Employment of Non-Lethal Capabilities for Visit, Board...

STO-TM-SAS-094 PAPER NBR - 1

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Employment of Non-Lethal Capabilities for Visit, Board, Search, and

Seizure Operations: Naval Postgraduate School Wargame

Dr. P. Dobias1, Dr. J. Appleget2, Mr. F. Cameron2, Lt Cdr A. Tahir2, LT F. Sen2, LTJG S. Unlu2, and LTJG M. Gencay2

1Defence Research and Development Canada DRDC CORA, 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, CANADA

[email protected]

2Naval Postgraduate School 1 University Circle, Monterey, CA, USA

ABSTRACT

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California offered to develop a wargame for the Maritime Command Pacific (MARPAC) Operational Research Team (ORT) addressing Maritime Interdiction Operations, in particular Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations. The results provide input for the work of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Systems Analysis Study (SAS) 094 (Non-Lethal Weapons Concept Development). SAS 094 co-operates with NATO Defence Against Terrorism Non-Lethal Capabilities (DAT NLC) program on organizing a NATO Non-Lethal Technology Exercise (NNTEX) focused on evaluation of the employment of non-lethal capabilities (NLC) during VBSS operations. The wargame would provide alternative look on the problem. The students developed a table-top board game for VBSS operations. A secondary seminar wargame was conducted for the Force Protection (FP) part of the scenario rather than developing another board game.

Both parts of the scenario (VBSS and FP) revealed a certain degree of scepticism toward NLC. The VBSS game provided some interesting insights into the preferences toward particular NLC; the most popular selection (and most used) was a multi-shot “Blunt trauma gun”. However, the game has also shown possible risks of trading lethal capability (e.g., a submachine gun for a blunt trauma gun). For the FP seminar wargame the participants favoured employment of rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) and/or maritime helicopter to NLWs. A quick survey administered at the end revealed that the somewhat reserved attitude toward NLC might be due to a lack of exposure. Majority of participants would prefer employing some warning to outright engaging the target. This reinforces potential benefits of NLC designed to warn the approaching vessels, or disrupting their ability to navigate. This would include long-range acoustic devices (LRAD), optical warning devices, and some of the participants desired artificial wave generators.

In addition, the study demonstrated the utility of turn-based table top games as analysis and planning tools. The inclusion of a certain degree of randomness, and consideration of enemy perspective provides interesting insights that would be lost if the approach were limited to the discussion of friendly courses of action. Therefore it is recommended to pursue this approach further.

mailto:[email protected]

EMPLOYMENT OF NLW FOR VBSS OPERATIONS: WARGAME

PAPER NBR - 2 STO-TM-SAS-094



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Maritime Command Pacific (MARPAC) Operational Research Team (ORT) was approached by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California with an offer to develop a wargame on a topic of common interest as a part of the NPS Operational Research program. The selected problem was the Maritime Interdiction Operations, in particular Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations. This topic provides input for the work of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Systems Analysis Study (SAS) 094 (Non-Lethal Weapons Concept Development) [1]. SAS 094 co-operates with NATO Defence Against Terrorism Non-Lethal Capabilities (DAT NLC) program on organizing a NATO Non-Lethal Technology Exercise (NNTEX) focused on evaluation of the employment of non-lethal capabilities (NLC) during VBSS operations [2]. The wargame would provide alternative perspective to the exercise. In addition, the wargame it related to the ongoing phasing in of the Advanced Naval Boarding Party (ANBP); it might serve as a training and capability assessment tool.

The initial intent (and expectation) was that the students would conduct a seminar wargame akin to the land Concept Development Assessment Game done by SAS 094 in 2014 [3]. The intended scenario (Section 2.1) included components of both the VBSS operations and ship's force protection (FP) in congested areas. However, after the discussion with the students and the advisors a more attractive option was devised. The students would develop a table-top board game addressing the VBSS operations. This wargame would include a schematic drawing of the target ship, and capability cards for each lethal/non-lethal system employed (Section 2.3). In addition, there would be pre-determined probabilistic tables for the likelihood of injuries and incapacitations. The students’ analysis team would act as the boarded vessel’s crew (White/Red team) and would provide courses of action (COA) for the crew. This could be eventually replaced by probability-based action cards for the crew. The mother ship support was not considered because of time limitations. However, these could be easily added. The FP component of the scenario would be analysed using a seminar wargame approach. While there was a consideration of developing second board game, because of time constraints it was not feasible. There is a proposed outline for such a game in the Appendix. The reasoning behind separating the VBSS and FP components of the scenario was that they happened at different scales (spatial and temporal), and therefore keeping them together would make the game unnecessarily complicated. The two components could be then possibly combined, if it were desired by users.

1.2 Objectives

The objectives of the wargame were twofold:

• To assess costs and benefits of NLC employment during VBSS; and

• To assess costs and benefits of NLC employment for force protection.

Secondary objectives included development of wargaming capability that could be used to train planning procedures, and to assess potential benefits of new capabilities.

1.3 Scope

Two options were gamed. The NLW-equipped boarding party (BP) was designated as a hybrid option since they retained their lethal capability (albeit somewhat reduced due to mandatory trade-offs, as will be discussed in Section 2.3); the baseline option was designated lethal.

Because of time constraints, and in order to keep the game development unclassified, a simplified subset of NLC





was employed. All the information on NLC was obtained from open source (Internet - in particular manufacturers’ web sites). The employed NLC and their base characteristics are in Table 1. Similarly, the employed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were generalized; it was assumed that the initial insertion of the boarding party would be generally compliant.

Table 1: Non-Lethal Capabilities

NLC Type Weight

Blunt trauma gun Kinetic 7 lbs / 3.2 kg

Pepperball gun Kinetic 8 lbs / 3.6 kg

TASER Muscular incapacitator 1 lb / 0.4 kg

Rubberball grenade Kinetic 1.5 lbs / 0.7 kg

Stun grenade Acoustic/optical 2.4 lbs / 1.1 kg

Smoke grenade Chemical/optical 2.4 lbs / 1.1 kg

Malodorant Chemical 1 lb / 0.4 kg

Tear gas Chemical 2.4 lbs / 1.1 kg

Pepper spray Chemical 1 lb / 0.4 kg

Baton Kinetic 1 lb / 0.4 kg

Handcuffs n/a 1 lb / 0.4 kg

LED Incapacitator Electromagnetic/optical 1 lb / 0.4 kg

The lethal option included Heckler and Koch MP5 sub-machine gun (referred to as a “machine gun” in the game) and a handgun. The single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) for the machine gun was 80%, for the handgun 60%. In addition, the lethal option included baton and handcuff since these are commonly carried by boarding teams. It was further assumed for the hybrid option that only one type of a rifle (e.g., a machine gun or a blunt-trauma gun) and one type of a handgun (i.e., a handgun or a TASER(TM)) could be used.

