenario, that

model does not provide for an ‘understanding’ of the computations and,

while it may be suitable to explain a first order type of ‘awareness’, it

would be useless for higher order conceptual and introspective

consciousness as argued many times before. The same argument would

still apply if a concatenation of linear symbolic processing is substituted by

a non-serial, sub-symbolic distributed type (see McClelland’s "Parallel

Distributed Processing"). Smolensky’s tensor space brings in interesting

possibilities when coupled with n-dimensional space accomodation of

quantum mechanical interpretations of consciousness. Some of these

considerations will be discussed in this volume.

If we focus on the transition p-->p* = what-->how we realize that for

p* symbols to become a ‘mark of the mental’ their ‘content’ must have

the ‘property’ of being about something else (in the Brentano sense), i.e.,

it must have ‘intentional’ states (e.g., desires, beliefs, hopes, etc.). One

may ask, how does arranging the symbols into propositional statements

animate the symbols with linguistically derived intentions, as in a

computer? The program representations may have content-laden states

but no independent intentionality. Why not reverse the causality vector

and posit that an intrinsic, inherited, original intentionality ‘in potency’

may realize that semantic potential via the acquired natural language tool

and / or in response to appropriate environmental triggers, as we

propose? Fodor’s 'Psychosemantics' is a variation of the ‘BPS’ internalist

approach when it holds that the interactive causal connections of the

representation with the external environmental reality it stands for

provides a sort of derived ‘meaning’ that fuels the represented symbols to

influence the behavior of the rest of the system! This clever explanation is

in sharp contrast with that of analytical philosophers of the same

‘internalist’ persuasion who argue that intentionality need not be

independently present in the physical state of a given symbolic

representation, that it builds its semantic content from causal connections

with other co-existing physical states (nodes) of the system (program).

Both of these positions still imply that any supercomputer could have

meaningful states without being necessary its being introspectively aware

of its own states. These models may explain sense-phenomenal

consciousness (awareness) but never a higher order type of introspective

consciousness. Apparently Dennet, contrary to Searle, does not think that

the introspective consciousness (self-awareness of intentionality)

supersedes in importance the information-bearing, behavior-driving

functionality of derived intentionality. This robotic animation with

computer-derived, other directed intentions is counterintuitive to say the

least. An unconscious patient (still a better computer than any built!) can

not generate intentions simply because it can not attain self-

consciousness, an absolute sine qua non. As Chalmers suggested, you can

substitute every neuron with a silicon chip and the resulting robot, like the

unconscious man, can not have qualia or generate intentions

independently. Searle expressed the same concern with his now famous

thought experiment, the "Chinese Room".

But advocates of functionalism, surviving branch of logical positivism,

adopt a neo-behaviorist stance when defending that a mental state is

‘what it does’, its functionality being based on its causal efficiency in

producing a measurable result. Thus p = p* = p** where the result p** =

neither a structural or functional isomorph of p, leaving many

intermediate black boxes between the real life intention p and the

observed behavior p**. This myopia of course implies that a simulation =

a duplication if only the result is considered. Pain or pleasure qualia being,

in this interpretation, just mental states known to be experienced by

activation of their corresponding neural centers. Only in theory can we

possibly isolate an independent property that depends exclusively on the

way the underlying system is organized, an example of Chalmer’s

principle of organizational invariance. It has been demonstrated

(Siegelman, 1994) that some massively parallel connectionist distributed

networks, as we would expect to find in the CNS, can not even be

simulated in supercomputers. If some conclude: a. that a super computer

is able to use environmental information creatively, b. that it understands

and even have a conscience, and c. that evolutionary selection is

predicated on overt behavior, then we can safely bet that they will be

selected by evolution to succeed humans. Any takers among

functionalists? :-)

Many readers would ask, what difference does it make whether the

brain bears the mind or causes the mind state? After all, their argument

goes, the semantic content in representations can only be judged by the

measured effects it is able to produce, it need not be of a denotational

character. The computer does not rely exclusively on its manipulation of

structure-sensitive language symbols, it also connects to the external

world by analog transducers and correlates interactively with hard-wired

chip connections and other aspects of the program. Besides, they continue

to argue, do humans always understand? The truth is that humans have

been largely hard-wired by nature, both internally and externally, to react,

to parse and create associations between linguistic elements and their

denotations, like machines do. This all may be true in part but no

computer has ever been animated like Stravinsky’s Pulcinella doll and

remain so independently!

We may want to fancy splitting hairs with Fodor’s dictum that:

"mental states are ‘relations’ to symbolic representations." and ask further

if one can consider the undeniable physiological correlates characterizing

the experience of a ‘mental state’ (e.g., anger) as a ‘property’ of an

appropriate symbolic representation. The symbols must be able to

instantiate their property content (e.g., anger) or at least derive it from

other measurable properties that can be instantiated by appropriate

manipulation of logical operations. One can code ‘is angry’ any number of

ways and provide examples of its instantiation in sport figures, etc. as

exemplified by measurable correlates, themselves codifiable in any

number of logically quantified relations to other symbol representations

(pulse, heart rate, pressure, etc.). Still the code does not have an

independent life of its own and depends on an interpreter (receiver) for

the instantiation to take effect. This is the easy example, what if the

linguistic predicative expression is ‘sui generis’ and can not be

instantiated, e.g., ‘he is an angel’, or a ‘square circle’, a ‘round square’ or

a ‘virgin’? How do you define the properties of un-instantiables? Do they

exist empirically or inside any space-time dimension, can they be

exemplified, are they necessary or contingent, can they be individuated?

We must remember from previous discussions that ‘being’ is very different

from ‘existing’. Can a symbolic representation catch all of these nuances?

Can they instantiate these properties minimally, with or without their

affective component or qualia? If you are a neo-behaviorist or a scientist

all you may care about is that, no matter how different their intrinsic

properties, two or more properties are the same if they cause the same

nomological or functional effect in their instances. This way a brachial

plexus chemical block by injection is identical to cutting the same nerves

connection to the arm you are trying to anesthetize!! Not all objects can

have exemplifiable properties accurately constituted (encoded) as

specified by axioms, like circles or squares where identities can be

established as long as the abstract specifications in the geometry theory

are met. We say that properties that necessarily have the same encoding

extensions are identical, but properties that necessarily have the same

exemplification extensions may be distinct, like the exemplification of the

property of being ‘round’ in different objects, e.g., round squares = round

circles. Empirical properties (low order logic) are handled differently from

the ‘many placed’ (high order logic) 'properties' of metaphysical entities.

As long as there may be a demonstrable causal effect empirical properties

may be assigned higher order status. These are some of the difficulties we

faced when trying to develop a propositional structure for beliefs.

The antecedent arguments clear the way for a better understanding

that the ‘relation’ between an object and its symbol representation may be

properly considered as a property itself. Relations have orders or levels

also, from the two place relation (e.g., <Republicans believe the

President> or <the contender is taller than the incumbent>) to the ‘many

argument places’ relationship that arguably give credence to symbolic

representations of meanings in a computer program where the symbols

are also related to other programs, hard-wired chips, transducers,

sensors, monitors, etc. When the relation is to non-instantiable properties,

including math constructs, metaphysical logic conclusions, etc., then the

resulting conclusion or model will depreciate in credibility even when it

may describe the truthful reality account. The same thing holds for

propositions when considered as limiting cases of properties.

Instantiations may not qualify as properties because they become their

object, i.e., there are no intermediaries and they are no longer related

causally. The Transubstantiation religious ritual instantiates the body of

Christ in the ‘Host’ in a symbolic, non-empirical way, which truth becomes

validated in those with that belief (faith).

This preceding elaboration brings us finally to the reason why our

‘BPS’ model position that an inherited proto-semantics that precedes

formal syntax structure in the generation of language and thought is more

tenable than the classical causation view that reverses the vector of

causation syntax--> semantics. ‘Meanings’ (‘that p’, e.g, beliefs) should

be considered in all cases as complex predicates in the propositional

attitude equation <Sa that p>. A syntactic structure of a complex

predicate is not meant to exhibit the internal structure nuances of a

complex property; but rather to evidence in a general way that property's

position in the logical network of properties. An eminently structured

specification like linguistic syntax should aim at becoming a natural device

for singling out a specific member among a structured realm of possible

entities, by identifying it by its place (its logical location) in that domain.

The ‘BPS’ model makes it possible for language syntax to become that

kind of device when nourished and fashioned by a genetic memory input

and early environmental influences within the context of an adopted

natural language. It is our belief that, unduly influenced by the successful

use of complex hyperstructured predicates and structured metaphores to

denote empirical, structured specifications (measurable properties) in

Artificial Intelligence (AI), have driven some of the best analytical minds

into the naïve faith belief that ALL properties are literally structured. We

have provided examples to illustrate how even the definition of what a

property is, is put into question! For all we know, the complex mental

‘properties’ themselves may not even have a tangible structure to get hold

off and translate into symbols. The first chapters in this volume struggle

with these complexities. It would seem as if our best neuroscience minds

have not capture the difference between their observable descriptions and

their mathematical logic representations thereof, between the 'what' of

the description and the 'how' of the explanation, between the perceptual

and the conceptual, between the ontological and the epistemological. We

are convinced that they constitute an inseparable hybrid where a quantum

theoretical glue interface may best show the two sides of the coin as

belonging to the same epistemontological reality.

End of Prologue

Ch. 1

INTRODUCTION.

(Recapitulation)

As noted at the Introduction of Volume I, “Neurophilosophy of

Consciousness”, this treatise is all about an attempt to model a

biopsychosocial (BPS) comprehensive understanding of self-consciousness

seen from the perspective of theories of many types and hues

encompassing the physical, metaphysical, neural, cognitive, functional,

representational and higher-order aspects of consciousness. Each subset

aims at different aspects of the problem and none of the theoretical

perspectives in isolation suffice for explaining all of the self-evident

features that we strive to understand. Consequently an ontologically

rooted multidisciplinary synthesis grounded on real-time, existential

ecological considerations may provide the best pluralistic map to guide

future enquiries.

Regardless of whether self-consciousness is inseparable from human

life as we have defended or, as Jaynes suggested in 1974, based on

ancient Greek linguistic evidence, it was not known before the pre-

Homeric epics, the fact remains that thought and consciousness, in our

view, play an essential role in the viability and perpetuation of the human

species when confronted with an ever-changing inhospitable external

environment it didn't choose to be born into. To achieve this survival goal

man must harmonize his inherited biological endowments with his ongoing

acquired psychic and social experiences. The brain, physical substrate of

conscious activity, sorts out, categorizes and organizes the ongoing

receptor sensory input such that any survival threat to the species is met

with an adaptive Cannon response. The individual's psychic life is the

resultant compromise between an inherited, not so flexible homeostatic

body proper machinery and the constant social environmental challenges

of an objective world of chaotic sensations about atemporal, acausal,

asymmetric objects and events which must be given order and

accommodated in a structure of time, space and causality of our choice to

prevent BPS life-threatening alterations of the body dynamic equilibrium.

Mental life has been charged with the psychosocial survival defense of the

human species. The holistic epistemontological integration of these 3 BPS

elements in a synthesis of neuro anatomico-physiological and physico-

chemical data has been structured with the help of logico-mathematical

tools of argumentation (see Merleau-Ponty 1945). It should not then be a

surprise to find so many different piecemeal approaches to study the very

different subsets of consciousness, that unique global feature so far only

observed in the human living creature.

The subsets of consciousness range in granularity from species

wakefulness vigil to further variations thereof we have called 'states' of

consciousness. Species wakefulness has two variations, depending on

whether its attention is engaged in a particular object / event (vigil-

transitive) or a dream-like cogitation (intransitive)]. In the 'BPS' model,

we made no essential distinction between the transitive, receptor-guided

wakefulness and the intransitive sleep-guided Rem 'wakefulness', except

for the attending adaptive motor response that is abolished during REM

sleep.

We apologize once again for having insisted so often on the clear

distinctions between the different 'states' of consciousness during

expositions. To that effect we have dedicated one whole chapter

(Understanding the Consciousness Literature.) to establish the

differences.The literature is full of semantic confusions coming from

younger inexperienced investigators that have not yet sorted out the

different abstract levels of argumentation possible. We have equated

sensory awareness (sense phenomenal consciousness) with stereotypic

reflex-adaptive responses that may operate sans qualia or the need for

introspective activity. This is the type non-human species or artificial

intelligence (AI) robots imitate or emulate and can be further considered

as the result of a 'non-inferential' type of brain processing. The reflex

responses may be very complex as when dodging multimodal obstacles

while driving downhill on a familiar winding road while solving a puzzle or

listening to the news as you drive. If we remember how these same

environmental features have been sorted out and categorized in our brain

neuronal networks for future memory retrieval in the physical absence of

the same objects / events, then we should have no problem

understanding how these subconscious resources may be accessed were

the same driver to suddenly encounter a novel feature change like a

collapsed mountain bridge, etc. Then we may 'consciously' experience

sounds, colors, shapes, smells, etc. (sense phenomenal qualia) or fright,

hopes, beliefs, etc. (conceptual qualia), the total experience of which we

tentatively called phenomenal consciousness proper to distinguish it from

a concomitant introspective assessment of the novel situation within a

significant environmental context. We chose to call non-sensory qualia as

'conceptual' because, unlike most sense-phenomenal features, affective

states are not stand-alone features and are usually triggered in

association with more complex conceptual organization of prior acquired

experiences (religion, morals, etc.) of the subject as an agent. We have

defended the argument that conceptual qualia carries both inherited

(amygdaloidal-mediated fear responses) and acquired affective baggage

(hypothalamic / limbic / hippocampus-mediated pain, sorrow, etc.), but

more important, before accessing inferential linguistic resources to

structure the appropriate syntax, it requires the previous proto-semantic

inherited input (proto-linguistic organ, 'plo') to formulate the introspective

thought narrative sequence (inner language?). This is a variation of

Fodor's HOT model of consciousness as was discussed in Volume I and

briefly expanded below.

As we ponder on these complex abstractions we find language very

limited and troublesome at times. So, we must arbitrarily insist on

'awareness' as being distinct from 'consciousness'. When I become 'aware'

of the road obstacles without thinking about them my sensory receptors

and my muscle / gland effectors act as servo controls that run the show

'subconsciously' according to non-inferential, programmed neuronal

networks, we are running on servo controlled mechanisms, a combination

of genetic and acquired contingency 'survival' codelets. When the novel

situation exceeds the expectations of an automatic reflex response we

must 'access' higher neuronal networks (e.g., language machinery) and in

the process we become consciously aware. This is not different from the

situation of an olympic gymnast about to land on a high bar after a

somersault. She has both inherited and acquired by training motoneuronal

networks able to 'select' the appropriate nerve fibers to activate and

protect the biological integrity of her body without having to make a

conscious analysis and selection. Based on this self-evident account we

developed our explanation on how subconsciously select from many

available probable solutions in cortical attractor basins the one best

adapted to solve the novel contingency. We must introspectively situate

ourselves as actors in the ongoing new scenario by translating the

complex proto-semantics into a sentential code which, by inner speech,

elaborates the thought. 'Access consciousness' describes a pre-inferential

unconscious reaching for a narrative mechanism (Broca's) to elaborate the

high order thought associated with introspective consciousness. It simply

makes it possible for a reflex-driven 'unconscious' phenomenal state of

mind to avail itself of available, pertinent and concurrent mental states to

interact with its content in the solution of the novel situation in behalf of

species life preservation. This also represents a variation of Ned Block's

1995 model of 'access consciousness'. The equivalent access to a

narrative, non-linguistic state of mind that brings introspection and qualia

in the form of a 'stream of consciousness' is much more complex to

analyze and awaits future dilucidation of asymmetric processing.

Thus, we have unconscious adaptive responses to multimodal sensory

input --> novel situation --> unconscious activation of access circuits to

ongoing available and pertinent algorithms --> unconscious 'plo' pre-

narrative algorithm processing into syntax structure--> inner language--

>conscious thought & unconscious elaboration of response--> motor

adaptive response. It is not clear whether in the last step the thought is

causally efficient in producing the result, especially after Libet's

experiment but we adopt causality based on other criteria (see below).

It should be noticed that the different appellations we chose to identify

the different mental states does not necessarily commits their content to

either the ontological or the epistemological perspectives. In fact we

prefer to conceive self consciousness as an additional component of reality

inseparable from life (as the measurable physical constituents of reality

plus the associated abstractions or sets of relations among those

constituent particles beyond sensory or combinatorial human resolution)

like quantum mechanical or E-M fields, or even vitalism. Abstract

nominalization of extrasensory or extra-combinatorial resolution of self-

evident reality must be included as part and parcel of logical options,

conceptual plurality is in, dynamically equilibrated inside complex

manifolds accommodating referential domain divergence all converging on

the single phenomenon of self-consciousness.

To get an idea of the un-surmountable problems we have encountered

in elaborating an all inclusive ontological 'BPS' model of self-consciousness

we have had to bridge the physical and metaphysical epistemological

accounts and accommodate both in the same hybrid manifold. It was not

easy and is still inconclusive because the descriptive, ontological What,

the explanatory, epistemological How, and the spiritual Why questions

summarize different approaches to an understanding of self-

consciousness. Your research choice will very much depend on whether

you feel comfortable with reliable first person accounts or you rather cast

your reputation exclusively on third person accounts (direct or indirect

measurements). Both metaphysical logic ‘dualists’ and physico-

mathematical 'physicalist' models ultimately rely on logical inferences and

intuitions. Somehow, it is hoped that, having framed phenomenal,

conceptual, narrative (sensory or linguistic varieties), access and

introspective accounts into symbolic, sentential or phenomenal

consciousness logic calculus, we may identify where their respective

domains substantively coincide, overlap, link or non-locally interact inside

the comprehensive manifold. The most elusive concept to frame has been

'qualia'. So far nobody has been able to articulate a qualia space and

assign location coordinates for the different quale, whether in sense-

phenomenal (representational?) or conceptual consciousness (intentional?,

see Hardin 1992).

Neither has anyone even attempted a cognitive account of the

subjective qualia experience. (see Lycan 1996, Chalmers 2003, see the

entry on self-knowledge). An unconscious 'awareness' of a red apple can

be measured psychologically by an external planned behavior paradigm; if

the awareness becomes a conscious experience the subject can match the

apple redness using a color palette. It may sound like a contradiction but

neither conscious or unconscious (here better called subconscious)

'experience' requires reflexive introspective consciousness because the

self need not appear as an explicit element in human experiences of

spatio-temporal objects, their attributes and their relations; only when

their meaning and intelligibility become relevant to the subject in the

context of 'BPS' survival as noted above. It is in this context that inherited

and acquired memories fashion contingent strategies of adaptation by

integrating the stereotypical cause--> effect routines with the improvised

cognitive and intentional demands of the moment. Integration is a

continuous, never ending dynamic processing by the ongoing, temporally

extended subject at all levels of mental states as discussed, from local

feature gathering defining a unit participant to a global assembly of all

participants in a changing scenario of spatially connected interacting

objects in the external environment. (See Cleeremans 2003). We need not

argue that only conscious states are capable of this local / global

integration, any artificial intelligence attempt to 'animate' a representative

computer program of a conscious state will not make it conscious

independent of the intentions of the programmer, regardless of Caruthers

2000 wishful thinking to the contrary.

Another serious problem that seems to haunt physicalist activists is

related to the 'levels of organization' of reality. Most investigators are

specialists within their respective disciplines and feel increasingly insecure

as they have to stray away from their secure discipline niche. If their job

description (or discipline) requires them to examine diamonds before

cutting them to make a living in the market they insist in being concerned

about the tetrahedral arrangement of the diamond's carbon atoms,

something they don't need to market the diamond. Others may go further

and become obsessed with the valence angles of carbon atoms as a

function of their orbital arrangement or the influence of weak orbital

electron spin effects or strong nuclear gravitational effects on the orbital

electrons, etc. Unless you are old enough to retire from academia or a

research institution and adopt a cosmological perspective, you are wasting

energies in navigating unchartered waters sans an experience compass to

guide you through the troubled waters, regardless of your IQ scores. If

these youngens were to find solace and time to be reflexive on the

problem of interdisciplinary misadventures they would realize that our

peripheral sensorium 'presents' (the What) and / or our central brain

'represent' objects or events in our existence which we manipulate

inferentially by deduction (the How) but we are and remain blind to the

structural / functional elements of transparency giving rise to such

conscious thoughts and experiences that characterize the various mental

states! Yet we insist on the certainty of the gospel poetry derived from

such deductions. In our opinion, it would seem as if, semantically

speaking, natures invisibility stems from the intrinsic character of the

intentionality of conscious mental states as modified by previous social

experience and resulting in an ongoing self adjusting, self organizing

autopoiesis (see Varela 1980) that escapes our empirical and logic-

deductive detection. This is as far as the ontology of consciousness has

traveled thus far in providing an answer to the 'What' question. While

traveling along the circumferential asymptote cycle of noumenal -->

cosmological recursion we know that we have no better option for

truthfullness than a probabilistic 'How' answer or a faith-based 'Why'

explanation.

Most cognitive 'scientists' don't realize that epistemological

representationalism has developed a richer but less reliable model of the

virtual mental states in consciousness, the richer the model the more they

become less scientific, and there is no reason to deny it. It may even be a

good thing! Its reality is outside the descriptive or even the explanatory

reach of scientific methodology as it relies almost exclusively on

computational criteria. Yet, no one has developed a truly conscious robot

as yet. Neither has anyone provided the non-gnomic bridging principles

that link the physical or neural facts with facts about mental states (see

Kim 1998). Any intelligible explanatory link, whether factual, gnomic or

functional that extrapolates from measurable micro to observable macro-

behavioral properties will always need to include the quintessential

component of life or at least recognize the autonomy of biology as a

special science (see Fodor 1974), the only guarantee of such model ever

being autonomous (see Chalmers 2001). The transition from the physico-

chemical to the psycho-physical is not continuous and remains beyond our

present cognitive and conceptual capacities. As long as physicalists wear

their horse blinders they will ignore the metaphysical bridge as the only

one in harmony with our epistemic limitations. The physicalist dream of an

inter-theoretic deduction makes as much sense as trying to reduce

sociology to the quantum mechanical level of explanation! Furthermore,

first person and third person perspectives are driven by inherently

different semantic underpinnings. Any claim to the contrary is plain

wishful thinking, e.g., Baar's global landscape model which is essentially

an elegant attempt to explain 'access consciousness' and will suffice to

explain unconscious awareness, never introspective self consciousness.

Only in the 'BPS' model of self consciousness is there a place found for

theology as a required constitutive social element. Nobody in the scientific

world would dare ask the question of 'Why' a consciousness? That is a

theological question rooted on ethical / moral principles of social

conviviality. Scientist professionals describe the 'What' and philosophers of

science, with the aid of metaphysic logic, explain the 'How' but only a

believer is apt to propose his version of 'Why' based on informed intuitions

or alleged extra-sensorial perceptions or 'revelation'. The appeal for a

dualist interpretation is never as strong as when discussing the causal

efficiency of thoughts. Were thoughts to be the concurrent result of an

adaptive response or a post-facto residual phenomena (as Libet's 1985

experiments suggest) then dualism would collapse and phenomenal and

conceptual qualia would be mere epiphenomenal events irrelevant to the

physical laws controlling the adaptive response of our species to maintain

'BPS' equilibrium and we humans would be not much different from robots

existing in other worlds with identical physical laws in operation. As a

corollary, this attractive argument would do away with the notion of free

will, especially within a narrow interpretation of 'BPS' survival strategies.

It is so difficult to explain the 'aboutness' of thoughts (intentionality) that

were it not for the undeniable fact of self-evident altruistic behaviors

against self-interest and contra 'BPS' survival, one would succumb to the

temptation of denying the existence of 'free will'. But free will survives as

will be evident when we develop further the cortical attractor basin model.

To accommodate both versions we preserve 'free will' by assigning it

veto power on the unconscious / subconscious driven intended adaptive

response in behalf of a higher ineffable spiritual value, we call this form of

control 'proximate causation'. If not, what other functions may

phenomenal or conceptual states of mind serve the species that evolution

would not have rid off already? Why consciousness? The argument

assigning consciousness a smooth control and efficiency of the adaptive

response implies causality as a temporally co-existent activity along with

the elaboration of the motor response; as we have argued it happens

when subject is presented with novel situations where species bio-psycho-

social survival (BPS) is at stake.

In a 'BPS' context, any theory of mind requires the subject not only to

introspect in reflexive contemplation of self but also gain an insight into

the mental states of those sharing his ecological niche, their beliefs,

intentions and motivations. The entire body and facial expression

language complement linguistic and artistic narratives in documenting an

individual's state of mind. This way informed cooperative interactions

assure social survival for the group. The Kantian chaotic world of

multimodal sensations from environmental objects, their individual

attributes and interactions may get sorted out and recombined with

equivalent genetic or acquired stored memories according to the individual

neuronal network structure / functional processing idiosyncrasies that

gives us our personalities and it is only by a theory of mind that a social

consensus, as it were, is achieved before collectively deciding for a course

of adaptive action for the group. We have argued that the pain / pleasure

reward system is intimately associated with both phenomenal and

conceptual forms of consciousness and it is conceivable that different

response protocols to same event may be so ingrained that social

consensus among a plurality of intrinsic motivations may be difficult to

attain as witnessed in the geopolitical 'balkanization' of multi-ethnic

pluralities.

In short, there may be a constellation of metaphysical / ontological

theories of self consciousness, each touching on their different aspects

and manifestations, some so specific as trying to look at general reality

under a high power microscope, others so general as trying to look at

specifics with a telescope, none trying the nearly impossible task of

articulating a common sense epistemic bridge between the physical and

the non-physical aspects, with the exception of Chalmers and our

Epistemontological View of Reality. As we treaded carefully along the

minefield of indirect 'facts', first person accounts, inferences and

explanatory poetry we tried to examine the scope of each model cast on a

puzzle board to see the range of their individual extensions from a vintage

point perspective and proceeded to approximate the puzzle parts as best

we could fit them into a unit to achieve an integrated operational working

mosaic. The most important piece of the puzzle is inspired by important

variations on the 2 leading high order (HO) theories both of which

requiring an ad hoc continuum between an unconscious, non inferential

phenomenal state (established from either online sensory receptor

perceptual input or offline memory conceptual input), an unconscious

access intermediate stage, a subconscious relevant inferential, narrative

state and finally a conscious high order mental state, all of which causally

precedes the adaptive response (if any, as we see in dreams), as we have

argued above. Our 'BPS' model approach assumes the highly controversial

stance that ultimately, towards the end of that sequence, proto-semantics

precede syntax structuring during the ongoing serial elaboration of the

self-conscious thought (see our arguments in Volume I). We further

assume that either a basic first order sensory perception (BOP), a basic

first order thought (BOT) or memory conceptual input starts the process,

both eventually converging on a similar neuronal pathway. This way an

audio-visual external object / event perception (BOP) or an affective

unexplained state (desire, belief, anger, etc.) originating from either body-

proper homeostatic disturbance propioception (BOP) or pain / pleasure

reward system will first be subjected to an evaluation of its potential

survival threat by amygdaloidal processes described in Volume I.

Meanwhile, a simultaneous slower pathway evaluates the context in which

same perception is situated by utilizing hippocampus pathways as

described. At this point a series of preparations for a possible adaptive

motor / glandular response take place; this involves reticular activating

system (attentional), hypothalamic, limbic and executive pre-frontal

cortex participation as also described in Volume I. It should have been

noticed that the originating affective state perception may have, by

exception, required a preceding high order process (HOT) requiring self-

consciousness in itself. For example, a sudden depressive feeling of guilt

(BOP) may also have intentionality (aboutness) and thus needs, besides

the initial amygdaloidal evaluation, accessing narrative network pathways

to situate the affective feeling in context (HOT). BPS basically describes

two co-existing, ongoing, online mental states, one non-inferential

subconscious 'gut feeling' inner sense (BOP, a variant of Lycan's 1996

HOP) and an initially non-inferential unconscious accessing of narrative

pathways leading to the eventual production of higher order thought

(HOT) whose content is the feeling that oneself is the subject of that guilt

experience (self-consciousness). We hope this variation does away with

the need to explain inner sense or inner perceptions at the unconscious,

non-inferential level, more in harmony with neurophysiology evidence. It

may also explain why the object / event, whether sensory perceived or

present in thought (BOP), generating a gut feeling of unexplained

depression and guilt may or may not trigger an eventual high order

reflexive thought (HOT) depending on its valence (pain / pleasure) and

magnitude as controlled initially by the life-preserving amygdaloidal

system. This gut feeling of unconscious qualia has been deemed

incoherent by Papineau. Once the original perception (BOP) finds its way

and persists un-explained (or pathologically explained by narrative brain)

in high order thoughts, we are dealing with an emerging case of mental

health.

Details on the inner neuronal workings of the 'BPS' model described

are found in Volume I but in general they draw heavily from Edelman,

Damasio and Llinas models molded to fit a 'BPS' approach where we find it

un-necessary to distinguish between dispositional or occurring higher-

order thoughts (Caruthers 2000) because, while temporally appearing as

'occurent', in reality there were various populations of neuronal network

alternatives in cortical attractor basins at the 'disposition' of subjects who

subconsciously isolated the appropriate adaptive alternative based on

preferred pathways along weighted synaptic alternatives established on

'BPS' survival prerogatives criteria.

The careful reader may have noticed that while we had been trying

hard for an ontological definition of self-consciousness based on

neurological, neurochemical and neuroscience criteria in general, it has

remained elusive to fit inside a cognitive model straight jacket. Not even

'qualia', of which self-consciousness may arguably be considered a subset

of, has revealed its constitutive secrets. At that point the neuroscientist

has to make a qualitative jump into trading ontological certainty for a

lesser granularity epistemological representational certainty. Not all

known facts about consciousness can be represented in cognitive theories,

the ontological 'What' will always be superior in quality than cognitive

representational 'How' or any speculative theological 'Why'. Dennet and

Baar's Global Workspace theory are essentially a physicalist-oriented

representational accounts of 'access consciousness' and, like all cognitive

theories, have much to contribute in the simulation of the unconscious

state. A virtual mental state, where attentional and working memory

scenarios play important roles, have but very little to say about self-

consciousness. It should be clear that any cognitive model must integrate

with neural correlates to market the idea among neuroscientists. The

required bridging of analog computer programs of reentrant cortical loops

of Edelman with neurophysiological data coming from cortico-thalamic

electrophysiological activation (see Crick-Koch, Llinas 2001),

neurochemical NMDA synaptic data or QM theory is very challenging. In

our opinion fMRI confirmation of Damasio's clinical data on fronto-limbic

nexus or visualization of online fronto-mesencephalic loops of monitoring

activity prior to the elaboration of an adaptive response (Gray 1995) will

tie in with Edelman and Llinas work to give the neural theories a decided

advantage at least in an understanding of unconscious phenomenal

'consciousness' (awareness). The ever present affective component

mediating the conscious mental state and its relation to the pain /

pleasure peri-acqueductal gray--> hypothalamus--> frontal cortex axis

along Medial Forebrain Bundle MFB remains a puzzle to be resolved.

We have seen in the physics lab how two resonant oscillators

communicate at the speed of light through air across big distances when

one of the oscillators reaches a critical resonant frequency. This response

may provide an explanation for the apparent simultaneity we often see in

neuronal processing, effector responses and computers. Can we then

explain consciousness according to a quantum physics protocol? Nothing

could behave more counter intuitively than quantum mechanics at the

Planck micro dimension level. Yet familiar EMF propagate at

counterintuitive speeds and distances and do many counterintuitive things

some of which we can indirectly measure, others we can barely believe

they can exist like zero point gravity, non-locality or 'entanglement'. We

personally believe, like some others, that an alternate faster-than-an-

action-potential propagation speed can be also achieved by moving the

EMF along the chemical bonds of bound or structured water ubiquitously

found in the cellular milieu. Besides speed of propagation, quantum

mechanical (QM) systems act holistically because their associated particles

continue interacting even when separated at long distances, as if they

remained 'entangled'. This may well be the un-articulated mediation in the

Penrose-Hameroff micro-tubular model. However, their explanation is

based on the quantum-mechanical-like selective collapse of a wave

function from a superposition of multiple probable states to a single state,

as it happens in QM systems when there is an attempt at observation or

measurement. The collapse triggers a coherent flow controlling neuronal

activity, similar to the coherent flow measured in Bose-Einstein

condensates. In this volume we follow up on these ideas in developing

further the BPS model.

It is usually at this point where the uncertainties borne out of the

probabilistic nature of QM systems lead others to look further into non-

empirical criteria, a qualitative jump, as we enter into the metaphysical

domain looking for complementary explanations. Enter the substance and

/ or property dualistic models of consciousness. Detractors from these

views fail to see that the 'ontology' of physical reality at the fundamental,

quantum mechanical level is really informational or cognitive-theoretic (it

from bit) where the ontology of psycho-physical invariants will have to

settle for inferred metaphysical logic descriptions. We strongly suspect

that QM theories will treat self consciousness and its inseparable life

feature as a fundamental feature of physical reality whose intrinsic

monadic attributes access reflexive, high order states of consciousness

(see Russell 1927, Stapp 1993).

End of Ch. 1

Ch. 2

UNDERSTANDING THE CONSCIOUSNESS LITERATURE

(To know something supposes an act of the understanding, i.e.,

when we experience an object or event and then are able to

distinguish it. )

(Fractal tori)

INTRODUCTION.

The physical brain and the metaphysical mind are so inexorably

intertwined one with the other in their functionality that they become an

inseparable hybrid unit. What we know about the brain is the result of

direct observations, simulations in the laboratory or metaphysical logic

inferences therefrom, especially when dealing with relevant aspects

beyond the materiality of the physical brain or when the complexity

resides outside the limited resolution of the brain’s own sensory or

computational capacities. Consequently, whatever perspective we wish to

examine about the mind must always keep the brain, however indirectly,

in proper focus lest we end up in a fantasy-land dissertation / explanation

or a poetic exercise. All multidisciplinary narratives carry along the lingo

typical of their individual discipline components. Consciousness is no

exception.

From the very outset we should distinguish between the explanation

of the philosopher and the description of the practicing scientist. It is

much easier to make credible ‘descriptions’ of observables from a science-

based knowledge of brain function than to ‘explain’ the brain from a

philosophy-based analysis of the mind, especially so when the philosopher

is unfamiliar with the brain. Both approaches are ultimately inference-

based and the analyst needs to have some basic familiarity with the most

complete and fundamental theory of matter that of course includes brain

matter, i.e., quantum theory. As it turns out, theoretical physicists are in

reality natural philosophers, less concerned –in consciousness studies-

with descriptions than with explanations, for the obvious reasons

attending any study of complexity. It is always preferable –because of

credibility- to discuss the intangible mind from the perspective of empirical

facts about the brain than the reverse; but it should be clear that this is

only a pedagogical convenience and not an absolute necessity. That being

the case, it behooves students of consciousness to familiarize themselves

with the lingo of complexity studies, Wittgenstein’s warnings about

language semantics and a working knowledge of quantum theory and

logic. In the interest of brevity we will be selective in the choice of

examples to illustrate the point.

ARGUMENTATION

Even among prominent neuroscientists we often find a clear category

confusion between an epistemological explanation and an ontological

description, like we say “confusing the (epistemological) map with the

(ontological) territory.”. This is especially so among practicing physicists

and engineers whose formative training emphasized, as it should have, on

the practical solution of problems with a focus on pragmatism (science

philosophers in ‘akadummy’ retire early.) What that kind of formal training

didn’t emphasize was that ALL science is essentially, inherently ,

unavoidably subjective because WE humans are the observers of the not-

so 'objective' reality and cannot dissociate the observer from the

observed, a direct consequence of the hybrid nature of existential reality.

Consequently our observations and conclusions are as good as the

resolution capacity of our sensory receptors and the resolution of our

brain combinatorial capacity to permute, combine, sort, etc. brain

neuronal network representations of the observable data; very limited

indeed when compared to sense resolution in other biological species and

machine digital computation. To this human species limitation we add our

inborn curiosity about our origins and destiny that forces us to intuit that

there IS a reality out there beyond those limits of resolution and we

naturally extend our conclusions beyond the material reality of the

observed empirical phenomenology; enter metaphysics (e.g.,

mathematics or logic) as a 'sine qua non' component of the physical

structure of reality. Many practicing scientists, not so much in denial as

not being properly educated, would even deny the relevance of

metaphysics to their disciplines!

To make sense of the consciousness literature one must therefore be

very attentive to the implied epistemological assumptions when taken as

facts, the implied level of organization (conscious, subconscious,

unconscious, etc.) and often the neuro-physiological level of organization

being either described or explained (cellular, molecular, atomic, etc.).

Once a consciousness student realizes that brain matter is subject to

the same quantum influences as any matter anywhere else in the material

world, the obvious focus would have to be, inevitably, ultimately to

describe or explain how may that non-physical mind be causally efficient

in driving the physical brain into adaptive motor responses, if at all. This

constitutes the very basis for the claimed existence of a human ‘free will’

in what seems to be a perfectly deterministic world, even when the

behavior of empirical macro objects and events are more often than not

statistically determined. At the Planck level of organization (also called the

microphysics level) the indeterminism of individual quantum events is

likewise constrained by statistical laws. The new frontier in consciousness

research unavoidably would have to focus on this level of organization

when exploring how quantum field theory may mediate as a possible

special ‘semantic glue’ bridging the physical world determinism we witness

and describe, the epistemic interpretations we offer to explain them and

the conscious free will that participated (or not) in shaping it; as we have

discussed in a previous paper on a hybrid concept of existential reality

(see also Stapp). In this investigative effort we must be especially aware

of the ubiquitous temptation for the exclusive use of quantum theory

interpretations of consciousness as pure metaphor by some proponents

who spend no effort to define e.g., how the mental discernment that we

experience preceding the execution of ‘free will’ can be analyzed in terms

of its quantum equivalent in entanglement, superposition, collapse or

complementariness, etc., as it happens in other specific empirical

situations, e.g., Froehlich’s non-linear coupling of biomolecular dipoles in

the microwave region (see below for some other brief examples). It is also

important to ascertain what resources (mathematical, experimental, first

person narratives, etc.) do published accounts use to view any alleged

quantum correlation –observed or inferred- between mind and brain.

Recent literature has speculated on how may quantum field theory be

consistent with a human free will. Physical determinism and conscious free

will -and their consequent existential implications therein generated- have

important socio-dynamic questions that remain un-answered. To follow

this interesting debate we need to evaluate the resources offered to back

up any claim about the alleged correlations between the empirical

measurements and the deductive conclusions. For example we need to

examine how close this mind-body relationship is, is it assumed, inferred,

observed or measured with instruments? Is the brain considered identical

with the mind (monism), similar or separate entities (dualism)? We say

that there is a natural supervenience of the mind with the brain. Notice

immediately that a supervenient correlation implies a dependence relation

between the properties or facts about the mind and properties and facts

about the brain, correlation being a descriptive term with empirical

relevance. Notice also however that causation, so important in the

empirical sciences, is simply a relationship between a cause and an effect

(or result) whether an event, object or state. Sandwiched between the

causal agent and the result there may be a third hidden entity that both

share simultaneously without any causal interaction being involved. An

explanation is only an epistemological / theoretical attempt to find

meanings (practical or not) in the observed and described correlations.

