Empedocles' Cosmic CycleAuthor(s): Denis O'BrienSource: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May, 1967), pp. 29-40Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637758Accessed: 18/10/2008 04:34

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EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

HITHERTO reconstructions of Empedocles' cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence for Empedocles' main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments and of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles' cosmic cycle.'

I In fr. 17 Empedocles describes how the world grows to be one from many

and then again grows apart to be many from one. This allows us to distinguish initially two processes of unification and separation and two states of com- pleted unity and completed separation. But we must keep an open mind on the relative duration of these times and on the condition of the world particularly at the two terminal states of complete unity and complete separation.

In the Plysics Aristotle tells us that Empedocles' world moved and was at rest in turn.2 That there is movement when the elements are becoming one or becoming many is clear both in itself and from what Aristotle tells us: KWveLOaLt JLEv orTav X eXtLa (K rTOAACWV TOLji TO EV TO VELKOS TroAa e7 evos), LqpE?petv

' Ev TOlS iETcrav) XpdVotS.3 But it is not clear whether the world is at rest for both in between times, complete unity and complete separation, or for only one. Aristotle's use of singular and plural, Tov ,ueTaiv) Xpdvov4 and ev -roLs .LEra

XpovoLs,5 is no indication either way. Therefore the sense of Aristotle's remarks has to be determined from passages elsewhere in his works. In the De generatione et corruptione Aristotle says that the elements arose from the Sphere LaZ T7jv KtvwaT.6 This most naturally implies that separation and movement began together. It would be possible but less simple to suppose that before the elements were separated the Sphere was moving in some less genetic fashion. In the De caelo Aristotle twice implies that at the other terminal point, com- plete separation, the elements were moving. He is arguing for the priority of natural movement.7 Without a world or before the world began there could not be, as Plato and the Atomists supposed, disordered movement existing on its own. There could not be any movement, only rest. Thus Anaxagoras is right in principle to start his cosmogony from a unity that was at rest. Aristotle continues: E'K 8toErctTroWv Kal KLVOVE'VWV OVK EV;Aoyov TroLEv rl7FV dyeveLm. 8to KaU

This article summarizes the results of a pedokles-Doxographie', Hermes xciii (1965), longer work prepared under the supervision 7-33. H6lscher's denial of any cyclic repeti- of Professor W. K. C. Guthrie, who has very tion in Empedocles seems to me very mis- kindly made one or two corrections to the guided. present essay. I should perhaps remark that 2 250b26-251a5 and 252a5-32. this article was completed before the ap- 3 250a27-29. 4 252a9, pearance of U. Holscher, 'Weltzeiten und 5 250b29. 6 315a22. Lebenszyklus, eine Nachpriifung der Em- 7 3002o ff.

'ErTTE8oKA J5s 7rapaAcE'TE r-7v ' r7s- ~7AOTaT-oST oV yap av 77ovvao (avurT-raat TOY oupavOv EK KEXWPLCtaJEV&WV 1LEv KaTacKEvd(aWv, CVYKptLw 8I rTOIWV 7Sf T' XAoTrTa.1

The context clearly implies that Empedocles was committed to starting the generation of increasing Love from elements that were separate and moving. Given the context, there would be no point in the criticism if the elements had been separate and at rest. A little earlier in the same discussion Aristotle criticizes the birth of animal parts under increasing Love immediately after criticizing the random precosmic movement of the Timaeus: Tr 8( i roaoV7 ov

ErTavCpoLT av TrS, ITOTepOV SvvarOTv OV oVX v T7 71V KlVOVEIJVCl aTCKTCWS Ka

IpLyvuvaat 0rotavTas l ets ELa, E' (v owvv raaTL Tar KaTad dvfLcv UrvvLaraTteva

o'Lt!a7ra, AEycO $' olov crra. Kal adpKcas, KcaOTrep 'Eplrre0oKAX7s <fa' yt'vecOat, e'

7TS (tAoT7rTOs7g' AEyEL yap cog "TroAAaal ELEV KopcraI avavXceves esAacrrauav".2 Aristotle's remark fairly clearly presupposes that before Empedocles' elements are made into flesh and bone they are already moving. Their movement is aTdaKTWr because at the beginning of Love's world movement is still largely controlled by Strife.3 Again the point of Aristotle's remark would in this context be largely lost if the movement of the elements at the beginning of increasing Love had been initiated from a time of rest. These two passages from the De caelo confirm the interpretation of the De generatione et corruptione. If the elements under complete Strife were moving, there is no time when they can have been at rest except in the Sphere.

Simplicius speaks of two rest periods in each cycle, rest under complete movement and rest at the time of complete separation.4 Simplicius' extensive quotations,5 and his ability to illustrate topics such as the role of Love6 or the admission of chance7 with quotations of his own choosing, make it very likely that he had access to the whole of the physical poem. But the alternation in time between the one and the many does not seriously engage Simplicius' attention: for Empedocles' alternation Simplicius sees as describing in mythical terms the difference between the intelligible and the sensible world.8 Em- pedocles never really intended there to be a time when Strife would be in complete control of the world and the elements would be fully separated.9 Consequently it is not unnatural for Simplicius to let himself be guided on the details of alternate rest and movement by what he supposes Aristotle is saying. But we have seen that Aristotle in the Physics is ambiguous. He does not make it clear whether he is thinking of one rest period in each cycle or of two. It is easy to see why Simplicius chooses the interpretation that he does, the wrong interpretation as it happens. For on Aristotelian principles, between opposed movements rest must intervene;I0 and becoming one from many and many from one are opposed movements par excellence. I I Later Simplicius shows clearly

