Epicurus' Doctrine of the SoulAuthor(s): G. B. KerferdSource: Phronesis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1971), pp. 80-96Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181858Accessed: 31/10/2008 11:55

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Epicurus'doctrine of the soul

G. B. KERFERD

T HE discussion of the soul in Epicurus'Letter to Herodotus (Diogenes Laertius X. 63-68) raises two major problems of interpretation, that of the structure of the soul, and that of its distribution and

manner of functioning in relation to the body. It will be convenient to begin with a preliminary survey of these problems in their various aspects before suggesting some possible lines of solution.

I. The Structure o/ the Soul

Apart from one sentence the meaning of which is quite uncertain, the whole treatment of the soul in the Letter suggest at first sight a unitary view - the soul is treated as if it were a single substance. This approach stands in contrast to later Epicurean traditions ac- cording to which there was (a) a Doctrine of Parts (so T6 XoyLM'rx6v and r6 &Xoyov in E ad. D. L. X. 66

fr. 311 Us., Aetius IV. 4. 6 = fr. 312 Us. = 140 Arr., Diog. Oen. fr. 37 Chil- ton = 36 Grilli = 39 William, and animus and anima in Lucr. III. 136 ff., lamblichus ap. Stobaeus 363. 11 Wachsm. = Usener, Epicurea p. 353).

(b) a Doctrine of Elements according to which the soul is in some sense a mixture made up of different constituents (so Lucr. III. 231 ff., Aetius IV. 3. 11 = fr. 315 Us. = 139 Arr., Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1118 d = fr. 314 Us. 138 Arr., Alexander Aphr., De An. I. 8 = fr. 315 Us.) In Lu- cretius these elements are four, namely breath, heat, air and the fourth, nameless, element.

This discrepancy raises problems. But we are told in par. 35 that the Letter to Herodotus was a summary (either exclusively or inclusively) for those who have already made some progress in the study of Epi- curus' doctrine (troy 7rpoPePjx6toc 'xxvJr ?v 6- Tov 6X?av rl(XkeL) and in par. 68 we are told that the summary has dealt with general outlines - s'7rot - in such a way that the details can be worked out from them subsequently, cf. 45 and 83. We are accordingly confronted with the following questions. Do either or both (a) and (b) above represent views held by Epicurus, and if so are they already implied in what he says in the Letter to Herodotus? In that case what is the re- lationship between the Doctrine of Parts and the Doctrine of Elements? Or is one or both of views (a) and (b) a later development, later either

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in the lifetime of Epicurus (suggested by Bignone, Epicuro, Opere 97 n. 2 and Atene e Roma (1940) 175) or after his death?

1. The problem of the first two sentences of par. 63.

Mvst 8& raurio aZ ouvop&v &vocppovrcx &7L T'Xq oLaDaelLq xcxl '& 7ta wa1- o( T yaPIp O n LOt7' 71 7cqtoL a' e-OCLor 7rt=L9r) aT 'a'rt Xvmo?Lep? MXp 6Xov 'ro &apoLtaL 7rwapeaTrAop[Levov, 'rrpoGaEpepCaToctov U 7VrVLOeLC'

LTVX XpOcaLV 9XGVTL XOaL 7tfl 5 eV TO&rcp npoa (pep, 7n ? 9=L ae rTO [LXpO o 7O?o7pV oapUcy v eWykp 'r Xro[epd'z xoc x'ouiiv -rou'&v, aup ? a? ro&9cp VXXO' xoL ro ?o7tn A&po'a?.

It is widely held that these sentences refer to a three-element view of the soul (Diels' emendation of the text by inserting implies this. It is the view taken by Giussani, Studi Lucreziani 210, Bailey, Epicurus p. 227, Greek Atomists 388-9, Commentary on Lucretius Vol. II p. 1006, Diano, Giorn. Crit. della Filos. It. (1939) 105 ff., Arrighetti, Epicuro Opere p. 470: la quarta nature priva di nome e la terza della nostra epistola, Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists 196-7.) On this view the soul consists of particles of (or like) heat and breath and a third unnamed element. We are left with two further problems - why in the Letter to Herodotus is air not mentioned sepa- rately from breath as it is by Lucretius and why is there no mention of the distinction made in Lucretius between animus and anima?

