Element Ibrd Education

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Making Primary Education Work for India’s Rural Poor – A Proposal for Effective Decentralization

Lant PritchettVarad Pande

The World Bank



2

Outline

Quality of education is a BIG problem…

especially for the poor

Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality

Decentralization and Primary EducationReform in India: The Two Questions

An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles

A ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform



3

Outline





4

24.7%

85.5%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Bottom 40% Top 20%0

25

50

75

100

Karnataka Kerala Rajasthan WestBengal

65.4%

96.9%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Bottom 40% Top 20%

Quality of Government Primary Schooling in Indiais very low…especially for the Poor

Enrolment

Framework for Judging Quality

AchievementCompletion

Percent of 6-14 yr oldscurrently in school

(1998-99)Average

78.8%

Percent of 15-19 yr oldscompleted at least Grade 8

(1998-99)

Average49.6%

Percent of children with InadequatePrimary Learning Achievement for

Math of Age for Class 5 or in Grade 5

Note: Framework adapted from Warwick and Reimers (1995); Enrolment and Completion data from ‘Educational Attainment and Enrollment Profiles’, Filmer (2004); test scores analysis forgovernment and government aided schools only based on data from Singh, Jain, Gautamand Kumar (2005)

…+ Anecdotal Evidence of low quality (Pratichi Trust, PROBE Report, etc.)…+ Evidence of student migration from government to private schools

67.6%

81.7%

69.7%

53.8%

Not reaching Grade 5Scoring < 50% in Grade 5(Govt School)



5

Outline






6

The low quality is caused by ‘ systemic ’ and not ‘ managerial ’failures; and thus requires an institutional solution

TeacherAbsenteeism

19

15 1411

1617

2725

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Uganda India Indonesia Zambia Bangladesh Papua NewGuinea Ecuador Peru

Source: Kremer et al (2004), pg 9

% Teacher Absence Rates by Country

Country

Level of Parental

Satisfaction

Other Evidence

59.0%60.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

with childprogress

with teacher

Source: The Pratichi Education Report (2002); Berliner and Biddle (1994) pg 113

Level of Parental Dissatisfaction(West Bengal)

Evidence

l ‘Non’ Teaching: “Teaching practices have been reduced to aminimum…it has become a way of life” ( PROBE)

l

Growth of Private Schooling …which meets the differentiated(quality) demand…even among the poor (Tilak et al.)

“Best practice”level of absence

7.0%

72.0%

21.0%

0%

25%50%

75%100%

A or B Grade C Grade D or F Grade

Grades given by Parents toChild’s school (USA)



What is ‘Accountability’? –Demystifying the Elements of the Accountability Relations

Delegation

Feature

Financing

Enforcing

Performing

Informing

There are Five Features to Any Accountability Relationship

What

You give a task to theaccountable ‘agent’

Example 1:Buying a Sandwich

l You ask for asandwich

Example 2:Going to a Doctor

l You go to the doctorto be treated

You give the ‘agent’ themoney to do the task

l You pay for thesandwich

l You pay the doctor forthe treatment

The ‘agent’ does theassigned task

l The sandwich ismade for you

l The doctor treats youto try cure yourailment

You find out how wellthe ‘agent’ has done thework

l You eat the sandwichwhich informs you of itsquality

l You see if you are feelingbetter – you assess theperformance of thedoctor

You reward goodperformance and punish

bad performance

l You choose whether tobuy a sandwich from theseller the next time,affecting his profits

l You go to him nexttime (if he was good)or choose to gosomewhere else if not



Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability

Relationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first leg

Citizens

Policy Makers

V O I C E

l Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality ofpublic services they receive(VOICE)…

l But, Citizens …

- may vote along ethnic /ideological lines(DELEGATION)

- may not be able to attributeservice to appropriatePolicy-Maker (INFORMING)

- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short(ENFORCING)




Service Providers

Policy Makers

C O M P A C T

l Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve servicedelivery performance(COMPACT)…

l But, Policy Makers …

- may not be able to specifyexact contracts(DELEGATION)

- may not be able to monitorService Providers (INFORMING)

- may not be able to alterincentives of ServiceProviders (ENFORCING)

Relationship 2: COMPACT, long route second leg




Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWER

l Clients can play major role in tailoringservice-mix to their local needs andmonitoring Service Providers (CLIENTPOWER)

l But, Clients …

- often do not have choice (lack ofcompetition)