Causations are essentially unidirectional and not always reversible

correlations (except in recursive cyclings) between two or more systems

involved. To illustrate physical causation we usually speak of the four

fundamental kinds (electromagnetic, weak, strong and gravitational) of

interactions which just explain the empirical correlations that are observed

in physical systems. Notice that even an accurate description of an

observable object or event ('What’) is NOT necessarily conditioned to

result from a direct causal relationship (usually an inferred explanation),

not to mention the ‘Why’ of the object / event presence (usually justified

in the theological domain).

If and when we speak of a strong or absolute reduction of mind

events, where claims are made that all conscious states and properties

can be formally reduced to the material domain (materialism) and

specifically to physics (physicalism), we mean we have approximated the

dependence further with a resulting formula, symbol or algorithm, what is

termed a ‘logical supervenience’, a rare situation indeed sometimes seen

in e.g., geometry. Without such proof any claims of ‘reduction’ (horse

blinder approach) means that knowledge of the brain alone is necessary

and sufficient to understand the mental domain, e.g., cognition. When

limits to a reduction are recognized we speak of ‘weaker’ reductions; like

when describing the empirical fact that the visual cortex V1 increases its

glucose uptake when some object is flashed into the retina of a subject -

as indicated by a PET scan- This does not establish an unequivocal causal

relationship and never explains the why. Physicists describe the ‘How’

while metaphysicists explain the ‘Why’ as noted above. There may be

natural, repeatable, falsifiable and observable facts in a correlation but

this does NOT establish a logical supervenience. See Chalmer’s “The

Conscious Mind”. Tree apples always fall to the ground and the mind may

consistently ‘cause’ an observed brain response but that does not imply

necessarily an interactivity that can be empirically measured and

described, let alone logically explained, e.g., what is life, gravitation, the

mind? Anyone thinking that DNA can explain life,..... better think about it

again.. The complexity of describing how a physical brain may interact

with a non-physical mind brings into the scene the monistic approach, as

we mentioned above, which considers the knowledge of the brain as

necessary and sufficient to understand the mind states for them

considered as ‘epiphenomena’. The eliminative materialism of the

Churchlands is an extreme monistic approach that wouldn’t even consider

the mind-brain correlations as existing.

An epiphenomenal mental state is not to be confused with an

emergent state in that the latter does not predicate its existence

exclusively on that of the brain substrate and may have an independent

origin (dualism). Contemporary dualism is a modified version of the

classical Cartesianism that viewed reality as consisting of 2 disparate

‘parts’, a type of ‘substance’ dualism in the form of a thinking mind and

extended matter. To escape the characterization of the mind as either a

‘part’, substance or ‘being’ some prefer to speak of a ‘functional’ dualism.

In our own biopsychosocial (bps) model of consciousness we have

adopted by reference the Kantian version of dualism as modified to

accommodate a neutral ‘psychophysical’ interface where quantum theory

may play a substantial role in explaining their natural supervenience in

terms of a hybrid reality unit. In it we find the empirical sense phenomena

and the subsequent transcendental noumena which the brain elaborates

when explaining, representing and understanding the empirical

phenomena. There are various types of dualism, e.g., in Chalmer’s

psychophysical model where information plays a dominant role

corresponding to our modified view of Kant’s model. The CTMU model of

Chris Langan banks heavily on a universal syntax information model. The

hybrid model of reality gives birth to an interesting paradox for the

ingrained physicalist who must swallow hard the fact that quantum theory

is the most successful model of matter based mostly on axiom-based

mathematical logic inferences (explicate, first person account domain)

about our limited empirical observations (implicate, third person account

domain)!

Is quantum theory science or philosophy?? Only the open-minded

knows better than excluding the metaphysical domain from science and,

at the same time accepts the fact about his sensory and brain-

computational limitations. Metaphysics is NOT dead! This should never be

construed as an exhortation to abandon the laboratory where science is

born, just the opposite, to talk about consciousness requires being familiar

with the physical brain substrate wherein ‘resides’ the elusive mind and

the metaphysical logic to extend the comprehension of that being

observed and / or computed.

To illustrate the possible practical importance of the preceding

argument we will briefly consider a model that describes the transition

from the continuously evolving Schrödinger wave function quantum state

to a discontinuous ‘eigenstate’ b of the measured observable B, i.e., the

reduction or ‘collapse’ of a reversible state (wave function) --> irreversible

state (eigenstate) with defined probabilities (of future outcomes). This is

an example of how an instant conscious volitional mental act (of choice)

can be framed into the mathematical “projection postulate” of von

Neumann when the brain mediates the position between the observer and

the observed, i.e., between the sense-phenomenal event and the effector

response formulation by the observer from available alternatives as we

discussed in a previous paper. How these claims may be rooted on

measured observables Stapp, Beck and Eccles elaborate, e.g., on how the

measurable macro level quantum uncertainties originating during pre-

synaptic / post-synaptic information transfer at neuronal synapses

(conformational macromolecular changes in ion channels,

neurotransmitter exocytosis, etc.) can be amplified (phase, resonant,

amplitude, spin coupling) to generate measurable entanglements of brain

activity (EEG, MEG). The volitional conscious event is a post discernment

choice among the probable alternatives in cortical attractor basins. As

discussed elsewhere, we believe that the complex act of integrating all

relevant factors (biological, psychic and social) and their re-segregation

into neuronal assemblies of possible alternatives of choice is all done

unconsciously, the conscious act been relegated to a consent to the

alternative most compatible with a positive emotional qualia (happiness,

relaxation, euphoria, etc.) as subconsciously isolated, i.e., each potential

event has an associated qualia experience or intrinsic actuality that

becomes its recognized label at the moment of choosing (actualizing a

probable state co-generates the qualia experience); we called it

‘proximate causation’. This neuronal-based mental state arguably would

qualify as ontological in nature which justifies the characterization of its

reality as ‘hybrid’ in nature. It is this ‘intrinsic actuality’ that Stapp argues

as ‘ontic’ as opposed to ‘epistemic’ in nature. This way the integration /

synchronization of the neuronal synaptic events in the assemblies become

the neural correlate of ‘unconscious’ events at the discernment stage prior

to the conscious superposition that precedes the collapse of the associated

wave function, as explained. Now, where the probability of a potential act

pre-existed in a cortical attractor, is now materialized in the present. To

the trained neurophysiologist there is no mystery in the common place

observation of how both inherited and acquired BPS factors influence the

plasticity of neuronal networks connectivities at unconscious levels in the

form of complex physiological reflexes triggered into conscious reality by

just willing its occurrence...or inhibition (act against self preservation).

Once a sense-phenomenal event activates a relevant neuronal assembly,

the attending bio-molecular synaptic events, among other things, induce a

symmetry breakdown and propagation over the brain of the bosonic

modes thereby generated (mesons, photons). The dynamically ordered /

correlated states produced in the neuronal networks represent the

entanglement or coherent state that precedes the collapse (choice).

The unconscious integration of BPS constitutive elements is guided by

their survival value to the human species on an individual experiential

basis. This being said, is it still far-fetched to say that every conscious

mental state has an associated 'physical' counterpart in the form of the

collapsed eigenstate. This idea may be too much for the physicalist mind

set to stomach and we suspect that they fear that placing a hybrid entity /

being between epistemology and ontology is mind-boggling, especially if

reality ultimately should be reduced to a universal syntax, e.g., CTMU

model. The alert reader will immediately notice the logical gymnastic

effort to assign physicality to a mind / information entity to avoid the

closure in the physical domain obstacle when describing its interaction

with the physical brain.

A reciprocal, dynamic, causal and intentional interactivity between the

physical brain and non-physical mind is more than anyone, except the

intellectually daring, bargained for. In our opinion Freeman’s data on the

olfactory system of rabbits –as discussed elsewhere- is convincing

argumentation that quantum field theory and Beck’s stochastic resonance

amplification can be literally applied to material brain states. By contrast,

the Penrose-Hammerof model of consciousness is predicated upon a

‘postulated’ coherent entanglement of the ubiquitous tubulin molecule

(changes in their conformational states in neuronal microtubules) caused

to subsequently collapse under the influence of another ‘postulated’

gravitation-induced objective state reduction, the latter equated as a

willed act of consciousness. This approach requires modifications of both

quantum theory and general relativity to accommodate ‘quantum gravity’

and ignore the concept of time as we know it, and for now it won’t fly.

One very interesting leading-edge concept is slowly evolving about the

role for the psycho-physical neutral interface as championed by Jung and

Pauli. This approach gives ‘ontic’ physicality to information. However, it

should be noted that this questionable epistemological treatment of

information is a significant departure from the familiar syntacto / semantic

Shannon type information theory where recursive parsing among

Chomskyan partition alternatives would become irrelevant.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Most practicing physicists and engineers approaching retirement age

and whose formal training and current practice emphasized, as it should

have, on the practical solution of problems with a focus on pragmatism

experience conceptual difficulties in accepting the possibility that the ontic

randomness of measured quantum events may well provide room for an

analysis of mental causation, i.e., the possibility that conscious mental

acts can influence brain behavior. They refuse to abandon the dogma of

‘closure in the physical domain’ notwithstanding the real challenge

presented by a quantum theory operating at a Planck level of organization

they can’t either see or measure directly a la Newton. Only

mathematicians, ‘akadummys’ or HiQers have taken the painful task of

being open-minded, revolutionary and willing to spend the time and effort

to cross disciplines and learn their associated lingoes and other linguistic

nuances, e.g., modal logic where a syllogism has three variations. It is not

often that practicing scientists see a syllogism other than as an argument

consisting of stated premises being followed of necessity by a conclusion

that is different from the stated premises, if the premises (universal

statements) are true (for all, some or one), the conclusion must also be

true (categorical syllogism). But now, more often than not, in the

hypothetical syllogism, both premises (wave or particle) and / or

conclusions (probabilities) may be conditional, e.g., where Heisenberg’s

uncertainty principle applies. More troublesome are the disjunctive

syllogisms where the leading premise (e.g., behaves as a wave or a

particle) may find the other premise denying one of the previous

alternatives and the conclusion being the remaining alternative. Like it or

not, the classical logic analysis based on Boolean Algebras has given way

to quantum logic to accommodate mathematical representations of

quantum mechanical, mind-boggling measurements (e.g., slit

experiments) in the physics laboratory.

Intoxicated by the symbolic celebration of the phenomenal successes

of Newtonian mechanics where the classical dynamics of a particle

position, momentum, energy, etc. nicely fit into a commutative type

algebraic representation in Boolean algebra, the practicing physicists can’t

easily conceive of a non-commutative, non-Boolean quantum logic to

explain the elusive probabilistic behavior of particles in the atomic and

subatomic Planck level of organization as manifested in the laboratory

measurements of observables. As it turns out this approach is the best fit

for explaining fundamental processes attending particle dynamics in the

universe, notwithstanding the fact that this way the certainty becomes a

probability and measurements seem uncertain and irreducible, like those

complexities we find when analyzing life and consciousness, c’est la guerre

about existential realism. The quantum analysis captures the ‘state’ during

an instant measurement as represented by the time-dependent state

function (state vector). The evolution of the ‘state’ as a function of time

(based on observable measurements of position, momentum, energy,

spin, etc., e.g., slit experiments) is described by the Schrödinger

equation. For a given possible value of an observable, it can be calculated

the probability of it becoming its true value if measured, see Born. As it

happens, one can not simultaneously evaluate the linear acceleration of a

particle in a given direction and also simultaneously ascertain its position

in the same direction (Heisenberg uncertainty principle), thus we settle for

characterizing the ‘state’ at an instant in time, an incomplete but realistic

description of the real physical state ‘in se’. More uncanny has been the

observation that two such systems can interact and then separate

infinitely BUT remaining correlated (tangled, synchronized!), what we now

call ‘non-locality’. This requires that alterations in one get transmitted to

the next at speeds exceeding that of light itself!, just what we need to

explain the speed of thought!! This is another instance of our human

species limitations to acquire knowledge about ‘things’ we can’t see or

precise their location, especially as it moves at the speed of light or

higher.

Our existential reality, at any level of human comprehension, is a

‘derivative reality’, one that is logically inferred from the ‘invisible original’

by a differential calculus of variations and also by deductive integration of

their ‘invisible’ constitutive parts until both sensory and computational

invisibilities acquire a ‘critical mass’ that makes their cognitive intuition at

the conceptual and sense-phenomenal level possible. Thus there are

things ‘in se’ (beyond our cognitive capacities) and things ‘derived’ both

conceptually (by analysis) and empirically (by sense-phenomenal

synthesis). Materialist scientists ignore these facts especially how human

efforts to compensate for these inherited limitations have historically

manifested in theologies. Rather than ignore the role they play in

existential reality it would make sense to deal with something that just

won’t go away, if history is a reliable witness. Like Will Durant said:

“Those who ignore the lessons of history will be condemned to repeat it.”

This brief survey is an open invitation to studious scientists and

materialist philosophers to seriously consider the possibility of naturalizing

epistemology (see Quine) and considering existential reality as hybrid in

nature…. Or, should the foundations of quantum theory be reconsidered

as no more than just information about the invisible reality ‘in se’?, (see

Fuchs).

Deltona Lakes, Florida Winter 2006

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Beck, F. (2001). Quantum brain dynamics and consciousness. In The

Physical Nature of Consciousness, ed. by P. van Locke, Benjamins,

Amsterdam.

2. Beck, F., and Eccles, J. (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and

the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of

Sciences of the USA.

3. de la Sierra, A. (2006). The Possible Quantal Interface and the Hybrid

Nature of Reality. Part I. Telicom Vol. XIX, No.1

4. de la Sierra, A. (2006). The Possible Quantal Interface and the Hybrid

Nature of Reality. Part II. Exploring the Interface. In Press

5. Flohr, H. (2000). NMDA receptor-mediated computational processes

and phenomenal consciousness. In Neural Correlates of Consciousness.

Empirical and Conceptual Questions, ed. by T. Metzinger, MIT Press,

Cambridge.

6. Fröhlich, H. (1968). Long range coherence and energy storage in

biological systems. International Journal of Quantum Chemistry.

7. Fuchs, C.A. (2002). Quantum mechanics as quantum information. In

Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations, Växjö University Press,

Växjö.

8. Grush, R., and Churchland, P.S. (1995). Gaps in Penrose's toilings.

Journal of Consciousness Studies.

9. Hameroff, S.R., and Penrose, R. (1996). Conscious events as

orchestrated spacetime selections. Journal of Consciousness Studies.

10. Jung, C.G., and Pauli, W. (1955). The Interpretation of Nature and

the Psyche. Pantheon, New York.

11. Neumann, J. von (1955). Mathematical Foundations of Quantum

Mechanics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

12. Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press,

Oxford.

13. Penrose, R., and Hameroff, S. (1995). Journal of Consciousness

Studies.

14. Pessa, E., and Vitiello, G. (2003). Quantum noise, entanglement and

chaos in the quantum field theory of mind/brain states. Mind and Matter.

15. Stapp, H.P. (1999). Attention, intention, and will in quantum physics.

Journal of Consciousness Studies.

End of Ch. 2

Ch.3

AN 'EPISTEMONTOLOGICAL' ARGUMENT.

(Metaphysics and Grids)

ABSTRACT

Ontology is often confused with epistemology because ontology usually

refers to a systematic account of that which 'exists' without differentiating

between objective, perceptual and conceptual existence. In the modern

parlance of artificial intelligence (AI) that which "exists" is that which can

be represented, i.e., only empirical objects / events (e.g., a territory) can

be represented (as a map). Epistemology is about human knowledge or

knowing. Thus, when the knowledge of a given domain is ‘represented’ in

the declarative formalism of sentential / symbolic logic, the set of relevant

objects / events thus represented is called its relevant universe of

discourse. Because of this confusion as to what 'exists', the object or its

abstract representation, which goes back to medieval times, we chose to

elaborate on this distinction between essence and existence. We humans

are the protagonists of existential reality, and as such living humans

should be the measure of all ‘things’ in existence, those entities that

ontologically are and those that epistemologically are not. This way, we

will be in a better position to appreciate that existential reality has

ontological and epistemological components co-existing as an inseparable

hybrid or ‘epistemontological’ unit. This realization is the justification to

modify our representational model of brain dynamic function from a

propositional to a probabilistic logic processing, more in harmony with

experimental EEG, fMRI, PET Scan data, etc. suggesting quantum dynamic

processing of sensorimotor perceptual information with the conceptual

tools of mathematical logic.

INTRODUCTION.

As we have often pointed out earlier in many previous publications,

there is often a category confusion, even among prominent

neuroscientists, between the perceptual (which we prefer to call sense-

phenomenal) and the conceptual entity which often translates into the

equivalent confusion between the ontological description of an empirical

object or event and its epistemological explanation that gives it existential

meaning; like we say, confusing the perceptual territory with its

conceptual map. We find that this confusion finds its roots way back in the

medieval conceptualization of essence and existence of an entity

(observable or not) as we will discuss further on. Perhaps if we were

open-minded enough to realize that ALL of human physical reality is

essentially and inherently subjective so long as we humans remain the

exclusive ontological observers and / or epistemological interpreters of

perceptual phenomena and cannot biologically dissociate the observed

from the observer, a direct consequence of the hybrid nature of existential

reality. Unfortunately the human species has been denied both a sense-

phenomenal and a cognitive introspective absolute knowledge of

noumenal and cosmological reality while, at the same time, has been

given an insatiable inborn curiosity about our origins and destiny which we

insist in reducing to noumenal levels of organization. Barring an

unforeseen species mutation we must plow with the oxen given and

optimize our handling of information on the basis on an uncertain,

probabilistic human mode of existence. We will try to bring into focus the

origins of the apparent paradox between our inborn cognitive aspirations

and the limited percepto-conceptual tools inherited to achieve that goal.

ARGUMENTATION.

Ontological and epistemological arguments come and go, from St.

Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinos, Descartes and in between. Perhaps if we

free ourselves of philosophical biases it should not be difficult to accept

that manifest perceptual reality (empirical objects and events) is in the

mind of the human beholder. Any significant change (drug, development

or disease-induced) in the sense-phenomenal receptors (extero, intero or

propioceptors) or their target neuronal networks will cause a

corresponding distorsion in the percept; ditto for posterior subsequent

processing culminating in the elaboration of their conceptual meaning and

adaptive response.

We make a distinction between manifest physical reality (e.g., sense-

phenomenal statue) and the physical reality ‘in se’ (e.g., sub-atomic

noumenal components of statue's granite) which may have always existed

in the absence of any observer. Consequently ‘manifest’ reality (existential

reality) has BOTH an invisible noumenal and / or cosmological and a

measurable sense-phenomenal, perceptual or empirical component. The

noumenal aspect has a probable conceptual structure and while it may be

in constant change, those changes, below the sensory level of resolution,

are not necessarily manifested in the perceptual aspect which may

continue to preserve its extension, position in spatiotemporal coordinates

and appropriate attributes of shape, form, color, etc., what we call its

‘essence’ to distinguish it from the invisible (to our senses) noumenal /

cosmological aspect which cannot have but a probabilistic ‘existence’

endowed with a conceptual structure. Thus, the gold ring I wear in my left

hand finger has two co-existing, inseparable 'physical' structures, the

probable gold lattice arrangement I conceptually infer from other factual

considerations and the empirically manifest shiny circular structure my

brain builds up from a visual perception. The latter has essence, the

former only probable existence. It is important to notice that both the

perceptual and the conceptual entities, are the result of brain processes

where initially the empirical percept preceded the probable conceptual

structure that gives meaning to that sensory perception within the

economy context of the subject. An explanation is always the predicate of

the empirical object / event since thoughts, sua sponte, cannot generate

them. To complicate matters further with the BPS ‘lei motif’, once the

rudiments of the perceptual phenomena are captured by sense receptors,

its probable, ever changing conceptual structure is biased / defaulted in

behalf of biopsychosocial equilibrium imperatives, inherited and acquired.

From the aforementioned, we can suggest, contra Descartes, that essence

precedes existence because all predicates require a subject on which to

embody the attributions.

Do mental triangles have essence or existence? We can

mathematically infer all kinds of verifiable conclusions about their

structure, e.g., the sum of their internal angles is always 180 degrees, but

the mental triangle is only a post-facto virtual representation of e.g., that

Egyptian pyramid we once saw or read about, one that had perceptual

extension and spatiotemporal positional coordinates; as such the mental

representation only has a probable existence not an essence. Thus, the

Cartesian ontological argument for existence is counterintuitive and can

be improved on. For us religious believers our conceptual God can only

exist (based on a high probability, self-evident logical intuition) and an

attributed human-like essence is a justifiable anthropo-morphisification

rooted in psycho-social considerations we have discussed elsewhere.

Empirical, perceptual beings in history, e.g., like Jesus, have descriptive

essence whereas the theological conceptualization of a ‘Trinity’ can only

give God / Holy Spirit existence which can be as undeniable as the

verifiable sum of the internal angles of a triangle adding to 180 degrees.

Any serious-minded and objective scholar who has critically observed the

macro-structural organization of our cosmos, and has seriously pondered

about life and our inexorable drive to reduce both to an invisible hyper-

dimensional micro-structural algorithm on the one hand and who has read

in any reputable dictionary on the linguistic meaning of ‘structure’ and

‘intelligence’ will agree on the characterization of that conceptual God in

existence as being mentally represented as an ‘intelligent designer’ of

both micro and macro structures. Is this assertion a biased religious view

of Judeo-Chrislamic beliefs? We don’t think so..., not any more than our

beliefs on the geometry of the triangle!

Again, one may properly consider questioning what portion of the

sense-phenomenal reality hybrid has essence (can be described) and

which has exclusive existence (can only be explained)? The conceptualized

specific crystalline arrangement of the gold lattice of my left finger ring is

consistent with many verifiable measurements and its existence and / or

essence has accordingly a higher probability, we have to learn how to live

with the uncertainties of our probable world reality. Perhaps it would help

if we were to consider ideas as mere convenient mental representations

that can always be traced to the ‘thing’ (essence) it is trying to represent

instead of animating the mental construct with an independent existence

or, as it happens with mathematical numbers when endowed with an

especial essence, product of the claim of a ‘clear and distinct’

mathematical perception. First, mathematics performs in the conceptual

domain, it is only a convenient language tool at the service of fashioning

probable explanations of the perceptual domain captured by the senses.

Any other interpretation of the phenomenal essence of a conceptual God

or mathematical numbers is a convenient species of Platonic realism,

especially useful for pedagogical or analytical dissection. To keep it simple

one must remember that our limited sensory tools ‘describe the What’ of

the empirical phenomena followed by an attempt to find the meaning of

the ‘What’ percept (within the context of BPS species economy) by the

also limited human brain combinatorial tools trying to ‘explain the How’.

At a higher conceptual level, consistent with the psychosocial imperative,

an inherited drive elaborates and tries to ‘explain the Why’ in the form of

mythopoetic religious elaborations of questionable essence and undeniable

conceptual existence as valuable psychosocial tools. It is impossible to

conceptualize the perfection of an isosceles triangle or the grace and

demeanor of my lovely black cat Chevy if you have never had the sense

phenomenal experience of seeing any triangles or cats before. One may

conceptualize a special geometry or domestic animal but that probable

existence is no guarantee of substantiation or embodyment into a finite

being of verifiable ‘essence’. It is fair to clarify that any mental abstraction

in existence carries the potential / probability of being an act in potency

as the periodic table of Mendeleyeff resolved when conceptual predictions

about physical reality became measurable. Are we certain about the

structure of atomic orbitals with electrons spinning in this or that

direction? I don't think so.. This is not to be construed as a generalization

that all potential mental existence of entities like conceptual Gods or

mathematical numbers will actualize, transubstantiate or materialize into

sense-phenomenal measurable beings in tangible existence. To say the

least, it begs the question of what caused the mental abstraction of the

triangle in the absence of a preceding empirical encounter with a sense-

phenomenal triangle? But humans have historically experienced the

singular life of prophets. The normal human mind cannot possibly have

thoughts (conceptualize) about any entity not already in essential or

contingent probable existence as we hope to show in the case of cortical

attractor space below. The fertile grounds for regressive infinitudes are

laid out to spoil the analysis, not to mention the potential proliferation of

an infinity of mental ‘beings’ and the subsequent search for their

actualization in the empirical domain! Inferences across domains, i.e.,

from the invisible conceptual to the physical macroempirical perceptual

being constitute serious logical errors, as frequently seen in the radical

physicalist reductionism…. unless they want to invoke an article of

physicalist faith. This is not to say that, by exception, some inferred

abstractions, solidly rooted in experimentally verifiable facts, may

constitute acts in potency with assigned probabilities of transubstantiation

across domains, the evolving case of quantum theory. Even in this case,

the structure and function at the fundamental level of resolution remains

inside a black box. Kant would have defined ‘existence’ as: “the copula of

a judgment”, like invoking the probable empirical being whose factual

‘description’ as a ‘wavicle’ conforms to the quantum theory

conceptualization of a wave carrying a particle.

The finitude and imperfection of a green leaf sense-phenomenal reality

endows it with essence and existence, albeit limited to the macro level of

resolution / organization human species can only perceive. Rephrasing it,

we are dealing with two types of existence in this hybrid sensory

experience, the existence at the empirical macro level is necessary, as

witnessed by the relevant sensory apparatus perceiving the serrated

green structure, etc. whereas the probable existence at the conceptual

photosynthetic micro level with its conceptualized electron transport relay

system, etc. is contingent. At the macro level, the existence of the green

leaf can be considered an attribute / property of its essence but it is not

necessary and may be confusing if extrapolated to the conceptual micro

level, invisible to our senses. To create an ontological argument about the

necessary existence in being / essence of the electron transport system

micro structure mediated by chlorophyll is unwarranted poetry although it

remains a probable act in potency, a very useful one, I may add. Same

argument holds for evolution, a very useful theory that leaves many facts

of existential life unexplained.

But one may properly ask, how could the sense-phenomenal redness

of an apple not have a previous independent existence, now appearing as

an attribute / property of the apple? Should its sensory reality

automatically confer it an independent existence? The easy way to avoid

embarrassment is to say that the color is a creation of the brain primary

visual cortex because a Daltonism patient would see the same apple a

different color. If pigment molecules could be isolated would they still be

red when scattered over a different surface? Can this be a case of

contingent existence? But how can anything be sense-detected, e.g.,

colors have hues, if they do not have an independent existence first? What

is the empirical structure of rainbows?

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Much of the focus on this presentation has been on the ontological

visible aspects of object we can describe with an invisible underlying

microstructure we can only explain. We have limited ourselves to briefly

analyze the special hybrid nature of the knowledge we either inherit or

acquire within the context of our species sensory and brain combinatorial

limitations and how it specifically relates to its noumenal or relative truth

value, especially the probabilistic nature of the structure of our belief

system and its justification and reliability on its production. We will follow-

up on these caveats as we develop further the themes we now only briefly

call the readers attention to.

Montgomery Village, Maryland Spring 2008

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Kant, Immanuel. 1990. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp

Smith. London: Macmillan Education Ltd.

2. Barnes, Jonathan. 1972. The Ontological Argument. London: Macmillan.

3. Hartshorne, Charles. 1965. Anselm's Discovery. LaSalle: Open Court.

4. Oppy, Graham. 1995. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Wippel, John. 1982. "Essence and Existence," in The Cambridge History

of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny

and Jan Pinborg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 385-410.

End of Ch. 3

Ch. 4

THE POSSIBLE QUANTUM INTERFACE AND THE HYBRID NATURE OF REALITY. Part I

("It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the view that the

substratum of everything is of mental character." Sir Arthur Eddington)

(Quantum Fields)

INTRODUCTION.

Perhaps many good scientists, sworn to uphold the tenets and defend the rigor

of scientific methodology, do not realize that quantum mechanic / field theory -far

from being the direct, exclusive result of an experimental scientific enquiry- is the

most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available where metaphysical

logic and mathematics played a decisive role in its coming into being. Consequently

it may be worthwhile to briefly scrutinize its structure and determine whether

quantum theory can help us to understand the complexities of life and

consciousness. The perfectly deterministic world of a Newtonian / relativistic

cosmos has been now complemented by the fresh notions of a ‘quantum

randomness’ thereby reopening the possibility that conscious free decisions or ‘free

will’ becomes again the centerpiece of intellectual scrutiny and bring man back to

his deserved central position in the cosmos, a “new Copernican revolution”.

We will try to make a distinction between ‘quantum randomness’ and other

types of blind, purposeless motions so problematic for the exercise of a free,

conscious volition. Practicing scientists seldom have the time or inclination to

ponder on the hybrid nature of reality, half of which is sense-phenomenal in its

origin and the other half containing the corresponding valid logical inferences about

its meaning within the context of a biopsychosocial survival economy. The

metaphysics represents that other self-evident reality moiety escaping our sense or

brain-computational detection resolution because of its supercomplexity in virtual

structure and function. In this brief overview we will be trying to smooth out an

understanding of how the transition from the ontological sense-phenomenal to the

epistemological metaphysical (effort to make an existential sense of it) is seamless

where the constituents are inseparable and constitute a hybrid unit. By describing,

correlating or explaining how that Kantian chaotic world of sensations out there in

the existential empirical world gets transduced into adaptive efforts to face

potentially dangerous contingencies. We will unavoidably enter into a discussion of

our freedom (free will) to influence this transition where an empirical contingency

generates single or multiple adaptive, probable solutions from which to freely

choose or consent to.

Since quantum events occur in the brain as elsewhere in the material world we will

start from the premise that their presence is relevant for those aspects of brain

activity that are correlated with mental activity, leaving aside the present

controversy on whether these events are in any measurable way causally efficient.

We wish to concentrate more on how quantum theory may adequately interface the

deterministic physical world of sensations with the indeterministic world of possible,

theoretical, logically inferred solutions to contingencies threatening human

biopsychosocial equilibrium. This may be the equivalent of joining the temporal

scale of human survival with the historical time frame beyond it or joining the

actual instant with the possible future, perhaps joining the world of sensations with

the world of ideas. But all such possibilities are premised upon the existence of a

human free will; can quantum theory help identifying such 'sine qua non'? It is

fairly plausible that conscious free decisions will no longer constitute a philosophical

problem in a perfectly deterministic world thanks to a better understanding of the

two aspects of quantum ‘randomness’ as we already see in stochastic / chaotic

systems. In our opinion, quantum theory may turn out to be that successful

interface joining both sides of the same coin of operational reality.

ARGUMENTATION.

First let us agree on the rules of the communication game. We start with the

premise that our human operational reality has two inseparable components, the

sense-phenomenal matter of the empirical domain and the metaphysical mind that

makes it intelligible for human adaptive purposes. How do we relate one to the

other? When we co-relate matter and mind we can do it two ways: we can describe

an invariant observable transition in the empirical domain from a-->b. The

description does not commit the proponent with a particular causal agent because

causation is an explanation that, while depending on the sense-phenomenal

observation, is to be understood as a linguistic term used to imply metaphysical

abstractions attempting to make operational sense of the observed correlation. We

should understand causation to be an irreversible sequence a-->b to accommodate

the possibility of a future identification of a common but unknown cause giving rise

to both a and b.

In the physical domain the relevant causal relations (termed interactions) are

either electromagnetic, weak, strong or gravitational, which are just metaphysical

logic inferences to adequately explain or ‘make sense’ of the empirical correlations

that are witnessed in the environment or the simulation laboratory. Those familiar

with the relevant literature will have discovered that, unfortunately, the present

knowledge about the interface bridging material and mental states are based

exclusively on descriptions of empirical correlations shying away from any attempt

to search for any causally conditioned sequence that would provide a needed

theoretical understanding. The main reason is an ingrained scientific / intellectual

bias about causality and exclusive closure in the ‘physical’ domain. Read

observable, repeatable and falsifiable sense-phenomenal domain guided by

scientific methodology. For the physicalist persuasion, if outside the reach of

scientific methodology, it doesn’t exist!! Enter quantum dynamics…, is it science?

And if not….then what? If not, theoreticians become expendable and, like the busy

clinicians, our neuroscientists become satisfied with, e.g., the empirical correlations

between active brain tissue and their increased glucose consumption (Pet Scans) or

their increased circulatory content of haemoglobin (fMRI). So much for our natural

curiosity to learn about our origins and destiny; a subversion of our inherited

nature?

How may a non-deterministic quantum dynamics interface bridge mind and

matter into a hybrid whole? Can a metaphysical mind be causally efficient to

interact with the physical matter of the brain? Or more appropriately, is the sub-

Planck dimensional domain of quantum dynamics theory or fact? We know, e.g.,

that a measurable quantum phenomena such as radioactive decay, photon

emission and absorption or wave interference, etc. -while random in nature- carry

the potential of being framed into a probabilistic description. Does that qualify QM

as having ‘scientific’ predictive value?. If I can’t predict –as it happens- when a

chunk of radioactive material will emit a sub-atomic particle by decay or how many

particles will be produced in the next hours, if any, does that disqualify QM as a

reliable theory of causality because it can only provide statistical probabilities of a

decay to happen? Is there a ‘hidden variable’ in the QM formulation that will make

it more acceptable? We believe that the conceptual chasm between the classical

deterministic Newtonian / relativistic and the non-deterministic Planck manifolds

can be successfully bridged by a QM theory phrased in an universal syntax.

Otherwise the sense-phenomenal empirical world will remain ‘a matter of fact’ and

the sub-Planck manifold of QM will ultimately turn into one of many mysterious

metaphors so well suited for spinning in the public media by special interest groups

and the uneducated. If we harmonize the facts of scientific methodology and the

relevant metaphysical circumstances in which they play themselves out we will

have an operational model, a true Theory of Everything (TOE) highlighting the

hybrid nature of reality. Just as for the informed literati and the objective,

dispassionate mind-frame there should not be any incompatibility between the

rationally-inspired Darwinism and the psychosocially-inspired theology; we also

claim the same consideration for a hybrid conception of reality. We will give below

examples of the special hybrid nature of QM itself, indeterminate at the

macrophysical empirical level but genuinely deterministic at the inferential Planck

dimensional level.

Paradoxically as it may seem, it is not far-fetched to claim that QM is today the

best candidate for a genuinely deterministic theory as required in the domain of the

physical environment. We can appreciate this and other relevant facts better if we

remove all theological / philosophical concepts from admixing with experimental /

mathematical logic facts, an intellectual challenge indeed.

The evolution of a quantum mechanical (QM) wavefunction describing the

complete story of a physical system under the Schrödinger equation is undoubtedly

deterministic in nature. It should be remembered that the uncertainty occasionally

experienced, especially when an observation was made or a quantum

measurement was performed, was explained by invoking some elusive process of

“collapse of the wavefunction” The collapse process itself is usually postulated to

proceed in an indeterministic fashion, BUT with probabilities assigned for various

possible future outcomes, via Born's rule, calculable on the basis of the system's

wavefunction, means that, notwithstanding the unavoidable fact that the collapse

quantum event introduced an element of randomness (realized at the ontological

level and epistemological level). This way, in our opinion, a special type of non-

random determinism is born (see Stapp) as will be examined below. Is there room

here for the possibility that a willed conscious mental act can collapse the wave

function and thus influence the course of any such seemingly random / chaotic

behavior as we see e.g., in brain dynamics? Or is coherence and entanglement a

previously required antecedent before collapse? One way to avoid a commitment to

a QM free will possibility is to throw the towel and claim that conscious acts are

open-ended fractal dynamic processes that cannot be computed. (See Penrose). A

mental state collapse usually implies a metaphysical reduction of an entangled,

coherent quantum configuration of infinite possibilities awaiting for a choice

initiative. But, in a more global context, we would be more interested in

incorporating in our tentative model of a hybrid reality the entanglement-induced

non-local correlations of quantum physics because a mind-brain entanglement

opens the door for a more comprehensive characterization of a mind-matter hybrid

correlation phrased in an universal syntax without the need of a duality concept.

But whatever attempts to associate these QM processes with either neuronal

synaptic events (Eccles) or microtubules (Penrose) may be premature until at least

a ‘one electron at a time rectification’ process that can operate at body temperature

is solidly established and put to empirical test.

Yet, perhaps the most promising approach should be one focusing on a lower

level of organization like neuronal networks which today represent the only credible

candidates to embed mental representations. This approach, quantum field theory,

has the advantage of a possible cooperation with highly developed areas of

investigation like tensor network theory (Llinas), neuropsychiatry (Jung) and

Bohmian mechanics.

Finally one often wonders whether ‘chaotic’ behavior constitutes yet another

aspect of reality governed by quantum field theory as well, as Bohmian mechanics

suggest? Our sense-phenomenal world seems governed by strictly deterministic

natural laws but, at the Planck dimensional level chaotic indeterminism reigns?

A chaotic system can be deterministic in yet another way reminiscent of

quantum systems: two systems with identical initial states will have radically

divergent future developments, but only within a finite, short time span because if

either system evolves over a longer period of time it becomes randomly

indeterministic and lacking in predictability or computability! In private

communications the undersigned has had with Dr. Chris King, a research

mathematics professor from Australia, he claims, if I understood correctly, that

such fractal dynamic system evolving over a long period of time represents a

relevant universe of possible solutions in the future that become available for the

human to choose from by exercising conscious free will. I personally would like to

amend this attractive speculation by suggesting the intervening participation of the

fast amygdaloidal and slower hippocampus system to assure that the choice

harmonizes with a biopsychosocial survival imperative; if it does the final filter

before the conscious choice becomes the pleasure / pain system involving the

hypothalamus and cyngular gyrus. This amendment will bring Dr. King’s brilliant

insight agreeably in line with the rest of our own BPS model of consciousness. If

this informed speculation turns out to be true Chaos Theory it will pre-empt

quantum approaches in the neurosciences. We suspect they are intimately related

in many significant aspects beyond the scope of the present overview. One

interesting feature of this approach is that chaotic behavior comes in all hues,

types, dimensions and structural organization, i.e., from Minkowsky to Hilbert

space, quantal discrete or continuous, in wave or particle form and even fluid

kinematic flow, all of which are features of human life manifestations. However

diverse, they all share the common requirement that their behavior is strictly

predicated, for their mathematical characterization, upon their initial conditions.

But don’t hold your breath waiting for some magic solution to harness the

theoretical potential of either the deterministic or indeterministic aspect anytime

soon because there exist processes which can equally well be fitted either inside

the deterministic model of classical mechanics or the indeterministic semi-Markov

model, regardless of the number of observations made.

SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS.

We discussed above how the disengagement of the concepts of causality from

determinism was deemed appropriate. As we have seen, the notion of cause /

effect was not so easily disengaged from much of what is relevant to a concept of a

hybrid reality. The events in the physical domain are deemed determined if given

specified initial conditions. Their forward sequential evolution are described by

natural laws. In a deterministic world everything can be explained under the aegis

of closure in the physical domain and the Leibnizian “Principle of Sufficient Reason”;

any metaphysical / mathematical unfalsifiable explanations are deemed just

metaphors or sophisticated poetry. More recently, a mathematical analysis of the

probability of Darwinian evolution -a metaphysical construct in itself- to explain

specified complexity, i.e., Intelligent Design (ID) was similarly labeled by un-

informed nihilists. Determinism is not always necessarily related to causality,

predictability or a theological destiny, as I have tried to explain.

In the un-relenting biological drive of the human species to understand his

origins and destiny man has depended on recorded history to regard the present

state of his ecosystem / universe as the invariant result / effect of its preceding

state and as the causally efficient agent of the state that will immediately follow.