Because the wargame considered only the NLC that could be carried by the boarding team, acoustic and optical system that could be employed by the mother ship or from the RHIB were not considered.

1.4 Targets

Two target vessels were considered: container ship (assumed to be longer than 50 m), and a fishing vessel. It was assumed that in both cases that there would be 15-20 persons onboard, including crew and possibly several undeclared passengers; they would generally have a very negative attitude toward the boarding team, because they would perceive them as a disruption to their routine. In addition, the negative behaviour would be driven also by the far of having the Blue discover their contraband. Hence, while they initially comply with the Blue orders, the situation eventually escalates to an actual confrontation.





Figure 1: Target vessels (cargo ship - left, fishing ship -right)

1.5 Participants

The game developers were acting as the White team; the boarding party was played by variety of US and non-US (e.g., Pakistan Navy) military subject matter experts (SMEs) from Navy, Army, and US Marine Corps background. For the purpose of the analysis they were denoted by their initials; Table 2 shows the participants, their background, and what type of previous experience (if any) with the VBSS operations they had.

Table 2: Blue team players

Participant Background Previous VBSS experience

AB Navy No

AD Marine Corps No

AP Army No

HO Marine Corps (pilot) Observed

HY Navy Observed

IM Navy Observed

JE Marine Corps (pilot) No

NA Navy Observed

TA Navy Observed

SH Marine Corps Boarding Team

1.6 Paper Organization

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the VBSS scenario, considered weapon systems, behavioural response assumptions, and the game aids (board, cards). Section 3 contains discussion of the game conduct, observations, and results from the VBSS games. Section 4 deals with the FP scenario, assumptions, and the results. Finally, Section 5 contains summary and conclusions.





2. VBSS GAME SETUP

2.1 Scenario

A military ship (MS) A (a frigate with an onboard boarding team) is patrolling international waters off the coast of a country X as a part of an international counter-piracy/counter narcotics task force. Intelligence indicates a suspicious cargo vessel within the MS A area of responsibility (AOR). The MS A captain receives an order from the coalition higher headquarters (HQ) to board and search the vessel; if there is a positive find of a contraband, they are to seize the ship and escort it to a port in Country X.

MS A approaches the suspected vessel; the vessel is initially compliant, stops when ordered so, and allows the boarding team to approach and board. Once the boarding team gets onboard, the situation rapidly deteriorates, and force (up to and including lethal) must be employed by the boarding team.

After the Blue Team gains control of the target vessel, they search it and find significant illicit cargo. At that point they seize the vessel, and escort it to a port in Country X (Section 4, FP scenario picks up at this point).

2.2 Blue and White Order of Battle

The MS A boarding team consists of six personnel, plus the crew of the rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) used to approach the target vessel. The team operates in pairs. Each person is equipped with

• Communication equipment, and

• Personal protective equipment (body armour, life jacket, helmet).

The weight of this equipment was assumed to be 22 lbs (approximately 10 kg), allowing for another 18 lbs limit for weapon systems in order to keep the overall load under 40 lbs1 (approximately 18 kg).

The two possible target vessels were represented by a board on which the Blue players would move pawns representing the boarding team. The crew of the boarded vessels consists of 15 to 20 personnel, including possible undeclared passengers. They may be armed with knives, sticks, and small arms (handguns). The personnel on the deck would wear life jackets. There was no actual representation (like pawns) of the crew; however, this could be added if desired for follow-on games. Instead, the analysis team filled the role of the White cell and determined what the crew reaction would be. The weapons effects were represented via a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (shown in Appendix A); this spreadsheet included the SSPK probabilities for all the employed weapons systems, as well as the likelihood of wearing lifejacket, and the resulting impact of life jacket protection on the weapons effectiveness.

2.3 Weapon Systems

As is outlined in Section 1, two options were considered, lethal and hybrid; the latter includes a combination of lethal and non-lethal weapon systems, subject to following constraints, using weapon classes from Table 3:

• One from the class “rifle” (i.e., sub-machine gun or a blunt-trauma gun) per person;

• One from the class “hand gun” per person;

• One from the class “grenade” per person; and

1 It was assumed that 40 lbs (approximately 18 kg) would be maximum load that would allow for sufficient mobility, including safe boarding using cable ladders.





• Overall weight of all weapon systems must remain below 18 lbs (approximately 8.2 kg).

Each weapon system is represented by a capability card. For the systems that have a limited number of rounds (e.g., grenades), there will be respective number of squares on the card for the players to mark off. Table 3 contains overview of the two weapon configurations; Figure 2 shows and example of a capability card. All the cards are shown in Appendix B. The weapon characteristics are generalized, based on open source data; the capabilities should be understood as a representation of a particular class of NLC rather than technical characteristics of a specific weapon system from engineering trials.

Table 3: Weapon system options.

Lethal Hybrid Class

MP5 machine gun MP5 machine gun

Rifl

e Blunt trauma gun

Pepperball gun

Handgun Handgun

Han

d-gu

n

TASER

Rubberball grenade

Gre

nade

Stun grenade

Smoke grenade

Malodorant

Tear gas

Pepper spray Pepper spray

Baton Baton

Handcuffs Handcuffs

LED Incapacitator





Figure 2: Example of a capability card.

2.3 Assumptions

The baseline SSPK values for the considered weapon systems were based on the open source data (Table 4) and do not represent accurate representation of particular weapon systems (lethal or non-lethal). Rather, they are approximations for corresponding weapon types. For lethal systems these values represent a kill probability using the most common means of employment (e.g., short burst for a sub-machine gun). For non-lethal weapons the SSPK values represent the probability of achieving (short-term) incapacitations with a single employment of the NLC. Due to the nature of NLC, it is assumed that all the effects would be reversible. The SSPK values were further modified to account for environmental limitations. For instance, it was assumed that the crew on the bridge, inside the cargo area, and on the bow would wear life jackets; on the other hand, personnel in the living area and in the engine room would not. It was assumed that life jacket would decrease effectiveness of blunt trauma systems as well as of TASER. Similarly, some of the systems, such as smoke or light would not work as well outside as they would inside due to wind and ambient light.





