Running Head: EMOTION REGULATION

Emotion Regulation:

Implications for Political Science and International Relations*

Moshe Maor

Department of Political Science

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

James J. Gross

Department of Psychology

Stanford University

1/8/2015

* Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on The Politics of Non-Proportionate

Policy Response, at the 2015 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Warsaw. We thank

Alex Mintz and Eran Halperin for their useful comments. Correspondence concerning this

article should be addressed to Moshe Maor, at: moshe.maor@mail.huji.ac.il

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ABSTRACT

Despite robust evidence that emotions can have a powerful impact on public opinion,

political behavior, and foreign policy, few studies have directly addressed the possibility

that emotions may be strategically regulated by politicians, policymakers, and other

actors. To systematically examine the role of emotion regulation in domestic and global

political domains, what is needed is a framework for organizing the large number of

regulatory strategies available to political actors who wish to influence others’ emotions.

One such framework is Gross’s (2014) process model of emotion regulation, which

previously has been used primarily to examine psychological processes at the individual

level in healthy and clinical populations. We show how this framework facilitates an

analysis of whether different emotion regulation strategies and implementation tactics

have different political consequences, both immediately and over the long term. We also

provide guidance on productive directions for future research within each domain of the

process model.

Keywords: Emotion, Emotion Regulation, Political Science, International Relations,

Public Policy

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Politicians and policymakers are successful to the extent that they can influence

others’ views, decisions, and behaviors. One way to exercise this kind of influence is by

modifying others’ emotions. This is because emotions affect opinion formation, attention,

learning, and political behavior (for recent reviews see Brader et al. 2011; Brader and

Marcus 2013; Groenendyk 2011), as well as attitudes on a wide range of issues related to

world politics, such as nuclear proliferation, the logic of deterrence, the war on terror,

motives for war, alliances and defense policies, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian

intervention (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014; Mintz and DeRouen 2010).

Recently, scholars have begun to consider the strategies employed by politicians

to modify peoples’ emotions. Focusing largely on the competitive information

environment of electoral campaigns, scholars have noticed that different approaches to

influencing emotions have different consequences (e.g., Brader 2005, 2006; Ridout and

Franz 2011).1 These studies have yielded important insights, and what is now needed is a

framework for examining how politicians and policymakers regulate others’ emotions.

In this article, we integrate psychological research on emotion regulation, a young

and rapidly developing field (Gross 2010, 2014), with the study of politics at the

intersection between political and policy leaders, on the one hand, and the general public,

on the other. As we discuss in greater detail below, emotion regulation refers to attempts

to influence which emotions people have, when they have them, and how they experience

and express these emotions (Gross 1998a, 275). This process is driven by emotional

entrepreneurs2 – individuals, groups, and institutions that attempt to advance a political

and/or policy agenda by up- or down-regulating expected or actual emotions generated

during political processes.

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To understand emotion regulation in political contexts and – in particular – the

causes and consequences of the operation of emotional entrepreneurs, we extend the

study of emotion regulation, which has previously focused primarily on psychological

processes at the individual level, to the level of the political system and the level of world

politics. Focusing on individual and institutional political actors, our goal is to provide an

overarching conceptual framework delineating the major families of processes that

populate this emerging area which has so far developed as seven largely separate streams

of research.

The first stream focuses on the use of fear mongering to stir public opinion (e.g.,

Brader 2005; Kaid and Chanslor 2004; Kaid and Johnston 1991; Lupia and Menning

2009; Torres et al. 2012), or as is commonly known – the “politics of fear” (Burkitt 2005;

De Castella et al. 2009). The second centers on the use of outrage at opposition members

to cue in-group members to participate in action against the out-group members who have

committed the outrage (McDermott 2011). The third refers to the use by political leaders

of emotion-laden appeals, particularly on the issue of terrorism, to enhance their approval

ratings while minimizing criticisms, gathering support for their policy agendas, and

diverting public attention during domestic crises (De Castella and McGarty 2011; De

Castella et al. 2009; Mueller 2006). The fourth concentrates on the use by politicians of

emotions in modern political campaigns in order to activate party supporters while

attracting those who are unattached (Jerit 2004), influence political participation, activate

existing loyalties, and facilitate persuasion (e.g., Brader 2005, 2006; Weber 2012), and

determine voting decisions (Ridout and Franz 2011). The fifth considers the effect of

emotion regulation on political attitudes in intractable conflicts (e.g., Halperin et al. 2011;

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Halperin et al. 2014). The sixth focuses on the strategic use of emotions to effect foreign

policy outcomes (Zahariadis 2003, 2005; Petersen 2012). The seventh scrutinizes the use

of emotion to mobilize and demobilize members of social movements involved in protest

politics (e.g., Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Jasper 1997).

At present, the aforementioned literatures on emotions and politics rarely speak to

each other. They define and conceptualize emotion differently, vary in focus and level of

analysis, and consider how different types of emotions unfold in different contexts.

Perhaps most important, they have not clarified what it means for emotion to be

“manipulated,” and to demonstrate whether it has worked (Brader et al. 2011, 393). This

brings to the fore the need for an analytical framework that will: clearly delineate the

subfield of politics and emotional regulation at the intersection between political leaders

and the general public; encompass the variety of specific emotions and forms of emotion

regulation; unite features that are common to many different approaches to emotion; and

provide a theoretical context for future research.

