Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 2012, volume 30, pages 1045 – 1060

doi:10.1068/c1242j

Environmental change and migration: legal and

political frameworks

Susan F Martin

Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA; e-mail: martinsf@georgetown.eduReceived 27 February 2012; in revised form 10 July 2012

Abstract. With this paper I focus on international legal norms and organizational roles and

relations applicable to migration induced by environmental change. I examine movements

stemming directly and indirectly from environmental factors related to climate change—

including, for example, movements resulting from intensifi ed drought and desertifi cation

aff ecting livelihoods, rising sea levels, intensifi ed acute natural disasters, and competition

for resources that result in intensifi ed confl ict. The analysis focuses on the extent to which

legal and institutional responses aff ect patterns of mobility, especially in slow-onset

situations,  and the extent to which governance, more generally, aff ects the likelihood

that people will migrate as a result of environmental factors, especially in humanitarian

emergencies. I conclude that immigration policies, governance, and the level of development

in aff ected countries play a crucial role in determining the responses to natural hazards and

confl ict. They also help determine if migration poses technical or managerial challenges

or presents political challenges. Given the current gaps in appropriate migration policies,

more attention needs to be placed on identifying and testing new frameworks for managing

potential movements. Attention needs to be given to both sides of the environment and

migration nexus: (1) identifying adaptation strategies that allow people to remain where

they currently live and work; and (2) identifying migration and relocation strategies that

protect people’s lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain.

1 IntroductionWith this paper I focus on international legal norms and organizational roles and relations applicable to migration induced by environmental change. I examine movements stemming directly and indirectly from environmental factors related to climate change—including, for example, movements resulting from intensifi ed drought and desertifi cation affecting livelihoods, rising sea levels, intensifi ed acute natural disasters, and competition for resources that result in intensifi ed confl ict.

Understanding the ways in which political, legal, and organizational factors affect migration necessitates a review of the ways in which migrants are categorized in international, regional, and national law. Policy makers within and outside of the United Nations have tended to use a classifi cation system that places migrants into specifi c boxes, with the assumption that standards, mandates, and programs will follow the designated classifi cation. These categories broadly refl ect three dimensions—(a) where the displacement takes place (that is, within countries or across international borders); (b) what caused the movements (that is, between those who move to seek better opportunities elsewhere versus those who migrate to escape conditions in their home country or community, including confl ict, persecution, and natural disasters); and (c) the phase of migration and its duration (that is, premigration, during fl ight, in protracted situations, upon return or settlement). Also important in categorizing migrants is the willingness and ability of the country of origin to assist and protect those who are displaced. Refugees, in particular, are defi ned as such because they have a well-founded fear

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that their own government will persecute them if they are forcibly returned (referred to as refoulement). Less clear is the extent to which other displaced populations have a well-founded fear of other serious harm if refouled.

There are limits to the approach taken to date, however. In many cases drawing careful lines between categories of migrants hinders rather than facilitates the ability of national, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to offer appropriate assistance and protection. This is particularly the case when, as is the case of environmental migration, a complex set of causes are likely at play (Black et al, 2011). Few people migrate for a specifi c reason: generally, a combination of factors causes them to relocate (Carr, 2005). Even the broad distinction governments and international organizations often make between forced displacement and voluntary migration is too simple. Many migrants fi t both categories: they may be forced to leave their homes (forced displacement) but choose their destination based on opportunities there (voluntary migration). Agencies may too easily avoid responsibility by citing an institutional mandate to serve a specifi c population. Alternatively, agencies interested in intervening on behalf of a particular group may be denied the opportunity because they have no explicit mandate to do so. In the meantime, the displaced—whatever the geography, cause, or phase of migration—may face serious deprivation of their human rights if they are returned to their home communities or countries or remain without assistance and protection where they have moved.

In section 2 I focus on the legal, organizational, and political arrangements that pertain to forced migration in general and environmentally induced migration in particular. In section 3 I discuss the adequacy of the current legal and organizational regime for addressing issues arising from environmental migration, and in section 4 I provide recommendations for the future. I provide conclusions in section 5.

2 Legal and normative frameworksDifferent legal and normative frameworks pertain to internal and international movements of people and within each category to the causes of the migration or displacement. In this section I fi rst detail the legal norms related to internal migration and then turn to international movements.