Table 4: Baseline SSPK* for employed weapon systems.

Weapon System SSPK SSPK*

Machine Gun (per burst) 0.8

Hand Gun 0.6

Smoke Grenade 0.7

Led Incapacitor 0.8

Rubber Ball Grenade 0.6

TASER 0.5

Blunt Trauma Gun 0.8

Tear Gas 0.7

Pepper Spray 0.8

Pepperball Gun 0.8

Malodorant 0.7

Stun Grenade 0.5

*SSKP for NLW represents probability of temporary incapacitation rather than actual kill

The modified SSPK values by vessel’s space are in Table 5. The upper row shows whether the target vessel’s crew would be wearing lifejackets in the corresponding spaces.

It was assumed that the availability of NLC would have no fundamental effect on the rules of engagement. I.e., even though the NLW were available, the boarding team would still be able to employ lethal force when threatened. The NLW would provide additional means of force available to the team, but they were not obliged to employ them before they resorted to the lethal force.





Table 5: SSPK values for employed weapon systems by space.

Engine room Bridge Cargo

Area Living Area Bow

Life Jacket No Yes Yes No Yes

Machine Gun 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8

Hand Gun 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6

Smoke Grenade 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.16

Led Incapacitor 0.8 0.64 0.64 0.81 0.16

Rubber Ball Grenade 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.7 0.4

TASER 0.25 0.1 0.06 0.25 0.14

Blunt Trauma Gun 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4

Tear Gas 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.16

Pepper Spray 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.6

Pepperball Gun 0.8 0.4 0.25 0.8 0.5

Malodorant 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3

Stun Grenade 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4

Following sequence of events was assumed for the boarding operation.

Initially, the boarding team approaches the target vessel. As they near the insertion point, they observe a crew member within the boarding area. Once this person is warned, he complies with the direction to move to the bow. This step was included in order to let the players to try a game turn for the player’s familiarization with the game procedure but without impacting actual results; it was considered a “step zero” and it was not a part of scenario proper (as outlined in Section 2.1).

Once the team boards the vessel, they split, with two personnel taking control over those members of the crew who are assembled in the bow, and two personnel moving toward bridge (Bridge team). When the Bridge team approaches one of the stairwells, they are confronted by a crew member who threatens them, initially verbally, then with a knife. The Blue team must deal with this threat.

After the threat was either eliminated, or escaped, the Bridge team advances, taking control of the bridge; they collect intelligence indicating presence of undeclared personnel onboard; the Search team first searches living quarters, confronting one of the crew members taking nap. Then the Search team enters the cargo area. They are confronted by one or two individuals (depending on the outcome of the previous step) who engage them with small arms fire. Blue must determine the best response.

The crew assembled in the bow becomes agitated, and as they hear shots being fired, they confront the two Blue personnel overseeing them. Blue must attempt to deal with the unruly crowd that decides not to comply with their orders, and may become threatening or even violent.





2.4 Weapon selection Cards and Game Boards

Prior to the game, Blue players would select weapon systems for the hybrid option for each member of the boarding team (i.e., six record sheets). For the weapon systems that have a limited capacity, the weapons record sheet would contain a column with check boxes that the players would use to mark when the system was used. For example, it was assumed that only two rubber ball grenades would be available; hence, after each use the Blue player would check off the one of the boxes. The last column would then serve for the players to put their comments and observations about usefulness (or not) of particular systems. The cards would then be used for the post-game analysis to determine a) which systems were more likely to be selected, and b) which systems, if selected, were likely to be employed.

Figure 3: Weapons record sheet.

Two game boards, one for each target vessel type, were created (Figure 4). These boards enabled positioning pawns in particular areas to visualize the conduct of the VBSS and to prevent unrealistic assumptions about possible assistance between different parts of the boarding team. The pawns would be moved to appropriate locations for each turn.





Figure 4: Game boards for a cargo vessel (top), and fishing vessel (bottom).





2.4 Turn-by-Turn Collection Sheets and Adjudicating the Outcomes

Each of the turns would happen in four steps, each of them would be recorded on a turn-by-turn data collection sheet (Figure 5). Two games would be played in parallel, one for each of the two considered options. The Blue team would first determine the course of action for the lethal option, then for the hybrid option. The steps would happen as follows:

1. White cell would introduce the scenario element. For example, they would say: “boarding team finds a crew member inside the ship who is a little agitated by their presence. The crew member has a knife and threatens boarding party with that knife.” This situation would be written on the boarding team data collection sheet (Figure 6, second and third column – white space) by the White cell and handed over to boarding party for their actions.

2. The Blue team would then select the boarding team members (using their numbers for simplicity) and weapon card(s) for lethal and non-lethal options (columns 5 and 6). Then they would record what action would be taken (and why) in column 7.

3. The White cell would then adjudicate the outcome of the engagement based on the actions and SSPK values for the selected weapons. If result were undetermined (e.g., Blue soldiers fired and missed), the engagement card would be returned to Blue to determine follow-on action.

4. Once the turn was decided, the Blue players could record their observations and judgements about the employed systems (was it good or bad, what should they have done differently) in the last column.

Figure 5: Turn-by-turn data collection sheets. 2.5 Scenario Injects (Cargo Ship)

While the game set up was developed for both target vessel types, due to time limitations the actual game conduct considered only the cargo ship option. Following injects were used (by turn):

Turn 0 (to familiarize game players with the conduct of the game):

Blue wants to board the vessel without getting any help/interactions from the crew of the ship. Freeboard blocker – One of the crew members blocks the freeboard that the team intends to use. He

may be trying to help but the team cannot ascertain his intentions with any certainty. Blue Action: The On-Scene Commander will use all means available to ensure the suspect vessel

crew except the bridge personnel for “safety of the ship” musters on the bow and remains in that area before and during VBSS Team insertion.





Turn 1:

Boarding team divides into groups and checks status of crew members assembled on bow. Ladder-well blocker – There is a crew member blocking the ladder-well and threatening the boarding

team members proceeding to the bridge. He does not listen to warnings and is not moving away. The situation may or may not escalate; the crew member may produce a knife to threaten the boarding team.

Turn 2:

Bridge – Ship master refuses to cooperate with search and blames the boarding team for delaying his transit. One of the bridge crew members desires to speak to the boarding team.

