WHENTHEMIDDLECOMESEARLY:PUZZLESANDPERPLEXITIESINPLATO’SDIALOGUES

MIRIAMBYRD

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SeepublishedversioninProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy(2013)XXVIII:187-209

https://brill.com/abstract/journals/bapj/28/1/article-p187_17.xml

Plato’searlydialoguesappeartobemuchdifferentfromhismiddlebecause

oftheiraporeticnature.1WhereasSocratesofthemiddleperiodputsforth

philosophicalpositionsandarguesinsupportoftheses,Socratesoftheearly

dialoguesprofessesignorance,useselenchusonothersratherthanarguingfor

conclusions,andendsdiscussionsinaporia.2Thehypothesisof

developmentalismisoftenusedtoexplainthesedifferences.Thebasic

developmentalistposition,arisinginthe19thcenturywithKarlFriedrich

Hermanin1839andreachingdominancebytheearly1860’s,dividesthe

dialoguesintothreechronologicalperiodsandassociatestheseperiodswith

threestagesofdevelopmentinPlato’sthought,oftenidentifyingthephilosophy

oftheearlydialogueswiththatofthehistoricSocrates.3GregoryVlastos,

1 I would like to take this opportunity to thank the University of Texas at Arlington for awarding me a

Research Enhancement Program grant (summer 2008) for beginning research on Plato’s early

dialogues.

2 For examples of such differences found between the early and middle dialogues, see Gregory

Vlastos’ ten Theses in Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (1991, 47-49) and Terrence Penner’s

twelve points of contrast in “Socrates and the Early Dialogues” (1992, 125-130).

3 For a history of developmentalism, see C.C.W. Taylor (2002).

2

perhapsthemostinfluentialproponentofdevelopmentalisminthe20thcentury,

distinguishedthethoughtofSocratesintheearlydialoguesandSocratesinthe

middleastworadicallyseparatephilosophies.AccordingtoVlastos,Socrates,in

thesetwoperiods,

pursuesphilosophiessodifferentthattheycouldnothavebeendepictedas

cohabitingthesamebrainthroughoutunlessithadbeenthebrainofa

schizophrenic.Theyaresodiverseincontentandmethodthattheycontrast

assharplywithoneanotheraswithanythirdphilosophyyoucareto

mention….(Vlastos1991,46)

Manyotherscholarsagreethatthereisauniquephilosophicalpositioninthe

earlydialogues,eitherbelongingtothehistoricSocratesorinfluencedbyhim,

andtheirworkhasgivenrisetothefieldofSocraticstudies.4

Inthispaper,Ichallengethepositionthatthereisaradicalshiftbetween

Socrates’philosophyintheearlydialoguesandthatinthemiddlebyofferinga

competingexplanationofthedifferencesinthetwoperiods.5Iproposethat

thesedistinguishingcharacteristicsoftheearlydialoguesdisplaySocrates’use

ofthe“summoners”(parakaloËnta)describedinRepublic7andarethus

4 See, for example, Terrence Irwin (1977), Gerosimos Santas (1979), Terrence Penner (1992), Hugh

Benson (1992), and Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (1994).

5 Other scholars who argue against a sharp distinction between Socrates’ philosophy in the early and

middle dialogues include Julia Annas (1999, 12), Charles Kahn (1996, 39), and Christopher Rowe

(2007, 4-5).

3

explainedbyPlato’smiddleperiodepistemology.6Asaconsequence,myposition

isconsistentwithunitarianism,theviewthatthereisafundamentalunityin

Plato’scorpusandcontinuitybetweenperiods.7Myargumentisinfoursections.

Inthefirst,IestablishtheimportanceofsummonersinPlato’smiddleperiod

epistemology.Inthesecond,IarguethatPlatois,intheearlydialogues,awareof

theimportantfunctionplayedbysummonersanddepictsSocrates’attemptsto

summoninterlocutors.IarguethatSocratesembarksonhisdivinemissionasa

resultofthesummoningprocessandthat,inperformanceofhisdivinemission,

Socratesuseselenchusinanattempttosummonothers.Afterestablishingthese

points,Iargueinsection3thatPlatousesSocrates’failedsummoningattempts

toestablishaframeworkforsummoningreaders.Isupportthisclaimwitha

closereadingoftheLaches.Inthefinalsection,Iarguethatthefeaturesunique

totheearlydialoguesmaybeexplainedintermsofSocrates’andPlato’s

attemptstoinitiatethesummoningprocess,andItraceouttheimplicationsmy

hypothesisforthedebatebetweenunitariansanddevelopmentalists.

6 For more on summoners, see Miriam Byrd (2007, 365-381) and Nicholas Smith (2000, 126-40).

7 Charles Kahn defines unitarianism as follows: “The unitarian tradition tends to assume that the

various dialogues are composed from a single point of view, and that their diversity is to be explained

on literary and pedagogical grounds, rather than as a change in the author’s philosophy. Different

dialogues are seen as exploring the same problem from different directions, or as leading the reader to

deeper levels of reflection” (1996, 38).

4

I.SummonersintheMiddleDialogues

IntheRepublicandthePhaedo,bothconsideredtobemiddledialogues,

Socratesassignssummonersanimportantroleinepistemologicaldevelopment.

InRepublic7,afterdescribinghiseducationalphilosophy,Socratesexplicitly

describessummonersandsituatesthemwithinhispedagogicaltheory.

FollowinghisfamousallegoryofthecaveatRepublic514a-517b,Socratesstates

hisviewofeducation.At518b9-10heexplains:“Educationisn’twhatsome

peopledeclareittobe,namely,puttingknowledgeintosoulsthatlackit,like

puttingsightintoblindeyes.”8Rather,hecontinues:

Ourpresentdiscussion,ontheotherhand,showsthatthepowertolearnis

presentineveryone’ssoulandthattheinstrumentwithwhicheachlearnsis

likeaneyethatcannotbeturnedaroundfromdarknesstolightwithout

turningthewholebody.Thisinstrumentcannotbeturnedaroundfromthat

whichiscomingintobeingwithoutturningthewholesouluntilitisableto

studythatwhichisandthebrightestthingthatis,namely,theonewecallthe

good.(518c3-d1)

Theallegoryofthecaverepresentsthisturningoftheeyeofthesoulasa

forcibleturningofthebody.Inthecontextofdiscussingeducationinthegood

city,Socratesappointssummonersasignificantroleinthisprocess.At521a-d,in

theprocessofinvestigatinghowphilosopherswilldevelopwithinhiscity,

Socratesraisesthequestionofwhatwillleadthemfromdarknesstolightand

turnthesoulfrombecomingtobeing.Answeringhisownquestionat522a,

8 All translations of the Republic are from Grube and Reeve (1992).

5

Socratessaysthatnumberandcalculation,or“[t]hatinconsequentialmatterof

distinguishingtheone,thetwo,andthethree”(522c5-6),willfulfilltheroleof

thepersonphysicallyturningtheprisoner’sbodyintheallegory.

However,accordingtoSocrates,nooneusescalculationcorrectly,thatis,asa

summoningprocess.Heassertsthat“somesenseperceptionsdon’tsummonthe

understandingtolookintothem,becausethejudgmentofsenseperceptionis

itselfadequate,whileothersencourageitineverywaytolookintothem,

becausesenseperceptionseemstoproducenosoundresult”(523a9-b5).

Socratesdistinguishesthelatterassummoners.

