ences.

The second conference »« held on 6-8 DeceAei- 1915 bjtgjn «» Jilitan

s,fforces on their

fronts as soon as they [were] ready.

on these fronts."19

Franco-British front, Joffre specifically envisioned a combined

plan.* The Sorarae offensive was provisionally scheduled for the late summer

of 1916.

Meanwhile, theGerman General Staff had made plans to seize the ^nitia-tive in the West. Under the growing control of Erich von Fa kenhayn, we

beenCrushed! The British amphibious force was being withdrawn from? after Its abortive invasion attempt. Even in Mesopotamia, the weak

J had c eckeS and was now besieging the British at Kut-e1-Jmara.

.tions. Reverting to the western orientation which heIMU auailuuI,c J. Falkenhayn now felt that his resources would allow himto achieve decisive results against the French.

Falkenhayn anticipated his adversaries1 planned offensive for 1916. Hewould shift Ms main effort from the East to the West. He now viewed the

wls obviously ?aken to Increase his prestige among the allied generals.

131

French nation as war-weary and militarily weak after suffering nearly two million casualties, of which more than one million were dead or missing.*"Therefore, he fixed upon the British Empire as Germany's "arch enemy In thiswar " Believing, however, that he could not build up the necessary superior-ity'to defeat the British directly, Falkenhayn's solution was to strike atthe French Army, "England's best sword," and bleed it to death. The objectivehe chose was the psychologically key fortress complex of Verdun.* The Germansstruck on 21 February 1916 and dislocated all previous allied military plans.Falkenhayn had assessed his enemy correctly—the French would sacrifice theirentire army in the defense of this area and thus could not cooperate with theBritish in the Somme offensive as planned.21

THE INFERNO OF VERDUN: 21 FEBRUARY-15 DECEMBER 1916

Verdun was an ancient fortress area. (See Map 12) Even after theFranco-German War of 1870 it was considered a valuable blocking position inthe Meuse River valley. Prior to 1914, it had been continually reinforced asthe striking power and range of modern guns increased. But after the reduction of fortified areas such as Liege, Namur, and Maubeuge in 1914, the Frenchhad downgraded Verdun's importance. Additionally, the immediate need forheavier artillery during the early stages of the war led them virtually tostrip Verdun of large caliber guns. The removal of weapons from the fortscontinued through January 1916 and the empty casemates served as troop billets.Meanwhile, the defenders manned a single trench line three miles out from thefortress line with only one usable secondary trench system provided as a re

serve position.

The German Crown Prince, whose Fifth Army was given the mission ofassaulting Verdun, desired to attack simultaneously on both sides of the MeuseRiver. Falkenhayn, wishing to minimize his losses, initially ordered that theattack be confined to the east bank of the Meuse, Bad weather delayed theinitial attack from 12 February until the 21st. During this grace period theGerman buildup was detected, and Joffre began to reinforce the threatened sec

tor.

Although there is some confusion as to the purpose of the Verdun attack-

apparently lower echelon units were looking for a breakthrough—Falkenhaynlater insisted that he sought to destroy French men and material in a vicious

*The fortress of Verdun had fallen into German hands during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Following this humiliation, General Sere de Rivieres

was charged with the rehabilitation of the frontier defenses. The fortress

complex of Verdun was chosen as the cornerstone of the new system, and theFrench government spent huge sums for its continued reinforcement. The French

public was not aware of the downgrading of the Verdun defenses and would havebeen shocked if this supposedly impregnable fortress were to fall to the enemy.

Falkenhayn hoped that this would be sufficient cause to complete the demoral

ization of the French people and bring into power political elements more dis

posed toward a negotiated peace.

132

battle of attrition. (Indeed, the code name for the operation was GERICHTrExecution Place].) To implement this plan, an unprecedented number of artillery pieces was massed for the operation: 1400 guns on an eight mile front.