2.1 International norms regarding internal migrationInternal migration is an internal matter of state sovereignty. The limits of sovereignty are not absolute, however. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides clear guidance in article 13 that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” Article 12 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (1966) (ICPCR) affi rms that “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” The ICPCR provides certain exceptions, particularly when they are needed to “protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” To the extent that climate change produces conditions that undermine national security, public order, or public health—which may be the case in extreme natural disasters or confl ict—governments have the right to enact provisions that would limit freedom of movement.

A further relevant framework is the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2004) and the recently adopted, but not yet in force, African Union (AU) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (AU, 2009). Internally displaced persons are described as

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“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to fl ee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed confl ict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (page 3).

The AU Convention explicitly recognizes that there will likely be displacement from climate change, stating in article 4: “States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.”

The Guiding Principles affi rm that all persons have the “right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence” (principle 6, paragraph 1). In the case of climate-change-induced displacement, arbitrary displacement would include situations in which individuals are forced to fl ee for reasons that “are not justifi ed by compelling and overriding public interests” (principle 6, paragraph 2c). In the case of natural disasters, such displacement is arbitrary, “unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation” (principle 6, paragraph 2d). The Guiding Principles also state that “the authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects” (principle 7, paragraph 1).

Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster (Brookings Institution, 2008), issued by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, defi nes the conditions for the return of displaced persons:

“ the return of persons displaced by the disaster to their homes and places of origin should only be prohibited if these homes or places of origin are in zones where there are real dangers to the life or physical integrity and health of the affected persons. Restrictions should only last as long as such dangers exist and only be implemented if other, less intrusive, measures of protection are not available or possible” (page 21).

Conversely, people should not be required to return to areas in which their safety may be compromised: “Persons affected by the natural disaster should not, under any circumstances, be forced to return to or resettle in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at further risk” (page 21).

World Bank guidelines in measuring the adequacy of resettlement plans adopted in the context of large-scale development programs are also pertinent to the management of resettlement in the environmental context. The World Bank requires: a resettlement action plan, which includes a statement of policy principles; a list or matrix indicating eligibility for compensation and other entitlements or forms of assistance; a review of the extent and scope of resettlement, based upon a census or survey of those affected by the project; an implementation plan establishing responsibility for delivery of all forms of assistance and evaluating the organizational capacity of involved agencies; a resettlement timetable coordinated with the project timetable, assuring (among other things) that compensation and relocation are completed before initiation of civil works; and discussion of opportunities afforded to those affected to participate in design and implementation of resettlement, including grievance procedures. Consultation with the affected populations—those who are resettled and the communities they join—is an essential part of managing resettlement. The planning process should pay particular attention to restoration of livelihoods in the new location, provision of housing, security of persons, and other needs related to effective integration.

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2.2 International norms regarding international migrationThere are no international instruments that specifi cally address international migration stemming from climate change or other environmental factors. Those migrating because of environmental factors enjoy all of the human rights applicable in international law [see, especially, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the ICPCR, and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (1966), which defi ne the basic rights of all persons]. Importantly, article 13 of the Universal Declaration declares that “everyone has the right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country.” The Declaration does not, however, require any other country to admit people who exercise their right to leave. Similarly, article 14 of the Universal Declaration states that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”, but there is no corresponding obligation on the part of states to offer asylum.

A number of countries have ratifi ed conventions sponsored by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) specifi cally protecting the rights of migrants.(1) The 1990 International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families builds on the ILO’s conventions. It reaffi rms basic human rights norms and embodies them in an instrument applicable to migrant workers and their families. The underlying goal of the convention is to guarantee minimum rights for migrant workers and members of their families who are in a legal or an undocumented or irregular situation. However, the number of states ratifying the convention is also small. No major destination country of migrants has yet signed the convention, raising further questions about its effectiveness.

Environmental migrants and displaced persons who use irregular means of entry may be covered under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffi cking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000) and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), both of which supplement the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and went into force in December 2003 and January 2004, respectively. Within a few years of their adoption, the traffi cking and smuggling protocols had garnered considerable support, with more than 100 signatories and 67 and 59 parties, respectively.

Some environmental migrants may be covered under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.(2) The convention defi nes refugees as persons who were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries because of a “well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (article 1). States have an obligation not to forcibly return a refugee to “frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (article 33). While few persons seeking protection because of purely environmental reasons are likely to meet the defi nition, those fl eeing because they are unable to access resources because of a protected characteristic (that is, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion) may qualify.(3)

(1) Forty-two countries have ratifi ed the ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised) (1949) (No. 97), and eighteen countries have ratifi ed the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143) (1975).(2) The protocol eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time (pre-1951) limits on the Convention, making it a universal document.(3) In Africa the scope of coverage is greater because the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (now AU) Refugee Convention includes any who, “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (emphasis added). To the extent that climate change seriously disturbs public order, persons forced to leave their homes may be covered.