Asummoner,accordingtoSocrates,isaperceptionthatappearstobe

contradictory,suchasthesameobjectappearingtobebothtallandshortor

hardandsoft.Heusestheexampleofsomeoneholdingoutathumb,index

finger,andmiddlefinger.Whenoneobservestheindexfinger,perception

presentsoppositequalities.Theindexfingerisbigincomparisontothethumb,

butitissmallincomparisontothemiddlefinger.Perceptionpresentstheone

fingerasbeingsimultaneouslylargeandsmall,whichcausesthesoultobeat

loss(épore›n).9Puzzled,thesoulissummonedtousecalculation.Thoughprior

toencounteringasummonerthesoulbelievedthedataofitssensestobetrue

9 Socrates uses the term “épore›n” at 524a6 and e5. The verb “épor°v” means to be at loss, in

difficulty, puzzled, or at an impasse. Note that Socrates’ description of how summoners bring the soul

to aporia parallels Diotima’s description in the Symposium of the conception of Eros, who is a

personification of the philosopher. Penia, scheming to get beyond her lack of resources (épor€an),

managestobecomepregnantbyPoros(203b8-9). Eros is her offspring.

6

andtooksensationtobereality,thesummonerbringsittoaporia.Thesoul

realizesthatonethingcannotsimultaneouslyhaveoppositequalitiesinthe

samerespect,anditinvokescalculationtoresolvethecontradiction.Calculation

separatestheintelligibleobjects,bignessandsmallness,fromtheperception.

Platowrites:

Thenit’slikelythatinsuchcasesthesoul,summoningcalculationand

understanding,firsttriestodeterminewhethereachofthethingsannounced

toitisoneortwo.

Ofcourse.

Ifit’sevidentlytwo,won’teachbeevidentlydistinctandone?

Yes.

Then,ifeachisone,andbothtwo,thesoulwillunderstandthatthetwoare

separate,foritwouldn’tunderstandtheinseparabletobetwo,butrather

one.(524b3-6)

Whereasthesoulbeganbygraspingonesenseperception,itnowdistinguishes

theintelligibleentitiesfromtheperceptioninwhichtheyappearandattemptsto

grasptheforms.Platowrites:

Andisn’titfromthesecasesthatitfirstoccurstoustoaskwhatthebigis

andwhatthesmallis?

Absolutely.

And,becauseofthis,wecalledtheonetheintelligibleandtheotherthe

visible.(524c7-10)

7

Havingbegunpracticingcalculation,thesoulisreadytostudythemathematical

sciencesrecommendedbySocratesfortheeducationoffuturerulers.

ThoughSocratesdoesnotrefertosummonersbynameinthePhaedo,wesee

analogousintellectualpuzzleswhichplayasimilarepistemologicalrole.

Recollection,theprocesswherebysensiblethingsbringtomindourprior

knowledgeoftheforms,consistsofbeingsummoned,asisshowninthe

followingexcerptfromSocrates’descriptionofrecollectiontoSimmias:

Donotequalstonesandstickssometimes,whileremainingthesame,appear

toonetobeequalandtoanothertobeunequal–Certainlytheydo.

Butwhatoftheequalsthemselves?Havetheyeverappearedunequaltoyou,

orequalitytobeinequality?

Never,Socrates.

Theseequalthingsandtheequalitselfarethereforenotthesame?

Idonotthinktheyarethesameatall,Socrates.

Butitisdefinitelyfromtheequalthings,thoughtheyaredifferentfromthat

equal,thatyouhavederivedandgraspedtheknowledgeofequality?10(74b-

7-c6)

Whensomeonesees,forexample,apairofsticksthatappearequal,onenotices

thatinsomeaspectthesesticksalsoappearunequal.Thesticks,appearingto

haveoppositecharacteristics,provokethesoultothought.Intryingtoresolve

thecontradiction,thesoulseparatesouttheequalfromtheunequal,andrealizes

10 All translations of the Phaedo are from Grube (1981).

8

thattheequalitself,unliketheequalsticks,canneverappeartobeunequal.

Sensibleobjects,thetwosticks,havepromptedthesoultorecollectaform.

WhenSocratesrecountshisowneducationaljourneyinlines96a-101e,he

saysthatapparentcontradictionscausedhimtoabandonhispursuitofnatural

scienceanditsemphasisonthesensesandappealinsteadtotheformsascausal

explanations.Forexample,sightsuggestedtoSocratesthatalargemanwas

tallerthanasmallonebyahead.Thisexplanationofwhyonemanwastaller

thananotherprovedinadequate,however,forSocratesrealizedthatitledto

contradiction,“first,becausethebiggerisbiggerandthesmallersmallerbythe

same,thenbecausethebiggerisbiggerbyaheadwhichissmall….”(101a9-10).

ResolutionofthehypothesisinvolvesSocrates’separatingoutbignessand

smallnessfromtheperceptionofthetwomen.Socrates’newexplanationis

“thatitisthroughbignessthatbigthingsarebigandthebiggerarebigger,and

thatsmallerthingsaremadesmallbysmallness”(100e4-6).11

II.Socrates’DivineMissionandSummonersintheEarlyDialogues

ThesummoningprocessisevidentinSocrates’accountofhowheembarked

onhisdivinemission.HerelatesthathisfriendChaerephontraveledtoDelphi

andaskedtheoracleifanymanwaswiserthanSocrates.Theoracleanswered

thatnomanwaswiser.Socrates,uponbeinginformedofthis,wasperplexed

andasked:

11 Socrates uses similar puzzles in the Theaetetus. See 154c and 155b. At 155d he expresses approval

of Theaetetus’ puzzlement and describes it as the beginning of philosophy.

9

Whateverdoesthegodmean?Whatishisriddle(ka‹�t€�poteafin€ttetai)?I

amveryconsciousthatIamnotwiseatall;whatthendoeshemeanby

sayingthatIamthewisest?Forsurelyhedoesnotlie;itisnotlegitimatefor

himtodoso.12(21b4-8)

Socratesisherepresentedwithanapparentcontradictionverysimilartothe

summonersmentionedinRepublic7.WhenSocrateshearstheoracle’sanswer

toChaerephon’squestion,heisfacedwithaninconsistencythatprovokeshis

thought.Socratesperceiveshimselfaslackinginwisdom,andhebelievesthat

thisperceptionistrue.However,thegod,whomherespectsandtrusts,hassaid

thatnomaniswiserthanSocrates,whichSocratesinterpretsasthegodsaying

thatSocratesisthewisestofmen.Socratesbelievesthatthegodspeaksonly

truth.Whentheoracle’sanswerisaddedtoSocrates’beliefsthatheisnotwise

andthatthegoddoesnotlie,Socratesrecognizesthatheisfacedwith

contradiction.Socratesexperiencesaporiawhenconfrontedwiththegod’s

riddle.InApology21b7herecounts:“ForalongtimeIwasatloss(ÆpÒroun) as

tohismeaning….”Socrateshasbeenbroughttothefirststageofthesummoning

process:perplexityandadesiretoresolvetheapparentcontradiction.

Findinghimselfinaporia,Socratessetsouttosolvethepuzzlebysearchingfor

amanwiserthanhimselfsothathecanrefutetheoracle.Uponquestioning

“wise”men,Socratesdiscoversthat,thougheachbelievedhimselftobewise,

nonewas.Socratesevendiscoversthathe,inaway,waswiserthantheybecause

heisawareofhisownignorancewhereastheyarenot(21d).Socratessaysthat,12 All translations of the Apology are from Grube (1981).

10

becauseoftheimportanceheattachedtotheoracle,hecontinuedtoquestion

prominentmeninorderto“provetheoracleirrefutable”(22a8),andtheresults

haveconvincedhimthatthegod’smessageissomethingtothiseffect:“This

manamongyou,mortals,iswisestwho,likeSocrates,understandsthathis

wisdomisworthless”(23b2-4).Socrateshasnowfoundasolutiontothepuzzle.