- often cannot infer provider effort(INFORMING)

- often do not have powers to disciplinebad Service Providers (ENFORCING)

Relationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short Route



Source: World Development Report, 2004


The Three Relationships of Accountability in Service Delivery

Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWER

Policy Makers

V O I C E

C O M P A C T



5.9

1.8

7.3

1.8

0

5

10

15

UttarPradesh

West andCentralAfrica

South andEastern

Africa

Asia LatinAmerica

8-13.5

37.824.723.721.721.210

25

40

Kerala Karnataka Rajasthan West Bengal Bihar

0%

50%

100%

Boy Girl

Yes 98%

The key missing accountability relations in Primary Educationbetween parents and teachers are Informing and Enforcing

Delegation

Feature ofAccountability

Financing

Enforcing

Performing

Informing

Is this the KeyProblem?

Somewhat: Diffusedobjectives but Parentswant to delegate (i.e., sendchildren to school)

Yes, many teachersare not performing

adequately

Evidence

Yes, no usable info on classperformance; parents notactively involved in school /teaching matters

Is it important for your child to be educated?

Yes 89%

Source:PROBE Report, pg 14

No, teachers are paidvery well relative toother countries

Average Salaries as multiple of Income per capita by Region

Average = 6.1 Note: Uttar Pradesh figure isfor 1995-96; all others arequoted from Carnoy andWelmond (1996);Source: Mehrotra and

Buckland (2001)

% Teacher Absence Rates by Indian States All India Average 25%

34.0% 29.0%0%

25%

50%

VECs PTAs/MTAs

% Households Aware of Existence and activities of Community Structures

Source: CAG Report (2001)

Yes, parents have little orno powers to discipline orreward teachers

l

Kremer et al (2004) find only one case of teacher dismissal ever in3000 government schools surveyedl No monetary incentives possible for high performing teachers

under current government teacher terms of employment



Alternative Explanations for Low Quality are Unlikelybe Sufficient

Lack of AdequatePublic Expenditure

Presence andDemand for ChildLabor

Lack of ParentInterest/ Involvement

1

2

3

l Child labor is not big enough – NSS (1993) shows only 8 percent

l Most child laborers work as family labor, so their time is fungiblel Even if child labor is ‘high’, direction of causality is not clear

Is it important for a boyto be educated?

Parents’ Attitude to Education in India

Yes 98%

No 1%No

Response 1%

Is it important for a girlto be educated?

Yes 89%

NoResponse

1%

No 10%

Source:

PROBE Report, pg 14

Parents, evenpoor parents,seem keen toeducate theirchildren

65

70

75

80

1993 1999

%Enrollment rate among 5-11 year olds

Budget expansionapproaches don’t seem

to have worked in India – e.g.: District PrimaryEducation Program(DPEP)

DPEP Districts

Non-DPEPDistricts (withsame criteria)

Source: Jalan and Glinskaya (2003)



Outline




Decentralization and Primary EducationReform in India: The Two Questions



Decentralization And Primary Education Reform in India

India is Trying toDecentralize

Indian NeedsPrimary Education

Reform

l 73 rd and 74 th Amendments to theConstitution devolve politicalpower to local governments

l States modify Acts and holdelections to local governments

l Functions in XI and XII Schedulesdevolved to local governments

l Continued low enrolment,completion and achievementdespite central and state schemes

(and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)

l Much lower educational indicatorsfor poor, who sufferdisproportionately

Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in this

Decentralizing Context

Question 2:Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right

Model for Primary Education Reform

dd d l



Addressing Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery inthis Decentralizing Context

India is Trying to

Decentralize

l 73 rd and 74 th Amendments to theConstitution devolve politicalpower to local governments

l States modify Acts and holdelections to local governments

l Functions in XI and XII Schedules

devolved to local governments

Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in

this Decentralizing Context



Decentralization is Neither a Necessarynor Sufficient Condition for High Quality Education

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0

children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

F i s c a

l d e c e

n t r a l i z a t i o n ( S c

h n e

i d e r )

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AA

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AA

A

A

A

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0


0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

P o

l i t i c a

l d e c e

n t r a

l i z a t i o n ( S c

h n e

i d e r )

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0


0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

A d m i n d e c e

n t r a l i z a t i o n ( S c

h n e

i d e r )

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

AA

AA

A

A

A

A

AA

A

A

A

Correlation between Decentralization Indicators and Primary Education Outcomes

Source: Analysis based on data from Governance and Service Delivery Indicators Dataset, Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, (2004)