I 301 ai4-I8. poem. This would account for from seven 2 300b25-3I. to eight per cent. of the whole work, if we 3 Cf. De gen. et corr. 333bI6-2o and b22-33. accept the figure in the Suda, s.v. 'Ejv7re?o-

The point of this passage is that initially KAfs, of 2,000 verses for the physical poem. Aristotle expects Love to be the cause of 6 De caelo 528. 29-530. I I.

natural movement and Strife the cause of 7 Phs. 330. 31-331. i6. unnatural movement. He argues that in 8 Sample passages are Phys. 31. 18-34. 17, fact the reverse turns out to be the case, for I60. 22-16I. I3, 1123. 25--II24. i8, II86.

his purpose is to indicate a lack of con- 30-35; De caelo 140. 25-141. II, 294-. 10-13, sistency in Empedocles' system. 530. i2-i6, 590. I9-591. 6.

4 Phys. 1125. I5-22. 9 De caelo 530. 22-26, cf. Phys. I 1121. 17-2 1.

5 Simplicius quotes over a hundred and IO Phys. 26Ia3I-b26.

fifty verses or part verses of the physical I Phys. 229a7-b22.

D. O'BRIEN 30

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

that he has been influenced by this line of thought. He writes: . . . KatL r

7jpetLev Ev rTWL /LETaev Xpovcol' TO v yap evav7Lwc KLvrareWV I7tpE/la JLEraETv EoUTv.I When after a long digression Simplicius turns to Aristotle's second set of

remarks on alternate movement and rest in Empedocles' world he records the opinion of Eudemus that there was only one rest period in each cycle: EN;rqjlos

? -7V a K tLVr7laV EV T7 Lt rjTS LAlCLaS E mTLKpaTCELta KaTa rOV bCalpov EKSEoXETa .E

Eudemus' opinion is left to stand without comment. Simplicius' view of the cycle leaves him without the interest to retrace his steps and to discover for himself whether there was one rest period or two. But Eudemus does not, as has been supposed,3 contradict Aristotle. For Simplicius' point in introduc- ing Eudemus is that Eudemus made it clear that he thought of the Sphere alone as at rest. And that, as we have seen, was the view of Aristotle. Eudemus is opposed not to Aristotle, but to Simplicius' false interpretation of Aristotle.

Plutarch knew Empedocles well. He often quotes from Empedocles or refers to him,4 and Lamprias' catalogue records a work in ten books on Empedocles,s to which Hippolytus once refers.6 In the De facie Plutarch introduces a de- scription of Empedocles' world under total Strife as a warning against too strict an interpretation of the Aristotelian and Stoic doctrine of a natural place for each element, a doctrine which would prevent the moon being made of earth. In the course of this description Empedocles' elements are clearly said to be moving: f'evyovaaL Kal drroaTpeqodlevaL Kal q?epollevac bopds 3Sias Kal avOdSeLt.7 It is true that very soon afterwards there is a reminiscence of the random movement of the Timaeus. But there is no reason to suppose8 that Plutarch's anticipation of Plato will have falsified his reference to Empedocles. We have already seen in Aristotle a comparison of Empedocles' state of total Strife with the random movement of the receptacle in Plato's Timaeus.

There is perhaps a difficulty in the way of our accepting Aristotle's evidence that the Sphere was at rest. In the passage of the Physics which we have made use of Aristotle introduces the following verses to confirm or to illustrate alternate movement and rest in Empedocles:

OUVTCWS 7t tLEEV EV K 7TAEOVWV fLEJLa0rCEKE (eVEOat 7)6 a Tr&Atv SLtavvTos evos TTrAOV Kr EK7EAEOoVUL,

rT7t tev yLyvovTat re Ktal ov Co(toV trrtTESo alcv

7rL be rTa(' dXAAoTrovTra SLa/L7repes ovSa/aL A)ye1, 7ravwTr1 S atv Eacv aKteva 77'0t Kara KVKAov.9

Following von Arnimlo it is now quite widely held" that Aristotle has

II183. 26-28. 2 I 83. 28-1184. 4- 3 Karsten, Empedoclis Agrigen:tini .. frag-

menta, Amsterdam, 1838, p. 367. Solmsen, Aristotle's system of the physical world, a com- parison with his predecessors, Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1960, p. 223 n. 4. Cf. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar, Heft 8, Basel, 1955, Eudemos bon Rhodos fr. I0, and p. o09.

4 Plutarch quotes some hundred verses or part verses.

5 No. 43 corrected by Treu, Der sogenannte Lampriascatalog der Plutarchschriften, Walden- burg in Schlesien, 1873, ad loc.

6 Ref. 5. 20. 6.

7 926D-927A.

8 As does Cherniss, Loeb edition of the De facie (I957) ad loc.

9 Fr. 26. 8-I2 = fr. 17. 9-13. 10 'Die Weltperioden bei Empedokles',

Festschrift Th. Gomperz dargebracht, Wien, 1902, pp. 17-I8. The view is derived from Alexander and Simplicius, Phys. 1123-5.