Heisnotwiseinrespecttothefactthathedoesnotknowanythingworthwhile,

butheiswiseinrespecttothefactthatheisawareofthelimitationsonhisown

wisdom.

BothintheApologyandinthePhaedo,Socrates’storyofhisownintellectual

developmentincludesadescriptionofbeingsummoned,andtheactofbeing

summonedisplacedatsomeimportantjunctureinhislife.InthePhaedo,after

beingsummonedSocratesgivesupnaturalisticexplanationsandinsteadappeals

tothehypothesisoftheforms,whichservesasthephilosophicalfoundationof

themiddledialogues.IntheApology,Socrates’experienceofsolvingtheoracle’s

riddlehasanequallymomentousimpact.Socrates,speakingofthegod,says:

“whenhesaysthisman,Socrates,heisusingmynameasanexample

(parãdeigµa)”(23b1).Socratesissayingthatthegodwishestousehimasa

rolemodelforothers,andhethinksthatwhatthegodwishestoillustrateisthat

mortalswouldbewisetounderstandthattheirwisdomisworthless.He

continues:

SoevennowIcontinuethisinvestigationasthegodbademe–andIgo

aroundseekingoutanyone,citizenorstranger,whomIthinkwise.ThenifI

11

donotthinkheis,Icometotheassistanceofthegodandshowhimthatheis

notwise.(23b5-9)

IarguethatnotjustSocrates’humanwisdom,butalsohissuccessfully

undergoingthesummoningprocess,makeshimexemplary.Accordingto

Socrates’accountofChaerephon’svisittotheoracle,Socratesdoesnotmerely

acknowledgethatheisfacedwithariddleandgiveup,declaringhisignorance,

butheissummonedtoanswertheriddle,takesgreatpainsinhisinvestigation,

andisabletomovebeyondhisformeropinionsandfindasolution.Socratesisa

worthymodelforothersnotonlybecauseofhisabilitytorecognizethathehas

beenbroughttoaporia,butalsoduetohisabilitytoprogressbeyondthatpoint.

Socrates’activityofexaminingandcross-examiningothers(29e)representshis

ongoingfightagainstcomplacencybycontinuingtheinvestigationofhis

assumptions.Asexplanationofwhyhepersistsinquestioningpeopleeven

thoughhehascollectedareasonableamountofsamples,Socratessaysthathe

keepsonsothattheoraclewillremainunrefuted.Socratesmovesbeyondhisold

assumptionsinhissolutiontotheriddle,butratherthanallowhisnew

assumptionstosolidifyintothebeliefthathehas“knowledge”,Socrates,by

continuingtheinvestigation,admitsthehypotheticalnatureofhisinterpretation

andhiswillingnesstore-examinebeliefs.

Socrates’professionofignorancecontributestohisactingasarolemodelfor

fellowAthenians.13Heoftenexemplifiesthesummoningprocessbybecoming

13 Whether or not Socrates is genuinely perplexed by an impasse to which he has led an interlocutor, I

believe that his actions present us with a positive role model since we should recognize puzzling

12

puzzledalongwithhisinterlocutorsintheearlydialogues.Hemodelsonewhois

challengedbyriddlesandisattemptingtoworkoutinconsistenciesinbelief.At

theendoftheLaches,forexample,Socratesdeclareshimselftobeinthesame

stateofperplexityashisinterlocutors,declaring:“asthematterstands,weare

allinthesamedifficulty”(200e6).14InCharmides165b,Socrates,speakingto

Critias,asserts:

youaretalkingtomeasthoughIprofessedtoknowtheanswerstomyown

questionsandasthoughIcouldagreewithyouifIreallywished.Thisisnot

thecase—rather,becauseofmyownignorance,Iamcontinually

investigatinginyourcompanywhateverisputforward.15(165b5-c2)

Critias,unconvinced,accusesSocratesofjusttryingtorefutehim,andSocrates

replies:

Oh,come,Isaid,howcouldyoupossiblythinkthatevenifIweretorefute

everythingyousay,IwouldbedoingitforanyotherreasonthantheoneI

wouldgiveforathoroughinvestigationofmyownstatements—thefearof

unconsciouslythinkingIknowsomethingwhenIdonot.AndthisiswhatI

claimtobedoingnow,examiningtheargumentformyownsakeprimarily,

butperhapsalsoforthesakeofmyfriends.(166c6-d6)

problems for what they are and have the appropriate reaction of being humbled and perplexed. See

Gareth Mathews (1997) for the position that Socrates’ declarations of ignorance reveal a genuine and

appropriate perplexity.

14 All translations of the Laches are from Sprague (1992).

15 All translations of the Charmides are from Sprague (1992).

13

AsimilarproblemisfoundintheMeno.There,MenoaccusesSocratesof

puttinghimunderaspellsothatheisperplexedandcompareshimtothe

torpedofishthatmakesanyoneittouchesnumb.Socratesretorts:“Nowifthe

torpedofishisitselfnumbandsomakesothersnumb,thenIresembleit,butnot

otherwise,forImyselfdonothavetheanswerwhenIperplexothers,butIam

moreperplexedthananyonewhenIcauseperplexityinothers”(80c7-d1).16

Socratesdoesnotjustprovideanexampleofthesummoningprocess,buthe

triestosummonothersashehimselfwassummoned.Whenperplexedbythe

oracle’sanswertoChaerephon,Socratesidentifiesthepronouncementasa

riddle.Hisreferencetoriddles,inthecontextofquestioningothers,indicates

thatheistryingtobringthem,also,toaporia.Forexample,inRepublic1,when

Polemarchusbaseshisdefinitionofjusticeasbenefitingfriendsandharming

enemiesonSimonides’statementthat“itisjusttogivetoeachwhatisowedto

him”(331e,332a-b).Socratescastsdoubtonthedefinition,saying:“Itseems

thenthatSimonideswasspeakinginriddles(±in€jato)—justlikeapoet!”

(332b9-10).Socratesthenimmediatelylaunchesaseriesofargumentsthat

convincePolemarchus,too,thatthisstatementispuzzling.Polemarchusloses

hisconceitofknowledge,rejectshisformerdefinition,andiswillingtojoin

Socratesininquiry.WeseeasimilarexampleintheCharmides.Charmidessays

thatherememberssomeonesayingthattemperanceismindingone’sown

business.Socratescallsthedefinitionariddle,saying:“ifwesucceedinfinding

outwhatitmeans,Ishouldbesurprised,becauseitseemstobeasortofriddle16 All translations of the Meno are from Grube (1981).

14

(afin€gµati)”(161c7-9).Immediatelyafterward,SocratesquestionsCharmides

untilheispuzzled.AftershowingCharmidesthatthedefinition,asheand

Socratesinterpretedit,leadstoabsurdity,Socratescasthisnetforabiggerfish,

thetrueauthorofthestatement,Critias.At162a-bSocratestwicerepeatsthe

claimthatthepersongivingthisdefinitionmusthavebeenriddling.OnceCritias

enterstheargument,Socratesleadshimthroughagruelingquestioningprocess

duringwhichCritiasbecomesperplexed,thoughheunsuccessfullyattemptsto

concealthisfact(169c-d).SocratesalludestoriddlesonceagainintheApology,

butmockinghisaccuser,heplacesMeletusinthepositionofriddler.Protesting

theimpietycharge,SocratessaysofMeletus:

Heislikeonewhocomposedariddle(a‡nigµa)andistryingitout:‘Willthe

wiseSocratesrealizethatIamjestingandcontradictingmyself,orshallI

deceivehimandothers?”Ithinkhecontradictshimselfintheaffidavit,asif

hesaid:‘Socratesisguiltyofnotbelievingingodsbutbelievingingods….