Missing Crew Member – The bridge team informs you that they received the indication from the bridge personnel that there is a missing crew member who may be in living space. Boarding team shall use all available means to suppress a crew member’s threating behaviour when discovered.

Crew member in bed – Search team investigates the allegation and searches the living area. They find someone in his bed in the living area. He may be just sleeping, may be drunk. Once awaken, the crew member is abusive toward the boarding team members.

Turn 3:

Cargo – During interrogation the Bridge team determined there may be undeclared, possibly armed persons on board and they want the search team to move from the living space to check the cargo compartment. The search team encountered someone in cargo area. There is a possibility of him running away. The team identifies one or more weapon on this person and has to determine the approach. If the ladder-well blocker escaped, he might reappear here as well. There is a potential for armed confrontation here.

Engine room – Once/if the person in the cargo area was detained, he informed the search team that there is another person in the engine room. Boarding team encounters a crew member in engine room who is using abusive language towards boarding team and charges them with a large wrench.

Turn 4:

Bow area – The crew members confined in the bow are getting agitated and out of control. The boarding team members must use the available means to control the crew. The situation can escalate as the rumours about the boarding team executing crew members spread.

Turn 5 (if the boarding team intends to leave) – this might not be played if the ship is seized and must remain under control of the Blue force:

Agitated Crew during egress – the crew is angry with VBSS team for perceived theft of a crewmember’s property. As VBSS team disembarks the target vessel, the irate crew follows. The VBSS Team will need to use all available means to keep the crowd back and deny access to the secure area on the fantail of the target vessel.

The scenario ends when all the boarding team members have disembarked the OPFOR vessel.





3. VBSS GAME RESULTS

3.1 Analysis Approach

The primary objective of the game was to determine the costs and benefits associated with the weapon selection and subsequent employment within varying threat environment. Measures such as frequency with which a particular weapon was chosen among various Blue players and effectiveness of the selected weapons were considered. Mission success criteria considered numbers of deaths and serious injuries among the target vessel’s crew.

The analysis team recorded feedback from players during and after the game. The data collection sheet included selections of weapons (including which of them were actually employed), actions taken by the boarding team, resulting outcomes of weapon employment obtained through probability means implemented in a Microsoft Excel adjudication spreadsheet, and players’ remarks on the weapons selection and effectiveness recorded at the end of each turn. At the end of each game, the workbook containing all player-input values was saved for analysis. After the game, players were asked to fill short surveys recording their feedback on costs, benefits, and risks associated with the employment of the non-lethal weapons.

3.2 Wargame Results

The wargame provided insights into the popularity of weapons among players and also the lethality associated with each weapon. Following graphs show the results associated with weapons chosen and the types of injuries caused by weapon type. The graphs also look at the correlation between different factors such as number of times a weapon was used to number of injuries caused by that weapon.

Figure 6 shows the number of times a weapon was selected, and also the number of times that weapon was actually used. Baton and pepper spray were given to the boarding team by default for each iteration of the game. Since they were employed on several occasions, they were included in the figure, but the scale was cut off at 20 in order to better plot the contrast in the numbers of selection of other weapons. Blunt trauma gun was among the most selected options, and if selected, it was used in nearly all instances. At the other extreme, smoke grenade was second least selected option, and it was never employed. Tear gas and pepper spray tended to be used fairly often for the crowd-control turn. For comparison, in the lethal option, machine gun was employed 18 times (out of 30) while it was employed only twice for the hybrid option.

Figure 7 shows the total injuries in the hybrid option caused by each weapon together with the number of times that weapon was used. We see that while the blunt trauma gun was most frequently used, in five out of 14 times it was employed it missed the intended target or was rendered ineffective by the life jacket. TASER had the lowest relative effectiveness (it worked in only 30% of applications). Again, this was caused by the assumed protection afforded by life jackets. For comparison, in the lethal option machine gun caused injury or death in 17 out of 18 times it was employed.





machine gun per team. Such an option would still provide the Blue team with the firepower required to eliminate the threat;

Due to the accuracy issues and the need to close circuit on the target, the participants were concerned that TASER might not be very effective onboard, in particular in open areas and against targets wearing life jackets. These concerns might be overcome by carefully conducted sea trials;

Blunt trauma gun was the system of choice by the Blue players. While it had limited effectiveness against targets wearing life jackets, it was still a good choice against variety of targets including the ones armed with blunt weapons (wrench) and the hostile crowd members; and

The players were hesitant to employ smoke and explosive systems. These might not be very applicable in the maritime setting.

3.3 Surveys

After each game the Blue players were giving short questionnaires assessing their perceptions on NLW costs, benefits, trade-offs, and associated risks. School of thought analysis (SOTA) [4] was used to analyse the results. SOTA looks at the clustering of responses around particular values. It provides interesting perspective of the survey results because it can identify dissenting responses. The root causes of these can then be investigated further. Figures 8-10 show clustering of the responses to survey questions.

The survey had two main components. At first, questions were asked in a form of positive statements and the participants needed to select their degree of agreement with the statement ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. These questions were further divided between costs and benefits. The second component asked the participant to evaluate risks associated with the NLW employment in terms of likelihood and severity of consequences. Following is the list of questions that were asked of the Blue players and a summary of responses. To do so, each response was assigned a numerical value; these were then compared with other responses. The chart in the top right corner of Figures 8-10 show distribution of the responses on a two-dimensional plot, while the diagram in the top left corner show binary tree of the responses.

Benefits:

Q1 The availability of NLW would contribute to mission success.

Q2 The availability of NLW decreased the likelihood of escalation of the confrontation.

Q3 The availability of NLW improved soldier’s freedom of action.

Q4 The availability of NLW decreased the likelihood of friendly and neutral casualties.

Q5 Targets would more likely be compliant if NLW were available.

Q6 The availability of NLW provided improved ability to warn the targets.

The response (Figure 8) clustered around neutral (neither agree nor disagree). There was no particular clustering of responses by environment (i.e., Army, Navy, or USMC). However, there was a tendency of the players with limited or no boarding experience to agree with the benefits, while those with actual exposure to boarding operations tended to have a lower opinion of the potential benefits. The most sceptical responses were to questions four through six (NLW availability would decrease likelihood of friendly and adversary casualties, would enhance ability to warn, and would increase compliance). Most operators with actual boarding experience tended to disagree with these statements.