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2.3 National legal frameworks for addressing environmental migrationThe immigration policies of most destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants or displaced persons, unless they enter through already-existing admission categories. Typically, destination countries admit persons to fi ll job openings or to reunify with family members. Employment-based admissions are usually based upon the labor market needs of the receiving country, not the situation of the home country. Family admissions are usually restricted to persons with immediate relatives (spouses, children, parents, and, sometimes, siblings) in the destination country.

Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum seekers—that is, those who fi t the defi nition in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: persons with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Some countries have established special policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The United States, for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to persons “in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed confl ict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions.” Environmental disaster may include “an earthquake, fl ood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected.” (4) Importantly, TPS applies only to persons already in the United States at the time of the designation, not to people who seek admission from outside of the country. It also pertains only to situations that are temporary in nature. If the environmental disaster has permanent consequences, a designation of TPS is not available, even for those presently in the United States.(5)

At the European Union level, the “Temporary Protection Directive establishes temporary protection during ‘mass infl uxes’ of certain displaced persons. The term ‘mass-infl ux’ refers to situations where masses of people are suddenly displaced and where it is not feasible to treat applicants on an individual basis” (Kolmannskog, 2009, page 3).

It has never been used, however. Sweden and Finland have included certain environmental migrants within their immigration policies. The Swedish Aliens Act of 2005 specifi es that persons in need of protection include those who are unable to return to their native countries because of an environmental disaster (Sweden, 2005). Similarly, in the Finnish Aliens Act “aliens residing in the country are issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if … they cannot return because of an armed confl ict or environmental disaster” (Kolmannskog, 2009, page 4).(6)

For the most part, movements from slow-onset climate change and other environmental hazards that limit economic opportunities are treated in the same manner as other economically

(4) United States, title 8, chapter 12, subchapter II, part V, §1254a.(5) When the volcano erupted in Montserrat in 1997, TPS was granted to its citizens and was extended six times. In 2005, however, it was ended because “it is likely that the eruptions will continue for decades, [and] the situation that led to Montserrat’s designation can no longer be considered ‘temporary’ as required by Congress when it enacted the TPS statute” (Termination of the designation of Monserrat under the Temporary Protected Status Program: extension of employment authorization documentation [69FR 40642] [FR 19-04]", 6 July 2004).(6) A number of other countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc basis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced signifi cant disruption because of natural disasters. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Canada suspended deportations of those from such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Maldives, Seychelles, Indonesia, and Thailand. A number of governments announced similar plans after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

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motivated migration.(7) Persons moving outside of existing labor and family migration categories are considered to be irregular migrants. In the absence of a strong humanitarian basis for exempting them from removal proceedings (which is unlikely in the slow-onset situation), these migrants would be subject to the regular systems in place for mandatory return to their home countries. As their immediate reasons for migrating would be similar to those of other irregular migrants—that is, lack of economic opportunities at home and better economic opportunities abroad—there would be little reason for destination countries to manage these movements outside of their existing immigration rules.

3 Organizational arrangementsJust as the international legal frameworks for addressing climate-change-induced cross-border migration are weak, so are the institutional roles and responsibilities at both the international and the national levels. With the exception of the refugee regime, in which clear responsibility is given to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there is no existing international regime for managing movements of people. This is not to say that there is a total absence of governance. There are a plethora of international organizations that have some responsibilities related to both internal and international migration.(8)

Recognizing the potential importance of climate change as a driver of humanitarian crises (including large-scale displacement), the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) for coordination, policy development, and decision making on humanitarian assistance has a task force on climate change. The IASC was created through a resolution of the General Assembly, with members drawn from the United Nations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movements, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and key nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. The mandate of the IASC taskforce on climate change is to lead the preparation of high-quality analytical inputs to the United Nations Framework Convention a Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, and provide guidance as appropriate to the IASC on integrating climate risk management into agency policies, operations, and relevant IASC guidelines and tools. The taskforce’s 2010 work plan emphasized the need to mainstream climate risk management, by identifying “needs and requirements for support at the regional and country level, encompassing preparedness, disaster risk reduction, disaster management and response” (IASC, 2010, page 1).