No evidence of high correlation between decentralizationand education outcomes in cross-country analysis



0

5

10

UP Rajasthan MP AP Kerala Poland Chile Colombia

FiscalAdministrativePolitical

‘Unbalanced’Decentralization

• PoliticalDecentralizationhas happened(election of PRIs)but…

• Administrative

and Fiscal Decentralizationremains weak

Source: World Bank (1999)

Decentralization in India Has Been Unbalanced andIncomplete

Unbalanced Decentralization in India in anInternational Context

D e c e n t r a

l i z a

t i o n

I n d e x

( 0 - 1

0 )



Outline

Quality of education is a BIG problem…especially for the poor


‘Effective’ Decentralization,can help, if done in the right context




UnbundlingFunctionalAllocation andRecommendations

Status quo

Analysis

First Principlesof Public Finance and Accountability

•Disaggregate intofunctions andactivities:

- Logical, mutuallyexclusive andexhaustive

(MECE)functionalclassification

- Consistent withIndian publicadministrationdelivery system

Who providesthese functionsand activitiestoday in India?

What are the keyfunctions andactivities in PrimaryEducation?

How to decide whoshould providewhich functions andactivities?

What changes arerequired to thecurrent system ofservice delivery?

•Analyze de jurefunctionalallocation of eachtier by studyingexisting legislation

•Analyze de facto

functionalallocation (on-the-ground picture) byconducting surveysand interviews

•Based on thissystematic analysis,propose changes tocurrent system

•Develop a detailedproposal for

reform of primaryeducation thatdraws on thefindings of ouranalytical approach

Our Analytical Approach To Effective Decentralization

•Use FirstPrinciples ofPublic Finance findoptimal allocationfrom public financeperspective

•Use FirstPrinciples ofAccountability toaddress theaccountabilityissues



Step 1: Unbundling

Function Activity

G r a m

P a n c

h a y a t

U s e r

G r o u p s

Curriculum designLearning achievement standardsPlans for physical expansionPlans for quality improvementSocial Capital

Physical Capital Beneficiary Selection Choice of students for targeting programsEnrolmentRecurrent Textbook choice/purchaseLearning materialsMaintenance Maintenance of school buildings/facilitiesMonitoring of school processes

HiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal

Monitoring andEvaluation

Tests of learning achievement

BlockCentral

Standards

Planning

Asset Creation

Operation - NonTeacher

Operation -Teacher

Responsibility

S e r v

i c e

P r o v

i d e r

( s c

h o o l

)Village

State District

Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?

Functions and Activities in Government Primary Schooling in Rural India

Output: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and Activities

S 2 S Q A l i



Function

G r a m

P a n c h a y a

t

U s e r

G r o u p s

O eration - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation little, not systematic

Responsibility

Service

Provider(school)

Village

StateGovt District Block

CentralGovt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation

little, not systematic

Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE FACTO

Function

G r a m

P a n c

h a y a

t

U s e r

G r o u p s

Operation - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation

BlockCentralGovt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation

Responsibility

ServiceProvider(school)

Village

StateGovt

District

Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?

Step 2: Status Quo Analysis

Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE JURE

Lessons

• Current system is

highlycentralized withlittle role for PRIs

/ User Groups

• Schools / teachers have

little or noautonomy… oraccountability



Principle

What are the First Principles of Public Finance ?

Explanation

Unit Cost of productiondeclines as scale ofproduction increases

Implication

l Activities with significant economies of scaleshould be done by a higher level of government

The actions of one agentaffects other agents

l Activities with significant externalities should bedone at a higher level of government, so that the‘external’ effect can be ‘internalized’ in thesystem

l Equity may imply financial support to education ata large enough geographic scope to allow for

redistributive transfers to equalize across smallerunits

Step 3: Use First Principles

Economies ofScale

Externalities

EquityNeed for equitablespread in inputs,process or outcomes

l The more heterogenous the demand for theactivity is likely to be, the more locally it should bedone

Heterogeneity ofDemand

Variation in local needsand preferencesbetween regions



24

Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance

What is the size of ‘optimally sized catchments area’ of aservice provider to jurisdiction?