But a more careful historical scrutiny has also witnessed conceptual ‘mutations’

usually ascribed to ‘advances in technological savoiz-faire’. During the vital life-

span of the human species we witness changes in conceptual approaches to social

contingencies but we always end up consolidating our support of the deterministic

viewpoint when repeating the old adage “The more things change the more they

stay the same.” The more evidence history accumulates the more facts add up to

question blind determinism as the exclusive explanation for the occurrence of

events as evidenced by the conceptual revolutions attending, e.g., the transition

from classical Newtonian --> Einstenian relativistic --> Maxwellian quantum

theories. Were these evolutionary paths obvious to their proponents? In our

humble opinion QM now opens a new possibility of explaining how past, present

and future may be causally connected in a deterministic way where man retains the

option to choose, individually or by a collective consensus from a range of possible

options with probable outcome. Man may now be able to predict the probabilities of

non-immediate future scenarios within a historical time frame if a set of invariant

initial conditions can be provided. Considering the invariant fact of our present

human limitations to ascertain reality beyond the sensory and brain-computational

capacity to resolve, we may have to be content with basing our predictions on

recorded history and a Turing-styled recursive parsing among neuronal / silicon

data bases, all accounting for known natural forces acting at given instances, or the

temporal positions and directions of cosmological, sub-Planck and observable

objects / events. QM will expand the scope of K. Popper’s range of determinism

potential in terms of a predictability based on their statistical probability of

realization. This way we also mitigate our fears about our own status as free causal

agents in our existential world. David Bohm amended the classical QM by

formulating the equivalent of Einstein ‘hidden variable’ equation claiming being able

to determine, on the basis of the system's wavefunction and particles' initial

positions and velocities, what their future positions and velocities should be. The

un-articulated premise is that particulate matter has at all times a definite spatial

position and direction profile. This development, if sustained, would bring stability

and determinism to sub-Planck metaphysical reality.

We have argued for the idea that existential reality may seem like being

constituted by reflex adaptive response acts triggered into action by environmental

contingencies that consciously or not are perceived as threats to the biological,

psychic and social integrity of the human species in his ecological niche. During his

average lifespan of 76 years there seems to be a constancy in the physical

environment and the natural laws that control its slow evolution during this short

period. Our world seems at times fixed and determined by external natural forces

beyond our control to change even though intuitively one feels at other times as if

in control of destiny by the exercise of a free will to choose among alternatives

available in an indeterminate assortment of viable options. How can we be both

determined and undetermined at the same time? This paradox may be resolved if

we conceive reality as a hybrid unit characterized by the exigent circumstances of

human biological / reproductive survival as a species and the chronic species

imperative of searching answers for the question of his origins and destiny

impacting more on his psychic and social survival. We are dealing with two different

time frames, lifetime and historic / geological. In so doing we need to reconcile the

paradox of life time frame determinism with the indeterminism and uncertainties of

the future beyond lifetime. We have developed arguments in this overview in

defense of quantum and chaos theory as candidates for reconciliation providing

that their mathematical analysis continues to yield alternatives compatible with the

co-existence determinism with human free agency.

Deltona Lakes, Florida, Winter 2005

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

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3. Bohm, D. (1990). A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter.

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4. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

5. Grush, R., and Churchland, P.S. (1995). Gaps in Penrose's toilings. Journal of

Consciousness Studies 2(1), 10-29. See also the response by Penrose, R., and 6.

Hameroff, S. (1995). Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(2), 98-111.

7. Hagan, S., Hameroff, S.R., and Tuszynski, J.A. (2002). Quantum computation in

brain microtubules: decoherence and biological feasibility. Phys. Rev. E 65,

061901-1 to -11.

8. Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and Philosophy. Harper and Row, New York.

9. Jung, C.G., and Pauli, W. (1955). The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche.

Pantheon, New York. Translated by P. Silz. German original Naturerklärung und

Psyche. Rascher, Zürich, 1952.

10. Kandel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H., and Jessell, T.M. (2000). Principles of Neural

Science. McGraw Hill, New York.

11. Kane, R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

12. Kaneko, K., and Tsuda, I. (2000). Chaos and Beyond. Springer, Berlin.

13. Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

14. Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

15. Pessa, E., and Vitiello, G. (2003). Quantum noise, entanglement and chaos in

the quantum field theory of mind/brain states. Mind and Matter 1, 59-79.

16. Popper, K.R., and Eccles, J.C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain. Springer, Berlin.

17. Schwartz, J.M., Stapp, H.P., and Beauregard, M. (2004). Quantum physics in

neuroscience and psychology: a new model with respect to mind/brain interaction.

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18. Stapp, H.P. (1993). A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface. In Mind,

Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Springer, Berlin, pp. 145-172.

19. Tegmark, M. (2000). Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes.

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20. Wheeler, J.A. (1994). It from bit. In At Home in the Universe, American

Institute of Physics, Woodbury, pp. 295-311, references pp. 127-133.

End of Ch. 4

Chapter 5

EXPLORING THE QUANTUM INTERFACE. Part II

(“…. shaping future history as a viable continuation of the past in harmony with

natural law, all done at every fleeting instant we call the present. . ”)

Sociological level: From Dennet’s “Religion as a Natural Phenomenon”

Conceptual level: The interface bridge

Biological level: Sagittal X Human Brain

(“No limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself, or, if you prefer, we

are not free to cease being free. ” Sartre.)

ABSTRACT

In this Part II essay we expand further on the complexities of the

multidisciplinary contents of Voluma I of the book "Neurophilosophy of

Consciousness" to explore further the relevance of quantum dynamics in creating a

continuum between the perceptual, physical reality we define by measurements

and the conceptual metaphysical meanings we extract from the observations to

provide meaningful explanations to our existential life. At this point it is mere

speculation that we will ever be able to seamlessly connect the precise quantum

probabilities we measure (as the temporal evolution of the Schrodinger equation in

simpler atomic level systems) with the pluralities of future adaptive outcomes for

the human species that quantum dynamics brain processing suggests as will be

developed as an extension of Dr. Walter Freeman’s ‘attractor’-basin theory.

In the process we postulate, without demonstrating as yet, the process by which

we use our free will to select from all available future scenarios that adaptive

solution with the highest probability of success for the human agent, i. e. , one

causally connecting the preceding past and consistent with the laws of nature.

We are fully aware of the gigantic effort in modifying and / or coupling both

classical logic and quantum theory into a ‘modal’ unit such that quantum theory

probabilities actually be considered ‘actual futures’ at the existential

biopsychosocial level. In doing so we root our speculations on the laboratory data

and the mathematical inferences derived therefrom, never losing sight of the

philosophical implications and possible practical derivations for neuropsychiatry.

Keywords

Actual futures, Amygdala, Attractor -basin theory, Biopsychosocial, Brain

processing, Causal connection, Cerebral cortex, Classical logic, Consciousness,

Existential, Free will, Freeman, Future, Human species, Hybrid , Interface, Natural

law, Nature , Neuroeffector, Neurophilosophy, Neuropsychiatry, Ontological,

Philosophical implications, Probability, Quantal , Quantum theory, Reality ,

Schrodinger equation, Three-layered’ approach, Turing computer processor,

Volition.

INTRODUCTION.

In part I of this discussion we made an attempt to flesh out some of the

complex issues contained in our previously published book "Neurophilosophy of

Consciousness", Volume I (de la Sierra, 2003). In it we encompassed all relevant

multidisciplinary aspects of the consciousness debate to defend the thesis that self-

consciousness is a biological, psychological and sociological (BPS) survival strategy

for the human species when confronting the quotidian variations of contingencies in

both the internal body physiological and external environmental milieu. We

discussed the importance of free will and intentionality in getting a handle on the

process of adaptation to novel situations fraught with all kinds of possible dangers

to the species. For pedagogical purposes we viewed reality as the ontological and

the epistemological layers joined together as a hybrid unit by a quantum interface.

The ‘three-layered’ approach was hardly sufficient to distinguish between which

human ‘choices’ are really unconscious / subconscious and which are the result of

deliberate and intentional volition. This time around we ‘solubilize’ / disperse the

layers and characterize quantum fields as the ubiquitous continuous interface

medium containing all ‘discontinuous’ elements of reality (internal body proper,

external empirical and the brain in between) dynamically interacting in such

colloidal-like fluidity. The transduction of the empirical information content

(potential meanings) of the environment by exteroceptors now include also the

input from visceral interoceptors and the muscle and joint propioceptor activity, all

of which initiate the kind of brain processing activity that will culminate in the

generation of action alternatives from which to select those with best adaptive

value. Besides receptors, we now incorporate in the process the participation of

neuroeffectors at both the autonomic visceral brain and somatic motor cortex, both

of which are dynamically involved with the primary sensory cortex as we will

outline below.

We will, on an ad hoc basis, access relevant multidisciplinary arguments

previously published to sustain this interpretation, as needed. An elementary

familiarity with neuroscience, philosophy and biophysics will be helpful in following

how the recursive flow of information (inherited or acquired meanings), from the

Planck to the existential dimensional level…and back, i. e. , the recursive dynamic

transition from chaos to such probabilistic order scenario as would, arguably, make

free choices possible.

To have free will is to act with a conscious capacity for rational self-governance

and being able to determine independently whether and how one exercises that

capacity on any given occasion. To what extent we are free to generate a plurality

of alternatives to choose from is open to scrutiny. Ultimately—as discussed—the

spectrum of choices are fashioned according to a hierarchy of BPS survival

strategies operating at unconscious levels where the inherited and the acquired

meanings are balanced not so much to optimize the adaptive response of the

species as to identify the viable individualized choice for a given contingency arising

in his ecosystem niche.

It is not self-evident how the truth of a natural determinism underlying a

biopsychosocial survival strategy may not preclude free will. Hence, it would be

proper to explore and identify experimentally the sort of residual indeterminism

that survives and makes possible the survival of freedom of choice. To act with free

will requires that there exist somewhere a plurality of futures available to the agent

causally connected with the preceding past and consistent with the laws of nature.

Can quantum theory probabilities actually be considered ‘actual futures’ at the

existential biopsychosocial level? We believe so and will ground the argumentation

on laboratory data and the mathematical inferences derived therefrom, never

losing sight of the philosophical implications and possible applications in

neuropsychiatry.

ARGUMENTATION.

Experimental neurodynamic profile: We all have experienced a check-out

transaction at the cashier’s counter in the local supermarket: It leaves no doubt

that the brain is a poor digital processor with no working memory for more than the

few digits of the ID password in the credit card, not to mention the limited ad hoc

computational capacity to deduct the stamps discounts, etc. Consequently, any

hope to reduce brain function to an exclusive Turing computer processor is a futile

exercise. However, experimental data coming from intracellular or extracellular

neuronal recordings, electroencephalograms (EEG), event related potentials (ERP),

magneto-encephalograms (MEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),

positron emission technology (PET) and neuropsychological observations of

behavior, evidences the relevance and importance of unconscious analogical and

quantum field computations based on other non-linear memory resources.

But, can we always rely on what is being recorded in those tracings? Or is the

solipsistic, first person account narrative of the experience felt (after the

presentation of the stimulus) a reliable sign of the agent’s active control over the

outcome of the response? A stereotaxic stimulation at a relevant brain neuronal

locus would have elicited a similar recording where any active desire or volition

from the agent is obviously absent. Then who or what, if anything, controls an

intended result?

On the deterministic side, the amygdaloidal complex initially responds to

environmental stimuli it prejudges as potentially nociceptive to human species, i. e.

, a threat to biological survival. The ‘fast’ response circuitry is wired up genetically

and results in a transient motor inhibition to act (freeze response) while a slower

ongoing circuit (hippocampus) analyzes the environmental context surrounding the

genesis of such particular stimulus. Meanwhile, pending the resolution of the

‘context’ analysis by the hippocampus, the amygdala organizes a Cannon (fight /

flight) contingency plan to match the results from the hippocampus memory

database. Should the sensory stimulus be judged to represent a survival threat

within the context of the particular surroundings, the motor activity relay switch is

released from inhibition and, based on the individual’s physical resources to

respond, a prefrontal cortex decision is made from the alternatives of facing or

retreating from the source of the stimulus. The particularities of the response

involve various brain modules, not the least of which is the cingular cortex and

hypothalamus as will expand later on. (Charney, 2004a; Charney, 2004b) Many

years back, on an experimental fishing expedition, we registered recordings from

exploratory electrodes in the insular cortex representing the ‘visceral homunculus’

but were only able to obtain much noise, internal from the multiple neurohumoral

synaptic events and external from the interface of the recording electrodes and the

equipment; any valuable extracellular and scalp EEG tracings in rats were hidden

behind the noise background notwithstanding our use of a computer of average

transients (CAT) in an attempt to extract (add on) meaningful low amplitude

signals above noise levels. With the miniaturization of electronics and

modernization of computers we now recognize the necessity of such noise to

augment the weak signals by resonance / phase coupling as will be expanded on

below.

Likewise, the alpha, beta and gamma wave components of brain

electroencephalogram (EEG) tracings behave chaotically because of the ample

distribution of extracellular interdendritic many to many interconnectivity, giving

the wave transmission profile the characteristic fractal dynamics fingerprint aptly

described in Pribram’s hologram model (Pribram, 1976). The small individual

output from all relevant neurons responding to a specific nociceptive stimulus

cohered by becoming integrated (locked in phase) giving rise to the related ERP

(Zeman, Till, Livingston, et al, 2007). The nonlinearity of so many inhibitory /

stimulatory neuronal / humoral transmitters moving to and fro the neuronal

membrane generates the consequent chaos dynamics reflected in the tracings.

Needless to say that such information content is computationally intractable, as

discussed elsewhere. Some of this chaotic activity could even be traced to central

motor nuclei controlling effectors. What then is the need and justification for all this

measured recursive cyclic activity between neuromuscular effectors and the

receptors once the stimulus has passed? Why the active involvement of cingular

and hypothalamic cortices? Dr. Walter J. Freeman, of the University of California at

Berkeley, has provided, in our opinion, the best model to explain the ‘chaos’ in his

‘attractor theory’ after careful mathematical analysis and computer simulations

(see Freeman graph below). His seminal studies on rabbit olfaction have convinced

us that the premotor and motor cortices along with the limbic system are

continuously involved in controlling central autonomic (hypothalamus) and

neurosecretory activity in the body economy to support the postural and musculo-

skeletal adjustments in the execution of chosen adaptive behaviors.

Figure 1.

What is the meaning of all this?

Causal chains run from past to future, and not in the other direction. Our

conscious deliberation causes our particular choice among available alternatives,

which causes our actions. We need to get a feeling for the many parts of the brain

active in the dynamic synthesis of a global state of cooperative synergy in the

premotor cortex, in particular the particularities of the sensory system that initiated

the action. There is a role of emotions in the harnessing and creation of the

neuroendocrine milieu that will sustain effective motor-adaptive responses.

(Charney, 2004a; Charney, 2004b) The analysis of the sense receptor participation

is a tad more complicated and may require a finer distinction between free will and

intentionality, means and ends because we can either choose to activate the means

resources that will obtain a specific end result or, lacking the resources, I can only

form an intention to achieve such ends whenever resources (physiological, etc. )

become available, i. e. , it becomes a goal intended whenever a spectrum of

alternatives become available to choose again from. This way intentional acts

precede in time the execution of the viable effective strategy to achieve that goal.

Meanwhile the perceptual sensory apparatus continues actively monitoring the

changes in the environmental scenery as directed by the executive cortex acting as

a central command parsing and sorting among the available alternatives to

adaptively respond, based on the internal body state of physiological homeostasis

(visceral brain, compartment 1) vis a vis its adequacy to meet the environmental

contingency encountered. This requires a dynamic / continued self adjustment, self

configuration sustained by an exhaustive parsing, sorting out and continuous

recursive recycling between effectors and sensory receptors. Through the aegis of

recursion, neuronal plasticity, Hebbian and neurohumoral bias control of synaptic

gates, an evolving construction of adaptive alternatives is built up where genetic

and acquired BPS survival strategies are represented in neuronal populations to

choose from when needed, constituting thereby the possible future states, custom

tailored for the particular individual in his ecological niche. In addition, the

recursive cycling potential allows the agent to go back in time, as it were, not to

change the past but to choose a better alternative that is a possible continuation of

that same past and consistent with the laws of nature. This way the current brain

representation the agent has of his internal body state (insular cortex?) and the

external world at large (sensory cortex) will understandably have the highest

probability to come up in a future search for alternatives. What is important to keep

in mind is how those internal and external mental states are kept continuously

updated (dynamic self configuration) by the active participation of exteroceptors,

interoceptors and propioceptors which inform the effector network of relevant

variations in state. These variations may generate new alternative scenarios to be

chosen from if needed. In a previous publication we suggested the amygdaloidal

complex and the hippocampus as the main data source about online sense-

phenomenal and off-line memory data respectively that informs the executive

cortex command center. Needless to say that, in the hierarchical prelation totem

pole, the controlling neuronal assemblies genetically charged with assuring the

biological viability and perpetuation of the species (amygdala) are at the top; they

would reflexly override any other activity pattern contrary to this biological survival

imperative. The fact that we can consciously neutralize its driving force in cases of

altruism or heroism argues in favor of the survival of a free agency albeit possibly

acting ‘contra natura’. These complex patterns of self-organizing recursive neuronal

activity that functionally integrates a set of viable solutions under a given set of

conditions and perspectives with an assigned probability of realization constitutes

an ‘attractor’ alternative or brain state available to the agent to choose from. A

search for viable alternatives involves ‘state transitions’ which are partially

controlled by ‘de novo’ variations in the initial conditions (triggered by changes in

the internal / external environment) when amplified to cause jumps from one brain

state to another. Measurements are consistent with an initial reticular activating

system (RAS) in the brain stem inducing hippocampus theta waviform activity (4

Hz/sec. ) via septal nuclei (see Freeman 1992).

We disagree with Dr. Freeman’s assigned role to emotions as the driving force

behind the generation of intentions. In our view they have a secondary subsidiary

role in providing the hypothalamic neurohumoral fuel that orients and drives the

collective effort to structure an adaptive motor response by inducing the subjective

affective qualic experience as a rallying background behind the collegiate effort.

Neither do we consider the amygdala as either a functional or structural part of the

cingular cortex. As we have repeatedly affirmed, based partially on LeDoux

measurements, it is the strategically located amygdaloid complex, with its direct

lateral connections with basal ganglia and ascending / descending motor pathways

(lateral forebrain bundle, LFB) on the one hand and its direct medial connections

with septal, hypothalamic and nucleus accumbens (medial forebrain bundle, MFB)

on the other hand, that provides the best position in the loop to qualify as the

organizer of the global response combining the lateral executive cortex foresight

with the medial cingular cortex insight preceding a choice of action; all of which Dr.

Freeman conceptually encapsulates in his “generation of intentions” idea.

In our own BPS model the conscious deliberation on appropriate alternatives is

no more than the anticipation of possible effective / affective scenarios likely to

play out in the different alternatives available. Deliberation is a mental rehearsal

play back of ‘attractor’ package candidates until a best fit (with the attending

participation of pain / pleasure network filters) is identified and is consciously willed

to be executed, what we have described as ‘proximate cause’ free will. In the

context of this essay we’d like to stress the importance of these recursive, dynamic

mental exploratory journeys into prospective futures—and failed pasts—that makes

possible a better logistic control of past strategies to take into consideration new

environmental scenarios as they dynamically play themselves out anew online at

the biological, psychic and sociological level; the beginning of a new alternative or

the modification (changes in Hebbian synaptic strengths or connectivities, regional

blood flows, etc. ) of an old ‘future’ attractor basin to choose from. It is like shaping

future history as a viable continuation of the past in harmony with natural law, all

done at every fleeting instant we call the present.

One may wonder how may these different options in the attractor landscape co-

exist without interactive annihilation, destructive interference or disuse atrophy?

The clue to the answer is a paradox in itself, the shifting, asynchronous global

spatio-temporal chaotic activity patterns we measure on the scalp electrodes of

resting subjects arguably maintain ALL options open at random. Contrasting as

they may be in terms of goals (intentions), possible outcomes (probabilities),

viabilities, oxygen supply requirements, or neuro-motor execution strategies, they

all get a chance to rehearse the changing script, no disuse atrophy is possible

under these circumstances. Because of this seeming chaos, not in spite of it, a

relevant and appropriate ordered alternative is possible to be selected, reminiscent

of Edelman’s neo-Darwinian natural selection of neuronal populations. But how?

In our view the receptor input, whether coming from an exteroceptor,

interoceptor or propioceptor location, alerts (via reticular activating system) the

relevant sensory cortex (EEG synchrony) as to the change monitored and readies

the system to focus its resources on likely attractor candidates. The bracketing

selection continues narrowing (shifting transitional states) by inferential processing

(‘reductio ad absurdum’) in harmony with real time resources for adaptive solutions

until a best fit attractor with the highest probability of success is ‘enslaved’. This

cooperative evolution of macroscopic order from microscopic chaos cannot be

simply explained by the entrainment of coupled oscillators into recursive synchrony

as classical neuroscience may have it. Baars’ global entrainment model is

insufficient unless it incorporates quantum / chaos dynamics in his description. This

way we may move closer to a model that is capable of explaining how the internal

generation of chaos (measured noise) paradoxically is required at different stages

to entrain, constrain and enslave the global networks representing each and all

attractors in the landscape maintaining in the process a dynamic self-generative

recursive updating from which to choose when the proper environmental stimulus

is monitored by sense receptors. Motor neuron feedback will adjust focus of sense

receptors on new variations according to priorities established by previous similar

experiences, all in defense of species survival and perpetuation according to the

individualized BPS equilibrium, custom modeled for that individual in his ecological

niche.

Another way of conceiving a chosen ‘attractor’ is to view it as the most probable

neuronal network complex to be triggered into action in a global landscape in

response to a known characteristic contingency arising internally in the individual or

externally in his ecological niche which was previously recorded in the primary

sensory cortex as an amplitude modulated (AM) oscillating wave front (now hidden

inside the chaotic interactivity). The latter results from the integration (phase

coupling?) of the contributions of a multitude of relevant synapses recruited to

participate. While the attractor was being structured (modified, reinforced, etc. ) by

the various internal / external receptor inputs to the primary sensory cortex, the

latter became thereby the basin for the particular attractor, the same one that

when accessed de novo triggers it into activity as identified by the phase transition

and its macroscopic AM, a varying ‘fingerprint’. The variation corresponds to the

arrival of the stimulus plus the resonant phase locking with attractor.

In our opinion, there must also be present the input of ‘mirror neurons’ in the

anterior cingulate gyrus and insular cortex, especially if they recognize the

perceptual profile and became part of the attractor population of neurons. The

mirror neurons, it would seem, add another dimension to the choice process as

they are able to distinguish between self (internal) and non-self (external

environment). Soon after they were discovered in 1995 by Rizzolatti of the

University of Parma we incorporated them into our BPS model to explain how the

newborn would be able to map mother’s baby talk phonemes (cooing) and facial

movements onto frontal motor cortex controlling such movements (via Cranial

nerves VII, IX) so important in the vocalization stage of language development and

the ability of viewing the environment as not an extension of self as discussed

elsewhere. At that time of publication we excluded the participation of the primary

sensory cortex based on a chronology of myelinization of thalamo-cortical

projections criteria which left the oculo-kinetic mesencephalic reflex as solely

responsible for the newborn imitation responses; we may have to review that

interpretation. We have no doubt that mirror neurons will provide a unifying view in

any attractor modeling, especially after a very recent non-invasive study by

Iacobini at UCLA describing how we can use our mirror neurons to figure out the

intentions of others. In January 2006, NY Times published an interesting review,

(see “Cells That Read Minds”). The ability to bring to life goal-directed imitation

rehearsals including the affective component. I also used equivalent data in my

book to underestimate the importance of the newborn maps in his un-myelinized,

undeveloped premotor cortex (cingular gyrus?) that controls the muscles involved

in the facial and laryngeal expression / phonation (Cranial nerves VII, IX). But we

insisted on how, somehow, all sorts of facial movements and cooing baby talk

sounds from his lactating mother form a vinculum between his genetic past and

acquired present so important in the posterior post-natal evolution of language.

That forms the basis of our previous claim that a ‘protosemantic’ data base

precedes and guides the elaboration of syntax, contrary to the opposite dogma by

Chomsky. I also charged these mirror neurons with participation in the emergence

of that crucial moment in the development of self-consciousness when the infant

can tell the external ‘other’ as not an extension of self. Furthermore, we considered

the stereotaxic evidence fact that there is a poor homuncular representation of the

vegetative system (explained also by the somatization of ‘referred pain’) in the

insular cortex and how they have developmentally been substituted mostly by

mirror neurons. These are activated (fMRI data) during the qualic feeling of

emotional states of anger, sadness, guilt, etc. , when elicited by either memory

recalls or empathy when witnessing equivalent events as they occur in the ‘other’

person. This was additional evidence that mirror neurons constitute an essential

component in the elaboration and accessing of relevant ‘attractors’.

Our long held suspicion that a Lamarckian mode of inheritance made intuitive

sense had now been given a good experimental footing with the discovery of mirror

neurons notwithstanding our past failed experimental attempts to find evidence in

the germinal cells DNA in trained rats to verify their suspected modification.

Imitation learning, when goal directed, is essential in the incorporation of

behavioral variations memes into the updating and reconfiguration of attractor

content. The incorporation of acquired memes into the gene pool remains an

unsolved puzzle and the answer may well reside in the activity of mirror neurons

and ‘silent genes’ ('junk DNA') of the genome. It is not an exaggeration to predict

that mirror neurons will change many dogmatic conceptions about Darwinian

evolution as the exclusive explanation of existential reality. See the Conclusions

below for additional arguments.

Philosophical implications. If we are to consider the preceding arguments as

‘prima facie’ evidence in support of the survival of ‘free will’ notwithstanding the

determinism imposed by nature’s laws governing the sense-phenomenal world, we

still have to answer many questions, e. g. , what kind of control may the agent

have over his choices, is he / she really free? We may distinguish analytically

between guidance and regulatory aspects of such causal influence on the evolution

of volition in the willing agent. When we are able to choose or not from available

alternate scenarios we are talking about ‘regulation’. Once chosen we have to

consider the ‘guidance’ control available to the agent of the particularities of his

choice; can they be modified during the execution phase? From a legal viewpoint

only the consequences ascribed to the ‘guidance’ control during the execution

phase bear scrutiny and generate moral / legal responsibilities because it is

assumed the agent could have chosen to act differently…, but could he? Is the

guidance sequence different from the regulatory neuronal script which, in principle,

generates no moral / legal responsibility?

Before we give the obligatory and controversial answer we’d like to remind the

reader about the supercomplexity of human decision making when reckoning with a

myriad of conflicting facts and feelings and biomedical resource problems pressing

on the agent. Even main frame supercomputers can crash land a NASA satellite!

Considering the ever changing adjustments the physiological homeostatic

machinery must undergo to maintain the relative constancy of the agent’s internal

milieu and his / her psycho-social adjustments to maintain an interactive harmony

with the changing external environment he / she didn’t choose to be born into, it is

amazing that the agent’s brain can still self-renew, reconfigure and self-generate in

harmony with its survival and reproductive imperative as well as the social

conviviality demands, as discussed. We may have relatively few crash landings but

our jails are full of citizens that could have made different choices and fell through

the cracks nonetheless. Limited as we are in our sense-phenomenal and brain-

computational resolution abilities as a species, by and large we still can handle

adequately such supercomplex processing which somehow was intelligently put

together for our use and benefit as a chosen species. Can we conceive of a causally

efficient but uncaused intrinsic intentionality? To live is to be constantly choosing

but can we be unconscious of our choices as existentialist Sartre would have it in

his contradiction. The Shakespearian choice “To be or not to be” is ultimately

resolved as to “consciously choose to be or unconsciously not to be”. Even the

choice of not choosing may be available when you’d rather vegetate like petunias

do and let your life events be caused by controlled substances or other external

political agents! Notice that when we for example raise our hand to point out with

our finger at a perpetrator the act is essentially different from when you raise your

hand away from the hot oven, unless you want to ascribe the raising of the hand at

the police station to an unconscious intrinsic intention to facilitate your conscious

identification of the perpetrator before consciousness took over! Regardless of the

extent of our conscious participation in the configuration of a future attractor, we

still hold the key to release its content or not and may even choose ‘contra natura’

against our own best BPS survival interests for the sake of higher lofty goals of our

own choosing.

SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS.

In our original BPS model published we suggested how a biopsychosocial

equilibrium was maintained by a complex recursive system capable of updating at

every instant the mental state of the agent to meet the demands of a changing

internal / external environment. Having to reckon with the stochastic dynamics

inferred from the role of the visceral brain (compartment 1) we found it necessary

to account for a dynamic high dimensional system, its evolution, changes of state

and sudden state transitions as registered experimentally. We had identified the

amygdaloidal complex as the locus of this recursive differentiating / integrating

activity where the visceral brain homeostasis (inner) and the complex

environmental ongoings (outer) are monitored for their compatibility with bio-

survival imperatives that take into consideration the inherited (amygdala) and the

acquired (hippocampus) contributions to the mental state. As a result, the agent’s

internal organization is adaptively modified to harmonize with the agent’s other

external survival psychosocial imperatives.

At the micro level we can measure how infinitesimal environmental variations

are picked up by sensory receptors where the ensuing initial conditions produced

are rapidly amplified, triggering a divergent flow of non-linear activity to attractor

basins (much like noise would ordinarily behave in a chaotic system). Engineers are

familiar with such behaviors in kinematic flows, crystal growth, synchrony of optical

systems and neuronal systems. The long range challenge is to provide an

epistemological interface explaining how the chaotic dynamic activity at the micro

level interacts with the ongoing macro level activity in the sociological domain.

Neuronal networks, besides their plasticity and Hebbian dynamics, may also exhibit

non-local connectivities. Coupling makes possible that receptor noise induce phase

transitions (resonance / stochastic coupling?). Interacting neuronal populations are

organized via the traditional action potentials born at synaptic junctions and

measured with microelectrodes inside the cells. In the extracellular milieu we

cannot measure the field potentials they generate and depend on EEG tracings to

reflect activity as an epiphenomenon. It can be demonstrated that cortical neurons

are independent and exquisitely responsive to inputs coming from internal /

external receptor sources to maintain a self-organizing readiness to respond to

significant ad hoc variations in the environment as seen in space / time phase

transitions. When you subsequently register similar recurring events at a broader

scale of time-space you witness the imprint of a fractal dynamics system. For

example, when sense-phenomenal data is transmitted by receptors to sensory

cortex it becomes destabilized. Wave packets formation follows as information is

being processed. For example, amplitude modulated (AM) waves in the gamma

range (ca. 50 Hz) have been measured in rabbits when they respond (discriminate)

to conditioned olfactory stimuli. The field potentials measured by EEG are

generated by dendritic potentials when they cohere (entangle) as self organizing

domains of neuronal processing (chaotic wave packets). One can follow the

transition from the cortical AM activity to AM wave packets. The Katchalsky (K)

model of Freeman (see Freeman, 2008) describes how coupling of excitatory,

inhibitory, positive, negative, lateral inhibition / excitatory as well as feedbacks of

layered networks, can exhibit quasi periodic oscillations, attractors and chaos, all

typical of dynamic systems. Freeman describes the dynamic interaction beginning

at olfactory receptors, periglomerular cells, olfactory bulb, anterior olfactory

nucleus, pre-pyriform cortex and deep cortical pyramidal cells. During rest or

inactivity the system is acting as an aperiodic (chaotic) global attractor with spatial

coherence. During the duration of a stimulus it switches to coherent AM fluctuations

becoming very sensitive to variations in the parameters. The input oscillations are

seen at the gamma band 50 Hz AM pattern during a phase transition. Paradoxically,

noise is now the outcome of an underlying deterministic process. There are many

variables involved in the evolution of individual neurons into integrated cooperative

populations operating far away from thermodynamic equilibrium. Stochastic chaos

dynamics provides the basis for self organization based on the sensory cortex

integration of non-linear neuronal inputs that makes it possible to create / amplify

the minute perturbations into the global dynamic profile of chaotic systems. E. g. ,

empirical objects / events are non-linear and their analog sensory inputs are

initially transduced into complex dynamic system of a stable chaotic profile. The

complexity results from the synaptic interfaces and their non-linear membrane

dynamics when bombarded by an assortment of contrasting (potentiating /

inhibitory) asymmetric neuro-transmitter molecules being transported to and fro

across membrane ionic / lipid channels. The slower axonal events transmitted seem

more like convenient physical conveyances to coordinate chaotic activities with

distant neuronal circuit modules distributed in parallel arrangements. How are

decisions made possible in this chaotic system? It seems like the brain depends on

its chaotic resonant excitations to amplify the initial conditions and generate a

holographic wave processing. The apparent randomness of the chaotic behavior

makes it possible to be selective in locking phase with an attractor. In Freeman’s

experiment the olfactory cortex went into high energy excitation (after subject

sniffed a known chemical) until a basin of low potential energy (attractor) is found

that corresponds with the sniffed molecule. A novel chemical will cause a

bifurcation and the formation of a new basin memory to become accessible in

future encounters. Fractal neuronal dynamics is the common denominator to

membrane’s macromolecular asymmetry channels and global instability. The

transmission of the nerve action potential is the only linear activity, the rest shows

the typical chaos bifurcation sink.

At another level of analysis we intuitively experience two contradictory gut

feelings, we are convinced that we can mentally deliberate to make actual what

now only exists in potency as one of many futures and choose the one that really

will make a difference in our future lives. But we also know that ultimately, it was

based on how comfortable we felt with the choice, an affective consideration

hopefully reflecting the truth value of our decision. We don’t know how the

influential pain-pleasure system interacted with the ongoing parsing among the

propositional premises being considered, i. e. , which aspect weighted more in our

‘choice’ from a spectrum of alternatives, each with differing probabilities.

Consistent with the BPS model position on the language generation of thoughts

issue we discussed elsewhere, we escape again from the infinite regressions /

progressions philosophical trap by concluding that the affective qualia and the

logically-inferred judgment co-generate recursively at unconscious levels of

processing.

We also discussed a possible quantal architecture of attractors following a lead

from Walter Freeman’s experimental data. The model suggests how intimately the

possible futures are linked with past experiences as the former continuously self

configures suggesting that we may never really ‘break with the past’ but we can

modify the past strategy and use it more effectively in the future. The temporal

direction of empirical causation runs from past to future except at the quantum

directed microscopic level during a parsing search before a final selection from

‘possible’ futures in the landscape by recursive feed-back reshapes the ‘future’.

Yes, we can change the past from the possible-futures instant present.

At the sub-Planck level of organization we briefly reiterated how macroscopically

insignificant perturbations in the initial conditions of the receptor field get

reinforced / amplified by phase coupling with background internal / external noise

until an attractor basin is targeted and a resonance-coupled, non-linear state

transition is initiated. How may receptor or primary sensory cortical neurons give

rise to such destabilized global state transitions is akin to asking, as Freeman

suggested, how may few molecules of air and water create a hurricane? We

mentioned how Edelman’s goal directed neuronal populations are entrained,

constrained and enslaved by synaptic plasticity, weighted Hebbian synaptic

configuration, neuro transmitter modulation, feedback recursion, memory inputs,

interactions with other mini global dynamic networks, etc. This is not to be

construed as an indication of having created a stable state of synchrony in the

totality that will interfere with the intrinsic autonomy of the constitutive parts. In

our view, a global state maintains its autonomy at subconscious (not unconscious!)

levels as the result of a continuous receptor monitoring of objects / events in the

internal / external milieu, the differential extraction of their features and their

integration into a new brain configuration representing the object / event before

interacting reciprocally with amygdaloidal complex as discussed above. It remains

questionable whether Crick’s recording of 40 Hz synchrony describes the brain

representation or binding of that extracted from the sense-phenomenal features

after achieving their initial phase / frequency synchronization. The global unit

formed is stabilized by the downward constrainment of its participating neurons

which maintain their self-configuring dynamics capable of the instantiation of

‘intentional’ goal-directed behavior that includes the affective and attention mental

state in its implementation. Repeating, once a familiar or novel pattern is

recognized in the environment it leaves a trademark readout in the amplitude-

modulated tracing very easily distinguished from the uneventful resting state

tracing containing the background basal state noise from receptor instability.

The alert reader may have noticed that the preceding account smacks of a self-

configuring, self-generating circular causality that eludes assigning responsibility

for identifying the agent or entity designing this recursive strategy whose

complexity far exceeds that of Dr. Behe’s macromolecular assemblies which

prompted a mathematical analysis by Dr. Dembski of the probability of such

assemblies to self-configure as guided by Darwinian principles. Everybody knows

how Darwinism fared when explaining such lesser specified complexity.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. Blakeslee, S. (2006). Cells that Read Minds. The New York Times, Jan. 10, 2006.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/10/science/10mirr.html?8dpc.

2. Arney, D. S. (2004a) Discovering the neural basis of human social anxiety: a

diagnostic and therapeutic imperative. Am J Psychiatry, 161, 1-2. (2004b)

Psychobiological mechanisms of resilience and vulnerability: implications for

successful adaptation to extreme stress. Am J Psychiatry, 161, 195-216.

3. de la Sierra, A. (2003). Neurophilosophy of Consciousness, a Biopsychosocial

Model. (ISBN 978-1-4116-3982-9). http://www.delasierra-sheffer. net/ID1-

Neurophilo-net/index.htm).

4. de la Sierra, A. (2006). Part I: The Possible Quantal Interface Joining the Hybrid

Nature of Reality. Telicom 19:4 (July-August): 34.

5. Freeman, W. J. (1992). Tutorial on neurobiology: From single neurons to brain

chaos. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 2(3): 451-482. http://sulcus.

berkeley.edu/Freeman/manuscripts/ID6/92.html.

6. Freeman, W. J. (1999). Consciousness, intentionality and causality. Journal of

Consciousness Studies 6(11-12): 143-172.

http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/FreemanWWW/manuscripts/IF8/99.html.

7. Freeman, W. J. , and Erwin, H. (2008). Freeman K-set. Scholarpedia, 3(2):3238.

8. Iacoboni, M. , Molnar-Szakacs, I. , Gallese, V. , Buccino, G. , Mazziotta, J. C. , et

al. (2005). Grasping the Intentions of Others with One's Own Mirror Neuron

System. PLoS Biology 3: 3 (e79 doi:10. 1371/journal. pbio. 0030079); PMID =

15736981.

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280, 798-809.

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driving force behind “the great leap forward” in human evolution. Edge 69 (May 29,

2000). http://www.edge. org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html.

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Freeman olfactory cortex model: A multiplexed KII network implementation. Analog

Integrated Circuits and Signal Processing. 50(3): 251-259.

12. Teman, P. M. , Till, B. C. , Livingston, N. J. , et al (2007) Independent

component analysis and clustering improve signal-to-noise ratio for statistical

analysis of event-related potentials. Clin Neurophysiol, 118, 2591-2604.

End of Ch. 5

Ch. 6

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF BELIEFS.

INTRODUCTION.

Can beliefs qualify as propositional-type knowledge? Must beliefs be

conscious-processing activities? Do we make judgments based on

propositional logic processing when recognizing a person, a place or when

reflexly initiating the proper motor command to an effector controlling

muscle / glandular activity? To explore these possibilities we should be

able to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be met

to make belief a syntacto-semantic structure subject to a propositional

processing such that when a subject S believes (b) that p, it is identical to

when the same subject S knows (k) that p, i.e., “S (b) that p” = “S (k)

that p” where p represents the proposition-encoded belief (b).