The Global Migration Group (GMG), established to promote coordination and identify gaps in the international system for addressing international migration issues, has also weighed in on climate change and migration. In 2011 the GMG issued a statement that took a cautious view of the potential need for new policy arrangements, noting:

“ In the long term, States may wish to review existing legal instruments and policy framework to identify possible new solutions to the situation of those who move in relation to climate change. This would address normative gaps, enable a more focused and specifi c approach and possibly improve the governance of this issue” (pages 2–3).

(7) New Zealand’s Pacifi c Access Category—under which 75 people from Tuvalu, 75 from Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga may immigrate to New Zealand each year—is sometimes described as climate-change-related legislation. The program is based on employment, however, not environmental factors. The immigrants must be between 18 and 45 years old, have an offer of employment in New Zealand, have English skills, meet minimum income requirement, undergo a health check, and have no history of illegal entrance.(8) This chapter focuses on governments and intergovernmental organizations. It should be noted that there are also a large number of international and local nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to displaced populations. Important roles are also played by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Committee of the Red Cross, and national societies in providing services to both internal and internationally displaced persons. Their activities are outside of the scope of this paper, however.

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Nevertheless, there has been notably slow progress in establishing a lead agency responsibility for protection of those who are displaced by natural disasters and other environmental factors. The IASC (2006) guidance on coordination (known as the cluster approach) in emergencies notes that:

“ at the country level in disaster situations ..., the three core protection mandated agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF and OHCHR [Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights]) will consult closely and, under the overall leadership of the [UN Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator], agree which of the three will assume the role of Lead for protection” (page 3).

The UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ webpage on displacement acknowledges that “Given major protection concerns in recent large-scale natural disasters such as Haiti, the protection lead in contexts of natural disasters is currently under discussion.”(9)

Only UNHCR among these agencies has had extensive experience in protection of displaced populations, but its work has focused primarily on confl ict situations. The agency has begun responding, albeit in an ad hoc way, to displacement in the context of natural disasters. In the State of the World’s Refugees UNHCR (2006, page 21) explained its involvement in tsunami relief:

“The sheer scale of the destruction and the fact that many of affected populations were of concern to the organization prompted the move. Responding to requests from the UN Secretary-General and UN Country Teams, UNHCR concentrated on providing shelter and non-food relief. In Sri Lanka, UNHCR’s presence in the country prior to the tsunami allowed for a comparatively swift and sustained humanitarian intervention—including efforts focused on the protection of internally displaced persons.”

UNHCR also assisted tsunami victims in Somalia and Aceh, Indonesia, pointing out: “The protection of displaced populations was especially urgent in areas of protracted confl ict and internal displacement in Aceh, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, there was concern for some affected populations whose governments declined offers of international aid, such as the Dalits (formerly known as untouchables) of India and Burmese migrant workers in Thailand; it was feared they might be discriminated against and their protection needs compromised” (page 21).

More recently, the UNHCR has become involved in the international response to Cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008), China’s earthquake (2008), and fl oods in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar/Burma (2010), providing shelter and supplies but not protection.

In several recent speeches Antonio Guterres (2007), the High Commissioner, has given voice to his concerns about this protection gap, particularly in the context to climate change:

“When we consider the different models for the impact of climate change, the picture is very worrying. The need for people to move will keep on growing. One need only look at East Africa and the Sahel region. All predictions are that desertifi cation will expand steadily. For the population, this means decreasing livelihood prospects and increased migration. All of this is happening in the absence of international capacity and political will to respond” (unpaginated).

The Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika Feller (2008), summarized the dilemma before the Executive Committee:

“New terminology is entering the displacement lexicon with some speed. The talk is now of ‘ecological refugees’, ‘climate change refugees’, the ‘natural disaster displaced’. This is all a serious context for UNHCR’s efforts to fulfi ll its mandate for its core benefi ciaries … . The mix of global challenges is explosive, and one with which we and our partners, government and non-government, must together strike the right balance” (page 1).

(9) See http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/displacement

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Thus far, however, there has been no inclination on the part of the Executive Committee for UNHCR to take a more comprehensive role with respect to those who are displaced because of natural disasters or climate change. At a ministerial meeting celebrating UNHCR’s 60th anniversary governments did agree on the need “to deepen our understanding of evolving patterns of displacement and to agree upon ways to respond to the challenges we face in a changing global context” but did not specify what role the UNHCR (2011) should play in the future.