StatePopulation: 30-80 million

Zilla Parishad

Population: 800,000-2 million

Block PanchayatPopulation: 60,000-600,000

Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000

Economies of Scale



25


Zilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 million




Optimal Catchments Areas for LEVELS of Education

Primary schools Secondary Schools

Universities

l Whereas theoptimalcatchments areafor a primaryschool is atvillage level (GP

jurisdiction)…

l …the optimalcatchments areafor a Universityis district / statelevel (State

jurisdiction)

Economies of Scale



26



Zilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 million



Operation

Setting learning achievementstandards

Monitoring and Evaluation(process and outcome)

AssetCreation

Planning

Primary

School

Optimal Catchments Area for FUNCTIONS of Primary Education

l Whereas theoptimalcatchments areafor Operationsis at villagelevel (GP

jurisdiction)…

l …the optimalcatchments area

for a SettingLearningStandards isstate level(State

jurisdiction)

Economies of Scale



27


Functional Allocation according to Economies of Scale Criterion`

Economies of Scale

Function

StateDistrictBlockGPSchool

Monitoring and Evaluation

Public Finance First PrincipleExternalities /System-wide

EffectsEquity Heterogeneity of

DemandEconomies of

Scale

Operation - Non teacher

Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher

Planning

Asset Creation



28

Equity Doesn’tRequire Centralization

Equity Concernsare Important

l Major inequity / variations in primary education levels existsbetween districts within states

l This creates equity rationale for centralization of educationdelivery


Equity

44.074.5

104.0

04080

120

Muzaffarnagar Lucknow Muradabad

59.885.6

120.0

04080

120

Kannur Kollam Idukki

Gross Enrolment Rate - UP (2003-04) Gross Enrolment Rate - Kerala (2003-04)

l This does not imply all functions in primary education shouldbe done by higher levels of government….

l As long as Standard Setting and M&E are done by higher levelof governments, AND redistributive equalizing fiscal transfersare done, goal of equity can be achieved

Source: DPEP MIS Database http://www.dpepmis.org/webpages/edatabase.htm



29

Function



-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher

Planning

Asset Creation

-


EffectsEquity

-

-


Economies ofScale


Functional Allocation according to Equity Criterion

Equity



30

Function



Public Finance First Princi leExternalities /System-wide

EffectsEquity

-

-

-


Economies ofScale

-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher -

Planning

Asset Creation

- -


Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Public Finance

Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and AssetCreation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective



31

What are the First Principles of Accountability ?

Activities that requiredecisions to be made usingindividual judgment in localcontext

Activities that requireseveral repeatedtransactions at the locallevel

Step 3: Use First Principles - Accountability

Discretionary Transaction-Intensity

InferringPerformance

Where can performancebe better inferred –locally or technically

Examples

Does the service requiremany localtransactions?(Transaction Intensive)

Does the service require decisions madein local context? (Discretionary)

No YesNo - Central Banking

Yes Immunization Ambulatory Care

ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction- Intensive and Locally Observable require local

input for accountability



32

Step 3: Use First Principles –Accountability

Discretionary , Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activitieslike Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs

Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Accountability Function

Operation - Non teacher High High Local

Operation - Teacher High High Local / Technical

Monitoring and Evaluation Medium Medium Local / Technical

Technical

Asset Creation High

Standards Setting

Planning Medium

Accountability First Principle

TransactionIntensive?

Who Can Best InferPerformance

(Technical or Local)?

Medium

Local /Technical

Local /Technical

Low

Medium

Low

Discretionary?

Step 4: Optimal Allocation based on



33

Function

G r a m

P a n c

h a y a

t

U s e r

G r o u p s


Operation - Teacher


Support

BlockCentralGovt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation Support

Support

Responsibility

ServiceProvider(school)

Village

StateGovt

District

Step 4: Optimal Allocation based onFirst Principles Analysis

Functional Allocation in Primary Education –Based on First Principles Analysis l States doStandardsSetting andMonitoring

l PRIs assumeresponsibility for

actual Operation- As much as

possible as low aspossible

- Higher PRI tiersback-up on

professionalism,technical

First Principles of Public Finance First Principles of Accountability Function

Operation - Non teacher Yes Yes Local

Operation - Teacher Yes Yes Local / Technical

Monitoring and Evaluation No Y es Technical

Accountability First Principle

TransactionIntensive?

Who Can Best InferPerformance

(Technical or Local)?

Yes

Bit Technical

Local

No

Somewhat

No

Discretionary?