(26e10-27a7)

Continuing,Socratessays:“Youmusthavemadethisdeposition,Meletus,either

totestusorbecauseyouwereatalosstofindanytruewrongdoingofwhichto

accuseme”(27e3).Socratesgoesoninlines27b-28atobringoutthe

inconsistencyinMeletus’impietycharges.Inallthreeoftheseexamples,

Socratesdeclareshisintentiontoshowthataknowledgeclaimisinconsistent

withtheinterlocutors’otherbeliefsbydrawingattentiontoitasaperplexing

riddle.Then,Socratesusesquestionandanswertobringtheinterlocutorto

15

perplexityonthematter,revealingtohimthathedoesnotknowallhebelieved

himselftoknow.17

Socrates’attemptstosummoninterlocutorsarenotlimitedtoinstancesin

whichheexplicitlyreferstoriddles.Theaboveexamplesareallinstancesof

Socrates’uniquestyleofquestioningothersinthecourseofhisdivinemission.

IthasbecomecommonpracticetorefertoSocrates’patternofquestioninginthe

earlydialoguesbythisterm.18Lately,however,scholarshavechallengedboth

theassumptionthatSocrateshasamethodandtheassumptionthatthismethod

iselenchus.19Socrates’useofelenchususuallyfollowsacertainpattern.

Socrates’interlocutormakesaknowledgeclaim,oftenintheformofamoral

definition.Socratesnextaskstheinterlocutoraseriesofquestions,eliciting

otherbeliefsfromhim.Socratesthenshowsthattheinterlocutor’sanswers

implythenegationoftheoriginalknowledgeclaim.Fromthis,Socrates

concludesthatthereisaninconsistencyinthebeliefset.Atthispointthe

17Michael C. Stokes notes Socrates’ use of riddling in these three dialogues and argues for a similarity

between passages, but he uses this information as support for the claim that Socrates is treating the

oracle as he does his human interlocutors (1992, 39-41).

18 For an early and influential discussion of elenchus, see Robinson (1953).

19 For scholars who deny that elenchus is a method, see Brickhouse and Smith (2002, 147, 154-156)

and David Wolfsdorf (2003, 301-2). For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that elenchus is a

philosophical practice whereby Socrates refutes or cross-examines stated knowledge claims.

16

interlocutorisshownthathemustrejecteitherhisinitialclaimoroneofhis

otherbeliefs.20

Elenchushasgreatpotentialtosummon.First,itdisturbstheinterlocutor’s

complacencybypresentinghimwithacontradictionwithinhisaccount.Ideally,

thisawarenessthatone’saccountisnotsufficient,combinedwiththeunsolved

puzzlecreatedbythecontradiction,motivatestheinterlocutortoinitiate

thought.Finally,throughstrugglingtoresolvethecontradiction,theinterlocutor

makesepistemologicalprogress.TheslaveboydemonstrationintheMeno

presentsuswithanincomplete,butmoderatelysuccessful,exampleofSocrates’

summoningthroughelenchus.ThoughSocratesreferstotheprocessas20Accordingtotheso-calledconstructivistinterpretation,Socratesthinksthat

hehasestablishedthattheinterlocutors’thesisisfalse.Forexample,in“The

SocraticElenchus,”Vlastosdefinesthepatternof‘StandardElenchus’asfollows:

“(1)TheinterlocutorassertsathesiswhichSocratesconsidersfalseandtargets

forrefutation.(2)Socratessecuresagreementtofurtherpremises,sayqandr

(eachofwhichmaystandforaconjunctofpropositions).Theargumentisad

hoc:Socratesarguesfromqandrbutnottothem.(3)Socratesthenargues,and

theinterlocutoragrees,thatqandrentailnot-p.(4)ThereuponSocratesclaims

thatnot-phasbeenprovedtrue,pfalse”(1983,39).Non-constructivistsdeny

thatSocratesisusingelenchustosupportpositiveknowledgeclaims.For

examplesoftheirarguments,seeBenson(1995),Stokes(1986),andGrote

(1888,449-50,and457).IbelievethatBensonmakesaconvincingcaseand

sharehisposition.

17

recollection,hispatternofquestioningisthesameasthatusedearlierinthe

dialogueinhiselencticexaminationofMeno.Inthisdemonstration,Socrates

beginsquestioningaslaveboy,askinghimtosolveageometricalproblem.At

first,theboythinksthatheknowstheanswer.AsSocratescontinuestoquestion

him,however,andshowhimtheproblemswithhismathematicalreasoning,the

slaveboyrealizesthathedoesnotknowtheanswerandbecomespuzzled.

Describingthebenefitsofelenchus,Socratessaysthat,priortotheexamination,

theboy“thoughtheknew,andansweredconfidentlyasifhedidknow,andhe

didnotthinkhimselfataloss,butnowhedoesthinkhimselfataloss,andashe

doesnotknow,neitherdoeshethinkheknows”(84a7-10).Accordingto

Socrates,findinghimselfinaporiamotivatestheboytoseekanswers.Socrates

asks:“Doyouthinkthatbeforehewouldhavetriedtofindoutthatwhichhe

thoughtheknewthoughhedidnot,beforehefellintoperplexityandrealizedhe

didnotknowandlongedtoknow?”(84c4-6).21Theboy’scuriosityand

willingnesstocontinuesubmittinghimselftoSocrates’questioningresultsinhis

eventuallylookingintherightdirectionandseeingthecorrectanswer.Though

elenchusleadstoapositiveresultfortheslaveboy,thesummoningprocessis

leftincomplete.Theboy,atthisstage,onlyhastrueopinion–heseesthatthe

answeriscorrect,buthecannotprovideanaccount.However,Socratesclaims

that“ifhewererepeatedlyaskedthesesamequestionsinvariousways,you

21 In Sophist 230b-d, the Eleatic visitor presents a similar view of beneficial effects of a process that

appears to be elenchus.

18

knowthatintheendhisknowledgeaboutthesethingswouldbeasaccurateas

anyone’s”(85c8-d1).

ThesuccessofSocrates’summoningprocessdependsupontheinterlocutor.

Elenchuspresentstheinterlocutorwithcontradictionswithinhisownthought.

But,onceSocratesrevealsthoseinconsistencies,theinterlocutoristheonewho

chooseseithertoacknowledgeordenythatheisinaporia.Likewise,the

interlocutorchooseswhethertobecomeeagerforinquiryor,alternatively,sink

backintocomplacencyandignoretheproblem.22Socratescanusequestionsin

anattempttoturnaninterlocutor’sattentioninahelpfuldirection,buthe

cannotforcesomeoneblindedbyfalsebeliefstofocusonwhatisbeforehim.At

most,Socratescansetupasummoningopportunity;hecannotforcetheprocess.

Understandably,elencticdialoguestendtohaveinconclusiveendingsinwhich

problemsremainunresolved.

III.Plato’sAttempttoSummonReaders

WiththeexceptionofhisslaveboydemonstrationintheMeno,Socrates’

attemptstosummonproveunsuccessful—thoughinterlocutorsarebroughtto

contradiction,theydonotacknowledgebeinginastateofaporiaandgiveupon

attemptstoresolveinconsistencieswithintheiraccounts.23WhywouldPlato

22 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, Socrates’ description of his role as midwife in Theaetetus

150d-151b supports this point.

23 Socrates’ failure is underscored by Plato’s choice, as interlocutors, of historical figures such as

Alcibiades, Charmides, Critias, and Meno, who had already become notorious for their lack of virtue.