Figure 8: Summary of survey results for the NLW benefits.

Costs:

Q1 The soldiers would be reluctant to use NLW.

Q2 The availability of NLW would increase the likelihood of unintended lethal consequences.

Q3 The availability of NLW would make the rules of engagement too complicated.

Q4 Adversary may think the weapon being used is lethal and take action accordingly.

Q5 NLW will be prone to overuse (excessive use of force).

Figure 9 shows the results for the costs. The clustering was identical with that obtained for benefits. In this case the participants tended to disagree with the Costs statements. The highest disagreement (i.e., the least concern) was with the statement that soldiers would be reluctant to use NLWs; the opposite was also true, one of the highest concerns was that the operators would be prone to overuse the weapons. Two of the participants, one from Navy and one from Marine Corps, were concerned that the presence of NLWs would make rules of engagement unnecessarily complicated, and may lead to unintended lethal consequences.





Figure 9: Summary of survey results for the NLW costs.

Risks:

Q1 The decision making process will be significantly slower than the case where only LW are used.

Q2 Soldiers will use lethal force when non-lethal force was intended (e.g. use of wrong ammo).

Q3 Soldiers will use non-lethal weapon when lethal force was intended (e.g. use of NL ammo when lethal force was intended to suppress a threat).

Q4 Availability of non-lethal means will lead to faster force escalation (e.g. use a TASER instead of negotiating because that is easy and quick).

Q5 Expectation to use NLW will lead to greater vulnerability of friendly forces.

Q6 The rules of engagement would become too complicated to follow.

Q7 Media or adversary may present NLW employment as excessive use of force.

Q8 Soldiers may be prosecuted for injuries caused by NLW because of undue suffering of victims (e.g., a rubber bullet causing a permanent body injury).

Q9 Adversary may not be able to differentiate between LW and NLW and this may escalate confrontation.

In terms of likelihood (Figure 10, top) most of the risks were assessed as possible, with one of the Marine Corps participants having the most pessimistic view and assessing four (Q1-Q3, Q7) as likely, and Q8 as very likely. On the other extreme was another Marine Corps participant, with actual boarding experience, together with a US Army and a Pakistan Navy participant. This group tended to gravitate toward assessing most of the risks as plausible, with the exception of Q6 (too complicated rules of engagement). The latter was assessed as very likely.





Figure 10: Likelihood (top) and severity of consequences (bottom) for NLW-associated risks.

In terms of severity of consequences (Figure 10, bottom) the overall responses were between somewhat severe and severe; the one with overall worst assessed consequences was Q2 – the risk of inadvertently using lethal ammunition. In this case the clusters were more along service lines. All of the Marines and the US Army





participant were clustered somewhat together, in two sub-clusters. Their responses were close to the average response. Navy participants formed the other group. This group seemed to be little more pessimistic in their views. A possible explanation might be that the former group had more small arms training and consequently felt they would not make such a mistake.

Overall, the questionnaires showed somewhat sceptical attitude toward NLC. Because none of the participants had previous experience with the NLWs, this result may have been influenced by the game dynamics that highlighted potential weaknesses of the non-lethal systems. However, this result highlights the need for extensive field trials to validate the NLW effectiveness for VBSS operations.





4. FORCE PROTECTION OF MOTHER SHIP IN AN ESCORT ROLE

4.1 Scenario

The FP scenario was an extension of the VBSS wargame discussed in the previous two sections. Once the boarding team gained full control of the target vessel, they discovered contraband, and detained several crew members. They received an order from the TG ALPHA headquarters to seize the target vessel, and to escort it to a port in Country X, where they are to hand over both the vessel and the crew to the local authorities. As they approach the port, they have to pass through a fairly congested area with large numbers of small vessel traffic. The intelligence indicates that there is a terrorist organization operating in the area, with an objective to attack a coalition warship using a small boat as a suicide bomb, possibly employing other vessels as a diversion. There is also a risk of drive-by assaults by criminal gangs associated with the detained crew. These assaults could use small arms such as assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

4.2 Seminar Wargame

Because of time constraints, this part of the analysis was conducted as a seminar wargame. The participants would discuss risks and possible countermeasures. These discussions were captured by the analysis team. In the end, the participants filled in a short survey. The participants were the same as the players for the VBSS game.

4.3 Analysis Approach

The primary objective of the analysis plan was to determine utility of non-lethal weapon systems for force protection of a ship in congested conditions, with limited manoeuvrability. The notional systems considered were long-range acoustic and optical warning devices, as well as shorter range systems such as flash bangs. Because the game was organized as a seminar wargame, exact weapon characteristics were not considered. It was generally assumed that the long-range systems would have effective range up to approximately 1km, while the short-range systems would go up to approximately 100m.

A set of four questions were asked of the players; they then discussed their options. The analysis team recorded their feedback, and then administered a questionnaire with seven questions related to the previous discussion.

4.4 Results

The discussion revolved around two possible scenarios of the mother ship being approached by a fast boat in a congested area:

1. Terrorists using the tourist boat for deception – terrorist organizations may use deception, more specifically masquerading as legitimate traffic (e.g. tourist vessel, such as a luxury yacht sailing under a western flag). This was assessed as a realistic possibility by the players; consequently, every boat approaching the ship at high speed should be treated as real threat.

2. What if the tourists are drunk and do not know what they are doing? – this question served as a counterpoint to Point 1. It was assumed that the fast approach is a show of bravado or simple curiosity exhibited by the crew of a legitimate yacht, possibly under influence of alcohol or drugs. That would account for their ignoring warning signals. Overall, it was agreed that as pointed for Point 1, any fast approaching vessel should be considered a threat and intercepted or engaged, especially if there is an indication of an actual terrorist threat.





The two points above served to illustrate the difficulty in making decisions about the force employment in this type of scenario. On one hand there are legitimate FP concerns, and on the other hand the ship needs to avoid causing unnecessary civilian casualties. Following are the captured discussion points organized by a question.

Q1. What could be initial actions by the escort?

• Track small boats entering a predetermined assessment zone with available sensors: navigation radar/surface radar.

• Prepare to deploy ship’s helicopter and RHIBs. One or two RHIBs can easily intercept the threat and warn it while screening the mother ship.

• Identify the approaching boat through visual means; establish if there are any indications and warnings related to it.

• Issue initial warnings via marine VHF radio channel 16. • Try to assess intent (friendly or hostile) towards mother ship; monitor boat’s course and speed

changes using both radars and visual sighting. • The mother ship can try to change her course to see whether the small boat is following her.