But there are serious objections to this whole interpretation which must first be discussed before we attempt to deal with what are essen- tially consequential problems. The first difficulty is that the language of the first sentence is so unitary in character that it does not seem by itself to have anything to do with a doctrine of elements. The soul is a asicpo e7%tLepeg and this suggests that it is a single body. While the term Xero[Lep? no doubt does imply constituent particles it does not imply or suggest different kinds of particles (although of course it does not exclude such a possibility either). In the second half of the sentence the unitary flavour is even stronger. We are not told that some soul particles are like heat and others like breath, but that the soul itself is like a blend of the two and that in some respects it is like the one and in other respects it is like the other. This comparison does not naturally suggest either different parts of the soul like one or the other element or different constituent elements of the soul, one like breath and the other like heat. What it does suggest is that the soul as a whole has some resemblance to breath

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and some resemblance to heat.' When we turn to the second sentence there also we find that with the text as given in the manuscripts2 the natural reference is not to constituent particles and so to a doctrine of elements in the soul as a whole, but to some doctrine of a part in relation to the soul. Heinze (in his edition of Lucretius III pp. 35-6) argued that the reference must be either to the whole soul seen as a part - the quXzXov ,ue6poq - of the body, or to a part of the soul. He preferred the first of these alternatives. At this stage, that of first sight, it may seem that the second is the more likely. When later writers wish to distinguish the two main parts of the Epicurean soul, the rational and the irrational, it might be said, it is ,epoq and its deriva- tives that they naturally use for this purpose (see references in (a) above on p. 80). Accordingly we should ask whether the second sentence should not be taken as referring to one of the two parts of the soul, rather than to one of its elements. (Of course if one of the two parts of the soul was equated either exclusively or by predominance with one of the elements the result might be the same as the view here rejected. But the meaning of the sentence would not be altered - it would still re/er to a part of the soul rather than to a constituent element as such.) If the reference is to such a part, to which would it be? The reference to the superior fineness of its parts might lead us to think of the animus, because of the superior speed normally ascribed to intellectual processes, such speed being promoted by superior fineness. But the reference to its power of "sympathy" (auJX7Tcx)3 and to the general 'powers' of the soul in the later part of par. 63 suggest that it is rather to the anima that we should look in the first instance.

2. The evidence of the scholium in par. 66. The scholium first states that 'elsewhere Epicurus says that the soul 1 How dangerous preconceived ideas may be can be seen from Bailey, Greek Atomists 388, who actually says 'Breath and heat, then, or rather, as Epicurus states it, with a scrupulous accuracy not imitated by his follower, 'particles resembling those of breath and heat', are the first constituents of the soul.' Unfortunately Bailey himself is not scrupulously accurate. The Greek does not say 'particles resembling' - it is the whole body of the soul that does the re- sembling. a All the manuscripts read lat 8i Tb ipo4. The definite article is appropriate if the part in question is one of two. Whether the reference is to part or to element the mss. reading should be preferred to the emendation to 'L by Woltjer, followed by Apelt, Von der Muhll and Arrighetti. As Bignone (Epicuro, p. 97, n. 3) says 'Nel dubbio 6 periculoso toccare il testo manoscritto.' a See what Bailey (who does not take this view) says on auF7ra$Om (Epicurus p. 227).

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is composed of very smooth and very rounded atoms, extremely dif- ferent from the atoms of fire.' On this Bignone (Epicuro 100 n. 4) wrote: "1 questo un indizio che Epicuro, nel luogo a cui si riferisce lo scoliasta, polemizzava contro Democrito, il quale faceva consistere l'anima solo di atomi ignei." The polemic against Democritus, which most scholars accept, is likely enough, although the reference could equally well be to the traditional view of the soul as involving heat for which cf. Aristotle De caelo 303 b 20. But we are not justified in inferring that here Epicurus was positing other elements in addition to fire which is what Bignone's words suggest. The Greek taken by itself suggests that the soul consists of a different kind of atoms altogether, excluding fire, and of a single kind of atom at that. This is entirely consistent with the statement in par. 63 that the soul is a a6.x Xenro?epec and it goes no further than that statement so far as concerns any doctrine of a plurality of elements. The important statement which follows in the scholium clearly atributes the basic distinction between animus and anima to Epicurus, but it does so in such a way as to suggest that they are differentiated by location rather than by any difference in the constituent elements. Once again, we are left with a unitary view of the structure of the soul. How this could conceivably be reconciled with the undoubted later evidence of a four-element view of the Epicurean soul is discussed below.

II. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul. The soul for Epicurus while undoubtedly material and composed of atoms, is also necessarily responsible for life, sensation and thought. Clearly not all atoms occurring in nature involve all or any of these three functions. What then is it that makes these particular atoms fulfil the functions of a soul in this way? This is the problem which in Italian has been called the problem of the PsichicitcL of the soul, and for this I am tempted to coin an English equivalent, Psychicity. Some important general statements bearing on this problem are given in the Letter to Herodotus 64-66, but the main evidence comes from later sources, above all from Lucretius.

1. The evidence of the Letter to Herodotus 64-66. The following points seem reasonably clear:

(a) The soul is the major cause of sensation but for this purpose it must first have been contained within a body.

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(b) The body in such cases itself receives a share in the same cnaurrcowp of sensation.

(c) This share does not cover the whole range of the soul's functions. (d) This share of the body in sensation is derivative in a way that

is not the case with the soul's power of sensation. The soul came into existence together with the body but when so brought into existence acquired sensation in a more fundamental way than the body, because there is a difference in the way in which a soul loses its acquired power of sensation and the way in which the body loses it.

While I believe that (d) is a fair representation of what is said in the Letter the details are often not clear and there is much that is unexplained. For further elucidation we must turn to the later tradition.

2. The doctrine of elements in the later tradition. The soul is described as a xpa,ptu Ex Err'c&pcov by Aetius IV. 3. 11- 315 Us. 139 Arr., the four elements being 7up683i, OCep6)r], veuFx- 'rtx6v and &xcxrovo6?Cea'rov. This description is found also in Plutarch (Adv. Col. 1118 d- 314 Us. = 138 Arr.) and it is developed in detail in Lucretius III. 231 ff. The fourth unnamed element is responsible for sensation according to Aetius, while according to Plutarch it is that by which the soul judges, remembers, loves and hates, and in general its thinking and reasoning faculty spring from the unnamed element. According to Lucretius it is the fourth element which starts all the movements of sensation as the other elements are insufficient without it. He may have added in III. 240 the statement that the fourth nature is also necessary for thought, but this depends on an uncertain reading and apparently he does not say this elsewhere.

Three different views were put forward in the nineteenth century about the relationship between the four elements and the two parts of the soul:

(a) The animus consists solely of the nameless element, while the anima is made up from the other three elements without the nameless element.

- Reisacker, Brieger (second view). (b) The animus consists of the other three elements together with

the nameless element, while the anima is made up from the other three elements without the nameless element.

- Woltjer, Eichner, Tohte, Brieger (earlier view, 1877, 1884), Munro (Vol. II" p. 194)

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(c) All four elements are found both in the animus and in the anima. - Giussani, Studi 188 ff.

Heinze pp. 41-42. Bailey, Greek At. 392 and Appendix V. (Brieger in 1893 seems to have conceded that this is correct for Lucretius, cf. Giussani 192 n. 1)

I believe most would now agree that Giussani, Heinze and Bailey have so conclusively proved their view against the previous two views that it is perhaps not necessary now to rehearse their arguments.

3. The fourth element and the problem of Psychicity As the fourth element is necessary in order to make sensation possible it is of interest to ask how the fourth element produces this result. It is clear that sensation involves a whole series of movements - move- ments of images, movements of the body, even movements of the other elements in the soul. But not all of these movements are themselves sensations - the presence of the fourth element is a prerequisite. Indeed psychicity may fairly be said to be related directly to this fourth element.

It will be convenient to distinguish logically some six or seven different possibilities. The first four of these would assign psychicity to the fourth element per se.

(a) It is a specific property of the separate individual atoms of the fourth element.

It is hardly possible that this should have been Epicurus' view. It violates the general principle that atoms are quality-free except for shape, size and weight - par. 54 (though admittedly the pro- hibition there applies to the assignment of perceptible qualities other than shape, size and weight) and the doctrine that atoms cannot change and so are -awab par. 54-55.

But more important than these considerations are the emphatic arguments of Lucretius (II. 865-930) that the power of sensation arises from things which are insensible - ex insensilibus sensile gigni- followed by a further argument (IL. 933-43) to the effect that sensation arises by a union of matter and not by a mutation of the original particles.