ARGUMENTATION.

When analyzing beliefs we are at the very outset faced with their ‘truth

value’ content as determined by their probability of being either falsified

and / or successfully reduced to a sentential or symbolic logic

representation. As it turns out to be, in our experience both S’s knowledge

and beliefs are ultimately in the mind of the beholder. If so, can we count

on the cognitive process that produced the belief as a coherent and

reliable guide to 'truth'? Unless we characterize the ideal ‘beholder’, we

are also faced with the question as to whether it is justified to generalize

that all humans have same knowledge about themselves and their

empirical reality. Take color-blind subjects to illustrate how beliefs may be

formed in them about colors, e.g., the sense-phenomenal occurrence of

‘redness’. Is it possible to believe in something that is false? But color

blind Daltonism subjects, e.g., one physicist, knows and believes about

the redness of apples! What they cannot ‘describe’ ontologically they can

‘explain’ its sense-phenomenal reality epistemologically. At this point we

wish not to complicate matters further when considering if, for those with

normal color vision, ‘redness’ is ontologically an empirical being with a

measurable independent ‘essence’ or a mere abstract, epistemological

‘existence’, a la Heidegger based on a brain representation? The

ontological sense-phenomenal description of that visible part of the light

spectrum and the successful epistemological explanation of its correlation

with the energy frequencies of other constitutive components, visible or

not, more than compensates for the lack of direct sense knowledge of

‘redness’ and an epistemologically-derived belief reliably takes the place of

an empirical sense verification. Is this physicist as justified in substituting

his direct empirical knowledge of ‘redness’ for a belief in the abstract

'reality' of a red color as when a believer explains the existence of a

JudeoChrIslamic God? How else could this color blind physicist understand

and deal with electro-magnetic spectrum theory and its many derived

concepts? Likewise how else can a believer explain the awesome

experience of birth, life, self-consciousness, cosmological order or

negentropic evolution? Both our believer and physicist will have a hard

time explaining that he ‘knows that p’ without ‘believing that p’ or vice

versa! Same thing happens to believers in God or in the invisible sub-

Planck order! Our empirical, falsifiable and sense-phenomenal reality

seems constant because of our well documented limitations in our species

sensorium and brain-computational capacities. Only our epistemological

explanations may change our knowledge / beliefs as historically witnessed

by the cumulative nature of science evolution. Meanwhile knowledge /

beliefs are ever invisibly changing at the lower n-dimensional granularity

levels of organization of sub-Planckian quantum dynamics.

Does it then mean that, like in the physicist case above, only when

there is enough correlated falsifiable evidence in its support that a belief

will integrate well with independent relevant evidence about same issue,

that theological knowledge can be justifiably and / or reliably claimed?

What mental or biological processes in S, if any, may properly and reliably

substitute for such empirical support evidence?

Suppose we accept as self-evident the experimentally demonstrated

‘freeze response’ reflex in humans (or any flexion reflex for that matter)

when experiencing un-explained sensory stimuli being judged a-priori by

our brains to be potentially life-threatening; is this neuronal network

processing of sensory information considered true knowledge even when it

was inherited, never learned in the past and also unconscious? Can S

state his belief that p (e.g., that flexing his fore-arm away from the hot

stove will prevent his hand from getting burned)? Is that belief justified

true knowledge? Suppose further, contrariwise, that ‘S belief that p’ is

premised on one or more false measurements or deductions? Sometimes

we may rely excessively on the cognitive process that produced the belief,

as when, e.g., S promised a colleague attending same Mensa event to sell

his lot in Florida before a witness, now unable to locate. A month later S

develops a mild un-diagnosed retrograde amnesia and refuses to honor

his commitment in a sworn declaration after a negative polygraph test

based on his honest belief that such promise never happened. Did S

commit a punishable act of breach of contract or perjury? Did he have

‘knowledge’ of an event existing in a memory he cannot now retrieve to

consciousness? To make things worse, S can produce good testimonial

evidence for the intrinsically false proposition from honest friends

attending that same event. If we become for a moment aware of the

serious limitations of our sensory resolution in providing us a reliable

account of our empirical reality, imagine the truth value of memory, as

noted, and such higher processes as intuitions, introspections, etc. as

reliable sources of knowledge we take as true beliefs. An alert judge may

notice that while S theory of his case is not reliable (his then un-

diagnosed amnesia) it was nonetheless justified. From an evidentiary

viewpoint this justification is the result of evidence (e.g., witnesses)

submitted by defendant S. Here evidence-based belief = knowledge and

both are false! As noted, we may have provided the necessary but

insufficient conditions for knowledge to be achieved, yet an operational

belief is the next best available. Either you rely on S’s internal brain /

mental processes as providing the justification / conclusion at time t or on

things external to S as when S justifiably but unreliably (as proven from

external evidence unknown to S) believes that p at time t. This situation is

sometimes called the ‘Gettier problem’.

Somehow, perhaps without being aware of it, neuroscientists of the

physicalist faith blindly adopt the philosophical naturalism moral stance

and thus insist on external evidence on which they can rely before they

may conclude that ‘S believes that p’ = ‘S knows that p’. However, the

scientific methodology, so useful in the handling of the observable objects

/ events of the natural world cannot be the exclusive arbiter of truth

values (see Harman) when complex axiological and moral issues are being

analyzed. It is doubtful that their certainty or even their probability can

always rest / supervene exclusively on substantive ontological

specifications as we have seen above. This would be the ideal situation

where both approaches may agree. Thus far the closest we may ever

come to a reliable belief production in a mental state is using f-MRI or PET

Scans, like relying on a description of the details of a murder committed

inside a closed house based on recorded sounds of gun blasts coming

from the house while observing a man running away from the house on a

video take from a hovering TV news helicopter! Now, should the TV

journalist be expected to guarantee the truth of his assertion that a

murder has been committed? What if his justification for his belief

production is based on his true knowledge that the man fled through a

window leaving the dead woman alone? How then may true belief become

unquestionable knowledge to all concerned? Is it enough to be internally

justified, relying on the subjects ability to maintain normal mental

processes? Or do we need external proof that the latter is true? Would

anyone question a recent amputee’s honest belief that he still feels pain

and can move the absent leg? After all, no mental reflective activity would

make amputee realize otherwise (phantom leg syndrome); is he in

possesion of knowledge about his leg based on his honest (but untrue)

belief, is he unreliably abnormal? What then is more important, to assign

beliefs a truth value based on external corroboration (read science

methodology) or on reliable, reflective mental activity? The equation ‘S (b)

that p’ = ‘S (k) that p’ depends on an analysis of how are our beliefs

formed. Do we need a new logic to represent knowledge with a different

probability of being true than propositional logic now provides? On the

sub-Planck level of organization, are all the probabilities of future

scenarios based on quantum dynamics considerations of true knowledge

on which to base our beliefs?

If we regard beliefs as being true, how are they formed? Ordinarily we

think of beliefs as mental attitudes toward objects, their relationships

(when present), or events. Since beliefs are expressed in sentences,

whatever it is that they express we consider it as being a propositional

attitude as noted earlier. Since computers cannot independently generate

their own language they can only be useful to ‘emulate’ belief or

knowledge systems. There are many convincing Turinoid arguments to

support the notion that our brain neuronal networks operate like main

frame computers, yet, like in computers, there is still a black box that

contains the explanation of the who, what (or where) programs the brain

computer to perform such formidably complex task well beyond humans

capacity to resolve cognitively.

Sometimes it becomes convenient or unavoidably necessary to sketch

a diagram of an engine, a geographical region in a territory or a brain

topology or a computer circuitry than to bring any of them to the limited

confines of a laboratory or conference room auditorium for detailed study.

In so doing we are acting as human transducers by translating one

ephemeral sense-phenomenal perception of, e.g., the Texas territory, into

a more manageable map form of representation we can now measure and

reduce to symbolic or sentential elements, coordinates, etc. or other

markers of the perceptual fact we can now manipulate logically. How

should we go about it? As we discussed elsewhere, if it were the true case

that, e.g., thoughts are causally efficient to generate language, it would

almost become an impossible task to analyze such well known facts about

language on the basis of something as elusive as thoughts or their

invisible representations thereof. Because human curiosity about its

origins and destiny must be satisfied most linguist scholars yield to the

inevitable task of explaining the invisible and mysterious thoughts on the

basis of a preceding well documented and tangible language generation

model. Once established that language causally precedes thoughts we

now add, then beliefs structured in language code can be causally efficient

in producing the corresponding behavior. In our BPS model we try to

avoid this enigmatic problem by postulating an operational recursive co-

generation of both language and thought. Do we –or anyone else, we

suspect- then have a real choice but to use a representational approach to

analyze beliefs? This way the perceptual sense-phenomenal fact can be

transduced to a propositional language representation (Hebbian neuronal

networks?) that can be stored and retrieved / recalled for parsing as

needed. Two or more such perceptual elements are thus subjected to

combinations or permutations with inherited or acquired data bases giving

rise to conceptual elements. Thus the knowledge of the perceptual fact

and the conceptual elements recursively combined can give rise to beliefs

about the perceptual object / event in relation to the existential

conceptual background belief system of the subject. In this manner the

generation of the belief mental state is a token of either the perceptual

fact, its propositional equivalent representation of the belief or a required

combination thereof. It is beyond the scope of this brief account to discuss

(speculate) how perceptual qualia facts are represented or whether qualia

are intrinsically representational (see Chalmers, Block). Suffice it to say,

at this point, that qualia would be ‘invisible’ unless they carry a semantic

content to the subject experiencing it. At the perceptual level sense-

phenomenal facts are semantic neutral, and acquire their ‘meanings’ at

conscious levels when they incorporate their substantive content within

the context of other circumstantial experiences, ongoing or stored in

memory off-line. Thus we adopt by reference the posture that qualia

(sense-phenomenal or conceptual) may be reduced and structured in a

propositional format compatible with other sense-phenomenal

representations in the mind / brain. Likewise, non-propositional feelings or

qualia (e.g., anger, sadness, etc.) acquire their meanings within the

context of the existential circumstantial reality of the subject and in the

process conceptual facts and / or beliefs are modified and generated.

Assuming that the preservation of the biological integrity of the

human species has the highest survival priority, the inherited DNA-coded

meanings (proto-semantics) guide and direct the syntax structure of

culturally-acquired meanings as expressed linguistically. How DNA

sequences, folding, etc. get translated into a neuronal network machine

language controlled by the human species biological survival (homeostatic

equilibrium) rules is still a mystery. A novel environmental sense-

phenomenal online, or a body-proper input will find the subject in a

particular internal state in accordance with the instant task at hand. We

have described elsewhere how novel inputs are processed first in the

amygdaloidal / hippocampus complex and then an adaptive response with

the best probability of success is fashioned according to the biological

proto-semantic machine language rules and other psycho-social

imperatives. Past the amygdaloidal and hippocampus context screening,

the inputs are initially neutral and they need to be parsed with relevant

acquired memory data to find the appropriate meaning withing the

context of the adaptive response. The common denominator driving the

recursive recycling of parsing and / or commingling of new and old data is

the representation format that will generate an inner language, at least

when dealing with issues reduced or otherwise instantiated to

propositional formats in their brain / mind representation. Such

representations must be recursively processed, accessed and deployed for

use in relevant theoretical inferences we associate with the elaboration of

means-beliefs guiding ends-responses.. (see Fodor)

Meanwhile the perceptual sensory apparatus continues actively

monitoring the changes in the environmental scenery as directed by the

executive cortex acting as a central command or CPU in a computer

parsing and sorting among the available alternatives to adaptively

respond, based on the internal body state of physiological homeostasis

(visceral brain, compartment 1) vis a vis its adequacy to meet the

environmental contingency encountered. This requires a dynamic /

continued self adjustment, self configuration sustained by an exhaustive

parsing, sorting out and continuous recursive recycling between states of

effectors and sensory receptors. This way internal and external mental

states are kept continuosly updated (dynamic self configuration based on

input) by the active participation of exteroceptors, interoceptors and

propioceptors which inform the effector network of relevant variations in

state. These variations may generate new alternative scenarios to be

chosen from if needed. The real problem comes when the cortical

‘attractor’ quantum dynamics model just described has to be integrated

along with a propositional model into a common representational system

manifold generating the belief that is causally efficient in guiding an

adaptive response. For the present purposes, we will avoid the issue of

integration now and deal with the equally complex problem of defining the

structure of the belief representation.

Arguably, language is the best tool to forge the representational

structure of facts, beliefs and thoughts. As Fodor has previously

suggested, it is difficult to escape the similarity of language and thoughts

in their productivity and systematicity. These features also account for the

richness and variety of possible beliefs when their language

representatives are combined, permuted or otherwise recursively cycled

during parsing.

Thus “S believes that P & B” where the proposition P hopefully

becomes true and is based on the high probability of belief B being true

under modal logic such that ‘If B then P’. How do we arrive at our beliefs?

Simply stated, we experience sense-phenomenal perceptions of objects or

events in the environment (external or body proper), e.g., we observe the

white ball traveling towards home plate at a certain speed and spin.

Immediately we form the belief (B, of probability =1) that there is a tall

pitcher hurling a spinning white sphere (object properties) to the batter

during the baseball series (event). The linguistically structured syntax

proposition P that preceded was based on the representation ‘If B then P’

where the sense-phenomenal visual perception was causally efficient in

accessing the language consumer system to recursively generate the

proposition’s syntax structure describing the object and event. Here belief

and knowledge blend , B = P. Notwithstanding the possible color blindness

of the observer (e.g., baseball was red), we have arrived at the best

possible concordance between fact and belief for S as explained above.

Notice how the ontological fact of the redness of this ball is operationally

substituted by the epistemological fact / belief of the whiteness of all

standard baseballs ever produced. The analysis gets more complex when

the belief formed is based on false premises unknown to the observer S.

The amputee of our previous example temporarily lacks the neuronal basis

on which to form the belief (B) that he no longer has a left leg and

honestly expresses linguistically the proposition P: “My left leg hurts.”,

even when the sense-phenomenal probability of a fleshy, bony left leg is

= 0, a false premise! This last situation brings into focus the problem of

reliability of our beliefs and how the brain netwoks operate in the

formation of beliefs based on mis-information provided by body-proper

internal data (or sense-phenomenal data as in the subject with color

blindness). As noted earlier, beliefs as such, are, in theory, formed neutral

and acquire their semantic content based on the bio-psycho-social (BPS)

circumstance of subject S. Fortunately, the shared genetic and acquired

memory data bases content for the human species in a given ecological

niche enables us to predict the behavior of other humans (theory of mind)

and even the composition of their tissue biopsies. Having examined the

possible brain processing of on-line sense-phenomenal perceptual data

and / or off-line conceptual memory data in the formation of beliefs or

knowledge, we ask, how is the belief or knowledge about the Arctic circle,

geographical coordinates, or the invisible structure / function of the

postulated sub-atomic ‘wavicles’ at the sub-Planck n-dimensional domain

any different from the equivalent belief or knowledge about life,

consciousness or a conceptual ‘intelligent designer’ of such negentropic

existential cosmological complexity? As long as humans naturally yearn

for an explanation about life, cosmos or their own origins and destiny

there will always be two beliefs, one, an un-identified non-physical-

pantheistic invisible force driving the random evolutionary self design of

matter guided by the natural laws in exclusive control of their properties

and their interactive relationship, or two, a theistic intelligent designer

bringing a mental ordering to a chaotic world of sensations..

When is a reliable mental state P = B operational? If the

representational structure be linguistic in nature we have argued for an

inherited proto-semantic default guiding the relevant syntax structure of P

in the adopted language, i.e., proto-semantics precedes syntax structure

where DNA-coded Q is causally efficient in the production of P following

the language rules of the acquired language. The same neuronal networks

processing the phonologically-derived acquisition of knowledge, as

discussed elsewhere, should be able to produce the inner language when

working in a reverse direction using similar neuronal network nodes and

adjustable synaptic weights. Connectionist brain networks CAN be

compatible with a propositional architecture of beliefs.. We reject the

‘dispositional’, ‘functionalist’ and ‘interpretationist’ approach to beliefs as

being another attempt at introducing a physicalist version of behaviorism

without further ado notwithstanding the observable fact that one belief

may produce a multitude of behaviors depending on S’s relevant BPS

conditions antecedent. Furthermore, attributing beliefs and desires to a

computer programmed with coded conditions antecedent assigns them an

unwarranted intentionality never demonstrated in the lab for a computer.

However, in our ‘hybrid’ model of reality the quantum cortical ‘attractor’

becomes an quasi-deterministic neuronal-coded reservoir of dispositional,

implicit beliefs and attitudes, a brain robot ready to provide the best

adaptive probable response to a significant environmental change. These

are based on on-line ongoing sense-phenomenal events or as off-line

subconsciously retrieved data from memory data bases (genetic /

acquired) with a probability potential of being explicitely realized under

certain conditions where the human subject S’s free will controls the final

adaptive choice volitionally. To the extent that the implied or tacit beliefs

are integrated from various sources of measurable empirical external and

internal body proper data, they are synonymous with knowledge as we

know it; however they remain subconscious until accessed for conscious

deployment as explicit knowledge / beliefs. There is a caveat however, all

of these conclusions are based on the presumption that the subject S is a

BPS just, reasonable and healthy individual to avoid the distinction Quine

makes between the ‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’ belief attributions where, e.g.,

the ‘de dicto’ amputee’s belief / knowledge about pain in his phantom limb

is not a measurable fact ‘de re’. We believe that ‘de re’ and ‘de dicto’

beliefs can be distinguished from each other by the level of consciousness

they mostly operate. It is not far-fetched to consider the latter as

subconscious reflex beliefs not to be considered consciously as a reliable

basis on which to plan a strategy for an adaptive, explicit response,

perhaps a case of a belief without subject's S self acceptance.

Subconscious reflex beliefs / knowledge may be considered a subset of

the procedural knowledge class (e.g., how to ride a bicycle) to be

distinguished from the conscious semantic or declarative knowledge seen

when, e.g., analyzing a proposition. Implied subconscious knowledge may

be inherited and unconscious or acquired and subconscious in content,

mostly combinations thereof and, like procedural knowledge, becomes

behaviorally explicit and conscious when chosen or otherwise activated to

guide an adaptive response. It is more difficult to accept a transition from

an unconscious, inherited, implicit or procedural, neuronal reflex

knowledge, e.g., S walks à S has a conscious explicit belief that he can

walk, than to accept the more credible transition to consciousness from a

subconscious cumulative, acquired, implicit, semantic / declarative

knowledge, e.g., “The U.S. can negotiate with the Taliban.” à to a

conscious explicit belief that indeed the U.S. can negotiate with them.

Both, circumstantially constitute justified true beliefs.

It must be said that the ‘functionalist’ model, according to which what

makes a brain representation a belief mental state are facts about the

internal structure of the object / event they represent (known or not!), is

necessary BUT insufficient for an absolute description of noumenic reality.

To believe that an entity built in a lab (or in another world) with a

functional composition and chemistry identical to humans will necessarily

have life and self-consciousness is an article of faith of the physicalist

pantheistic persuasion.

But, how may an inherited neuronal processing like, e.g., unconscious

neuro-muscular walking, coded in genetic DNA language and transduced

into moto-neuronal networks assemblies have a propositional structure? If

not, how may its representation become compatible or interactive with the

propositional structure of a semantic / declarative belief content, e.g.,

DNA base-pairing language (proto-semantics) à linguistic logical syntax?

Can the implicit probabilities of world realization embodied in quantum

dynamics brain attractors content be considered as propositions for sets of

possible worlds where varying relevant premises are permuted, combined

and parsed? Can both the ontologically-derived (sense-phenomenal and

body proper-derived environments) perceptual data be indelibly coupled

with the epistemologically-derived conceptual propositions clothed in

linguistic garb? Can set theory be married to modal logic? For one thing

one may have to balance out the probabilistic nature of the multivariate,

implicit, quasi-determinism of the many worlds coarse granularity of the

cortical ‘attractor’ model, incorporating the instantaneous transitions -as

they occur in the external and internal environments-, with the much

more discreet and finer granularity of the linguistic structure. As long as

cortical ‘attractors’ can be viewed as functional propositions about the

content of our knowledge and / or beliefs about self in relation to the

external and internal (body proper) reality there is a hope of developing a

general theory of knowledge / beliefs or any other propositional attitude

for that matter. In such model every possible adaptive solution is assigned

a probability of future success based not only on ongoing instant

environmental changes (internal and external) but also on the invariant

genetic and the variable acquired related knowledge / beliefs. This holistic

view has the advantage of individualizing S’s adaptive responses to the

same stimulus, cause man is him AND his existential bio-psycho-social

(BPS) circumstance, as Ortega y Gasset would have said. There may exist

inside the cortical ‘attractor’ basins as many neuronal networks

possibilities to choose from as there may be circumstantial modifiers to

influence the choice. There is as much productivity in the many worlds

scenario of the cortical ‘attractor’ as in the linguistic recursive generation

of syntax structure. We reject the Fodorian notion that knowledge or

beliefs or their brain symbolic representations thereof always exist

independently of each other. Culturally acquired experiences act as

modifiers of semantics as languages evolve without significantly affecting

productivity and systematicity of language except as circumstances so

demand in the course of time. The interactive relationship between the

DNA-coded genetic memory and the protective neuro-humoral role in

defense of the biological integrity of the human body and in achieving

homeostatic BPS equilibrium is well documented. Animals, unlike humans,

cannot conceptualize the meaning of such unconscious reflex activity; the

proto-semantic content represented in their neuronal networks is never

formulated as a survival imperative in barks or, brays or yelps. Only

humans can rationalize and conceptualize its inherited and protective

attributes learned from experiments and express it in the syntax structure

of an adopted natural language as a knowledge or belief, e.g., S believes /

knows that excessive microwave radiation from his cell phone can burn his

ear lobes. This integration of inherited and acquired information, existing

as cortical ‘attractors’ containing probable scenarios in future encounters

with the realities of our existence makes us believe that language syntax

structure, while systematically produced via an inherited proto-semantic

neuronal processing needs no longer to be exclusively ascribed to internal

properties of the brain or externally acquired influences.

Thus we may conclude that inherited or acquired adaptive responses

for existential contingencies can only become knowledge or beliefs at

conscious levels through the aegis of an inner adopted natural language

structured in symbolic and / or sentential syntax. The main arguments in

the defense of language for the production of knowledge or belief come

from Davidson who argues that all believers know that their beliefs can be

false, especially when considering the existence of mind-independent

reality beyond humans’ limited power of sensory and brain combinatorial

resolution. These preceding conclusions can only be ascertained via logical

mechanisms requiring the mediation of a language. The simplest

propositional structure of any belief is contingent upon antecedent

knowledge or belief about other knowledge or belief with specific content

where subjects, predicates, their attributes and interactions, etc., need be

apprehended conceptually. Likewise, children need develop their language

lexical content and parsing potential before being able to conceptually

formulate beliefs or any other attitude propositionally structured..

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. Block, N. (1991), "Troubles with functionalism", in D.M. Rosenthal, ed.,

The nature of mind (New York: Oxford).

2. Carruthers, Peter (1996), Language, thought, and consciousness

(Cambridge: Cambridge).

3. Dennett, Daniel C. (1969), Content and consciousness (London:

Routledge). 1991. Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious

Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1993. The Reliability of

Sense Perception. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

End of Ch. 6

Ch. 7

BRIEF NOTES ON THE POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF A BELIEF PROPOSITION.

Part I

ABSTRACT.

One of the most important recurring problems present in practically all

discussions (among laymen and physicists alike) about the relation

between mind and brain is the blurry distinction between an ontological

description and an epistemological explanation. It is important for authors

to remember that there must be present an empirical relevance to the

brain for an assertion about the mind to be considered a descriptive

‘correlation’. Ideally, a logical supervenience between the assertion and

the observation should follow. The term causation is often used loosely to

describe a correlation where only a natural (not logical!) supervenience

can be claimed (see Chalmers). Between the cause and the effect there

may be many intermediary black boxes (e.g., a common cause in their

history); in such cases we can only claim to have an explanation which is

no more than epistemological / theoretical attempts to understand

correlations between the sense-phenomenal empirical description and the

resulting formulation from their fitting into non-phenomenal metaphysical

/ mathematical-logical abstractions. Consequently, it would be premature

to talk about mind-brain interactions, if any, in the sense of causal

relations. This confusion is so pervasive that perhaps human existential

reality should be considered an inseparable hybrid between the ontological

and the epistemological, what we have called ‘epistemontological’ reality.

Fortunately, quantum theory, a mathematical, non-phenomenal

abstraction has proven to be, in terms of power and precision, a

formidable instrument for predicting the behavior of particulate matter.

Optimistically, and daringly, we believe that brain matter itself should be

tackled as a proper target for the study of elusive subjects like life and

consciousness within the context of quantum dynamics. At the very least

it may someday be able to describe / explain which set of facts about the

Planck microscopic world impinges on the falsifiable brain macroscopic

measurements or behavior. Since every long journey starts with a single

step, we humbly thought that, in the very least, the ‘many worlds’

possibilities of modal logic can be adapted and reduced to the more

reliable probable world of quantum dynamics. We must find that best

fitting propositional structure that effectively incorporates the ontological

and epistemological aspects of human existential reality. In future writings

we will elaborate, based on the well known limitations in human brain

sensory and combinatorial capacities, on the probability that ALL human

knowledge –all things considered- is ultimately based on ‘beliefs’, whether

we talk about the structure of the atom or ‘intelligent design’.

INTRODUCTION.

Being now the reader more familiar with the meaning of ‘a subject S

beliefs’ from a previous chapter, let us examine how two or more speakers

can express the very same thing / content when using different

declarative sentences, even if they are speaking in different natural

languages. That information content they have non-linguistically

expressed is what we call the propositional content of their utterances,

which may be true / false always or sometimes. We will have more to say

later about how the meaning of the proposition itself may be extracted

from the biopsychosocial (BPS) contextual background attending the

expression. Thus, whether a lover tells her counterpart ‘Ich liebe dich.’,

‘Te amo.’ or ‘I love you.’, the same propositional content is being globally

expressed. It is important here that we make a clear distinction between

the extracted non-linguistic personal affective knowledge, feeling or belief

being expressed to the other partner (the belief proposition) from the

source, i.e., the chosen natural language syntax to phrase the declarative

sentence expressed. It is that belief information content (whether

sometimes or always true or not) that the lover in the example is actually

expressing (whether as a necessity or a possibility, contingent or not on

other relevant BPS circumstances). We call these variations the modal

properties of a proposition.

We should begin to appreciate that, whereas the syntax structure of

a linguistic expression in many / the same individual, speaking the same /

different acquired languages may vary considerably, it is the invisible

propositional content captured inside its semantic structure that carries

the burden of characterizing the meaning of what is intended to be

informed. There is an acquired linguistic syntax style and there is an

inherited, primitive, proto-semantic bio-psycho-social ‘belief’ content that

precedes the language syntax structure, contra Chomskian dogma on an

universal grammar where syntax precedes semantics. The propositional

content is that complex invisible structure behind the visible syntax

arrangement. What then is the possible structure of a belief proposition, if

any? We may have to use a special optics to see if it is possible to either

identify its constitutive elements (when present) and / or find out how

they are put together. Once we adopt the most reliable structure we will

explore how best it may be adapted to express the quantum dynamic

probable, adaptive solutions to environmental contingencies that are

available (represented) in brain networks for humans to choose from.

It is important that the reader keeps in mind our restricted use of a

‘many world’ expression where the different worlds scenarios exist only in

the mind of a given sentient human being as probable outcomes adapted

to his vital BPS circumstance. Albert and Loewer 1988 postulate that

“..every sentient being has a continuum of minds”. Should there be

significant changes in the evolving biopsychosocial dynamic equilibrium

affecting one or more coexisting mental states in a subject there will be a

corresponding functional brain readjustment (in superpositional adaptive

harmony with environmental / universal quantum states?) with

probabilities of enactment equal to the quantum probabilities for these

individual coexisting states.

ARGUMENTATION.

Explaining the atomic 'word' particles of an invisible structure is

difficult enough but always easier than putting them together as a

meaningful propositional, molecular sentential whole. For one thing each

atomic particle will carry the meaning of the word used in the sentence

expressed, e.g., it identifies the protagonist-subjects, objects / events and

some relationship R (e.g., attitude) that binds them together. In the

example before, the visible structure of the sentence “I love you.”

becomes subject S believes (b) that he loves (L) his girl friend (g) or

expressed as a propositional (P) functional structure: S (b) that P or

[S[L[g]]] as the universal structure derived from the original sentence

structure involving only two protagonists (S&g) and a going relationship

(L). As complex as it may seem at first sight it merely substitutes atomic

particles (S,L,g) for the meanings of the words (subject, loves, girl friend)

they represent. Or conversely, the meaningless propositional function -

expressed in the symbolic or sentential representation- is animated by

their substitution by real protagonists, objects or events and their

relationship, i.e., when the propositional function becomes the meaningful

proposition itself. Of course the efficacy of the transformation is

predicated on the atomic 'word' particle having captured the full

‘contextual’ semantic value of the word or phrase in the original sentence.

Worse off, it may be the case where the propositional structure carry

atomic particles not represented by any word, phrase or syntax

arrangement of the sentence. Conversely some words in the sentence

may be semantically neutral. Contextually, the sentence “I love you.” may

even be an expression of gratitude for a favor received from a stranger,

not the strong affective feeling we associate with the relation between two

lovers. It should be noticed the very special role played by the relationship

R in coupling as a unit the atomic word particles or phrases.

Because of the special correlation between the visible sentence and

the invisible proposition derived therefrom, the semantic values of the

latter should always be recovered from the former, unlike the situation

that obtains when the semantic value of the expressions in the

propositions stand as sets of possible worlds where the 1:1 correlation

between the sentence and the proposition may be blurred. However, this

is a feature we should cope with to develop further the propositional

structure entity in dealing with the brain’s many world ‘attractor’ feature

and its quantum dynamics and neuronal network organization. If we can

accomplish that feat we will have created an operational

epistemontological hybrid closer to existential reality than either the

myopic science methodology or the poetry of conventional philosophy.

How so? For starters, we should be aiming at a propositional structure

whose atomic word constituents are rigid designators, whether the

descriptions of scientific observations / measurements, indexicals,

predicates, the linguistic referentials or others. We will explain.

If we exclude other modal aspects for the moment, propositions

should assert in words or symbols what is true, false, probable or at least

possible. When we say S loves his wife =[S[L[w]]] or x2 + y2 = z2 we are

describing a propositional function with undetermined atomic word

constituents, different from <Angell loves Suzi.> or <For all values of x

and y, x2 + y2 = z2> which are true propositions in all possible worlds. In

the first case we rest on a historical referential and in the second case on

the definite description of a scientific measurement, both examples of

rigid designators true in all possible worlds. In the first case we have

substituted the symbols with designated verifiable individuals thus –by

using a relevant extension- we effect a transition from the indeterminacy

of possible worlds to the specificity of ‘intensions’ and in the second case

the bare math formula would have said nothing unless we add that it

<will be true for all values of x & y>. This way these word / symbol

expressions evolve from being extensions at possible worlds (or

probabilities) to relevant intensions, e.g., mapping all such probabilities or

possible worlds to an individual. Fodor’s ‘propositional attitude’ model

[e.g., S (a) that P = <Angell believes that he loves Suzi>] comes closer to

what an ideal propositional structure should be like where the subject

(Angell), the attitude predicate (believes) and the ‘that’ clause (he loves

Suzi) bears more semantic weight and is more fine-grained than the

classic many world model. When the attitude verb and the ‘that’ clause is

followed by a sentence it defines its intensionality, the set of worlds in

which it is true without losing possible different meanings.

In theory any proposition has two different kinds of particles, one

refers to the sense-phenomenal objects / events ‘things’ in the empirical

domain and the other to conceptually-derived explanation of their

meanings. The special senses monitor the significant features of the

external world while the visceral brain monitors the significant deviations

from the genetically programmed homeostatic neuro-hormonal settings.

The unconscious, servo-controlled brain builds up and maintains a

constantly changing model of self within the context of these internal and

external variations. The sub-conscious brain infers and maintains the

probable outcome of each possible scenario as embodied in the relevant

propositional structure(s) and, when facing a significant contingency, has

the option to access the repertoire of conceptual representations

embodying such features. In modeling itself, the conscious brain

computational networks choose (based on their adaptive value) to either

act to change the relevant features of the contingent environment or

modify the current relationship between self and such environment. The

propositional structure should hybridize the ontologically descriptive

‘contingent thing’ and its epistemological, conceptually-derived meaning.

How do we bind them together as a hybrid unit? What are the primitive

relations (R) between the observed (empirical e) and the inferred

(conceptual c)?

From an informational content (representation) point of view the

empirical (o) should imply the conceptual (c), e = c, e > c, e < c. Ideally

the empirical should bear a logical supervenient relation to the conceptual.

But, as Chalmers has aptly suggested, in existential reality we can at best

only hope to get a propositional structure of natural supervenience; but

we now believe that based on a possible quantification of a modal logic (of

belief?) as it relates to quantum probabilities, we can improve on it. But it

will be difficult. It would be incoherent to quantify a domain of things

probable and it is easier to assume that all possible objects / events in a

given world exist in a single, fixed quantifiable domain. This way all or

none , always or sometimes, indexicals and protagonists, necessary or

possible, etc. can all become incorporated into the new propositional

architecture. E.g., ∀ (all) and ∃ (some), x□A→□∀xA, etc. Notice the

square symbol indicating the “necessary” condition (as opposed to

“possible” or ◊). Different objects exist in different possible worlds and

the domain of quantification contains ALL possible objects, i.e.,

∀y□∃x(x=y) means that every object in existence is necessarily to be

found in the domain of all possible objects. To satisfy Quine’s concern

about the context-dependant ontological reality when using the quantifier

“some”, only objects / events with a clear empirical probability, containing

only the spatio-temporal particulars found in a given macro quantum

world (in a world-relative domain) should be included in the expression.

This is denoted in a modal logic (M) by the predicate expression “E” (for

actually exists), e.g., ∃x(Ex&Mx&Sx), would stand for the fact that, e.g.,

there exists (∃x) a living French president (Ex) of Hungarian ancestry who

signed (Sx) a treaty of cooperation with the US in the Middle East. Will

this approach work when dealing at the micro quantum level?

This world-related (w) structure may bring un-expected problems for

the system's semantics when satisfying / verifying (v) the condition of

‘nested domains’ (wRv) when the domain of a possible world (w) is a

subset related (R) to the domain of v where our object / event verifiably

(v) and in actuality exists. The problem was solved above by introducing a

predicate statement of actual existence (Ex) into the equation; this

existence can be instantiated. Thus, for ALL values of x, any properly

phrased statement of predicate logic (Ax) results from substituting y and

n for any occurrence of x in Ax : (∀xA(x) & En). Once we have taken care

of the *proper use of rigid designators, as explained above, the semantics

of a quantified modal logic becomes more compatible to equate with the

quantum dynamic probabilities system characterizing brain attractors and

we hope to model such measurable phenomena to construct a formal

theory that describes and explains it. The ‘model’ of the phenomena or

system so described / explained is not a structure but a theory, hopefully

to be expressed in a formal language.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Assuming we are able to arrive at a suitable propositional structure,

one in which its arguments are properly expressed, how do we ascertain

their validity? We have to develop a sound system where its sets of rules

and axioms logically prove / validate all the arguments therein expressed.

Whereas in the classical propositional logic we use ‘truth tables’ to

demonstrate that valid conclusions stem from the exclusive validity of

premises in A, in modal logic we cannot develop truth tables matrices for

the modalities of A, e.g., it is ‘possible’ (◊A) or ‘necessary’ (□A) that A,

etc. A valid complex (molecular) expression in propositional logic depends

on the validity (truth value / falsehood)) of the propositional variables of

each constitutive (atomic) sentences. A simpler sentence example will

illustrate; the validity of the expression “All presidents are humans.” is not

a guarantee that “All presidents make rational decisions.” In the former

sentence (□A) is always true of necessity, in the latter (□A) is false (not

absolutely or necessarily true). To be able to handle the complexities of

modal semantics it is necessary to introduce the concept of ‘many worlds’

scenarios or ‘many valued logic’. This way, of all possible world scenarios

W (e.g., at the macro level of organization), there exists a possible world

(w) where presidents -in that given set- make valid rational decisions. Our

lofty goal is, at the mind / brain level, to be able to assign probability

values to that particular / vital w scenario based on measured quantum

values at the Planck level of organization.

To accommodate existential reality (sometimes called ‘free logic’)

Lukasiewicz and others had to ‘mongrelize’ the classic approach by

introducing symbols like ‘not’ (~), ‘ if…then..’ (-->), possible (◊A) and

‘necessary’ (□), among others. We may be able to expand the classical

‘truth table’ to include these notations and valuate (v) the truth value of

complex sentences, e.g., “ v(□A, w)=T iff for every world w′ in W, v(A,

w′)=T ”. Thus, it is necessary that the argument A is true (□A) at a world

(w) if and only (iff) the argument is true in ALL possible worlds (w1, w2..)

in (W). The possibility of argument A (◊A) is true (T) just in case A is true

in some possible world (w1…). Again, we hope to convert possibilities into

measured probabilities for a quantum dynamic system with the aid of

these quantifiers.

Arguments in a complex proposition about brain function may take

other values beyond mere truth and falsity because their truth values

depend on the values of their constitutive components whose individual

validities are modal. Enter ‘many-valued logic’. In our opinion, we should

be able to develop a ‘truth table’ matrix that includes values between

truth (1) and falsity (0) according to the probability of their conclusion

being instantiated in falsifiable reality. Thus,

1) v(A) + v(A1,A2..An) + v(~A) = 1. Furthermore,

2) v(A à B) = [1, 1- v(A1,A2..An) + v(~A) + v(B)]

Notice that intermediate values between truth and falsity are open

ended and thus impossible to frame inside a conventional value matrix.

In our particular case where we assume the brain is constantly self-

modeling and incorporating the relevant features of its internal (body

proper) and external (empirical) environment we need to incorporate

temporal notation to reflect conditions at time t and t+1. Now for a

validation (v) of A it will be ‘necessary’ that argument A (□A) is true (T) at

a given time w iff it is always also true in the future of w at w’. Notice the

requirement that present w and future w’ are related (R) transitively

(wRw’). Simply said, the argument A is true in the present w just in case

it is also always true at all times after w. Notice the required relation R of

transitivity between the present time w and the future w’ or wRw’.

3) v(□A, w)=T iff for every w′, if wRw′, then v(A, w′)=T.

Similar relations may be developed for ‘seriality’ and ‘density’. The

validity of the temporal approach is predicated on the binary relation R on

W (if a non-empty set of worlds W) indicated above as expressed in the

‘frame’ <W,R>. Such model requires a valuation assigning truth values to

all constitutive component sentences at each world in W.

In this brief essay we have left out quantum theoretical considerations

and how they relate to ontological / epistemological issues related to mind

‘beliefs’ which we defer to a future publication. At that time we will

elaborate on the premise that quantum dynamics of brain function can

rest on a special structure of a propositional logic because its dynamics

can be considered as a special probability calculus which we labor to

dissect out and then integrate. We still don’t know how to go about

characterizing the values of v(A) from a range of values B (each with

distinct probabilities) without relying on a projection operator on a Hilbert

space (H) lattice.