" Bignone, Empedocle, studio critico, Torino, 1916, p. 562 n. 3, p. 592 n. i, s.v. fr. 17. 0o. Cornford, Loeb edition of the Plysics I952 ad loc. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Pre- socratic philosophy, Baltimore, 1935, p. I75 n. I30. Apparently Ross, edition of the Phy,sics, Oxford, I955, ad loc. Munding, 'Zur Beweisfiihrung des Empedokles', Hermes

3I1

misunderstood aKvT,rot to mean literally motionless, whereas the sense of the

piece makes it clear that Empedocles intends the elements to be adcL'v7ro in so far as they are fixed forever in a cycle of change. It might possibly be argued that Aristotle has founded his interpretation of alternate periods of rest on his misunderstanding of this verse. But it is unlikely that Aristotle has in fact misunderstood dKIV1TroL. For he adds in a note to the quotation that we must understand the last verse but one to mean 'in so far as the elements changefrom here' or 'from here to there'.' 'Here' may mean the world last mentioned, the world of becoming many from one, or it may mean the world of immediate experience.2 Now the present world Aristotle knew was the world of increasing Strife: he complains of Empedocles' failure to provide a cause for the world 'being the same now under increasing Strife as it was before under increasing Love'.3 Thus in either case 'here' should be the world of increasing Strife. But Aristotle cannot have supposed that as the world moved on from here, i.e. from increasing Strife, the elements came to be at rest: for, as we have seen, Aristotle knows that under total Strife the elements are moving. Thus Aristotle cannot have misunderstood the verses in the way that has been suggested, though he may have misunderstood them in a less obvious way.4

In that case we may wonder how Aristotle saw these verses as a suitable illustration of the alternation of rest and movement. An answer may be that Aristotle sees the alternation between rest and movement as underlying the alternation between one and many. For rest and unity, movement and plurality were regularly associated by the Presocratics: by Xenophanes,s by the Pytha- goreans,6 by Parmenides,7 by Anaxagoras,8 and in their own way by the Atomists, who probably gave no 'moving cause' because they saw plurality as ultimate,9 as well as by Plato in the Timaeus. I It is likely that Empedocles also saw rest and movement as dependent in some way upon unity and plurality,

lxxxii (1954), 135. Solmsen, H.S.C.P. lxiii (1958), 277, and op. cit., p. 223 n. 4. Kahn, Anaximander and the origins of Greek cosmology, New York, 1960, p. 23.

1 The reading evGevWe has better textual support, E K and Simplicius, though it is not adopted by Ross. evOE've EKEfOE, F H I J, is probably an attempt to explain a puzzling phrase. The process of expansion can be seen at work in Simplicius, cf. 125. 5 and 17-18, from whom the fuller reading has possibly arisen. evOevSe is all that is needed for the interpretation of Aristotle's note suggested below.

2 This latter sense would be like the use of evOevO e and ecKEFae as a pair or separately to describe the contrast between this world and the world of forms or the world beyond the grave, e.g. Plato, Phaedo 07 e, 117 c, Theaet. 176 a, and see L.S.J., s.v.

3 De gen. et corr. 334a5-9. 4 Aristotle's note suggests perhaps that he

has taken the first three lines and the last two lines to describe not the same cycle from different points of view, which is Empedocles' intention, but different phases of the cycle. The first three lines could be taken to de-

scribe the elements passing into and out of the Sphere, 'in so far as they grow to be one from many and then many from one'. This involves discontinuity of change from move- ment to rest and rest to movement, which Aristotle would agree was not jsTreTCos alov. The last two lines, if they describe movement from here, i.e. from increasing Strife, would describe a period of movement with no rest, and this Aristotle would be inclined to agree is being 'fixed in a cycle'.

5 Frr. 23, 24, 25, 26. 6 Arist. Met. 986a22-26. Porph. Vit. Pyth.

38. Plut. De Is. et Os. 370D-E. 7 Fr. 8 especially lines 4, 26, 29-30, 36-41. 8 Anaxagoras' mixture, in some sense a

unity, was at rest and the effect of movement was to separate out its parts.

9 Cf. Guthrie, J.H.S. lxxvii ( 957), 40-41. Simplicius was probably wrong to think of the atoms as kv'aac adKctvlra, Phys. 42. 10-II.

10 57 e, cf. 52 e, 57 c, 58 d-e, 62 b i. The association of rest and unity may be seen at Phaedrus 245 d 6-ei (preferably reading yyv), where there may be a reminiscence of the return of Empedocles' world to the Sphere. Cf. Phaedo 72 b-d.

D. O'BRIEN 32

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

Love being in some sense cause of rest, while Strife is cause of movement.I But whereas rest and movement were of primary importance for Aristotle and his school, what interested Empedocles more was unity and plurality. Thus Em- pedocles describes explicitly the alternation of unity and plurality in fr. 17. The accompanying alternation of rest and movement was probably included more or less incidentally in the account of the different phases of unity and plurality. If so, Aristotle's alternative to quoting the lines he does would have been to quote snippets like those Eudemus has chosen:2 and these would have obscured what for Aristotle was of leading interest, namely the regular succession of periods of rest and movement. Aristotle was aware of the tra- ditional association of rest with unity and of movement with plurality.3 Quite likely he has accepted the alternation between unity and plurality as a good enough reminder of the parallel alternation between rest and movement.