19

writedialogueafterdialogueshowingSocratesfailinhismission?Ipositthatat

leastonereasonPlatoallowsSocratestofailtimeaftertimeisthatheisusing

Socrates’attemptstosummontheinterlocutortosummonus.WereSocrates’

interlocutorscarefullytoexaminetheirbeliefs,identifyquestionable

assumptions,andsucceedinresolvingcontradictions,readerswouldbeleftwith

theopinionsofothersratherthanwithpuzzlesdesignedtoprovokethought.

SincePlatodoesnotspeakinhisownvoiceinthedialogues,anythesis

concerninghisintentisdifficulttosupport.Manyscholarsassumethatthemain

speakerofadialogue,usuallySocrates,isthemouthpieceforPlato.Onthebasis

ofthisassumption,theyusethewordsofthemouthpiecetosupporttheirclaims

concerningPlato’sbeliefsandintent.Thisapproachisnotopentome,however.

SincePlatomakesaconsciouschoicetoavoidspeakinginhisownvoice,I

believethatacceptingthemouthpieceassumptionispresumptuous.24Ihave

freelyquotedfromSocratesinthemiddledialoguestosupportmyclaimthat

Socrates,intheearlydialogues,employsapedagogicaltechniquehecontinuesto

endorseinthemiddleperiod.However,inthatcase,IuseSocrates’wordsin

ordertosupportaclaimaboutthebeliefandactionofthedramaticcharacter.I

wouldbeonmuchweakergroundifIweretousethatapproachtosupporta

claimaboutPlato’sintent.25

24 The mouthpiece assumption, prominent though it is, has been challenged in recent years. See, for

example, Press (2000).

25 Another option is appealing to Plato’s letters. Letter VII does not mention summoners, but the views

expressed at 341c-e do express a pedagogical philosophy consistent with use of aporetic dialogues to

20

TheveryfactthatPlatowrotehisdialoguesforanaudience,however,offers

someinsightintohisintent;itisreasonabletosupposethathehopedtoaffect

readersinsomebeneficialway.26Plato’srepeatedrepresentationsofSocrates’

elencticencountersindicatethathetooktheprocessofbringinginterlocutorsto

aporiaseriously.Thisdoesnotprovethatheendorsedit,sincehemighthave

hadsomeothergoalinemphasizingit.However,ifPlatodidbelievethatbeing

summonedwasimportanttoengaginginphilosophicalinquiry,andheintended

hisdialoguestohaveabeneficialinfluenceonhisaudience,itislikelythat

aporeticdialogueswerecraftedtosummonreaders.

MyargumentusesaclosereadingoftheLachestoshowthat,ifonelooksatthe

dialogueasawhole,Platohascreatedadditionalpuzzlesforthereader.The

reasonIhavechosentofocusonjustonedialogueratherthanpresentrelevant

passagesfrommanyisthatmyclaimrequirescontextualevidencethatcanonly

beprovidedbyexaminingthedialogueasaunifiedwhole.27Ihavechosenthe

Lachesbecauseitiswidelyrecognizedtobeoneoftheearlierdialoguesandit

summon readers. Because this letter has not been definitively identified as Plato’s, however, it offers

weak support for my position.

26 See Rowe’s argument for the persuasive function of the dialogues (2007, 9-12).

27 I recommend Edward Halper’s discussion of “evidentiary literalism,” the assumption that, because

the mouthpiece gives Plato’s philosophy, the only acceptable evidence for an interpretation of Plato’s

dialogues is what is explicitly asserted. Halper (1993), appealing to the differences between a

philosophic treatise and a Platonic dialogue, proposes that both structural and contextual evidence are

important for understanding Socrates’ arguments, and he correctly points out that evidentiary literalism

is hardly neutral since it rejects any interpretation appealing to implicit arguments in the text.

21

representsSocratesconductinghisdivinemissionasdescribedintheApology.I

showthatSocratesisattemptingtoleadinterlocutorstocompletethe

summoningprocess,butflawsintheircharacterpreventhimfromsucceeding.I

thendemonstratethatPlatoisusingSocrates’failedattemptsinorderto

summonreaders.

Thedialoguebeginswithaconversationbetweentwooldergentlemen,

LysimachusandMelesias,whohaveinvitedthegenerals,LachesandNicias,to

attendwiththemStesilaus’demonstrationoftheartoffightinginarmor.

Lysimachusexplainsthat,sincethegeneralstooarefathers,theyseektheir

counselinthematterofhowtoraisetheirsonsThucydidesandAristides,also

present,tobegoodmen.Theywishtoknowiflessonsinfightinginarmorwill

improvetheirsons,andtheyaskadviceaboutotherpursuitsthatwouldbenefit

theboys.Socrateshappenstobepresentattheeventand,throughthe

promptingofLachesandNicias,isinvitedtojointheconversation.Thoughthe

subsequentconversationoriginatesindebateoverthebenefitoflearning

Stesilaus’art,withthetwogeneralsarguingopposingpositions,Socratesre-

framestheirdiscussionbyleadinghisinterlocutorstoseethattherealconcern

ismakingtheboysvirtuous.Socratesexpressesconcernoverwhetheranyofthe

menpresenthavethisknowledge(186a-c).LysimachusandMelesiasareaware

thattheylackit,butthegeneralsseemconfidentthattheyarequalifiedtogive

counselonthesubject.Inordertopreventthemadvisingoutofignoranceand

harmingtheyoungmen,Socratessetsthestageforaseriesofelenctic

arguments.Hepointsoutthattheknowledgerelevanttocaringforyoungmen’s

22

soulsisknowledgeofvirtue(189d-190c).Sinceinvestigationofthewholeof

virtueappearstobetoodifficult,Socratesrecommendsinvestigatingonepart,

courage(190c-d).Hecontinuesontoaskthegeneralstotellhimwhatcourage

is.

Earlyinthedialogue,beforeelenchusbegins,Platorevealstheinterlocutors’

fundamentalbeliefs.Thegeneral’sspeechesconcerningfightinginarmor

provideanintroductionintotheirviews.Laches’laterdistinctionbetweenlogoi

(words)anderga(deeds),madeat188d,isanticipatedhere.Niciasappearsto

valuelogoiovererga.Hecallsfightinginarmora“branchofstudy”(181e1),and

assumesthat,assuch,itisbeneficial(Hoerber1968,99).Heextolsitsvalue,

claimingthatitinitiatesloveoflearning:

suchastudyarousesinusthedesireforanotherfineformofinstruction,

sinceeverymanwholearnstofightinarmorwillwanttolearnthesubject

thatcomesnext,thatis,thescienceoftactics;andwhenhehasmasteredthis

andtakenprideinit,hewillpressontothewholeartofthegeneral.Soithas

alreadybecomeclearthatwhatisconnectedwiththislatterart,allthe

studiesandpursuitswhicharefineandofgreatvalueforamantolearnand

topractice,havethisstudyasastarting-point.(182b4-c5)

Niciasassumesanassociationbetweencourageandknowledge,declaring:“this

knowledgewillmakeeverymanmuchbolderandbraverinwarthanhewas

before”(182c6-9).Nicias’emphasisonintellectualmattersisemphasizedbyhis

useofthewords“mathema”and“episteme”,ortheirderivatives,eleventimesin

thirty-fivelines(O’Brien1963,142).