Notably, the IOM, which has played an important role in assuming lead responsibility for camp management in natural disasters and has the most explicit responsibilities for nonrefugee migration, is not listed as a potential protection lead since it does not have a mandated protection role. The IOM’s Constitution sets out its role as a service organization operating on behalf of states. Its fi rst two purposes and functions pertain to its original role in making arrangements for the transfer of migrants, refugees, and displaced persons. The IOM provides, at the request of and in agreement with the states concerned, migration services such as recruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation activities, medical examination, activities facilitating reception and integration, advisory services on migration questions, and other assistance. It also assists in voluntary return migration, including voluntary repatriation, and has an increasingly prominent role, as discussed above, in managing camps established for those displaced by natural disasters. The IOM’s constitution also gives it a role to provide a forum to states as well as international and other organizations for the exchange of views and experiences, and the promotion of cooperation and coordination of efforts on international migration issues, including studies on such issues in order to develop practical solutions. The IOM has been a focal point for discussion of environmental migration since 1992, when it cohosted a series of consultations on the interconnections between the environment and migration, in the context of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Since then, the IOM (2007) has published working papers and books on climate change and migration and worked with UN agencies and experts to defi ne more precisely the category of environmental migration.

4 Intersection between legal/institutional system and current and future migration patternsIn this section I assess the extent to which legal, organizational, and political frameworks affect the volume, patterns, and character of migration, considering the legal and organizational frameworks both as a driver of migration and as an intervening obstacle infl uencing individual migration decisions. The analysis will focus on two issues: fi rst, the extent to which legal and institutional responses affect patterns of mobility, especially in slow-onset situations; and, second, the extent to which governance, more generally, affects the likelihood that people will migrate as a result of environmental factors, especially in humanitarian emergencies.

4.1 Migration-specifi c legal, institutional, and political frameworks as drivers of migrationAbout 3% of the world’s population are international migrants. A higher proportion (about 11.5%) is composed of internal migrants. Although a range of factors account for this relatively low level of mobility (fi nancial constraints, cultural ties to one’s home community, language barriers, absence of networks in destination areas, low potential for increasing income upon migration, etc), legal, institutional, and political barriers to movement must be considered as an important contributor.

My own work in Mexico has uncovered the ways in which these frameworks support or constrain mobility. In a series of community meetings held by the binational study team on Mexico to US migration in the 1990s respondents in traditional migrant source areas were asked whether they intended to migrate to the United States (as had many others in

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their communities) and, if not, the reasons that they chose not to migrate. A frequent refrain was that those not intending to migrate knew that (1) it was against US law; and (2) it was dangerous to cross the border on one’s own or with smugglers. Although many others chose to go to the United States anyway, these respondents indicated that they would attempt to migrate only if there were legal channels for admission. At the time of these interviews voters in the state of California had passed Proposition 187, which was seen in Mexico as anti-immigrant and anti-Mexican, leading some respondents to express their reluctance to migrate into what they saw as a hostile political environment.

Other research I undertook at the time demonstrated the supportive role that legal, institutional, and political frameworks could have in stimulating migration. Refugee resettlement programs are a case in point. On a trip to Kenya to interview Somali refugees I was greeted by a sign in one camp that said “we are vulnerable women awaiting resettlement”. Several countries give priority for resettlement to women at risk, generally those who had been raped or physically attacked in the camps or were at signifi cant risk of such abuse. Knowing the rules, the women who greeted our research team identifi ed themselves in terms of their eligibility for admission to a third country. The large-scale resettlement to Western countries of Vietnamese reaching other Southeast Asian countries has often been cited as a factor in precipitating continued exodus from that country during the 1980s. Similarly, boat departures from Cuba in the mid-1990s ended only when the United States and Cuba negotiated an agreement under which Cuban authorities prevented boats from leaving and the United States repatriated those who were interdicted on the high seas.

More recent evidence as to the impact of the economic crisis on migration patterns further illustrates the effects of laws and policies. To take the United States as an example, analyses of migration patterns since 2008 reveal that levels of unauthorized migration came down as the economic crisis unfolded. US and Mexican data reveal that the number of persons newly migrating to the United States is about half of what it was in better economic times in the late 1990s and mid-2000s. The economic crisis also appears to have reduced some demand for temporary workers, at least in professional categories, resulting in a lower number of applications for a visa category known as the H-1B program. By contrast, no apparent change has occurred in levels of legal immigration for permanent residence in the United States. The vast majority of permanent resident slots are reserved for family reunifi cation. There are large backlogs in each family category, creating long waiting times for a visa. It appears that, once a would-be permanent resident is able to enter the United States, they do so regardless of economic cycle, unlike the unauthorized and temporary workers whose decision to migrate is driven by shorter term economic opportunities.