Newport, North Carolina, Xmas 2007

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 1. Carnap, Rudolf, 1947, Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago

Press

2. King, Jeffrey C., 1996, ‘Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure’,

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 495-521

3. Kripke, Saul, 1972, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University

Press and Basil Blackwell

4.Russell, Bertrand, 1924, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Mac

Millan New York

5. 5.Tarsky, Alfred, 1995, Introduction to Logic. Dover Publications, Inc., New

York

End of Ch. 7

Ch. 8

IS THE BRAIN A PROBABILISTIC OR A LOGICAL MACHINE?

ABSTRACT

Many would accept the premise that the human mind is a continuously

updating dynamic engine as a self-evident truth. This makes it easier to

accept that the conclusions emanating exclusively from propositional logic

processing cannot, under deductive monotonic logic principles, be

overturned by any new relevant, contingent information that might

present itself either perceptually or conceptually. This is so because it

would be counterintuitive and contrary to experience. We believe that,

consistent with the dynamic brain processing of sense-phenomenal and

memory-based conceptual data, we have to reject the exclusivity of the

canonical ‘modus ponens’ of propositional logic and adopt a probabilistic

model that would seem more realistically adequate to explain how human

reasoning analyzes contingencies and makes adaptive decisions.

INTRODUCTION.

In part I of the preceding chapter we left out any detailed

consideration about how our conclusions on a modified logic may be

readied for a hybridization with a modified quantum theory, we said: “In

this brief essay we have left out quantum theoretical considerations and

how they relate to ontological / epistemological issues related to mind

‘beliefs’ which we defer to a future publication. At that time we will

elaborate on the premise that quantum dynamics of brain function can

rest on a special structure of a propositional logic because its dynamics

can be considered as a special probability calculus which we labor to

dissect out and then integrate. We still don’t know how to go about

characterizing the values of v(A) from a range of values B (each with

distinct probabilities) without relying on a projection operator on a Hilbert

space (H) lattice.” We will attempt to do this now as we continue to

introduce modifications on both modal / Bayesian logic and quantum

theory.

The common denominator guiding our effort to hybridize classical logic

and quantum theories into an analytical tool to study brain dynamics is

probability theory whose inevitable relevance we envision in both

ontological and epistemological considerations of existential reality. While

much effort is spent by intellectuals in speculations about an ephemeral

noumenal reality invisible to our senses and elusive to our intellect to

apprehend by deductive inference, a noble endeavor indeed, we need at

least to elaborate a reliable, operational modal inductive logic to provide

satisfactory answers to pressing medical and societal conundrums of the

highest complexity. Hopefully we should be able to develop the theoretical

foundations for a reliable probabilistic inference beyond mere Bayesian

conditionalization rules. The time has come for intellectuals to abandon

the illusion of a structured, static and reducible physical reality, accept our

human species inexorable sense-phenomenal and brain computational

limitations and start thinking about how to best reason about uncertainty;

this way life and consciousness may be closer to our possible

understanding. It may turn out that the human brain, different from the

silicon brain, functions according to, not propositional but probabilistic

rules of inference. Human rationality is probabilistic, not propositional! We

often seem to forget that our inherited reptilian brain component is hard

wired and seemingly unable to yield much of its biological survival

imperative settings to the relatively fleeting demands from acquired

proposition-structured requirements to adjust. The cognitive sciences may

as well accept that a probabilistic logic would be better equipped to

understand the complexities of existential reality….just an intuition, not a

‘deduction’!

ARGUMENTATION.

It is well known that the human brain combinatorial capacity in tests

of numerical reasoning is very limited. But it is also well known that the

probabilistic approach of quantum theory has yielded a wealth of valuable

novel predictions about future scenarios, albeit casted as probabilities.

Can human rationality, at least as structured in the operation of the

brain’s executive cortex, be probabilistic in nature? If so it behooves our

research effort to change our cognitive approach. What follows is another

fishing expedition on the possibilities present by changing gears from

propositional to probabilistic inference logic. How do we go about it?

The first apparent limitation in structuring probabilistic reasoning rules

is accepting that such a daring approach requires a radical change in the

processing of information and realizing also that the conclusions to be

derived from their novel handling is, at best, semi-quantitative when

casted as probabilities. The reader must also be aware that the probability

logic we are marketing is NOT the garden variety mathematical probability

based on the objective probability that a sense-phenomenal object / event

becomes an observable data ‘fact’ but rather, as enunciated in the title,

based on the subjective probabilities or ‘degrees of belief’ that the

execution of an adaptive solution (to a given contingency) can be realized

while simultaneously being subject to constant variations and updating in

its locus at the cortical attractor basin. Self-evident sense-phenomenal

(both body proper and external) and historical experience can attest to

the fact that change is the most fundamental of all independent variables,

the reason we had to conceptualize the notion of time to measure change;

we will expand on this in a future chapter.Propositional logic is ill fitted to

analyze inferential relations whose dynamic character makes truth

preserving and absolute certainty to hold only for a fleeting instant

moment or for the illusion of a static reality, a reality which itself has a

dependence on contingent facts of questionable certainty. This way, as we

discussed previously, propositional logic arguments put a constraint on

human beliefs about his existential reality and thus becomes incoherent

‘de facto’. See Davidson, 1984. How can a probabilistic modal logic

become coherent? Enter conditional probability logic.

This is what we find when we examine this alternative. Of all possible

future world scenarios w available in an updated cortical attractor basin to

choose from, the one selected –represented as statement S (or a

hypothesis H)-- has an initial primitive probability represented as Pi(S)

when confronted with a new empirical contingency evidence E (of

probability > 0). The probability of S being chosen, i.e., the degree of

belief / confidence in S, will be conditioned on E’s truth value as an

indicator of its own probability P(E) and expressed as the new or final

probability Pf of S based on E’s probability. Pf(S | E) = Pi(S&E)/P(E). We

have argued that the probability of perceptual falsifiable evidence = 1 and

an evaluation of the probability of E should be limited to conceptually

derived ‘evidence’, e.g., mathematical reduction. In our opinion this

consideration undermines to some extent the reliability value of

conditional probability as the equivalent of a probabilistic inference or

even as inductive reasoning.

In Bayesian terms this would be the equivalent of Pf(S | E) = Pi(E | S)

× Pi(S)/P(E) and P(E) is assumed to be greater than zero and as such the

new evidence (algebraically) increases the confidence on the initial

hypothesis after the condition was imposed by the evidence. What if the

probability of the new evidence is closer to zero?

The inconsistency on the use of the conditional notation (|) in the

literature when a division (/) is meant has created considerable confusion

for the uninitiated when analyzing the proposed inequality equations, as

the following sentences will show. Let the hypothesis H (or statement S)

that all those voting in the Louisiana presidential primaries for Obama are

black. Let the observation (evidence) E1 stand for a white, non-voter and

E2 for a black voter. According to modal / `Bayesian Confirmation Theory'

both E1 and E2 may, in principle, provide `some' confirmation for

hypothesis H (or statement S) because E1 ’supports’ H (or S) just in case

Pi(E1| H)/Pi(E1) > 1 and E2 provides much better confirmation for H,

because, according to theory Pi(E2 | H)/Pi(E2)>> Pi(E1| H)/Pi(E1). In

layman terms, the initial cortical attractor probability (PiS) that black

voters in Louisiana voted for Obama is increased to a new final probability

(PfS) based on new contingency E2 (black voter statement) than on E1

(white non-voter).

In our opinion probabilities range from 0 -->1 and for contingency E1,

to state that Pi (E1| H)/Pi(E1) > 1 is a misleading expression when the

conditional notation (|) continues to be used in the literature as a division

sign (/). Especially when it seems to be stating that, after transposing the

denominator to the right hand side of the inequality it would imply that

probability of new event E1 (white non-voter, probably known to be zero)

can only decrease the probability of the hypothesis. But, transposing

terms this is equivalent to Pi(E1| H) > Pi(E1) which means that the

probability of H being true increases with the observation E1 than without

it! Likewise, for E2, Pi(E2 | H)/Pi(E2) >> Pi(E1| H)/Pi(E1) both sides of the

inequality look identical because of the confusing notation for

conditionality being incorrectly taken as meaning a division.

Like in classical logic, anytime a hypothesis logically supervenes on a

piece of evidence, the evidence confirms the hypothesis or

statement. But, is human reasoning, at its best, exclusively dependent on

propositional logic calculations over symbolic representations using proof

rules like in silicon brains? We'd rather think that, unlike our unconscious

processings where inherited biological survival imperatives for the species

default the possible outcomes of an analysis, subconscious analysis is a

going over / review cortical neuronal network ‘possible world’ / future

scenarios representations (as coded logical statements S or hypothesis H)

in cortical attractor basins (streaming consciousness) where the ones with

optimal bio-psycho-social equilibria are considered for the final free will

choice or consent to the brain robotic-like selection. Whereas the

computer assessment means accessing different rules of processing, the

human mind considers more options as syllogistically represented in the

future scenarios model where biological, psychic and sociological priorities

are factored in. What is ultimately more important, to learn how we

humans actually reason out existential contingencies or how we ought to

logically reason them out (like docking a space module in space or

removing one electron at a time from an external atomic orbital)? We

seem to know more about the abstraction than the actual behavior (based

on a probabilistic decision-making process). We are not advocating a

retreat back to pre-Chomskian Skinnerian behaviorism but to remind our

best minds that ultimately man is the measure of all things, perceptually

sensed or conceptually inferred, computable or not, whether beings in

measurable essence or in invisible conceptual / virtual existence. Complex

mathematical analysis is not a game for the physical religionist to display

his obvious talents, instead we view it as a necessary tool to better

understand and predict integral human behavior in its ever-changing

biopsychosocial perspectives. Reality has to be reasoned out existentially

from a human logical, not an exclusive computer perspective. The careful

reader may have noticed that, in this approach, we are anchoring our

probabilistic inductive conclusions in perhaps not so solid logical deductive

abstractions, c’est la guerre for the limited human existence in a constant

search for that elusive noumenal perfection. Man is the handy man at the

very center of universal creation and complex, sophisticated abstractions

are his tools…, just that!

One may validly question how could it be possible to make valid

inferences from false conditional statements, from untrue premises and

consider them a useful basis for thoughtful analysis and adaptive action?

In the example given above the standard conditional inference was built

thus: by polling the first 100 voters in Louisiana’s presidential primaries as

they exit the voting building it was recorded they were all black and voted

for Obama. On this basis, the categorical premise that probably all voters

for Obama were black was either supposed, believed or known to be true

from other unrevealed sources; this conclusion or hypothesis is the

equivalent of a cortical attractor solution when confronted with the new

evince on the voter's polling. In this process of conditionalization the

‘modus ponens’ inference is that if the first 100 voters polled indeed were

black (Pi) and voted for Obama, then possibly and probably all black

voters in the polling building voted for Obama (categorical premise has an

unknown probability). Once this evidence E from the first 100 voters who

allegedly all voted for Obama is verified (probability=1) a higher

probability or belief can be assigned to the cortical attractor final

conclusion that all blacks probably voted for Obama. The degree of belief

in this final conclusion ideally should be the same as in the verified results

of the polling. According to the Bayesian identity P(p | q) = {P((q | p)

P(p))/P(q)} a conditional probability can be ascertained from its converse

conditional probability and the initial conditions. Thus, e.g., if the

probability that the first 100 voters polled were black and voted for

Obama Pi(p), then the conditional (Bayesian) probability that all blacks

voted for Obama P(q) is P(p | q) = {P(q | p)P(p)/P(q)}. If the initial

probability Pi(p) is verified to be true, Pi(p)= Pf(p) = 1, then the final

probability P(q), under Modus Ponens updates the probability (degrees of

belief) that all blacks voted for Obama -the consequent P(q)- upon

confirming that the antecedent Pi(p) (the first 100 blacks polled voted for

Obama) is true. It should be noticed that the truth value of the

consequent P(q) is contingent upon the ‘condition’ that verification of

antecedent Pi(p) is reliable {Pf(p) = 1}. This confers a higher probability

that P(q) may be true. This can be expressed: Pf(q) = Pi(q | p)Pf(p) +

Pi(q/~p)Pf(~p); if our original belief was probably (e.g., Pi(q)=0.9) that

all blacks voted for Obama, then considering that the verified polling

showed that Pf(p)=1, our new (final) degree of belief should be closer to

0.9 than it had been.

Similarly, as we saw in the previous chapter, we can expand further

this probabilistic approach to include syllogistic quantifiers like All or None,

Some or Some not. E.g., some blacks P voted for Obama Q. All those that

voted for Obama Q are unemployed R, consequently the inferenced

conclusion that some blacks P are unemployed R is a probabilistically valid

conclusion. Here P and Q are the subjects, Q and R the predicate terms of

the syllogism.

We should be now in a better position to examine in more detail how

the future scenarios’ attractors in the executive cortex basin, parading /

streaming before our subconscious mindscan reverie, be accessed /

‘measured’ as a processed sense-phenomenal event along with their

attending qualia. Before getting too technical let us consider for a moment

an example on how, e.g., when confronted with the problem of connecting

an USB adaptor to an appropriate jack in our PC tower, we need to

consider and process body position stability as provided by flexors and

extensor muscles as we steadily lower our bodies to approach the hard

floor, blindly find with our finger’s touch the proper spatial coordinates (in

the back of the PC tower!) before pushing the adaptor into the correct

position; we didn’t need to do anything more complex than consent to an

unconscious selection of the most comfortable possible position from the

many available involving a selection of the best available involuntary /

voluntary muscle groups to complete the desire job. In other words, our

conscious free will consent to one of several inherited motoneuron reflex

alternatives available can be structured as an operator acting on all

probable future combinations coded in neuronal networks at spinal and

supraspinal levels to execute the most adaptive probable response. At

higher mental levels of higher structural and functional complexities than

the spinal or subcortical levels, the perceptual sensory (or conceptual

memory) input about the contingency to be solved has the effect of either

incorporating / or modifying the probability for future events to occur. This

may involve initially 1)the incorporation of perceptual sense-phenomenal

data or conceptual (memory based or theoretical construct) data to

modify that relevant information already in existence in cortical attractor

basins and / or 2)the subsequent choice / consent after the modification,

as needed. We have expressed elsewhere that the choice / consent may

not necessarily reflect an optimal solution for the contingency presented

but rather the one most in harmony with subject’s biopsychosocial

equilibria. The choice / collapse of the relevant mental state from the

linear combination of all correlated states (many worlds) is co-generated

with the conscious event. In a previous publication we had suggested the

processing generating the choice as being the result of a recursive cyclic

parsing which co-generates the conscious experience and relevant quale.

Newborns may not be able to make subconscious choices or conscious

consents and would only respond stereotypically to newly acquired data

based on the inherited biological imperative default. This them will be

elaborated further in subsequent chapters.

It has been suggested (Manousakis, E. Foundations of Physics 2006)

that operationally consciousness arises as the result of changes /

alterations in what they call ‘state of potential consciousness’ |ψi>. (our

cortical attractor basin), to |ψi+1> i.e., it is consciousness that produces

the quantum effect, |ψi+1 > = ˆO |ψ>i where operator ˆO “represents

the action of consciousness through an operational question which…causes

a change.” We prefer to dissociate the postulated Universal / Global

Stream of Consciousness from the individualized ‘substream of potential

consciousness’ we experience. As we stated above the effect of perceptual

or conceptual input into our brain can be passive (a modification of pre-

existing future scenario for future recall) or active (when a change in

mental state calls for an immediate adaptive free choice solution among

alternatives). Future chosen world scenarios are already neuronally

‘bound’ upon receiving an input for change, for collapse of the chosen

state which activates the neural correlates. Inferred change triggers (co-

generates) the qualia of consciousness. It is possible to use the vector

calculus notation to represent the pool of potential future outcomes as a

linear combination of possible events and projection operators and their

correspondence to known distributions. Thus, let the state vector in

Hilbert space |ψ> represent the linear combination of the basis vectors

|i> in the cortical attractor basin where i = 1,2,3…n The sum of all the

vectors |i> describes all possible mental states each of which is associated

with its corresponding neuronal network correlate, albeit with more

flexible / modifiable synaptic weights than the stereotyped inherited reflex

connections.. We prefer to think that the exercise of a free will choice

should not be considered as a random unrestricted ‘measurement’

equivalent from a pool of possible outcomes obeying a statistical

distribution function when iterated many times. Instead, we are all

familiar with how a conscious effort in willing a desired result can be

causally efficient on activating the relevant neural processing, as we did

when choosing the most comfortable body position in the previous

example. Nonetheless, it is convenient to consider the choice as the

equivalent of a Newton projection operating on the mixture of probability

amplitudes and comparing the differences between the prior state and the

new one required. The probable neuronal chain of causation leading to the

free will choice of the best adaptive solution from the possible future

scenarios will be discussed in another article. We can fantasize or write

high brow mathematical poetry about the assignment of a probability

outcome for the chosen mental state based on the square of the

coefficient in the linear combination. The Hilbert vector space finite

measurement is a scalar product of the (length) of the overlapping vector

states |ψ> and |φ>, M = <ψ|φ>, normalized to unity. Until such time as

we are able to identify the proper representation of a mental state such

that near infinite number of computer iterations would keep you away

from complex multi-component vectors and bring you close to real

number values, these are just high falluting speculations. But, we’ll get

there… steady and unrelenting…..

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

It should be clear that both classical quantum theory and logic must

be streamlined and forced to fit into the straight jacket of a

psychophysical framework, the only model that would explain the intuition

that conscious free will is causally efficient in driving neuronal network

processes, like isolating the correct body position in the example. From

neurophysiology we know that subconsciously the proper ensemble of

neuronal network populations are ready to be activated if the result does

not compromise body integrity and is otherwise compatible with other

psycho-social, emotional well being considerations. It is self-evident truth

that we need to build models that brings us both closer to noumenal

reality and models that makes it easier to grasp the uncertainty present in

all manifestations of existential reality. As it may turn out, our cognitive

neuronal outlays are designed naturally to deal with a probabilistic world

when we consider the infinite individual variations in tastes and

approaches to solutions for the same problem of a viable biopsychosocial

existence.

As we discussed above, if we describe the vector states |ψ> and |φ>

as representing possible world scenarios (cortical attractor basins) and a

perceptual / conceptual input respectively, then the latter has the

potential of modifying / updating the prior relevant content: |φ> = ˆO

|ψ> where ˆO is the operator for that particular action of introducing

either sense-phenomenal data or theoretical constructs based on memory

data. The resulting overlap of the prior state and the new state: M =

<ψ|φ> can be manifested as an updated solution to an old contingent

problem for future use or a command for the execution of an adaptive

action by activating the appropriate motor networks to effector glands or

muscle. This would be the equivalent to an ‘observation’ in classical

quantum theory. An ample overlap after a large number of ‘computer’

iterations can be represented as |ψ n+1> = ˆO |ψn>. After a repeated

number of normalizations we approach the value: < ψ n|ˆO | ψ n > = 1.

Eigen vectors represent the unchanged future world’s scenarios after the

perceptual / conceptual input; eigen values is the result of the

modification introduced. We actually update / actualize the neuronal

network (Hebbian) weights as a practical result of our modifying the

attractor content of the cortical basin. We realize we are not ready yet to

pin point specific algorithms or equations to describe the thought process

in a probabilistic world of varying sense-phenomenal content and their

corresponding varying conceptual meanings but we think we are heading

in the right direction by giving form to a psychophysical model dealing

with an integral view of biopsychosocial existence.

But we also know that a real human being may consciously interact

directly with that invisible submicroscopic or world futures scenario and

make or consent to adaptive choices which now we daringly wish to give

form and ‘explain’ as a projection measurement / observation that may be

pedagogically represented as the potential outcome of the Newton-

Raphson operator on a linear space combination of possible solutions

created by the result of the comparison between the pre- perceptual /

conceptual modification (|Xn>) and the ‘new’ mental state that resulted

(|Xn+1>). This way, having modified on a first stage, the configuration of

neural connectivities of previously existing networks (as the result of

perceptual / conceptual de novo inputs) the second stage would be the

emotion-influenced recursive parsing, comparison with mental status

(before 1st. stage), reiteration and selection from a more restricted

narrowed-down pool obeying well defined probable distributions.

Mathematically, this distribution is given by the square of the coefficient in

the linear array combination of possible solutions inside the Hilbert vector

space when the scalar product between the two overlapping states (prior

to input & as modified by it) occur as we briefly indicated in the previous

paragraph above. This is concluded by the executive frontal lobe cortical

activation of the appropriate neuron pools to motor effectors.

Finally, the reader may have noticed how we have left out a

discussion of the relevance of classical neurophysiological synaptic nerve

transmission as opposed to the much faster quantum theoretical

electromagnetic transmission of information to and fro sensorimotor

neuron pools. This will require a discussion of the ‘time’ factor which we

will leave for a future discussion below. Somehow it may seem surprising

that nature confirms that time does not exist and only changes are able to

be monitored, measured and recorded, there is no such thing as a time

receptor organ ever described in the literature and as we described in an

earlier publication in this series, sense-phenomenal input, after

amplification, reaches the cortical attractor basin via single / multiple

photon absorption, resonance coupling indirectly related to time, ie.,

frequencies. It so happens that besides those invisible quantum effects,

we can also empirically demonstrate synchronous neuronal activation

mediating sense-phenomenal input by changing the axonal conduction

velocity from receptor to central brain processors. How the invisible and

the macro handling of change to achieve synchronicity needs further study

in other chapters below.

In Deltona Lakes, Florida. Winter 2007

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Bayes, Thomas, "An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the

Doctrine of Chances", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of

London (1764) 53: 37-418, reprinted in E. 1S. Pearson and M.G. Kendall,

eds., Studies in the History of Statistics and probability (London: Charles

Griffin, 1970).

2. F. Selleri, and A. van der Merwe, Quantum Paradoxes and Physical

Reality

3. N. Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge

University

4. W. Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory

(Dover, New

5. D. Bohm, Phys. Rev. 85, 166 (1952). ibid, 85, 180 (1952).

6. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 463 (1957).

7. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970).

8. J.S. Bell, and A. Aspect, Speakable and unspeakable in quantum

mechanics: Col-1987).

9. Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology

(Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2003).

10. Carnap, Rudolf, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press; 1950).

11. Carnap, Rudolf, The Continuum of Inductive Methods (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press; 1952).

12. Carnap, "Meaning Postulates", in Meaning and Necessity (Chicago:

Phoenix Books; 1956): 222-229.

13. Christensen, David, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on

Rational Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2004).

14. J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek, Quantum Theory and Measurement,

(Princeton

15. A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (1935).

16. E. Schr¨odinger, Proc. Cambridge Phil. Soc. 31, 555 (1935); ibid 32,

446 (1936).lected papers on quantum philosophy (Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge,Press, Cambridge, 1934). Atomic Theory and Human

Knowledge (Wiley, New University Press, Princeton, 1983).

17. J. Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,

Chap. VI, pg. 417 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1955).

18. Efrastious Manousakis, Founding Quantum Theory on the Basis of

Consciousness.Unpublished? Department of Physics, Florida State

University,

APPENDIX for VECTOR IDENTITIES: Taken from “Introduction to Tensor

Calculus and Continuum Mechanics.” By JH Heinbockel, Old Dominuum

University.

The following identities assume that ~ A; ~ B; ~ C; ~D are diferentiable

vector functions of position while

f; f1; f2 are diferentiable scalar functions of position.

1. ~A _ (~B _ ~C) = ~B _ (~C _ ~A) = ~C _ (~A _ ~B)

2. ~A _ (~B _ ~C ) = ~B(~A _ ~C) − ~C(~A _ ~B)

3. (~A _ ~B ) _ (~C _ ~D) = (~A _ ~C )(~B _ ~D) − (~A _ ~D)(~B _

~C )

4. ~A _ (~B _ ~C) + ~B _ (~C _ ~A) + ~C _ (~A _ ~B ) =~0

5. (~A _ ~B) _ (~C _ ~D) = ~B(~A _ ~C _ ~D) − ~A(~B _ ~C _ ~D)

= ~C (~A _ ~B _ ~C) − ~D(~A _ ~B _ ~C )

6. (~A _ ~B) _ (~B _ ~C) _ (~C _ ~A) = (~A _ ~B _ ~C )2

7. r(f1 + f2) = rf1 + rf2

8. r _ (~A + ~B) = r _ ~A + r _ ~B

9. r_(~A + ~B) = r_ ~A+r_ ~B

10. r(f ~A) = (rf) _ ~A + fr _ ~A

11. r(f1f2) = f1rf2 + f2rf1

12. r_(f ~A) =)rf) _ ~A + f(r_ ~A)

13. r _ (~A _ ~B ) = ~B _ (r_ ~A) − ~A _ (r_ ~B)

14. (~A _ r)~A = rj~A j22!− ~A _ (r_ ~A)

15. r(~A _ ~B ) = (~B _ r)~A + (~A _ r)~B + ~B _ (r_ ~A) + ~A _ (r_

~B)

16. r_(~A _ ~B) = (~B _ r)~A − ~B(r _ ~A) − (~A _ r)~B + ~A(r _ ~B)

17. r _ (rf) = r2f

18. r_(rf) =~0

19. r _ (r_ ~A) = 0

20. r_(r_ ~A) = r(r _ ~A)−r2~A

End of Ch. 8

Ch. 9

A FISHING EXPEDITION INSIDE HILBERT'S SPACE.

(Explode Hidden)

ABSTRACT

At an earlier chapter we stated that “At the sub-Planck level of

organization macroscopically insignificant perturbations in the initial

conditions of the (intero, extero & propio) receptor (EM) field get

reinforced / amplified by phase coupling with background internal /

external (EM) noise until a (cortical) ‘attractor’ basin is targeted and a

resonance-coupled, non-linear state transition is initiated.” A stream / flow

of orderly subconscious events (arguably substreams of a postulated

Universal stream) is thereby generated carrying as its content all of our

thoughts and experiences and their associated ‘quale’. These comprise

sense perceptual data (internal / external), memory-based abstract

conceptual inputs and their associated quale.

Introspectively the observer establishes a distinction between the “I”

and a significant new piece of information about the object / event sensed

or conceptualized. The “I” becomes the equivalent of a measuring

instrument trying to choose a particular state from a linear combination of

possible correlated states. The ‘intuition’ that precedes the choice

represents an incomplete analysis / synthesis of relevant adaptive

information, as such, a possibility of knowing or modifying the possibility

of future events to occur. An introspective observation may act like an

‘operator’ (O), by comparing the original possible state vector |ψi> (in

Hilbert space) and the ‘new’ contingency situation |ψi+1> = O |ψi>

(operator acting inside this space). This way we may alter the possible

states of consciousness with a modified probability for re-occurrence in a

future situation. The state vector |ψi> is a linear combination of the basis

vectors |i> describing all possible future scenarios associated with specific

neural networks, where i= 1,2,…N. The sum of all N vectors and their

associated probabilities represent all possible outcomes to choose from. In

this chapter we proceed to analytically dissect out the adequacy of this

interpretation. We found there is much more work to be done before a

quantum dynamical interpretation of brain processing can be put to useful

application.

INTRODUCTION.

We have seen in the previous chapter quoted above the enormous

difficulty faced in modifying classical logic parameters to a modal logic

capable of assimilating in the particularities of the quantum dynamic

processing reality of the brain system it hopes to describe. Now we turn to

quantum theory itself in an effort to identify which features will seamlessly

incorporate the descriptions of the empirical (ontological) facts of sense-

phenomenal reality and the modal explanations of the abstract

(epistemological) inferential deductions into a unified hybrid whole. It is

anticipated that the mathematical and conceptual structure of quantum

theory will have to be ‘mongrelized’ a little, like a molecule had to be

modified and fashioned into a hybrid detergent species able to bring

together such natural antagonistic pairs like hydrophilic and lipophilic

functional groups into one common solvent. What kinds of theoretical

modifications? Is it possible to equate the probability-bearing propositions

arguably present in cortical brain “attractor basins” to their equivalent in

quantum theory?

There are two ways to approach this. One involves Bayesian

Confirmation Theory or Manousakis reductionist efforts. The second is my

rather unusual, less conventional approach and involves an attempt to

flexibilize BOTH modal logic and classical quantum theory such that it may

become an useful tool to study the brain dynamics along the lines

suggested by Berkeley’s Freeman. This involves multidisciplinary aspects

and I disagree with Manousakis who mixes up a "universal consciousness"

with a subset of it he calls "personal consciousness". Similarly, Bayesian

logic is not the exclusive logic that departs from the propositional type but

it needs to be quoted as a guideline. Modifying conventional logic to make

it more probabilistic is difficult because it brings it closer to quantum

theory and the structure of this hybrid is still unclear to me and much

everyone else. This is a preliminary attempt at clarification of issues

encountered as it reaches into unexplored terrain.

The main problem we have faced in our bold attempt to dissect

quantum theory in search of common grounds bringing together the

domain of the visible macro-empirical with the invisibility of the Planck’s

level of organization has been the difficulty of extrapolating across the

conceptual bridge separating them. It is not difficult to visualize quantum

theory as a special probability calculus rooted in a special propositional

logic. But how do we project beyond the quantum theoretical states

probabilities (defined on the orthocomplemented lattices on a Hilbert

space H) of relatively simple binary systems to the supercomplexities

inherent in the probabilities of cortical brain ‘attractor basins’ dynamics? It

may well turn out that the qualitative jump from the finite, Boolean brain

to the infinite, atomic behavior in a non-Boolean Hilbert space is

meaningless? What follows is an account of this analytical effort where

many more questions are raised than answered..

ARGUMENTATION.

For starters, let us first consider what is known at the atomic level of

organization and then build up from there. One important first question

we must ask ourselves about the classical quantum theory is its adequacy

to incorporate modal features; e.g., are we satisfied with just eigenvalues

describing the state of the system at a given moment (collapsed state) or

should we venture into a dynamical description of those probable values

some time into the future where modal considerations must be reckoned

with? If the latter, we may not need to be concerned with the correlation

between eigenvalues and eigenstates, yet, our modification effort’s worth

is predicated on the possibility that the dynamic state should be able to

reliably predict the probability of a given ‘value state’ (Born rule). The

measured value state then represents a restricted subset of all possible

value states present. Ideally, we need to rely on probability values for the

different possibilities within a system and a projection on its future

evolution, specifically, we should be able to pin point which of the possible

dynamic value states has which probability.

Considering the supercomplexity of dynamic states present in

improper mixtures of multicomponent systems (as found at both the

macro brain dynamics and sub atomic Planck’s level) an attempt to

differentiate them into their constitutive subsystem components will not

yield as much information, if any, about their entrails, e.g., even at the

sub-atomic level, a mere modest ‘simulation’ with a much smaller two

component, orthogonally-arranged ‘pure’ system. To illustrate let’s briefly

follow-up on the ‘simpler’ sub-atomic level.

Schrödinger described how, in a two particle system, a base for each

one of the two component vector system |ei> and |fj> can be ascertained

such that their biorthogonal decomposition tensor product (in a Hilbert

space) can be represented as a linear combination of terms |ei> |fi>

whose coefficients uniquely represent their possible value states. From

these, a probability measure may be thus generated for this simplified

two-component dynamic system. But, are dynamic states = intrinsic or

relative value states of observables, both before and after being

measured? Are the properties being considered those not intended but

instead of {|ei>& |fi>} combined? Does it matter within the context of our

stated limited goals? More important, how can these conclusions be

extrapolated or expanded to include improper mixtures of subsystems of

arbitrary multi-component systems, as would be possibly expected in

brain dynamic systems?

In theory we believe that in multicomponent systems, e.g., |ei>, |fi>,

|gi>, |hi>……., individual units can be subjected to permutations and / or

combinations and expressed as binary systems where the bi-orthogonal

decomposition can be applied such that, e.g., {|ei>& |fi>}, {|gi>& |hi>},

{|ei>& |gi>}, {|ei>& |hi>}, etc. and can be considered as single

components for the purpose of calculating the tensor products of pairs like

{(|ei>) (|fi>& |gi>)}, {(|hi>) (|ei>& |fi>)}, etc. In this author’s opinion,

this may be the equivalent of factoring out a tensor product Hilbert space

(does not include factorization by axis rotations). But, what if the

properties of the pair, e.g., {|ei> & |fi>} are different from either

constituent |ei> or |fi> individually considered?

Tentatively, and based on Dieks spectral theorem analysis (1995), one

may consider possible value states in every system as the elements

present in their density operator’s spectral decomposition. This claim is

based on the results from further application of the biorthogonal

decomposition theorem where the density operator of either one of the

double components has an allegedly similar spectral resolution.

Furthermore, it is not clear if the properties of the subsystems generated

by either type of factorization are not influenced by that procedure,

especially if one considers that ‘axis rotations’ can generate an infinite

number of continuous component possibilities, each with an unknown

relation to each other and to the totality of the composite system. Are

(even?) atomic and other macro degrees of freedom ‘fixed’ or relative? At

this point in our search for answers we have to hesitantly decide on one of

two different approaches: either continue on the relativistic path or settle

for a modal interpretation at the atomic level and hope that the higher

levels of brain EM organization derive their attributes from their

subsystems. Is this derivation reliable? If so, how do you go about

correlating the brain composite system with their corresponding

subsystems? We do not have easy answers at this moment but will

continue in our fishing expedition, what is worth having is worth fishing

for..

Not being so familiar with the subtleties of advanced vector / tensor

calculus, we fail to see clearly the advantage of other related modal

approaches suggested (Clifton) like allowing one of the two component

system mentioned become the null space Pi (Boolean set of all sums of Pi

elements) orthogonally oriented to each of the factored out

subcomponents Qi in W such that each paired set thus obtained can be

subjected to a spectral decomposition analysis as mentioned. This way, all

possible values in the system is the set of all possibly valued projections

obtained, i.e., the sum of all P’s and Q’s. While these results may be

closed under the classical logic connectives, we fail to see how it can be

claimed that each member in W is contained in the set of all possible

properties. So much for our heroic attempts to reduce the complexities of

real-time brain dynamics to an unreal, constrained, and simpler two-

component system analysis. We may as well form the two component

system from the pure quantum theory state and a ‘preferred’ value state.

All suggestions are far from being able to assign an empirically adequate

probability measure based on a set of identified possible properties, the

latter so far defined as discussed. Could it be that a modal interpretation

of quantum theory cannot be realized because of the infinite dimensional

nature of Hilbert space and the impossibility of fixing variables applying

Lorentz transformations? Same question can be asked about the algebraic

approaches whose results are not always applicable to infinite-dimensional

cases.

In this ‘fishing expedition’ there are limitations to the simpler two-

component analysis of X and Y. This is so as the complexity of brain

dynamics resists being fitted inside the strait jacket of the simple spectral

analysis as discussed above for the reasons stated. Neuro-philosophical

synthesis extends horizontally to the various relevant disciplines leaving

the vertical in-depth analysis in a given area when that area has achieved

prominence in the analysis. The general concept of dealing with complex

dynamic systems (brain function included) by adopting and extending

successful analytical strategies that worked for simpler systems is not new

or so difficult in itself, but the multidisciplinary endpoint requires a

speculation that is complex, realizing that some concepts in specific areas

are approached differently, creatively, speculatively or simply by "fishing".

From this I have tried to build a heuristic base provoking interchange by

others, so that what had been uni-dimensional, superficial thoughts can

now stimulate and open ways for creative direction. I'm moving the line

between fact and fishing.

We had dreamt that a modal approach to quantum theory would

enable it to disclose, for every measurable moment in time, a set of

possible properties in existence and their corresponding probabilities, i.e.,

for a given system with property P at time t, what is the probability it will

have property P’ at a later time t’? This is specially true when following the

trajectories of macro objects in metric space. But we cannot even

guarantee a continuous trajectory / transition of the spectral components

of a physical system in the relatively simple spectral decomposition

analysis mentioned above. When dealing with stochastic dynamics like

those found in the brain one must be able to characterize transition

probabilities over infinitesimal time units in order to generate the relevant

quantum probabilities sought after. So far we can only guarantee single-

time probabilities. (See Bacciagaluppi, i993?) Should we invest so heavily

on quantum ‘operators’ and ‘quantum states’ as the exclusive narrators of

physical reality at the Planck level, not to mention the brain level? So

much just for the atomic level under consideration.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

After Dr. W. Freeman and Dr. Chris King’s interesting speculations and

measurements on brain dynamics that lead to the introduction of the

‘attractor’ basin and 'transactional' model of brain dynamics it has been

tempting to use their data and insights in the formulation of a hybrid sub-

model of existential reality as an extension of the bio-psycho-social (BPS)

model of consciousness. While neuroscience provides the raw empirical

data of brain structure and function, its conceptual meanings are to be

found outside the sense-phenomenal perceptual domain of discourse.

Consequently our operational conclusions about the mind-brain

conundrum are simultaneously ontological and epistemological

(epistemontological) and we find it convenient to take advantage of the

empirical successes of quantum theory (notwithstanding the questionable

noumenal truth value of its measurements) to bring together the

falsifiable empirical data and its conceptual meaning to the same melting

pot. Because, at its roots, quantum theory is a calculus of probabilities, we

need a quantum theory with a realistic interpretation of the ever changing

dynamics of physical reality. This calls for a fundamental change in both

the classical approaches of quantum theory and logic. While it may be

possible, as briefly shown, to ‘translate’ quantum theory into a Boolean-

type of classical probability such that unit vectors represent possible

states of a physical system and projection operators correspond to

‘observables’, it is hard to believe how the inner product of two such

operators and their associated spectrum (inside a non-Boolean Hilbert

space, see von Neumann, 1932), can yield even minimal information

about more complex systems like brain dynamics. It remains to be seen

how reliable the results can be even at the Planck level of analysis, as

discussed.

Unfortunately, at this stage of our analysis, we have encountered a

most interesting situation, as we force classical logic into a modal straight

jacket and try to push quantum theory into a Boolean framework, the

anticipated results of their possible fusion as a reliable measure of

probable outcomes from the pleyade of possibilities in a brain ‘attractor’

basin scenario, it is now more distant than before we started as we move

from the sub-Planck to the macro level of organization. Even at the Planck

level, reliable results are only available at the relatively simple

biorthogonal level of analysis. It is difficult not to feel like Jonathan

Livingston Seagull..! J

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. Albert, D. and Loewer, B., 1990 . “Wanted Dead or Alive: Two

Attempts to Solve Schrödinger's Paradox”, in A. Fine, M. Forbes and L.

Wessels (Eds), PSA, Vol. 1 (Philosophy of Science Association, East

Lansing, MI), pp. 277-28

2. Bacciagaluppi, G., 1995. “A Kochen-Specker theorem in the modal

interpretation of quantum mechanics,” International Journal of Theoretical

Physics 34:1206-1215.

3. Bacciagaluppi, G. and Dickson, M., 1999. Modal Interpretations of

Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

4. Bacciagaluppi, G. and Dickson, M., 1999. “Dynamics for modal

interpretations,” Foundations of Physics 29: 8, 1165-1201.

5. Bell, J. L. and Clifton, R., 1995. “QuasiBoolean algebras and

simultaneously definite properties in quantum mechanics,” International

Journal of Theoretical Physics, 34:12, 2409-2421

6. de la Sierra, A. 2006. Part I: The Possible Quantal Interface Joining

the Hybrid Nature of Reality. Telicom 19:4 (July-August): 34.