Such a framework would enable us to understand the processes by which

politicians and the policies they design may become valued or devalued for reasons

unrelated to their ability to affect goals (Edelman 1964, 1988; Jones, Thomas, and Wolfe

2014; Maor 2014a, b). As political actors look for emotion regulation opportunities, their

activities transform the course of action for governments and for other players in

domestic and world politics, and powerfully influence who is seen as deserving of what,

and why (e.g., Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997, 2005), who is capable of doing what,

and why, how and when things ought to be done, and by whom success or failure is

determined. Integrated in this process is the interaction of emotional information with the

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power of the politicians to establish different types of political actions (i.e., what

politicians say and what they do) and public policies (Westen 2007), as well as different

types of policy goals, tools, and audiences (Schneider 2013), and thereby, the direction

and pace of political change. The development of a conceptual framework that maps this

dynamic process would nicely complement William Riker’s (1986) seminal contribution

regarding political manipulation by agenda control, strategic voting, and manipulation of

dimensions which is concerned with cognitive rather than emotional processes. Such a

framework would also direct attention to the most prevalent theoretical approach in

political science – the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus and MacKuen 1993;

Marcus 1988).

This article proceeds as follows. The first section elaborates on the concepts of

emotion generation and emotion regulation. The second section examines why politicians

and policy makers might want to regulate others’ emotions. The third section describes

the process model of emotion regulation. The fourth section maps the literature using the

process model of emotion regulation. The fifth section reviews what is known about

emotion regulation efficacy. Finally, the sixth section describes promising possibilities

for future research.

EMOTION GENERATION AND EMOTION REGULATION

Emotions such as anger, fear, happiness, and sadness are an important part of

daily experience. Across situations, these emotions can vary substantially in their

intensity (e.g., from a mild to a hysterical response), duration (e.g., from a particular

moment in time to a particular time interval), and speed of emergence and decline (e.g.,

from fractions of a second to seconds or even minutes) (Suri et al. 2013).

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Contemporary scholars usually define emotions by focusing on three core

features. First, emotions are generated in the context of meaningful situations. The

meaning of these situations may be enduring or fleeting, biologically-based or culturally-

derived, personal or widely shared. When attended to and evaluated with respect to one’s

goals, these situations can give rise to emotional responses. Second, emotions are

multifaceted phenomena, comprised of subjective aspects (i.e., feeling), behavioral

aspects (which include relatively rapid changes in the face and posture, in addition to

relatively slower instrumental behaviors), as well as physiological aspects, which provide

metabolic support for these behavioral changes. Third, emotions are malleable: although

they may disturb what one is doing and impose themselves on one’s awareness, they are

not obligatory, and can thus usually be regulated (Frijda 1986).

To illustrate emotions in a political context, consider the anger felt by numerous

Americans over President Barack Obama’s health policy, labeled Obamacare. This

response may have involved strong negative emotions of some policymakers and

members of the general public, coupled at times (e.g., during anti-government protests)

with changes in emotion experience, activity of the muscles of face and body, as well as

changes in motivational and metabolic processes that support anticipated and actual

behavioral responses. Whether the emotion of anger is useful or not in this particular

context depends on one’s perspective regarding both the merits of Obamacare and the

most effective strategy either for supporting or blocking this health care policy.

When emotions are judged to be unhelpful, people may make efforts to change

the emotions that they and others feel and express. Emotion regulation may be defined in

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this context as the activation of a goal to up- or down-regulate the magnitude, duration

and/or quality of the emotional response (Gross et al. 2011; Gross 2014).3

When discussing emotion regulation, several important distinctions need to be

made. First, one must ask whose emotions are being regulated, and by whom? In

particular, the emotion regulation goal may be activated in oneself (intrinsic regulation)

or in someone else (extrinsic regulation). For our purposes here, our main focus will be

extrinsic regulation. Illuminating in this regard is the distinction between short-term

hedonic goals and “instrumental” (Tamir 2009) motives for emotion regulation which are

perceived to lead to longer-term benefits (e.g., Tamir et al. 2008). For our purposes here,

our main focus will be on instrumental goals which are perceived to lead to short- and/or

long-term benefits for emotional entrepreneurs. Second, one must ask why emotions are

being regulated. Sometimes the alteration in the emotion is an end in itself, such as when

a president visits the site of a natural disaster and offers comfort. Here the goal is to

down-regulate people’s sadness, fear, and anger following a natural disaster so that they

feel less devastated. At other times, however, an emotion regulation goal is merely a

means for achieving some other valued end – for example, political actors may up-

regulate people’s anger concerning a tax policy in order to mobilize support for the policy

to be terminated. Third, one must ask what strategy is being used to regulate emotion. A

consideration of the various strategies used to regulate emotions will be a major focus in

the sections that follow, but first we need to consider why political actors might want to

engage in emotion regulation.

WHY DO POLITICIANS AND POLICYMAKERS REGULATE EMOTIONS?

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Many politicians are strategic actors. When they act in the political system, they

know that emotions can affect opinion formation (e.g., Brader 2005, 2006; Druckman and

McDermott 2008; Huddy et al. 2007; Lerner et al. 2003; MacKuen et al. 2010; Small et

al. 2006), attention and learning (e.g., Brader 2005, 2006; Brader et al. 2008; Huddy et al.

2007; MacKuen et al. 2010; Geva and Shorick 2006; Redlawsk et al. 2007), and political

action (e.g., Marcus et al. 2006; Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008; Valentino et al.

2011). When they act in global politics, they know that emotions can effect ethnic

hostility (Kaufman 2001), deterrence (Mercer 2005, 2010), reputation and signaling

(Mercer 1996; 2010), nuclear proliferation (Hymans 2006), conflict resolution and post-

conflict reconciliation (Hutchiston and Bleiker 2008; Halperin 2014), and the eruption of

wars (Löwenheim and Heimann 2008). They also know that negative emotions have

distinct effects on public opinion regarding terror and war-related policy choices (e.g.,

Bleiker and Hutchiston 2008; Huddy et al. 2005; Skitka et al. 2006; Small et al. 2006)

and on electoral campaigns and mass media (e.g., Brader et al. 2010; Gross and

D’Ambrosio 2004; Gross 2008; Miller 2007).