II

At the end of his second discussion of rest and movement in Empedocles Aristotle writes: TO oS KaL &t' I'acov Xpdovcv oTra Xoyov o vo'S.4 At first sight it

might be thought that this sentence was a mere appendage, a footnote in- cidental to what has preceded. In that case the place of Aristotle's 'equal times' in Empedocles' cycle would perhaps have to be left an open question. But an examination of the passage makes it reasonably clear that the sentence is an organic part of Aristotle's argument and that these are equal times of rest and movement. Aristotle complains that Empedocles has not provided a cause of alternation. Love and Strife cause only their own activity, not their alternation in power: avrTa I Ev yap OVK at'Lra ra vTroreOevra, ov8e ToOT' jv Tro dCAoTrrT 7 VE,LKE elvatA, T& IEV To gvvayetv, arov oE T otaKpvev. el be TrpocropLertTa rO

EpE&, A,Kreov , ' ,,, oi, w., srw Cr , . .. Ev tEPE5 AEKTE`oV EP Uc'V OVT)S, cC07T?Ep OTC EaUTv T 0 ovvayeL TOVS vupcoW7rovs, 7

<At'a, Kal 0evyovatv ot EXOpo?t aAAq'Aovs TOTo yap VTroTNerat KaL ev t !r oAct Elvat' atfcveraL yap EIr rTtvov ovTrwc. TO, e Kal t' acov Xpovcwv 8ETraI Aoyov TiVS.S5 Here Aristotle allows that in a sense Empedocles has argued correctly to the existence of Love and Strife on a cosmic scale from the observation of par- ticular events. But this limited praise of Empedocles loses its point unless Aristotle reiterates that the alternation of Love and Strife should have been given a similar explanation. Thus -rTo e K~al &' o'acov xpdovwV, etc., picks up and repeats el Se IrpoaopLetTraL To ev /EVpet. This in turn looks back to the two earlier definitions: ev LEpet Tro 7Trv S7peleWrv Ka KatvetOal Trdatv6 and To KpaTelV KaL KlVElV EV iLEpEL T7'V si&ALav Kal TO VECKOS V7TrdpXEi rots 7TpTpataow El dvdyK V s., 7pelEF,v Se TO'v peTrav Xpovov.7 Aristotle's references to alternation have become increasingly abbreviated. But almost certainly it remains the same alternation which he has primarily in mind throughout the passage, the alternation of rest and movement. We have seen that Aristotle knew that the Sphere alone was at rest. Thus Aristotle's remark will mean that the Sphere lasted for as long

I The notion of Love as primarily cause De caelo 30 iai--14, and Simplicius' com- of rest is the more likely if, as we shall argue, ments, Phys. 22. I6-I8 and 42. 8-io on Love's time of rest in the Sphere lasts for as Arist. Phys. I84bI5-I8. long as the world of movement and plurality 4

252a31-32. that in a sense 'belongs' to Strife. 5 252a25-32.

2 Frr. 27. I, 3-4, 31, ap. Simpl. Phys. 6 252a2o-2I.

1I83. 28-1184.4. 7 2527-IO.

3 Met. IOO4b27-29, cf. Phys. 201bi6-21, 4599.1 D

33

as the whole period of separation and movement, i.e. the period which includes increasing Strife, total Strife, and increasing Love.

This is quite likely the implication of fr. 30:

avTrap 7Tret ,eya NelKOS' VL t1LEAEEarat EOpEq`0r7

ES rLTUas T7 avopovcre rEACtolEvotO xpovoto,

0os acrv d4Oiatos- rTAar`os0 Trap' cA'OAara OpKOV . . .

(The limbs in the first line will be Strife's limbs, not as is commonly supposed the limbs of the Sphere.) Aristotle quotes this fragment in a passage of the

Metaphysics which reproduces exactly, though in a somewhat shorter form, the

argument of the passage in the Physics.' da/otlaros, though singular in form, should imply two times, a time that is given and a time that is received. The

simplest rate of exchange would be for Love and Strife to have equal times.

Quite likely therefore the fragment implies that Love now cedes to Strife a time equal in length to the time that Love has herself enjoyed during the

Sphere. The second time it will be simplest to suppose lasts for as long as there is movement and separation in the world, i.e. until the rebirth of the Sphere.

There remains the question: for how long were the elements separated under total Strife ? The answer to this question we must defer for a moment.

III

In fr. 35. I o we hear that when Love is prevailing Strife is driven increasingly 7r' Ecrxara reptar'a KVKAOV. Where does Love go when Strife is prevailing?

The answer is not, as has usually been supposed,2 that Love in her turn is driven outside the world. That idea has been accepted simply for the sake of its symmetry. The opening lines of the fragment tell us that Love was confined to the centre of the world when Strife's power was at its height:

E7re; NEdKOS JLV evepTrarTv lKETO fOEVoOS Stvs, v E' /zca`rt OtAor7s Trrpo4aALyyt yEve-raL,

EV T Lrm & ra? lrTvra UvvepXEcraL Ev /Iovov euat,

OVK dq'ap, aAAa OeAr)i avvtratleV' cAAoOev aaAAa.