(b) It arises when atoms of the fourth element are brought together and so it is a property of their concilium whenever this occurs.

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(c) It arises when atoms of the fourth element are brought together in one or more particular patterns of arrangement - i.e. not simply any concilium but in the right concilium.

Bailey's analysis of the genesis of colour might suggest that Bailey favoured this view, but his reference to the need for appropriate move- ment in a concilium means that it was not his considered view; cf. Greek Atomists 393-4. It could not be Epicurus' view because clearly such a pattern could arise outside a body, yet sensation cannot.

(d) It arises from the appropriate movement in a concilium of atoms of the fourth element in the right positions, and arrangements.

This seems to be the view of Giussani (Studi, p. 189). But the objection already mentioned under (c) could apply here also. Moreover all of the possibilities so far mentioned involve treating sensation as a property of the fourth element per se. This would surely make sen- sation into a au,upp?xo6q. Yet in the Letter to Herodotus par. 64 it is spoken of as a asvust&oia both of the soul and of the body.

(e) It might be that sensation is a special kind of movement of fourth- element soul-atoms, only found when these move within the pores of the body-atoms. 'They are forced by the very minuteness of their field of movement into the appropriate motions of sen- sation' - Bailey, Greek Atomists 398.

On this view it is the pores which alone make possible these sen- sileri motus. It might be objected that any specified motion could arise by chance in infinite space outside a body. But this objection would apply also to the soul as a whole. Yet Bailey (I.c.) seems correct in saying that for Lucretius the soul owes its very existence as an aggregate body to its confinement within the body and there seems no reason why sensation also should not have been regarded as a ,TLM dependent on the special motions imposed by the internal configu- ration of the body-atoms. Controversial support for the view here suggested may come from the interpretation of Lucretius III. 262 pro- posed below. But it seems also to be supported by the first sentence of par. 64 in the Letter to Herodotus.

(f) It could be that the fourth element never itself constituted sen- sation but produced it by acting as a catalyst. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, par. 64-66 does seem to be saying in effect that body and soul each exercise a sort of catalytic effect on the other so far as sensation is concerned. But there is nothing to suggest that

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either acted as a true catalyst i.e. that they were initiating changes in processes without themselves participating in them.

(g) The general view as given in Lucretius is strongly in favour of the assignment of sensation to the whole soul and indeed to the body also though it is admitted that there are insensitive parts of the body. It is transmitted, admittedly from one atomic complex to another, but if all have the power of sensation some- how or other then psychicity must be a kind of motion.

4. The internal treatment by the soul o the e'&acoXo derived from perception.

The et8Awcx of perception must leave a permanent record of themselves in the soul to make memory possible and (probably) also to enable nrpo?B4it to be produced.

It might be that the actual images themselves pass on through the pores of the body into the mind - so e'q r-v 6+Lv ' 'rv &&votav in par. 49 of the Letter to Herodotus (as Zeller held, Ph. d. Gr. III.1l.436, cf. also Diano, GCFI (1939) 132) but it is more likely that the image of sense-perception was 'reproduced' as a new image in the mind by the sensiferi motus (so Bailey, Greek Atomists 418). More difficult is the way in which they produce a permanent record.

(a) It might be that the images however received are physically collected and stored up in the mind. So apparently Bailey, Greek Atomists 245, 417-419. But see contra Furley, Two Studies 197: this would mean bringing e.g. iron atoms into the soul in cases where iron is perceived. Yet the soul can only consist of its own (four) kinds of atoms. This objection however would only apply to the direct-entry theory of images, not to the telegraph theory.

(b) It could be that the images produce changes of patterns of ar- rangement in the soul atoms. To this it might be objected that if specific arrangement of the soul-atoms is what gives the soul its Psychicity any rearrangement would endanger this or destroy it altogether. This objection could be met by supposing that the rearrangements were of a subordinate kind, within an unchanged overall pattern.

(c) It could be that a change of pattern of movement of the soul-atoms rather than a change in their arrangement in relation to each

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other is what is involved - so Furley, Two Studies 202, and cf. &WXv 'trvm xLv7]aLv in Letter to Herodotus par. 51.

(d) Lucretius in Book IV 962-1036 suggests that memory is aroused by fresh similar images from outside, and perhaps the best view of all is that of Diano (GCFI (1939) 138-9) based in part on this statement of Lucretius. According to Diano memory is neither a change of pattern or of motion, but the capacity of repeating the act of apprehension to which the mind has become accustomed. Exactly how such a capacity could be stored in the soul-atoms is however not easy to understand.