Understanding the impact of emotions leads politicians to compete for control of

the emotional arena. The “prize” of this competition is the power to regulate one or more

of three types of expressions of emotions, elicited by political candidates, political

groups, public policies, politically-relevant events, and even specific objects or symbols

in the political system and in world politics: individual emotions, group-based emotions

that derive from the emotional experiences of an individual in response to group-related

events (e.g., Smith, 1993; Mackie et al. 2000; Iyer and Leach 2008),4 and collective

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emotions that arise when the society as a whole, or its part thereof, experience the

emotions (e.g., Niedenthal and Brauer 2012; Stephan and Stephan 2000).

The power to regulate emotions in the political system includes quantitative as

well as qualitative dimensions. The former refers to attempts to increase (up-regulate) or

decrease (down-regulate) a particular emotion, such as fear or anger; the latter, to

attempts at changing the type of emotion (e.g., anxiety into anger).

Politicians regulate emotions in order to influence perceptions, preferences, and

vote choices, as well as to exercise public authority to achieve substantive ends. The goal

of affecting political and policy contestations may be short-term changes in the

aforementioned attributes, as well as durable shifts caused by reconfiguration of emotions

and emotional experiences. For this reason, emotion regulation in political and policy

environments features a distinct set of players, strategies, and dynamics.

In the context of highly dynamic polities and modern political life, a successful

emotion regulation strategy has pervasive and profound effects. It shapes the nature of

interaction within states, that is, between politicians and voters, between politicians and

organized interests, between politicians and other policy actors. It influences mass

political behavior, the activities of interest groups, and public policies. A successful

strategy also shapes interactions between states. Overall, emotion regulation profoundly

changes the contours of political and public policy contests and therefore creates politics

and policies. It advantages the set of political actors who recognize the potential role of

emotion regulation, alongside the role of institutional and agenda manipulation, and who

master the use of tools and strategies employed throughout this process. It disadvantages

politicians whose attempts to regulate emotion backfire, for example, when people who

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value autonomy feel they are being manipulated and this, in turn, provokes a reaction

which undermines the aims of those who are perceived by the public as the manipulators.

For political scientists wishing to understand how emotion regulation influences

politics and policies, the profound role of emotion regulation in political arenas has two

main implications. First, it indicates that it is essential to explore emotion regulation

strategies and their effects at the domestic and global levels if we are to gauge the full

spectrum of those who participate in political and policy processes, how, and with what

impact. Second, it solidifies the rationale for concentrating on how political and policy

actors seek to control the public sphere.

THE PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION REGULATION

In a political context, emotional entrepreneurs face the challenge of influencing

which emotions the general public and policy makers have towards a given political

candidate or a public policy, when they feel them, and how they experience or express

them. The basic logic of their actions can be understood when one takes into account two

factors: first, that political and policy processes involve evaluation and behavior by

members of the general public and policymakers with limited cognitive capacity to

execute mental operations (Simon 1978; Pashler 1998); and second, that “attention

requires capacity, and the amount of capacity required increases from early to late modes

of attention” (Johnston and Heintz 1978, 432). Taken together, these factors suggest that

engaging in extrinsic emotion regulation may be a very effective means of influencing

responses to a given candidate or policy. This premise is equally relevant under “hot

cognition” conditions, that is, when all cognitive objects are linked to affective tags in

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long-term memory via associative network, and therefore emotion influences political

information processing automatically (Lodge and Taber 2013).

In what follows we offer a conceptual framework that highlights a psychological

perspective on the ways emotion regulation happens during political and policy

processes. It draws upon Gross’s (1998a) process model of emotion regulation, which

helps to organize the numerous forms of emotion regulation at the individual level. The

framework advanced here specifies five stages which represent five families of emotion

regulation processes, namely, situation selection, situation modification, attentional

deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. These families may be

distinguished according to when in the emotion-generative process they have their main

impact (Sheppes and Gross, in press; see Figure 1).

[Figure 1 about here]

Situation selection consists of efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to modify the

political or policy situation members of the public and/or policymakers encounter in

order to increase or decrease the likelihood that certain emotions will arise. This family of

emotion regulation strategies is best captured in the attempts by emotional entrepreneurs

to influence the decision of these individuals to either approach or avoid an encounter

with the political candidate’s personality traits, principles, and policy positions, or the

policy goals, policy tools, or target populations, by hiding them from sight or masking

them. Because this strategy occurs before individuals enter into an emotional situation, it

is the most forward-looking attempt at emotion regulation. An example is a government

policy which erects roadblocks to catch drivers with tax debts. The anger among large

segments of society that is likely to be generated by this policy may be regulated by

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emotional entrepreneurs in a call to drivers to use public transport during this tax

campaign. Another instance is when emotional entrepreneurs in government significantly

limit public access to sites, people, and information related to the policy goals, the policy

tools or the target populations (‘t Hart 1993). A salient example is the detention in

relocation camps of more than 100,000 people of Japanese descent living on the West

Coast of the United States during the Second World War.

Situation modification refers to efforts emotional entrepreneurs make to modify

the external features of the political or policy situation in order to alter its emotional

impact. So even if one approaches the political candidate or policy, the emotional

information may be regulated by changing certain characteristics of the external political

or policy situation. An example is the timing of the business cycle by Republican

presidents so that economic growth is produced just before elections for which voters,

whose “feel-good” factor outweigh their concerns about rising inequality following GOP

presidents’ policies, reward them (Bartel 2008).