Organizational strengths and weaknesses can be important drivers of migration. This can be seen at the national and international levels. At the national level the institutions that have responsibility for managing international migration have often been underfunded and understaffed to undertake their full set of responsibilities. Backlogs for processing applications for admission can be found in numerous countries, restricting access by people who are otherwise eligible to migrate. Limited enforcement resources at borders or in the interior (for example, at worksites) may encourage unauthorized migration, even as administrative barriers curtail legal admissions. A decision to deploy or withdraw offi cers in certain countries—for example, to process refugees for resettlement—will determine how many and which refugees are able to gain admission to the territory of the destination country.

Politics plays an important role in decisions about how many to admit and who will be eligible. As discussed above, foreign policy interests greatly affected the refugee resettlement decisions of the United States and its allies in the Cold War. Constituent interests can also be important; members of the diaspora often argue in favor of admission of their conationals.

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If the diaspora group has amassed political infl uence, these pleas may receive a positive response from policy makers. Interestingly, public opinion appears to have less infl uence than these other factors. Most public opinion polls show that large majorities, certainly in North America and Europe, prefer lower levels of immigration, but over time most destination countries maintain or increase the number of immigrants (Facchini and Mayda, 2008).

Although internal migration is less subject to legal, organizational, or political drivers, especially in countries that respect the individual’s freedom of movement, they do play an important role. In many countries the decision to accept or deny credentials in certain professions occurs at the subnational level, restricting the ability of persons to practice their professions if they relocate. (Recredentialing is a barrier to international migration as well.) Residency requirements for access to social programs and benefi ts may also hinder internal movements. Some countries severely restrict residence permits, especially in urban areas. The Chinese hukou system is an example, where it is diffi cult for the estimated 140 million internal migrants to obtain rights in their new destination if they are still enrolled in their home community. Although the number of migrants has grown rapidly in the past twenty years, some observers of China’s economic growth posit that the hukou has dampened the mobility that might have occurred in a more open system.

These examples are relevant to our understanding of the determinants of migration in the context of climate change. To the extent that destination countries continue to restrict access through a combination of legal barriers, organizational weaknesses, and political backlash, only a small portion of those affected by climate change will likely qualify for admission. Internal migration will be a more attractive option, especially in places with relatively few barriers to individuals or households relocating within the territory of the country (assuming that there are viable areas for relocation). Where there are existing patterns of unauthorized migration, and social networks and fi nancial resources to help people gain a foothold, people affected by other climate change drivers may migrate illegally to new destinations. Resettlement programs can be an effective tool for managing fl ows of people, but they can also become magnets that attract not only those for whom the programs are intended but others as well.

4.2 Governance and level of development in the context of humanitarian emergenciesGovernance and the level of development in affected countries play a crucial role in determining the responses to natural hazards and confl ict. They also help determine if migration poses technical or managerial challenges or presents political challenges. As discussed above, two of the potential scenarios on climate-change-induced migration foresee the potential for emergency movements emanating from intensifi cation of natural hazards, resulting in disasters, and/or competition over scarce resources, resulting in confl ict. In each of these cases governance—often combined with the wealth and assets of affected populations—will likely determine whether people are able to cope in place or will become displaced. Governance will also affect the potential responses to these movements.

Amartya Sen’s (1981) analysis of famines in India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and the Sahel is the basis for this assessment of the extent to which natural hazards or confl ict precipitated by climate change will lead inevitably to large-scale displacement and humanitarian crises. In each of these cases drought led to famine only because markets, governments, and the international community failed to redistribute food to prevent starvation, not because food itself was lacking. Similarly, the potato blight did not cause the Great Famine in Ireland in the mid-19th century; food was exported to Britain at the same time that people were dying from starvation in Ireland. The great migration of the Irish to the new world became the only lifeline available to people to ward off the worst effects of the famine.

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Defi cit in governance caused the failures that resulted in severe loss of life and massive displacement. In simple terms, to the extent that governments are ill-prepared to address the symptoms of climate change (drought, intensifi ed cyclones and hurricanes, rising sea levels, and confl ict), displacement is likely to increase. Moreover, governments that fail to anticipate these displacements are far more likely to experience emergency movements. On the other hand, if governments take adaptation seriously, they may be able to provide alternatives for their populations that save lives and, when migration is needed, allow it to occur in a safe, dignifi ed, and orderly way. In the next section I turn to a discussion of these implications for law, policy, and practice.

5 Conclusions and policy implicationsDiscussion of policies to manage environmental migration is in its infancy. As understanding increases of the various ways that environmental change affects migration patterns, and vice versa, governments are beginning to think through how to manage the implications of these interconnections.