At 0715 on 21 February, the heaviest artillery preparation yet unleashedsignalled the attack. The guns poured 100,000 shells into the small fronteach hour. Three German corps launched the attack, each division attackingwith two regiments on line and one in reserve. Objectives were limited andwere to be seized only after the artillery had destroyed all enemy resistance.After the initial bombardment, scouting parties probed forward to test thedefenses. If the destruction had not been complete, a second bombardment wascalled in. In no case were infantry troops to attempt to overcome strongpoints with frontal assaults. The attacking troops carried flamethrowers andgrenades in order more effectively to force the defenders from their positions.They also carried trench stores, such as light mortars, barbed wire, screwpickets, and entrenching tools, to assist them in establishing temporarydefensive positions against counterattack or to surround enemy strong pointswhich could not be reduced0 If a strong point could not be blasted away itwas bypassed and encircled. Thus, a precisely coordinated attack which substituted weight of metal for human lives had evolved.22

Despite the heavy support and deliberate tactics employed by the attackers,the results of the initial assault were

disappointing. For a combination of reasons the offensive had only gained thefront line trenches by the end of thefirst day. Foremost amongst these moder

ating factors was the narrowness of theassault frontage and Falkenhayn's failureto provide a supporting attack west ofthe Meuse. As a result, French artillerypieces were able to enfilade the advancing German lines from across the river.French resistance and reaction to adversity were other important factors in

limiting German successes.

Coordinated defensive efforts by thethe outnumbered French soon ceased to

function above company level. Small unitcommanders dispayed determination and

leadership which thwarted a major breakin the defenses. And the orders of theunflappable Joffre that any commandervoluntarily surrendering ground would becourt-martialed, stiffened resolve0 Mean

while, the French high command sped reinforcements to the vulnerable point. Inspite of the heroic efforts of the defenders, the reserve trench line fell on

Witness of the Destruction Wrought at

Verdun. Aerial Views of Fort Douamont

Before the German Assault and Afterwards.133

the 24th. By that evening, the local commander, General de Langle de Cary,had decided to evacuate the Woevre plain and the entire east bank of theMeuse. The bovine Joffre reacted characteristically by replacing him withGeneral Henri Pe*tain.

Upon assuming overall charge of the defensive sector, Petain was facedwith a critical supply problem. Heavy German fire had restricted communications with the front to one rail line and a parallel road from Bar-le-Duc.Moving reinforcements into the line would be meaningless unless these mencould be adequately supplied and fed. This single line of communications,later immortalized as La Voie Saoree (The Sacred Way), soon was improved andefficiently scheduled. As many as 6000 trucks passed into Verdun each day.

Petain organized his defenses into four corps areas, each provided with

separate artillery support. Local counterattacks were ordered whenever appro

priate, and while they regained little lost ground, they startled the Germans

who thought the French were beaten. The German advance slowed. Again, thetactical mobility of the offensive had washed against rapidly constructed defenses and had been stopped. The phrase, coined on the field of battle—Us

ne passeront pas\ ("They shall not pass!11)—fully described the grim determination of the French poilu to carry out his orders to the death.

Up until the end of February, German losses had not been heavy. But now

faced with a check on the east bank, Falkenhayn decided to expand the battle

and attacked west of the Meuse on 6 March. Encouraged by the optimism of the

German Crown Prince and his staff, Falkenhayn was determined to push on. A

battle of attrition was in prospect. Meanwhile, Petain had wisely reinforcedthis new zone and conditions now appeared to be equalized between the two

sides. Bad weather also grounded the aggressive air formations which had

given an advantage to the Germans. The defenses again held. Fighting on

both sides of the Meuse settled into the familiar pattern of trench warfare.