The difficulty of deciding this question is acute because all the evidence seems to relate either to individual acts of perception or individual acts of recollection or individual acts of thought. In all these cases movement is naturally involved. But what we want to know is how memories are stored when not actually in use and there seems to be no passage bearing directly on just this question.4

5. The doctrine of molecules Individual atoms moving downwards through the void move all with equal speed, and the same speed continues when deflexions follow after collisions. This speed is the speed of thinking (Letter to Herodolus par. 61). Even within compound bodies all individual atoms still move at the same speed (par. 62). Collisions can however produce the appearance of slower movements (par. 46 fin.) and Bailey(Epicurus pp. 220-1) is likely to be right in supposing that this operates in two ways: -

(a) because a given atom takes longer to travel from point a. to point b. if it is deflected from its course from a. to b. (In this Bailey is following Brieger (1893) pp. 7-9)5.

(b) In the movements of compound bodies which do vary in speed but only because in the faster body more atoms are moving in the direction of the whole body than is the case with the slower body.

' Cantarella, L'Antiquitd Classique (1936) 273 ff. supposed that there was a reference to memory in Arrighetti fr. 32. 10, but see Arrighetti pp. 583-4. 5 There is no good evidence for Bignone's view (Epicuro, pp. 225-238) that there is a pause at the moment of impact. Nor is there any likelihood of truth in the attempt by Arrighetti pp. 467-8 to re-introduce differential velocities for light and heavy atoms after impact while accepting that there is no differentiation before impact. See Giussani, Studi 100 ff.

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Giussani (Studi, p. 58) argued that the term 6yxog was used to re- present what we call a molecule, i.e. the least particle of a substance which possesses the qualities distinctive of that substance, and he further argued that in II. 454 Lucretius used the term glomeramen to mean 'the molecule of liquids'. Bailey (Greek Atomists 342-4 and Appendix IV) successfully refuted this view, but argued that in Lucretius the term semen, while it sometimes refers to individual atoms, on other occasions refers to "the already formed nuclei, specifically adapted for the making of 'things'." But Bailey has to admit that in many passages semina in Lucretius refers to individual atoms and it is probable that this is true in all cases.

Is there then no doctrine of molecules in Epicirus? The answer must surely be that there was. Once it is admitted that the properties of individual atoms are limited and that the properties of things and substances only arise in combination this inevitably carries with it a doctrine of molecules.

6. What Lucretius says about the relation between the elements and the soul in Book III.

The soul is not simplex (231) but is triplex (237) and there must also be included a quarta natura (241). The relationship between these constituents is difficult to express because of the patrii sermonis egestas (260), the following points however seem clear:

They cannot be separated. (263-4). Their capacities cannot be divided spatially. (264). They are like the multiple powers of a single body. (265). Why should he refer here to the poverty of the Latin language?

Bailey (Commentary Vol. II p. 1033) writes: 'Yet the difficulty clearly was not so much that of expression in Latin, but rather that of the explanation of an unusually subtle idea; this is one of the Graiorum obscura reperta.'

But I want to suggest that the meaning is perhaps more specific than this. In the other passage where Lucretius refers to Patrii sermonis egestas (I. 832) it is because he has no word in Latin to express homoeo- meria, a technical doctrine which he ascribes to Anaxagoras. Again in I. 136-139 it is the absence of technical terms in Latin which is the source of the trouble. Perhaps in Book III also it is a similar absence of technical terms in Latin which is what he has primarily in mind. In that case I would suggest that the kind of technical term for which Lucretius is looking is one that will express the special Epicurean doctrine of atomic blending.

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According to Aetius IV. 3. 11 = 315 Us. - 139 Arr. the soul for Epicurus is a xp&t?v.6 This is a not very common word for the product of xp&at4, which term is used in par. 63, and it seems frequently to be found in Epicurean contexts,7 so that it could even be that this is the very word in question. The doctrine involved is explained in Alexander of Aphrodisias De Mixtione 214. 28 - 215. 8 Bruns - fr. 290 Us. Democritus had supposed that a xp&aL involves really only a juxta- position of separate ingredients each preserving its own nature as before the mixture, but no longer separately perceivable because of the smallness of the amounts juxtaposed in any particular part. But Epicurus supposed that in xpoc&at the separate substances were first broken up into their constituent atoms which were then re- combined. So it was not so much a combination of two or more sub- stances as a new combination of substance-forming atoms.