Attentional deployment refers to attempts by emotional entrepreneurs to change

the direction of attention towards a political candidate or policy after the emotional

situation has been encountered in order to change their emotional impact. This activity is

undertaken primarily by cognitive means, especially distraction. Distraction refers to

efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to direct attention either away from the emotional

aspects of a political candidate’s personality traits, principles and policy positions, or

policy goals, policy tools, and target populations, mainly by producing independent

neutral thought content (Van Dillen and Koole 2007). An example of the use of

distraction in order to reduce public anger is the decision by Israeli Prime Minister,

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Benjamin Netanyahu to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Hamas

terrorists in the midst of the social unrest amongst Israel’s middle class. Another

example, by same prime minister, is the decision to bring the world’s largest fire-fighting

aircraft, the “Evergreen” Boeing 747 supertanker from the U.S., when Israel’s worst ever

forest fire was already waning.

Cognitive change consists of efforts by emotional entrepreneurs to change the

meaning of a political candidate’s personality traits, principles, and policy positions, or

policy goals, policy tools, and target populations, in a way that alters their emotional

impact. They do so by changing how members of the general public or policymakers

make sense of these political or policy features and/or about their capacity to manage

them. The most studied form of cognitive change is reappraisal, which involves an

attempt to change the meaning of an event in order to influence emotional responses to an

event (Gross 2001, 2002; Gross and Thompson 2007; van Zomeren et al. 2012). An

example of cognitive change is the attempts of U.S. Senator James Inhofe (Oklahoma) to

frame climate change as a hoax, using rhetoric “that was often visceral, hyperbolic, and

shrill […]” (Cox and Béland 2013, 318). This strategy “encouraged people to make

reflexive judgments, filter out conflicting information, and thereby foreclose careful

thought about the relations between scientific knowledge and policy outcomes” (Cox and

Béland 2013, 318).

Response modulation refers to changing one or more of the experiential,

behavioral, or physiological components of the activated emotion response towards a

political candidate’s personality traits, principles and policy positions, or policy goals,

policy tools, and target populations, in the final stage of the emotion generating process

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in order to change its emotional impact. One form of response modulation is expressive

suppression (e.g., Richards and Gross 1999, 2000), which refers to efforts to suppress

emotional behavior. An example is the dismantling by the Hong Kong Police of the

“Occupy Central” protest site in Hong Kong, bringing to an end almost three months of

intense, pro-democracy demonstration.

The process model of emotion regulation provides an overarching framework for

analyzing the actions of emotional entrepreneurs. The different stages in the model

represent a cycle of stages that is activated repeatedly during an emotion. For example, a

fear response to a political candidate, generated by a smear campaign operated by a rival

candidate, may lead one to quickly withdraw one’s support from the candidate and then

subsequently look for another candidate to support. The individual’s “emotional

response” contains all these different responses, perceptions, and actions. However, they

are represented in the model with a few cycles of the situation-attention-appraisal-

response sequence, each of which may successively influence the situation that gave rise

to the emotion in the first place (as indicated by the arrow in Figure 1).

MAPPPING THE LITERATURE USING THE PROCESS MODEL OF

EMOTION REGULATION

In the following sub-sections, we draw attention to the three major families of

emotion regulation processes that have been explored to date in the political arena.

Situation Selection

Most research on emotion regulation in political settings (often explicitly termed

emotion manipulation) focuses on situation selection. This strategy often revolves around

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increasing exposure to emotional appeals in order to evoke a particular emotion in the

target audience (Kaid and Johnston 1991, 56).

Focusing on the tone of election campaigns, communication scholars have

explored multiple forms of emotional appeal (Marmor-Lavie and Weimann 2005) and

claimed that spot viewing influences perceptions and judgments of candidate likeability

(for a comprehensive review of this literature see Kaid 2004; Kaid and Chanslor 2004),

that the best medium for emotion initiation is television (Way and Masters 1996), that

there is a reliance on emotional appeals in both negative and positive ads (Kaid and

Johnston 1991), that the most popular strategy in negative ads appears to be humor or

ridicule (Kaid and Johnaton 1991), and that the use of emotional appeals undermines

rational and issue-based voting and therefore reduces the quality of voter decision making

(Goren 1997; Marmor-Lavie and Weimann 2005) and undermines the values inherent in

liberal democracy (Dermody and Scullion 2003).

Political science scholars have demonstrated that voters behave differently in

different emotional states (e.g., Marcus 2000), that fear-arousing rhetoric may be

selectively deployed to support political purposes (De Castella et al. 2009; De Castella

and McGarty 2011; see also: Burkitt 2005; Jeritt 2004; Weber 2012), that politicians will

have greater ability to use fear for their purposes when a citizenry’s psychological profile

makes it less motivated or able to adapt to fear appeals (Lupia and Menning 2009), that

political ads in the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign elicited five emotions, namely, anger,

fear, enthusiasm, pride and compassion (Brader 2006), that political ads using non-verbal

emotional cues to evoke emotions (particularly enthusiasm and fear) can change the way

citizens get involved and therefore can promote democratically desirable behavior

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(Brader 2005), and that leaders and citizen groups in the U.S. manipulate emotions to

polarize the electorate (McDermott 2011).

In addition, Ridout and Franz (2011) have demonstrated that televised ads

influence people’s voting choice, with greater influence on those who are the least

informed about politics, and that tone and emotional appeals are not the same; hence,

anger appeal can be found in both negative and positive ads. They have also found an

inconsistent pattern of results with regard to the impact of fear and anger ads – sometimes

they benefit their sponsors and sometimes they are ineffective (see also Calantone and

Warshaw 1985; LaTour and Pitts 1989, Mueller 2006; Torres et al. 2012), and a

consistent pattern regarding promotional ads and appeals to enthusiasm – they never

result in a backlash. Ridout and Franz (2011) concluded, as did Lau, Sigelman and

Rovner (2007), that we do not know whether negative ads “work”. The core message is

that, compared to no regulation, situation selection in campaign advertising leads to

greater or lesser liking of political candidates by the general public, voting for political

candidates, participation in politics, vigilance in political interactions, reliance on

contemporary evaluation, persuasion and activation of existing loyalties (e.g., Brader

2005, 2006).