Empedocles does not here describe the position of Love and Strife during the

Sphere and then go back to recount the events which have led to their being in that position. It is true, things are said to come together: and then we are told, 'not all at once'. But that does not mean that OVK da'ap, aAAa OeArJ,al qualifies itKETO and ye-rat as well as avvEepXELra. tKETO describes an action com-

pleted before ovvEepXcraL and completed it should remain, no matter for how long the events described in arvvepxeTra are then said to continue. Equally, &ve'prarov PevOos is not likely to mean the Sphere's outermost circumference, the same as EroxaTa TrEp[Lar'a KVKAov. Like the Latin imus or infimus used of the centre of

AI et. 0ooo0b12-17 don, 1952, p. 90. Mugler, 'Deux themes de 2 e.g. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th la cosmologie grecque, devenir cyclique et

edition, London, 1930, pp.234, 236, 242. pluralit6 des mondes', Jltudes et Commentaires Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, London, xvii (1953), 42-43. Zafiropulo, Empedocle 1912, p. 239. Bignone, pp. 223, 576, 585. d'Agrigente, Paris, I953, p. 15I. Raven, The Frenkian, JEtudes de philosophie presocratique, Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1957, ii, Paris, 1937, pp. 53-55. Freeman, The p. 346. Santillana, The Origins of Scientific Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd edition, Oxford, Thought, London, I961, pp. I 12-13. I 949, p. i 86. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, Lon-

D. O'BRIEN 34

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

a sphere,' eveppraros will more naturally describe the centre of the whirl, not its circumference: and Strife therefore will have been at the centre of the whirl before it is driven Err' E'rxaa 7r'pLara KVKAOV. The tense and mood of yEvrraL are

probably correct, as generalizing the events described. The change of mood from LKETro to yevqrat,2 from particular to general, is like the change of mood from general to particular in some of Homer's similes.3 'When Strife reached the innermost depth of the whirl, and whenever Love has come4 to be in the centre of the whirl, (then) there (in the centre) do all things (begin to) come together to be one only, not at once but gradually drawing together from different directions.' Thus Love is driven to the centre of the world when Strife prevails. When Love prevails she expands from the centre and drives Strife to the circumference.

Fragment 35 completes our understanding of the temporal structure of the cycle. There is obviously not meant to be any very long delay between the action of LtKETr or yevrlra and of vvpepXErat. Increasing Love follows more or less at once upon Strife's reaching the innermost centre at the height of its power. Now the time of increasing Love will presumably, for reasons of sym- metry, be equal to the time of increasing Strife. Thus we have two alternations in the life of the world. There is first the major alternation between one and many or rest and movement. Then there is the minor alternation within the period of movement and separation between becoming many and becoming one, with only a short while when the elements are fully separated. Each alternation is composed of equal parts, of halves. This is probably in part the answer, in so far as there was an answer, to Aristotle's demand for a cause of alternation. 'Equal times' probably seemed to Empedocles the obvious and natural result of the broad oath of fr. 30 and of the broad oaths and necessity of fr. I 5. In this way equality, equal times, will in Empedocles' eyes probably have helped to explain how the world alternates between being one and being many, the major alterna- tion, and between becoming one and becoming many, the minor alternation. s

IV

How were the elements arranged under total Strife? Tannery writes :6 'On ne doit pas ... supposer que le Neikos arrive a produire une separation com- plete des elements, de fagon a conduire chacun d'eux a une place determinee de l'univers; son action n'ira pas plus loin qu'une dissociation complete de l'homogene, et dans cet etat de dissociation, le repos originaire aura fait place a un tohu-bohu ofu s'agitent, en mouvements desordonnes, les masses elemen- taires, indistinctes et confuses.' Tannery's description is in part bound up with

I Cicero, De nat. deorum I. 103, 2. 84, 2. clauses, sect. 467 and 534, should be ex- i i6, Tusc. Disp. 5. 69. Manilius, I. 170. plained in the same way. Macrobius, in Somnium Scipionis i. 22. 4. 4 The aorist subjunctive when followed in

2 This change of mood Wilamowitz finds this way by a present indicative regularly has 'undenkbar', Hermes lxv (1930), 248-9, and the sense of the English perfect, see Goodwin, Groningen 'impossible', 'La composition sect. 90. litt6raire archaique grecque', Verhandelingen s For the importance of equality in Em- der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van pedocles and among the Presocratics Wetenschappen, Afdelung Letterkunde, Nieuwe generally see Vlastos, 'Equality and Justice Reeks lxv. 2 (1958), 2 6 n. 2. in Early Greek Cosmologies', Classical

3 II. 4. I41 ff., I6. 297 ff., 21. 522 if., Philology xlii (I947), 156-78. quoted by Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, sect. 6 Pour l'histoire de la science hellene, 2nd 547-9. The change of mood between opta- edition by Dies, Paris, 1930, p. 319. tive and indicative in parallel subordinate

35

his belief that there is only one world from Sphere to Sphere, with 'increasing Strife' a mere preliminary sorting out of the elements. But as if to refute Tannery's very words that none of the separated elements had 'une place determinee de l'univers', Plutarch in the passage already quoted from the De .facie introduces Empedocles' state of total Strife to indicate precisely what would happen if each element were restricted to its 'natural' place in the universe. That is also the implication of Aristotle's criticism in the De caelo that Empedocles omitted to describe the origin of the universe under increas- ing Love. Aristotle's point presupposes that the elements have been arranged by Strife in essentially the positions which they already occupy in Aristotle's world. Thus Empedocles' elements, when fully separated by Strife, will have been arranged in concentric spheres.

V

There is evidence that, at least for some part of the cycle, Love and Strife were perhaps also thought of as arranged in roughly concentric spheres, fr. 17. I7-20:

Toe a' 8ev IrrWXov' O E voS ECvat,

Trvp Kal V8wp Kat yata Kal ^jepos arAETroV ios?,

NetLKo' r ovtAO4LevoV StXa r6tv, araAavrov aTravrTtr,

Kal ltX LAo7r v rotawtV, tr7 tfljKOS re 7TrdTOS Te.