Two points are of great interest here. The first is that this distinc- tion attributed to Epicurus clearly does imply a doctrine of molecules. Plutarch (A dv. Col. 1110 b = fr. 60 Us. = 20. 2 Arr.) preserves an example from wine: 'Often the wine does not possess the property of heating or cooling as it enters the body. Rather the bodily mass is so set in motion that the corpuscles shift their position: the heat- producing atoms are at one time concentrated, becoming numerous enough to impart warmth and heat to the body, but at another time are driven out, producing a chill.' See for discussion Bailey, Epicurus p. 389. The second is that it fits exactly with what Lucretius is trying to say about the soul, as Heinze saw (p. 41-2). It is not a mixture of four substances by juxtaposition, but a true Epicurean xp&,zx. This explains the reference to semina in III. 127 - 8 and primordia in III. 236, and it probably explains the use of 7rotoi3 in Aetius IV. 3. 11. That it represents exactly the way Epicurus frequently thought is shown by the reference to &'rot?ot nupk &=o Te)ea'xo( in D.L. X. 115. More- over I believe it enables us to approach with greater confidence the well-known problem-passage in Lucretius III. 262 - 5:

inter enim cursant primordia principiorum motibus inter se, nil ut secernier unum possit nec spatio fieri divisa potestas, sed quasi multae vis unius corporis exstant.

6 So Plut. Adv. Col. 1109 e, Alexander Aphr. De Mixtione 215. 11, 231. 28, 232. 28. 7 It may be that Epicurus had a special preference for neuter nouns in -,. cf. Cleomedes II. 1 given in Usener p. 89.

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On this Bailey argues as follows (Commentary Vol. II p. 1037): prin- cipiorum must, as usual, be gen. of primordia; see i. 55 n. It is impossible that primordia principiorum should go together, since first beginnings cannot themselves have first beginnings. It must therefore go with motibus (which otherwise would be left in the air) and mean 'with the motions of first beginnings' i.e. suis motibus or propriis motibus, 'with the motions proper to them'. He translates:

'For the first-beginnings course to and fro among themselves with the motions of first-beginnings, so that no single element can be put apart, nor can its powers be set in play divided from others by empty space, but they are, as it were, the many forces of a single body.'

In all the essentials of this view Bailey was preceded by Munro, Giussani, Heinze, and Ernout and Robin (Commentaire), and this is the interpretation followed by most translators. But Bailey saw clearly enough that nil unum does not refer to single atoms but to the four constituent elements in the soul (cf. also line 269 with its emphatic sic). This however seems to need some specific reference to the four elements, in the same sentence if possible, in order to make the statement intelli- gible. This raises the possibility that principiorum may here after all mean elements. This is actually proposed in a complicated way by Leonard and Smith, while still keeping principiorum motibus as a single phrase, meaning 'with the motions of the elements'. But the best sense of aUl is given if we take together primordia principiorum - with the meaning 'the atoms of the elements course to and fro among themselves with such motions that no single element can be separated ...' This seems to be the interpretation actually reached by Emout in the Bud6 translation - sans doute, les mouvements des corps premiers de ces substances s'entre-croisent a ce point qu'il est impossible d'isoler une d'entre elles et de localiser chacune de leurs facultes - and I have little doubt that it is the correct one.8

7. The origin of the sensiferi motus in Lucretius. According to Lucretius the fourth nature penitus prorsum latet and it subest so that there is nothing in our body magis hac infra. (III. 273-4). We have already been told that there can be no spatial separation of one element from another (III. 264) and Bailey is presumably right (Commentary Vol. II. 1038-9) in inferring that the reference must be to the relative imperceptibility of the fourth nature rather than its

8 A similar translation is given by R. Waltz (1954) and M. F. Smith (1969).

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separate location im particular parts of the body. But he might have added that its obscurity is in relation to the body (cf. 274) rather than in relation to the other elements - the quicquam in line 274 is quite general and refers to everything whatsoever, not simply to the other elements. Indeed if I am right about the distribution of individual atoms in the soul-xpa&a a locational distinction would not be possible even within a particular part of the soul. None the less we are clearly told that it is the fourth element which is the source of the sensi/eri motus (III. 245-6, 271-2).