23

Laches,ontheotherhand,valuesergaoverlogoi.28Heisagainstthistypeof

trainingduetotheactionsofitspractitioners.Heobservesthatthoughthe

Lacedaemoniansareexpertsinwarcraft,theteachersoffightinginarmor

“regardLacedaemonasforbiddengroundandkeepfromsettingfootinit”

(183b4-6).Inaddition,theteachersofthisartfailtodistinguishthemselvesin

war,evenworse,“themenwhopracticethisartseemtobethosewhohavethe

worstluckatit”(183c7-8).Asanexample,Lachesrecountsaninstanceinwhich

Stesilaus,whohasjustgiventhedisplay,publiclymadeafoolofhimselfinbattle

(183d-e).

Thedistinctionbetweenwordsanddeedsisreflectedinthereasonsbothgive

forbringingSocratesintothediscussion.LachesissurprisedthatMelesiasand

LysimachushavesoughthisandNicias’advicebutnotSocrates’.Onereasonis

Socrates’actions:“heisalwaysspendinghistimeinplaceswheretheyoung

menengageinanystudyornoblepursuitofthesortyouarelookingfor”(180c5-

6).Also,LachespraisesSocratesforhisdeedsonthebattlefield.Lachessays:

Don’tunderanycircumstancesletthemangetaway,Lysimachus—becauseI

haveseenhimelsewherekeepingupnotonlyhisfather’sreputationbutthat

ofhiscountry.HemarchedwithmeintheretreatfromDelium,andIcantell

youthatiftheresthadbeenwillingtobehaveinthesamemanner,ourcity

wouldbesafeandwewouldnotthenhavesufferedadisasterofthatkind.

(181a-b)

28 See similar discussions in Robert Hoerber (1968, 99) and Henry Teloh (1986, 45).

24

Nicias,too,vouchesforSocrates,butherecommendsSocratesforareasonmore

closelyassociatedwithlogoi.NiciasvouchesforSocratesbecause,hesays,

SocratesrecentlyrecommendedthesophistDamon,amanwhoseintellectNicias

findsimpressive,asamusicteacherforhisson(179e-d).Later,immediately

beforeelenchusbegins,thegeneralsdisplaythesesamebasicvalueswhenthey

consenttobequestionedbySocrates.Niciasconsentstoitbecauseheenjoys

intellectualdiscussionwithSocratesandbelievesittobebeneficial.Niciassays:

Itakepleasureintheman’scompany,Lysimachus,anddon’tregarditasat

allabadthingtohaveitbroughttoourattentionthatwehavedoneorare

doingwrong.RatherIthinkthatamanwhodoesnotrunawayfromsuch

treatmentbutiswilling,accordingtothesayingofSolon,tovaluelearningas

longashelives,notsupposingthatoldagebringshimwisdomofitself,will

necessarilypaymoreattentiontotherestofhislife.(188a8-b6)

LachesconsentsbecausehebelievesthatSocrates’deedshaveentitledhimto

speakonthetopicofvirtue.Lachesexplainsthatheenjoyslisteningto

discussionsaboutvirtueandwisdomwhenthespeaker’swordsanddeedsarein

harmonybuthatestolistentoamanwhosedeedsarenotinharmonywithhis

words(188c-d).Here,Lachesshowsapreferencefordeedsoverwords–heis

onlywillingtolistentothewordsofthosewhosedeedsherespects.Concerning

Socrates,Lachessays:

NowIhavenoacquaintancewiththewordsofSocrates,butbeforenow,I

believe,Ihavehadexperienceofhisdeeds,andthereIfoundhimaperson

privilegedtospeakfairwordsandtoindulgeineverykindoffrankness.Soif

25

hepossessesthisabilitytoo,Iaminsympathywiththeman,andIwould

submittobeingexaminedbysuchapersonwiththegreatestpleasure,nor

wouldIfindlearningburdensome,becauseItooagreewithSolon,though

withonereservation–Iwishtogrowoldlearningmanythings,butfromgood

menonly.(188e-189a)

Theinterlocutors’definitionsfollowtheirpreviouslyexpressedbeliefs.When

SocratesasksLachestodefinecourage,Lachesanswersconfidently:“Good

heavens,Socrates,thereisnodifficultyaboutthat:ifamaniswillingtoremain

athispostandtodefendhimselfagainsttheenemywithoutrunningaway,then

youmayrestassuredthatheisamanofcourage”(190e4-7).Thisdefinitionof

courageemphasizesdeedsbutleavesoutpossiblestrategy(Hoerber1968,99).

Laches’definitionistoonarrow.Socratespresentstheexampleofamanwho

fightstheenemyinretreat(191a-c),theactionforwhichLacheshadearlier

praisedSocrates.Lachesnextattemptstodefinecourageas“asortofendurance

ofthesoul”(192c9-10).Thisdefinition,too,stressesaction.Socratespointsout

thatthisdefinitionistoobroad.SocratesguidesLaches’thirdattempt,

persuadinghimtoaddknowledgetothedefinition:wiseenduranceiscourage

(192d).SinceLacheshasattendeddeedstotheexclusionoflogoi,hehasnot

consideredwhatkindofwisdomisnecessaryforcourage.

WhenLachesdefinescourageaswiseendurance,Socratesbeginshiselenchus

bysuggestingthattheyinvestigateinwhatsenseitiswise.Hepresentsalistof

examplesbasedontheimplicitassumptionthattherelevantwisdomisskill

knowledge.Here,heseemstobefollowinguponapointLachesmadeinhis

26

earlierspeechagainstfightinginarmor.At184b,Lacheswarnsthatsomeone

whohasgainedfalseconfidenceduetolearningthisartwilllikelybetoobrash,

ratherthanbrave,inbattle.Thisimpliesthathavingtechnicalskillisnecessary

forbeingbrave.

Itturnsoutthat,inthecontextoftheseexamples,Lachesthinksthattheactsof

foolishendurancearethemorecourageousones.Forexample,Lachesbelieves

thatamanwhoenduresinbattlebecauseheknowsthatreinforcementsareon

theirwayandthathissidewillhavegreaterstrengthislesscourageousthanone

whoenduresinbattlewithoutthisknowledge(193A-B).Similarly,Laches

believesthatthosewhodiveintowellswithoutbeingskilledarebraverthan

thosewhodosowithtraining(193C).Laches’reactiontotheseexamplesshows

thatthenotionofcourageheusesinordertopickoutindividualcasesof

courageousbehaviorisdifferentfromthedefinitionhehasgiven.Also,his

reactionimpliesthathebelievesthatcourageisfoolishendurance,whichis

oppositetohisdefinition.Notonlyiscourageasfoolishendurancecontradictory

tohisstateddefinition;itcreatesinconsistencywhenaddedtohisbeliefsthat

courageisnoble(193D)andfoolishendurancedisgracefulandharmful(192D,

193D).

AfterperformingelenchusonLaches,Socratessuggeststhattheyalsosummon

Niciastothehunt(194B).Nicias’definition,too,followsfromthebeliefshehas

expressedearlier.Nicias,whovalueslogoiovererga,discardsthenotionthat

enduranceplaysaroleincourage,and,drawingonasayingheattributesto

Socrates,“thateveryoneofusisgoodwithrespecttothatinwhichheiswise

27

andbadinrespecttothatinwhichheisignorant”(194d1-2),infersthatcourage

isakindofwisdom:“theknowledgeofthefearfulandthehopefulinwarandin

everyothersituation”(194e10-195a2).Thisassociationofknowledgewith

couragewasearlierassumedat182cinhisspeechsupportingStesilaus’art.

SocratessetsthestageforelenchusbyconfirmingthatNiciasdoes,indeed,

believethatcourageisapartofvirtue(198a).Socratesasks:“Anddoyoualso

speakofthesamepartsthatIdo?Inadditiontocourage,Icalltemperanceand

justiceandeverythingelseofthiskindpartsofvirtue.Don’tyou?”(198a7-10).