Standards Setting

Planning Somewhat

Technical

Asset Creation Yes

Key Messages

Function



EffectsEquity

-

-

-


Economies ofScale

-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher -

Planning

Asset Creation

- -



34

As discussed, Many Models of EducationDecentralization have not worked well

Decentralize withoutunbundling

Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations

(But not TeacherOperations)

DecentralizeFunctions, withoutdevolving Finance

1

2

3

l Indonesia Experience

l Latin America Experience

l India Experience (1995-2005)

-Pushed all functions to district level (below provinces)-Bad monitoring systems means that little information aboutregional performance is available to stimulate competitionor disseminate good or bad practices

-Pushed responsibility to local governments…-…But without enhancing operational control at local level(e.g.: Argentina)

-Devolved functions (including primary education) to PRIs…-…But PRIs do not have adequate finance or control overfunctionaries to implement their mandate

But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by Suggesting



35

G r a m

P a n c

h a y a

t

U s e r

G r o u p s

StandardsPlanningAsset CreationOperation - Non TeacherOperation - Teacher

HiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal -


Responsibility

S e r v

i c e

P r o v

i d e r

( s c

h o o

l )Village

State District

Function

BlockCentral

Greater Operational Responsibility to

PRIs, especially ofTeachers

But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by SuggestingCountervailing Forces

Strengthen Centreand State for

Standard Setting andMonitoring

1

2

l Consistent Standard Setting is Critical To Provide the GuidingFramework for Local Governments to Operate and Manage

l Uniform Monitoring is Essential for Quality Control, DesigningRewards & Recognition Systems and Generating Credibility

The Two Big Messages from Our Analysis



36

Outline

Quality of education is a BIG problem…especially for the poor


‘Effective’ Decentralization,can help, if done in the right context


A ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform

Shifting Teacher Operations to PRIs is Already Happening



370%

50%

100%

Orissa MP

Shifting Teacher Operations to PRIs is Already Happeningin India through the Various ‘Para-Teacher’ Schemes

l Approach Paper to 10 th Fiveyear Plan envisagedimportant role for para-teachers

l Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan(SSA) Funding can be usedfor para-teacher programs

l Donors are funding para-teacher programs in States(eg: SK in Rajasthan fundedby SIDA)

l States are using SSAFunding for para-teacherprograms (eg: Orissa)

Central GovernmentPolicies

State GovernmentPolicies

95%

~100%

Teachers Hired as Para -Teachers as % of All Government Teachers Hired

Note: Orissa numbers for 2001-2003, MP numbers for ‘last 4-5 years’ from text on pg 16Source: Govinda and Josephine (2004)

Almost all incrementalhiring of teachers by mostlarge States is being donein the para-teacher model

Para-teacher Model Seems To Be the Chosen Pathfor Hiring New Teachers

And Evidence Suggests These Are Showing Considerable



38

55

63

33

42

51

60

4652

0

20

40

60

Other RuralRajasthan

SK School

…And Evidence Suggests These Are Showing ConsiderableSuccess

64.0%51.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

PrimarySchool

SSK

Source: Analysis based on data from - West Bengal: Pratichi Education Report 2002; Rajasthan:World Bank PAD for Rajasthan DPEP, 1999, SIDA Evaluation Study and NSSO 52nd Round

Student Attendanceon day of visit

Experiment One: SSK Schooling in West Bengal

25% higher

20.0%14.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

PrimarySchool

SSK

43% lower

Teacher Absenteeismon day of visit

9.0%24.0%

0%

25%

50%

PrimarySchool

SSK

Dissatisfaction withTeacher (Parent Response)

62% lower

Experiment Two: Shiksha Karmi (SK) in RajasthanTest Scores

15% higher

27% higher

16% higher

14% higher

Math LanguageGrade 1 Grade 4 Grade 1 Grade 4

83

72 71

85

51

63

0

20

40

60

80

100

Enrolment Rate Attendance Rate

SK

Rajasthan

All India

% Enrolment and Attendance

l HigherAccountabilitycan offsetenormous otherdisadvantages

l Greaterautonomy forperformanceand localresponsivenessworks

l Lower wages donot appear toreducemotivation



39

But the ‘Para-Teacher’ Model Is Not a Sustainable SystemicSolution to India’s Primary Education Crisis – Its Only a Quick Fix

Variance in Pay forIdentical Work is

Starkly Visible

Index of Primary School Teacher Salary in India

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

Index

‘Regular’ Government

School Teacher(Rs 5000-9000)