Lucretius makes two points with some emphasis:

(a) the fourth element is stirred first and then the movements pass to heat, wind and then air, and then everything including blood and flesh (III. 245-251).

(b) but the body itself feels (III. 350-369) - neither body nor soul, whether as anima or animus can feel when isolated from each other (III. 331-336).

The fact that Lucretius refers to the fourth element as 'consisting' of atoms of a particular kind, and that he refers to the other constituent elements of the soul in similar terms is not inconsistent with the kind of xpoas doctrine suggested above. Even when he explains differences in temperament and character as due to a predominance of various elements this need not mean that there were any areas where such elements occurred in pure form i.e. without admixture of other soul atoms. In each case we need have no more than &'ro[ot tup6q Mc7roreXecnt- xoE and so on.

III. The letter to Herodotus 63-68. I return now to the interpretation of the text of the Letter to Herodotus 63-68. In the light of the evidence already discussed the following points may now be made.

1. The first paragraph does not describe different elements in the soul. This is so because of the way in which the elements were com- bined in a xpa,ua. The behaviour of the soul, however, is in various ways like the behaviour of such elements in separation because it is composed of atoms of the elements although re-combined in a new way.

2. There remains the possibility that there is a reference to a doc- trine of parts of the soul - or more strictly to the soul as a whole

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and to one particular part within it, namely the animus. Heinze was right in maintaining that there is (in Lucretius) no relationship be- tween the doctrine of elements and the doctrine of parts in the soul. This differentiation of the "part" is stated to be based on the fact that it is iroXX'v 7ropo)XXyrJv sprd gc, rn Xe7-roR?epeLqc xocl ax r6v tou&tv. This is usually interpreted as though noXA?v were n),E meaning 'more', and as though the phrase itoX?'v 7rapV?XOyrkv ZLX?Jyp Tq XCTCroPEpC meant toX ? The reason for this interpretation is the belief that the reference must be to the fourth nature.

But- (a) This is a very elaborate and unnecessary periphrasis. Why not

say simply ?r'soCuepi=epov? (b) The phrase does not, anyway, naturally have this meaning.

The commonest meaning of napcxUay4 is 'change' - very commonly change of position or movement, and often with the idea of 'interchange'. It also frequently refers to qualitative variation. Moreover it would normally be accompanied by a genitive of that which varies or is varied - so 7p.?X y'v ,i.y&&Cv in par. 55 of the present letter. This is the meaning of xwcrmc 7cpaUcxyiv Lpi5v in the Letter to Pythocles par. 95 and again in -&c lkpouve'voc 7ropaoAXUxya& in par. 113. This applies, I would say, in all probability also to the other cases listed under 7 xpaxXcx in Arrighetti's index. A comparison after 7rxpocday would normally have np6s + accusative, not a genitive.

For these reasons I now suggest that the currently received interpre- tation of this sentence should be rejected. There is no question of different degrees of lightness of parts, i.e. degrees of XvCTOPELOL. What we are concerned with is a p.epo4 - and I now translate - 'which has acquired great mobility (or perhaps 'great capacity for change', i.e. 'variability') as a result of the lightness of parts of just these things (namely of breath and heat)'. It is by virtue of its power of variation that it is able to undergo modifications jointly with (ausv- in au[L- 7rxO*q ... ) the rest of the structure.

This interpretation is not new - it is to be found in the Latin translation attached to the Cobet's Greek text published in the Didot series,9 which reads: "Est autem pars que multam accepit immutati- o This translation was based on Hubner's corrections made in 1844 to the first Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius completed in 1431 by St. Ambrose of Camaldoli (Ambrogio Traversari) who had learnt Greek from the Byzantine Manuel Chrysoloras.

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onem exilitate partium etiam horum ipsorum, consentit autem huic magis et reliquae congregationi." But we must now consider again the question of the ue?poa which is the subject. Assuming that it refers to a part of the soul, I have already mentioned the difficulty of de- ciding whether this would be the animus or the anima. But the following sentence suggests that it is neither, as the contrast seems to be to r6 XOL7OV 64pOLap. This suggests that the reference is to the ai-?L which is the soul as a whole. This would be possible if we followed Heinze's interpretation of tLipo4 as referring to the soul as a part o/ the body.