WhenNiciasanswersintheaffirmative,Socratessays“Weareinagreementon

thesepoints….”(198b2).Socratesthenbeginsconstructinganargumenttoshow

thatNicias’definitionofcourage,combinedwithotherofhisbeliefs,resultsin

inconsistency.SocratesascertainsthatNiciasagreesthat

[W]eregardasfearfulthingsthosethatproducefear,andashopefulthings

thosethatdonotproducefear;andfearisproducednotbyevilswhichhave

happenedorarehappeningbutbythosewhichareanticipated.(198b5-9)

Thenheargues,andNiciasaccepts,thatknowledgeisnotjustofpast,present,or

futurebutofalltimes(198d-199a).Courageis,then,notknowledgeoffuture

goodandevilbutknowledgeofgoodandevil(199c-d).Amanwithknowledgeof

goodandevilhasallofthevirtues.Socratesasks:

Thendoesamanwiththiskindofknowledgeseemtodepartfromvirtuein

anyrespectifhereallyknows,inthecaseofallgoodswhatsoever,whatthey

areandwillbeandhavebeen,andsimilarlyinthecaseofevils?Anddoyou

regardthatmanaslackingintemperanceorjusticeandholinesstowhom

28

alonebelongstheabilitytodealcircumspectlywithbothgodsandmenwith

respecttoboththefearfulanditsopposite,andtoprovidehimselfwithgood

thingsthroughhisknowledgeofhowtoassociatewiththemcorrectly?

(199d4-e3)

Socratesconcludes:“Thenthethingyouarenowtalkingabout,Nicias,would

notbeapartofvirtuebutrathervirtueentire”(199e5-6).Niciasappearstobe

contradictinghimselfbymaintainingthatcourageisbothapartofvirtueandthe

wholeofvirtue.Nicias,too,hasreachedanimpasse.

ThoughSocrateshassuccessfullyperformedelenchusonthegenerals,hehas

notfullybroughtthemtoaporia.SocrateshasmadeprogresswithLaches.

Lachesisawareofinconsistencyinhisbeliefset,agreeingwithSocratesthat

theirdeedsarenotinharmonywiththeirwords(193e).Laches’admissionthat

heisnotinagoodstate(193e)impliesthathewishestoresolvethisproblem,

andSocratesrallieshimtocontinuesearchingforcourage:

letusholdourgroundinthesearchandletusendure,sothatcourageitself

won’tmakefunofusfornotsearchingforitcourageously–ifendurance

shouldperhapsbecourageafterall.(194a1-5)

Lachesexpressesenthusiasmforthesearch,saying“Iamreadynottogiveup,

Socrates,althoughIamnotreallyaccustomedtoargumentsofthiskind.Butan

absolutedesireforvictoryhasseizedmewithrespecttoourconversation….”

(194a6-b1).Atthispoint,Lachesisperplexedaboutamatteraboutwhichhe

wasformerlycomplacent.However,hehasnotfullyarrivedataporia.Hedenies

hisignorance,saying“IstillthinkIknowwhatcourageis,butIcan’tunderstand

29

howithasescapedmejustnowsothatIcan’tpinitdowninwordsandsaywhat

itis”(194b2-5).

ThoughLacheshasbeenstimulatedtoseekanswers,hisneglectoflogoihas

lefthimillequippedforphilosophicalinquiryandhefailstoendureinthesearch

forcourage(Teloh1986,51;Hoerber1968,99;O’Brien1963,141-142;and

Devereaux1977,134).AfterLachesfindshimselfatlossanddoesn’tknowhow

toproceed,SocratesinvitesNiciastodefinecourage,andatSocrates’request,

Lachestakesoverthejobasinterrogator.Nicias,however,ismoreexperienced

inargumentation,andLachessoonrelinquisheshisroleinfrustrationat196c.

EvenwithSocratesatthereigns,at197eLachesdisplaysunwillingnessto

continuetheconversation,eveninapassiverole.WhenSocratesattemptsto

keepLachesengaged,saying“Payattentionandjoinmeinexaminingwhatis

said”(197e7-8),Lachesunenthusiasticallyresponds“Verywell,ifthatseems

necessary”(197e9).ThoughLachesisstillpresent,heisnolongeractively

engagedinthesearch.

Niciasalsofailstoendureinthesearchforcourage.ThoughNiciaspresents

himselfasathinkerandclaimstofindSocraticelenchusbeneficial(188a-c),heis

deficientinlogoi.Afteradmittingthathehasnotsuccessfullydefinedcourage,

Niciasbreaksoffdiscussion(200b).Niciasendstheinvestigation:“AsfarasIam

concernedIthinkenoughhasbeensaidonthetopicforthepresent,andifany

pointhasnotbeencoveredsufficiently,thenlateronIthinkwecancorrectit

bothwiththehelpofDamon…andwiththatofothers”(200b6-7).Niciasoffersto

instructLachesaboutcourageafterDamon,thesophist,hasfoundaresolution

30

(200c).Clearly,Niciashasbeenneithertroublednorperplexedbythe

inconsistencyrevealedinhisthought.

SocratescannotachievehisdesiredresultwithNiciasbecauseNiciasiscontent

withusingthethoughtofothers.Nicias’definitionofcourageisnotreally

originaltohim,butisaninterpretationofoneofSocrates’points.Recallthat,in

introducinghisdefinitionofcourage,Niciassays“Ihaveoftenheardyousaythat

everyoneofusisgoodwithrespecttothatinwhichheiswiseandbadin

respecttothatinwhichheisignorant”(194d1-3).Fromthishereasonsthat

wisdomisanecessaryconditionofcourage(194d),andbuildshisdefinitionon

theideathatvirtueisasortofwisdom(194dff.).Later,whenNicias

distinguishesbetweencourageandboldnessinhisdiscussionwithLaches,

Socrates’attributesNicias’distinctionstosophists.Socratessays:

Nevermindhim,Laches.Idon’tthinkyourealizethathehasprocuredthis

wisdomfromourfriendDamon,andDamonspendsmostofhistimewith

Prodicus,whohasthereputationofbeingbestamongthesophistsatmaking

suchverbaldistinctions.(197d1-5)

WhenNiciasrealizesthathedoesn’tunderstandwhatcourageis,heiscontentto

usewhateversolutionDamonproduces(200b)ratherthantrytofigurethings

outforhimself.Thispatternofusingthethoughtsofothersasasubstitutefor

independentthoughtisreinforcedbythereader’sknowledgeofNicias’

notoriousfailureintheSicilianexpedition.Socrates’remarkat199athat“the

lawdecrees,notthattheseershouldcommandthegeneral,butthatthegeneral

shouldcommandtheseer”remindsthereaderofNicias’real-lifefailureto

31

exhibitcourage.Whenitwastimetowithdrawbysea,Niciaswassuperstitiously

frightenedbyaneclipseofthemoon.Ratherthandemonstratingcourage,he

listenedtoseersanddelayedretreatforamonth.Thislackofintellectualself-

relianceresultedinadevastatingdefeatforAthens(Devereaux1977,134-135;

Hoerber1968,145-6;andTeloh198654).

Thereaderisleftwithapuzzle:theperspectiveofergaalonehasproventobe

deficient.NotonlyhasLachesreachedimpasseduetoignoranceofthekindof

knowledgeassociatedwithcourage,buthislackoflogoihasmadehimfailin

ergaandthuspreventedhimfromresolvingthecontradictiontowhichelenchus

led.Ontheotherhand,Nicias’focusonlogoitotheexclusionofergahasproved

deficientaswell.Nicias’removalof“endurance”fromthedefinitionofcourage

leadstocouragebeingindistinguishablefromthewholeofvirtue.Also,hisown

lackofendurancemakeshimdeficientinlogoi.Failuretoendureinreasoning

thingsoutandlookingforanswershasledhimtobecontentwithusingthe

viewsofotherswithoutunderstandingthem.Thesefailuressuggestboth

wisdomandenduranceareessentialtothedefinitionofcourage(O’Brien1963,

139-140;Devereux1977,135;andHoerber1968,102).Canthetwobe

combined?