Q2. What actions could be taken, and what capabilities would be beneficial to disrupt the approaching boats?

• If the boat cannot be identified, the mother ship will use all means available to attract the boat’s attention. This includes any non-lethal warning capabilities that may be available, but also radio and warning shots. The latter may be problematic in a congested area due to ricochet concerns. These weapons can be installed on the mother ships and organic units.

• In order to intercept a fast attack boat in a congested area, a faster platform may need to be employed. Examples are helicopters, RHIBs, or unmanned systems.

• Helicopters can be extremely useful against small boats. Their speed and manoeuvrability is a great advantage. Helicopters can be the best choice to defend the mother ship; it can be equipped with non-lethal (e.g., laser warning systems or flashbangs) or lethal capabilities. Alternatively, a helicopter may use downdraft to disrupt the small boat’s operation. However, the helicopters may not be available all the time when we required, or it may be threatened by small arms employed by the approaching boat (it becomes a high-value target itself).

• RHIBs, with their shallow draft, are highly manoeuvrable platforms. They can intercept the threat; they might be armed lethal or non-lethal systems (such as portable warning devices or blunt trauma systems for short-range encounters) to disrupt or neutralize threats.

• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are useful for surveillance and intelligence collection on the approaching boats; they can be used for early detection and identification of small boats.

• Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) could play a prominent role in minimizing safety risks to the armed forces by increasing standoff from potential suicide boats.

• Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) can be used to warn, but also to disorient and possibly incapacitate crew of the approaching boats2. The effectiveness of LRAD may depend on the range, weather conditions (humidity), and their number and their locations on the mother ship.

• The Active Denial System (e.g., Silent Guardian™ Protection System) is a directed energy NLC. It can be used to deter approaching boats from relatively long range. This could be a very efficient means of preventing lethal escalation.

2 LRAD project an acoustic signal over large distances. It can be used to transmit either voice (i.e., give directions to approaching

vessels), or very loud noise that can be used to distract or disorient the crew.





• Laser weapon system (LaWS), another directed-energy weapon could be employed to take out small boats that demonstrated hostile intent (e.g., by the way they manoeuvre). This weapon could take a target out of action easily. The ability to engage multiple targets in a quick succession would be a great advantage against small boat threats.

• The mother ship itself may try to generate significant wake; large waves can be difficult to navigate for small boats. However, due to restricted manoeuvrability of the ship in an escort role or in congested area, this may not be feasible. An ability to artificially generate waves in the way of approaching fast boats would create an effective screen and would likely discourage approach from the vessels that do not have adversarial intent.

• Other possible non-lethal capabilities that might be useful include optical devices such as laser dazzlers and flares.

• In summary, the capabilities addressing the approaching threat discussed in response to this question include, in the order of perceived effectiveness3: o Helicopter o RHIB o LRAD o LaWS o Close-in Weapon System o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles o Active Denial System o Optical Devices o Flares

Q3. How effective do you thing the non-lethal weapons be in such a scenario?

• Due to high manoeuvrability and speed of the small boats the non-lethal weapons may not be useful beyond initial employment as warning devices.

• The most effective means of reducing this threat would likely be highly manoeuvrable platforms such as helicopters and RHIBs.

• Consequently, the best NLC would likely be LRAD.

Q4. When should the ship make the switch from non-lethal to lethal, if at all?

• While non-lethal weapons could provide a means to reduce risk of unintended collateral damage (e.g., sinking non-threat vessel), lethal force would likely be necessary to protect the mother ship from actual threat.

• The decision time can be a big factor. If the approaching boats can be detected at longer range NLC could be used as a part of force escalation.

• If the threat is too close, commander might have no option but to employ lethal force immediately. This can include main gun, close-in weapon system, or helicopter capabilities (e.g. hellfire missiles). There is no formula to determine which activity or set of activities to employ.

At the end of the discussion, the seven statements (Table 6) were presented to the participants; they were to select their response ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Again, SOTA was used to analyze the responses. The results are in Figure 11. The responses were widely distributed. While there was overall

3 The first two capabilities refer to platforms rather than weapon systems (lethal or non-lethal). They were possibly selected because the participants were already familiar with them. This makes the list somewhat incoherent because it is impossible to compare these two platforms with the rest of the capabilities; several of the listed capabilities could be mounted on a RHIB or a helicopter.





agreement that NLC would be useful to determine potential hostile intent, there was a navy officer who felt strong disagreement. In terms of response to Q2 and Q3, majority seemed to slightly favour measured response (use flares first, than warning shots); this again suggests potential utility of non-lethal warning systems. The responses to what is more dangerous, engaging wrong target or missing real target were almost evenly divided. There was fairly general agreement that RHIBs or helicopter would be good means of distinguishing possible threat. The responses to Q6 and Q7 about the effects of location on threat probabilities were again almost uniformly divided. There didn’t seem to be any particular patter to clustering.

Table 6: FP scenario questions.

Q1 NLW equipment on mother ship such as LRAD (Long range Acoustic Device) and other hailing devices can be very effective to filter out non-hostile from hostile boats

Q2. As a captain of a war ship after evasive manoeuvre fails: I will fire a flare first; wait for response and then fire warning shots from 0.50 cal

Q3 As a captain of a war ship after evasive manoeuvre fails: I will fire warning shots from 0.50 cal straight away

Q4 False positive (i.e., Bunch of tourists not paying attention and you fire warning shots at them ) is more dangerous than false negatives (Terrorist boat mistaken to be tourists and we didn’t open fire at them)

Q5 Helicopter in the air to investigate during transit improves discrimination of False Positives and Negatives (see Q4 for definitions)

Q6 Tourists are more likely near shores so use own fast boat as scout

Q7 A fast boat in relatively open sea is more likely to be a terrorist boat and this hypothesis should be kept in mind while making the decision to open fire





Figure 11: Responses to questions from FP scenario.





5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 VBSS Scenario

A turn-based table top wargame was developed for this scenario. While only generic weapon system characteristics were used, the methodology itself could be easily adapted or expanded to accommodate more complex scenarios. Thus, while even in the simplified state the game provided some interesting insights to the NLC employment, its real value lies in its future utility as an analysis or training tool.