Petain adopted a policy of rotating divisions through his defensive sec

tors in relatively short intervals,, By the end of June, sixty five French divisions had been through the hell that was Verdun while the Germans had used

only forty seven, each of which endured a longer period in the line. The

success of Petain's policy showed that soldiers who must be exposed to contin

uous danger and artillery bombardment will maintain their mental and physical

resiliency over a longer time if they are allowed specific amounts of rest in

the rear and leave on a regular basis. Exposure to prolonged trench warfare

conditions produced a new phenomenon: shell shock, a mental condition charac

terized by erratic, often hysterical behavior. Another benefit of Petain's

troop rotation policy was the boost that it gave to the morale of French unitSc

All knew that the heavy punishment and high number of casualties which had to

be endured would be shared equally.23

Brutal and local successful fighting continued until 15 December 1916.

The battle culminated in a series of methodical counterattacks, directed by a

rising military commander, General Robert Nivelle. These regained much of the

lost territory. The results of this longest battle in modern history were

truly staggering. The French casualties were approximately 542,000 men. But

the strategy of attrition can be a two-edged sword and Germany suffered nearly

434,000 casualties. Falkenhayn had discovered, too late, that battles in this

134

war often assumed a character and will of their own when the commander couldnot shut down a battle after its initial failure. In part for his misca cula-?1on! the Chief of the German General Staff was replaced by Field Marshal Paulvon Hindenburg and his ever present first quartermaster general, Ludendorff.*This team would direct the war efforts of Germany, indeed of the Central Powers,for the remainder of the war. Another factor in Falkenhayn's replacement wasthe loyal response of the British Armies to the predicament of the French atVerdun The British would assume the major role in the planned offensive onthe Somme River and attempt to relieve the German pressure on the French.

FIRST BATTLE OF THE SOMME: 1 JULY-19 NOVEMBER 1916

As mentioned above, the original plans for the Somme offensive hadcalled for the French to make the main effort with the British in a subsidiaryrole. Falkenhayn's attack at Verdun reversed these roles and the reasons forthe offensive were altered. Instead of applying pressure on the Germans, theSomme offensive was now designed to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun.

(See Map 13 )

The location and tactics employed at the Somme are open to serious criticism. Joffre gave as his reason for selecting this area that it had beenquiet since 1914. This may have been true, but this period of inactivity hadallowed the Germans time to reinforce and methodically develop a defensiveposition. In truth, Joffre probably wanted the attack here at the junctionof the French and British forces to ensure British cooperation. Haig, it willbe recalled, had desired an attack in Flanders utilizing an amphibious endrun; but once he agreed to the Somme attack he became a loyal and enthusias

tic supporter.

The British plan of attack was ambitious. The British Fourth Army underGeneral Henry Rawlinson would make the main attack, supported by the FrenchSixth Army to the south. After penetrating the German lines and seizing thehigh ground to the rear, the gap would be widened and developed. With theflanks secured, the main effort would turn north and, after decisive victory,all available cavalry units would conduct the exploitation. The main attackwas to be supported by secondary attacks, demonstrations, and feints. Inimplementation, these plans were to prove most disappointing.

The Royal Flying Corps established air superiority over the battlefield.The British ground forces, now swollen with half trained conscripts, watchedthe preparatory bombardment begin at dawn on 24 June. The assault was delayedfrom 29 June to 1 July, however, because of bad weather. Despite the extradavs of preparation, the German wire and defenses were not harmed seriously -because the British still lacked the heavier artillery necessary to counteract the improved defenses. Additionally, the number of malfunctioning roundsamong the new high explosive shells seriously hampered the preparation for

*This traditional title did not connote any particular duty but was used bythe assistant to the Chief of the German General Staff.

135

the attack.

At 0728 hours on 1 July, the" French and British Infantry climbed fromtheir trenches and began the harrowing advance. The French employed thecreeping artillery barrage in front of their forces, but British artillery-infantry coordination was still inadequate. Once the artillery fire liftedfrom the German trenches, the machinegunners left the protection of their dugouts, zeroed in their weapons, and extracted their toll in lives. The heavilyburdened British infantry, soldier advanced slowly across the 500 meters on no

man's land. The battalion attack formation comprised four lines, each separated by 100 meters, the troops being spaced eyery three paces. But as thewithering machinegun fire began, the soldiers bunched up and the lines becameintermingled. The casualties on that first day were at the heaviest rate

ever sustained by the British Army—60,000 men.