Thoughneitherofthegeneralsfightshiswaythroughthedifficultiesof

elenchus,theirconversationwithSocratesofferssomedirectionforthereader

whohasendurance.Forexample,Lachesreachesanimpassebecausehe

associatesthewrongkindofknowledgewithcourageousbehavior.Heappeared

tocontradicthisdefinitionofcourageaswiseendurancebecausehelabeledas

32

courageousexamplesofpeopleenduringthoughtheylackedrelevantskill

knowledge.Ironically,animplicitresolutiontohiscontradictionisprovidedin

thediscussionatlines195b-196b.Nicias,defendinghisownpositionagainstone

ofLaches’criticisms,distinguishesbetweenskillknowledgeandknowledgeof

goodandevil.OneofNicias’examplesinvolvesthecraft-knowledgeofmedicine.

Hepointsoutthatthedoctor’sknowledgeofhowtohealabodyisseparatefrom

theknowledgeofwhetheritisbetterforaparticularindividualtoliveortodie

(195C).Laches,however,refusestoacceptNicias’distinctionandaccuseshimof

being“unwillingtomakeagentlemanlyadmissionthatheistalkingnonsense….”

(196a10-b2).Laches,writingNicias’contributionoffas“emptywords”,doesnot

recognizeitspotentialtoremovehimselffromhisearlierdifficulty.Laches’

inconsistencyisproducedwhenheassociatesthewisdominvolvedincourage

withskillknowledge.IfLachesweretodiscardhisassumptionaboutthetypeof

wisdomrelevanttocourage,hecouldresolvehisproblem(O’Brien1963,139-

140andDevereaux1977,136).29Resurrectingthedefinitionofcourageaswise

enduranceprovidesapossiblesolutiontoNicias’problem.Nicias’definitionof

couragefailstodifferentiatecouragefromvirtueitself,but,ifcourageis

endurancebasedonknowledgeofgoodandevil,couragecanbedistinguished

fromvirtueingeneral.

IV.TheSummonerExplanationanditsImplicationsforDevelopmentalism

29 For a related interpretation, see Teloh (1986, 50 and 55).

33

Ihaveaccountedfortheaporeticfeaturesoftheearlydialogues—Socrates’

declarationsofignorance,useofelenchus,andthedialogues’inconclusive

endings—intermsofSocrates’attemptstosummon.Ihavealsoarguedthat

Platousesthesefeaturestosummonthereader.Thethesisthatdifferences

betweenearlyandmiddledialoguescanbeexplainedasPlato’sapplicationof

middleperiodepistemologyisnotlimitedtoaporeticfeatures,however.Italso

explainsanothermajordifferencebetweenthetwoperiods;whileSocrates

appealstothehypothesisoftheformsinthemiddledialogues,hedoesnot

mentionordiscusstheformsinhisearlierworks.Inresponse,onecanargue

thatlackofmentionoftheformsinearlydialoguesdoesnotentailthatPlatohad

notyetformedanopiniononthesubject.30Moreover,thethesisforwhichIhave

arguedprovidesagoodexplanationforhissilence.Withinthedramaticcontext

oftheearlydialogues,Socratesisdrawingoutandexaminingthethoughtof

interlocutorsinanattempttosummonthem,andsharinghisownviewswould

hinderthisprocess.31Similarly,explicitlypresentingthehypothesisoftheforms

intheearlydialogueswouldpreventthereaderfromgraspingtheformsthrough

herowninquiry.32

30 See, for example, Paul Shorey, (1933, 314); Rowe (2007, 39); and Kahn (1996, 40).

31 Julia Annas makes a good point on the subject. She writes: “Socrates’ lack of position must be

understood to be relative to the context of teaching: he has no doctrine when eliciting other peoples’

views, since if he did, this would interfere with the process of getting views out of them, but this does

not mean he has no positions of his own which can be discussed in a different context (1999, 21).”

32 Kahn also explains silence concerning the forms by appealing to Plato’s pedagogical motives. He

proposes that Plato was aware of how unusual his view was and expected it to be met with hostility,

34

Mythesishasinterestingimplicationsforthedebatebetween

developmentalistsandunitarians.Therearetwocommonapproachesto

attackingdevelopmentalism.Oneischallengingtheaccuracyofthestandard

chronologicalorderingofPlato’sdialogues.33Idonotusethistacticand

tentativelyacceptthedivisionofthedialoguesintothreechronological

periods.34Instead,Ihavetakenthesecondapproach,providinganalternative

explanationofdifferencesbetweenperiods.Byexplaininguniquefeaturesofthe

earlydialoguesasmanifestationsofSocrates’epistemologyinmiddleworks,my

argumentchallengestheinductivecaseforthedevelopmentalistclaimasan

inferencetothebestexplanationandalsobringstolightanimportantpointof

continuitybetweenthetwoperiods.

Myexplanationhasanadvantageoverdevelopmentalisminthatitdoesnot

dependonthecontroversialassumptionthatwehaveanaccuratelinear

chronologyofthedialogues.ThoughIhaveusedthechronologicallabelsof

“early”and“middle”inthispaper,thesummonerexplanationappliesequally

wellwhenwesetasidetheseterms.Thepurportedinconsistencywithwhich

thus the “rhetorical motivation for his use of indirect statement and the device of myth-making, his

holding back and then his gradual, ingressive exposition of the otherworldly metaphysics (1995, 32).”

Rowe, too, argues that Plato, aware of how strange his theories would sound to his contemporaries,

sought to prepare the readers of his early dialogues (2007, 23-25).

33 For scholars who raise serious challenges for the project of ordering the dialogues, see Nails (1995);

Thesleff (1989); and Young (1994).

34 Though developmentalism presupposes acceptance of the standard ordering of the dialogues,

acceptance of the established chronology does not imply developmentalism.

35

I’vebeenconcernedis,atitsmostfundamentallevel,aninconsistencybetween

thestyleandcontentofaporeticdialoguessuchastheLachesandEuthyphroand

so-calleddoctrinaldialoguessuchasthePhaedoandRepublic.35Mysummoner

explanationexplainsthesedifferencesbypositingthattheaporeticdialogues

presentanapplicationofapositionheldincertain“doctrinal”works.In

addition,itsindependencefromchronologyalsogivesitanedgeinaccounting

forinconsistencieswithinasingledialogueorbetweendialoguesassignedtothe

sameperiod.

Thecumulativeforceofattacksagainstdevelopmentalismhasleftusinneedof

abetterexplanationofinconsistencieswithinthedialogues.Iproposethatthe

hypothesisthatSocratesandPlatousesummonersinordertoprovoke

philosophicalthinkingprovidesanalternativeframeworkforinterpretingthe

significanceofcontradictionswithinthePlatoniccorpus.Thisframeworknot

onlypreservesconsistencyforanauthorwhoplacedmuchemphasison

harmonizingone’sbeliefset,itchallengesustotacklePlato’sprovocative

puzzlesandusethemasopportunitiestoengageactivelyinphilosophical

inquiry.36

UNIVERSITIYOFTEXASARLINGTON

35 I question this label because Socrates himself often refers to his main assumptions as hypotheses.

36 I have revised this conclusion in light of questions raised by Gerald Press in his commentary.

36

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