Relatedly, scholars of social movements have shown that situation selection is

undertaken by the strategic use of threats and blame (Jasper 1997; 2006a, b; Jasper and

Poulsen 1995). Threats are intended to produce negative emotions such as anger and

outrage, and blame is intended to suggest targets against which these emotions could

generate injustice frames (see also Vanderford 1989). And scholars of international

relations have embraced the manipulation of fear in the study of conflict processes. For

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example, the politics of fear has been addressed by numerous scholars of post-conflict

societies, divided by the pain of past or current injustices and by emotions derived from

traumatic events (Ahmed 2004; Brown 1995; Butler 2004; Holes 2004). The

phenomenon of interest in these studies has been the extension of fear to broader social

relations, that is, to society at large. In addition, Petersen (2011) has developed an

analytical framework to explain variations in Western intervention in the Balkans by the

strategic use of emotions by political entrepreneurs. Although not much variation in

intervention strategies was recorded, the analytical framework directly engaged with the

notion that violence creates anger and fear, stigma leads to contempt and hatred, and

status reversals to resentment. By angering those who have a clear ethnic identity,

political entrepreneurs can produce retaliation and begin a spiral of violence, which, in

turn, will elicit the desired Western intervention. In other words, by changing the level of

violence, political entrepreneurs change the power of this emotion as a strategic resource

and thereby its effectiveness in eliciting the desired intervention.

Relatedly, Ross (2014) has argued that, as a “circulation of affect” in the context

of social interaction accumulates over time, social actors are exposed to new

combinations of emotions and, consequently, emotions are decoupled from their original

objects and become attached to new objects and meanings. For example, in the aftermath

of 9/11, government-sponsored acts of racial profiling contributed to the invention of the

terrorist enemy as a racialized synthesis of Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern phenotype

and cultural stereotype, and this, in turn, has influenced public tolerance for the use of

force. And Zahariadis (2003, 2005) has demonstrated that foreign policy entrepreneurs –

in this case, Greek politicians who responded to the breakup of the Yugoslav federation –

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used political symbols to generate emotions and convey the meaning of policy images.

When successful, images loaded with emotional meaning have found a receptive political

audience thus increasing their role in the policy process. Emotional manipulation has

been facilitated when affect was high and cognitive meaning not well specified.

Cognitive Change

Cognitive change is most commonly used to decrease negative emotion. An

attempt to directly negate fear appeals or reduce negative emotion may also be on the

strategic menu of emotional entrepreneurs. The aim is to negate or reduce the effects of

provocative messages, conveying direct threats that are derived from a “dangerous”

candidate in order to turn voters away from him or her. Calantone and Warshaw (1985)

focused on two negation strategies, namely, denying the validity of fear-inducing charges

and counterattacking the opponent who raised this association. They found that fear-

inducing charges by a credible source reduced the attacked candidate’s vote, but this

effect was fully offset when a second credible source denied that the charges were valid

or levied a counterattack. When both negation strategies are simultaneously employed,

the attacked candidate’s vote increased above its pre-attack level.

Cognitive change has also received attention by scholars of social movements.

For example, Gamson (1992) claims that for protest behavior to emerge, an “injustice

frame” should be activated. Such frames comprise ideas and symbols that allow members

and activists to construct their grievances through a sense of moral indignation. This

process involves cognitive change which provides evaluations about how significant a

specific problem is, what a fair solution of this problem is, and how the problem could be

alleviated or resolved by social movement activities. Emotion regulation plays a key role

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in this process because such frames depend on “the righteous anger that puts fire in the

belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson 1992, 32). A successful up-regulation of anger may

lead to increased willingness of activists to challenge whatever perceived harm or

suffering they have encountered. In addition, activist leaders are often engaged in

managing and mitigating emotions such as fear of arrest and death in order to facilitate

grass-roots participation in high-risk protest action. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001)

demonstrated that civil rights activists in the United States and East Germany used mass

gatherings, rituals, shaming, new collective identities and the possession of guns in order

to reduce participants’ fears. Gun possession, for example, could modify one’s appraisal

of a situation in order to alter its emotional impact.

Another context in which cognitive change has received attention is in studies of

intractable conflicts (Halperin 2014; Halperin et al. 2011). For example, in the context of

the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a nationwide survey of Jewish-Israeli adults was

conducted. This survey assessed both cognitive change and attitudes toward providing

humanitarian aid to Palestinian citizens. Israelis who regulated their negative emotions

using cognitive change were more supportive of providing humanitarian aid than Israelis

who did not use cognitive change (Halperin and Gross 2011). A second study from this

same research group randomized Israeli participants either to a cognitive change training

condition or to a control condition just before the Palestinian UN bid in 2011. One week

after the training, participants who had been trained to use cognitive change showed

greater support for conciliatory policies and less support for aggressive policies towards

Palestinians than control participants. These effects were still evident five months later,

and at each time point, negative emotion mediated the effects of cognitive change on

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conflict-related attitudes (Halperin et al. 2013). Studies of cognitive change have also

addressed intractable conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy et al.

2011), Cyprus (e.g., Halperin et al 2012), Northern Ireland (Moeschberger et al. 2005)

and other contexts.

Response Modulation

Response modulation is most commonly used to teach new rules of emotion

expression. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) have demonstrated that U.S. civil rights activists

engaged in “emotion work” aimed at creating (or suppressing) various emotions, fear

included. Emotional work is undertaken, amongst others, by rhetoric (Robnett 1997),

day-to-day interaction with the target audience in order to build emotional loyalty

necessary for persuasion (Lofland 1996), socialization, i.e., teaching new emotion rules

(Hochschild 1979) which make the expression of certain emotions, such as anger,

acceptable (Taylor and Whittier 1995), and the creation of institutions that promote and

legitimize the expression of emotions (Morgen 1995). Making a particular emotion

acceptable may trigger a process by which activists or would-be activists recognize that

the collective fails to experience the emotions that are appropriate for the event, and

consequently, they take on the burden of feeling that emotion (Goldenberg, Saguy, and

Halperin 2014). This process of emotional burden, which may explain collective action,

compliments models in which emotions are considered as a motivational source for

collective action (e.g., Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Relatedly, making a particular emotion

acceptable may also impact the communication of an emotional entrepreneur’s thoughts

and intentions because emotions serve a very important functional role in these processes

(e.g., Le Bon 1960/1895; Van Kleef 2009; Van Kleef et al. 2010).