7. Dickson, Michael and Dennis Dieks, "Modal Interpretations of Quantum

Mechanics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007

Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/qm-modal/ The

original ‘modal interpretation’ of quantum theory was born in the early

1970s, and at that time the phrase referred to a single interpretation, due

to van Fraassen. The phrase now encompasses a ... modal interpretations

of quantum mechanics,” Foundations of Physics, 31, 1403-1430. –––.

2001b. “A modal interpretation of quantum mechanics based on a

principle of entropy ...Michael Dickson and Dennis Dieks

http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/qm-modal/

8. Freeman, W. J. 1992. Tutorial on neurobiology: From single neurons to

brain chaos. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 2(3): 451-

482. http://sulcus. berkeley.edu/Freeman/manuscripts/ID6/92.html.

9. King, Jeffrey C., 1996, Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure,

Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 495-521

End of Ch. 9

Ch. 10

BEING AND BECOMING IN BRAIN DYNAMICS.

("We can no longer say that the past has been but is no longer, while the

future will come to be but is not yet.")

(Uncertainty)

Abstract.

From the many sense-phenomenal objects and / or events in our

immediate environment (including memories) only a limited number of

steady states of discrete, individualized neuronal patterns (cortical

attractor basins) are set-up to respond exclusively to particular stimuli in

the future. For example, olfactory receptors in the nose when activated

would converge & activate a particular set of olfactory bulb neurons acting

as a relay switch to a corresponding cortical attractor basin uniquely

coupled, for each particular odor, to a corresponding different memory,

emotional and physiological patterns of responses (mental state). When

these signals were analyzed on the oscilloscope screen they were found to

resemble chaotic systems with ‘attractor basins’. Once it was

experimentally documented as the probabilistic nature of brain dynamics,

we are forced to generalize it for ALL sensory receptors and consider not

just the fleeting moment when the sensory stimulus is present, the

‘being’, as it evolves or ‘becomes’ past but in transit into a potential

future, but also to predict with variable degrees of certainty its evolution

into that future, the ‘becoming’ we may be able to control and free

willingly choose from available ‘futures scenarios’ alternatives. In so doing

we acknowledge an involuntary shift away from the reductionist physical

approach into the metaphysical ‘emergence’ realm of ‘process’ philosophy.

So be it!

KEYWORDS.

attractor basins, being, brain dynamics, causation, correlation, cortex,

Descartes, EEG, electroencephalogram, emergence, environment, future,

Hebbian recursive feedback loop, indeterminism, logic, memories, mental

state, metaphysics, mind, natural, neurobiology, oscilloscope, philosophy,

probability, quantum theory, receptor, reductionism, retrocausality,

sense-phenomena, supervenience, thalamus, time, vector, virtual

temporal, temporal asymmetry.

INTRODUCTION.

Anyone who has ever watched an electroencephalogram recording

(EEG) can’t help but be amazed at the complexity of the information

content hidden in what, at first sight, appears to be meaningless random

tracings from the chaotic activity of substrate neurons and their

surroundings. It was not until 2001 that Dr. Walter Freeman, at the

Freeman Laboratory for Nonlinear Neurodynamics at the University of

California at Berkeley, established that sense-phenomenal input from

millions of olfactory receptors (environmental feature detectors) in the

rabbit nose converge into the tiny olfactory bulb (pattern analyzer). In the

olfactory bulb, signals are differentiated and relayed to cortical areas

where they are organized into a limited number of steady states of

discrete, individualized neuronal patterns (attractor basins) responding

exclusively to particular odors -- a transition from chaos to order. Once a

cortical basin is set-up, the particular molecular structure of a given odor

would activate a particular set of bulbar neurons. These neurons then act

as a relay switch to the corresponding attractors in the cortical attractor

basin. The latter are also uniquely coupled to relevant different memories,

emotional and physiological patterns of responses creating the

corresponding mental states. The neural pathway from receptor to

attractor basin is available for future modification, memory recall during

‘flow of consciousness’ and for conscious free will isolation from other

attractors when needed. When these brain signals were analyzed by Dr.

Freeman on the oscilloscope screen they were found to resemble chaotic

systems with ‘attractor basins’.

Can we generalize and speculate that all sense-phenomenal receptors,

internal or external, are feature detectors of the internal / external

environment? These receptors would send sensory data to thalamic

analyzers (or central sub-thalamic loci) that would differentiate the input

as to patterns (pattern analyzer) before relaying the information to

cortical attractor basins where the appropriate networks are activated.

These new or established networks would cause us to become

momentarily conscious of the change from the original brain state to

another one featuring the new environmental feature detected, analyzed,

and processed. The data suggests further that each individual attractor is

dynamically updated by maintaining neuronal plasticities capable of

switching neuro-humoral connections in the formulation of a proper

adaptive response to the new environmental contingency. It remains to be

answered what features of sense reality get extracted (at the

receptor/analyzer stage) to be further processed: Cohen and Stewart

argue in The Collapse of Chaos (1994) that feature detectors are

themselves features and collectively will be self-referential to create

consciousness.

We have a different interpretation discussed elsewhere (de la Sierra,

2009, in press) in which we incorporate the virtual temporal element to

differentiate between the ‘being’ (present state) from the ‘becoming’

(probable future) mental state. In a previous chapter we briefly forayed

into Hilbert’s space searching for a mathematical reduction of brain

dynamics incorporating some of these findings but came back almost

empty-handed. For now we will pause from looking into logical or natural

supervenience or causation / correlations of the mental state, but will

briefly focus on the possibility of consciousness being instead an

‘emergence’ phenomenon.

ARGUMENTS.

It is very persuasive to consider brain dynamics as within the

analytical scope of cognitive dynamic Systems Theory and Complex

Systems Theory if we modify the attractor basin model which, no doubt, is

itself a modification of Fodor’s brain ‘module’ model (Murat, 2008). If the

mind/brain state space can be represented as a complex multidimensional

matrix composed of many subroutines, one for each feature of the

environmental scene, we can analogously say then that it may be possible

to consider the ‘subroutines’ of dynamic systems theory as attractor

basins for ease of computation. Then, it is easier to visualize how the

unique environmental features (initial conditions) are selected by sense-

phenomenal receptors and relayed for further feature and pattern

analysis. In that instance, the path taken to the cortical basin (via

thalamic (or central subthalamic loci) relays (with exception of olfactory

signals) becomes impossible to predict except when subsequent minor

environmental perturbations (e.g., color, position or memory change)

reaches threshold and activates the current attractor neuronal networks,

switches to a different attractor or initiates a new one, giving rise to a

temporary conscious perceptual image or conceptual thought qualia. But,

this model needed further conceptual modifications, we needed to

introduce a virtual temporal dimension of environmental change,

perceived or not, if we wanted to explain how we may exercise our

conscious free will in choosing from the available alternatives in the

various attractor basins in a given time, just like we ‘choose’ how best to

position our bodies on the floor while trying to screw an adapter behind

the computer tower not directly in sight! How do we go about introducing

‘time’ into non-relativistic quantum theory?

As it turns out, the two classical antagonists of Greek philosophy,

Heraclitus (“everything gives way and nothing stays fixed”) and

Parmenides (“what is has no beginning and never will be destroyed”)

views of reality are probably both correct. The idea that “the past has

been but is no longer, while the future will come to be but is not yet”

needs modification. We have at present nothing to say about

“retrocausality” (i.e., the view that effects may precede causes) other

than to suggest that recursive loops can amend past strategies registered

inside an attractor network but not put into effect yet. However, the

probable future exists now in potency (inside an attractor basin) and is

being constantly modified by updates from a changing Heraclitean reality

until the future scenario with the highest probability of adaptive success is

either updated for future consideration or consciously willed into actuality

in response to a present contingency.. Likewise, empirical macroreality is

where it had been until perceptually incorporated into the mind of the

beholder regardless of how it all began and will end, the way Parmenides

envisioned it to be. We prefer the view that perceptual or conceptual

reality data bases in existence in attractors as probable future scenarios

become less distant in the future in transit to become present and then

become past.

Unless a more privileged mind than this author succeeds in reducing

brain dynamics to a reliable level of quantum predictability, we will

continue our exploration of related alternatives, all of which have to

incorporate the temporal element into the equation. For instance, one way

would be to compare the instantaneous mental state |ψ> at time t0 with

that mental state |φ> an instant later at t1 to allow for whatever

perceptual or conceptual changes be integrated as a new event with a

given probability. One may speculate that the integral of many such

fleeting qualia of change during that short interval of time constitute the

flow of consciousness. Analytically, to reduce this intuition to a

measurable formulation we need a function of time to represent the

environmental change from a present ‘being’ to a future ‘becoming’… but

there are no known receptors of time ever being anatomico-physiologically

identified except as implied in frequencies, e.g., color or sound detection.

The attempted reduction requires that there be an overlap of states

immediately before and after the perceptual/conceptual input such that it

can be ‘measured’ as the scalar product of the two vectors <ψ|φ> inside

Hilbert space which happens to be the square of the length of the vector

when is normalized to unity, i.e., <ψ|φ> = 1. Once the variable

environmental inputs are organized / processed as orderly sequences of

countable events the analyst is in a position to correlate change within a

time interval if we have a reference periodic change familiar to our human

experience in the form of neuronal network recursive periodic oscillations

(e.g., pineal gland circadian rhythms or the shorter tronco-encephalic

cardio-respiratory cycles), which can not only bind together successive

events as perceptual / conceptual units, but can also be formulated as an

concurrent operator as Manousakis (2006) tried to do. For limitations in

this approach see chapter “A Fishing Expedition Inside Hilbert Space”. The

formulation of the frequency operator as a mathematical tool to measure

change is outside the scope of this brief analysis.

As we consider these possible developments we are involuntarily

shifting from an implied quantum dualism to a consideration of

consciousness as an emergent phenomenon that does not require

identification of a causally efficient agency -- an extreme case of

unfathomable complex dynamics. The disappointment, from a reductionist

point of view, is diminished when we realize that our most trusted and

reliable intellectual scientific disciplines also become emergent entities as

we consider their lower and lower levels of organization, from the

measurable macrolevel to the invisible sub-Planck level. What the reader

shouldn’t lose sight of is that, as we try to conform the macro level of

observation to known physical principles rooted in mathematical

symbolism, we move from the questionable certainty provided by a limited

sense-phenomenal perceptual apparatus to the uncertainty of a

probabilistic domain that inevitably ends in a hybrid epistemontological

view of reality. Thus, the measurable facts ‘described’ by classical physics

need to be ‘explained’ in the arbitrary symbolic language of mathematics.

So much for the truth value of a chemistry discipline level based on those

physical interpretations where the ‘indivisible’ atoms of chemistry

themselves emerge from a lower level quantum theory, not to mention a

‘modern biology’ rooted in chemical interpretations of a helical double

stranded chemical structure. What many would consider more troubling is

that if we honestly acknowledge those human cognitive limitations, we

involuntarily are moving from another unfathomable in se ‘substance’,

physicalist philosophy to a more modest functional ‘process’ philosophy

which we will briefly discuss below. Neither can science reduce life to its

fundamentals, nor philosophy even explain thought or language

generation on a ‘neuronal protocol’ basis. Emergent explanations would

have to fill the irreducible abyss.

However, it is likely that we may be able to explain brain dynamics as

an emergence of attractor dynamics from the underlying neural networks.

There is abundant neurophysiological data suggesting the existence of

Hebbian recursive feedback loops traveling to and fro across cooperating

neuronal attractor basin networks in addition to feed-forward input -->

output arrangements connecting everything to muscle / gland effectors.

Each attractor is considered a subsystem for computer analytical

purposes. When attractors having similarities are linked together as

semantic attractors they can also exist on time scales to differentiate

between the human ‘now’ from the ‘later on’.

We are not aware of any studies on self-organizing activities in

attractor space as claimed, other than what is genetically pre-

programmed as archetypes; nevertheless, it is clear that self-organization

should be a required feature when arguing for ‘emergence’. As previously

argued elsewhere (de la Sierra, 2003), the recursive co-generation of

language and thought may not require “emergence” as an explanation

which is a last resort explanation. While we recognize the intrinsic sensory

and brain combinatorial limitation of humans, we have the intellectual

obligation to attempt a reduction first and precisely attractor dynamics is

such an attempt where the neocortical executive cortex can be thought of

as being an accumulation of subsystems point attractors.

Should the metaphysical brain --> mind ‘emergence’ justify a switch

from ‘substance’ metaphysics to ‘process’ philosophy? It seems like the

invisible quantum dynamics has involuntarily also promoted ‘process’

philosophy. A subject of a future article may be a discussion as to how

quantum dynamics resuscitates metaphysics in general, and brings to the

fore the specific related issues of ‘emergence’ into focus, be it the

probabilistic existential reality within the context of the epistemontological

view or as it relates to the classical emergence of ‘being’ at the different

levels of matter/energy organization. How so?

Quantum mechanics virtually split the atom and did away with the

classical physics ‘indivisible’ atom. Was physical matter as we know it de-

materialized into a quasi-stable probabilistic pattern extracted from

seemingly random fluctuations? In our analysis the specific isolation of an

attractor brought about by the free will ‘collapse’ of an evolving wave

function thereby introduces a new type of probabilistic indeterminism into

the fabric of science and thereafter nature’s laws may be experienced as if

imposed from below (as when the macro objects of empirical reality

‘emerge’ from the invisible micro processes of quantum chemical

interactions, a sort of creative spontaneity, the result of self-organizing

activity or teleological intelligent design) but conscious free will survives

for topà down control of what seems a physical determinism beyond our

conscious means impossible to influence. Brain dynamics, as we have

argued, responds to perceptual or conceptual environmental changes

requiring a distinction between ‘now’ and ‘later on’, and thus must “reject”

the time–invariant relationships of special relativity that conceives

‘changes’ as a function of the observer’s frame of reference. Things

emerge as stability patterns of intrinsically variable processes (attractors),

debunking the classical ‘substance’ for a ‘process’ metaphysics. As the

level of organization increases from the invisible sub-Planck to the

measurable macro level we witness the emergence of perceptually

structured ontology at the expense of conceptually structured

epistemology. In the real world of existence the chunk of black carbon

perceived is as real for the coal miner as the invisible 4-valence

projections in the tetrahedral structure of the crystal lattice the physical

chemist conceptually ‘sees’ with the eyes closed. This is, as expected,

reflected in the various quantum theoretical interpretations of

consciousness, from the quantum field poetry or microtubular quantum

gravity fuzzy explanations to the psychological descriptions of behavior

(Rosenberg, 1996), so long as the material brain is always included in the

mix.[1]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Neuroscience has thus far been unable to identify any anatomico-

physiological structure able to detect time directly, except as it is

manifestly implied in the detection of frequency variations as measured in

perceived sound and color variations. We can only detect sense-

phenomenal changes in our internal / external environment. To

compensate for this important perceptual limitation in detecting changes

below our human levels of sensory / perceptual resolution, we had to

resort to conceptualizing that changes manifest themselves sequentially

and must occur within some measured interval, so that we may

consciously apprehend its transitions, thus our space-time world view.

Thus, we conceptualize both linear and cyclic changes / transitions—the

latter to be able to assign an arbitrary but convenient measurable

periodicity on which to base linear changes occurring in a given interval

we choose to call an ‘event’. This way, existential reality becomes a hybrid

of the sense-phenomenal ontological / empirical perception and the

memory-based epistemological conceptualization. This view is essential to

understanding brain dynamics and consciousness, because we happen to

be innately hardwired to experience empirical reality as events of change

in a linear sequence. To explain our limited sense capacity to perceive

only three dimensions we had to conceptualize time as a measure of

change and add more dimensions to the Cartesian empirical limits,...

enter vectors conceptually to provide a measure of rate of change in a

chosen direction.

Once the probabilistic nature of brain dynamics was experimentally

documented (Freeman, 2001), we are forced to consider not just the

fleeting moment we call present, the ‘being’, as it evolves or ‘becomes’

past in transit into a potential future. but also to predict with variable

degrees of certainty its evolution into that future -- the ‘becoming’ we

may control and free willing choose from available ‘futures scenarios’. We

have briefly described how we and others labor to harness / reduce the

extreme complexity of the brain’s probabilistic dynamics into a workable

formulation at the service of those charged with handling its aberrations,

for “the real time human remains the measure of all things, those physical

things that perceptually are and those virtual things that conceptually

exist but are not.”

Intellectual life is committed to reducing the empirical reality that is

measured ontologically to workable formulations with the aid of

epistemological/metaphysical tools to extend its reaches and anticipate

real or conceptual obstacles. This way, we go the way we must go,

because science evolves as we try to reach asymptotically that

unreachable reality ‘in se’. The path we travel today may be labeled

‘dualist’ only to find out involuntarily that an ‘emergent’ label may be

more fitting with the evidence available. C’est la guerre.

Deltona, Florida, Spring 2008

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1) Alfinito, E., and Vitiello, G. (2000). Formation and life-time of memory

domains in the dissipative quantum model of brain. International Journal

of Modern Physics B, 14, 853-868.

2) Aydede, M. (2008) The Language of Thought Hypothesis. In . Zalta,

E.N. (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Palo Alto, CA:

Stanford U. Press and

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/language-thought/.

3) Atmanspacher, H. (2003). Mind and matter as asymptotically disjoint,

inequivalent representations with broken time-reversal symmetry.

BioSystems. 68, 19-30.

4) Cohen, J., and Stewart, I. (1994). The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering

Simplicity in a Complex World. New York: Viking.

5) de la Sierra, A. O. (2009, In press). More on Being and Becoming in

Brain Dynamics, a Temporal Assymetry in the Physical World? Telicom

22:1.[LMB3]

6) de la Sierra, A. O. (2008). “A Fishing Expedition Inside Hilbert Space.”

Telicom, 21(3), 32-37.

7) de la Sierra, A. O. (2003). Neurophilosophy of Consciousness, a

Biopsychosocial Model. (2 ed.) USA: Lulu.com

8) Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

9) Freeman, W.J., Kozma, R., Werbos, P.J. (2001) Biocomplexity:

adaptive behavior in complex stochastic dynamical systems. Biosystems,

59, 109-23.

10) Freeman, W.J., and Vitiello, G. (2006). Nonlinear brain dynamics as

macroscopic manifestation of underlying many-body field

dynamics. Physics of Life Reviews, 3, 93-118.

11) Manousakis, E. (2006). Founding Quantum Theory on the Basis of

Consciousness. Found Phys. (36)6, 795. (See: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-

ph/0604100 ).

12) Rosenberg, G.H. 1996. Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the

hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 76-88.

[1] Many may think I am explicitly arguing from a theological point of

view because of the free-will issue. I know better than to argue from that

perspective when trying to convince deterministic materialists. Instead, I

agree with that deterministic approach up to the level of deciding from the

many seemingly pre-determined options in attractors. But determinism

stops there because what we find in the attractors is a special type of

determinism, what I call a ‘ probabilistic quantum indeterminism’ because

I can freely isolate one of the choices. I can’t understand why it is so

difficult to compare the subconscious choice of the best of many PRE-

DETERMINED, hard-wired, inherited body postures AND the conscious

choice of the best of the many PRE-DETERMINED (but SOFT-wired),

acquired behavioral alternatives as they exist in attractors! It is very

difficult to accept the idea that we are obligated to posit the reality of an

unconscious, complex, chaotic (but structured) deterministic organization

given to us as an example of negentropic ‘evolution’ which we can

consciously control by free will, it must all smack of theology. But it is not

approached like that at all. The other aspect of dealing with the

atemporal, acausal, non-linear asymmetry of reality ‘ in se’ which we

MUST transform into linear sequences because we naturally process

information that way, is rooted on self-evident natural experiences but it

is a hard sell because I explain it by invoking the mediation of the

language adopted which we know is linearly processed.

End of Chap. 10

Chap. 11

A TEMPORAL ASYMMETRY IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD?

“Perhaps it might be said rightly that there are three times: a time

present of things past; a time present of things present; and a time

present of things future.” St. Augustine

ABSTRACT

We continue to explore various possibilities of quantum theoretical

analysis of brain dynamics hoping to find an acceptable interpretation for

the market of ideas. We try to point out what we consider weak points in

each one hoping also to get suggestions from experts (mostly wearing

horse blinders in their narrow fields). Physical reality out there is self-

evidently timeless, undergoes non-linear changes and is acausal yet we

obviously experience it as a linear sequence of events, a natural temporal

asymmetry! If we hope to develop algorithms to explain brain dynamics,

we have to solve first this asymmetry issue. To us it is clear that we have

epistemologically linearized the sensory input to make sense of its

originally non-linear information content. In the preceding chapter we

examined how we could artificially introduce time to linearize a tenseless

physical reality using quantum theoretical tools in the formulation of the

resulting algorithm. In a nutshell we conceptualized the co-existence of

cyclic transitions of convenient measurable periodicity such that we could

assign temporal durations to the linear events we experience, enter ‘time’

as a convenient invention to measure non-linear changes in nature. As

usually happens when analyzing complex systems, many important issues

remained unclear.

This time around we stop messing around with changing either the

physical or metaphysical domains, declare them independent, non-

interacting worlds and just consider how cooperatively we can synchronize

their independent ‘activities’ such that, epistemologically, by becoming

‘entangled’ we can formulate an algorithm explaining how we transform

the non-linear physical world into the linear sequence of events our

senses functionally experience. Enter a conceptual ‘time’, this time as an

‘emergent’ phenomenon. We do this by manipulating tensor space

mathematics to cancel the effects of the temporal asymmetry nature tries

to impose on us. We leave out the mathematical elaboration of the

formulation.

INTRODUCTION.

In the previous chapter on ‘being and becoming’, following Manousakis

lead, we tried to ‘temporalize’ an essentially ‘tenseless’ physical reality in

nature where its objects/events are filtered by sensory receptors and

perceived as evolving in a linear sequence of temporal events inside our

mind’s view of a three-dimensional world (see Minkowsky). The strategy

at that time was to conceptualize the mental co-existence of cyclic

transitions of convenient measurable periodicity such that we could assign

temporal durations to the linear events as they seem to occur in our

experience of nature, like clocking the position change of our favorite

racing horse in the track during an interval of ‘time’. After all, absolute /

mathematical time in a virtual clock flows independent to anything

external and can be use to measure the duration of any event (in arbitrary

units, seconds, minutes, etc.) undergoing perceptual changes, i.e., in

motion, position, etc. The ‘time’ element in the Schrodinger equation of

quantum theory IS an external clock and we would have to deal with it in

the subsequent evolution of the equation -where the requirement that it

commutes with other observables- is irrelevant in a timeless, point size

duration interval (the invisible ‘Now’ in the metaphysical domain) between

a past and a future event as we find in the physical world (and also absent

from all mathematical formulations) can be either ignored or treated /

neutralized as time invariant by introducing a time reversal operator. But,

is this reference-free, non-relativistic Newtonian approach justifiable, even

when we could use natural cycles as clocks? This is especially troubling

where, in our human psycho-physical world, ‘being and becoming’ is only

coming into self-conscious awareness of the relevant event. Linear time

sequences (e.g., stream of consciousness), un-existent in the non-linear

natural physical world remain a fundamental psychological dimension of

BPS survival reality. When we perceive the objects or events content of

that timeless nature, where things ARE, not just HAPPEN, we don’t just

say ‘this IS’ but ‘this is NOW’! Think about it.

To the good analytical mind two things become obvious, 1)physical

reality, at all levels of structural organization, independent of ‘time’, Is,

was or will be out there in the physical world regardless of how it (and the

observer) got there and where / when it will go and 2)to impose an

exclusive linear-type evolution on sensed physical reality is capricious and

‘contra natura’. Do we have a choice? Can we change our innate neuronal

predisposition to experience the evolution of sense-phenomenal reality as

a linear sequence of events…so much for the ontology of sense reality.

Clearly we cannot significantly alter our genetic endowment BUT we can

epistemologically ‘assign’ a hierarchy of priorities, an unconscious

biological survival imperative, a subconscious psychic survival drive and a

conscious social survival behavior for group conviviality’s sake. So we

invent / conceptualize ways to harmonize nature’s tenseless multifactorial

evolution with our species genetic limitation to capture/experience only

the linear / sequential aspects of that complex evolutionary change. Thus,

we conceptualized time and invented tensor / vector calculus to provide a

functional measure of rate of vital change in the given direction that

optimizes biopsychosocial (BPS) survival for the species, as elaborated in

the preceding chapter on ‘being and becoming’.

This time around, keeping in mind that quantum events, visible or

invisible to us, will occur in the material world -and the physical brain is

no exception- we need to change gears a little and briefly explore how

may ‘time’ bind synchronously the ontologically perceptual physical

domain of (gene-controlled) sense-phenomena to the epistemologically

conceptual non-physical domain of (gene / meme-controlled) mental

activity. The non-physical mind and the physical brain need not lose their

sovereign domain identity and cooperatively labor in behalf of BPS

survival. Our inherited incapacity to experience non-linear timeless

ontological events in nature, while irrelevant to the physical sciences (in

its search for context / time-independent first principles), is

epistemologically resolved as taking place in cognitive measurable time

via the coupling with linear sequential language processing where

meaning is extracted from the perceptual content. The conceptual hocus

pocus comes to achieve this synchrony between two non-interacting

domains both inherited genes and acquired memes have to be considered,

both a non-commutative algebra had to be used and mathematical

transformations chosen to preserve the symmetry of fundamental

dynamical equations (e.g., time-reversal and time translation ‘structures’)

isomorphically.

ARGUMENTATION

The ‘attractor basin’ theory of brain dynamics, attractive as it may be

in ‘explaining’ the complex tracings of electroencephalograms (EEG) and

magneto-electroencephalography (MEG), has much to explain regarding

things like the metaphysical underpinnings and significance of ‘free will’

choices, causation or temporal projections into the future. If we close our

eyes and ponder deeply about the sense-phenomenal reality we

experience in quotidian life, our best informed intuitions will a-priori reject

any notions on either the absolute determinism of both materialist and

theological philosophers as the exclusive explanation of reality. The

Kantian chaos of sensations processed in the sensory receptual (feature

processing) and perceptual (proto-semantic processing) level of brain

analysis carry no temporal content (other than the indirect frequency

features of the audiovisual component) because there is no difference

between past and future in the non-linear natural world and only a brain-

imposed conceptual ordering of related events as linear sequences of

occurrences provides a possible coupling with semantic language parsing /

processing for meaningful comprehension of the sensed event. This way

the recursive co-generation of language and inner flow of mental events

(thought) is made possible. Somehow our attentional neuronal networks

can only focus on the change from the instant *past to the instant future,

what McTaggart a century ago called the ‘earlier than’ and the ‘later on’

instant we now call the ‘present’ (Now). This brings synchronous coupling

between the timeless physical reality ‘in se’ (underlying the seemingly

relativistic macro reality) and the meaningful existential reality we live in

the fleeting present tense, fugacious and shifting as the empirical ‘now’

may appear to be. This seamless coupling process joins the timeless

Parmenidian and the fugacious Heraclitean world into a functional hybrid

unit without either domain losing their sovereign independent domain

identity. We may attempt in the future an equivalent analysis of energy

vectors where we question the well established Boltzmann theory

explaining the linear vector of time as the direction in which entropy

increases as witnessed by an alleged increase of structural disorder. But

human experience and history have witnessed the opposite, self-evident

negentropic evolution in the direction of increased structural order in the

empirical world. Likewise nobody has ever explained why entropy should

have been be so low (increased structure) at the beginning of the ever

expanding cosmological Big Bang evolution in time. Nobody should be

surprised at the intuition that the inherited forward, linear, sequential

human experience of time is of a metaphysical and non-inferential mental

nature. All inherited unconscious processing is free from temporal

considerations and is not consciously accessible unlike the acquired

subconscious readily accessed by conscious free will where temporal

considerations are required to choose from the various ‘attractors’ future

scenarios linearly flowing in the stream of consciousness. We have

proposed elsewhere the archetype organization of inherited potential to

evolve in act according to the direction assigned by the proper

environmental stimulus. Like time, space is also the epistemological

creation of the conscious mind to explain the sense-phenomenal

observation of linear change, e.g., displacement of bodies in motion.

The arrow of time continues its forward linear projection as a

convenient independent variable that makes measurements of duration

possible in the empirical world while it also makes possible to express the

timeless ‘earlier than’ past and the ‘later on’ future as the present

measurable temporal ‘now’ events where tenses and the semantics of the

indexicals ‘being and becoming’ virtually come alive linguistically. It is

important to notice that a ‘coming into being’ is predicated upon an

unidirectional, linear forward sequential evolution vector, something

impossible in the non-linear evolution of physical reality ‘in se’, we can

arbitrarily impose an epistemological linearity straight jacket to ontological

natural reality to extract meaningful BPS data compatible with our survival

as a species. Our inherited incapacity to experience non-linear timeless

ontological events in nature, while irrelevant to the physical sciences (in

its search for context / time-independent first principles), is

epistemologically resolved as taking place in cognitive measurable time

via the coupling with linear sequential language processing where

meaning is extracted from the perceptual content.

All things considered in the preceding exposition, do we need to take

sides between an ontology rooted in the falsifiable tenets of scientific

methodology AND an epistemology rooted in the non-physical, axiom-

based tenets of metaphysical logic? We may not have to cash exclusively

on the truth value of information emanating from poorly defined sense

reception / perception or an equally poor brain-combinatorial

conceptualization of the already poor resolution of sense data? Why not

‘be real’ and declare the autonomous identity of both the perceptual

physical/material domain AND the conceptual non-physical mind domains

as acting as an indivisible, cooperative/complementary hybrid unit, the

epistemontological unit? But how do we formally reconcile the complex

temporal asymmetry separating the two domains, as discussed? Can a

different modification of a quantum theoretical approach achieve the

functional synthesis of physis and psyche co-existence in a psycho-

physical super model?

We have systematically avoided the temptations of adopting the

pretentious claims of quantum theoretical models of multiverse ‘holismic’

proportions. Keep it simple, we as humans do what we have to do to stay

alive, reproduce, be happy in our conviviality with self and others; all

embodied in our biopsychosocial model now extended to include an

epistemontological sub-model of existential reality. Perhaps not so simple

to explain will be how may time emerge when an acausal, time-indifferent

tool like quantum theory is used to analyze this physical ßànon-physical

complementarity. (correct square with x)

As before, this complementarity correlation can arguably be

represented as a primordial tensor product decomposition of a time-

indifferent mind and a time-sensitive brain domains, Mind (M) ⊗ Brain (B)

= M⊗B in a separable Hilbert space H assuming the archetypal symmetry

of both domains The details of the mathematical analysis is beyond the

scope of this brief *exploration but may be found on page 94 of Dr.

Primas work on “Time–Entanglement Between Mind and Matter”. Suffice it

to say that the two independent domains do not interact and, following

Leibnitz idea, the material and non material (B & M) achieve synchrony by

postulating an entanglement. We agree with Leibnitz that mental time is

the ‘Now’ but have to disagree on his view of the order of *succession in

that he does not consider the (probable) future as also being stored in

present memory (in the form of attractors). To achieve this synchrony

between two non-interacting domains both inherited genes and acquired

memes have to be considered, both a non-commutative algebra has to be

used and transformations chosen to preserve the symmetry of

fundamental dynamical equations (time-reversal and time translation

‘structures’) isomorphically.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Any minimally informed student of neurosciences and mathematical

logic should have no problem conceding that, since he / she can eye

witness the self-evident changes in the macro structure of sense reality

(empirical objects/events) as they age, the invisible micro structural

counterpart of the same observables must be also undergoing equivalent

associated changes. While we are not prepared to concede that these age-

related changes are necessarily accompanied by a decrease in the

relevant structural organization (aging), as Boltzman thermodynamic

entropy would have us believe, two things should be clear: 1)changes, at

least in the physical inanimate / inorganic empirical world are non-linear,

independent of time and causality, the material world does not depend on

an observer to justify its Heideggerian essence, existence and presence in

that instant moment a human observer calls ‘now’. 2)if we remain in the

neighborhood long enough we will experience the aging of the same

objects/events as a linear concatenation of sequential, causally linked (in

the macro level) flow. We seem to conceptually organize the

macrophysical world sensory input as if it linearly streams down our

consciousness effort. Why does the perceptual experience of changes in

nature is fundamentally different from the same change as it must

logically occur (barring the presence of some invisible influence) in the

absence of any observer?

We have discussed the qualitative aspects of yet another possible way

of formulating a quantitative approach to brain dynamics. The

undersigned author feels it is too premature to buy stock on the holistic

aspects of the quantum theoretical approach. Yet, it is still possible to

develop a non-Boolean format to explain the apparent discrepancy

between the timeless structure of the physical domain and the time-

sensitive structure we experience when perceptually incorporating its

content into the conscious realm. The strategy has been to formulate the

equations that describe both ontological and epistemological domains as

‘entangled’ by arguing that it conceptually achieves a synchronization and

complementarization of both domains while preserving their integrity (non

interacting). We did not discuss the mathematical procedure by which a

time variable (with a Gaussian distribution) can be induced in a timeless

domain (Kolmogorod time operator). A most complex quantum

modification of conditional probability theory seems necessary but was not

discussed due to questionable assumptions in the analysis of its

justification. It is possible to pedagogically introduce time translation and

reversal operators in the analysis to restore the temporal symmetry

nature seems to have broken. This way man epistemologically

conceptualizes time to give meaning to the Kantian chaos of sensations in

the perceptual world. Is this another example of an emergent

phenomenon from the cooperative effort an unconscious inherited

‘archetype’ / protolinguistic neuronal structure and a subconscious

acquired meme data base both coupled to language generated linear

processors that create the illusion of time while recursively co-generating

inner language and thought (consciousness).

Springtime 2008 in Deltona, Florida

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1) Altmanspacher, H. (2003). “Mind and matter as asymptotically disjoint,

inequivalent representations with broken time-reversal symmetry”.

BioSystems 68, 19-30.

2) Atmanspacher, H. and beim Graben, P. (2006). “Contextual emergence

of mental states from neurodynamics.” Chaos and Complexity Letters.

2(2), in press. [Preprint available online (PDF)]

3) Franck, G. (2004). “Mental presence and the temporal present”. In

Brain and Being, ed. by G.G. Globus, K.H. Pribram, and G. Vitiello,

Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 47-68.

4) Freeman, W.J., and Vitiello, G. (2006). “Nonlinear brain dynamics as

macroscopic manifestation of underlying many-body field dynamics”.

Physics of Life Reviews 3(2), 93-118.

5) Primas, H. (2003). “Time-entanglement between mind and matter”.

Mind and Matter 1, 81-119.

6) Schwartz, J.M., Stapp, H.P., and Beauregard, M. (2005). “Quantum

theory in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of

mind/brain interaction”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B

360, 1309-1327.

7) Stapp, H.P. (1993). “A quantum theory of the mind-brain interface”. In

Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Springer, Berlin, pp. 145-172.

8) Stapp, H.P. (1999). “Attention, intention, and will in quantum physics”.

Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(8/9), 143-164.

9) Stapp, H.P. (2006). “Clarifications and Specifications In Conversation

with Harald Atmanspacher.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(9), 67-

85.

10) Vitiello, G. (2002). “Dissipative quantum brain dynamics”. In No

Matter, Never Mind, ed. by K. Yasue, M. Jibu, and T. Della Senta,

Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 43-61. 11) Whitehead, A.N. (1978). Process

and Reality. Free Press, New York.

End of Ch. 11

Ch. 12

THE NEURODYNAMICS OF PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION.

ABSTRACT.

The research on the cortical ‘attractor’ model for olfactory inputs by

Dr. W. Freeman has been a seminal source of valuable information in the

unraveling of the super complex dynamics of brain function which to this

date remains unsolved, especially when we try to modify and

adapt/expand the olfactory model to include and functionally integrate ALL

perceptual (sense-phenomenal) and conceptual (symbolic or sentential

logic) functions as discussed in previous chapters. We have really tried to

remain close to measured or mathematically-derived data, from EEG,

MEG, fMRI instrumental data to self-evident experiences like perceptual

and / or conceptual qualia. Perhaps the most difficult step will always be,

not so much the explanation of how perceptual/conceptual inputs are

amplified by brain background signals to form new and update old cortical

attractor basins by quantum wave resonant / amplitude couplings or how

they parade before our mind as a flow of consciousness, but how do we

subconsciously isolate one of several such cortical attractors (future

outcomes) as the exclusive conscious choice based on its probability of

adaptive success in response to significant environmental contingencies.

But we have no doubt that, just like we unconsciously isolate the most

effective motoneuronal networks -among so many available- to safely

score points at Olympic gymnastics, we can also subconsciously isolate

the equivalent cortical attractor neuronal networks (at spinal and

supraspinal motoneuronal levels of integration) when adapting to those

environmental threats to body integrity. But we ask, how does the non-

physical mind is able to be causally efficient on the physical brain during

the conscious exercise of free will, what we have opted to call ‘proximate

causation’ for lack of a better characterization? Suppose a grieving

gymnast decides to fake a fall to quit her performance risking a fracture

when landing her feet on the high bar? We may never know how many

elements, if any, functionally mediate or anatomically bridge the invisible

transition from the grieving conscious choice to modify the motoneuronal

effector network(s) unconsciously pre-programmed to preserve the body

integrity (and the relevant mental state). When we compare this control of

the gene-controlled unconscious plan with the equivalent control of gene /

meme subconscious selection of the best adaptive probable plan by

consciously willing it into actuality we feel free-will exists. The

explanation, however, within the context of brain dynamics, will have to

be metaphysically conceptualized as a problem of complex indeterministic

causation or else surrender your analytic effort to the accommodative

label of ‘emergent’ psychophysical behavior or a ‘functional’ approach. We

outline below some of the gray areas resisting being framed into

conceptual formulations and revisit the ‘conditional probability’ tool within

the context of neurodynamics.

INTRODUCTION.

Probabilistic or indeterministic causation remains refractory to being

successfully reduced to operational algorithms because of so many

complex gray areas. Before throwing in the towel, we should explore

causation in itself while zeroing on functionalist aspects according to which

we should restrict our view of ‘mental states’ as those defined by their

causes and effects. This focused view excludes, for the moment, any

consideration of intrinsic properties of such states but rather concentrates

on the mental state in relation to immanent or transcendental perceptual

and/or conceptual inputs, other inner states or behavior. This narrowing

has the advantage of conceiving mental states as being conceptually

shared and realizable by different systems such as computers and even

other biological species..

ARGUMENTATION.

Every long journey starts with one small first step, what do we

understand by ‘causation’ as it applies to brain dynamics? In general

terms we may think of causation as an act, intentional or not, that brings

about an effect, be it an object (e.g., work of art), an event (e.g.,

punishable behavior) or a mental state (perceptual/conceptual qualia like

sounds or sadness, respectively). Functionally speaking, for each and

every consequent act of causation there has to be an origination in the

form of an agent (person or object), an event (e.g., a force causing

change in motion) or an antecedent mental state. We will use the term

‘sine qua non’ to imply that the agency, event or mental state initiating

the relevant end result, must be both necessary and sufficient to have

caused such consequent response. We will briefly discuss below the

special case of ‘propositional attitudes’ (Fodor). Having now framed the

scope of causation we are most interested in, let us illustrate with some

further focusing examples to follow.