This indeed is what I think must be the meaning, and if it is, the whole passage begins to make sense - it is the relation of soul to body which is being discussed, not of one part of the soul to another. But difficulties remain. Cobet's translation treated gcTL as existential, and this interpretation of grrL has also been built into the received interpretation, so that we find translations such as 'there is also the part which...' This will not do if the reference is to the soul as a part of the body and Heinze, apparently not very confidently, (p. 34) offered 'sie (sc. Die Seele - GBK) ist aber ein Theil, der, an Feinheit selbst diese noch weit iibertreffend, eben dadurch mit dem Rest der Anhaufung mehr mitempfindet'.

I wonder if we may not do better than that: if so-rt is not existential, it could be taken with e'L?64 in the sense 'but the part has acquired. . . ' This periphrastic use of the verb 'to be' with a perfect participle would have plenty of parallels. Linguistic features now begin to fall into place. There is no xatx before r6 Vkpoq, which is something that ought to have been there if the reference were to a part not already mentioned. There is no need for a second article after pepo4 (i.e. r6... eLWX6;) which is needed on the existential interpretation if the original article is retained before 'poq. The soul while resembling breath mixed with heat is not identical with them. But it does derive one quality from the quality of breath and heat, namely variability resulting from their XenroCeptoc. This it derives from the individual atoms, and this is the basis of the LxwvqaLoct of the soul mentioned in the later part of the same paragraph. It is this sympathetic ease of movement which is the source of the soul's Psychicity.

On the basis of this hypothesis - of an essentially unitary soul built up in a special way from highly mobile individual atoms - we may now consider some problems in the succeeding chapters dealing with the soul in the Letter to Herodotus, while recognising that at many points we are necessarily dealing in conjecture rather than certainty.

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The soul contains the greatest part of the cause of sensation (par. 63 fin.), this being its power of sympathetic variation. It 'contains' it because it contains matter which can move according to suitable patterns. But this capacity of suitable movement is acquired, not innate - so oU ,Vu E'L)

probably be sufficient now to offer an expanded paraphrase with some added comment:

'For this reason then it is also the case that as long as the soul is present in the body it never loses the power of sensation although some other part of the body than the soul be lost. (This is because the soul has acquired the power of sensation, by being contained in the body as a vessel as in this way, and only in this way, are the appro- priate movements possible.) But in the case of a quantity of soul being destroyed jointly (with a part of the body separated e.g. by amputation), when the container has been broken either in its whole or in some part, provided that the container survives, then the soul that is being destroyed in it preserves its power of sensation.'

This last is certainly a difficult sentence. My interpretation would take -r a'T?ymoov as the subject of &?taiv - I am not aware that this has previously been proposed - and the reference as a whole to the continuation of activity and so presumably sensation in severed limbs and parts as described in Lucretius III. 634-699. It appears that this passage in Lucretius has not previously been brought into conjunction with what Epicurus is saying at this point.

So much for the effect of amputation or loss of parts, provided the soul has not left the whole or the parts. 'But if the body survives either in whole or in part, it loses sensation as soon as the number of atoms has been lost, whatever that number may be that produces the tension necessary for the constitution of the soul.' This statement so far from being obscure seems in fact to be rather precise. It suggests that a loss of part of the soul is sufficient to destroy sensation. This part is described as constituted by the atoms that provide the tension and it suggests a sort of loss similar to that of blood-pressure which is sufficient to destroy the power of sensation. This is a much simpler idea than Giussani's suggestion that Epicurus is arguing against Aristoxenus. Nor is Bailey likely to be right in thinking that the ten- sion is an attunement o/ the body into harmony with the soul (Epicurus p. 232). 'Finally when the whole body is being broken up and destroyed (reading 8La.Xuo1ovou) then the soul is dispersed and loses the capacity for sensation since the container is necessary to enable the appropriate motions to occur.'

University o/ Manchester

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Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1971), pp. 1-96Front MatterThe Ideas as Aitiai in the "Phaedo" [pp. 1-13]The Prayers of Socrates [pp. 14-37]Plato's Separation of Reason from Desire [pp. 38-48]Thophraste, "Metaphysica" 6 a 23 ss. [pp. 49-64]Theophrasts Kritik am unbewegten Beweger des Aristoteles [pp. 65-79]Epicurus' Doctrine of the Soul [pp. 80-96]Back Matter