EMOTION REGULATION

22

Altering emotional responses once they have been elicited by emotional

socialization (Aminzade and McAdam 2001, 39) is also undertaken by addressing the

“social epistemologies of emotion” (Thoits 1989), that is, the beliefs regarding different

aspects of emotions (e.g., who is likely to experience what kinds of emotions, the

dynamics of emotional contagion, and so on). Gould (2009) has nicely described the

historical process of emotion work in gay and lesbian movements which has changed

how they feel about themselves and others, and how emotions should be interpreted and

expressed.

EMOTION REGULATION EFFICACY IN POLITICAL AND POLICY

SETTINGS

Of course, just because emotion regulation is attempted doesn’t mean it will

succeed. Some attempts to regulate emotions are doomed to fail because the levels of

emotional intensity are overwhelmingly high (Sheppes and Gross, in press). Others may

fail or backfire because emotional entrepreneurs do not accurately track ongoing or

anticipated emotional responses generated by a candidate or policy, fail to activate an

emotion regulating strategy on time, fail to employ the most appropriate strategy, or make

a mistake in the selection of the emotion regulatory goal (Gross 2013).

Contextual factors, such as place, technology, demography and history, may also

play an inhibiting role. For example, an attempt by emotional entrepreneurs to down-

regulate collective guilt generated from a public policy in a country whose dominant

groups have experienced collective guilt as a consequence of being confronted with

ingroup-perpetrated immoral historical events may not be as successful as the same

strategy employed in a country which did not experience collective guilt. Still, under

EMOTION REGULATION

23

some conditions, emotion regulation goals set by emotional entrepreneurs may be

realistic and attainable. This raises the question of which emotion regulation strategies

may be more effective than others. In the context of the political domain, as elsewhere,

effectiveness refers to a strategy’s success at achieving the initial emotion regulation goal

per unit of effort expended (Sheppes and Gross, in press).

In the process model described above, the five families of emotion regulation

processes may be categorized according to when in the emotion-generative process they

have their primary impact (Sheppes and Gross, in press). If a politician is likely to

generate an emotional impact, which is a target for emotion regulation by emotional

entrepreneurs, it is reasonable to expect that employing a strategy that diverts the

potential emotional trajectory before the politicians’ emotional impact on attitudes and

behavior is fully developed, will tend to operate quickly and efficiently, compared to the

employment of strategies later on in the process model. The same holds for a public

policy. If a public policy is likely to generate an emotional impact which is a target for

emotion regulation by emotional entrepreneurs, employing situation selection will tend to

be quicker and more efficient than utilizing the other emotion regulation strategies.

Continuing with this rationale, if a political candidate or public policy is likely to

generate an emotional impact, emotional entrepreneurs should take into account that

some emotion regulation strategies may be employed before the emotion has had an

impact on attitudes and behavior of individuals, or afterwards. Specifically, situation

selection, situation modification, attentional deployment and cognitive change may be

considered antecedent-focused strategies because they may gain their maximum impact

when they start operating early in the process of emotion generation (Gross 1998b). In

EMOTION REGULATION

24

other words, they operate on an individual’s emotions before the process of emotion

generation has had a full impact on the individual’s attitudes and behavior. By contrast,

response modulation falls under the category of response-focused strategies because it

starts later in this process, when the individual’s response is well-developed (Gross

1998b). Based on Sheppes and Gross’s (in press) insight regarding the variance in the

effectiveness of the aforementioned strategies, one may argue that antecedent-focused

strategies are generally more effective than response-focused strategies in up- or down

regulating emotions derived from a political candidate or public policy.

The idea advanced here is that policy scholars should pit one strategy against

another on the basis of the assumption that a strategy that alters the emotion trajectory

early on should be more effective than a strategy (or a set of strategies) which intervenes

later (Sheppes and Gross, in press). It is expected that the relative costs of strategies that

intervene earlier will be lower than those that intervene later on, and thus have to deal

with the fully developed consequences of emotion generation.

Focusing on changes in emotions generated from a political candidate or public

policy raises an intriguing set of conceptual and empirical challenges related to the

strength of an emotion stimulus, the specific emotions generated (e.g., anger, fear,

disgust), the specific groups of emotions generated (e.g., positive/negative), and the

intensity of emotions an emotional entrepreneur is facing when regulating. Each of these

factors may help to explain and predict the effectiveness of emotion regulation. Scholars

of politics and policy could evaluate the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies

employed by emotional entrepreneurs under different emotion strengths, different

emotions, different groups of emotions, and varying emotion intensity.

EMOTION REGULATION

25

Students of politics and policy could test the claim that the later the emotion

regulatory process occurs in the emotion-generative process, the more likely it is to be

affected by the level of emotional intensity (Sheppes and Gross 2011). Applying the same

logic while focusing on the level of effort emotional entrepreneurs need to employ in

order to replace existing and incoming emotional information, one could test the claim

that emotion regulation strategies employed by emotional entrepreneurs at an early stage

in the emotion-generative process are unlikely to be affected by the level of emotional

intensity because they replace existing and incoming emotional information with minimal

effort, and are therefore expected to operate quickly and efficiently. By contrast, emotion

regulation strategies employed by emotional entrepreneurs at a later stage of the emotion-

generative process are likely to be affected by the level of emotional intensity because of

the effort required to replace existing and incoming emotional information, and are

therefore expected to operate slowly and inefficiently (Sheppes and Gross 2011).