We have inherited motor reflex arcs (with varying degrees of

complexity) to preserve the biological integrity of the human species, from

the simple monosynaptic, segmental withdrawal flexion to the complex,

polysynaptic, suprasegmental walking reflex. It always involves a receptor

‘organ’, an effector (muscle, gland), their associated afferent and efferent

neuronal pathways and sometimes intermediate associate neuronal

connections. These basic varying connectivities, by and large, are

genetically hard-wired and cannot be consciously accessed at their

unconscious level loci to modify their synaptic connections but we may

sometimes consciously inhibit their instantiation (against self interest) as

when terrorists explode themselves in crowds, religious fanatics walk on

nails or activists set themselves to fire as we witness during pathological,

heroic or altruistic acts. Consider the following specific example to help us

further focus on brain neurodynamics.

We may have noticed or heard that an unconscious anaesthesized

patient in the operating room (OR) will not reflexly respond to remove the

nuisance produced by slight mechanical touch stimulation on his cheeks

caused by the neurological hammer, a bristle, a pin prick or a walking

flea. The observed behavior is different when the same events are

repeated while he sleeps in the recovery room or when fully awake during

vigil, now he responds with a slap to remove the nuisance stimulus. What

does that tells us? Unlike the OR where the deep stage of anesthesia

inhibited all motor responses, in the recovery room we are dealing with

desinhibited segmental reflexes possibly involving a few spinal segments

controlling nearby superficial, touch receptor areas on the cheek. Each

small area with touch receptors (dermatome) is wired-up to specific motor

neuron pools activating one among varying neuron-->muscle

combinations covering the moving receptor surface area. Another

significant difference is that the sleeping unconscious patient may not

reflexly respond by self slapping his cheek to remove the significant

nuisance unless the position of the nuisance (e.g., moving flea) changes

whereupon the hand precisely aims at the new location and activates the

appropriate motoneurons to slap the flea down. This unconscious isolation

of one of many probable motoneuronal responses (depending on surface

location of stimulus) illustrates the diversity and precise genetic network

configuration of inherited responses available. This interpretation is all

based on classic neurophysiology after the British school of Sherrington, et

al.

Lets introduce now another variation, let’s wake the patient up.

Suppose the same aching patient receives same nuisance flee stimulus

while he is awake recuperating from the surgical spinal decompression

procedure to remove the neck pain from a pinched (as it exits from the

cervical vertebra) upper cervical peripheral nerve. Why isn’t the

consciously inaccessible, gene-controlled reflex arc is not unconsciously

triggered into action this time, like before when he was asleep? Because

now, if it did, a reflex slap on the moving flee area of his face would likely

unintentionally jerk his neck and undo the surgical relief previously

provided. But instead he consciously willed into action a different

otherwise inaccessible & unconscious segmental reflex that produced

instead a milder contraction of his facial musculature. Had he responded

and jerked his injured neck, an amygdaloidal, gene-controlled, neck

avoidance reflex would have aggravated his condition. Fortunately, while

the amygdala is temporarily inhibited from reflex responding to the cheek

stimulus, the cheek stimulus also traveled to the meme-controlled

memory data base in the hippocampus for a ‘context analysis’ of the

situation. This resulted in a subconscious level comparison analysis of the

biological risks involved in the various probable responses available in the

cortical attractor basins connected to the hippocampus. Consciously

isolating and activating the relevant cortical attractor controlling local

movements of facial musculature (e.g., buccinators muscles) was a more

conservative choice of response than the unconscious reflex release of a

damaging slap controlled by the amygdale, now inhibited from acting

while waiting for the result of the hippocampus context analysis. The

meme-controlled memories or conceptual analysis would oppose the slap

& neck displacement to ‘preserve’ biological integrity of the patient and a

more conservative cortical attractor alternative was instantiated. As we

have detailed in other publications notice how gene-controlled reflex

neural networks at unconscious level are transiently inhibited when

stimulated by potentially life threatening stimuli (See Le Doux avoidance

reflex) pending a context hippocampus evaluation at subconscious levels.

Based on meme-controlled hippocampus memories, the gene-controlled

amygdaloid memories are released from inhibition and a ‘fight or flight

Cannon response’ ensues to protect the species. If the contex analysis

reveals no such danger (e.g., a sudden poisonous snake rattle sound was

coming from a cage in a nearby zoo). In this case the context analysis

posed no biological threat to the actor and no cortical activation of an

attractor solution was necessary.

It is important to notice the obvious general similarities in the cortical

attractor adaptive response to perceptual / conceptual inputs when it

includes in addition other extra-biological, psycho-socially acquired

aspects of existential reality. This time the biological gene-coded

memories in the amygdaloid-limbic system neuronal networks are

synaptically integrated to their appropriate psychosocial, meme-coded

memories in the hippocampus network complex by variable strengths

Hebbian synapses. The genetic aspects of musculo-skeletal control by

motor-neuron probable responses can accept limited modifications /

updating (through physical training) of the future motor outcomes neuron

pool). These infrequent alterations are more primitive in the sense that,

while defaulted by biological preservation imperatives (e.g., visceral

neuro-humoral equilibrium), their modifications do not normally require

access to conceptual memory pools (logic / language processors) for

subconscious context analysis except as noted. Functional musculo-

skeletal updates by exercise training are unconsciously processed and

decay when not incorporated in a lasting memory data base. There is a

notable exception when a subconscious context analysis report, that would

have resulted in the eventual conscious activation of an appropriate

cortical attractor, is consciously rejected in favor of a conscious will to act

against self-interest, even contra-natura, as in the cases noted above. We

have seen how unconscious, gene-controlled biological preservation and

meme-controlled psychosocial equilibrium fundamentally differ in their

inputs and context analysis before the subconscious isolation and and

intentional actualization of their ‘future outcomes’ neural networks. Like in

computers, we have access denied to core Microsoft company-inherited

programming while being able to access, modify, isolate and execute

those we personally programmed and choose to execute at will. Notice

though that in both cases we CAN control by proximate causation, e.g.,

turning the PC off or changing programs! But notice also that, unlike the

computer case analogy, we still ignore the primitive neurophysiological

mechanisms underlying the unconscious isolation and conscious consent

to the appropriate motor reflex in a complex postural feat AND the

appropriate cortical attractor from a pool of probable alternatives. At the

reflex level of musculo-skeletal control the maintenance of bipedestation

and an erect posture when opposed by disrupting gravitational forces (as

in gymnastic movements) trumps any other body posture during exercise

in the normal person, except as noted above.

We can arguably compare the segmental and supra-segmental moto-

neuronal pools as the neuro-anatomical equivalent of the cortical attractor

networks and label them both as representing future outcomes available

to 'choose' from, at conscious or subconscious levels as illustrated. We can

even extend the analogy to suggest that the motoneuronal menu has

varying probabilities of selection depending on the immediately preceding

body posture just like the probability of selection, isolation and activation

from an attractor menu is predicated on appropriate antecedent

perceptual / conceptual input as discussed. What remains for both sub

models to explain is just how our mind zeroes on the appropriate physical

brain network to activate it into actuality? In our opinion this is clearly a

problem of unfathomable probabilistic causation where complex

ontological and epistemological issues control our explanations as we will

elaborate on below before settling on a modified Fodor’s ‘propositional

attitude’ model as discussed elsewhere. We proceed to lay the foundations

for that search. It seems appropriate to keep in mind that reality ‘in se’

dispenses of any epistemologically imposed constraints, whether

temporal, linear, symmetrical, or causal ‘corrections’, as we discussed in

two previous chapters about how our species inherited the ability to

incorporate an epistemological temporal clock to harmonize the primitive

atemporal, asymmetric, non-linear, perceptual / conceptual environmental

inputs with our language-controlled linear and sequential way of

processing such data. Fundamental physics does not need any such

‘corrections’ considerations either, as Russell and the modern

‘eliminativists’ have argued. So causation is a mind-created concept to

extract meaning from a seemingly indeterministic or chaotic reality. It is

useful in that it allows the human species to reductively analyze such

reality within the perceptual and conceptual limitation genetically

imposed. We aim at following a reductive, conceptual, analytical path

between the extremes of Russelian eliminativism and primitivism as long

as there is lacking scientific criteria to distinguish between a conscious

‘cause’ of a mental state or thought and the latter’s alleged intrinsic

condition of self-generating the state sans causation (emergence). We do

admit that conceptual modeling often requires the selection of that self-

serving and convenient condition to play the role of ‘cause’ regardless of

its truth value. In this respect, of considerable importance to

neuropsychiatrists, there exist verifiable fMRI data documenting the state

of limbic-based emotional euphoria. With the ancient Greeks, we believe

that achieving a maximal mental state of happiness compatible with

concurrent biological integrity, if possible, is the ultimate goal of

existence. Accordingly we speculate that for the cortical attractor to be

‘consciously chosen by consent’ from the various probable alternatives

available it must itself play the role of being itself causally efficient in

instantiating the happy mental state or vice versa, when a given mental

state, controlled by neuro-hormonal current states, acts to select, isolate

and instantiate the compatible cortical attractor, in a reciprocal dynamic

manner. Whatever the final answer may eventually be we must continue

to scrutinize neurodynamic causality. If we analogize the conscious choice

(free will consent) with the instrumental collapse of the wave function

during a quantum mechanical measurement we need to carefully examine

also the probabilistic causation variant.

Unfortunately, in our examination to follow we will have to introduce

less than universally accepted terminology and concepts in this leading

edge, ambitious philosophical analysis as a mere guide to travel the

choppy waters of brain causation. At first sight it may seem easy to

explain causality when simply describing a tennis racquet hitting the ball

towards the net as a simple event category involving two entities whose

roles are clearly to cause and to respond, respectively (C causes the effect

E). But there is more in the causal relata than a willing agent and a visible

result when explaining the neurodynamics of probability causation (e.g.,

perceptual C rather than conceptual C* input causes mental state E rather

than motor behavioral effect E*). Probability causation should include,

besides the perceptual or conceptual input, a categorical characterization

of the consequent object, event or mental state that results, singularly or

together, and their respective roles when they become a behavioral or

mental state reality. To complicate matters further, the category may

refer to either spatiotemporal immanent results being instantiated (e.g.,

ongoing, online act of painting) as opposed to transcendental result (e.g.,

the abstract, non spatio-temporal, off line, cognitive fact that such

painting exists in my memory). A subsidiary aspect of the category is its

granularity, whether the result is individuated (countable, coarse

granularity) or generalized (invisible structure of Bohr’s atom of fine

granularity). This is important in establishing the nature (linear, cyclical,

transitive, etc.) of the causal relationship, if any. A related aspect in the

granularity analysis of the chosen cortical attractor result / effect is the

reliability or truth value assignation. The result may be connotational

(e.g., a contingent proposition, suggested or implied meanings /

attributions) or denotational (e.g., predicate concept, exact literal

meaning). What this means is that if the agent chooses a general abstract

solution of fine granularity as his result, the causal relationship is termed

intensional or connotational (e.g., an explanation) but if the choice is

more specific, of coarse granularity, then the relationship is termed

extensional (e.g., a description) or denotational. Since neurodynamics

implies a conscious choice-by consent to existing alternatives in cortical

attractors based on their probability of implementation we can say that

during the flow of subconsciousness, before the conscious choice by

consent, the causal relation result is intensional / connotational and as

soon as an isolation and a conscious choice is made the result / solution

may be anything depending on the level of organization being considered.

I may be thinking of choosing a specific missile weapon of coarse

granularity, descriptive and denotational OR choosing the best equation of

motion describing its trajectory in general terms, of fine granularity,

explanatory and connotational, as the causal relationship may be. Thus,

when a presidential candidate S consciously chooses the alternative

(among several probable outcomes available) of an unconditional pull out

of military personal from Iraq predicated on his ‘belief’ that P the local

government ‘may’ control terrorist activity [an example of Fodor’s

“propositional attitude” (S believes that P)], the causal relation result is

intensional and connotative as opposed to the other candidate S’ choosing

to keep troops there for 2 more years (predicated on his factual

‘knowledge’ that the Alliance commitment to immediate deployment of

10,000 troops ‘is’ viable), is an example of a different propositional

attitude (S’ knows that P) where the causal relation is extensional and

denotational. S explains, S’ describes the probable future outcome. Notice

that the granularity of the attractor’s perceptual/conceptual content itself

controls the causal relation between the agent (presidential candidate)

and his conscious choice of a solution from the available probable future

outcomes. To the best of our knowledge none of the available monitors of

brain activity, including fMRI, can experimentally distinguish between

connotational and denotational attractor content (and indirectly describe /

explain the causal relation), a psychology experiment is sorely needed.

Needless to say that either intensional or extensional, connotational or

denotational a choice may constitute a case of perceptual / conceptual

underdetermination or overextension. In the search for meanings to be

extracted from an instrumental measurement of an environmental object /

event (ontological object), the observation may be forced to loosely fit

into a mathematical formulation (epistemological abstraction) that may

either underdetermine or overextend the fine-grained granular

representation of reality ‘in se’. Existential reality is consequently an

operational epistemontological hybrid in an undeterministic but

probabilistic world. In another writing we may express our views on the

extreme cases where an abstract, conceptual representation of invisible

‘reality’, i.e., string/’brane’ theory, has aspiration on being accepted as an

unique case of ontological reality!

There is a related complication where the fineness of the granularity

may never be ascertained because of the lability of interacting cortical

attractors in the basin whose individualized neuronal network composition

may vary in perceptual and / or conceptual content, making it almost

impossible to instrumentally determine the sequence or transitivity of

synaptic events in the causal chain. Considering the speed with which

these events happen, may as well ignore the transitivity in intermediate

causality, linear or recursive. Better to bite the bullet and settle for coarse

spatiotemporal ontological individuation when representing events.

As promised above we now proceed to briefly examine some relevant

points on the probabilistic causation variant as it pertains to brain

neurodynamics. It is possible that the quantum neurodynamics control of

indeterministic causation may sound counterintuitive because causality is

usually associated with determinism (even in the natural sciences). As we

said above, this is a special case of indeterminism because it carries the

implied presumption that a conscious choice can cause the preceding

indeterministic process to become determined by the isolation and

execution of a specified event based on its probability of being selected

among other existing alternatives. As we elaborated in another chapter,

when an object, event or mental state, acting as a perceptual or

conceptual input, raises the probability of their effects as expressed in the

subconscious isolation and conscious consent to the selection of an

appropriate cortical attractor among various other future outcome

alternatives (the equivalent of an instrumental measurement causing the

collapse of a wave-function in quantum theory), then we can formally

represent the situation in a ‘conditional probability’ format. If we suspect

that various perceptual or conceptual ‘factors’ stand for potential causal

agents (causal relata) we can formulate their potential status as causal

agents on a probability basis as: P(B | A) meaning that the conditional

probability of cortical attractor B being empirically isolated and

instantiated (based on observed behavior) given the particular perceptual

/ conceptual input A acting as causal agent. Formally expressed as a

probability function we get the probability ratio: P(B | A) = P(A & B)/P(A).

This approach, as we have detailed elsewhere, has the advantage that it

does not have any dependence on temporal, causal or symmetry

constraints, in harmony with reality ‘in se’. Ideally the indeterministic

probability characterizing brain function cannot be conditioned on a

tautology relation without denying its dynamic nature. However,

probabilistic causation theorists have incorporated the counterfactual

notation and techniques to remove spurious or otherwise irrelevant causal

influences in an attempt to reach the tautology ideal in the analysis. See

Markoff Condition. A formal elaboration is beyond the scope of this brief

analysis.

Probabilistic approaches have their own built-in limitations as is the

case for ‘pre-emption’. Imagine two neuronal pathways with different

synaptic weights where A, the least probable to cause an effect (slower

conduction) initiates the action that randomly activates a component of

the faster second neuronal pool B that causes an effector response pre-

empting A from arriving at the target. Which should we attribute as

having raised the probability of a target response? Which of the

intermediate neurons in the train of causation was randomly activated?

This problem is particularly relevant due to the very nature of attractor

networks, their lability of connections is such that an invariable pattern of

succession / progression along intermediate synaptic components cannot

be guaranteed unless indicated by appropriate brain monitors, e.g., fMRI,

as they happen, barring the occurrence of causally irrelevant pseudo

connectivities that are concurrently activated. A related complication

arises when a perceptual / conceptual causal input may not be followed by

its expected probable effect, e.g., spurious (random or with regularity)

inhibition. Causation is usually associated with asymmetry, i.e., cause C--

> effect E is not reversible. As mentioned before, we have postulated two

instances of possible reversible causation: retrocausation where recursive

cycling in neuronal pathways brings about update modifications originating

in cortical attractors into a subject’s thinking instead of the other way

around. A second interesting reciprocal symmetric causation is illustrated

when a neuro-hormonal based euphoric emotional mental state may cause

an induction bias in favor of a particular cortical attractor as an adaptive

solution to a contingency being experienced and viceversa when a

consideration of that particular future outcome produces happiness. An

important element of our modified cortical attractor model is predicated

on the reciprocal causation between the continuous perceptual /

conceptual updating inputs into the attractor basin and the associated

affective mental state it generates.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

In this occasion we have revisited for the third consecutive time the

complex issue of indeterministic causation within the context of brain

neurodynamics, from the configuration of attractor basins in the human

cortex from sense-phenomenal, perceptual and memory based

conceptual, never ending updating inputs (that bring about fleeting

moments of consciousness flow evidencing our stock of probable future

solutions) to possible environmental contingencies as they may arise. We

dedicated the most space to revise the relevant aspects of the

metaphysics of causation to provide the guidelines for a systematic

approach in its analysis when we opt to consciously isolate and choose,

from many probable alternatives, the attractor best suited for a contingent

solution to environmental challenges. After such systematic perusal of

issues to be encountered and its possible formulation for analytic

reductions we come to the troubling realization that, because

indeterministic causation in brain neurodynamics requires examining the

intermediate labyrinthic neuronal network pathways between the

conscious causal agent and the resulting effect in the isolation and

instantiation of the chosen attractor, we tend to single out self serving

conditions that best suit our biases without the benefit of a determination

of their respective truth values or an experimental confirmation using the

appropriate brain instrumental monitoring or observed behavior. Another

disappointing conclusion pertains to the coarse granulation understanding

of brain function probabilistic causality imposed by our analytical tools,

instrumentally and conceptually unable to identify

extensional/denotational singular causality, leaving us instead with the

uncertainties of general or intensional/connotational causation. The future

of brain neurodynamic causation is predicated on the success of the causal

relata being formulated in propositional format for ease of computer

simulations. We are not aware of any serious work beyond Fodor’s

‘Propositional Attitude’ model formulated around his ‘Language of Thought’

hypothesis. This would allow us to examine our tentative speculation on

the reciprocal symmetric causation between neuro-humoral instantiated

emotional states and the cortical attractor about to be chosen, among

other things.

In Deltona, Florida Summer 2008

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

End of Ch. 12

Ch. 13

DYNAMIC SYNTHESIS OF LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. AN

EPISTEMONTOLOGICAL VIEW.

ABSTRACT.

Understanding what a mental state of ‘consciousness’ entails much

more than the unconscious ‘binding’ together or the functional integration

of the perceptual properties or attributes of an object, e.g., the shape,

color, texture, tactile contours, size, etc. of a statuette because these

varied sensory properties are inevitably experienced coalesced as an unit

whole concurrently integrated with the subconscious association of the

object with a contextual ongoing event or memory thereof (genetic or

memetic), e.g., the statuette being a loved one’s gift on your birthday to

match the smooth marble table it sits on. This way the perceptual and

conceptual constitutive elements fuse into a single conscious state by way

of its attentional underpinnings. (See Dr. Francis Crick, “The Astonishing

Hypothesis.”) It is not enough to have the visual occipital cortex

unconsciously integrate the perceptual signals arriving from the retina

(and other sensory input) and thereby assign properties and attributes

which then coalesce into the beautifully smooth, coral colored version of

Michelangelos Pietas, this would be the equivalent of having a language

sentence with just a subject, ‘statuette’ without qualifications as to

number, spatiotemporal location/position, history, etc. We need to

subconsciously find a context within which the object becomes historically

and sociologically meaningful to our existence; this analysis is

subconscious and depends on hippocampus memetic data base. When the

perception posits a potential life threat to the species, as determined first

by an amygdaloid protosemantic genetic data base and confirmed

thereafter by the hippocampus context analysis, there will follow an

adaptive Cannon response. This consists of an unconscious triggering of

the appropriate musculo-skeletal responses to reflexly fight or flee. At

times there may be a subconscious activation of the language machinery

to articulate the relevant contextual premises and co-generate thought in

an evolving ‘inner language’ appropriate to the co-existing emotional

quale. As thought and consciousness co-evolve with language processing

we are now in a position to subconsciously isolate and then consciously

choose by consent among probable future alternatives and activate a

cortical attractor as the exclusive response to the original set of

perceptual and conceptual input mix.

Before we attempt to apply these interpretations to the explanation of

the ‘flow of subconsciousness’ preceding the free-will choice (charged with

the activation of an adaptive cortical attractor solution), we need to sort

out the variety of probable mental states, how they link together inside

the attractor basin when defining a resting mental state (as a function of

neuro-humoral based attentional status), how their links become labile

when being updated, how they exibit reciprocal causality between the

perceptual and/or conceptual input and how they are singled out for

isolation and instantiation. At least we hope to provide the guidelines and

danger signals for those traveling this unchartered route.

INTRODUCTION.

Unlike what happens during the dream state of unconsciousness, the

normal vigil state of subconscious awareness is followed normally by an

attention span triggered by a sudden change in either the ongoing

perceptual scenery or memory input. It seems like we need these

changes, however small, to maintain us in a state of self-consciousness,

otherwise we shift into a subconscious stage of mere awareness when we

are no different from any complex monitoring robotic device; this is the

way we spend a substantial part of the quotidian vigil state and then may

lapse into an unconscious dream state if no novel stimulus is present.

Otherwise we are in and out of subconscious awareness as determined by

the recursive cycling of stimulation from the mesencephalic reticular

activating system (RAS) and/or diencephalic pineal gland. This fleeting

state we term the ‘flow of subconsciousness’ depending on which ongoing

attractor(s) content(s) is(are) then controlling the mental state. One may,

e.g., be walking along the fair grounds as we view a table counter

decorated with colorful flowers and a substantial number of gadgets

generating audio signals, all distracting me from feeling the pain coming

from some uncomfortable cobblestones under the shoes. Each particular

stimulus (color, shape, sound, motion, plantar pressure, etc.) provides its

own attentional alert on the corresponding cortical sensory area yet we

experience an indelible fusion of all stimuli present as an unit phenomenal

event because of our brain’s inability to individualize / separate the

component parts for individualized experiencing, the equivalent of a flicker

fusion frequency while watching a movies where the individual takes from

the camera are fused as one unit, a single unconscious state. Nonetheless

each audio, visual or tactile input is being subjected to a continuous

subconscious ‘context’ analysis where, barring a significant biological

threat, a silent ‘inner languge’ provides the inferred meaning before an

adaptive correction is instantiated. Either one of the individual stimuli

may assume dominance/priority based on the associated neurochemical

millieu generated to activate the appropriate RAS network. Imagine the

cobblestones under her shoes threatened the biological integrity of her

plantar surface. Once the attentional input is focused into the pressure

receptors on the plantar surface and their corresponding relay input into

the cortical attractor(s) or parts thereof, these are singled out into

subconscious prominence for us to continue the bracketing process until

one is promoted into subconscious isolation and conscious instantiation

based on its higher probability of adaptive success, all things BPS

considered. She had a few alternatives to choose from, e.g., could have

returned back home and wear stronger boots, etc., but it was easier to

take another route with a smoother pavement. In what follows we will

examine some of the arguments in support of a single unit of

consciousness where particular experiences are subsumed in a more

complex unitary experience of conjoint phenomenology as opposed to a

mosaic or composite of related parts as we find during those fleeting

moments when we examine the probabilities available during the flow of

subconsciousness. Since we are at the center of this decision process, it

makes sense, with Descartes, to distinguish the consciousness of self from

the subconscious flow of the alternatives to be consciously chosen by

consent from or from the choice being subconsciously isolated. To the

extent that inherited, unconscious biological imperatives of self-

preservation default our choices in the decision process, visceral-brain-

controlled neurohumors influence our emotions and social conviviality

influences our psychic life, perhaps a holistic Gestalt conception of a

conscious bio-psycho-social (BPS) unit is more appropriate when argued

as derived from the totality of all relevant things considered as previously

defended by Carnap.

ARGUMENTATION

Consciousness about objects, events or memories thereof without a

conscious agent minding their content is counterintuitive. Consequently,

the agent has the dual Cartesian role of being simultaneously the

conjoined unit actor and unit observer capable of making judgments about

a unit self within the context of the outcome alternatives being evaluated

or isolated. The unity of the self is preserved whether experiencing a

mosaic of alternatives in the flow of subconsciousness or an individualized

alternative when choosing amongst them. This must be the case because

the agent should be able to consider his own BPS preservation as may be

affected when evaluating qualitative, quantitative, relational and especially

the probability/modal categories of the perceptual and conceptual

information content, what Kant termed the cognitive ‘structure of

knowledge’ (we have added the perceptual element). We emphasize again

that objects, events or memories may as well have no essence or

existence unless there is an agent existentially impacted by their

conscious presence. The meaning of this dual relationship to the agent has

to be syllogistically extracted / inferred by accessing the language

processor during the recursive cycling co-generating language and

thought at the moment of decision *making by proximate causation. This

bears a slight resemblance to James arguments about the synchronicity

aspects in achieving unit consciousness.

Similarly, we find it simpler to view the conscious unit exclusively as

that experience / feeling of what it is like for the agent to reciprocally

interact dynamically with all the constitutive components now subsumed

into a holistic unit view, at least when in the process of isolating by choice

the attractor best adapted to solve the problem at hand. As long as there

may be an unfamiliar perceptual or conceptual change present a general

idle flow of conscious events of coarse granularity may ensue where the

conscious unit may be grossly differentiated as to its subject, object,

connectivities and other forms until bracketing and selection of the

appropriate subunits progresses and a best match with the originating

perceptual and/or conceptual stimulus is achieved resulting in the all

important unit of phenomenal consciousness being consciously isolated.

When dealing with intractable complexities it is pointless to integrate

concepts from the bottoms --> up unless a lucky strike matches the

conceptually inferred abstraction result with the self-evident experiential

quale. It makes more sense to us to conceptually differentiate the self

evident truth of the conscious experience into parts and proceed from the

top --> down trying to reframe the resulting jigsaw puzzle into the best

fitting, abstract modeling straight jackets available. When you choose to

start integrating from shaky abstract singularities up, the results of a

collapse are more catastrophic than differentially building up the pyramid

up from a shaky broad base instead. It makes more sense to consider the

‘flow of consciousness’, a coarse-grained but unified conscious experience,

as a composite of other relevant probable future outcomes (attractors). As

the selection process evolves by bracketing, the resulting unified

conscious experience will be unitary and exclusive, not a composite or

mosaic. However, to the extent that the actor and observer remain

distinct entities the experiences are co-conscious because the unified

consciousness of self (observer) evolves when experiencing a composite

‘flow of subconsciousness’ leading to the exclusive isolation / selection of

the individualized attractor, , i.e., they are components of a single state of

consciousness of variable and diminishing granularity as we approach the

isolation and actualization stage. The careful reader will note that this is

akin to the Kantian division of experience that distinguishes the observer

and the observed. The latter, as described, has three levels, one dealing

with the properties and attributions of individual objects that when unified

gives them the spatiotemporal position, color, shape, etc. where the

‘binding problem’ applies. The second level is relational as it describes the

causal relationship between such relevant objects along with their

biological, psychic and social implications for the agent, what we call the

unitary event. When we finally join them together seamlessly we get the

‘attractor’ structure that is singled out for selection and instantiation.

Finally, the third level dynamically links more than one attractor and their

constitutive BPS encasing giving rise to a ‘flow of subconsciousness’ of

varying event content and complexity. We must emphasize once again

that consciousness of self as an observer agent is always required in all

conscious acts as just described, because objects, events or memories

only exist to the extent these acquire an inferred vital meaning in relation

to the agent / subject BPS equilibrium, thus the requisite for a language

processor to represent the symbolic or sentential premises of a logical

analysis as an accompanying thought is co-generated. Consequently we

need not posit the existence of yet another level of consciousness unless it

entails a significant existential BPS meaning for our survival as a species,

e.g., the audio-visual, tactile or kinesthesic, etc. inputs (intensity,

duration, frequency of stimulation) may only trigger a ‘subconscious

awareness’ of their presence iff their stimulation reaches threshold values

depending on their degree of fine structural granularity. Below this

threshold sub-ontological level, as e.g., quantum ‘structure’, we need

accessing the language processor to elaborate the conceptual /

epistemological explanation of their questionable perceptual / ontological

existence at the conscious epistemontological hybrid level of structural

and / or functional level of organization, e.g., the valuable Bohr atomic

orbitals of physical chemistry.

In other words, objects come into phenomenal existence (not essence)

at unconscious levels through a synthesis of their properties and attributes

(e.g., that pink, smooth statuesque), then at subconscious level of

awareness (not consciousness) when causal relationships are established

between relevant contiguous objects and the agent during a contextual

analysis. When this results in a threshold level of change that is significant

to the agent we must extract the BPS meaning of the event being

generated by accessing the language processing networks that co-

generates unitary consciousness, whereupon an appropriate adaptive

response must be called upon, first by activating a flow of

subconsciousness from the relevant cortical attractor basins. All things

BPS considered we proceed to elaborate the most appropriate course of

action by choosing by consent from among the available probable

outcomes the one best adapted. Another example will help clarify.

Imagine a mountaineer in his daily descent along the dangerous curvy,

but familiar, steep mountain. The first level of analysis (shape, color,

motion, size, texture, etc. of familiar environmental objects) and the

second level (the familiar causal interactivities of the different objects

withing sight and hearing in his path down the curvy road) operate at the

unconscious and subconscious level of analysis respectively as

demonstrated by his driving while transmitting by cell phone a puzzle

being discussed in his car radio (‘he’s on automatic pilot control’). If e.g.,

all of a sudden there is a potentially significant change ahead of him that

looks and sounds like earth movements as he approaches a bridge. This

event draws genetic data from amygdala, memetic data from

hippocampus for contextual analisis at the unconscious and subconscious

levels requiring now a third level of analysis for the evaluation of safety

alternatives available depending on the road conditions for the speed,

weight and value of the car, the height of fall from the bridge, etc. He is

drawing now from a restricted number of cortical attractors in the fast

flow of a subconscious effort to review the best probable adaptive safety

solution from those available, push hard on the brakes and slam-stop the

expensive car against the side of mountain, gently apply the brakes

without sliding before approaching the bridge, jumping out of the car, etc.

all of which alternatives are controlled by biopsychosocial hierarchical

imperatives continuosly asking what we want, believe, desire, attitudes,

resources available, memories of similar situations or whatever elements

that can be brought to bear and integrate into a coherent unit of conscious

cognition prior to instantiate the proper unit of behavior including motor

commands to effector organs to coordinate the appropriate musculo-

skeletal posture, psychic and emotional background to cope with biological

self preservation and financial loss of his car, among others. Fortunately

the constitutive links in this complex chain of adaptive behavior are

already present in the form of cortical attractor probable future outcomes

as argued elsewhere. They just need ongoing update and modifications

before consciously willing one of them into actuality. Contrary to some

authoritative opinions (Brook 2001), context analysis, whether at

unconscious, subconscious or conscious level, must always be considered

indexical, self-referential because when a meaning is extracted out of a

perceptual or conceptual source of input meaaningful to the agent, not to

the species, family, ethnic or cultural group he belongs to, we mean the

individualized agent who is he and his existential circumstances in his

ecosystem niche, an unit of focal attention encompassing the agent-

observer and his autobiographical memory baggage, the dynamic one and

same person extending diachronically across time carrying along

experiences, emotions, feelings, etc.

We mean indexicality in all aspects of its inner language expressions,

pronouns, demonstratives, temporality and locality. There is no such thing

as a fixed cortical attractor architecture even at the species-stereotyped

and unconscious genetic reflex level component. But the conscious level

has a sense-phenomenal perceptual and a conceptual (language-based

component) where neuro-hormonal levels may have influenced and biased

a contextual analysis. As we always stress, in the normal person the

preservation of biological integrity genetically defaults the analysis while

the preservation of psychosocial equilibrium memetically biases any

consideration. Conscious free-will consent may, in abnormal, ‘contra

natura’ cases, trump any of the previous conservative settings. We are not

ready to dismiss the idea that the intentionality derived from all BPS

things being considered in a conceptual / contextual analysis is causally

efficient in the generation of the free will focal choice of a given attractor

among others. This would require a reciprocal causation where

biopsychosocial considerations and their neurohumoral accompaniments

influence the ongoing semantic analysis and the propositions thereby

generated providing a feedback into the neurohumoral machinery to

create a dynamic equilibrium between the propositions and the attitudes.

This is not an easy task and deserves further examination before singing a

requiem to the ‘propositional attitude’ model of Fodor. To us mental

states, whether of coarse granularity, as in a flow of subconsciousness or

otherwise, become conscious because of their being the result of a

preceding subconscious state accessing the language processor to

generate the higher order thoughts, both being co-generated in the

process. It is not preposterous to suggest that at least both stages are

reciprocally causal on each other. It has been very difficult to convince our

colleagues about the correlations between language and consciousness

but a deeper reflection on a fairly well documented laboratory experience

with split brain patients (See Trevarthen) may help. An object presented

to the left language hemisphere (right visual field) elicits conscious verbal

report of its presence except when the attention is shifted to the right

non language hemisphere (patient reaching for object with left hand) at

which time the co-generation of language report and consciousness of

object is lost! We have not been able to document a 1984 allegation by

the experimenter that repositioning the object to the left visual field (right

hemispheric presentation) brings back the conscious verbal report of its

presence. The experimenter, in our opinion, should have modified the

experiment protocol and allowed for extinction of the prior memory

(diachronic memory) so as to distinguish between an extended memory of

the object as opposed to new perception of the object. Another aspect of

same idea is that the contextual analysis that followed the original object

presentation to the left ‘talking brain’ hemisphere is retained in cortical

attractor memory and triggered into actuality by the subsequent

presentation of any cue suggesting / inferring its phenomenal presence;

all of which suggest to us that either we see what’s in our brain (not in

front of us) or we are witnessing a trans-callosal transfer of information by

quantum fields?

If unit consciousness depends on the brain’s structural and / or

functional integrity of its neuronal networks connectivities (isomorphism)

at the three different levels of integration, i.e., top --> down: a)between

cortical attractors in a basin, b)between the causally-related perceptual

objects and their attending conceptual and emotional components in an

isolated cortical attractor or c)between the variously amalgamated

properties or attributions of the individual objects, then it shouldn’t

surprise anyone that if their links are altered functionally by surgery,

disease, updates or otherwise, the results will reflect the change in

composition of the new resulting unit. Likewise if we select to directly

excite selected parts of the unit by electrical stimulation (see Penfield’s

cortical stimulations), or exclude parts of the units from participation by

callosal section (commisurotomy) followed by stimulation of a single

hemisphere or some other surgical or pathological ablation or isolation,

the unity is not breached but the resulting derangements in accessing

data bases during behavioral control, belief formation or some other

function, will reflect the altered composition of the new unit of focal

attention or behavioral consciousness and consequently the self

consciousness of the bearer of the conscious states. During the normal

mental health state, among all relevant cortical attractors in a basin, only

those of higher probability based on their logical and semantic coherence

will be isolated from competing cortical attractors. We are looking forward

to the day when the different brain disorders (Dissociative Identity

Disorder, schizophrenia, split brain, hallucinations, anosognosias,

blindsight, etc.) and their neuropsychological cognitive and affective

behavioral concommittants will be analyzed in accord to this simpler view

as it will continue to develop.

The alert reader may have noticed that we have defended in this and

previous writings the synthesis of two seemingly incompatible views of

brain neurodynamics, one stressing the visible ontological aspects deeply

rooted on falsifiable brain monitoring results (EEG, MEG, PET Scans and

fMRI) plus behavioral / psychological data, and the other view based on

the invisible epistemologically-inspired, explanatory deductions from

metaphysical logic. Our pedagogical pendulum swings from where

language plays the fundamental role in processing the symbolically

encoded representations of existential reality in co-generating

consciousness / thought, to the vector representation of phase spaces

(Hilbert space). The former stresses brain software, the latter brain

hardware (wetware). One stresses a shifting attention from one coalition

of neurons to another one competing for dominance, an isomorphic view

(see Hurley)…. but ultimately the winner is the human agent, a

deterministic view. The other view does not substitute these explanations

but adds another dimension that brings into focus the indeterministic

nature of existential reality and the conscious role a free agent plays in

determining what’s in stock as probable future outcomes before freely

choosing according to his unique biopsychosocial reality. The big hurdle to

us has been… and remains to be is how language processing may bridge

the gap between the ontological descriptions and the epistemological

explanations attending brain neurodynamics in the generation of

consciousness / thought. To us it matters not whether the symbolic or

sentential software generated in processing perceptual / conceptual input

trumps or not the brain’s alleged (or implied) isomorphic multidimensional

phase space hardware as underlying the transformations of complex

vectors in Hilbert space, both views arguably are necessary (sufficient?)

factors in determining a conscious state. As long as we humans remain

the centerpiece about which crucial perceptual and conceptual information

is denied because of species sensory and brain combinatorial limitations

we must depend on a language processor to make the appropriate logic

symbolic or sentential representations necessary for us to formulate the

premises and conclusions to syllogistically extract their meaning and

survive as a biological, psychic and social unit….. unless our detractors

have a better explanation. Reality is an epistemontological hybrid.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I can see where there will always be problems with language

communications of complex issues unless people agree on the same

meanings. For us anything within the threshold resolution of our senses or

measuring instruments is perceptual and we experience and describe their

physical ‘essence’ presence as an ontological 'phenomena'. If the entity

(object?) is beyond sense-phenomenal or instrumental resolution and

description, we must instead explain their possible existence (presence?)

inferentially by way of conceptualizing tools, either symbolic or sentential

logic. Thus we can experience phenomenal (color, shape, size, etc.) or

conceptual (affective anger, sadness, euphoria, etc.) feelings (qualia) or

combinations thereof. We consider affective qualia as conceptual in nature

because affective qualia are not neutral to the extent that a conscious

agent experiences them in relation to the 'meanings' of objects, events or

memories in our biopsychosocial lives and thus requires contextual

analysis by the same conceptual tools. Notice that, counter intuitive as it

may initially sound, the contextual analysis of sense phenomenal and / or

memory inputs may proceed at subconscious or conscious levels

depending on the need to access a language processor to extract

contextual meanings from ongoing environmental changes been witnessed

/ monitored, being aware of. If the changes are familiar and uneventful,

the subconscious awareness is not being recorded into memory, is not

attended to or reportable because usually some other activity has

captured our attention and language processing capacities or neutralized

our RAS input into consciousness as when we fall asleep when we are not

experiencing a significant BPS 'change'. When before the presence of

familiar, uneventful events our attention wanders away and we talk of

being 'aware' as opposed of being 'conscious' of their presence.A complex

robotic monitor of environmental changes is 'aware' as we are when

subconsciously processing familiar input devoid of notoriety or significant

changes in our BPS equilibrium. If a change becomes existentially

significant and requires inferential language processing to extract its

meaning to us then the agent being affected becomes part of the mix and

we are then at the conscious level proper, as argued. I realize that such

views, as expressed, assume premises that may not be accepted by all

and we invite a pointed discussion of any such presuppositions as outlined

in the argumentation.