Much of the attention to date focuses on internal migration, largely in the context of adaptation and disaster risk reduction strategies. Adaptation refers to “initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change effects” (IPCC, 2007, page 269). In Cancun in 2010 the parties to the UNFCCC resolved that, in the context of adaptation planning, governments should take “Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels” [Cancun Accord, 2010, paragraph 14(f )]. Disaster risk reduction involves “systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events” (UNISDR, 2009, pages 10–11). Adaptation and disaster risk reduction can involve steps to reduce the need for individuals to migrate to get out of harm’s way, or it can involve migration as an adaptation/risk reduction strategy that allows a community or household to cope with changes and, perhaps, reduce risk for others.

The National Adaptation Programmes of Action and other adaptation strategies often discuss the ways in which migration has been used as a coping strategy when environmental factors impinge on people’s livelihoods and security. Many of them also refl ect concerns that climate-change-induced environmental hazards will intensify such migration. Increased rural to urban migration is seen as problematic, particularly when urban centers are unable to absorb large numbers of internal migrants who have lost their means of livelihood. Adaptation strategies often propose land-use policies and programs that would have the effect of stabilizing populations in areas that might experience large-scale out-migration in the absence of such measures.

Fewer adaptation strategies focus on migration as an explicit adaptation process in its own right, either to help preserve fragile ecosystems by reducing population pressures or to protect populations affected by natural disasters or rising sea levels. Migration has been a traditional risk management process for people affected by the vagaries of climate, allowing diversifi cation of income. Remittances are already an important mechanism through which many households cope with lost income from both slow and acute natural hazards.

Where resettlement is referenced in adaptation strategies, there is little detail as to how it will be accomplished. The lessons of previous planned resettlement programs do not appear to have been integrated into planning for what are seen often as inevitable relocations. Involuntary resettlement, however, can be fraught with perils for both the migrants and

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the receiving communities, necessitating a process that involves far more consultation and planning than described in the adaptation strategies.

Given the current gaps in planning as well as the immediacy of the problem due to the decision to increase funding for adaptation, more attention in the short term needs to be placed on identifying and testing new frameworks for managing potential movements. Attention needs to be given to both sides of the environment and migration nexus: (1) identifying adaptation strategies that allow people to remain where they currently live and work; and (2) identifying resettlement strategies that protect people’s lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain. Since internal migration is the most likely outcome for those affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, highest priority should be given to policies and programs aimed at managing these issues within the most affected countries. Technical assistance should be given to governments in the development of adaptation strategies to ensure that their plans refl ect what is known about effective models for averting migration, when possible, or facilitating movements, when staying in place is undesirable. Once adaptation programs involving migration are implemented, it will be important to evaluate them to determine their effi cacy and adherence to the rights of the affected populations.

Some international migration will occur, particularly when preexisting networks and patterns of movement exist. Few potential destination countries have explicit policies to manage climate-change-induced migration, unless affected populations migrate through the normal immigration policies that give preference to family reunifi cation and employment-based admissions or are admitted as refugees. With the exception of some discussions in Australia and New Zealand regarding admissions from the Pacifi c Island countries, no destination countries have considered establishing special labor admissions programs for persons affected by loss of livelihoods as a result of slow-onset climate change or other environmental hazards. While potential destination countries have asylum and/or resettlement systems to manage admission of persons who cannot return home because of a well-founded fear of persecution, none has systems in place to manage admission of persons who cannot remain or return home because of environmental threats. At best, destination countries have policies to defer deportation of those coming from countries with natural disasters, but these are generally postdisaster and ad hoc in their implementation. In sum, no major destination country has a proactive policy designed to resettle persons adversely affected by environmental hazards.

Many movements from both slow-onset and rapid-onset situations are likely to be immediately cross borders, from one poor, developing country into another. Particular attention should be placed on identifying who cannot be relocated within their home countries, either because of widespread habitat destruction (as in the case of certain island states) or because relocation would pose security risks that could provoke violence or even confl ict. Such migration may be particularly challenging as the receiving countries will likely have few resources, legal structures, or institutional capacity to respond to the needs of the migrants. In these cases the international community may well be called upon to provide assistance and protection to those migrating or displaced by climate-change-related events.