Scholars of politics may also pit one emotion regulation strategy against the other

insofar as the valence of emotions (i.e., positive/negative) or specific emotions (e.g., fear,

disgust) are concerned. In addition, each emotion regulation strategy (or set of strategies)

may be subject to in-depth analysis. Perhaps the ideal candidate for such an exercise is

cognitive change, because the operationalization and measurement of a change in the

interpretation of an emotional stimulus in a way that modifies its emotional impact is part

and parcel of the tool-box of constructivist scholars.

Furthermore, some strategies may be effective in the short run, whilst others may

be more productive in the long-run. Going back to the Israeli example of the Boeing 747

supertanker, the distraction may have blocked public anger during the first days of its

EMOTION REGULATION

26

arrival, but very quickly, public anger over preparedness matters emerged and was

directed at the incompetence of the Minister of Interior, the Minister of the Treasury, and

the Prime Minister. Bringing the supertanker was therefore very effective in the short run

and maladaptive in the medium- and long run because of the prolonged public attention

focused on the devastation caused by the fire. One might therefore test a claim that the

strategy of distraction is likely to be effective in the short term, but its regulatory

consequences will tend to evaporate quickly.

By contrast, employing emotion regulation strategies late in the emotion-

generative process, which is likely to involve relatively high emotional intensity, may be

costly to activate yet may produce long-term benefits. Late regulation strategies, such as

reappraisal, require much effort from emotional entrepreneurs. Members of the general

public and policymakers must be persuaded to engage and understand the emotion

derived from a candidate or policy, and perhaps also its consequences. Once the

emotional situation is attended and understood, the meaning of the emotional situation

may be significantly altered. Such a strategy may therefore have short term costs but long

term benefits. One may therefore test the claim that emotion regulation strategies

employed by emotional entrepreneurs later in the political or policy process might have

short term costs but long term benefits. Our discussion of emotional regulation

effectiveness could also be widened to include individual differences (e.g., gender), group

differences (e.g., hegemonic vs. subservient), as well as cultural and geographic ones. In

addition, it is clear that the aforementioned list of emotion regulation strategies is not

exhaustive. To complement this list, scholars of emotion regulation, public policy,

EMOTION REGULATION

27

political science and international relations are encouraged to identify other possible

emotion regulation strategies.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The paper’s main contributions are to direct attention to how emotions can be

regulated so as to help politicians, policymakers, and other actors operating in domestic

and global political domains benefit from what is useful, but avoid what is not, and to

offer a conceptual framework for organizing and directing research on extrinsic emotion

regulation processes within and between states. We have used Gross’s (2014) process

model of emotion regulation in order to highlight the large number of regulatory

strategies available to political and policy actors who wish to influence others’ emotions.

We have relied on this process model because it has proven to be helpful in the study of

emotion regulation at the individual level in healthy and clinical populations.

We have distinguished five families of emotion regulation processes that have

their primary impact at different points in the emotion-generative process, and suggested

that emotion regulation strategies can target each of these unfolding stages. We have also

mapped the literature using the process model of emotion regulation and showed that

most research to date has largely focused on three families of emotion regulation

processes, namely situation selection, cognitive change and response modulation. In

addition, we have proposed that antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies that are

initiated before the emotion generative response is sufficiently developed may be more

effective than response-focused regulation strategies that try to fight off a well-

established emotional response, and that the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies

may depend on the resources required by the underlying regulatory strategy; the

EMOTION REGULATION

28

emotional intensity of the impulse one is regulating; and whether a strategy targets a short

term or long term goal.

In reviewing the relevant literature, we have pointed to additional work needed on

situation selection, cognitive change, and response modulation, and we have identified

the pressing need for work on situation modification and attentional deployment in

political contexts. Ongoing opportunities exist in virtually every area of inquiry into

emotion regulation. For example, scholar may examine the efficacy of the following

attention deployment strategies: (i) distraction; (ii) thought suppression, which involves

efforts not to think about a certain emotional content (e.g., Wegner 1994); (iii)

rumination, which involves attempts to ask “big questions” (Why are we sad? Why do

these bad things happen to us?) regarding negative events, in order to direct attention

inward with an abstract, rather than action, orientation (e.g., Watkins 2008), and (iv)

mindfulness, which involves effort at directing attention to the immediate here and now

aspects with an orientation of acceptance (Bishop et al. 2004).

Scholars may also define and dimensionalize each of the emotion regulation

strategies, differentiating it from related constructs, and developing empirical measures.

More work is needed to understand how emotion regulation is employed; the underlying

process that allow it to create value for emotional entrepreneurs, and how to evaluate it

more effectively. In order to get inside the heads of these entrepreneurs, scholars also

need to broaden their methodological toolbox and develop research designs that

incorporate lab experiments, the use of electroencephalographic (EEG) techniques,

functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other biologically oriented analyses,

the use of interventions outside the lab, such as conveying messages through the

EMOTION REGULATION

29

education system (e.g., Bar-Tal and Rosen 2009), dialogue groups (e.g., Maoz 2011),

drama shows and soap operas (e.g., Paluck 2009), and the use of reappraisal training (or

not – control group) to survey participants (Halperin et al. 2013; Halperin 2014).

Experimental techniques as well as agent-based modeling could generate findings and

hypotheses, some of which may be examined in the real world of national and

international politics, preferably by using different methods of data collection.