Para-teachers(Rs 900-3500)

‘Regular’GovernmentTeachers get paid3-6 times morethan para-teachers

Note: Analysis of Teacher pay based on survey of para-teacher schemes in Govinda and Josephine (2004) and other studies of para-teacher systems in India

Pressure for ‘ex-postregularization’

l States under pressure to ‘regularize’ para-teachers when para-teacher lobby becomes substantial

l Unplanned and ad hoc regularization can bankrupt already fiscallydrained states

Variance in Quality ofTraining, Instruction

and Outcomes

l

Quality of instruction varies immensely as no standards areestablished for hiring, training, performance evaluation andcontract duration, e.g.:

- Qualification requirement for para-teacher varies acrossstates from Grade 5 pass to Higher Secondary

- Training requirement for para-teachers varies across statesfrom 12 days to 2 years

1

2

3

Rs.

S W M k M d P l h C bi h B



40

So, We Make a Modest Proposal that Combines the BestElements of the Current Formal and ‘Para-Teacher’ Systems

Apprentice(Shiksha Karmi)

Associate(Adhyapak)

Master(Maha-Adhyapak)

Phases of Teacher Professionalization

A District Professional Teacher Cadre (DPTC)

• Initial hiring done onrenewable contractbasis by ZP on GPrecommendation

• Assignment to

schools depends onGPs

• Permanence granted atend of contract periods,based on comprehensiveevaluation- Technical Criteria: training, input indicators,teacher tests- Bottoms Up Criteria: Performance review andrecommendation byGP/SMC

• Few promoted to‘Maha-Adhyapaks’based onconsistentlyexceptionalperformanceevaluation ratings

Phases ofEmployment

The DPTC will have an initially fixed and then a



41

Step jump whenqualify for Adhyapak

1

Annual increment based onreview, when Adhyapak

2

Step jump if qualifyfor Maha-Adhyapak

3

Compensation(Rs.)

Years of service

The DPTC will have an initially fixed, and then aperformance and seniority based compensation system

Apprentice(Shiksha Karmi)

Associate(Adhyapak)

Master(Maha-Adhyapak)

l Initially fixed pay,later performanceand seniority-based

l Big jumps insalary levelsacross phases toserve asincentive toperform

l Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rareand controlled,

most spendcareer asAdhyapaks

Key Messages3 Elements ofPerformanceBased Pay

Lo w-per forming teacher track H i g h

- p e r f o r m

i n g t e a c h

e r t r a c k

How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack Up



42

How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack UpAgainst Existing Systems in India?

Hiring

Assignment

Training

Salary

Supervision

Dismissal

Existing FormalGovernment

ExistingPara-teacher

ExistingPrivate

Our Proposal(DPTC)

•Done by stategovernment

•Done by stategovernment

•Done by stategovernment, anddistrict-level lineagency

•Fixed (andgenerous) scalefor life

•Little or none insubstance

•Almost neverdone

•Done by GP,criteria varies

•Stays withinvillage

•Varies: district lineagency or parallelagency

•Fixed and small(‘honorarium’)

•Closely monitoredby SMC/VEC orGP

•At will forunsatisfactoryperformance

•Done by schoolmanagement

•Done by schoolmanagement

•Varies: states haveguidelines + largeunrecognised sector

•Usually fixed (andsomewhere betweenformal and para-

teacher scales)

•Closely monitoredby schoolmanagement

•At will forunsatisfactoryperformance

•Done by ZP oncriteria + GPrecommendation

•Done by ZP on GPrecommendation(GP has veto)

•Organized by ZPbased on guidelinesfor phased training

•Fixed when SK;seniority andperformance-based

when Adhyapak

•Closely monitoredby GP/SMC +technical criteria

•At will when SK;For cause whenAdhyapak stagereached

D t li ti th Right M d l f P i Ed ti



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Decentralization the Right Model for Primary EducationReform?