Attention should be addressed specifi cally to the slower onset situations in which loss of livelihoods generates emigration pressures. In the absence of legal opportunities to immigrate, at least some portion of those who migrate in anticipation of lost livelihoods as a result of climate change and other environmental hazards will likely become irregular migrants. The challenge in these cases is to determine whether these individuals should be given

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consideration over others who migrate in search of better opportunities.(10) There is reason for skepticism that many destination countries will answer this question in the affi rmative, at least as long as conditions in the home country have not yet deteriorated to a life-threatening degree. With the exception of their refugee and asylum policies, countries tend to frame their admissions policies around their own national interests, prioritizing admission of persons who will contribute to economic growth, meet labor shortages, or have close family ties in the destination country. While exceptions may be made for environmentally induced migrants whose situation most resembles that of refugees, there is less likelihood that governments will make an exception for those who resemble economic migrants. Gauging whether those leaving slow-onset environmental decline are in need of international protection will be diffi cult in these cases.

In moving towards more coherent frameworks, the lessons of the past will be useful, particularly to the extent that planned resettlement, including internationally, may be needed. More systematic examination of previous planned resettlement programs would help ensure that climate-change-induced resettlement policies do not fall victim to the problems identifi ed in these initiatives (Cernea, 2000; Robinson, 2003). Identifi cation of best-case examples of resettlement—that is, programs that respected the rights of the resettled and resulted in an improved economic and social situation—is as important as identifi cation of pitfalls experienced in programs that failed. Guidelines promulgated to protect those who are involuntarily resettled from development projects or who are displaced from natural disasters should be examined systematically to determine their applicability to the resettlement programs proposed by countries fearing the worst consequences of climate change. Technical assistance and training to the ministries that may be responsible for resettlement are essential to ensure that all alternatives are exhausted before people are required to relocate, affected populations are involved in the planning, and all steps are taken to ensure appropriate preparations and implementation.

The promulgation of guidelines and the development of policies to respond to environmental migration will require new modes of international cooperation. As discussed, however, there are weaknesses in the coordination mechanisms that have been established for addressing both voluntary and forced migration. These weaknesses may well be exacerbated by increased mobility stemming from climate change. In particular, assessments are needed of the effi cacy of current arrangements in such areas as early warning of potential large-scale displacement, emergency responses, planned resettlement, and management of mixed-motive fl ows of people. Attention should be given to the work of the IASC’s Taskforce on Climate Change and the GMG as two existing mechanisms for coordinating responses to displacement and migration. Special focus should be given to the arrangements within the cluster approach for protecting and assisting those who are forcibly displaced by natural disasters, examining in particular the adequacy of current mechanisms for protecting internally displaced persons.

Whether a new convention on climate-change-related displacement is desirable—or, for that matter, is feasible—are questions that beg easy answers.(11) The history of international conventions related to migration is a mixed one, determined largely by whether the movements are forced or voluntary. While the refugee convention and traffi cking protocol are widely ratifi ed, the conventions on labor migrants have had very low levels of ratifi cation. Because climate-change-induced migration will likely have elements of both forms of migration, (10) It may be more politically palatable to ensure that those facing both acute and slow-onset environmental changes are not barred from applying for already established labor migration programs rather than establishing new ones for them. Michael Clemens (2012) noted the benefi ts via remittance fl ows to Haiti of becoming eligible to participate in seasonal and agricultural worker programs in the United States after the 2010 earthquake.(11) See David Hodgkinson et al (2010) for arguments in favor of a convention.

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depending on whether the trigger is slow or rapid onset, the future of such a convention would be questionable.

Beyond feasibility, a number of other issues would need to be addressed before determining that a new convention is the best way to improve governance related to climate-change-induced migration. First, how should environmental migrants or displaced persons be defi ned? For that matter, what term should be used in categorizing this form of migration, particularly given the other factors that are usually at play in explaining movements? Would the same approach work for internal and international movements? Who among those who migrate because of climate change or related environmental reasons face protection problems that should be of concern to the international protection? And the list goes on.

The promulgation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement may be a more effective model for addressing the development of international standards related to climate-change-induced migration. The Guiding Principles were built on existing human rights and humanitarian and refugee law to develop norms and standards that apply to internally displaced persons. Although they are not themselves binding, the Guiding Principles bring together pertinent law in a manner that has allowed governments and international organizations to set standards that are consistent with international norms. The adoption of the AU Convention on Internally Displaced Persons, which is based largely on the Guiding Principles, demonstrates that this approach has given credibility to the norms established. It is particularly relevant for this paper that the AU Convention has incorporated protection of those displaced by climate change into its provisions. A similar process that would also address international movements could be equally effective in developing a legal framework for addressing climate change and migration.ReferencesAU, 2009, “Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa”,

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