Given that emotion regulation can affect the general public in a particular state or

globally, as well as specific groups in society, scholars might wish to demonstrate how

emotion regulation operates at these levels at a number of different stages in the

policymaking process. Scholars may also examine the role of time in designing studies,

and consider, for example, how and why emotional entrepreneurs employ specific

strategies in particular time periods, why emotion regulation strategies change and evolve

over time, how changes in the identity of emotional entrepreneurs affect their strategies,

how changes in the time horizons of emotional entrepreneurs influence their emotion

regulation strategies, and how different macro-social factors influence emotional

entrepreneurs and their effects in different historical periods. Scholars may also examine

the processes by which emotion regulation strategies are built, maintained and repaired.

In other words, more work is needed in order to gauge how emotion regulation strategies

are managed.

Our framework could also be used to further the most prevalent theoretical

approach in political science – the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus and MacKuen

1993; Marcus 1988) – with its now widely adopted three-dimensional structural account

of affective appraisals (that is, enthusiasm, anxiety and aversion/anxiety) which has

EMOTION REGULATION

30

generated novel hypotheses regarding dimensions of political participation; attention,

learning, reliance on contemporary considerations, and defensive and aggressive actions

to protect extant identifications and convictions (e.g., Brader 2006, Marcus et al. 2000;

Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Huddy et al. 2007, MacKuen et al. 2010). Scholars may

examine emotion regulation in familiar but punishing environments as compared to other

environments in order to gauge the nuanced operation of the disposition system with

regard to the activation of feelings of anger and frustrations. How does emotion

regulation impact the ability of the disposition system to track responses to familiar

situations, and how do emotion entrepreneurs make use of these abilities? How does

emotion regulation work in the case of enthusiasm and satisfaction generated by familiar

and rewarding environments?

Scholars seeking to theorize about and test the role of emotions in world politics,

especially the processes through which individual emotions become collective and

political (Crawford 2014; Mercer 2014), may analyze the use of emotion regulation to

“scale up” or “scale down” emotions between the individual, societal, governmental and

nation-state levels. In international relations theory, the way emotions move from one

level to another is still not clear (Stein 2013, 387; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014, 499),

perhaps because it is not evident how important agency is in the explanations of emotion-

driven international outcomes. Once we move away from structural explanations and

identify the agency involved, we are able to explain threat perceptions by integrating

emotion regulation. Scholars should therefore pit traditional explanations of threat

perception – the constructivist, the sociological institutionalist, and the psychological

explanations which ignore the role of emotion in threat perception (e.g., cognitive biases

EMOTION REGULATION

31

and heuristics, loss aversion, framing and risk propensity) – against our explanation in

order to gauge the comparative advantage of each.

Scholars of international politics and emotion may also build in emotion

regulation as a driver for threat perception by looking at the way it is used to bolster the

credibility of deterrent threats, especially its success in the emotional loading of the

likelihood of a threat. Scholars may also build emotion regulation into the analysis of

attempts to promote international interventions or institutionalize emotions in peace and

war systems, as well as in other forms of strategic interactions. Focusing on diverse

strategic contexts of foreign policy decisions, scholars may examine the deliberate

production of emotions, such as empathy, in formal and informal diplomatic negotiations

amongst members of security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998), or fear, during

(cold or hot) wars.

Theorizing the actual process and the specific mechanisms that render emotion

political at the regional and global levels enables scholars to focus on specific emotions

which are manipulated for specific purpose by specific actors using specific strategies

during specific periods. Conceived in this way, one can move away from the view that

emotion can explain only deviations from rationality, and towards the use of emotion to

explain accurate judgments as well as erroneous ones (Mercer 2005). This understanding

of the relations between emotion regulation, perception and decision making opens an

important research agenda for scholars of international relations and emotions. This

agenda faces “difficult but not impossible [methodological] challenges, challenges that

political psychologists have long grappled with” (Stein 2013, 387).

EMOTION REGULATION

32

One reason this topic is so compelling is that often innovation in the social

sciences occurs at the intersection of disciplines (Dogan and Pahre 1990). This may pose

a problem when politics does not have the same currency as the other disciplines (e.g.,

economics). In our case, however, emotion regulation is part and parcel of power games

in politics, and therefore, there is no need to engage in concept stretching (Sartori 1970)

or other forms of conceptual engineering. The emergence of this new research agenda is

critical to political science and international relations because it bridges a significant gap

in our understanding of the competition over control of the emotional arenas in domestic

and global political domains. Although scholars of political science and international

relations lack a consensus on what the most interesting questions are that require

solutions, the fact that this topic is directly related to the dynamics of legitimation and

valuation of politicians and public policies should suffice to place it on a research agenda.

Findings from studies addressing these questions promise to transform how we think

about the intricate relationship within and between states.

EMOTION REGULATION

33

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Figure 1. The process model of emotion regulation (reproduced with permission from

Gross & Thompson, 2007).

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1 The literature on campaign advertising has examined the effect of positive versus

negative advertising (e.g., Marcus 2003; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Macus, Neuman

and MacKuen 2000; MacKeun et al. 2010; Neuman et al. 2007), discrete emotions (e.g.,

Valentino et al. 2011), and the combined effect of both (Huddy et al. 2007).

2 McDermott (2011) defined emotional entrepreneurship as “the process by which leaders

strategically use outrage at opposition members to cue in-group members to participate in

action against the out-group members who have committed the outrage” (p. 114). We

prefer a much broader definition whose analytical reach captures also the use of humor or

sarcasm, as well as other tools.

3 On the neural bases of emotion and emotion regulation, see Ochsner and Gross (2014).

4 See, for example, group-based anger (e.g., Reifen Tagar et al. 2011), group-

based guilt and shame (e.g., Iyer and Leach, 2008), group-based pride (e.g., Haslam et al.

2000) and group-based hope (Cohen-Chen et al. 2014). According to Smith (1993) and

Mackie et al. (2000), group-based emotions are influenced by the level of identification

with the group, as well as by unique appraisals of the event at hand which depend on the

group member’s personality, values, and interests and by the type of event. Successful

emotion regulation can affect both factors.