The VBSS scenario revealed a certain degree of mistrust toward NLC. The scope of the game was somewhat limited due to time constraints. For example, employment of non-lethal systems by the mother ship in order to disrupt or disorient the boarded vessel’s crew was not considered at all. However the game provided some interesting insights into the preferences toward particular NLC. The most popular selection (and most used) was a multi-shot “Blunt trauma gun”. However, the game has also shown possible risks of trading lethal capability (e.g., a submachine gun for a blunt trauma gun). While some of the participants selected smoke or explosive-based systems, these were rarely or never employed. Pepper spray and tear gas were used to deal with a hostile crowd situation, not against individual targets.

Among the identified concerns were too complicated rules of engagement, inadvertent use of lethal systems when non-lethal system was intended. Interestingly, some of the participants did not think that non-lethal systems would help in identifying potentially hostile targets.

5.2 FP Scenario

In order to manage the scope of the project, this part of the study was conducted as a seminar wargame. The participants discussed a set of questions revolving around the FP tasks in a situation when manoeuvring was restricted. Again the discussion revealed certain mistrust toward NLC. The participants perceived the employment of RHIBs and/or maritime helicopter as the most effective FP means. In terms of NLC, their focus was on warning systems such as LRAD or optical warning systems. In addition, active denial was brought up by the participants as a plausible system (the information about this system was not provided by the analysis team).

However, a quick survey administered at the end revealed that the somewhat reserved attitude toward NLC might be due to a lack of exposure. Majority of participants would prefer escalating more slowly and employing visual warning to outright engaging the target (e.g., using warning shots). This reinforces potential benefits of NLC designed to warn the approaching vessels, or disrupting their ability to navigate. This would include LRAD, optical warning devices, and some of the participants desired artificial wave generators.

5.3 Table Top Wargames

The VBSS wargame, and the proposed FP wargame (in Appendix C) could enrich analysis, training, and course of action development for MIO. The table top turn-based wargame approach provides a cost-effective alternative to computer simulations, can be easily set up and assessed. These games provide significant extension to scenario discussions or simple seminar wargames, because they provide also the OPFORCE perspective, and possible counter-measures to friendly force actions. In addition, the stochastic component (e.g., the inclusion of hit and kill probabilities) can simulate the effects of uncertainties, and as was observed during the games, can significantly change the situational dynamics. Therefore it is recommended to pursue this approach further.





REFERENCES

[1] NATO SAS-094 Terms of Reference: Analytical Support to the Development and Experimentation of NLW Concepts of Operation and Employment (SAS-094), 2011

[2] K. Sheehy, et. al, NNTEX 15-Maritime Execution and Analysis Plan, Draft, May 2015

[3] P. Dobias, J. Nelson, P. Paulissen, NATO Non-Lethal Weapons Concept Development Assessment Game – Land, 29-30 October 2014, Brussels, Belgium, STO-TR-SAS-094

[4] F. Cameron and G. Pond, Military Decision Making Using Schools of Thought Analysis – A Soft Operational Research Technique, with Numbers, in proceedings from 27th International Symposium on Military Operational Research, 2010, http://ismor.cds.cranfield.ac.uk/27th-symposium-2010, accessed 4 July 2015

http://ismor.cds.cranfield.ac.uk/27th-symposium-2010





APPENDIX A

Figure A-1 shows an example of the adjudication sheet used to determine weapon effects during the game.

Figure A-1: Adjudication spreadsheet.

FIRE

NO FIRE

PUNDER INFLUENCELIFE JACKETEFFECTIVENESSLife Jacket/Wet EffectFinal ProbRandom FIRE IS TARGET WET? RESULTMachine Gun 0.8 1 0.8 0.19 SUCCESS FIRE Medium Injury

Hand Gun 0.6 1 0.6 0.81 MISS FIRE MISS

Smoke Grenade 0.7 1 0.7 0.5 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury

Led Incapacitor 0.8 1 0.8 0.06 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury

Rubber Ball Grenade 0.6 0.7 1 0.42 0.65 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Taser X2 0.5 1 0.5 0.25 0.54 MISS FIRE MISS

Blunt Trauma Gun 0.8 1 1 0.8 0.4 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury

Tear Gas 0.7 1 0.7 0.83 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Pepper Spray 0.8 1 0.8 0.72 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury

Pepperball Gun 0.8 1 1 0.8 0.35 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury

Malodorant 0.7 1 0.7 0.85 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Stun Grenade 0.5 1 0.5 0.48 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury

Machine Gun 0.8 1 0.8 0.2 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury

Hand Gun 0.6 1 0.6 0.19 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury

Smoke Grenade 0.7 1 0.7 0.73 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Led Incapacitor 0.8 0.8 0.64 0.91 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Rubber Ball Grenade 0.7 1 1 0.7 0.35 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury

Taser X2 0.5 1 0.5 0.25 0.63 MISS NO FIRE MISS





Malodorant 0.7 1 0.7 0.31 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury



Hand Gun 0.6 1 0.6 0.99 MISS FIRE MISS

Smoke Grenade 0.4 1 0.4 0.41 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Led Incapacitor 0.8 0.8 0.64 0.38 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury





Pepper Spray 0.5 1 0.5 0.77 MISS NO FIRE MISS



Stun Grenade 0.4 1 0.4 0.91 MISS NO FIRE MISS

Machine Gun 0.8 1 0.8 0.83 MISS NO FIRE MISS


Smoke Grenade 0.7 1 0.7 0.44 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury



Taser X2 0.5 1 0.5 0.25 0.11 SUCCESS NO FIRE Medium Injury




Pepperball Gun 0.8 1 1 0.8 0.99 MISS NO FIRE MISS





Smoke Grenade 0.4 0.4 0.16 0.89 MISS NO FIRE MISS


Rubber Ball Grenade 0.8 1 0.5 0.4 0.79 MISS NO FIRE MISS


Blunt Trauma Gun 0.8 1 0.5 0.4 0.19 SUCCESS NO FIRE Minor Injury

Tear Gas 0.4 0.4 0.16 0.72 MISS NO FIRE MISS



Malodorant 0.3 1 0.3 0.48 MISS NO FIRE MISS


IF Wet

RND Minor InjuryMedium InjuryMajor Injury/DeathRESULT Minor Injury Medium Injury Major Injury/Death RESULT