It is difficult to suppose that Love is equal in length and breadth to each of the

elements.' For this would make the elements equal to each other in volume, which in a world roughly like our own would make the radius of the earth three times as large as the distance from earth to heaven.z Further, when Aristotle considers what Empedocles meant by the equality of his elements, he does not consider the possibility that they could have been strictly equal in volume.3 It is also difficult to suppose that Love is equal in length and breadth to all the elements taken together.4 For this would suggest that drd&avrov describes Strife as in some way equal to the elements. But if the reference of adrdavrov is external, Strife compared to the elements, it would be simpler to read EKaCtrr or rararvT,5 which would again make Strife, and so by implication Love, equal to each of the elements.6 More probably the verse means that Love is equal to herself in length and breadth, i.e. stretched out in the shape of

a sphere. For a sphere is the only three-dimensional figure in which from any direction, passing through the centre, length is equal to breadth. (In a cube

I That is the view of among others Tan- nery, pp. 314-I5, and evidently Burnet, pp. 208, 232, 236.

2 The formula for the volume of a sphere is A-rr3. If, in order to approximate to the condition of the present world, we include water with earth and fire with air, then the ratio of the radius of the inner to the outer sphere is I: I 3. The suggestion is not that

Empedocles would have wanted, or been able, to work out the mathematics precisely. The result of equal volumes can easily be visualized by someone who is not a mathe- matician.

3 De gen. et corr. 333aI6-34, cf. Meteor. 340a8-I8.

4 This is apparently the view of Bignone, s.v. fr. 17, but cf. p. 541 and Studi sul pensiero antico, Naples, 1939, p. 338.

s Sextus, Adv. Math. 9. 10, 10. 317, and

Hippolytus, Ref. IO. 7. 5, have a7iTdvrT7L or

aOramrw7. Simplicius, Phys. 26. 3 and 158. i8, has 'Kaarrov. Panzerbieter reads EKaacWrl and

suggests atravrt for Sextus, Beitrage zur Kritik und Erkldrung des Empedokles, Meinin- gen, I844, ad loc.

6 We cannot perhaps entirely exclude the possibility that with the reading aradvT-lt Strife is said to be 'everywhere equal (sc. to all the elements taken together)', and so too that Love is 'equal in length and breadth (sc. to all the elements taken together)'.

36 D. O'BRIEN

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

for example there are different dimensions from the centre to different parts of the circumference.)

Similarly, dcrdAavrov adrcvry7& probably describes the position of Strife. adrAavros in Homer regularly means no more than 'equivalent to' or 'like' (L.S.J., s.v.). For Empedocles' phrase we may therefore compare rr7Troo' IEL(7v used of a shield in Homer, II. 12. 294, and taov d7rdvrrlq used to describe Prometheus' liver growing again at night after the eagle's daily attack on it, Hesiod, Theog. 524. In either expression 7rdvroaT and d7rrdvrt7 serve to prevent the comparison being external: the shield and Prometheus' liver are not com-

pared to anything else, they are 'every way equal (sc. to themselves)'. So too, Strife, we suggest, is 'everywhere equal (sc. to itself)'.

Now further, similar expressions are used of a sphere: of... . 7Trvro0ev acov, Parmenides fr. 8. 49 ;I (7TrdrOev> 'aOS caVrCi Empedocles fr. 29. 3 ;2 7ravroOv

tfcos <(oF> fr. 28. I ;3 and probably Laov arravrrt Timon fr. 60. 2.4 c'drdavrov a7rdvr7]L occurs again in Aratus, Phaen. 22-23,5 to describe the earth suspended in the centre of the world. The notion of weight or balance present in Aratus, and easily suggested by -rdAavrov, is found also in the description of Par- menides' Sphere, fr. 8. 44, LLeUaaoev laorraAEs rrav-rYt. Strife too, we suggest, is

arranged in the form of a sphere, 'equal on every side (sc. to itself)' or perhaps 'equally balanced on every side'. The difference will be that, since Love, as we have seen, moves to and from the centre of the world, therefore Strife will form not a solid but a hollow sphere. That is, Strife will form an even spherical layer surrounding Love.

This description of the positions of Love and Strife may perhaps be true only during the Sphere, when in the most obvious sense Strife is 'apart' from the elements and Love is 'in' them.6 But the description quite likely applies to Love and Strife at any time. Love we have seen is never outside the elements. She expands and contracts to and from the centre. And the 'battle' between Love and Strife seems to have been envisaged not as a chaotic toing and froing, 'rather after the analogy of the battlefield, wherein one point after another is lost for a considerable time to the enemy, and then regained, perhaps only to be lost again',7 but as essentially a regular process, with Love in the period of her increasing power constantly pressing on the heels of Strife, and not abandoning positions once attained, fr. 35. 12-I3:

ooraov S' acev VTrEK7rpoOEOL (Strife), roaov alev 7eTie7EL

'MrfoJpwOv (ptor'T70oS dEL?a9LyEos ajfppoTos opjj.

of Diels, for ol Simpl. Phys. I46. 22. 2 Schneidewin, Philologus vi (1851), i6I,

for laos gartv aivrt-i Hipp. Ref. 7. 29. I3. 3 This verse is quoted anonymously by

Stob. Ed. I. 5. 2 = I. 144. 20 Wachsmuth, but followed by a verse, fr. 28. 2 = fr. 27. 4, attributed by several authors to Empedocles. eot add. Maas, E'v Grotius, ;jv Diels, d0oov or od'sc Wachsmuth.