Indian NeedsPrimary Education

Reform

l Continued low enrolment,completion and achievementdespite central and state

schemes (and Sarva ShikshaAbhiyaan)

l Much lower educationalindicators for poor, who sufferdisproportionately



And Our Proposal is Better Than the Alternatives



44

Privatization/Vouchers

§ Unlikely to be politicallysupportable (teachers

unions)

§ Entirely new system(not tried and tested inIndia) - likely to bedifficult to implementacross the country

§ Diffusion question -only one country adoptsnew voucher system in130 years

Our Proposal (DPTC)

§ Builds on what alreadyexists – adapts best of

current formal and para-teacher systems

§ Does not hurt interestsof existing teachersunions while givingexisting para-teachers abetter deal

§ Channelises thedecentralizationmomentum in India

‘Business As Usual’Reforms / SSA

§ Unlikely to substantiallyimprove outcomes

without systemicchanges in servicedelivery

§ Previous similarapproaches (e.g. DPEP)didn’t show muchsuccess

§ Substantial fiscal burdenon state and centralfinances

And Our Proposal is Better Than the AlternativesOne Extreme—

get rid ofsystem

Onlyincremental

reform

Reform ofexisting system

Accountability Linkages in Existing System:



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HRD Ministry (ElementaryEducation Bureau)

Project Approval Board

Policymaker (State and Central Government)

State Department of SchoolElementary Education

State Implementation Society

District Education Committee / Office

Block Education Committee / Center

School ManagementCommittee (SMC) or

VEC

Parent TeacherAssociation (PTA)

Schools(Teachers)

Organizational Provider

FrontlineProvider

COMPACT

Client Groups

State Government

VOICE

CLIENTPOWER (?)

MANAGEMENT

‘Client Power’ isparticularly weakin the presentframework

Accountability Linkages in Existing System:The SSA Framework

Accountability Linkages in Our DPTC Proposal:



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l COMPACT strengthened as PRIsget management ofTTEs

l VOICE getsstrengthened as clientssee importance ofparticipation ingovernance andservice delivery

decisionl CLIENT POWER gets

strengthened asSMCs/PTAs areinvolved in meaningfulperformanceevaluation

y g pRedefining Voice , Compact and Client Power

HRD Ministry (ElementaryEducation Bureau)

Project Approval Board

Policymaker (State and Central Government)

State Department of SchoolElementary Education

School ManagementCommittee (SMC) or

VEC

Parent Teacher

Association (PTA)

Schools (Teachers)

Organizational Provider

Frontline Provider

Client Groups

State Government

VOICE

Zila Panchayat

Taluk Panchayat

Gram Panchayat

Policymaker (PRIs)

Gram Sabha

CLIENT POWER

COMPACT

Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns of



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Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns ofthe Political Economy of Reform and Transition

Issue / Concern How It is Dealt With in Our Proposal

• ‘Grandfathering ’: i.e., TTEs of all existing regulargovernment school teachers to remain unchanged – noone is dismissed + salary protection

Opposition from existing‘Regular’ Government

Teachers

• Para-teachers no longer exploited, as they are given aclear track for tenure (career progression plan) as pertechnical and bottoms -up criteria

Unfair Exploitation of‘para-teachers’

• State gives transitional funds to PRIs to bear premiumwage cost of existing ‘regular’ teachers

• Large block grants to PRIs to fund their new role

Bakrupting the PRIs bymaking them pay the

teachers

• Balances local control with higher level support fortraining, professional standards and monitoringQuality of Schooling

Outcomes

Our Proposal is a Winner



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Our Proposal is a WinnerBecause it Addresses BothQuestions

l Gets decentralization ‘right’

- Learns from bad models ofdecentralization

- Based on analytically rigorousapproach

- Uses decentralizing momentumto drive reform

l Combines best elements ofexisting Indian systems (Formal +Para-teacher)

l Addresses root problem ofaccountability

l Is a systemic / institutional reform,not a managerial solution

l Has a viable plan to addresspolitical economy concerns andissues of transition

Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in India’s

Decentralizing Context

Ours is a ‘well-designed decentralization’ proposal for education reform, and the

present decentralization momentum provides the opportunity to make it happen





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APPENDIX



Why We Think OurProposal is a Winner

Addresses the RootIssue: Accountability

Uses StrategicIncrementalism

Likely to be PoliticallySupportable

l Framework rewards good teachers and punishes bad ones

l Effective Functional Allocation Based on Analytical Framework:- States do Standards Setting and Monitoring- PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation

l Combines the best elements of existing Indian models (formal +para-teacher), and does propose something entirely new

l Uses existing momentum for decentralization to design thenew system

l Does not alter contracts of existing formal government systemteachers

l Provides increasing mass of ‘para-teachers’ with concrete andsystematic career progression plan

Element Ibrd Education

Documents

Transcript of Element Ibrd Education