In his isolated headquarters, Haig completely misunderstood the firstday's action. He deluded himself that "Reports. . .seemed most satisfactory."^In fact, none of the objectives had been attained and the only result had beenthe blooding of the "New Armies-" The British commander ordered the attacksto continue until 18 November. He remained optimistic that he could achievetactical success and a breakthrough with one more offensive. Another factorin Haig's determination to keep up the offensive was Joffre's insistence thatit was vital to divert German attention while the French consolidated theirposition and retook ground lost in the Verdun battle.

On 15 September,

after two months of mu

tually destructive

attacks and counter

attacks, tanks made

their unimpressive

entry onto the field of

battle. While they

were locally successful,

these new machines were

mechanically unreliable?and the British had not

adequately developed a

doctrine for their in

tegration with infantry

units. Of the forty

nine tanks employed,

only eighteen were able

to cross the line of

departure. Despite its

failure to retrieve

victory on the Somme,

the new tank weapon

proved its shock value .on the enemy defenders Ponderous British Tanks Made Their Disappointing

Debut on the Somme Battlefield

136

and showed the way to regaining tactical mobilityo The British high commandimmediately ordered 1000 of the new machines and all armies began assessingthe value of this revolutionary new weapon.25

The great attrition battles of Verdun and the Somme confirmed the wasteful and immobile nature of warfare on the Western Front. The lesson that abreak into the enemy's defensive positions could be achieved if a commanderwas willing to expend the resources was seen once again. But the ultimatepurpose of a penetration, the rupture of the enemy's entire defensive system,proved illusive. In reaction to their heavy losses in the defensive portionsof these battles, the Germans developed and field-tested a new method of"elastic" defense which will be fully discussed later. In fact, the failureof many German commanders to adhere to these new elastic defensive measuresduring the latter stages of the Battle of the Somme resulted in increasinglyheavy casualties. Commanders who either could not or would not abandon theold policy of holding forward positions at all costs subjected their soldiersto the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery. The use of the aeroplane asan effective ground support weapon in addition to its many other uses was alsoconfirmed in these battles. And, the introduction of the new tank weaponwhile not decisive, showed the Entente Powers its strong potential. In partdue to its faltering start, the Germans discounted the weapon and were slowto develop their own tanks or anti-tank tactics.

Perhaps the greatest lesson of these battles, however, was the close relationship between events all along the trench line. Commanders on both sidesnow visualized the entire Western Front as a single battle zone. The abilityof both sides to shift combat power rapidly from one sector to another made itmuch more difficult to achieve effective surprise. It also proved the efficacy of countering enemy initiatives in sectors unaffected by direct assault*

Coincidentally with the great battles on the Western Front, Austria-Hun-qary attempted a decisive operation against Italy. The Austrian commander,Field Marshal Conrad von HBtzendorf, was obsessed with a hatred of Italy. Hewas determined to divert the combined military operations of Germany and Austria-Hungary against this ancient foe in 1916. Falkenhayn, of course, wasmost unsympathetic to this view since he had already decided upon his battleof attrition against the French at Verdun. Although refused German assistance,Conrad nevertheless persisted with his plan to attack in the Trentino, behindthe main Italian armies on the Isonzo front. Falkenhayn, equally determined,went into battle at Verdun without Austrian cooperation. This situation is aclear illustration of the fact that the Central Powers suffered from difficulties similar to those of the Allies in coordinating military operations in a

coalition war.— ■ ■

Conrad's plan in the Asiago Offensive was to drive through the mountainpasses of the Trentino, seize the northern Italian plain, and, in so doing,trap the Italian armies on the Isonzo and Carnic fronts.26 (See Map 14) Because of the sensitivity of the Italian commander to the possibility of sucha move and the difficulties involved in assembling the Austrian strike forceof fifteen divisions, Conrad could not hope to achieve surprise.

137