Machine Gun 0.30975782 0.1 0.4 0.5 Medium Injury

Hand Gun 0.31747555 0.1 0.3 0.6 Medium Injury

Smoke 0.86833243 0.7 0.27 0.3 Medium Injury

Led Incapacitor 0.19541744 0.8 0.2 0 Minor Injury

Hand Grenade-Rubber Ball 0.72269226 0.6 0.35 0.05 Medium Injury

Taser X2 0.60301513 0.5 0.4 0.1 Medium Injury 0.3 0.5 0.2 Medium Injury

Rubber Bullet 0.02398164 0.6 0.38 0.02 Minor Injury

Tear Gas 0.44380293 0.7 0.28 0.02 Minor Injury

Pepper Spray 0.06222618 0.8 0.18 0.02 Minor Injury

Pepperball Gun 0.55909626 0.6 0.37 0.03 Minor Injury

Malodorant 0.04431091 0.6 0.37 0.03 Minor Injury

Stun Grenade 0.70030375 0.6 0.37 0.03 Medium Injury

RND Minor Injury Medium Injury Major Injury/Death RESULT

0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 Medium Injury

ENGINE

BRIDGE

CARGO

LIVING AREA

BOW YES

NO

NO

NO

NO NO

YES

NO

NO

NO





APPENDIX C: FORCE PROTECTION OF A VESSEL IN CONGESTED AREAS – PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR WARGAME

C-1 INTRODUCTION In congested areas a military ship, especially when escorting another vessel, may be endangered by a small boat threat. These small vessels may be laden with explosives in order to damage or destroy either of the vessels. Alternatively, there may be swarms of small boats or individual boats loaded with gunmen armed with rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, etc. Here, a methodology is proposed for a wargame enabling a better insight into force protection means. Following are examples of questions that could be addressed:

a. What initial actions could be taken by the ship when a rapidly-approaching boat is detected?

b. How do these actions change after visual confirmation of the boat’s identity?

c. When should the ship employ lethal or non-lethal capabilities?

d. How effective would non-lethal weapons be in such a scenario?

e. What other means could be employed (e.g., RHIBs or Helicopter/ Camcopter), and how effective would these means be?

C-2 WARGAME METHODOLOGY Type of Game. The game would be played as an open board game where the area of operation can be divided into grids or hexagons. Two teams would be required for the game; the escort-vessel team and the fast-boat team. Alternatively, the fast-boat team might be played by the analysis team, but this would somewhat limit the effectiveness of the opposing force (OPFORCE). Having a separate fast-boat team would likely lead to better insights, because they would be better focused on their mission than a team playing this role in addition to other duties (i.e., analysis).

Weapons/ Assets Available. The following information would need to defined before start of the game:

a. Helicopter characteristics (sensors, weapons, range, time on station, etc.)

b. RHIB characteristics (speed, armament, crew)

c. Camcopter/ Small ship-launched UAV characteristics (sensors, marking/warning systems, range, speed)

d. Weapon systems (lethal and non-lethal) (range, effectiveness, purpose, ship-mounted or not, etc.)

Threat Generation. Fast boat threat would be generated by the OPFORCE in different hexagons on the board depending upon the sensor ranges of the ship. Using a random number generator and pre-defined probabilities the nature of the boat would be determined (is it local traffic, gunmen, suicide attack, etc.). Multiple iteration of the game would thus explore a wide range of actions taken by the ship. Multiple threats and non-threat ships could be generated for each iteration of the game.

Asset Deployment. The escort ship may choose to deploy assets available at various stages of the threat approach. There would be a penalty associated with premature or inappropriate action (e.g., sinking a fishing or tourist boat). Similarly, a penalty can be imposed to simulated delays or temporary limitations on the ship’s manoeuvrability. For example, they may choose to launch a RHIB but will lose one turn while doing so. Similarly, every asset would have limited endurance (defined in terms of the number of turns it would be available). For instance, a RHIB could stay launched for 10 turns. Thereafter, it would have to return to refuel. Additional penalty would be introduced to simulate limitations imposed by retrieving and re-launching the





RHIB. A similar technique would be applied to helicopters.

Movement of Assets. The available assets could be repositioned at the start of each turn. For example, the ship (and the escorted vessel) might be moved up to two hexagons in each turn. The ship personnel might choose to position the RHIBs (if lowered) and move them up to three hexagons each turn. The ship team would need to consider the ranges of own sensors to maintain its situational awareness. White/Red cell may choose to inject additional fishing and pleasure craft during some turns and play with no threat at all (to attempt to stimulate a false engagement or a friendly-fire incident).

Multiple Gameplays. Multiple iterations of the game would be conducted employing variety of capabilities to assess their effectiveness. Game plays can also be divided into a screening phase and a ship actions phase (once a fast boat penetrates the screen, i.e., gets past the RHIB or helicopter. During the ship-action phase effectiveness of various capabilities and courses of action could be exploited.

Ship-Action Phase. In order to ascertain the possible actions by the ship itself to counter the fast boat threat, this phase can be played in cases where the fast boat penetrates the outer screen formed by other assets, such as a RHIB. Ship actions near ports may also include calling on the local law enforcement or host nation military for assistance. This phase may serve not only for the evaluation of concepts and capabilities, but for planning rehearsal and tactics validation. A sample of responses is shown below:

a. Alteration of course by the escort vessel

b. Establish VHF radio contact

c. Attract attention using flares, or acoustic or visual devices

d. Establish identity of the approaching boat

e. Fire warning shots

f. Shoot to disable

g. Shoot to kill

Capability and Action Cards. Weapon and sensor systems could be represented through capability card that would be used by players as required. Similarly, certain actions could be scripted and included in a form of action cards.

Simultaneous Gameplays. In some instances it may be useful to have the game board designed so that two scenarios can be played simultaneously. For example, one could play the same scenario with and without RHIB to assess effectiveness of this capability or the impact of a lack thereof.

Data Collection and Management Plan (DCMP). The DCMP developed for the game would need to record all actions by the escort ship and also keep track of locations of all vessels of interest during each turn. This may be useful because positions of vessels during one iteration may have multiple possible outcomes. These could be then scripted for later games and/or used as inputs for multiple scenarios.

C-3 CONCLUSION Force protection of ships in congested areas is a challenging task that could benefit from standing table-top wargaming capability. Such capability could be employed to assess capability requirements, rehearse plans, validate courses of action, etc. This Appendix provides a possible approach to developing such a wargame. Analytical approaches tailored to specific objectives and solid measures of performance would have to be developed as well; however, these would change from problem to problem and likely could not be defined ahead of time.

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