Like it happens in all complex legal situations we have had to posit

tentative conclusions based on circumstantial evidence (read intuitions or

inferential logic) about the genesis of thought / consciousness, an

extension and update about a previous writing. Maybe there are invidual

variations in the mechanics of thought generation but we have to

pedagogically assume that it is constant for the human species. We make

distinctions between levels of ‘consciousness’, first and foremost we

distinguish consciousness of self as an actor (as when we focus on our

own autobiography in search of information relevant to an important

contingent event) from consciousness of self as an observer. We are not

prepared now to assign any structure to the observer other than to use it

as a pedagogical convenience. This is to be distinguished from

consciousness of the sense-phenomenal properties and attributes of

individual objects (color, shape, size, etc.) as unconsciously synthesized

and then subconsciously catalogued/categorized as a phenomenal

perceptual unit when esthetically judged (beautiful, old, heavy, etc.) in

relation to similar objects or memory memes and now able to be retrieved

into consciousness. This transit from ‘a’ category statuette to ‘this’

indexical statuette is to be noted to distinguish between ‘a’

transcendental, irretrievable abstract object and ‘this’ immanent real

object of my perception (or memory) when situated in causally relevant

relational aspects with other objects, the agent and his associated

perceptual / conceptual qualia controlling the ongoing perceptual scenery

OR as a conscious memory recall now existing as a modified/updated past

event inside an individual attractor in a cortical basin to be, in another

stage, be subjected to further scrutiny as to its probability of being an

adaptive solution to an important environmental change before being

isolated and instantiated. Meanwhile it is being continuously updated and

modified by ongoing perceptual and conceptual inputs while dynamically

linked to other attractors in the cortical basin. The neurodynamics of

linked cortical attractor units can be summoned to a coarse granularity

level of consciousness, flow of consciousness, for scrutiny and selection in

response to a significant environmental change.

In the argumentation that has preceded we have examined how best

to explain our human experience of unit consciousness notwithstanding

the presence of so many participating sub-units.

In Deltona, Florida this late summer 2008

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

End of Chapter 13

Ch. 14

BETWEEN RANDOM IMPOSSIBILITY AND ILLUSORY PHYSICAL

CERTAINTY, THE SURVIVAL OF FREE WILL.

“One can predict that the double reflecting surface of the mirror

neuron will be the new area of neurophilosophy research as we

march slowly but unrelentingly along the reductionist asymptotic

plank knowing that we have choices because free-will survives.”

(Ascending and Descending)

From Chaos to Probable Outcome.

INTRODUCTION.

I could have entitled this chapter in a number of ways: ”Between an

indeterministic and a deterministic reality.”, “Between epistemology and

ontology, a hybrid model of reality.”, “Reality as a complex probabilistic

chaos.” or “The physicalist religion’s horse blinders, their faith on

reductionism.” The common thread between these alternate titles is the

falsifiable premise that the human species has limited brain capacities for

sensory resolution and combinatorial processing. If we accept those

premises then the easier solution seems to be to just increase / extend

the resolving power of the senses with the appropriate instruments and /

or extend the human computational capacities with supercomputers. We

have no doubt this has been largely responsible for the demise of the

Skinnerian ‘behavioristic’ pessimism about the reality of a mind that

pervaded the pre-Chomskian era. We have taken long strides in improving

the quality and resolution of both instruments and computers.

Yet we remain ever so far from ascertaining the ontology of

consciousness, the limits of cosmos or the characterization of the Kantian

‘reality in se’, if any one exists. Why do we keep trying? I suppose

humans will always hunger for answers as to his origins and destiny. What

alternatives remain, barring an unforeseen species mutation sometimes

soon?

Let it be clear that, our species limited resolution capacities

notwithstanding, all of us involved in modeling reality should be

intellectually committed to a reductionist view of reality as an asymptotic

goal by stretching to the limits the resolving powers of our ontological

descriptions and epistemological explanations. Man remains the measure

of all things, those that are and those that are not. Thus, both aspects of

existence are relevant and should be integrated into a functional hybrid,

what we have termed an ‘epistemontological’ view of existential reality. All

of which reminds me of Chris Langan’s efforts in synthesizing matter and

information in his CTMU.

Let us briefly review what neuroscientists and mind philosophers have

accomplished in these respects and speculate on why a quantum

theoretical probabilistic approach may be the best compromise in

explaining ‘consciousness’ where conscious free decision-making or “free

will” consent survives the perfectly deterministic, physicalist world faith /

dream of reductionism.

ARGUMENTATION.

First things first. For the sake of an efficient and productive timed

communication, I will use the term ontology when exclusively referring to

sense-phenomenal / instrumental ‘descriptions’ of observable /

measurable beings in empirical reality leaving any ‘explanations’ of

structure or function of an object or event beyond our species sensory

phenomenal resolution to be inferred epistemologically with the aid of

symbolic or sentential logic tools. Thus, terms like ‘correlation’ between

mind ‘m’ & brain ‘b’ describes their relation when there is empirical

evidence to back up the claim and ideally there is logical supervenience

between them. But in most cases we have to rely on a ‘natural

supervenience’, as when e.g., there is a consistent reproducible

correlation between an increased glucose and oxygen consumption

(increased blood circulation) and an activated brain area. We need not to

worry about intermediate causal factors intervening as long as they

remain stable and invisible to detection. If we claim instead a causal

relation between ‘m’ & ‘b’ we are expected to theoretically explain the

correlation. E.g., if we posit that the conscious mind free will consent can

cause the actualization of a previously selected (subconsciously) and

activated cortical attractor, the claim must be backed-up by relevant,

falsifiable empirical correlations (EEG, MEG pattern description, brain

potentials, etc.) and ideally explained by one or more fundamental types

of causal interactions between ‘m’ & ‘b’ (weak, strong, gravitational or EM

forces).

If all attempts at precision fail, we can always ascribe and explain

*‘consciousness’ as having a Russellian type of primordial existence or

as ‘emerging’ from a special brain material complexity, both of which are

metaphysical constructions to embellish our ignorance about matters

immaterial! So, one often wonders about conceptual ego-trips into the

invisible when others with their feet on solid grounds are trying to

resuscitate and bring *behaviorism through the back door with the Don

Quijote’s Sancho Panza reality test, e.g., the psychophysical archetypal

*order approach of Chalmers, Jung, Bohm, Primas, etc. Our own

biopsychosocial model (BPS) implicitely, albeit reluctantly, gives in into it…

for now at least.

I will also assign jurisdictional frames to specify the particular mental

state being referred to, thus I will use the term unconscious to refer to

that mental state where the agent is totally unaware of those inherited

reflex neuronal networks programs charged with the preservation of

biological integrity for the species and whose conscious access is denied

during normal functioning, like the access to ‘machine language’ programs

running a computer registry or BIOS. The term subconscious I will

reserve to the mental state of conditioned awareness, to those network

processes containing both inherited (genetic) and acquired (memetic)

components that, when necessary, can subconsciously access higher

mental faculties to extract conscious meanings from the changes

monitored / detected in the ongoing (online) contingencies, e.g., by

accessing the mirror neuron complex or the language faculty.

In this last respect we have argued that at that time the adopted

language processing and accompanying thought (or conscious activities)

are recursively co-generated (see below). We admit that these distinctions

are a controversial premise because we do not always realize that, unless

there is a significant change in the ongoing, familiar scenery (external or

body-internal), the customary ongoings and familiar perceptual /

conceptual inputs are not reportable nor generate ‘inner language’. This is

a kind of neurophysiological ‘habituation’ like the one experienced when

using a cell phone while moving down hill along a familiar but dangerous,

uneventful road where the focus of attention is in the phone conversation

and the driving is set to ‘pilot control’ subconscious mode. Likewise, we

may have someone playing music in front of me while I focus my

conscious attention on a conversation with another person without being

oblivious to the music or the source, as opposed to what would happen to

my attention threshold if the musician is now pointing a cocked gun at me

instead! It should be mentioned that there is new evidence (continuous

flash suppression) that we still register (and respond behaviorally) to

perceptual stimuli we are not paying conscious attention to while focused

on some other activity.

Another forced short cut that may bias this discussion is worth pointing

out. In a previously published paper we found it easier to assume that

language generates thought than the reverse account based on the

relative completeness of language data (as opposed to the ambiguous

foundation of thought processes) on which to base language development.

As a compromise we arbitrarily opted for tentatively positing a recursive

cycling co-generation of both thought and language.

Furthermore, I will assume the troublesome position that the non-

physical mind that is involved in the conscious choices / *intentions of a

human being can influence the activities of his physical brain (as

suggested by Stapp 1999, 153), a most controversial stance attributing

the non-physical mind causal efficacy in driving the physical brain. We will

very briefly explain the quantum theoretical reasoning and other

intuitions.

In a nutshell we are saying that the psychological experience of being

in a conscious state with ‘inner language’ faculties is the result of an

actualization of one of several co-existing potential conscious states. We

are not going to develop here the technical notions of quantum theory

(wave functions, eigenvalues, state *vectors, etc.) we have adopted to

equate the coming into a conscious mental state to the actualization of a

Hilbert space state vector by giving our conscious consent to one of

several coexisting alternatives (entangled, superpositioned, embodied in

Hilbert space) , the one subconsciously isolated and consciously chosen by

consent (by collapse of its wave function) on the basis of its

biopsychosocial (BPS) survival value, in response to an important

perceptual / conceptual change detected in the environment. A particular

cortical attractor constitutes the state vector being the focus of the

directed attention / awareness. We can assign to any physical subsystem

(e.g., a brain) a singular state represented by a vector in its own Hilbert

space, as discussed elsewhere. At this moment we prefer to disclaim any

correlational continuity between our local selection to bring into a

conscious mental state and a cosmic scale Hilbert vector space. We

further disagree with the current interpretation of von Neumann’s

projection postulate suggesting that the mind becomes conscious after the

collapse of the wave function as it happens during an instrumental

measurement analogy. In our model, the initial online perceptual /

conceptual input triggers an introspective subconscious evaluation of

alternative solutions (cortical attractor’s probable future outcome) present

in the ‘flow of subconsciosness’, an arguable pre-conscious state. The

most compatible / adaptive vector space is consciously consented to and

the ‘collapse of the wave function’ follows, in that order. Contrary to what

happens in quantum mechanical instrumental measurements, our mind

(microscopic M?) conscious ‘consent’ represent the measuring instrument

of the brain’s (macroscopic B) cortical attractor isolated alternative. They

form a single quantum theoretical state vector (wave function) ψM + B

which arguably can in turn be the object of an empathy ‘measurement’ by

another observer’s mirror neuron system (theory of mind). Consequent to

a significant perceptual / conceptual input-induced change in the quantum

field wave (represented by the wave function) of the cortical attractors, a

wave function collapses onto the cortical attractor option with the highest

probability of success in resolving the contingency posited by the novel

input, all BPS consequences being considered in the process.

Besides the formalities barely mentioned, we prefer the intuitive

premises based instead on analogies to well established

neurophysiological facts (see British neurophysiology school of

Sherington) regarding the unconscious reflex coordination of the best

musculo-skeletal dynamic body posture (controlled by reflex networks in

sub-cortical basal ganglia, cerebellum, olives, etc.) in executing a complex

adaptive movement, like we saw in the Olympic gymnasts, where the

biological integrity of the subject is genetically guaranteed; in such cases

we need not be conscious of every possible moto-neuronal synaptic

connectivity to guide the many individual muscle fiber contractions

resulting in the gross, balanced, integrated and coordinated adaptive

movement needed. Based on the various relevant inputs (from muscle

spindles, stretch receptors, Golgi tendon receptors, mirror neurons and

others) the genetically programmed appropriate reflex arc just needs to

be unconsciously ‘isolated’ and mobilized into actuality by the simple

conscious consent (yes or no) to the ‘chosen’ reflex arcs by the

unconscious activity of the performer. Please notice that, for lack of a

more precise word now, we are making a subtle distinction between

choice and consent suggesting that only the latter is exclusively a

conscious event.

By analogy to the conscious consent to the ‘choice’ of a particular

gross movement from several unconsciously organized probable motor

responses just described, we are suggesting, for analytical purposes, that

a conscious consent / choice is the functional equivalent of an

instrumental measurement in quantum mechanics as discussed above.

This conclusion is based on our modification of Dr. W. Freeman’s seminal

work on the cortical attractor basin for the olfactory system of rabbits and

also on von Neumann’s projection postulate (1955, Ch. V.1) describing a

quantum mechanical instrumental measurement as causally efficient in

producing the transition of a quantum state à to an eigen state of the

observed event with a certain probability of occurrence, what we called

above the ‘collapse’ of the wave function (opposing the expected normal

continuous evolution of the Schrodinger equation). Arguably, then, when

we subconsciously ponder / measure on probable courses of action during

a flow of subconsciousness and make a ‘choice’ by consent to the

subconscious isolation of a given attractor from available future outcomes

alternatives in the cortical attractor basins (based on their probability of

adaptive success), we are just passing subconscious review before giving

our conscious consent (yes or no) to a previously subconscious isolation

and choice of an alternative among many available which caused the

activation (‘collapse’) of the ‘free-willed’ / chosen alternative. We have

tried to develop an algorithm incorporating vector spaces (Hilbert)

reasoning to explain this in more detail but have achieved limited success

thus far.

In this respect it should also be noted how the significant perceptual /

conceptual environmental change experienced (e.g., purposive, goal-

directed movement by another person or animal) captures our attention

focus and shifts it (e.g., visuo-motor *relays) to relevant ‘cortical mirror

neurons’ situated at the premotor, insular and parietal cortex loci, (see

Rizzolatti, G. 2002 *“Hearing sounds, understanding actions: Action

representation in mirror neurons”. Science 297, 846–848.) the same

general location where related prior events were registered in specific

cortical attractors based on the related content of the perceptual /

conceptual change as we speculate based on Dr. Freeman’s results. This

environmental change input triggers a transition from a chaos of

environmental sensations à stochastic/chaotic *probability in the attractor

basin à self consciousness and certainty of the ‘chosen’ attractor solution,

a veritable spontaneous but negentropic activity.

Unlike quantum theory that selects from probable ‘random’ natural

events (during an instrumental measurement), in our case the conscious

free consent to a preceding subconscious selection is equivalent to

‘choosing’ from complexly organized stochastic / chaotic synaptic

architectures, represented as symbolic or sentential modal logic syllogisms

and mapped as neuronal networks. Far from being random, they just

happen to be complexly ordered dynamic solution to events in potency.

But they cannot be considered inexorably deterministic events either to

the extent that we can consciously consent to a subconscious selection

even those alternatives isolated the least adaptive solution as witnessed in

heroic or pathological acts ‘contra natura’. The quantum theoretical

interpretation introduces, like in the previous case above, the conscious

consent to the antecedent subconscious selection (all things considered)

of a probable future outcome alternative and does away with the

physicalist deterministic model of reality and brings a new unexplored

domain between the deterministic and the indeterministic extremes

resolved by a conscious free will consent to a previous subconscious

selection based on biopsychosocial equilibrium considerations.

Somehow we get the intuition that nature’s ‘randomness’ only exists

when an event so behaving is considered isolated (for cognitive pedagogic

convenience), out of its normal natural / holistic ecological environment,

e.g., radioactive decay from an unstable atom. When so considered this

reality ‘in se’ is non-linear, asymmetric, indeterministic, atemporal and

acausal and as such, unintelligible to human cognition because of our

natural inherited linear / sequential way of processing information so aptly

simulated by computers. Thus the human species had to *bring symmetry

by temporalizing empirical reality and *linearizing the sensory receptors

input in harmony with an inherited sequential language processing by

inventing the concepts of time and space to explain change.

Independently related events can now be processed statistically or

linguistically when linearly coupled on the basis of their complementarity

and entanglement potential.

This is a most controversial and dark grey area indeed where it has to

be demonstrated how significant receptor inputs (e.g., movements,

sounds / phonemes) are eventually represented / encoded and readied to

be parsed and processed in the language *mill. Humans process

information in serial sequences with the aid of innate language processors

(see S. Pinker). For humans to extract the meaning of the quotidian

Kantian ‘chaos of sensations’ we may have inherited the ability to

represent crucial audiovisual environmental events as linked with

individualized phonemic and visual content tags attributing primitive

survival meanings when compared to an inherited gallery of audiovisual /

movement representations, what we have called the proto-linguistic organ

(plo) in the amygdaloid complex. We have not developed equivalent

explanations for other sensory input variations, but the ‘freeze response’

to pressure, tactile and other receptors can be easily demonstrated.

What has remained a mystery is an explanation of how the sensory

information travels and relates to mirror neurons strategically located in

pre-motor, insular, parietal and Broca’s cortical areas where we speculate

they may generate the emotional qualia as consciousness awakens. We

don’t know yet how mirror neurons connect with cortical attractors, if at

all. By using the technique of continuous flash suppression (what

magicians use to distract the public so you don’t see things while looking

at them) it has been demonstrated how unconscious stimulation by

objects invisible to the subject can control his behavior.

We speculate that soon after birth, the newborn had to activate the

inherited archetype allowing us to linearize the sense-phenomenal

environmental receptor input and couple it to the processing of the

adopted language. This way we integrate the inherited protosemantic,

amygdaloidal unconscious processing of sense-phenomenal data input

with the hippocampus subconscious, contextual analysis of the sensory

input and the insular mirror neuron input. The amygdalar and insular

components are charged with the preservation of species biological

integrity and the visceral brain neuro-humoral homeostasis respectively.

The hippocampus / executive cortex axis is involved in the preservation of

psycho-social equilibrium. As long as there is no significant / purposive

environmental change threatening the biological homeostasis and the

psychosocial equilibrium, we remain in a state of subconscious

awareness, like a sophisticated robotic monitor. As soon as a significant

perceptual / conceptual change ensues we either continue updating the

attractor basins with perceptual and / or conceptual memory based inputs

or adaptively respond to the environmental contingency. We can reflexly

respond *stereotypically at the unconscious protosemantic level by a

temporary inhibition of any response (‘freeze response’) pending a

contextual analysis by the hippocampus at the subconscious level. If the

contextual analysis is semantically positive and the sensory stimulus

represents a biological survival threat, the amygdala is disinhibited and a

Cannon, ‘fight or flight’ response is unleashed. Otherwise, when the

change carries the potential for a psychosocial disequilibrium then higher

mental faculties’ are accessed to extract meaningful information, e.g., a

language sequential, linear processor to parse the inherited and / or

acquired audiovisual representations data and generate the corresponding

syntax structure to express the proper symbolic and / or sentential

premises preceding the appropriate logical conclusions (propositional

attitude?) and co-generate the *corresponding thought / consciousness in

the process. Brain lesions to angular gyrus and Brocas area interfere with

this processing. A flow of subconsciousness is thereby triggered from

which the most probable and best adapted cortical attractor solution is

subconsciously isolated and freely chosen by consent from the probable

future outcomes as discussed.

A cortical attractor (including the corresponding mirror neuron

components) represents the unit behavioral complex attending the

solution to a novel contingency. It comprises a complex behavioral

strategy integrating the phenomenal and attitudinal / emotional aspects

and their associated perceptual / conceptual qualia included. Once more

we emphasize that perceptual and conceptual qualia are semantically

neutral and find their existential meaning within the context of an

individualized BPS equilibrium context requiring the language faculty to

generate the appropriate symbolic / sentential representations for

recursive parsing and syntax elaboration in the adopted language.

It has been most difficult to integrate the participation of mirror

neurons in this unit behavioral complex because of our paucity of

anatomico-physiological data. Their presence, in association with Broca’s

area, insular cortex and parieto-temporal angular gyrus, is an indication of

their likely involvement in the semantic, emotional and multimodal

assembly of the unit behavioral entity, not to mention their possible role

in the emergence of self-consciousness as we reverse the mirror neurons

focus into the agent / observer. As we published elsewhere, just like a

newborn baby can watch her lactating mother’s facial / body movements

and listen to her baby talk cooing until she eventually discovers the self

from that of mother’s and reciprocally, mother can anticipate the newborn

needs, an empathy mental state only possible with the help of mirror

neurons, we see no reason why the same ‘mirror neuron’ mechanism

cannot be directed inwards to auscultate the self in action and discover

the self as the actor and the observer! We can demonstrate using fMRI

techniques the complex coordination of left somatotopic premotor cortex

with auditory and left parietal cortex which lightens up when we either

move a hand while making a sound or watching someone else do it! If the

observer can empathize with the external subject making those sounds

and movements via mirror neuron system, especially the likely emotions

attending such behavior (as suggested by activity of insular mirror

neurons), we don’t see any serious problem about turning that empathy

faculty on ourselves and achieving self-consciousness in the process, a

veritable 'reciprocal theory of mind'! This area needs more development

because both phenomenal and conceptual qualia in our BPS model

requires the language faculty to be accessed for ‘interpretation’ as to what

it existentially means to me whereas in an ordinary ‘introspection’ a

semantic analysis may be waived, like when we are just ‘mindreading’

someone else. I can predict that the dual reflecting surface of the mirror

neuron will be the new area of neurophilosophy research as we march

slowly but unrelenting along the reductionist asymptotic plank knowing

that we have choices because free-will survives.

Deltona, Florida Winter 2007

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1) Beck, F. (2001). “Quantum brain dynamics and consciousness”. In The

Physical Nature of Consciousness, ed. by P. van Loocke, Benjamins,

Amsterdam, pp. 83-116.

2) Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press,

Oxford.

3) de la Sierra, Angell O. 2006 The Possible Quantal Interface in the

Hybrid Nature of Reality. Part I. Telicom 19:4 (July-August): 34

4) de la Sierra, Angell O. 2008 Being and Becoming in Brain Dynamics.

Part I Telicom 21:5 (September-October): 27-33

5) de la Sierra, Angell O. 2008 A Fishing Expedition Inside Hilbert Space.

Telicom 21:3 (May-June): 32-37

6) de la Sierra, Angell O. 2003 Neurophilosophy of Consciousness. Vol. I,

2d. ed. USA Lulu.com.

7) Franck, G. (2004). “Mental presence and the temporal present”. In

Brain and Being, ed. by G.G. Globus, K.H. Pribram, and G. Vitiello,

Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 47-68.

8) Freeman, W.J., and Vitiello, G. (2006). “Nonlinear brain dynamics as

macroscopic manifestation of underlying many-body field dynamics”.

Physics of Life Reviews 3(2), 93-118.

9) Primas, H. (2003). “Time-entanglement between mind and matter”.

Mind and Matter 1, 81-119.

10) Ricciardi, L.M., and Umezawa, H. (1967). “Brain and physics of many-

body problems”. Kybernetik 4, 44-48.

11) Schwartz, J.M., Stapp, H.P., and Beauregard, M. (2005). “Quantum

theory in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of

mind/brain interaction”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B

360, 1309-1327.

12) Whitehead, A.N. (1978). Process and Reality. Free Press, New York.

13) Wigner, E.P. (1967). “Remarks on the mind-body question”. In

Symmetries and Reflections, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp.

171-184.

End of Ch. 14

Ch. 15

AXIOLOGY IN POST MODERN JUDEOCHRISLAMIC MONOTHEISM.

(Hobbes: “..men being always in the precincts of battle,

or a multitude of battles fought by a multitude of men." Leviathan)

Monotheistic Pluralism

ABSTRACT.

Axiology is that “branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of

values and with what kinds of things have value” (see The Cambridge

Dictionary of Philosophy) including the ethical values of right and wrong,

vice and justice which we will be briefly examining in the broader context

of post-modern (arbitrarily chosen as beginning with the downfall of

Communism in the early 1900) geopolitical ethical/morality. Are these

absolute values, intrinsically good for humankind on their own merits? Or

is their value circumstantial and thus transitory. We will exemplify our

exposition with the global economy and nuclear technology developments

that threatens world peace and cultural anthropological diversity. How

may sociopathology of greed breeds psychopaths into the violation of

biological integrity. When BPS <--> SPB.

Key words: Cultural anthropology, axiology, ethics, moral values,

JudeoChrIslamic religion.

INTRODUCTION.

In this short parting essay we outline the basic tenets of the three

monotheistic historical religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam and

distinguish them from non-historical spiritual mysticism of Oriental origins

which is also in competition with monotheism to capture the human mind.

We examine how the underlying motives subconsciously or unconsciously

drive the actors to what seems at first glance either the silent wars of

socio-economical pursuits or the not-so-silent terrorist-inspired genocide.

To avoid being suspect of conscious genocidal traits, the latter’s spiritual

leaders may rationalize that suicide bombings are not the result of the

conscious freely willing choice under dictatorial rule, rather a

subconscious drive triggered by a new trigger, the unrelenting march of

western-inspired socio-economic globalization and its devastating effects

on cultural anthropological diversity and consequently no moral

opprobrium can attach to such neural instantiated defects arising out of a

complex set of determining conditions. Allowing such premises to control

one may ask: how can any terrorist be praised or punished if they can not

form the conscious intention or be the "first cause" of their actions or

character? We will briefly examine how cleverly-phrased ‘interpretations’

of Mid Eastern monotheistic dogma by their leaders can bring about the

ensuing social chaos such a fabricated naturalistic rational approach would

bring.

ARGUMENTATION.

Should the compliance with ethical/moral values be considered as

intrinsically valuable, ultimately worthwhile and desirable for its own sake

as a human species survival strategy, as we argued in the book

“Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.”Volume I (Lulu.com). Or, as

relativism would have it, merely instrumental to achieve higher

sociopolitical or hedonistic goals? It has been argued (from Epicurus to J.

Steward Mill) that the experience of pain or pleasure is the existential

measure of failure or success, respectively, of our ethical/moral response

to nociceptive environmental stimulation. This position is defensible under

the prelative hierarchical position genetically attributed to the preservation

of species biological integrity (see BPS model). But the justification lies in

the unconscious nature of the reflex neural mechanism underlying the

primitive response under the most exigent circumstances for an individual.

This is reflected in the adjudication of legal criminal responsibility in most

criminal codes in the Western world. A tad more difficult to understand is

the relief from criminal responsibility (temporary insanity) where a

complex admixture of inherited genes and socially-acquired memes can

create an involuntary psychic imbalance and trigger criminal behavior in

an individual. Can this justification for such anti-ethical or immoral

antisocial behavior be extrapolated to include the collective sociopolitical

and theological domain based on collective pain or madness criteria? Can

we in the 21st. century still endorse Machiavelian strategies where ends

justify means? Quare!

As we have elsewhere elaborated in the bio-psycho-social model

(BPS), there are fundamental differences between the unconscious

biological, subconscious psychical and conscious social levels of behavior

based on access to volitional ‘free will’ to ponder on available probable

responses in the brain’s attractor basins and their bps consequences for

the individual actor. One question that keeps knocking at the door is that

living creatures in nature seem to have being created to live and survive

as collectives, whether packs, family, tribe, community, etc. Is there a

global consciousness, a subconscious drive to build global villages and

economies and if so, at what price? To destroy cultural diversity in all its

manifestations?

It is significant and curious that, as we explore the ramifications of this

development, a conclave of JudeoChrIslamic Middle Eastern leaders get

together in Europe while Pope Benedictus XVI celebrates in Australia the

World Youth gathering. This all argues in favor of a seemingly natural

drive towards ecumenism as a survival strategy. Is there something like a

‘social’ or collective free will, what is the truth value of their leader’s

utterances? Are they inspired on absolute, intrinsic human values or

national-interest/religious ‘tribal’ transitory values? Let us examine some

current examples and their background axiological justification.

In his book “Truth and Tolerance” Pope Pius XVI (San Francisco:

Ignatius Press, 2004) acknowledged the post-modern polemics between

Christianity and other religions, between theological and political interests.

Following Pope Pius VI lead on defining heavens on earth as the most

important non-eternal piece of real estate, he wisely acknowledged that

friendly/creative JudeoChrIslamic cultural anthropological interaction is of

the essence to resolve the controversies at its etiological roots.

Exchanging war / political prisoners, signing treaties and other temporary

solutions are only symptomatic palliatives, not etiologic cures. He

characterized the disease as a “crisis of truth” in both postmodern

Western and Middle Eastern cultures’ approach in the solution of the

differences in the spheres of faith and culture that divide them. In a

nutshell, he questions whether man can ever get to know truth ‘in se’ and

perhaps can settle for an agreement to practice the twin virtues of

tolerance and freedom as opposed to making any claim on absolute truth

in their positions on religion, culture and faith. More important, in our

opinion, is that he thought all religions should agree on the

complementarity of faith and reason as survival strategies at all

biopsychosocial levels. This distinguishes between the religious and the

mystic because there is a spiritual core serving as a common denominator

to the monotheistic JudeoChrIslamic pluralism but absent from mysticism.

Historically mythopoetic religious activity can devolve along the paths of

enlightened physicalism with the support of the myopic science

methodology, monotheism or pluralistic mysticism. The latter’s claim as

the ‘religion of the spirit’, based on an alleged imageless spiritual

experience contrasts the historical-based ‘divine’ call of the monotheistic

trio. Paradoxically, the enlightenend physicalist religion is more attracted

to the spiritual experience-based symbolic mysticism than the history-

based monotheism, notwithstanding the evolution of Christianity from the

enlightenment period of its early childhood development, the same

enlightenment that now tries to exclude religion from its deliberations! Not

to mention that mysticism requires man to ascend and ‘fuse’ with that

elusive, impersonal ‘All One’ in contrast to the passive, one-in-one

personal relationship and obedient demeanor of the monotheist. Go

figure! This is in our opinion a crucial distinction where the intermediate

actor between little Joe-Blow in the street and the God controls the

former’s socio-economic behavior (at the polls or at the dynamite-laden

truck), a non-trivial distinction between the mystic middle man mediating

communication between the impersonal ‘All One’ and his followers as

opposed to the monotheistic personal access to his God. All things

considered, all monotheistic religions must link the word of their God not

only to the socioeconomic conditions of their environmental ecosystem

niche but to their search of truth at all cognitive levels, from teleology to

theology.

Having set the background essential differences inside the

monotheistic and mystic approaches to quotidian existential reality let us

briefly examine, as an illustration, the case for nuclear weapons control

and its geopolitical underpinnings.

Who would have suspected that the ‘Cold War’ era, immediately

following World War II, was nothing but very hot inside the nuclear

reactor facilities of the Western world AND inside insurgent training camps

in the Middle East, both committed in principle to monotheistic dogmatic

principles of conviviality. What happened when this Middle Eastern heat

translated into the surprising September 11 NYC Twin Tower terrorist

bombings? Now it is a clear proof –in retrospect- that a new chapter in

world history was in the offing, a religious crusade in reverse? Global

security and world order was being re-shuffled and the support structures

sustaining the socio-political and socio-economic Middle-Eastern life were

being modified, a harbinger of fundamental changes in the value structure

that will follow, as witnessed on Sept. 11, 2001 and the aftermath that

followed, a race to develop nuclear energy for ‘peaceful purposes’ in

China, North Korea, Israel, Iran and God knows who else. What

happened? Was the Middle East catching up in the new century with the

Western attempts at globalizing their economies and lives or just the

opposite, a terrorist reaction to it? Was this an extremist-fundamentalist

violation of their monotheistic tenets or a subconscious ‘call of the wild’?

Here are some speculations to consider.

For the good observer, it was easy to see that the Nazi capitulation

that ended WW II left some bad blood between the victors and got worse

with the US-led economic globalization of Eastern European countries

surrounding Russia after the demise of Communism. This is currently

followed-up by the threat of nuclear ‘defensive’ missiles in the same

countries while they join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) for

‘defensive’ purposes. Fortunately for the Western world, Russia and

Europe had a common enemy/concern, the Islamic Jihadists in their

midst, especially in the former Russian republics, not to mention the ever-

present latent threat from an expanding Chinese Mongolian Border. Last

but not least, is the real cultural threat by Western social mores following

the economic globalization as perceived by the Middle Eastern mind set.

Has the Western society abided by monotheistic moral guidelines or has

the Middle Eastern counterpart exceeded in its ‘retaliatory’ response?

As soon as the peaceful civilian use of nuclear technology gave birth

to ‘light water reactor technology’ oil rich Muslim countries were in a

position now to achieve nuclear leverage with the Western world. That

prompted the enactment by the Western-oriented nuclear powers of a

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and a watch dog to oversee its

compliance in the form of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As expected, the response was for the Middle Eastern countries to do

three things 1)go underground under the pretense of developing nuclear

technology for ‘peaceful’ purposes, 2)take advantage of the Western world

dependence on their oil by controlling the production and price of

petroleum AND 3)provide funds for the proliferation of terrorist militia

insurgency to frustrate the economic development of the Western world as

exemplified by the events on Sept. 11, 2001. As history has demonstrated

military nuclear technology development makes warfare very attractive

and, in the West, it was compelling after the hard times experienced

during the 1970 ‘Oil Crisis’. All that, notwithstanding the Three Mile Island

and Chernobyl nuclear reactors meltdown disasters. Should we then be

surprised that the conceptual ethical/moral structure of our Mid-Eastern

monotheistic counterpart would suffer adjustments to reflect and counter

the perceived destructive effects of Western socio-economic globalization?

Arguably, the Western strategy was later corroborated by the historical

Iraq disastrous invasion under the false pretenses of 1)complying with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA conclusions on the alleged

ongoing development of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction or WMD) and

2)acting under the aegis of the UN Security Council Act 688.4 allowing

armed pre-emptive interventions in the domestic policies of sovereign

nations for the benefit of humanity adopted at the time of the first Bush

administration (1991).

The question remains for history to resolve, is Mid Eastern terrorist

activity inspired on a defensive posture to block the unrelenting march of

a Western-inspired social and economic globalization of the landscape, a

perspective viewed as a corrupt and immoral threat to Eastern culture and

viewed under Ortega y Gasset’s optics as a justification of violence, the

‘ultima ratio’ (last recourse) criterion? Or was it the response to the de-

regulatory activity in a market economy brought in by the market

globalization, all of which is foreign to the Mid-Eastern mind set? Or was it

just a garden variety of religious extremist Jihad in competition with

Western views on a monotheistic way of life? Be it as it may, two wrongs

don’t make one right. Terrorist activity is ‘contra natura’ where many

innocent bystanders lose precious life, never a solution / justification for a

post-modern ‘New Order’ but an invitation to more disorder. An axiologic

pluralistic / ecumenical monotheistic approach rooted on truth and

tolerance based on a commitment to safe, healthy and free peaceful

conviviality seems to be the only viable solution consistent with human

biological integrity and psychosocial equilibrium. We feel, at another level

of philosophical analysis, that we are not yet prepared to document or

argue for the existence of a collective mindset triggering collective

terrorist activity where the response is greater than the sum of the

individual participant’s ‘free will’ mind sets other than to acknowledge the

power of persuasion of their religious leaders, whatever reasons motivate

them. Only free, democratic political processes can assure the emergence

of freedom, but who are we, Western leaders, to tell a free and sovereign

neighbor how to behave?

To summarize, we quote again from Chapter 22 of “Neurophilosophy of

Consciousness.”Volume I: “In the bio-psycho-social (BPS) Model of

Consciousness both genetics and environmental endowments enter into

the equation for human social survival as determinants and predictors of

the success or failure of self-rule that leads to political independence. The

micro social-economic background at home, school and neighborhood

must provide a climate encouraging the guided but independent

deliberation that is conducive to the authentic selection of choices so

useful in detecting manipulation by others (including by well intentioned

cues from parents and teachers). The capacity to rule one self precedes

the capacity to rule others. But the rationality of individual moral behavior

that precedes a successful social conviviality is NOT to be understood as a

planned search for a reason to act morally or that moral behavior hinges

on a rational proof sustaining past acts. Instead, that moral principle is a

principle of rationality because, as creatures with rational wills, we

possess autonomy to be practical in finding the right reason preceding the

act.”

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

Before the end of the 20th. century we published two articles, “Judeo-

Chrislamic Theology, Stategy For Psycho-Social Survival” and “Man of the

Millenium, Immanuel Kant” (see “Neurophilosophy of

Consciousness.”,Volume I Chapters 20 and 2, respectively. Lulu.com).

There we predicted the events we presently witness in the Mid Eastern

world as summarily described here and how Kantian philosophy provided

the best guide to properly analyze and understand the philosophical

complexities attending what seems like an inexorable schism between the

religious parishioners of the monotheistic JudeoChrIslamic trio. At that

time we argued: “By contrast, this same 20th Century already evinces the

same signs and symptoms of a new Homeric Odyssey that sets aside the

individual and heroic, opening new Trojan gates to allow spiritual fresh air

to moisten the seed of imagination and creativity allowing it to sprout new

concerns for the living, for the environment, for infinity and for the magic

and the fantastic. It is again the beginning of a new spiritual Big Crunch

forged and lead by the forgotten women; back to the mythos of the

Homeric goddesses? How did it all happen? To illustrate, let us examine

briefly the evolution of our concept of mind.” Today we outlined what

some world leaders are doing (or preventing) to compromise and settle

for a pluralistic / ecumenical convivial state of truth and tolerance to

preserve a cultural anthropological diversity -being threatened by an

unrelenting advance of a Western-inspired socio-economic globalization-

among members of the monotheistic religious persuasions. We speculate

on the possible cultural anthropological underpinnings and chose the

controversial issue of Mid-Eastern nuclear weapons proliferation to

illustrate the urgency of such solute

It is not our intention to pass moral judgment on such recent complex

issues as described in this article, history will take care of that. We only

speculate on the possible motivations of East and West. Better than

repeating ourselves again, we quote from Chapter 20 of “Philosophy of

Consciousness.”Volume I: “How we view self and others is best reflected

in our adopted theory of social conviviality, whether based on pure

(rational), practical (theological) or uncommitted reason (agnostic). Such

an understanding of reality brings controversies about what each

persuasion regards as the basic requirements for justifying ethical / moral

judgments of accepted human behavior. Is it the capacity to act rationally

and mold one’s character independent of any causal influences other than

perhaps those reducible to a natural, Kelsenian law of order? After all,

rationalists argue, why should anyone be held accountable for his actions

if he is inevitably driven by natural processes, physical to the core and

beyond his effective control? But isn’t self-control just another facet of

having the right neural connectivities, something some people may have it

and others not? What does free will have anything to do with that? Isn’t it

rather a matter of one's personal history recorded in the ecological niche

as irrevocably driven by genetic makeup? This way most naturalist

parishioners will be assured a more or less well-tuned, culturally-approved

sense of right and wrong. To the unlucky believers growing up in bad

environments they have no control over, or with the wrong genetic

predispositions, random reservoirs of defective motives and character that

naturalism guarantees will get embodied in their brains, well..., bad luck!

We are a nation of justice not charity, they argue! To avoid being suspect

of unconscious genocidal traits, they conclude: since they are not chosen

by a freely willing agent no moral opprobrium can attach to such neural

instantiated defects arising out of a complex set of determining conditions.

Under such conditions one may ask: how can any citizens be praised or

punished if they can not be the "first cause" of their actions or character?

It takes little imagination to conceive of the ensuing social chaos such a

naturalistic rational approach would bring.”

Deltona Lakes, Florida Summer 2008

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. de la Sierra, A “Man of the Millenium, Immanuel Kant”, Chapter 2,

“Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.”, Lulu.com.

2. de la Sierra, A “Judeo-Chrislamic Theology, Stategy For Psycho-Social

Survival”, Chapter 20, “Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.”, Lulu.com.

3. de la Sierra, A. “Sociology in the BPS Model of Consciousness”,

Chapter 22, “Neurophilosophy of Consciousness.”, Lulu.com.

End of Text

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