4 Timon is describing Xenophanes' god, probably with the thought of it being anatpoetsL, cf. [Arist.] De MXG 977b I

5 This is probably imitated in Ovid's description of the earth, Met. i. 13 pon- deribus librata suis, cf. 34-35 aequalis ab omni parte.

6 This may also be the implication of the juxtaposition of fire and water in line i8: these two contrasting elements are united by the power of Love.

7 Millerd, On the interpretation of Empedocles, dissertation, Chicago, I908, p. 46. Millerd's description is apparently taken from Sim- plicius, Phys. 1 124. 7-9, where, however, the temporary advances and withdrawals of Love and Strife take place within a single and eternal sensible realm and are an attempt to explain the 'mythical' alternation of Love and Strife within this framework in a way that would mitigate the extreme neo- Platonic view whereby Strife alone is active in the sublunary world.

37

It is possible therefore that all the time Love is roughly 'equal (to herself) in

length and breadth', and Strife 'equal (or equally balanced) on every side (of Love)'.

VI

The last feature of the cosmic cycle which we have to consider is the sequence of stages in the zoogony. Aetius 5. 19. 5 names four stages which can be con- firmed singly from the fragments: separate limbs, fr. 57, monsters, frr. 60 and 6I, whole-natured forms, fr. 62, and men and women. The question is how we should place these stages in the cosmic cycle.

Separate limbs we are told by Aristotle and Simplicius were born EmrrT 7j LtAo7r7TOS, i.e. under increasing Love.' They were formed inside the earth2

and were therefore, as we should expect, and as Simplicius tells us,3 the first creatures to be born. These separate creatures were joined together by Love.4 The result will have been monsters.5 Monsters were still among the first creatures of Love's world: Aristotle refers to them as E'v 7raLs E adpXrs adpa avcroaorEaot.6

Whole-natured creatures were formed when fire was KpLVOpevov and OeAov

Trpos opolov lKE'rOaL, fr. 62. 2 and 6. They belong therefore to the world of in-

creasing Strife. They were described later in the poem than separate limbs.7

They sprang from the earth, xOovos E'aveheAAov, fr. 62. 4, and so were again the first creatures to be born.

The whole-natured creatures have no sex, OV1TE. . . E coavovras . . otov r

rmXnoptov advpdam yvlov, fr. 62. 7-8, or are more probably bisexual, since they have shares, the implication is probably equal shares, of fire and water, atxofTEorpcov V'adroS te Kat e'SleoS atlav c'XOVTrE, fr. 62. 5, and these are the male and female element respectively.8 They were described 7rpo -rs 7.r)v advpelwov Kal yvvaILKELov acoWdTrLTv &apOpWocrEos.9 Simplicius later speaks of them being

split apart.'0 Men and women are now each a avf/3oAov of the other." The

implication is obvious, though it has been denied,12 that the whole-natured creatures are split apart into men and women.

Thus so far we have clearly established two evolutionary sequences with no doubt about the opening stages of each. In Love's world separate limbs arise and join together to form monsters. In Strife's world there arise whole-natured forms which are later split apart into men and women.

Do men and women also arise in Love's world? Simplicius says they do, though a faint suspicion may be felt that he has himself produced men and

I Arist. De caelo 300b25-3I. De gen. anim.

722b17-20 and b26. Simpl. De caelo 587. 8-26. KaTa -rrjv -rTs dALt'as apX4v Phys. 371. 33-35-

2 Arist. De gen. anim. 722b24-26. Aet. 5. 22. I as corrected by Diels. Cf. fr. 96. I.

3 Phys. 371. 34. 4 Arist. De anima 430a30. Cf. De gen. anim.

722b20-28. Simpl. Phys. 37I. 35, 381. 22-25. De caelo 587. 18-19.

5 Aristotle in the passage quoted from the De anima may be thinking of separate limbs joining to form men and women.

6 Phys. I99b5- 7 The formation of bones, one of the

animal parts that arose at the beginning of Love's world, Arist. De caelo 300b29, was described in the first book, Simpl. Phys. 300. 20 quoting fr. 96. Whole-natured creatures were described in the second book, Simpl. Phys. 381. 29 quoting fr. 62.

8 Arist. De gen. anim. 765a8-IO. De part. anim. 648a28-3I. Frr. 65 and 67. Aet. 5. 7. I, cf. 5. 26. 4.

9 Simpl. Phys. 381. 29-30. 1O Phys. 382. 20. I Arist. De gen. anim. 722bII, cf. Plato,

Symp. 191 d. 12 Rudberg, 'Empedokles und Evolution',

Eranos 1 (1952), 23-30, esp. p. 28.

38 D. O'BRIEN

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 39

women from separate limbs in order to illustrate a passage of Aristotle.' But fr. 26 also implies that men and women arise as the elements are drawn to- gether by Love:

avTra yap Ecrwv -raira, St' a'AA-Awv 8e Gcovra

yivov?r' ~li6pw7rol' TE Kal "AAcwv E VEi Oqp6Zv 4aAAoIE dLEv 0pLA6Tr77t aUVvEPXoILEV Ls- EvaK a Kl.40

lAAwOE 8' aV' E1X2 i"KaaTa 0oppeV/IEa NEIKEOS- EXOEL,

EloToKEV eV UVUv,ipvva -ro rrav v7TEvEpoE yEv?7qTa.

It is true that this fragment is a mosaic of repetitions from earlier in the poem, probably a summary of the first part of the poem on the cosmic cycle and the elements. But the literal meaning of the lines is plainly that men and women are born both as the elements come together under increasing Love and as they are drawn apart by Strife.

Were men and women the final stage in either sequence? Fr. 20 indicates that in Strife's world men and women are later to be torn apart into separate limbs:

-roiro Ijev a'v lporewv tLEAEwv 0apt8LIKECT0V OYKOV'

aAAoTE ttEv OLAOT777L UvvEpPXoI_tEVv ls ESv airav-ra

yvta, ra' aolta AEA'oyXE fiiov OaXViovrog E'v aK1rKqtL'

aAAolE E8' ai&rE KaK7ICJ7t 8LaTI7O90-r' 'EptI8Ecrat ITAaheIaL av8tX' E'Kaaca 7TEptpP77Y(pLqvt ptoto. Cog 8 ' aivrws Q4otau't1L Kat tXuvatv v58poUeA,CWpotsg

a'pUL 7' EPLAEX`EaCaLV 48E l'TTEPOaC'L/tOrt Kv/43atgS

This fragment has usually been taken as a description of the power of Love and Strife in the life cycle of each individual. But 5IAAOTE C 'v ktAo-r7)-rL and aAo-rTE 8' aV'TE KaWqtac... 'Epl8Ecnaa indicate fairly clearly that we are still dealing with alternate worlds of Love and Strife. 'The limbs that have found a body in the peak of blooming life' will be separate limbs that become monsters and then men and women in the world of increasing Love. 'At another time' will be the world of Strife increasing. 'Limbs', the subject is still yvta, 'are torn apart again by wicked spirits of dissension and wander2 each of them apart along the breakers of life's shore.' This is not a plausible description of death. Nor does it easily describe, as Diels wishes,3 the formation of monsters from separate limbs. Empedocles' limbs have already found a body and are now torn apart: just the opposite process. The point must be that under increasing Strife men and women will be torn apart into separate limbs. They are torn apart 'again' because they become separate limbs under increasing Strife as before under increasing Love.

We may recall Aristophanes' speech in the Symposium, where the connexion with Empedocles has often been noted.4 There too men and women arise from bisexual creatures and are threatened with a further separation: qO3osg ovv EOrtLV, eaV tL?) KO U1LOL C4LEV 7TpOS To OEOVS, OTWSC tL7j KaU av'Otg 8LLc)taG7ao-

pLE0a, Kat' 7TepLttLEV EXOVTEs oo7TEp Ot EV TaLSt A7)aLS Ka-raypaL!7v E'KTETV7TWtl4EV0t

Phys. 371. 33-372. ii on Arist. Phys. 4 At greatest length by Ziegler, 'Men- 198b 10-34. schen- und Weltenwerden, ein Beitrag zur

2 Cf. &,Ad4ov-ro and E'7rAav&ro used of Geschichte der Mikrokosmosidee', Neue

separate limbs in fr. 57 and Simplicius, De Jahrbiieher xxxi (1913), 529-73, who, how-

caelo 587. 19. ever, supposes that there is only one zoo- 3 Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, ad loc. gonical sequence.

&LarE7TTptLojuELvoL Kaca Tras ptvas, yeyovorES wCo'TEp A7O'oraL. I In the Symposium we are also promised the possibility of being fused together again with our other half.2 Thus Aristophanes' speech contains in effect the whole of Empedocles' cycle: from double creatures to men and women, to quarter creatures, back to double creatures.3

It is true, there is no direct mention of whole-natured creatures in Love's world: but we are quite likely intended to assume their existence, so as to

complete the symmetry with Strife's world:

Increasing Love

separate limbs and monsters men and women whole-natured creatures

Increasing Strife whole-natured creatures men and women

(monsters and) separate limbs

Aetius may have taken only Love's sequence, which we have seen was de- scribed earlier in the poem, and rearranged the stages so as to end with men and women. Perhaps more likely, Theophrastus recorded only those stages of either

cycle that were described in detail, and wrote, starting with increasing Love :4

separate limbs and monsters and men and women under increasing Love, and whole-natured creatures and men and women under increasing Strife. In that case Aetius or his source has not surprisingly produced a single sequence by suppressing the first mention of men and women.

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge 1 93 a. This is explained as one of Plato's

jokes by Ziegler, p. 547 cf. p. 557. 2

192 d-e, 193 c-d. 3 Thus Aristophanes alone among the

earlier speakers shares with Diotima the attitude to Love as not simply an immediate delight, but a yearning that can find com- plete fulfilment only beyond the immediate world. Diotima in effect acknowledges the similarity at 205 d Io-e, cf. perhaps 212 C 4-6.

4 The reason for this would again have been that Love's zoogony was described first. Empedocles regularly speaks of in- creasing Love before increasing Strife, frr. 17. I-I7, 20. I-4, 26. 5-12; there is the same order in the passage quoted above

DENIS O'BRIEN

from Aristotle's Physics, 250b27-29. Fr. 21. 7-8 is an exception in putting increasing Strife before increasing Love, probably be- cause there Empedocles is appealing to our experience of the present world. Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 334a5-7, and Theophrastus, De sens. 20, speak of increasing Love as in the past (Aristotle's Trpo'rpov shows that Theophrastus' TOTe does not refer to the future). The priority of Love's zoogony is probably the reason for the tense of a7rcTAerTo, Aristotle Phys. 198b3I, describing monsters in Love's world, and &elIevev, Theophrastus, De caus. pl. I. 22. 2, describing fish which are fiery creatures and so in Love's world took up their habitat in a cool element, water, cf. I. 21. 5.

D. O'BRIEN 4o0